Natylie Baldwin's Blog, page 148

Pietro Shakarian: On the Agency of Former Soviet Republics

By Pietro Shakarian, ACURA, 3/21/23

The ongoing war in Ukraine has been framed in multiple ways by multiple commentators of international affairs.  Depending on one’s point of view, it could be characterized as a war between Russia and Ukraine, a proxy war between Russia and NATO, or a proxy war between Russia and a US-backed West.  The latter two perspectives anchor the war in the larger context of the gradual deterioration of US-Russia relations since the high point at the end of the Cold War.  In this framework, most scholars who adhere to this position perceive the expansion of NATO as a key reason for the deterioration and eventual break-down of ties between Moscow and Washington.

Although this position is amply supported by a substantial body of evidence, there are those who question it on the basis of excluding the agency of Ukraine.  By framing the war and its origins entirely within the larger context of US-Russia relations, these individuals contend, “does it not erase or mitigate the independent agency of Ukraine?”  Similarly, those who adhere to this argument contend that Ukraine should be able to join NATO if it so freely chooses.  The argument is applicable beyond Ukraine and, in different contexts, has been applied to various other former Soviet republics – Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, etc.

The response given to such arguments is usually that, yes, Ukraine (for example) has independent agency, but NATO membership is not, as the historian Stephen F. Cohen used to say, a fraternity or sorority, let alone the American Association of Retired People.  Not anyone can join.  The membership of the country must enhance the security of the other member states, not imperil it.  A similar response, employed by John Mearsheimer, contends that while these countries do have agency, their interests have to take a back seat to the larger aim of averting a cataclysmic nuclear clash between the superpowers.  Such was the case with Fidel Castro’s Cuba when it had to relinquish the Soviet missiles from its island as a necessary part of defusing of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

While such arguments are fully valid, an equally compelling response to the agency question, and one that speaks much more directly to the people of the post-Soviet space, is the fact that former Soviet republics like Ukraine are usually compelled into such a difficult geopolitical position by external forces that do not have the interests of the people at heart.  Again, this argument applies beyond Ukraine and, in different contexts, extends variously to Armenia, Georgia, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, and other ex-Soviet states.

The external forces in these cases are non-governmental organizations (NGOs) based out of numerous Western countries, especially the United States.  This is not to say that all Western-based NGOs exert some sort of nefarious influence in the region.  However, certain NGOs have clearly used (or abused) the goodwill of several post-Soviet governments in order to advance larger geopolitical aims.  These include the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the Open Society Foundation, the Eurasia Foundation, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the International Republic Institute (IRI), among many others.  In the 30-year period since the dissolution of the USSR, such organizations have taken full advantage of the acute socioeconomic conditions that emerged in these countries, with little or no regard for their independent agency, their national histories, or the longstanding economic, cultural, and personal ties that bind them together.

As a result of the loss of jobs, inter-republican economic ties, and the significant disruptions that occurred from haphazard market “reforms,” many citizens of these societies have gravitated toward these NGOs as sources of economic opportunity.  Still others have fallen under the sway of the messaging of these organizations, which have a clear geopolitical imperative – to diminish Russia’s political and cultural presence in the post-Soviet space, with the objective of preventing any sort of restoration of economic, political, or person-to-person connections.  Another, much more sinister aim, made all too painfully evident by the ongoing tragedy in Ukraine, is the effort on the part of these NGOs, in collusion with the Washington war party, to use these republics as geopolitical bludgeons against Russia, at the terrible expense of their own citizens.

Equipped with substantial budgets and a savvy understanding of soft power and social media, these same NGOs also know the value of marketing.  If large majorities of Ukrainians, Armenians, Georgians, and others might have opposed taking an overtly anti-Russian, pro-NATO stance in 1992 or 1998, then these NGOs work constantly to change public opinion, manipulating attitudes and manufacturing consent until the desired results are achieved.  These newfound “desires” for NATO are then represented as being just as natural as the Caucasus mountains or the wheat fields of the Ukrainian steppe.  To deny NATO, the NGOniks declare, would be to deny the long-awaited wish of the narod of the post-Soviet space to join the Western military alliance and purchase expensive military weaponry.

