Natylie Baldwin's Blog, page 153

Transcript: CIA director William Burns on “Face the Nation,” Feb. 26, 2023

CBS News website, 2/26/23

The following is a transcript of an interview with CIA director William Burns that aired on “Face the Nation” on Sunday, Feb. 26, 2023.

MARGARET BRENNAN: Mr. Director, thank you for making time.

CIA DIRECTOR BILL BURNS: Nice to be with you, Margaret.

MARGARET BRENNAN: You’ve got the whole world to watch right now, so I know you’re a busy man. I want to start on Ukraine and Russia with this anniversary. On the cusp of Russia’s invasion, you flew to Kyiv and you told President Zelenskyy, tell me if this is right, the Russians are coming to kill you. Was that the very first thing you said?

DIRECTOR BURNS: It wasn’t the very first thing I said to President Zelenskyy, but President Biden had asked me to go to Kyiv to lay out for President Zelenskyy the most recent intelligence we had, which suggested that what Vladimir Putin was planning was what he thought would be a lightning strike from the Belarus border to seize Kyiv in a matter of a few days, and also to seize an airport just northwest of Kyiv called Hostomel, which he wanted to use as a platform to bring in air- airborne troops, as a way again, of accelerating that lightning conquest of Kyiv. And I think President Zelenskyy understood what was at stake and what he was up against. Our Ukrainian intelligence partners also had good intelligence about what was coming as well. But I do think that the role of intelligence in this instance, what we’re able to provide to President Zelenskyy, not just on that trip, but you know, throughout the course of the war, have helped him to defend his country with such courage and tenacity. And I think that made a contribution early, you know, just before the war started.

MARGARET BRENNAN: Being able to share that intelligence?

DIRECTOR BURNS: Yes.

MARGARET BRENNAN: You also have said, and tell me if this is correct, that it was only a group of about three or four people around Vladimir Putin, who knew that he was actually planning this invasion?

DIRECTOR BURNS: No, I think that’s true. I mean, I had watched over the years, especially over recent years, as Putin had narrowed his circle of advisers, and it was a circle in which he prized loyalty over competence. It was a group of people who tended to tell him what he wanted to hear, and- or at least had learned over the years that it wasn’t career enhancing to question his judgments as well. And so that was one of the deepest flaws I think, in Russian decision-making just before the war as it was such a close circle of people reinforcing one another’s profoundly mistaken assumptions.

MARGARET BRENNAN: Does he take counsel from anyone these days?

DIRECTOR BURNS: I think he’s become increasingly convinced that he knows better than anyone else what’s at stake for Russia. I think his sense of destiny, and his appetite for risk has increased in recent years as well. And I think he had convinced himself by the fall of 2021, a few months before he launched his invasion, that his strategic window was closing for asserting control over Ukraine, which he thought was absolutely essential to Russia’s future as a great power and to his future as a great Russian leader as he saw it. And so he had also convinced himself that early 2022 was a favorable landscape, tactically, for Russia to launch such an invasion.

MARGARET BRENNAN: Why?

DIRECTOR BURNS: He believed that Ukraine was weak and divided, he thought the West was distracted, and he thought he had modernized the Russian military to the point where it was capable of a quick, decisive victory. Of course, it turned out that each of those assumptions was profoundly flawed.

MARGARET BRENNAN: You recently went back to Kyiv and you met with President Zelenskyy. And three months ago, I understand you met with Russia’s top spy chief. Is there any kind of opening that you are finding here? Any kind of opportunity?

DIRECTOR BURNS: No, I mean, the conversation that I had with Sergei Naryshkin, the head of Russia’s external intelligence service, was pretty dispiriting. You know, my- my goal was not to talk about negotiations, that’s something that Ukrainians are going to need to take up with the Russians when they see fit. It was more than anything else, what the President asked me to do, which was to make clear to Naryshkin and through him to President Putin, the serious consequences should Russia ever choose to use a nuclear weapon of any kind as well. And I think Naryshkin understood the seriousness of that issue and I think President Putin has understood it as well. I think it’s also been very valuable that the Chinese leadership, that Prime Minister Modi in India have also made clear their opposition to any use of nuclear weapons.

MARGARET BRENNAN: And you made clear to him that a nuclear weapon of any kind, a tactical nuke on the battlefield, would be treated by the United States with the utmost severity?

DIRECTOR BURNS: Absolutely, absolutely. And we’ve continued to make that very clear. And I think that direct message is going to continue to be important, as are the messages that come from other world leaders, whether it’s President Xi or anyone else.

MARGARET BRENNAN: There’s not a lot of contact with Russia right now.

DIRECTOR BURNS: There’s not a great deal, you’re right.

MARGARET BRENNAN: But you still have that line of communication with your counterpart?

DIRECTOR BURNS: Yeah and I- and I think even in the most deeply adversarial relationships, and that’s certainly what our relationship with Russia is today, it’s important to have those lines open, and the President believes that.

MARGARET BRENNAN: What do you walk away from those conversations with? You said it was dispiriting, why?

DIRECTOR BURNS: Well, because I think the, you know, it’s- there was a very defiant attitude on the part of Mr. Naryshkin as well, a sense of cockiness and hubris. You know, a sense, I think, reflecting Putin’s own view, his own belief today that he can make time work for him, that he believes he can grind down the Ukrainians that he can wear down our European allies, that political fatigue will eventually set in. And in my experience, Putin’s view of Americans, of us, has been that we have attention deficit disorder, and we’ll move on to some other issue eventually. And so Putin, in many ways, I think, believes today that he cannot win for awhile, but he can’t afford to lose. I mean, that’s his conviction. So instead of looking for ways to either back down or find a famous off ramp, you know, what Putin has done is double down. At each instance notwithstanding, you know, what is by any objective measure a strategic failure so far for Russia.

MARGARET BRENNAN: He doesn’t seem to have that assessment, though, I mean, 97 percent of his ground forces in Ukraine. It’s a meat grinder, does he just look at his population and say, I have enough young men I can continue to send off to die? I mean, what is the price that makes him change his mind?

DIRECTOR BURNS: Putin is certainly not a sentimentalist about the loss of Russian life or, you know, the huge losses that he’s taken in terms of Russian armaments, as well during the course of the war. But there’s a lot of hubris that continues to be attached to Putin and his view of the war right now. And I think, what’s going to be critical as we look ahead in 2023 and provide all the material and intelligence support that we can for our Ukrainian partners, is to puncture that hubris on Putin’s part and regain momentum on the battlefield. Because I really do believe, much as a- as a recovering diplomat, I’d like to see opportunities for negotiations. I don’t think the Russians are serious today. And I think, you know, it’s only progress on the battlefield that’s going to shape any improved prospects for negotiations down the road. That’s going to be the Ukrainians call. I think, as the President has made clear, it’s our job not just as an intelligence community, but as a government to provide all the support we can to the Ukrainians, so that they can strengthen their hand on the battlefield and ultimately at the negotiating table.

MARGARET BRENNAN: So Russia controls 18 percent of Ukraine. At what point does Putin say I can’t win?

DIRECTOR BURNS: I think–

MARGARET BRENNAN: You must have gamed that out.

DIRECTOR BURNS: I think Putin is, right now, entirely too confident of his ability, as I said before, to wear down Ukraine, to grind away and that’s what he’s giving every evidence that he’s determined to do right now. At some point, he’s going to have to face up to increasing costs as well, in coffins coming home to some of the poorest parts of Russia because many of the conscripts, you know, who are being thrown as cannon fodder in the front and the Donbas as well, come from Dagestan and Buryatia, the poorest parts of Russia as well. There’s a cumulative economic damage to Russia as well. Huge reputational damage, I think to Russia. It has not exactly been a great advertisement for Russian arms sales. So this is going to build over time, but right now, the honest answer, I think Putin is quite determined.

MARGARET BRENNAN: You said- I want to ask you about what appears to be potentially a new line of ammunition weapons for Russia. It looks like the U.S. was caught by surprise that China was actually considering providing lethal support. You said as recently as February 2, that Xi Jinping was reluctant to provide military assistance. What changed?

DIRECTOR BURNS: Well, I mean, I think this is something we watch very carefully. And I think, you know, the Chinese weigh very carefully this issue. And we’ve certainly made very clear the seriousness of the consequences for our relationship, and I think for China’s relationship with our European allies as well.

MARGARET BRENNAN: Sanctions?

DIRECTOR BURNS: This is an issue that we watch very, very carefully. You know, and as Secretary Blinken has said, publicly, you know, we have begun to see- we have begun to collect intelligence suggesting that China is considering the provision of lethal equipment. That’s not to suggest that they’ve made a definitive conclusion about this, that they’re actually begun to provide lethal equipment, but it’s obviously something that we take very seriously and watch very carefully.

MARGARET BRENNAN: Secretary Blinken said that the U.S. had picked up information over the last couple of months. But picking up information over the last couple of months to thinking they’re actively considering it- I mean, how confident are you in the intelligence that this is something Xi Jinping himself may change his mind about?

DIRECTOR BURNS: Well, we’re confident that the Chinese leadership is considering the provision of lethal equipment. We also don’t see that a final decision has been made yet, and we don’t see evidence of actual shipments of lethal equipment. And that’s why, I think, Secretary Blinken and the President have thought it important to make very clear what the consequences of that would be as well–

MARGARET BRENNAN:To deter it.

DIRECTOR BURNS: Yeah, to deter it, because it would be a very risky and unwise bet.

MARGARET BRENNAN: So why would Beijing risk a tailspin in its relationship with the United States and with Europe by crossing this line?

DIRECTOR BURNS: It’s a good question, and that’s why I hope very much that they don’t.

MARGARET BRENNAN: Because it doesn’t necessarily seem in his best economic interest, certainly, if sanctions are the consequence. Do you think that Beijing benefits from having the West distracted and involved in a prolonged conflict in Europe?

DIRECTOR BURNS: I mean–

MARGARET BRENNAN: That that’s the aim?

DIRECTOR BURNS: It’s conceivable, but I think, there’s no foreign leader who’s watched more carefully Vladimir Putin’s experience in Ukraine, the evolution of the war, than Xi Jinping has. And I think in many ways, he’s been unsettled and sobered by what he’s seen. I think he was surprised by the very poor military performance of the Russians. I think surprised also by the degree of Western solidarity and support of Ukraine. In other words, the willingness of not just the United States, but our European allies as well to absorb a certain amount of economic cost in the interest of inflicting greater economic damage on Russia over time. So all of that, I think, has sobered Xi Jinping to some extent.

