Natylie Baldwin's Blog, page 74

Yves Smith: What Would a Russian Victory in Ukraine Look Like?

By Yves Smith, Naked Capitalism, 7/8/24

From the launch of the Special Military Operation, this site has warned that Russia could win the war and lose the peace. That risk is still very much in play. The political calculus behind the Special Military Operation and Putin’s goals of demilitarization, denazification and no NATO entry for Ukraine almost succeeded, with Ukraine agreeing to a draft outline of key terms in Istanbul in March-April 2022.

But as it has been apparent that the resolution will come by force, not words, and Russia will impose its will on Ukraine, it is not evident how Russia intends to achieve its overarching goal of stopping the West from ever again using Ukraine to threaten Russian security. As much as strategic flexibility is very valuable in negotiations, not being clear where you want to wind up is not a great posture for waging war.

Perhaps Russia has a clear vision of desired end states within its leadership and is keeping its own counsel for now. But Russia does not appear to have embraced the necessity of somehow subjugating most if not all of Western Ukraine, let alone the best way to manage the situation on a long-term basis.

As we have explained before and will update below, given the certainty of intense European hostility toward Russia even after fighting in Ukraine stops, Russia will have to conquer, subdue, or somehow get other countries to partition Western Ukraine. Any of these outcomes is a pretty tall order. But anything less would result in a rump Ukraine that the West would treat as NATO lite, particularly with respect to the thing Russia wanted most to avoid, installation of nuclear missiles.

Another reason that Russia will in some form have to control a significant part of Western Ukraine is the Dnieper watershed. Recall Russia by its own law now deems all of Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson and Zaporzhizhia oblasts to be part of Russia:

Note that Kherson (in particular the city of Kherson) and Zaporzhizhia (including the city of Zaporzhizhia) both straddle the Dnieper. We hoisted this comment from PlutoniumKun last month, and it bears repeating:

PlutoniumKun noted recently in comments:

“I’m glad for once to see someone mention water and sewerage, something often overlooked in all the high level military/geostrategic theorising. Ukraine is topographically flat, which means that nearly all its water services require active pumping.

“This has clear strategic implications (nevermind the hardships this will cause for millions of Ukrainians). There is a good reason why most uncontentious national boundaries follow watersheds, not the obvious boundary of rivers – because once a river is shared, you need intensive co-operation on a wide range of issues, from fishing to bridges and dams and flood controls and… water quality. This is obviously unlikely for many years after whatever resolves the war.

“Since Russia needs to control the mouth of the Dnieper for strategic purposes, and needs to control the lower dams and canals for water supply, the obvious question is what happens if a rump Ukraine state is either unwilling or unable to maintain infrastructure upriver. Not just dams – what happens if they pump all of Kievs sewerage into the Dnieper? Russia can hardly complain if its crippled Ukraines infrastructure.

“So Russia has three choices – seek complete control over most of the Dnieper watershed (which is most of Ukraine), or accept that it has no control over it becoming a sewer and construct alternative infrastructure, or it can try to ensure that whatever deal finally finishes the war includes a comprehensive watershed management. The latter seems very convoluted and unlikely, not least because Russia might then have no choice but to pay for a lot of Ukraines infrastructure repair. So this may well be a major factor in Russias calculations – maybe even more so than the more obvious military calculations. Water infrastructure is very, very expensive, its not something that can be overlooked.”

The Dnieper watershed map:

By Francis McLloyd, CC BY 2.5, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=1729444

Russian officials have been pointedly silent on the question of what the end game for Ukraine might look like. One big reason is that is not how they conceptualize the military campaign. As we and others have repeatedly pointed out, Russia operates on Clausewitzian principles: destroy the enemy’s ability and will to fight, rather than focus on territory. Any acquisition follows from the elimination of combat capability. Historically has meant his armed forces. However, with the US having made color revolutions into an art form, that now includes informational warfare and NGO long-term campaigns to cultivate and coach Western friendly young people, ideally from academically accomplished or socially connected backgrounds, in the hopes that they will also be assets that can help accomplish US aims.

Russia (which recall at the start of the war had significant business ties to Europe, as well as a considerable number of its middle and upper middle class), did not anticipate that the US and NATO would go into vindictive divorce mode. Russia invaded with what it intended to be seen as an underpowered force, designed to drive Ukraine to the negotiating table. That did happen in less than a month.

After the deal fell apart, Russia muddled about, evidently lacking a plan B, until its embarrassing retreats in Kherson and Kharviv (which caused freakouts in the Donbass, since its people worried they could be abandoned too) led it to decide that it needed to engage in a serious, full bore campaign, and it set about to do so with its partial mobilization.

Due to the fact that the institutional might of the Collective West has gone all on trying not just to defeat Russia in Ukraine but also to subjugate Russia as a nation, a negotiated settlement is well nigh impossible. Aside from the perceived-to-be-high cost to personal and organizational credibility of the many deeply invested parties in the West, there is also the wee matter of what it would take to get Russia to have any faith in US/NATO pledges. Russian officials had been depicting the US as “not agreement capable” even before the conflict began. The news that Ukraine, France, and Germany had all engaged in a big con with the Minsk Accords was deeply disillusioning to Putin, who has, in an unusual display of sentiment and self-recrimination, discussed his bitterness about the betrayal. Putin has since taken to regularly mentioning (one might even say carrying on about even though is outside his normal mien) other instances of Western sharp dealing.1

Even as it greatly increased its military capabilities, Russia’s progress was regularly discounted by military officials, pols and pundits in the US/NATO sphere largely because apparent progress, measured in map terms, was meager. They could overlook that Russia was fighting in difficult terrain, an extended manufacturing/somewhat urbanized region that Ukraine had been fortifying since 2014. But Ukraine sacrificed some of its advantage by insisting on throwing men and machines against the extended (and over time, more formidable) line of contact, which was also conveniently close to the Russian border.