The historical periods of Khrushchev’s Thaw and Gorbachev’s glasnost underscore the indisputable historical fact that the countries of the former Soviet Union have a rich history of endogenous democratization efforts.  Yet, the post-Soviet NGO class represents democratization as only being possible through the “enlightened” influence of the United States and other Western societies.  To allow these countries to find their way to democracy independently is considered an anathema, a rejection of “European values,” and indicative of “democratic backsliding,” to use a very demeaning term all too common in the neocolonial lexicon of post-Soviet NGO-speak.  This line of thinking is horribly Hobbesian, assuming that without the “civilizing influence” of Washington, these “poor people” would revert to a “natural state” of “barbarism” and “Cyrillic autocracy” (as if use of the Latin alphabet indicates “civilization” and “democracy”).

With the discreet charm of used car salesmen, the representatives of these NGOs also extol markets and hyper-individualistic neoliberal values, while ignoring genuine social concerns like poverty and joblessness.  In terms of the historical memory of the Soviet experience, those affiliated with NGOs in former Soviet republics often emphasize the “totalitarian model,” asserting that there were virtually no differences between the various Soviet leaders and their contexts (e.g., that there was “no difference” between Lenin and Stalin, or even Stalin and Gorbachev).

Likewise, the NGO emissaries often represent the October Revolution of 1917 not as a genuine revolution (which it was, as the research of Alexander Rabinowitch and others highlight), but as a “Bolshevik coup.”  In this context, they also often downplay the major Soviet-era achievements of these republics, be they artistic, scientific, or economic. Furthermore, these NGOs emphasize the (incorrect) narrative (adopted as truth by the US foreign policy establishment) that the Washington “won” the Cold War and single-handedly defeated the Soviet Union, the dissolution of which they framed as “inevitable.”  Yet, as former US ambassador Jack Matlock regularly reminds us, this was simply not the case.  However, if one questions these narratives, they are attacked for peddling “Russian disinformation.”

Rather than reflecting the desires of the societies of the post-Soviet space, these Western-based NGOs usually subordinate wishes for genuine independence to the geopolitical objectives of Washington’s war class.  In this respect, they only succeed in acting as disruptors, upsetting the ability of countries like Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia from developing genuinely democratic societies and truly independent agency on the international stage.  The recent controversy in Georgia over the “foreign agent” bill is vividly illustrative of the roles of these NGOs as “disruptors” preventing these countries from achieving actual independence and democracy.  Rather than indicating a “roll-back of democracy” or a “contradiction of European aspirations,” the aim of Tbilisi was to move toward a genuinely independent and transparent democratic society.  After all, there is a reason why the “foreign agent” bill was based on the example of FARA in the United States.

Above all, by forcing the post-Soviet states to make a hard geopolitical “civilizational choice” between Russia and the West, these NGOs are being incredibly unfair to the peoples of these societies.  In this regard, they deny them the true agency and independence that they genuinely desire, barring them from the right to imbibe in the fruits of both sides as independent actors.  Moreover, the professed NGO aspiration of “democratization” has resulted in the opposite intended effect.  Across the former Soviet space today, from Russia to Ukraine, one encounters far more illiberal governments than liberal, democratic ones.  Indeed, the interference of external organizations into the endogenous political development of these states has led to a greater de-democratization throughout the region.

Perhaps most ironically and tragically, the professed zeal for “democratic enlightenment” has also led to a de-democratization of the United States itself.  In the drive to “contain Russia,” the military-industrial complex that President Eisenhower once eloquently warned against has now joined forces with corporate interests and a pervasive political culture of righteous conformity to erode the basic liberties upon which the country was founded.  The results bode poorly for America’s image abroad and only succeed in setting a bad example for the rest of the world, including the post-Soviet space.  Even more alarmingly, they also have the potential to bring humanity perilously close to nuclear catastrophe.  If the deafening silence on the journalism of Sy Hersh is any indication of the state of American democracy, then it becomes clear that the chief priority of Washington lawmakers should be fixing democracy at home rather than searching for monsters abroad.

Dr. Pietro A. Shakarian is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Centre for Historical Research, National Research University–Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburg, Russia. He previously worked as a lecturer in history at the American University of Armenia in Yerevan.