MARGARET BRENNAN: So you think this public- do you think the policy decision of public- publicly embarrassing the Chinese by saying we know what you’re thinking, why do you think that that will make a difference in Xi Jinping’s calculation?

DIRECTOR BURNS: I don’t think it’s a question of embarrassing anybody. It’s just a question of being very clear and direct about the seriousness of our concerns, as well–

MARGARET BRENNAN: Publicly.

DIRECTOR BURNS: Publicly as well. And privately because that’s a message that’s been delivered, you know, on a number of occasions before this.

MARGARET BRENNAN: What are the consequences for the conflict in Ukraine if this does happen? What does more ammunition and more weapons mean? Does this- Is it a game changer?

DIRECTOR BURNS: Well, I mean, obviously more ammunitions to the aggressor in this conflict to Vladimir Putin’s Russia, wherever it comes from, and we also have evidence that the Iranians are providing, you know, lethal equipment and munitions, that the North Koreans are doing the same thing as well. So wherever that lethal assistance comes from, it prolongs a vicious war of aggression.

MARGARET BRENNAN: German press is reporting China’s considering kamikaze drones, replacement parts for jets, other weaponry. Secretary Blinken just said ammunition and weapons, do you view those things differently in terms of- I mean, obviously, they’re used differently in the battlefield, but where is that line that they are crossing?

DIRECTOR BURNS: Well I mean I can’t comment on the specifics of what was reported in the German media as well. All I can say is, you know, we remain seriously concerned should China provide lethal equipment to Russia. As I said, we don’t have evidence of a final decision to do that today, we don’t have evidence that there’s actually been a transfer. And so all we’re trying to emphasize is the importance of not doing that.

MARGARET BRENNAN: The U.S. does have evidence that Chinese companies have been providing non-lethal support to Russian mercenaries, but it’s, you know, satellite imagery that helps target weapons. Isn’t that an indication of where their thinking is on this conflict, that they’re not actually peace brokers, but a party to it?

DIRECTOR BURNS: Well, I think it’s an indication that, you know, there is a strong partnership between China and Russia as President Xi, and- and Putin proclaimed just before the war started at the beginning of February. But I think the Chinese are also trying to weigh the consequences of, you know, what the concerns we’ve expressed are, you know, about providing lethal equipment as well. And weighing carefully, you know, where’s the point at which, you know, they would run into some pretty serious consequences and that’s what we’ve tried to make clear.

MARGARET BRENNAN: So this was testing the waters, in other words, for U.S. reaction to satellite imagery. To see if they can then go onto weapons–

DIRECTOR BURNS: Right, I mean, there’s a big distinction, in our view, and this is what U.S. policymakers have made clear between, you know, non-lethal equipment and lethal equipment as well.

MARGARET BRENNAN: So, how good is our visibility into Xi Jinping’s thinking and his decision-making process?

DIRECTOR BURNS: Oh, it’s always the hardest question for any intelligence service as well. You know, in- in an authoritarian system where power is consolidated so much in the hands of one man, but it’s something we work very hard at, and try to provide the President with the best insights that we can.

MARGARET BRENNAN: But you had such exquisite intelligence when it came to Russia and Vladimir Putin and his inner circle. Do we have that for Xi Jinping?

DIRECTOR BURNS: We work very hard to develop that.

MARGARET BRENNAN: Working on it?

DIRECTOR BURNS: I think we work very hard to develop the very best intelligence we can.

MARGARET BRENNAN: But I wonder if, when you’re talking about his thinking, and his decision making, if he suffers from the same kind of “Yes, man” culture that you said Vladimir Putin does. Because Xi Jinping got rid of a lot of people in his government.

DIRECTOR BURNS: Margaret, it’s a concern in any authoritarian system, and I think what we’ve seen in Beijing is President Xi consolidating power at a very rapid pace over the course of the more than a decade that he’s been in power as well. And as we’ve seen in, you know, in where Putin’s hubris has now gotten Russia, and the horrors that he’s, you know- you know, brought to the people of Ukraine. In that kind of a system, a very closed decision-making system when nobody challenges, you know, the authority of their insights of an authoritarian leader, you can make some huge blunders as well.

MARGARET BRENNAN: You’ve said Xi Jinping told his military to be prepared to invade Taiwan by 2027. The intel community seems a little bit more ambiguous in its conclusions here. Do you think it’s an outright invasion? Or do you think China’s more likely to slowly strangle democracy in Taiwan?

DIRECTOR BURNS: Well, first, I think we need to take very seriously Xi’s ambitions with regard to ultimately controlling Taiwan. That doesn’t, however, in our view, mean that a military conflict is inevitable. We do know, as has been made public, that President Xi has instructed the PLA, the Chinese military leadership, to be ready by 2027 to invade Taiwan, but that doesn’t mean that he’s decided to invade in 2027 or any other year as well. I think our judgment at least is that President Xi and his military leadership have doubts today about whether they could accomplish that invasion. I think, as they’ve looked at Putin’s experience in Ukraine, that’s probably reinforced some of those doubts as well. So, all I would say is that I think the risks of, you know, a potential use of force probably grow the further into this decade you get and beyond it, into the following decade as well. So that’s something obviously, that we watch very, very carefully.

MARGARET BRENNAN: I’d be remiss if I didn’t ask you when the intelligence community will have some insight into what Beijing was collecting with that spy balloon over the U.S.?

DIRECTOR BURNS: Well, I think we’ve already- I mean, the U.S. government, many of our partners have been bringing up from, you know, the seabed just off the coast of South Carolina as well, you know, a lot of materials from the platform that that balloon was carrying. It was clearly an intelligence platform as well. And I think we’ll be able to develop a pretty clear picture of exactly what its capabilities were.

MARGARET BRENNAN: But it will be awhile, won’t it?

DIRECTOR BURNS: It takes some time. But I think my understanding is that we’re managing to pull up quite a bit of evidence and material from that platform.

MARGARET BRENNAN: Do you think Xi Jinping knew that balloon was sent here?

DIRECTOR BURNS: I don’t know.

MARGARET BRENNAN: You have an idea?

DIRECTOR BURNS: I mean, this is something obviously we watch very carefully as well. I think the Chinese leadership obviously understood that they had launched this capability, that it was an intelligence platform, whether, when, and what the Chinese leadership knew about the trajectory of this balloon, I honestly can’t say.

MARGARET BRENNAN: You- I want to come back to something you just said about Iran. You’ve said in the past, there’s the beginnings of a full-fledged defense partnership between Russia and Iran. Exactly how far does the alliance go?

DIRECTOR BURNS: Well, it’s moving at a pretty fast clip in a very dangerous direction right now, in the sense that we know that the Iranians have already provided hundreds of armed drones to the Russians, which they’re using to inflict pain on Ukrainian civilians and Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. We know that they’ve provided, you know, ammunition for artillery and for tanks as well. And what we also see are signs that, you know, Russia is proposing to help the Iranians on their missile program and also at least considering the possibility of providing fighter aircraft to Iran as well. That creates obvious risks not only for the people of Ukraine, and we’ve seen the evidence of that already, but also risks to our friends and partners across the Middle East as well. So it’s, you know, quite disturbing set of developments.

MARGARET BRENNAN: Have Iran’s leaders made the decision to pursue a nuclear weapon?

DIRECTOR BURNS: To the best of our knowledge, we don’t believe that the Supreme Leader in Iran has yet made a decision to resume the weaponization program that we judge that they suspended or stopped at the end of 2003. But the other two legs of the stool, meaning enrichment programs, they’ve obviously advanced very far, you know, over the past couple of years–

MARGARET BRENNAN: 84 percent purity reportedly.

DIRECTOR BURNS: They’ve advanced very far to the point where it would only be a matter of weeks before they can enrich to 90 percent, if they chose to cross that line. And also in terms of their missile systems, their ability to deliver a nuclear weapon, once they developed it, has also been advancing as well. So the answer to your question is no, we don’t see evidence that they made a decision to resume that weaponization program. But the other dimensions of this challenge, I think, are growing at a worrisome pace too.

MARGARET BRENNAN: Israel has said they believe Iran has enough fuel for four bombs, and the enriched uranium that was found recently was at 84 percent purity- that’s very close to 90 percent, what you need for a nuclear weapon. So how far are they from testing? Or are you saying because they haven’t chosen to pursue a weapon that–

DIRECTOR BURNS: Right.

MARGARET BRENNAN: We’re not near that point?

DIRECTOR BURNS: Yeah. And they’re still a ways off, at least in our judgment in terms of their ability to actually develop a weapon. But their progress on enrichment is quite troubling, as I said before.

MARGARET BRENNAN: I have a lot of questions to still ask you, but I’m told we’re running out of time. I want to ask you, what keeps you up at night?

DIRECTOR BURNS: Oh, lots of things. It’s in the nature of this job. The job I’ve been proud to hold for the last couple of years as well. I mean, I think in the short term, there’s obviously a lot of concern about Putin’s war in Ukraine and doing everything that we can to support the Ukrainians. I’m very proud of the role that intelligence has played. I think we, not just at CIA but across the U.S. intelligence community, provided strong early warning of the invasion that was coming. I think we shared intelligence which helped the Ukrainians to defend themselves. I think the credibility of our intelligence has helped the President to build such a strong coalition. And I also think that the President’s decision to selectively and carefully declassify some of our secrets, some of our intelligence has had an important impact in the sense that it’s denied Putin the ability to shape false narratives, which I had seen him do too many times over the course of my experience with him in the last two decades. And it’s put him on the back foot, which is for Vladimir Putin that kind of uncomfortable and unaccustomed place to be. So I think for all those reasons, you know, I focus very intently on the role that intelligence plays in this conflict, and doing everything we can to support the Ukrainians and help the President shore up this, you know, remarkable coalition of countries supporting Ukraine.

MARGARET BRENNAN: You were the last American to speak with Vladimir Putin before this war.

DIRECTOR BURNS: I think the President talked to him on the telephone after that trip I made in you know, in early November of 2021, but you know with Putin and the conversation that I had in- in November, so several months before the war, you know, just left me with a very troubling impression that he was someone who had just about made up his mind to go to war at that point. And I had heard from him, before, a lot of what he had to say about Ukraine, his conviction that Ukraine is not a real country, you know real countries fight back. And that’s just what the Ukrainians have done, you know, so courageously over the course of the last year.

MARGARET BRENNAN: Yeah, he’d been telling you, it’s not a real country back in 2008.