It should have been clear that Ukraine was in far worse shape than its backers were willing to recognize after the Russian defeat of the much-hyped Great Summer Counteroffensive. Ukraine did not even reach the first Russian fortified defense line and suffered serious losses of men and materiel, embarrassingly including Western wunderwaffen like Leopard 2 tanks.

To skip over close to a year of fighting: Russia is now getting close to the point of breaking the Ukraine army. Even if the trajectory of travel has been clear, the Ukraine-skeptic commentators have had a tendency to make early estimates of the culmination point. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s forces are becoming visibly less effective. The speed of Russia’s recent advance into Kharkiv caught many Western experts by surprise. Russia now has such strong control of the skies that it can drop massive glide bombs, capable of destroying concrete buildings. Even the normally staid TASS has gotten cheeky:

There are now regular reports of Ukraine units refusing to fight. Zelensky even recently made a tired-sounding speech where he depicted Ukraine as unwilling to continue the conflict due to battlefield losses and said he was going to present a settlement plan, which will presumably be different from his old “Russia go home” peace plan.

It still seemed aggressive for Putin to table his own peace proposal that required Ukraine to cede all of the four oblasts that Russia deems to be part of the Russian Federation, even though Russia is in full possession of only one of them. That is, until you consider the balance of forces. Russia is vastly outproducing all of the Collective West in nearly all major weapons categories. Ukraine’s allies have for many months been engaging in an all-too-visible scramble to come up with more armaments. A recent example is the US telling Israel to turn over 8 Patriot missile batteries. Informed sources say this is not as big a demand of Israel as it appears, since these platforms are in storage and probably not in great repair.2 And perhaps more important, the US has informed its allies, including Israel, that Ukraine has priority for delivery of Patriot missiles.

On the battlefield, Russia is continuing to grind its way through the Donbass, and is expected fairly soon to be able to assault the last Ukraine defense line there, in Slavynsk and Kramatorsk. The reason Ukraine fought so hard in the Bakhmut area, which was the third of four fortified lines, was that it was considered to be much more defensible than Slavynsk and Kramatorsk. Not only were the buildings in and around Bakhmut apparently better suited to digging in, but Bakhmut is on comparatively high ground, while Slavynsk and Kramatorsk are in a low-lying area. And on top of that, Ukraine had also build more formidable defenses in Bakhmut.

The imperiled and not-far-in-the-future-to-be-toast status of the Slavynsk-Kramatorsk line may seem to be yet another map-watcher obsession. In fact this will be a key inflection point whether it comes about via continued Russia force or accelerating Ukraine military collapse. This is the last major fortified line in the built-up Donbass area. Russia if it wants to, particularly given its control of the sky, would be able to move to the Dnieper in fairly short order and/or threaten Kiev if it wanted to make the point that Ukraine was now ripe for Russia’s picking.3

Another set of options is that Russia sticks (for the moment) to its knitting, and then focuses on taking control of the parts of Kherson and Zaporzhizhia it does not now possess. The major cities of both oblasts straddle the Dnieper, putting the control-of-the-watershed problem in focus.

Russia could proceed as John Helmer has repeatedly described, of subjugating the rest of Ukraine via the destruction of its electrical supply.

The big point is that Russia is finally getting to the point where it can define the end game. Yet what does Russia want?

One might argue that Russia having had to greatly increase the ambition of its campaign due to the ferocious response of the US and NATO, does not seem to have been accompanied by a rethink of its aims. Recall the Powell Doctrine, which is commonsensical but regularly ignored:

“Is a vital national security interest threatened? Do we have a clear attainable objective? Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?”

Russia may have fallen into the trap of getting fuzzy about its objectives, particularly as it became apparent internally that it was getting the upper hand, and not even at too high a cost to its citizens. In other words, there’s not much reason to rethink what you are doing when it seems to be working….even if you’ve now gone way beyond your original map.

Remember that despite Putin having been criticized for vague Special Military Operation objectives, he and his top officials did seem to have a clear idea of what the end state would have to include. The draft Istanbul agreement shows Russia and Ukraine haggling over how many weapons Ukraine could have. Denazification might seem vague, but like “pornography,” it probably was pretty clear to Russian officials, with minimum requirements like removal of all Stephen Bandera statues, purging and barring from office of anyone with neo-Nazi affiliations, restoration of the status of the Russian Orthodox church, and preservation of rights of ethnic Russians.4

Again, Putin’s lack of great specificity made sense given his plan to force negotiations. He was not about to lay out concrete terms but instead seemed to seeking a package, with horse-trading among elements, that would overall do a pretty good job of satisfying Russian concerns.5

But the exposure and cultivation of intense Western hostility and the West having severely over-invested in the idea that it could use this war to subdue Russia has greatly increased both the stakes and difficulty of coming up with a stable resolution that leaves Russia reasonably secure.

The Medvedev map, the brainchild of Deputy Chair of the Russian Security Council and former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev still remains a clever solution:

The details are up for grabs, but the high concept is Ukraine is reduced to Greater Kiev and Ukraine’s neighbors, particularly Poland, gobble up big parts of pesky Western Ukraine.

The wee problem is that the West would reflexively reject anything that looked like it came from Russia as inherently bad. Is there a way to get the US and NATO to believe a variant of this scheme as theirs?

There is a remote possibility that Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s recent travel to Ukraine, Russia, and now China could advance this plan. Orban has long been critical of the way ethnic Hungarians have been top targets for Ukraine conscription. He has recently issued a list of demands, all involving the rights of the Hungarian minority, that Ukraine must meet before Hungary will agree to Ukraine joining the EU. Note that these protections are weaker than the ones Russia sought for ethnic Russians in the Minsk Accords, which amounted to a federalized status for the Donbass within Ukraine. But it does take some steps in that direction.