Eight out of ten of Russians consider themselves happy, says VTsIOM

Russians in St. Petersburg near the Singer Sewing Machine building, Photo by Natylie Baldwin, October 2015.

Intellinews, 3/20/23

Eight out of ten (82%) of Russians consider themselves happy, according to a recent survey conducted by state-owned Russian Public Opinion Research Centre (VTsIOM).

The poll surveyed 1,600 respondents over the age of 18 on March 10. Of those who claim to be happy, 35% say so with conviction.

The happiness index of Russians was 68 points, the same as last March. In October 2022, it was slightly lower – 66 points, the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Centre experts pointed out.

When asked about the main pillars of happiness, those who say they are happy most often list their family (24%), their own and their family’s health (21%), satisfaction with life in general (20%) and a good job (19%). Children make another 16% happy, and a good financial situation and prosperity, 13%. Living conditions and lack of loneliness were each cited by 8% of respondents, and 6% felt happy because of a healthy personal life.

Among those who feel unhappy, 20% cited the unsatisfactory situation in the country as the reason, and 19% the lack of material resources.

More than 40% of Russians believe that the majority of people around them are happy. One in three (36%) believes that there are about the same number of happy and unhappy people, and 14% notice more unhappy people.

The Social Happiness Index, which shows whether there are mostly happy or unhappy people around respondents, was 57 points in the March measurement. In March 2022, it was 60 points.

The pollsters noted that among those who definitely feel happy, 55% say they are surrounded by happy people, 9% see more unhappy people around them. In contrast, in the group of Russians who definitely feel unhappy, only 7% see more happy people around them, and 58% see more unhappy people around them.

Overall, the poll results indicate a relatively high level of happiness among Russians, with family, health and job satisfaction being the primary sources of happiness for most people. However, there are still a significant number of people who feel unhappy, with unsatisfactory situations in the country and lack of resources being the main reasons cited.

Russia’s economic sovereignty: status update (Import Substitution)

Photo by Anamul Rezwan on Pexels.com

By Edward Slavsquat, Substack, 3/21/23

“We have increased our economic sovereignty many times over. After all, what did our enemy count on? That we would collapse in 2-3 weeks or in a month,” Russian president Vladimir Putin said during his visit to the Ulan-Ude Aviation Plant last week.

Is Putin’s gloating justified? Yes … and no.

“Yes and No? No and Yes? But [callous ideologue on the internet] told me [meaningless word salad used to prop up a hopelessly warped view of Russia],” you might be screaming at your screen.

We blame both Anne Applebaum and the 5D Checkmate Wizards for shrouding Russia’s economic realities in an impenetrable fog of vapid slogans and lazy one-liners. Together they have created a mind-melting false binary in which there are apparently only two possibilities for Russia:

Total economic collapse as starving Russians hunt feral cats for sustenance.A Golden Age of profitable, sanctions-bypassing commerce and comfortable self-sufficiency.

Maybe it’s time to expand our horizons? Yes, probably. We will need at least five blog posts to do this, though.

Where to begin?

Putin said on March 19 that Russia had made great strides towards reducing dependency on foreign imports, so let’s start with import substitution.

Import substitution: Is it urgent now?

On February 15, 2022—nine days before Russian tanks poured into Ukraine—your correspondent asked if Russia was adequately prepared for an inevitable barrage of US-imposed sanctions (which, as historians will confirm, arrived about two weeks later).

We concluded that in vital sectors such as agriculture and energy, Russia had little to worry about (to the point where it was the world’s leading exporter of wheat). In other key areas—particularly electronics and manufacturing—there was definitely room for improvement.

Just to be very clear: Import substitution is different from autarky. There was never a plan to make Russia 100% self-sufficient.

But if Russia’s “trusted western partners” were willing to knee-cap trade agreements at the behest of Washington—like they did in 2014—who knows what else they were capable of? It became a national security issue; a way to safeguard against any future monkey business.

The topic of self-sufficiency predictably took center stage in Russia after the start of the “special military operation,” and the resulting tsunami of sanctions.

Blackpills came from unexpected places.