DIRECTOR BURNS: Yes, yeah. No, it’s a consistent theme with him. But, you know, over the course, especially of the 15 years, since, you know, I was ambassador in Moscow, you have seen, you know, his views harden with regard to Ukraine. I think, as you know, he can’t conceive of Russia as a great power without controlling Ukraine’s choices. And I think as he’s looked at Ukraine’s evolution over the last decade, what he’s seen is Ukraine’s stubborn independence, it’s democratic progress, it’s movement toward the West in political and economic and security terms, largely accelerated by Putin himself through his aggression in Crimea in 2014. He’s seen that as a direct threat to the ambition that cuts to the core of his view as a Russian leader, and I think that’s the backdrop to the horrific aggression that he’s launched.

Gilbert Doctorow: Do America’s Russian studies programs have any value whatsoever for foreign policy planners?

By Gilbert Doctorow, Blog, 2/13/23

I’d love to hear from any recent Russia Studies students who’d like to weigh in in the comments section on this. – Natylie

Back in November 2013, I wrote an essay about the negative contribution of Russian area studies programs in major U.S. universities to the education of their candidates for Masters degrees and ultimately to the formulation of foreign policy with respect to Russia and Eurasia. At the same time, I noted that the fundamental issues which made Russian area studies worthless also were being remarked upon by academic observers in area studies programs relating to Latin America and other regions. These programs all were gutted of substantive knowledge about the lands and peoples of given areas to leave room in the curriculum for honing numerical skills that might be helpful in finding jobs for the graduates in commercial banks or international financial institutions; or to leave room for human rights studies that could provide entrée to jobs in global NGOs.

These changes were not fortuitous. They were completely in line with the universal values and democracy promotion agenda that since the end of the Cold War had almost completely vanquished the Realist School of international studies, with its focus on substantive knowledge.

In the case of Russian studies, already a decade ago the final blow against it was the reduction of the field to generating anti-Putin and anti-Russian propaganda. In effect, the masters of the discipline believed they knew everything there was to know about Russia and there were no questions left to study.

My conclusion in the given essay did not mince words:

“Given the venomous treatment of Russia by the present-day professoriate in the United States, it may not be a bad thing if we lose a generation of Russianists and the field starts over from ashes like the phoenix.”

See Chapter 7 in the collection Does Russia Have a Future? (2015)

*****

I arrived at these observations not abstractly but quite concretely as a result of spending some months on campus at one of the two original founding centers of Russian studies in the United States, what had come to be called the Harriman Institute at Columbia University in New York. I had accepted an honorary appointment there to do a small research project but also to present to the academic community a book of mine that appeared in print during my stay, Great Post-Cold War Thinkers on International Relations. This was my first venture in scholarly publications following my decamping from university life in 1975 for a career spent mostly in Eastern Europe and Russia as marketing manager and eventually as country manager serving major international concerns.

Indeed the Harriman Institute allowed me to deliver a lecture on my book, which was understandable insofar as the title did not give them a clue about its iconoclastic contents. And subsequently they published in their annual collection of essays an appreciation I wrote of George Kennan, who was then very much in scholarly discussion due to a recent authorized biography of Kennan by a Yale professor. But mostly during my stay at the Harriman Institute during the 2010-11 academic year I kept my eyes open, attended various Institute events and learned what I could about the latest curriculum changes in Area Studies which were stunning.

The atmosphere which I found at Columbia in 2010 was shocking. The anti-Russian consensus in the political direction at the Institute was so dominant that all public lectures were gatherings of the like-minded at which questions from the audience which were out of line immediately brought down upon the head of the questioner accusations of being a “Putin stooge.” In my understanding, Columbia had ceased to be a center of higher learning as regards Russia and was operating at the level of a kindergarten.

Turning from these subjective observations to the specifics of course requirements, I was stunned at the recent decisions taken in the university administration to sharply reduce language requirements for Area Studies candidates. In effect, one could now obtain a master’s degree and not possess the skills to do independent research in the field or even to understand what was going on in the target country(ies) from native language media and other sources.

This may have been understandable in terms of the momentary circumstances of 2010. Ever since the bombing of the Twin Towers and start of the War on Terror, the CIA, which had been a large employer of Russian studies graduates, had been firing not hiring such specialists while it moved to bulk up its Arabic language resources both internally and through outside contractors. Moreover, those in the university administration and in the Harriman in particular could tell themselves that the loss of language training for U.S.-born students would be more than compensated for by admission of native Russian speakers from the large numbers of immigrants from Russia who arrived in the 1990s and later.

Regrettably, that last calculation was plain stupid. First generation Americans from Russia could be counted upon as Russia haters, and that is not a good starting point for the end purpose of Area Studies. In that connection, I thought about the leading lights in the field when I was a student at Harvard in the 1960s and then later a post-doctoral fellow of the Russian Research Center in the 1970s: Adam Ulam, Richard Pipes, Zbigniew Brzezinski all were first generation Americans; all were Russia-haters who poisoned many minds of students and of government policy-makers during their decades at the top. Indeed, the present war in and about Ukraine was well prepared by Brzezinski in his infamous volume of 1997, The Grand Chessboard.

*****

What I have just described with respect to Columbia’s Harriman Institute in 2010-11 was by no means peculiar to that institution. The gutting of Area Studies was going on across the country. The reduction of federal financial aid to language studies took was particularly stunning in 2013, which prompted me to publish in the same year my essay calling for the whole program of Russian studies to die off and make way for some new shoots and new personalities.

Yet, from the perspective of 2023, the situation of Russian studies at Columbia 12 years ago looks pretty good. I continue to be a subscriber to the online weekly digest of events at The Harriman Institute and I see nothing to be optimistic about, even now that the succession of political scientists as chairman has been broken by the accession of a Literature scholar a year ago. By title of events sponsored, one might easily conclude that the Institute has become a center for Ukrainian studies. Russia and everything related to Russia has more or less been sent to hell.

Given that in a matter of months, Ukraine may disappear from the map of Europe while Russia, like it or not, will be with us for eternity, you have to ask what the value of newly minted Columbia degrees in Russia-Eurasia Area Studies will be – to the students themselves and to the nation at large.

China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis

Flag of the People’s Republic of China

Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, 2/24/23

1. Respecting the sovereignty of all countries. Universally recognized international law, including the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, must be strictly observed. The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all countries must be effectively upheld. All countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are equal members of the international community. All parties should jointly uphold the basic norms governing international relations and defend international fairness and justice. Equal and uniform application of international law should be promoted, while double standards must be rejected. 

2. Abandoning the Cold War mentality. The security of a country should not be pursued at the expense of others. The security of a region should not be achieved by strengthening or expanding military blocs. The legitimate security interests and concerns of all countries must be taken seriously and addressed properly. There is no simple solution to a complex issue. All parties should, following the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security and bearing in mind the long-term peace and stability of the world, help forge a balanced, effective and sustainable European security architecture. All parties should oppose the pursuit of one’s own security at the cost of others’ security, prevent bloc confrontation, and work together for peace and stability on the Eurasian Continent.

3. Ceasing hostilities. Conflict and war benefit no one. All parties must stay rational and exercise restraint, avoid fanning the flames and aggravating tensions, and prevent the crisis from deteriorating further or even spiraling out of control. All parties should support Russia and Ukraine in working in the same direction and resuming direct dialogue as quickly as possible, so as to gradually deescalate the situation and ultimately reach a comprehensive ceasefire. 

4. Resuming peace talks. Dialogue and negotiation are the only viable solution to the Ukraine crisis. All efforts conducive to the peaceful settlement of the crisis must be encouraged and supported. The international community should stay committed to the right approach of promoting talks for peace, help parties to the conflict open the door to a political settlement as soon as possible, and create conditions and platforms for the resumption of negotiation. China will continue to play a constructive role in this regard. 

5. Resolving the humanitarian crisis. All measures conducive to easing the humanitarian crisis must be encouraged and supported. Humanitarian operations should follow the principles of neutrality and impartiality, and humanitarian issues should not be politicized. The safety of civilians must be effectively protected, and humanitarian corridors should be set up for the evacuation of civilians from conflict zones. Efforts are needed to increase humanitarian assistance to relevant areas, improve humanitarian conditions, and provide rapid, safe and unimpeded humanitarian access, with a view to preventing a humanitarian crisis on a larger scale. The UN should be supported in playing a coordinating role in channeling humanitarian aid to conflict zones.

6. Protecting civilians and prisoners of war (POWs). Parties to the conflict should strictly abide by international humanitarian law, avoid attacking civilians or civilian facilities, protect women, children and other victims of the conflict, and respect the basic rights of POWs. China supports the exchange of POWs between Russia and Ukraine, and calls on all parties to create more favorable conditions for this purpose.

7. Keeping nuclear power plants safe. China opposes armed attacks against nuclear power plants or other peaceful nuclear facilities, and calls on all parties to comply with international law including the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) and resolutely avoid man-made nuclear accidents. China supports the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in playing a constructive role in promoting the safety and security of peaceful nuclear facilities.

8. Reducing strategic risks. Nuclear weapons must not be used and nuclear wars must not be fought. The threat or use of nuclear weapons should be opposed. Nuclear proliferation must be prevented and nuclear crisis avoided. China opposes the research, development and use of chemical and biological weapons by any country under any circumstances.

9. Facilitating grain exports. All parties need to implement the Black Sea Grain Initiative signed by Russia, Türkiye, Ukraine and the UN fully and effectively in a balanced manner, and support the UN in playing an important role in this regard. The cooperation initiative on global food security proposed by China provides a feasible solution to the global food crisis.

10. Stopping unilateral sanctions. Unilateral sanctions and maximum pressure cannot solve the issue; they only create new problems. China opposes unilateral sanctions unauthorized by the UN Security Council. Relevant countries should stop abusing unilateral sanctions and “long-arm jurisdiction” against other countries, so as to do their share in deescalating the Ukraine crisis and create conditions for developing countries to grow their economies and better the lives of their people.

11. Keeping industrial and supply chains stable. All parties should earnestly maintain the existing world economic system and oppose using the world economy as a tool or weapon for political purposes. Joint efforts are needed to mitigate the spillovers of the crisis and prevent it from disrupting international cooperation in energy, finance, food trade and transportation and undermining the global economic recovery.

12. Promoting post-conflict reconstruction. The international community needs to take measures to support post-conflict reconstruction in conflict zones. China stands ready to provide assistance and play a constructive role in this endeavor.