We’ve often mentioned the plan described by John Helmer, of creating a big demilitarized zone in Western Ukraine. As he described, that could be achieved relatively easily via de-electrification. Russia has also been repeatedly warning the West that it would need to create a big buffer zone if the West kept helping Ukraine attack Russia, with the width of the no-go zone depending on the longest-range weapons the US and NATO deployed.

But even with Russia having repeatedly given a logical justification of why a measure like creating a large DMZ might be necessary, the results, of depriving civilians of functioning infrastructure, could be depicted as Gaza-like human rights violations. Alexander Mercouris argued in his July 7 show that Putin, like Lincoln, wants to occupy the moral high ground in this conflict. This method of subjugating the West would be ugly. But then so was the Reconstruction, but Lincoln did not live to see that.

Perhaps Russia has come up with a clever way to create a puppet state in the West. Given Ukraine’s spectacular corruption and near-certain US-UK determination to subvert it, I would not bet on it remaining tractable.

Mind you, it is way over both my pay grade and access to information to solve this problem. The big point remains: Russia looks to have been put in a position where it will have to bite off a lot more than it ever wanted to chew. So what will it do?

Tony Kevin: Ukraine war situation as of 5 August 2024

By Tony Kevin, Facebook, 8/5/24

Tony Kevin is a former Australian Foreign Affairs officer 1968-98 at Australian Government. Writer of ‘Return to Moscow’ (UWA Publishing, Perth 2017) and ‘Russia and the West, 2017-19’ (2019)

Here is my latest update on the Ukraine war situation as of 5 August 2024, drawn from multiple independent and Russian sources:

Russia has absolute military supremacy on the Ukrainian frontline. There is active fighting now in 3 particular localities: Pokrovsk/Progress, Toretsk, and near Kharkov . Ukraine is taking casualties, dead or disabled, of 1000-2000 men per day or up to 14,000 per week. These casualties cannot be replaced despite extreme and cruel measures of forced mobilisation that are now increasingly being resisted by Ukrainian civil populations from all regions. There has been massive male flight out of Ukraine and the birthrate has collapsed . Foreign mercenaries have largely fled the country too. Quite large numbers of untrained forces sent to the front and left without weapons or leadership, are simply surrendering to Russian forces when surrounded , or retreating without orders to do so.

Unable to make progress on the battlefront, but with a temporary surplus of long range drones, Kiev is carrying out militarily meaningless terrorist drone attacks that are damaging a few apartment buildings and killing a few civilians in weakly defended towns and cities in frontline regions of Russia adjacent to Ukraine like Belgorod, Kursk, Voronezh, and Rostov. Russia regards these acts as war crimes and promises retribution when the war is over. Ukrainian security chief Kirill Budanov will be high on the Russian prosecution list.

There will come a point – and it may come soon – at which enough Ukrainian soldiers will just stop fighting at the front that no amount of bullying by Kiev war enforcers can change the outcome .

It is still bipartisan US policy to fight Russia in Ukraine to the last Ukrainian but the Ukrainian soldiers are not superhuman. Their will to fight and die is close to cracking.

Russians are calibrating the rate of their advances and destruction of Ukr military units just fast enough to keep steadily demoralising and neutralising Ukr soldiers, while not panicking NATO elites too much into desperate decisions to expand the war. NATO elites have got the message and are going quiet.

On The Duran, Alexander Mercouris was convincing this week in reporting on this: see The Duran conversation, “Ukraine front line slow motion collapse” (copied also to YouTube and to my social media- and recommended viewing) .

Here also are extracts from the latest Russian Defence Ministry weekly report. Note the huge Ukr casualties this week. Russian casualties would by most expert estimates be between 5 and 10%% of these, which are sustainable given Russia’s massive mobilised manpower advantage:

“August 2⃣. [2024]

11 group strikes were carried out during the week against Ukrainian armoured enterprises, UAV workshops, ammunition depots and temporary staging areas of the Ukrainian armed forces and mercenaries.

The Central Group of the Russian Armed Forces liberated five settlements during the week, the Defence Ministry said.

Kiev lost 13570 soldiers, 14 tanks, 42 armoured vehicles, 189 field artillery guns during the week, according to the summary” (extracts end).

It’s only a matter of time now. The NATO armaments cupboard is bare. The trickle of F-16 aircraft now getting into Ukraine from US are militarily meaningless. NATO is afraid overtly to expand the war with their own declared regular forces. NATO covert special force units in Ukraine have taken significant personnel hits in recent weeks. Russia has superb intel on where they are and hits them now without compunction, when they are located in legitimate military rear-area targets alongside NATO weapons and ammunition storages and depots.

Finally, on the diplomatic front, Russia is rejecting phony peace signals by Kiev that do not reflect military and political reality as it has evolved on the ground since February 2022. Russia has made clear it is open to genuine peace signals through possible intermediaries China, Hungary or Turkey.

Until there is real policy and/or regime change in Kiev, such efforts will not bear fruit and the war will continue its slow and bloody path.

Asia Times: Putin asks Iran to postpone Israel strike, offers to mediate

By James Davis, Asia Times, 8/7/24

Russian President Vladimir Putin sent a personal letter to Iran’s leaders asking them to refrain from military action against Israel while he attempts to mediate between the two countries, according to sources with knowledge of the matter.

The letter was hand-delivered by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, who arrived in Tehran on Monday.

Shoigu is slated to meet the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, Ali Akbar Ahmadian, and the Chief of the General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Mohammad Bagheri.

He also will meet new Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, the news agency Interfax reported.

Iran has declared that it will retaliate against Israel for the July 31 assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, widely attributed to the intelligence services of the Jewish State. Israel has made no official comment on the killing.

Haniyeh and one of his bodyguards died in an explosion at a secure guesthouse for foreign dignitaries, under circumstances that remain unexplained. Haniyeh was attending the inauguration of President Pezeshkian.

Hours earlier, an Israeli airstrike killed Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr, a close Iranian ally. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps declared that it would inflict a “severe punishment” on Israel “at the appropriate time, place and manner.”

According to the New York Times, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, directed Iran’s armed forces to attack Israel in retaliation for the assassination of Haniyeh.

There is widespread speculation about possible Iranian actions as well as Israel’s potential response. On April 13, Iran launched over 300 projectiles at Israel. Almost all were shot down by a combination of Israeli and American air defenses.

Russia’s possible role in an Israel-Iran conflict remains an open question. Reuters reported August 6 that Putin asked Iran to avoid civilian casualties in any prospective military action on Israel.

The news agency said that Shoigu delivered this message in Tehran. It also reported that Iran asked Russia to sell it Su-35 fighters, one of Russia’s most advanced airframes. There are no reports of a Russian response to the request.

The New York Times reported August 5 that Russia was sending air defense systems to Iran, without specifying the systems in question. Russia does not have weaponry to spare from its ongoing operation in Ukraine, according to Russian sources, and is unlikely to provide its best air defense hardware to Iran.

According to sources familiar with Shoigu’s discussions in Tehran, Iran took Putin’s proposal under consideration but asked for high-tech Russian weaponry as part of the bargain – specifically, Russia’s S-400 air defense system, which has a range of up to 400 kilometers and capacity to track multiple targets.

Iran has had an older Russian system, the S-300, since 2016, although it is not known whether it has the newest version.

Some analysts believe that the S-400 can track American stealth aircraft like the F-22 and F-35. This is unlikely, given that Russia has delayed shipments of previously contracted S-400 systems to India – its best arms customer – due to the demands of the Ukraine conflict.

Israel has maintained close communications with Russia, advising Russian forces in Syria on thousands of strikes against Iranian-allied militias. Russia has stood down its air defense and allowed Israel to operate unimpeded.

The Ukraine war has put Israel in a bind: It does not want to get on Russia’s wrong side by providing military support to Ukraine.

The US has asked Israel to sell up to eight Patriot missile systems to Ukraine, and the matter reportedly remains under negotiation.

The Patriot is particularly important for Ukraine, as the only defense available against Russian aircraft launching glide bombs at a reported range of about 60 kilometers.

If Putin helps Israel by defusing a possible exchange of fire with Iran, he will want some favors in return.

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Reports Belousov’s July Call to Pentagon Chief Was to Prevent Assassination Attempt on Putin

Lenta.ru, 8/6/24 (Machine translated)

Ukrainian special services planned an attack on Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov at a parade in St. Petersburg on Navy Day. This was stated by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov on the Rossiya-1 TV channel.

He noted that several days before the parade, Belousov had a telephone conversation with Pentagon chief Lloyd Austin, in which he urged his American counterpart to persuade Kiev to abandon its intentions. According to Ryabkov, Austin was “extremely surprised” by the information, but took it seriously.

“Moscow and Washington avoided an escalatory spiral,” Ryabkov emphasized.

Earlier, the official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry , Maria Zakharova, pointed out the role of Great Britain in the Ukrainian assassination attempt on Putin. “There is no doubt that the assassination attempt on Putin, which [the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, Kirill] Budanov (included in the list of terrorists and extremists of Rosfinmonitoring ) spoke about, was planned with the participation of the Anglo-Saxon masters of Kiev,” she said.

The conversation between Belousov and Austin took place on July 12. As the American newspaper The New York Times (NYT) later wrote, citing sources, Belousov called Pentagon chief Austin about a secret Ukrainian operation.

Andrew Korybko: Five Takeaways From The Historic Prisoner Swap

By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 8/2/24

Russia and the West exchanged 24 prisoners [last] Thursday in the largest such swap since the Old Cold War. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and CNN published detailed reports about the diplomacy that led up to this deal, which included the WSJ’s Evan Gershkovich and Russia’s Vadim Krasikov as the highest-profile exchanges. The New York Times also shared brief bios about the others who were swapped. Here are the top five takeaways from this historic deal that most observers might have missed:

———-

1. Germany Was Responsible For Holding Everything Up

Russia conveyed that it won’t agree to any swap without the release of Vadim Krasikov, who was jailed in Germany for assassinating a Chechen terrorist that President Putin told Tucker Carlson had driven his car over the heads of Russian prisoners, among his other crimes. Germany balked for a while though due to the “morality” of releasing a convicted killer that’s serving a life sentence, but the US convinced it to go along with this, especially since Russia and Belarus agreed to release jailed Germans as part of the deal.

2. Poland, Slovenia, and Norway Chipped In But Got Nothing In Return

A total of four Russians who were imprisoned in the aforementioned countries were also released even though their governments didn’t get anything in return. This suggests a concession on the West’s part, albeit one that enabled Russia to make its own such concession that’ll be touched upon in the next point for turning this deal into the largest one in decades. Those three Western countries are presenting this as an “act of solidarity”, but it’s really proof of the US’ hegemonic power over them.

3. A Russian “Government-In-Exile” Will Likely Soon Take Shape

Eight members of Russia’s non-systemic “opposition” were also sent to the West as part of this deal. They’ll predictably soon set up a “government-in-exile”, which might generate lots of media attention but fail to have any influence inside of Russia. Their inclusion in this swap made it appear more “moral” in Germany’s eyes and thus helped convince it to agree. It can also be understood as a reciprocal concession for freeing the four Russians mentioned above from Poland, Slovenia, and Norway.