Anatol Lieven: Crimea Is a Powder Keg

Dock at naval base in Sevastopol, Crimea; photo by Natylie Baldwin, October 2015

By Anatol Lievan, Jacobin, 2/10/23

The greatest threat of nuclear catastrophe that humanity has ever faced is now centered on the Crimean peninsula. In recent months, the Ukrainian government and army have repeatedly vowed to reconquer this territory, which Russia seized and annexed in 2014. The Russian establishment, and most ordinary Russians, for their part believe that holding Crimea is vital to Russian identity and Russia’s position as a great power. As a Russian liberal acquaintance (and no admirer of Putin) told me, “In the last resort, America would use nuclear weapons to save Hawaii and Pearl Harbor, and if we have to, we should use them to save Crimea.”

In the eyes of all the participants in the war, Crimea is freighted with crucial strategic significance.

For the Ukrainian government, the recapture of Crimea and the naval base of Sevastopol would not only mark Ukraine’s total defeat of Russian aggression, but would also eliminate Russia’s ability to blockade Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, and make any future Russian invasion of Ukraine much more difficult.

The latter belief seems on the face of it flawed, since Russia would retain 1,200 miles of border with Ukraine to the east and north. However, it is tied up with the belief that the Russian loss of Crimea would mark victory over Russia in this war, and would be a humiliation so crushing that the Putin regime would fall — and that from this would follow the drastic weakening or even complete disintegration of the Russian Federation.

This is also the hope of the Polish and Baltic governments and of hardliners in Western Europe and the United States. They hope for the elimination of Russia as a significant factor in global affairs, leading to the isolation of China and the strengthening of US global primacy. Hence the increasing language (cynically borrowed from the Left) of the “decolonization” of Russia, a transparent code for the destruction of the existing Russian state.

US strategists also have a more specific reason to hope that Russia can be driven from Crimea. Sevastopol is the only Russian deepwater port on the Black Sea. The others would take immense effort, time, and expense to be turned into viable naval bases. The loss of Sevastopol would therefore virtually eliminate Russia as a significant power not only in the Black Sea but in the adjacent Mediterranean as well.

Then again, perhaps these US strategists should be careful what they wish for. A glance both at the map and at the policies of the Erdoğan government in Turkey should make clear both that Turkey, not the United States, would probably be the greatest beneficiary of this, and that a steep rise in Turkish power would by no means necessarily be to the benefit of the West.

It should also be noted that many Russian goals in the Middle East and Mediterranean have not in fact been contrary to the interests of the United States. If the Bush administration had listened to Russia (and France and Germany) and not invaded Iraq, it would have spared the United States losses of thousands of lives and trillions of dollars, and the people of the Middle East infinitely greater losses and sufferings.

If the Obama administration had listened to Russia and not overthrown the Gaddafi state in Libya, it would have avoided more than a decade of civil war in Libya, the spread of civil war and Islamist extremism across much of western and central Africa, and a great increase in illegal migration to Europe. If the Obama administration had destroyed the Ba’ath state in Syria, it would almost certainly have found itself mired in another catastrophe along the lines of Iraq, but without Iraq’s Shia majority to provide some sort of basis for state reconstruction. These actual or potential disasters were all the work of forces in Washington — not Moscow.

As to the Biden administration, it seems divided on the subject of how far to defeat Russia. On Crimea, a line leaked to the New York Times and other outlets has said that the administration wants to strengthen Ukraine sufficiently to be able to credibly threaten Crimea (presumably by recapturing the “land bridge” between Crimea and Russia proper, through the Russian-occupied territories of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia), but like the Pentagon, does not believe that Ukraine could in fact recapture it and thereby risk nuclear war.

The Biden administration appears to believe that if the Ukrainian army could break through to the Sea of Azov, this would frighten Moscow so much that it would agree to a deal (which Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky indeed offered back in March) whereby Russia would return to the lines it held between 2014 and last February, and the issues of the formal status of Crimea and the Donbas would be deferred for future negotiation.

This strategy is however extremely risky, because it requires a strong degree both of military fine-tuning and of control over Ukrainian actions — and neither is guaranteed. Moreover, without a full recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea, it would be very difficult for Russia to withdraw completely from the “land bridge” to the peninsula that it seized last year, because that would put Ukraine in a far stronger position to start a new war to capture Crimea at some stage in future. For the loss of the land bridge to Crimea would leave only the bridge across the Kerch Strait as a means for Russia to supply Ukraine by land — and Ukraine has already demonstrated its ability to destroy that bridge.

Furthermore, one of the reasons for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year was that Ukraine had been blocking the canal from the Dnieper River to Crimea, thereby gravely damaging Crimean agriculture. As long as a renewed war remains a possibility, if Russia wishes to hold Crimea, it must fight to hold or retake the land bridge.

An understanding of the importance of Crimea to Russians can be drawn largely from the goals of Western hardliners, mentioned above. The Russian establishment, and most ordinary Russians, are determined to maintain Russia’s position as a great power. Three other factors are however also present. The first is Crimea’s emotional significance, stemming from memories of the heroic defense of Sevastopol against the French, British, and Turks in 1854–55, and the Germans and Romanians in 1941–42. The Red Army lost more men in Crimea than the US army lost on all fronts of World War II put together.

The second is that between Crimea’s 1783 conquest by Catherine the Great from the Ottoman Empire and its Crimean Tatar allies, and its 1954 transfer to Ukraine by Soviet decree, Crimea was part of Russia. Until the latter date, at no point in Crimea’s history had it been part of Ukraine. Russians say — not without reason — that if the situation were reversed, and Crimea had been transferred from Ukraine to Russia, then much of Western public opinion would have sympathized with Ukrainian demands for its return.

The third is that Ukraine has an ethnic Russian majority. In January 1991, an overwhelming majority (94 percent) of Crimeans voted to become a separate “Union Republic” of the USSR, which would have led to Crimea becoming an independent state alongside Ukraine and Russia when the Soviet Union dissolved. In December of that year, a slim majority (54 percent) of Crimeans voted for an independent Ukraine, but on condition of Crimea’s autonomy, which the Ukrainian government unilaterally abolished four years later. Throughout the period of Ukrainian rule, a majority of Crimeans repeatedly expressed the desire for autonomy within Ukraine.

After the Russian seizure in 2014, an (internationally unrecognized) referendum and a series of opinion polls indicated that annexation to Russia had solid majority support. How things stand today is difficult to say given the level of repression now prevailing in Russia. But as former Zelensky adviser Oleksiy Arestovych has pointed out, the intense anti-Russian cultural measures introduced by the Ukrainian government — including the banning of the Russian language and the burning of Russian books — are unlikely to have increased support for Ukraine in Crimea.

It is impossible to say for sure if Russia would in the last resort use nuclear weapons to hold Crimea. It seems likely that they would begin by a less dangerous unconventional attack — for example the disabling of US satellites — that could begin escalation toward nuclear war. There are no grounds at all, however, for reasonable doubt that the Russian state would be willing to run colossal risks, for itself and for humanity. This being so, we should remember the words of President John F. Kennedy in his “Peace Speech” to American University in June 1963, reflecting the lessons that he had learned during the Cuban Missile Crisis:

“Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy — or of a collective death-wish for the world.”

The Bell: Ballooning budget deficit and ‘backdoor’ tax proposals

The Bell, 2/10/23

Ballooning budget deficit and ‘backdoor’ tax proposals

The Russian authorities are turning to businesses for money to top up the budget. As The Bell reported this week, the government is demanding large companies make a one-time budget contribution of up to 250 billion rubles ($3.5 billion). This comes on top of December’s tax recalculation that is expected to take a further 1.8 trillion rubles ($25 billion) out of the economy. Businesses are trying to resist, but the government is not budging – and has good reasons for its position: January statistics released this week showed a rapid rise in spending against a background of falling incomes.

What’s happening?

At the end of last year, the government grew concerned about the increasing budget deficit and Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin proposed a “revenue mobilization.” Among the measures under discussion were increased dividends for state-owned companies and one-off payments from large private companies, Bloomberg reported.

The government acted quickly. Back in mid-December, the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP), which unites Russia’s biggest companies, was invited to contribute about 200 billion rubles (the first proposal had been a sum that was twice as much, a source close to the discussions told The Bell). This was the brainchild of Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, the source claimed. Another source said that behind-closed-doors meetings with business leaders were led by Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Belousov.  

After The Bell published its article, Belousov confirmed our information. 

“A voluntary contribution from businesses is under discussion,” he said. “The fact is that last year’s financial results were very good.”

The government has invited businesses to come up with their own proposals on how exactly to levy additional payments. However, there is not much time: Maxim Oreshkin, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s advisor on economics, is apparently eager to offer a “gift” to his boss at RSPP’s spring congress.

The Bell has seen RSPP documents suggesting the association will resist any form of new payment. The documents point out that, in December, the Finance Ministry ordered a retroactive tax on profits generated by companies whose assets were revalued due to the strengthening ruble. And they stated that the mooted one-off payments will cost the Russian economy 1.8 trillion rubles — of which just 270 billion rubles will go to the budget.

The RSPP documents suggest that the government should either treat the December tax recalculation as a “contribution,” or cancel the tax recalculation and generate the required money by raising corporate income tax by 0.5 percentage points to 20.5%. 

The Finance Ministry has already stated it is “categorically opposed” to any tax increases.

Could Russia get more money from business without raising taxes?

The current situation is nothing new. The government always talks about the need for predictable tax rates — however, whenever it needs money, it has a habit of trying to impose sudden surcharges on businesses (allowing them to claim taxes remain the same):

Gazprom paid 1.24 trillion rubles into the budget as an additional Mineral Extraction Tax payment in 2022. This sum was sufficient to compensate the state for the sharp fall in oil-and-gas revenues in the second half of the year. For example, in November Gazprom’s MET payment of 466 billion rubles represented almost half of the total oil-and-gas income – without it, revenues would have been down 48%. In January 2023, Gazprom’s MET payments reverted to their usual 44 billion rubles.  Belousov in 2021 said that metal companies had “ransacked” the state for 100 billion rubles during the pandemic, and insisted that this money should be returned either through taxation or a one-off payment.In 2018, when he was working in the presidential administration, Belousov calculated windfall profits of metal companies, fertilizer and chemical gas companies at more than 500 billion rubles. He proposed collecting this money and spending it on the president’s initiatives. Nothing came of the proposal.During the 2016 oil price slump, the Russian budget was saved by a deal to sell 19.5% of the state’s shares in oil giant Rosneft, which generated more than 700 billion rubles. The deal was extremely opaque.