4. Turkiye’s Role In Facilitating This Swap Positions It To Host The Next Round Of Peace Talks

For as noble as China, India, and Hungary’s efforts are in trying to mediate a resolution to the Ukrainian Conflict, Turkiye has a much better chance of doing so than they do. Its role in facilitating this latest swap builds upon the earlier ones that it facilitated, which show that Russia and the West still regard it as a neutral middleman. This suggests that they’d agree to it hosting the next round peace talks along the lines of spring 2022’s ultimately sabotaged ones once all parties are ready instead of looking elsewhere.

5. Kamala Will Try Politicizing This Swap To Discredit Trump

Trump claimed earlier this spring that only he could secure Gershkovich’s release and that he’d get Putin to agree to this as a favor without receiving anything in return, yet the this week’s historic swap proved him wrong. In response, Trump suggested that the deal was lopsided despite the West getting twice as many people as Russia did, and he also speculated that cash was paid for them too. Kamala will certainly try politicizing this swap to discredit Trump, but it’s unclear whether voters will care all that much.

———-

Altogether, each side in this swap got what they wanted, and it represents a rare example of successful New Cold War diplomacy. Reflecting on the top five takeaways, the last two are the most significant, but neither can be taken for granted with respect to Turkiye hosting the next round of peace talks (let alone anytime soon) and Kamala’s politicization of this swap having any effect on the presidential race. Even so, they’re what observers should monitor to see whether anything meaningful comes of them.

Deep Dive: Russian security chief in Tehran as Iran weighs strike on Israel

By Amwaj Media, 8/5/24

The story: Russian security chief Sergei Shoigu has visited Tehran for talks with top officials, raising eyebrows given the growing tensions between Iran and Israel. Already, reports charge that Moscow has begun delivering air defense equipment and advanced radars allegedly requested by the Islamic Republic.

The visit comes as Iran and its regional allies weigh the scale of their response to Israel’s suspected assassination of Hamas political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh. Iran has pledged to avenge the July 31 killing of Haniyeh in Tehran as the region braces for escalation.

The Russian visit: 

Shoigu, the secretary of Russia’s Security Council, landed in Tehran on Aug. 5 on what Russian media described as a “planned working visit.”

Shoigu met his Iranian counterpart Ali Akbar Ahmadian, though details of their meeting have been kept under wraps.
The Russian security chief also sat down with President Masoud Pezeshkian and separately met Mohammad Baqeri, the chief of staff of the Iranian Armed Forces.
Iranian media quoted Shoigu as saying in his meeting with Baqeri that Russia “is ready for comprehensive cooperation with Iran in the region.” On his part, the top Iranian military commander described ties as “strategic,” indicating a systemic decision to expand the partnership.

Russia was one of the first countries to condemn the killing of Haniyeh and warn of its consequences.

In connection with a UN Security Council session on the assassination, Moscow also drafted a statement to condemn Israel, but the statement was blocked by Washington.

Given Russia’s growing defense cooperation with Iran, there has been speculation about the timing of Shoigu’s visit.

Some commentators have pointed out that Ahmadian invited his Russian counterpart to visit Tehran during a phone call in May, but no date was announced.
However, observers have also noted that the timing of the trip may have been influenced by developments in the region, such as Haniyeh’s assassination and the impending Iranian response.

Notably, Shoigu’s visit came on the same day that the head of US Central Command (CENTCOM), Michael Kurilla, arrived in Israel for talks with military figures. Washington has been rushing additional forces to the region, and played a key role in helping defend Israel when Iran last attacked Israeli military bases in Apr. 2024.

Amid the dispatch of US reinforcements, rumors have been circulating on social media about an alleged uptick in Russian cargo flights landing in Iran in the past three days. However, flight trackers have only confirmed one such arrival.
Reports emerged on Aug. 7 which claimed that Iran has requested advanced military gear, including air defenses and radar equipment, and that Russia has initiated deliveries.

The Iranian posturing: 

Haniyeh was killed in Tehran on July 31, just hours after attending the inauguration of President Pezeshkian.

The IRGC, which was hosting Haniyeh at a complex in northern Tehran, has said a “short-range projectile” carrying a 7 kg (15.4 lbs) warhead struck the room where the Hamas political bureau chief was staying in.

Iranian authorities continue to insist that Iran has a right to respond to Israel over the killing. Israel has not claimed the July 31 assassination.

In a meeting with foreign ambassadors to Tehran on Aug. 5, Acting Foreign Minister Ali Baqeri-Kani said Iran has a “legitimate right to take deterrent action.”
On the same day, Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanani vowed that Iran would “definitely and decisively” take action—but added that Tehran does not want to escalate tensions.

An article published on Aug. 4 in the weekly magazine Sobh-e Sadeq sought to make the case for a “severe response” against Tel Aviv, which it said would be a “wise” move.

The magazine, which is published by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), described Haniyeh’s killing as an attack on Iranian territory and insisted that the Iranian public supports action against Israel.
The conservative-dominated state broadcaster on Aug. 4 and Aug. 5 aired vox pops in which ordinary Iranians almost unanimously said Israel should be struck. However, many argued that any action should be aimed at restoring deterrence rather than starting a war.

The context/analysis: 

Long plagued by mutual distrust, relations between Iran and Russia have significantly expanded following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in Feb. 2022.

The bilateral partnership has especially grown in the military sphere, with Iran delivering drones which are reportedly being used in the Ukraine war. Tehran is also supporting Russian efforts to localize drone production.
Cooperation between Moscow and Tehran is additionally focused on connectivity, with the two sides pursuing development of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). The initiative seeks to connect India and Russia via Iran.
The growing Iranian-Russian cooperation has been a cause for concern in the west, leading European diplomats to call on the Islamic Republic to reverse course.

While cooperation has generally grown, many obstacles remain. For instance, Iran has so far avoided exporting ballistic missiles to Russia amid warnings from Washington. Moreover, collaboration in the energy sector has been lackluster.

In Feb. 2024, reports emerged that Iran had allegedly supplied Russia with around 400 missiles, including short-range Fateh-110 projectiles. However, those reports have reportedly been dismissed by Iran, Russia, and Ukraine.
Speculations that Russia may deliver up to two dozen Sukhoi-35 (Su-35) fighter jets and Mil Mi-28 attack helicopters to Iran have not materialized. This is even though reports emerged in Sept. 2023 that Yak-130 combat trainers were transferred to Iran amid rumors that an air base may have been prepared for the arrival of Su-35s.
The finalization of a comprehensive 20-year cooperation agreement has also been lagging, with Moscow pointing the finger at Tehran. The accord would succeed the 10-year cooperation treaty signed in 2001, which has since been extended for five-year terms—most recently in 2021.
While bilateral ties blossomed under late conservative president Ebrahim Raisi (2021-24), incumbent Reformist President Pezeshkian has signaled a willingness to engage with the west. Such a shift by Tehran, if it were to be reciprocated by western capitals, may be problematic for Moscow and could play a part in Shoigu’s engagement.

It remains unclear whether the precise date of Shoigu’s trip to Iran was set prior to Haniyeh’s killing. However, such a trip in the current climate may be seen as either Russian support for Iran vis-à-vis Israel, or an attempt to manage tensions between the two regional arch-foes.

What will likely fuel the view of Russia siding with Iran is what analysts see as the cooling of relations between Moscow and Tel Aviv over the past year, in view of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s war on Gaza.
Shoigu, a former defense minister who has a good working relationship with Baqeri, notably oversees Russia’s Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation which handles arms exports. Against this backdrop, it remains to be seen whether the bilateral engagement will produce dividends for Tehran in the military field.
Despite a possible shift by Moscow, the broader disparities at play are significant. Should a direct conflict between Iran and Israel emerge, observers argue that potential Russian support for Tehran is unlikely to match US backing for Tel Aviv.

The future: 

The vox pops on Iranian television may be an attempt by the authorities to gauge the public’s views, and scale the response to Israel accordingly. The Islamic Republic most recently struck Israel in Apr. 2024, when the IRGC launched an unprecedented attack over the suspected Israeli bombing of Iranian diplomatic premises in Syria.

Operation ‘True Promise’, which involved the firing of hundreds of drones and missiles, marked the first attack on Israel launched from Iranian territory.
Should Iran press on with a strike on Israel, it could be bigger than ‘True Promise’. Moreover, it may well include coordinated action by the Islamic Republic’s regional allies.

While military relations between Iran and Russia are growing, Russia will think twice before overtly backing Tehran against Tel Aviv. If cooperation is to expand, it will in all likelihood be limited to defensive capabilities, including air defenses.

Israel and Russia have seen their ties dwindle in the shadow of the Ukraine war. However, they have a so-called deconfliction mechanism in Syria to protect.
The deconfliction mechanism has prevented Israeli and Russian forces from clashing in Syria. If Moscow were to aid Tehran, it could impact Russian arrangements with Tel Aviv.
Even if Russia rushes air defense systems to Iran, their reliability and capabilities are questionable. Moreover, Moscow could very well be supplying spare parts. Notably, in Apr. 2024, Israel reportedly took out a radar site associated with a Russian-built S-300 missile defense battery covering a key nuclear site. Iran denied the incident.

Amwaj.media is based in the UK but our bustling newsroom is chiefly made up of journalists and analysts from across the region. Founded in January 2021, Amwaj.media is independently funded and operates as a service provider. The Editor is Mr. Mohammad Ali Shabani. We prioritize the safety and security of our team while considering our output as the result of a team effort. We have therefore chosen to anonymize most of our team’s own output.

5 most beautiful NEW Moscow Metro stations according to Muscovites (PHOTOS)

RBTH, 5/21/24

The Moscow Metro subway system continues to grow rapidly. In 2023 alone, 14 new stations were opened and, in the last five years, more than 40! Each has its own, unique design. And Muscovites voted for the most successful ones.

1. ‘Elektrozavodskaya’

stroi.mos.ru

This ‘Big Circle Line’ station opened in 2020. You can transfer from it to the station of the same name on the ‘blue’ Arbatsko-Pokrovskaya line. On one of its walls is a huge glass panel called ‘Battle of Heroes’ depicting a historical plot and the image of the defender of Old Russia. An interesting view of the image opens from the large round openings of the pedestrian gallery.

2. ‘Michurinsky Prospekt’

Sergei Kiselev/Moskva Agency

This ‘Big Circle Line’ station was opened in 2021. You can transfer from it to the station of the same name on the ‘yellow’ Solntsevskaya line, opened earlier, in 2018. The main feature of the design of this station are the red columns and ceiling panels with LED lighting. Some of them depict Chinese ornaments symbolizing the “friendship of nations”.

3. ‘Nagatinsky Zaton’

Sergei Kiselev/Moskva Agency

This ‘Big Circle Line’ station opened in 2023. When going outside, passengers get a picturesque view of the Moskva River. Therefore, the station was decorated with huge mosaic panels depicting fish.

4. ‘Filatov Lug’

stroi.mos.ru

This station on the ‘red’ Sokolnicheskaya line was opened in 2019. It’s an above ground station and its large panoramic windows let in daylight all year round. The designers were inspired by the stations of the 19th century: Waterloo in London, Pennsylvania Station in New York and Kievsky railway station in Moscow. Hence the abundance of glass and high vaulted ceilings.