What’s making the government nervous?

This week saw the release of the first budget statistics of the year, which showed the budget recorded a deficit in January of 1.8 trillion rubles ($25 billion). This compared to the surplus of 125 billion ($1.9 billion) that was recorded in January, 2022. 

Budget revenues in January fell 35%, mostly due to a 46% reduction in oil-and-gas income to 426 billion rubles. The reasons for that decline are related to falling prices for Russian  oil (Urals blend was selling for $49 per barrel in January —much lower than the $70 a barrel that was expected in Russia’s budget calculations) and reduced gas exports.

Non-oil and gas revenues fell 28% to 931 billion rubles ($13 billion). The most serious slump was in revenues from domestic VAT and income tax. However, that is largely a result of changes in the way these taxes are administered. In April, Russia switched to an accelerated payment of VAT refunds —- and from Jan. 1 almost all taxes and fees have been transferred to a single payment that is made on the 28th of each month.

Expenditure went up by a record 58.7% in January to 3.1 trillion rubles. Again, much of this can be explained away as a one-off — for example, the government paying up front for state contracts. The volume of public procurement increased fivefold in January compared with the same month last year (from 249 billion rubles to 1.3 trillion rubles). 

At the same time, some of this points to different dynamics — before the war, the Finance Ministry’s peak expenditure was in the fourth quarter. However, it’s not clear which expenses are being brought forward – after war broke out, the Finance Ministry stopped publishing a detailed breakdown of government expenditure.

It is still far too early to make any predictions about the state of the budget by the end of the year. But the dynamic is an important confirmation that things won’t be easy — and that revenue will fall. Under these conditions, the Kremlin and the government usually embark on so-called “resource mobilization” — i.e. going in search of hidden reserves they can tap.

Where is this leading?

The Russian government’s attitude toward business is only adding to heightened levels of uncertainty. Taxing profits after the fact is the complete opposite stable taxation. But the entire history of relations between business and the state suggests that the government will find a way to acquire what it wants — while maintaining the fiction of unchanging tax rates.

Household incomes in Russia fell just 1% in 2022

Russians’ real disposable incomes fell 1% in 2022, Russia’s State Statistics Service (Rosstat) reported this week. That is significantly less than forecast – the Ministry of Economic Development expected a slump of 2.2%. Incomes for Russians (following record growth of 2.2% in 2021) declined for three quarters in a row in 2022 and rebounded only in the final months of the year. The fourth quarter saw incomes jump 0.9%.

The late growth was due to falling inflation and increasing salaries. That was, in turn, fueled by the country’s sudden need for labor after the September mobilization and the related mass exodus abroad. In its report on the regional economy, the Central Bank indicated that, in December, half of Russia’s businesses suffered staff shortages. Firms said that they plan to keep increasing salaries in 2023 as a way of overcoming staffing problems.

According to calculations by the “Hard Figures” Telegram channel, car manufacturers were among the leaders for salary growth in November: pay was up 30% year-on-year. This coincided with a gradual resumption in output after a collapse in the months after the invasion. Salaries in passenger rail transportation were up 27% last year, in pipeline transport 23%, electronics 21% and 20% in metal products.

Entrepreneurship saw a 0.7% rise in its share of household incomes. “The changes in the structures of income favor funds from entrepreneurial activity,” said Lilia Ovcharova, an economist at the Higher School of Economics. “This is an effect of sanctions — as a result we saw a number of small and medium enterprises trying to develop imports for a range of products.” The role of “other cash income” also seems to be growing. In Rosstat’s methodology, this can include shadow incomes and remittances from abroad.

Russians spent less and saved more last year. In particular, the increase in saving (+7.3%) was noticeable. This indicates uncertainty – both about the present and the near future.

SCOTT RITTER: Arms Control or Ukraine?

U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev after signing the New START treaty in Prague, April 2010. (Kremlin.ru, CC BY 4.0, Wikimedia Commons)

Good background information provided here by Ritter on Putin’s decision to suspend Russia’s participation in the New START Treaty. – Natylie

By Scott Ritter, Consortium News, 2/22/23

…Background to the Decision

The backstory to New START is important, especially in the context of Putin’s declaration regarding Russia’s suspension. The core of that backstory is missile defense.

In December 2001, then-President George W. Bush announced that the United States was withdrawing from the landmark 1972 anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty, which banned (with limited exception) the development and deployment of missile defense systems designed to shoot down intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

The ABM treaty set in stone the Cold War concept of mutually assured destruction, or MAD, the idea that no side possessing nuclear weapons would use them against another nuclear power for the simple reason that to do so would bring about their own demise through guaranteed nuclear retaliation.

“The backstory to New START is important, especially in the context of Putin’s declaration regarding Russia’s suspension. The core of that backstory is missile defense.”

The insanity of MAD helped pave the way for all arms control agreements that followed, from the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (SALT), to the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty and on to the various iterations of Strategic Arms Reduction treaties (START).

Putin condemned the U.S. decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty as “a mistake.” At the time, U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals were subject to the limitations imposed by the 1991 START treaty. Efforts to further reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons were undertaken as part of the START II treaty.

But post-Cold War politics, combined with the U.S. decision to abandon the ABM treaty, left the treaty signed but unratified, effectively killing it.

Similar issues helped conspire to kill the START III treaty in the negotiation stage. The narrowly focused Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, or SORT, which was signed in 2002, committed both the U.S. and Russia to additional reductions beyond those mandated by START I, but contained no verification or compliance mechanisms.

The START I treaty expired in 2009, and SORT in 2012. New START was intended to replace both agreements.

The Medvedev Presidency

One of the sticking points has been the issue of missile defense. Under President Putin, Russia refused to enter any new substantive arms control treaty (SORT was more informal agreement than treaty in structure and substance) that did not meaningfully address missile defense.

But in May 2008, Dmitry Medvedev took over as Russian president. The Russian constitution prohibited a president from serving more than two consecutive terms in office, and so, with Putin’s support, Medvedev ran for Russia’s highest office, and won. Putin was subsequently appointed prime minister.

While the Bush administration sought to negotiate a follow-on treaty to the soon-to-be expired START I, Medvedev proved to be every bit as reluctant to entering any agreement with the U.S. that did not include limitations on missile defense, something President Bush would not accept.

In the end, the problem of negotiating a new treaty would be left to the administration of Barack Obama, who assumed office in January 2009.

In their first meeting, in London in late March 2009, the two leaders issued a statement in which they agreed “to pursue new and verifiable reductions in our strategic offensive arsenals in a step-by-step process, beginning by replacing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with a new, legally-binding treaty.”

As for missile defense, Obama and Medvedev agreed to treat it as a separate issue. “While acknowledging that differences remain over the purposes of deployment of missile defense assets in Europe,” the statement read, “we discussed new possibilities for mutual international cooperation in the field of missile defense, taking into account joint assessments of missile challenges and threats, aimed at enhancing the security of our countries, and that of our allies and partners.”

Let there be no doubt — the New START treaty that was negotiated between Russia and the United States, while singularly focused on reducing strategic offensive nuclear arsenals, contained a clear understanding that this treaty would be followed by a good-faith effort by the U.S. to address Russia’s longstanding concerns over missile defense.

This was reflected in the exchange of non-binding unilateral statements attached to the New START treaty. The “Statement of the Russian Federation Concerning Missile Defense” set out the position that New START “may be effective and viable only in conditions where there is no qualitative or quantitative build-up in [U.S. missile defense system capabilities].”

Moreover, the statement said any build-up in U.S. missile defense capabilities which gave “rise to a threat to [Russia’s strategic nuclear force potential]” would be considered one of the “extraordinary events” mentioned in Article XIV of the treaty and could prompt Russia to exercise its right of withdrawal.

For its part, the United States issued its own statement declaring that U.S. missile defenses “are not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia” while declaring that it intended “to continue improving and deploying its missile defense systems in order to defend itself against limited attack.”

“… the statement said any build-up in U.S. missile defense capabilities which gave ‘rise to a threat’ … could prompt Russia to exercise its right of withdrawal.”

The agreements reached between Obama and Medvedev, however, was not necessarily acceptable to Putin. According to Rose Gottemoeller, the U.S. negotiator for New START, Putin, as prime minister, nearly scuttled the talks when, in December 2009, he once again raised the issue of missile defense.

“They [the Russians] were going to have a critical National Security Council meeting,” Gottemoeller later recounted in an October 2021 talk with the Carnegie Council, “and the story I have heard told is that Putin, for the first time showing some interest in these negotiations, walks into the National Security Council meeting and simply draws lines through all the issues on this decision sheet and said, ‘No, no, no, no, no.’”

Gottemoeller went on to describe how Putin then travelled to Vladivostok and delivered a speech where he denounced the treaty as “totally inadequate,” criticizing both the U.S. and Russian negotiating teams as being “only focused on limiting strategic offensive forces,” noting that “they are not limiting missile defense. This treaty is a waste of time,” Gottemoeller quoted Putin. “We should get out of the negotiations.”

According to Gottemoeller, Medvedev stood up to Putin, telling his prime minister, “No, we are going to continue these negotiations and get them done.”

Broken Promise 

Anatoly Antonov was the Russian negotiator for New START. He dutifully complied with his instructions from the Kremlin to craft a treaty focused on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons, working under the assumption that the U.S. would be as good as its word when it came to engaging in meaningful negotiations on missile defense.

And yet, less than a year after New START entered into force, Antonov found that the U.S. had no intention on following through on its promises.

In , Antonov said that talks with NATO on a planned Western European missile-defense system had reached “a dead end,” adding that NATO proposals were “vague” and that the promised participation of Russia in the proposed system “is not even up for discussion.”

Antonov indicated that the lack of good faith shown by the U.S. regarding missile defense could lead to Russia withdrawing from the New START treaty altogether.

While the U.S. did offer to let Russia observe specific aspects of a specific test of a U.S. missile interceptor, the offer never amounted to anything, with the U.S. downplaying the abilities of the SM-3 missile when it came to intercepting Russian missiles, noting that the missile lacked the range to be effective against Russian missiles.

The late Ellen Tauscher, who at the time was the U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, had offered Antonov written assurances that the Mk. 41 Aegis Ashore system, which would employ the SM-3 missile interceptor, was not directed against Russia.