5. ‘Airport Vnukovo’

stroi.mos.ru

This station on the ‘yellow’ Solntsevskaya line was opened in 2023. It is absolutely unique not only for Moscow, but also for the whole of Russia, as it is the first (and, so far, the only) subway station that leads directly to an airport! That is why its design is reminiscent of the civilian airplanes by the Tupolev Design Bureau, which the airport is dedicated to.

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Russia’s southernmost city – Derbent

TRAVEL

MAY 25 2024

RUSSIA BEYOND

Derbent is a city in the Republic of Dagestan, where about 130,000 people live.

Serguei Fomine/Global Look Press

Serguei Fomine/Global Look Press

It is not only the southernmost (located on the 42nd parallel), but also one of the oldest cities in Russia. It was founded in 6th century B.C. And, in 6th century A.D., the Derbent fortess of Naryn-kala, the “solar fortress”, was built. Its walls are three meters thick and, in some places, reach 25 meters in height. It is the oldest fortress in Russia.

Legion Media

The Derbent Juma Mosque, meanwhile, is the oldest mosque not only in Russia, but also in the entire post-Soviet space. It was built in 734.

Bai Xueqi/Global Look Press

Derbent is home to dozens of ethnic peoples. Lezgins, Azerbaijanis, Tabasarans, Dargins, Kumyks, Avars and many others.

Bai Xueqi/Global Look Press

Derbent used to be dubbed the ‘Caspian Gate’. The city had a successful strategic position: the Caucasus Mountains on one side and the Caspian Sea on the other. Today, Derbent has become one of the most popular tourist destinations in the country. 

Bai Xueqi/Global Look Press

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Where to see Russia in miniature? We put together all the installations in one post!

TRAVEL

MAY 25 2024

RUSSIA BEYOND

Moscow, St. Petersburg, cities of the Golden Ring and the whole country in miniature. You can see the main sights of Russia on detailed models-dioramas.

Pavel Kuzmichev

1. Miniature Golden Ring model, Yaroslavl

Show-Model of the Golden Ring of Russia

You can visit all the ancient cities of Russia in just one hour in Yaroslavl. In the center of the city there is a show model of the Golden Ring, where not just the main sights and ancient temples are presented, but the life and atmosphere of the cities have been recreated.  

The main cities of the Golden Ring are also represented in miniature: Yaroslavl, Kostroma, Uglich, Ivanovo, Rostov the Great, Pereslavl-Zalessky, Sergiev Posad, Vladimir and Suzdal. In Ivanovo, dubbed the “city of brides”, they make fun of stereotypes – you can see brides in white dresses, while tours are being held in the Rostov Veliky Kremlin.

Night falls every 10 minutes. The street lamps in the cities turn on and the windows of the residential houses light up.

2. Miniature Moscow model, VDNKh, Moscow

Artur Novosiltsev/Moskva Agency

At the VDNKh exhibition center in Moscow, there is a whole pavilion dedicated to a miniature version of Moscow, in which more than 23 000 buildings and constructions of the capital have been recreated on a scale of 1:400.

Monasteries, train stations, bridges, palaces, skyscrapers are represented in detail. Interestingly, the chimes of the Kremlin’s Spasskaya Tower chime at the exact time. The lighting system imitates not only day and night, but also natural phenomena. In addition, the layout accurately depicts all the hills and valleys of Moscow. You can explore the city endlessly!

3. ‘Tsar’s layout’ of Russia, Moscow

Pavel Kuzmichev

Travel by train from St. Petersburg to Moscow, climb Mount Elbrus by funicular and get stuck in traffic near Moscow City. All in one day. In the Moscow diorama museum ‘Tsar-Maket’ (‘Tsar-layout’), you can see the whole of Russia on a 1:87 scale model and meet its tiny inhabitants.

The main idea of the model was to depict how trains and roads connect different regions. As on a real railroad, in addition to the trains themselves, there is a repair bureau, where diesel locomotives are repaired and several tracks between which the switches are switched and people who have mixed up their trains.

In mini-St. Petersburg, it rains all “night”, Moscow greets you with a giant traffic jam near the skyscrapers and, in Rostov-on-Don, there is a soccer match being held in a huge stadium. Soviet cartoon characters – ‘Cheburashka’, ‘Crocodile Gena’ and ‘Shapoklyak’ – ride on the carriage of one of the trains in Pskov. And there are a huge number of such “Easter eggs” in the layout!

4. ‘Grand Maket Russia’, St. Petersburg

Yulia Khakimova

Everyday life of Russia, from Kamchatka to Kaliningrad, can be found in miniature on the ‘Grand Maket’ (“Grand Model”) in St. Petersburg. In Siberia, they play dominoes, in the Urals, a TV crew films a report about mysterious crop circles, while in Kamchatka, a volcano wakes up at night. The 1917 Bolshevik Revolution is also depicted by the creators on a movie set.

Along the entire model field, there are buttons that activate interactive scenarios: extinguishing a forest fire, ash ejection on the Kamchatka hills, operating a sawmill and much more.

5. ‘Petrovsky Aquatorium’, St. Petersburg

Maria Rukhlova (CC BY-SA)

You can see 18th century St. Petersburg in this model museum. The main part of the layout shows the space in the waters of the Neva River and the Gulf of Finland, and the water is real! 

You can see interesting scenes of city life of that time: elephants walking along Nevsky Prospekt (they were once sent as a gift to Emperor Peter the Great), a fight between Lomonosov and sailors, Maslenitsa festivities, duels, balls and haymaking.

6. Exhibition Complex of Russian Railways, Moscow

Exhibition Complex of Russian Railways

At the Rizhsky train terminal, there is another model of Russia, the central idea of which is railways. On it, you can see all modern types of trains that travel around the country, the historical steam locomotive depot, railroad bridges and, of course, a model of the Riga station itself. All train lovers will find it very interesting! 