However, Tauscher said, “We cannot provide legally binding commitments, nor can we agree to limitations on missile defense, which must necessarily keep pace with the evolution of the threat.”

Tauscher’s words were prophetic. In 2015, the U.S. began testing the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor against ICBM targets. The SM-3 did, in fact, have the range to shoot down Russian intermediate- and intercontinental-range missiles.

And now those missiles were to be stationed on bases constructed in Poland and Romania, two former Warsaw Pact nations that were closer to the border with Russia than NATO forces had ever been.

The Americans had negotiated in bad faith. Putin, it turned out, had been right to question a strategic arms control treaty that did not consider Russia’s concerns over missile defense.

And yet this did not weaken Putin’s commitment to fulfilling New START. According to Gottemoeller,

“Putin, since this treaty has been signed, has taken a very positive stance about it. Since the treaty has entered into force, he has called it repeatedly publicly the ‘gold standard’ of nuclear treaties and has supported it…I know that he has been committed to the treaty and really committed to the efforts underway now in this strategic stability dialogue to get some new negotiations going.”

But Putin’s assiduous adherence to New START did not mean that the Russian leader had stopped worrying about the threat posed by U.S. missile defense. On March 1, 2018, Putin delivered a major address to the Russian Federal Assembly — the same forum he spoke to on Tuesday. His tone was defiant:

“I want to tell all those who have fueled the arms race over the last 15 years, sought to win unilateral advantages over Russia, and introduced unlawful sanctions aimed at containing our country’s development — everything that you wanted to impede with your policies has already happened. You have failed to contain Russia.”

Putin then unveiled several new Russian strategic weapons, including the Sarmat heavy ICBM and the Avangard hypersonic vehicle, which he said were developed in direct response to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty.

Putin said Russia had warned the U.S. that it would take such measures back in 2004. “No one listened to us then,” Putin declared. “So listen to us now.”

One of the people listening was Rose Gottemoeller. “[P]eople are worried about … the new so-called exotic weapons systems that President Putin rolled out in March of 2018,” the former arms control negotiator, by then retired, said in 2021. “[T]wo of them are already under the limits New START, the so-called Sarmat heavy [ICBM] and also the Avangard, which is their first strategic-range hypersonic glide vehicle that they are getting ready to deploy. They have already said that they will bring it under the New START Treaty.”

Gottemoeller noted that any future arms control agreement would be seeking constraints on these systems.

Treaty Extension in 2021

The New START Treaty was extended for a five-year term in February 2021, even though the Russians believed that the “conversion or elimination” procedures used by the U.S. to determine whether B-52H bombers and Ohio-class submarines converted from nuclear- to non-nuclear use, or eliminated altogether, were insufficient.

The Russians hoped that these issues could be worked out using the treaty-mandated Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) process, which meets twice a year to resolve issues such as these.

One of the problems facing both the U.S. and Russian inspectors and negotiators, however, was the Covid-19 pandemic. In early 2020, both sides agreed to suspend on-site inspections and BCC meetings due to the pandemic. By mid-2021, U.S. and Russian negotiators began discussing the creation of joint Covid protocols that could get both inspections and BCC consultations up and running.

But then came Ukraine.

On March 9, 2022, the U.S., U.K. and European Union all passed sanctions which banned Russian aircraft form overflying their respective territories and placed visa restrictions on Russians transiting EU or the U.K. en route to the United States. According to the Russians, these restrictions effectively prohibit the dispatch of weapons-inspection teams to the U.S. using New START short-notice inspection protocols, which have strict treaty-mandated timelines attached to their implementation.  

“By mid-2021, U.S. and Russian negotiators began discussing the creation of joint Covid protocols that could get both inspections and BCC consultations up and running. But then came Ukraine.”

In June 2022, the U.S. unilaterally declared that the moratorium on inspections imposed because of the Covid-19 pandemic was no longer in effect. On Aug. 8, 2022, the U.S. attempted to dispatch a short-notice inspection team to Russia to carry out treaty-mandated inspection tasks.

Russia denied entry to the team, and accused the U.S. of trying to gain a unilateral advantage by conducting on-site inspections while Russia could not. Citing the restrictions imposed by sanctions, the Russia Foreign Ministry said “there are no similar obstacles to the arrival of American inspectors in Russia.”

To resolve the impasse over inspections as well as other outstanding treaty-implementation issues, Russian and U.S. diplomats began consultations on convening a meeting of the BCC, and eventually were able to settle on a Nov. 29, 2022, date in Cairo, Egypt. Four days before the BCC was supposed to begin, however, Russia announced that the meeting was off.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, in statements made to Kommersant, said that the war in Ukraine was at the heart of the decision. “There is, of course, the effect of what is happening in Ukraine and around it,” Ryabkov said. “I will not deny it. Arms control and dialogue in this area cannot be immune to what is around it.”

Arms Control Could Be Dead

The State Department issued an official report to Congress on Russian compliance with New Start in early 2023 which accused Russia of violating the New START treaty by refusing U.S. inspectors access to sites inside Russia.

Russia, a State Department spokesperson stated, was “not complying with its obligation under the New START Treaty to facilitate inspection activities on its territory,” noting that “Russia’s refusal to facilitate inspection activities prevents the United States from exercising important rights under the treaty and threatens the viability of U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control.”

The insensitivity of the U.S. side to the impact of its actions targeting Russia — sometimes literally — as part of the overall U.S. response to Putin’s initiation of the Special Military Operation in February 2022 is, however, telling.

In his Feb. 21, 2022, address, Putin highlighted the role played by the U.S. and NATO in facilitating the Ukrainian use of Soviet-era drones to carry out an attack on a base near Engels, Russia, that housed Russia’s strategic aviation assets, including nuclear-capable bombers. He also pointed out that he had just signed orders for the Sarmat and Avangardsystems to become operational and, as such, inspectable under the terms of New START.

“The United States and NATO are directly saying that their goal is to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia,” Putin said. “Are they going to inspect our defense facilities, including the newest ones, as if nothing had happened? Do they really think we’re easily going to let them in there just like that?”

Rose Gottemoeller observed that the U.S. is “not going to change our policy on Ukraine because he’s [Putin] in a hissy fit over the New START treaty. That’s just not going to happen.”

But Putin’s stance is far more principled than a simple “hissy fit.” Born of the original sin perpetrated by the U.S. in withdrawing from the ABM treaty, Putin’s angst is directly tied to the deceit displayed by U.S. officials — including Gottemoeller — when it came to assurances given Dmitry Medvedev about missile defense during the New START negotiations.

This deceit led to Russia deploying new categories of strategic nuclear weapons — the Sarmat and Avangard — to defeat U.S. missile defense systems, including those that had been forward deployed into Europe.

And now, with the war in Ukraine being linked to a U.S. strategy of achieving the strategic defeat of Russia, the U.S. is seeking to use New START to gain access to these very systems, all the while denying Russia its reciprocal rights of inspection under the treaty. As Putin aptly noted, such an arrangement “really sounds absurd.”

The inability and/or unwillingness of either party to compromise on New START means that the treaty will remain in limbo for the indefinite future which, given that the treaty expires in February 2026, means there is a distinct possibility arms control between the U.S. and Russia is dead.

Risk of New Arms Race

While the U.S. and Russia had previously committed to a follow-on treaty to replace New START, the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine poses a nearly insurmountable obstacle for anyone seeking to have such a treaty document ready for signature and ratification by the time New START expires.

There is a good chance the U.S. and Russia, in two years’ time, will find themselves without any verifiable mechanism to assuage the fears and uncertainty about the two parties’ respective nuclear arsenals, leading to the real possibility — if not probability — that they will both embark on an unconstrained arms race fueled by ignorance-based angst that could very well result in the kind of misunderstandings, mistakes, or miscalculations that could trigger a nuclear war and, in doing so, end all humanity.

“The truth is behind us,” Putin said, closing out his address to the Russian Federal Assembly.

So, too, may be humanity’s last chance to prevent nuclear calamity, if a way can’t somehow be found to get arms control back on the agenda.

Here, Gottemoeller’s assertion that the U.S. would not alter its Ukraine policy to save New START underscores the self-defeating reality of the Biden administration’s efforts to arm Ukraine.

The sooner the war in Ukraine is over, the sooner the U.S. and Russia can get down to the business of preserving arms control as a viable part of the relationship between the two nations.

By seeking to extend the Ukraine conflict, however, the U.S. is in effect engaging in an act of self-immolation that threatens to engulf the world in a nuclear holocaust.

During the Vietnam War, the noted correspondent Peter Arnett quoted an unnamed U.S. Army officer as saying, “We had to destroy the village to save it.” With regard to the linkage that has been created between Ukraine and arms control, the same sick logic now applies — to save one, the other must be destroyed.

To save Ukraine, arms control must be destroyed.

To save arms control, Ukraine must be destroyed.

One sacrifices a nation, the other a planet.

This is the Hobson’s Choice U.S. policy makers have created, except it is not.

Save the planet. That is the only choice.

Joe Lauria: On the Legal Question of Russia’s Military Intervention

UN flag

By Joe Lauria, Consortium News, 2/10/23

This doesn’t necessarily reflect my view of the situation, but it’s an interesting analysis. – Natylie

Joe Lauria is editor-in-chief of Consortium News and a former U.N. correspondent for The Wall Street Journal, Boston Globe, and numerous other newspapers, including The Montreal Gazette and The Star of Johannesburg.

In his impassioned address to the United Nations Security Council on Wednesday, in which he appealed to the council’s humanity to bring about a ceasefire in Ukraine, British rock legend Roger Waters called Russia’s military action “illegal.”

That has gotten some attention and raised the question again of the legality of the military operation according to international law. As is often the case with law, the question is not as simple as it might seem.

What the Charter Says

The U.N. Charter has something to say about the legal use of military force. It allows it in two cases: when it is authorized by the Security Council and when it is legitimately used in self-defense. Council authorization for force is contained in Chapter VII, Article 42:

“Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 [economic sanctions] would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.”

The second instance allowing armed force is in self-defense, explained in Chapter VII, Article 51:

“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

So, on these narrow legal grounds, the U.N. Charter only permits the use of force after authorization by the Security Council or in self defense by a “member state.” Russia entered the eight-year Ukrainian civil war on Feb. 24, 2022 to defend against attacks against the majority-ethnic Russian oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk, which had declared independence from Ukraine in 2014.

Russia only recognized their independence on Feb. 21, 2022, three days before its intervention. It intervened without authorization from the Security Council, where the U.S., Britain and probably France would have vetoed it.