Alexander Hill: Why Russia still has friends on the world stage

By Alexander Hill, The Conversation, 7/3/24

Alexander Hill is a Professor of Military History at the University of Calgary

Russian president Vladimir Putin’s recent visits to both North Korea and Vietnam received significant attention in the western media. So, too, did a recent visit by Russian warships to Cuba.

Before the outbreak of the full-blown war in Ukraine in February 2022, such visits would have likely received much less attention. Now, they come amid western attempts to isolate Russia on the world stage. However, it seems these efforts have had little effect in undermining many of Russia’s international relationships.

While most European nations are on board with western sanctions, many other countries — particularly in the Global South — have maintained economic and political links with Russia. Why that is the case owes much to both historical ties and contemporary circumstances.

Old friends

Many of Russia’s enduring international relationships are ones with long histories. When it comes to North Korea and Vietnam, governments in both those states exist in their current forms thanks in part to military and political support from the former Soviet Union during the Cold War.

In the case of Cuba, it is certainly possible that Fidel Castro’s government would have been overthrown after the 1959 revolution had it not been for Soviet political and military support. In 1961, the CIA backed an attempt to overthrow Castro that failed. Subsequent Soviet support for Castro — even after the Cuban Missile Crisis — remained considerable.

In 1975, as Portugal’s colonial empire collapsed, the Soviet Union helped the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) seize power in Angola. Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s the Soviet Union — and Cuba — backed the MPLA in the face of opposition supported by the United States and apartheid South Africa.

Elsewhere in Southern Africa, nationalist and anti-colonial movements also received support from the Soviet Union. The African National Congress in South Africa and Namibia’s SWAPO Party operated from bases in Angola and both received Soviet support.

Both parties have remained the dominant political force in their respective countries since the fall of apartheid in South Africa. In both cases, there is still a recognition of the Soviet Union’s historical support.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian government allowed some Cold War relationships to wither to some extent. For much of the 1990s, President Boris Yeltsin’s government was more concerned with stabilizing the economic and political situation at home, and deepening ties with the West, rather than maintaining Cold-War era relationships.

Keeping friendships alive

From the late 1990s, the Russian government started to put more effort and money into reviving Soviet-era relationships. What has helped sustain many relationships are personal and military connections going back to the Cold War.

Tens of thousands of Soviet personnel — both military and civilian — spent time in other countries as younger people. More than 10,000 served at some point in Angola alone. Russian veterans organizations, such as the Union of Angola Veterans, maintain important links between the countries concerned today.

Many young people from countries across the globe studied and trained in the Soviet Union. Some of them are now leaders in their home countries. One example is the current president of Angola, João Lourenço, who attended university in the Soviet Union.

The Soviets typically supplied these countries with arms and military equipment. The ongoing maintenance and upgrading of this equipment is a further driver of continued ties.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many of these countries sought better relations with the West. Nonetheless, Cuban relations with the U.S. have remained strained, and American sanctions from the Cold War period have remained in effect for decades. The U.S. is also at the forefront of efforts to isolate North Korea. In both Cuba and North Korea, it is perhaps unsurprising that they would be keen to rekindle and maintain relationships with Russia.

Balancing between Russia and the West

In the case of Vietnam, relations with the U.S. have improved significantly since the Cold War and the destruction the Americans wrought on the country during the Vietnam War. However, Vietnam’s nominally communist government is hardly glowingly endorsed by the U.S. Despite some reconciliation with the Americans., Vietnam isn’t willing to drop its relationship with Russia at the behest of the West.

There are also important economic dimensions to many of Russia’s contemporary international relationships, particularly where discounted Russian oil is concerned.

Many governments with which Russia has good relations lack the sort of liberal-democratic credentials that are seen as desirable in the West. That certainly is the case for North Korea, Vietnam and Cuba. However, seeing Russia’s international relationships as a case of authoritarianism versus democracy is simplistic.

Countries like Namibia and South Africa are democracies. Their economic relations with Russia are relatively limited. However, a shared desire not to be beholden to the West plays a significant role in their ongoing relationships.

Russia’s growing ties with China helps strengthen its connections with other states through international organizations such as BRICS. The recent expansion of BRICS — and the possibility of other Russian allies like Venezuela joining it — point to a growing desire in some parts of the world for alternatives to a western-dominated international system.

Whether the U.S. and its allies like it or not, the world is becoming more multipolar than it was at the end of the Cold War.

The western response to Russia’s war in Ukraine has certainly crystallized European opposition to Russia. Elsewhere in the world, however, western actions and hypocrisy over the situation in Gaza have given many pause for thought, and possibly, even emboldened some to develop their ties with Russia.

Rose Gottemoeller: Despite Rhetoric, No Observable Change in Russia’s Nuclear Posture

Russia Matters, 7/29/24

“There is a difference between the political use to which Putin is putting nuclear threats … and what we see in terms of the military nuclear establishment in Russia taking action,” Rose Gottemoeller said in an interview with BAS. “We do not see the readiness of Russian nuclear forces really being raised in any way, do not see any changes in the status of Russian nuclear forces that would give rise to alarm, [and we do not see] that they are getting closer to pursuing some kind of nuclear use scenario,” the former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control said. In the interview, Gottemoeller predicted a “long period when we’ll have very little trust or confidence in the Russians,” but argues that it’s still “important to think about nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons arms control as being associated with constraining and ensuring that an existential threat to humanity does not get out of hand.” The interview was published one day after Putin threatened to end Russia’s moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear capable missiles, which Russia claims to be observing, if the U.S. deploys long-range precision missile systems in Germany.

Nicolai Petro: Ukraine – a tragedy of conflicting narratives

YouTube link here.