As the self-defense article pertains only to U.N. member states, it could not apply to Donetsk and Luhansk. Russia is a member state but the article says “if an armed attack occurs” against it, and there was at the time no armed attack against Russia.

So according to the U.N. Charter, Russia’s military intervention was not legally authorized.

Montevideo Convention

However, states are not prohibited by the Charter to request the presence of foreign forces on their territory. There is no language in the Charter about it. Officially inviting foreign forces onto one’s territory would not be considered an illegal occupation. Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Convention says:

“Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.”

The Russian army is certainly not seen as hostile in Donetsk and Luhansk. The murkiness of the legal issue arises then on the question of whether Donetsk and Luhansk were independent states in February of last year — states that could invite foreign forces onto its territory — or were they at the time still part of Ukraine? (Ukraine and the West argue they still are today. The republics passed referenda in September 2022 to join the Russian Federation.)

So what makes an independent state? According to the Montevideo Convention of 1933, “The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications:

a permanent population;

b. a defined territory;

c. government; and

d. capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”

This is key: Article 3 of the convention adds, “The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states.” That means no other other country has to recognize their independence if the above criteria are met.

Donetsk and Luhansk met the four requirements of the Convention including capacity to enter into relations with other states, as it has relations with the Russian Federation. The Convention says a state need not be recognized by other states. They have been recognized by Russia, Syria and North Korea.

So the Russian intervention is considered illegal under the U.N. Charter because it was not authorized by the Security Council nor does it meet the test of the self-defense Article 51.

But the Charter does not prohibit a state from inviting foreign forces onto its territory. A legal argument based on the Montevideo Convention can be made that the two territories were independent states at the time of Russia’s intervention and had the right to request foreign forces to enter their territory. In that sense, Russia’s military action in February a year ago was legal.

Patrick Lawrence: Totalized Censorship

Photo by Markus Winkler on Pexels.com

By Patrick Lawrence, Consortium News, 2/20/23

When I awoke Sunday morning to the news that YouTube had censored a long interview Seymour Hersh did with Democracy Now! on the grounds that it did not meet the Google subsidiary’s “community standards” and was, moreover, “offensive,” my mind went in many directions.

I thought of the New York Post case in October 2020, three weeks before the presidential election, when Twitter, Facebook and the other big social media platforms blocked America’s oldest daily after it reported the damning, politically damaging contents of Hunter Biden’s laptop computer.

I thought of what we now call “the disinformation industry” and all these diabolic organizations — PropOrNot, NewsGuard, Hamilton 68, et al. — that, stocked with spooks serving in staff positions and as advisers, dedicate themselves to discrediting dissenting writers and independent publications as conveyers of Russian propaganda.

And then I thought of a story a Russian acquaintance told me one afternoon over drinks when I was in Moscow some years back. Leonid was a professor of sociology at Moscow State University and had served the Central Committee and the Politburo in various advisory capacities during the Soviet era. Leonid knew how to ride the waves, let’s say, and he knew whereof he spoke. He also had a wonderful sense of humor and a highly developed appreciation for life’s infinite ironies.

Let me pass on his tale and then make the connection with Hersh’s exposé of the Biden regime’s Nord Stream op and the other cases I have mentioned.

We had been talking about the press, in Russia, in America, in Asia, and elsewhere, trading observations and comparing notes. It was then, in the bar at the old Metropole Hotel, that Leonid related a story he thought I would find useful or amusing or both.

Recollection at the Metropole 

During one of the periods of Soviet–American détente in the 1970s, the State Department offered to take two Foreign Ministry bureaucrats on a tour of the United States. They visited five cities — New York, Washington, Chicago, Los Angeles and San Francisco — with the minders from State taking care to show their guests the sort of things minders from State would want Soviet visitors to see. A certain camaraderie developed. It is nice to think about the scene, impossible as such occasions have become. 

When they reached San Francisco and it was time to say farewell, the State Department’s shepherds asked the two Soviets what aspects of American life they found most remarkable. The Sovs seem not to have hesitated before replying.

In the Soviet Union, they said, all the newspapers across 11 time zones say the same thing every day because they are carefully censored. They are told routinely what to say and what to leave out. Here in America the press is free. We have seen no sign of censorship in all the cities you have shown us. And yet wherever we are, when we pick up a newspaper they, too, say the same thing. From New York to California, nothing we have read is ever any different.

There is externally imposed censorship and there is internally imposed censorship, to state the obvious, and the two Soviet bureaucrats were fascinated to see, firsthand and for the first time, the latter at work. Brute censorship is nothing pretty to look at, Leonid, my Russian acquaintance, meant to say. But the invisible kind is just as effective.

Everyone in mainstream journalism knows where the fence posts are, as I like to put it, and if you spend too much time beyond them you won’t work in mainstream journalism very long. I wonder if Seymour Hersh, certainly proven to rank among the great journalists of our time, may have a thought about this.

Internalized Censorship

This question of internalized censorship, commonly known as self-censorship, has long fascinated me. I have watched many times as journalists, surrendering themselves for the sake of their professional careers, train themselves to hear the silent language that tells them what to say and what to leave unsaid. And then, over time, you find them giving vigorous voice to thoughts and beliefs imposed upon them, absolutely convinced these are their own thoughts and beliefs and they have come by them independently.

The modern mind’s eager desire to conform while we remain certain of our originality and individuality: Philip Slater touched on this in his too-soon-forgotten The Pursuit of Loneliness, published in 1970. So did Erich Fromm in Escape from Freedom, which appeared in 1941 and could hardly be more pertinent to our time:

“We are proud that in his conduct of life man has become free from external authorities, which tell him what to do and what not to do. We neglect the role of anonymous authorities like public opinion and ‘common sense,’ which are so powerful because of our profound readiness to conform to the expectations everybody has about ourselves and our equally profound fear of being different.”

I have had overbearing editors I greatly wished were more anonymous than they were, but let us set this minor point aside. Fromm and Slater are concerned with the collective psychology from which self-censorship draws for its extraordinary effectiveness. “Compulsive conformity,” Fromm calls it.

We can go back as far as Alexis de Tocqueville to gain a sense of how deeply rooted this conformity is among Americans. When we do, we cannot be surprised or mystified to note what the Soviet visitors noted 50–odd years ago and what we fail to see even as it is before us in plain sight: American media are as rigorously controlled via the mechanisms of internalized censorship as any newspaper in any of the “authoritarian” societies we profess to detest for their lack of freedom.

But what happened to Sy Hersh’s Democracy Now! interview last weekend, to the New York Post in the final weeks of Joe Biden’s presidential campaign, and to a lot of independent journalists at the hands of the disinformation industry since this took shape a half-dozen years ago requires us to think anew.

It is commonly said that the emergence of digital media since the mid–1990s, when the first such publications appeared (and when Bob Parry started publishing Consortium News), has brought us into a new era. And we can mean many things by this. Let us not now miss: For all the good these new media have done and for all the doors they promise to open, this new era is to be one of coercive, externally imposed censorship as heavy-handed as anything those visiting Sovs had lived with all those years back.

With the decline of our legacy media into craven subservience to power to an extent no one could have dreamed of a couple of decades’ back, independent media such as Consortium News are where the future of the Great Craft lies, a point I have made severally in this space. But it seems to me the digital platforms on which these media depend have been liabilities as well as assets from the first.

Technologies are not value-neutral. Jacques Ellul, the Christian anarchist and many-sided intellect, made this case in The Technological Society, which came out in English in 1964. To put his thesis too simply, technologies are not empty of content other than what is put into them. Implicit in any technology is an affirmation of the political economy and material circumstances that produced it.

In other words, the technologies available to independent journalists are corporate products. They are vital to independent practitioners as means of delivery, but, as we learn by the day now, access to them can be withdrawn at any time. Many of us seem to have missed this contradiction. Now we are pressed to recognize it. 

As we do, we are led to ask whether the promise of independent journalism can be extinguished by way of a totalized system of censorship. Do you think this phrase too strong? Marc Andreessen, the founder of Netscape, the web services company, and an influential figure in Silicon Valley, doesn’t. In the spring of 2022 Andreessen sent out this note via Twitter:

“I predict essentially identical censorship/deplatforming policies across all layers of the internet stack. Client-side & server-side ISPs, cloud platforms, CDNs, payment networks, client OSs, browsers, email clients. With only rare exceptions. The pressure is intense.”

I do not know how far we are from the world Andreesson warns us of. But is there an argument that we are headed in the direction he forecasts?

I do not wish to diminish the importance of independent media, a point I hope is by now clear, but to turn these thoughts another way, it is one thing to bully, cancel and otherwise suppress emergent publications and greatly another to censor a legacy newspaper such as the New York Post and a journalist of Seymour Hersh’s stature. My conclusion: The game is getting rough and is likely to get a lot rougher.

There is one other factor forcing the pace of America’s censorship regime that bears mentioning. This concerns the larger context. By the time digital media began to find their place in public discourse, the events of 2001 had forced the American imperium onto its back foot, and it has ever since assumed the hostile crouch of the wounded. As history teaches us, it is at this point that declining nations require the loyalty of all economic, political, industrial, and cultural institutions. Accordingly, the line between the national security state and corporate media has not been merely blurred in the post–2001 era: It is now more or less eliminated, as documents such as the Twitter Files make clear.

Are we surprised? We ought not be. Next question: What are we to do as an era of totalized censorship appears to be upon us? Subscribing to the independent publication of your choice would be a conscientious start.

SYSTEM UPDATE #35 – Pro-War Propagandists: How Bloodthirsty Media Push US Toward Every New War

Link here.

Alfred De Zayas: The Ukraine War in the Light of the UN Charter

By Alfred De Zayas, Counterpunch, 2/6/23

Alfred de Zayas is a law professor at the Geneva School of Diplomacy and served as a UN Independent Expert on International Order 2012-18. He is the author of ten books including “Building a Just World Order” Clarity Press, 2021. 

The war in Ukraine did not start on 24 February 2022, but already in February 2014.  The civilian population of the Donbas has endured continued shelling from Ukrainian forces since 2014, notwithstanding the Minsk Agreements.  These attacks on Lugansk and Donetsk significantly increased in January-February 2022, as reported by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine[1].

Like all wars, this war is a tragedy for all concerned, — not only for Ukrainians and Russians, but also for the continued validity of international law and the primacy of the UN Charter.  Already NATO’s military campaigns in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq in the 1990’s and early 2000’s sorely tried the authority and credibility of the United Nations as an Organization.  These military campaigns conducted outside Chapter VII of the UN Charter rendered the United Nations nearly irrelevant, because the Organization was unable to prevent the illegal use of force or mediate peace.  The unilateral actions of a number of states were never subject to accountability, not even the grave war crimes committed in Iraq and Afghanistan, as documented by Julian Assange in the Wikileaks publications. NATO countries grossly violated articles 2(3) and 2(4) of the Charter, absent any Charter justification, since article 51, which stipulates the right of self-defence does not cover pre-emptive military actions.

The so-called “coalition of the willing” perpetrated naked aggression against the people of Iraq in 2003 in a series of criminal acts that constituted a revolt against the UN Charter and international law.  Such military campaigns carried out against the letter and spirit of the UN Charter and hitherto not subject to prosecution by the International Criminal Court have significantly weakened the force of international law and resulted in the emergence of “precedents of permissibility” [2], as I described in a Counterpunch article published on 4 March 2022, in which I clearly condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine as an egregious violation of Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter.

On the other hand, it is clear that a violation of international law does not change jus cogens or create new international law (ex injuria non oritur jus – no right emerges from a wrong). Impunity only manifests the weakness of the system due to a lack of adequate enforcement mechanisms[3].

On 31 January 2023 Counterpunch published an essay by history Professor Lawrence Wittner entitled “The Ukraine War and International Law”[4].  He correctly condemns the violation of article 2(4) of the UN Charter by Russia and the war crimes that have ensued, for which there must be accountability.   Prof. Wittner refers to “rules of behavior among nations” in connection with war, diplomacy, economy, etc.  Among those rules of behavior are, of course, the “general principles of law” referred to in article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, notably the principles of good faith and the uniform application of norms.

In his book The Great Delusion[5], Professor John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago elucidated principles of international order and the necessity to respect agreements (pacta sunt servanda), including oral agreements.  In his article in the Economist on 19 March 2022[6], Mearsheimer explains why the West bears responsibility for the Ukrainian crisis.  Already in 2015 Mearsheimer had signalled the importance of keeping oral agreements, as those given by the United States to Mikhail Gorbachev in 1989-91, to the effect that NATO would not expand eastward[7].  In subsequent lectures Mearsheimer has explained that, whether of not the West considers NATO’s expansion a provocation, what is crucial is how NATO expansion is perceived by those who feel threatened by it.  In this context we must remember that article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits not only the use of force but also the threat of the use of force.  Promising to expand NATO to the very borders of Russia and the massive weaponization of Ukraine certainly constitute such a threat, especially bearing in mind the aggressive campaigns by NATO members in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Lybia.

For decades Russian Presidents Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev have been warning the West – notably at the 2007 Munich Security Conference[8] — that NATO eastward expansion constitutes an existential menace to Russia.  Both Presidents advocate a European security architecture that will take into account the national security concerns of all countries, including Russia. Whether Russian fears are objectively justified or not (I think they are) is not the pertinent question, since their apprehension is a factum.  What is crucial is the obligation of all UN member states to settle their differences by peaceful means, i.e. to negotiate in good faith.  That is precisely what the Minsk agreements were all about.  Yet, Ukraine violated the Minsk agreements systematically.  Russia did make a credible effort to negotiate since 2014 in the context of the OSCE and the Normandy Format.  German Chancellor Angela Merkel[9] and French President François Hollande[10] recently confirmed that the Minsk agreements were intended to give Ukraine time to prepare for war.  Thus, essentially, the West entered the agreements in bad faith by deliberately deceiving the Donbas Russians.  In a very real sense, Putin was taken for a ride at Minsk and during the eight years of Normandy Format discussions.  Such behavior reflects a “culture of cheating”[11] and violates well-established principles of international relations amounting to perfidy, in contravention of the UN Charter and general principles of law.  Notwithstanding, In December 2021 the Russians put forward two peaceful proposals in the hope of averting military confrontation.  Although the treaty proposals were moderate and pragmatic, the US and NATO refused to negotiate pursuant to article 2(3) of the Charter and arrogantly rejected them.  If this was not a provocation in contravention of article 2(4) of the UN Charter, I do not know what is.

Professor Wittner is right in reminding us of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 and the 1997 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, but these instruments have to be placed in legal and historical context, in particular in the context of Western pronouncements since 2008 to bring Ukraine into NATO, an issue that in no way was foreseen in the two instruments above.

Wittner is wrong in his evaluation of the Crimean issue.  I was the UN representative for the elections in Ukraine in March and June 1994 and criss-crossed the country, including Crimea. Without a doubt, the vast majority of the population there and in the Donbass are Russian and feel Russian.  This brings up the issue of the jus cogens right of self-determination of peoples, anchored in articles 1 and 55 of the UN Charter (and in Chapters XI and XII of the Charter) and in Art. 1 common to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  Wittner seems to forget that the US and EU supported the illegal coup d’état[12] against the democratically elected President of Ukraine, Victor Yanukovich, and immediately started working together with the Putsch-regime in Kiev, instead of insisting in re-establishing law and order as provided for in the Agreement of 20 February 2014[13].  As Professor Stephen Cohen wrote in 2018, Maidan was a “seminal event”[14].

Without the Maidan Putsch and the anti-Russian measures immediately taken by the Putsch-regime, the Crimean and Donbass peoples would not have felt menaced and would not have insisted on their right of self-determination.  Wittner errs when he uses the term “annexation” to refer to the reincorporation of Crimea into Russia.  “Annexation” in international law presupposes an invasion, military occupation contrary to the will of the people.  That is not what happened in Crimea in March 2014.  First there was a referendum to which the UN and OSCE were invited – and never came. Then there was an unilateral declaration of independence by the legitimate Crimean Parliamen, only then was there an official request to be re-incorporated into Russia, a request that went through the due process mill, being first approved by the Duma, then by the Constitutional Court of Russia, and only then signed by Putin.  Had a referendum been held in 1994, when I was in Crimea, the results would surely have been similar.  A referendum today would confirm the will of the Crimeans to be part of Russia, not Ukraine, to which they had been artificially attached by decision of Nikita Khruschev, a Ukrainian himself.  There are no historical or ethnic reasons justifying Crimea’s attachment to the Ukraine. Many international lawyers agree that Crimea exercised its right of self-determination and was not “annexed” by Russia[15].

Wittner is correct in recalling the fact that the General Assembly adopted a Resolution of 27 March 2014 rejecting the “annexation” of Crimea.  But what exactly does that Resolution tell us?  As a former senior lawyer with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and former UN Independent Expert, I must admit that for many decades the United Nations Organization applies double standards and does not live up to the Charter.  Many resolutions and pronouncements by successive Secretary Generals apply international law selectively, à la carte.  What the 2014 GA Resolution demonstrates is that the Organization is largely in the service of Washington and Brussels, partly because of the enormous financial dependency of the UN on the West.  Similarly, the GA Resolution of 2 March 2022 is yet another example of double-standards, bearing in mind that the GA had not adopted any similar resolutions when NATO committed aggression on Yugoslavia in 1999 or when the “coalition of the willing” devastated Iraq in 2003 without any threat or provocation by Saddam Hussein.

Wittner also cites Secretary General Guterres with regard to the “annexation” of Crimea and the Donbass.  As a former senior UN staffer and former rapporteur, it pains me to see how the Organization has been hijacked to support certain untenable positions of Western countries, and how it allows itself to be used in the geopolitical game, instead of remaining true to the Principles and Purposes of the Organization as laid out in the Charter. Where is the “outrage” of the Organization when it comes to the multiple aggressions of the United States against Cuba, Grenada, Nicaragua, Panama, Venezuela, the many coups-d’état directed by the US against governments it does not like, when the Organization keeps silent about the crimes committed by the CIA in Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib and secret detention centres, when the “annexation” of the Syrian Golan Heights by Israel is tacitly accepted.

Wittner poses an important question “what…are we to think about the value of international law”? As a professor of international law and a believer in the UN Charter, I ask the same question.  My 25 Principles of International Order[16] give some answers.   In my 14 reports to the UN Human Rights Council and General Assembly (2012-18) I formulated pragmatic recommendations how to reform the United Nations in order to deliver on the 1945 promise to “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”.  I agree with Wittner that it is necessary “to strengthen global governance, thereby providing a firmer foundation for the enforcement of international law”.  But there is a caveat – the Organization must be truly committed to peace, and not only sometimes.  It must not continue to apply international law à la carte, or it will lose all its authority and credibility.

Today what is absolutely necessary is an immediate cease-fire. The United Nations is failing the Charter if it does not make peace its priority and puts the entire system in the service of peace. The mediation proposals of Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula[17] must be taken seriously as well as the warnings and proposals by Professors John Mearsheimer[18], Jeffrey Sachs[19] and Richard Falk[20].

[1] https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/512683

https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine-closed

[2] https://www.counterpunch.org/2022/03/...

[3] https://www.counterpunch.org/2022/04/...

[4] https://www.counterpunch.org/2023/02/...

[5] Yale University Press, 2018.

[6] https://www.economist.com/by-invitati...

[7] http://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Why-the-Ukraine-Crisis-Is.pdf

https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2023/01/10/john_mearsheimer_on_ukraine_conflict_there_are_no_realistic_options_the_west_is_screwed.html#!

https://duckduckgo.com/?q=john+mearsh...

[8] http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president...

[9] https://english.almayadeen.net/news/p...

[10] https://global.espreso.tv/minsk-agree...

[11] https://www.counterpunch.org/2022/01/...

[12] https://www.nouvelobs.com/rue89/rue89-le-yeti-voyageur-a-domicile/20140311.RUE9766/le-coup-d-etat-ukrainien-a-bien-ete-pilote-par-les-etats-unis-la-preuve.html

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957

[13] https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL201...

[14] https://www.thenation.com/article/arc...

[15] https://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleto...https://www.rubikon.news/artikel/die-krim-und-das-volkerrecht

https://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/die-krim-und-das-voelkerrecht-kuehle-ironie-der-geschichte-12884464.html

https://www.wissensmanufaktur.net/krim-zeitfragen

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2020-04-03/russia-love

[16] https://www.counterpunch.org/2022/11/28/principles-of-international-order/

See Chapter 2 of my book “Building a Just World Order”, Clarity Press, 2021.

[17] https://www.politico.eu/article/ukrai...

[18] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CmqojuijtFg

[19] https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?tab...

[20] https://richardfalk.org/2022/09/14/uk...