Anastasia Tatulova, public ombudsman for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Russia, accused officials of presenting a “distorted picture” of Russia’s self-sufficiency. The country’s real sector was almost entirely dependent on imported equipment and components, the business leader said.

Read full article here.

Kim Iversen: MASSIVE Inflation Looming As Saudi Arabia Looks to Join BRICS Ending US Dollar Dominance

Link here.

Matt Kennard: Boris Yeltsin Privately Supported NATO Expansion

Boris Yeltsin

By Matt Kennard, Declassified UK, 3/15/23

Yeltsin said privately in 1993 Russia had “no objection” to Poland and Czech Republic joining NATOThe comments, which had not been agreed beforehand, “disconcerted” the Russian delegation The following year, Yeltsin told prime minister John Major he was “not against” NATO expansion provided it was done graduallyYeltsin was even keen to attend the 1997 NATO summit in Madrid when the first post-Soviet expansion was announcedBut Yeltsin’s prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin gave Major a different view in 1996, saying NATO expansion “would create a fragile situation which could explode” across Europe“Russia was not an enemy now but could become one,” Chernomyrdin warned

Boris Yeltsin privately stated he was not against NATO expansion in the 1990s while publicly opposing the military alliance, declassified files show. 

This posture went back as far as 1993, two years into his presidency, which would last until 2000 when he appointed Vladimir Putin his successor.  

Declassified notes from a meeting of the British cabinet in September 1993 include a statement from defence secretary Malcolm Rifkind on the “Russian attitude to the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation”. 

Rifkind said that on a visit to Poland the previous month, President Yeltsin had told his Polish counterpart Lech Wałęsa “that the Russian Government had no objection to Poland and the Czech Republic joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation”. 

Rifkind added that this statement “had not been agreed beforehand in Moscow” and “had surprised his Polish hosts and had disconcerted the rest of the Russian delegation”. 

Rifkind concluded that “it was not to be assumed that the Russian authorities as a whole would be so relaxed about the extension eastwards of a Western, albeit defensive, military alliance.”

Yeltsin’s acquiescence in NATO’s expansion was not something shared by his prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin. In a private conversation with prime minister John Major in 1996, Chernomyrdin said NATO expansion “could explode” across Europe, declassified files also show.

The proposed NATO expansion after the collapse of the Soviet Union was a hugely controversial policy in Russia. The Western military alliance had originally been set up in 1949 ostensibly as a “defensive” bloc against the “threat” posed by the Soviet Union.

‘Not against the process of enlargement’

But as NATO’s first post-Soviet expansion was being negotiated through the 1990s, Yeltsin’s private support continued. 

In December 1994, John Major and President Yeltsin had a bilateral meeting in Budapest. “This record should be handled discreetly, and is not suitable for passing on to the Americans,” the summary of the meeting read. 

“Yeltsin said he had felt that he and the Prime Minister had come to an agreement…over NATO enlargement,” it added. 

Yeltsin “was not against the process of enlargement, so long as it was well balanced and gradual”, it continued. 

“It would be all right if, after a time, one country joined NATO, and then perhaps a year later another. But he could not agree to enlargement if it was a matter of taking in the whole of Central and Eastern Europe (comment: by implication as a block). This would affect all of Russia’s interests.”

Major said “he understood Yeltsin’s concerns”, adding, “we believe that enlargement had to be handled cautiously and without deadlines…After the division of Europe for so many years into two blocs, everyone needed to approach this subject with great caution.”

Yeltsin “said he understood the Prime Minister’s position and was satisfied with it”. 

In December 1996, Major and Yeltsin talked on the phone as plans for the announcement of the first NATO expansion got closer. “On NATO enlargement, the message was…all sorts of voiced opposition, but in the end tacit acceptance that it would happen,” a summary of Yeltsin’s position read.

Madrid Declaration

These sentiments continued after Tony Blair’s Labour won the general election in May 1997. “The noises made by Yeltsin [on NATO expansion] were all positive,” read the summary of a call between new prime minister Blair and Yeltsin.

A British telegram from Washington, also from May 1997, recounted that a meeting between President Clinton and Yeltsin had “excellent atmospherics”. It added: “Yeltsin [is] in good shape. Clinton encourages him to come to Madrid, sketching out possible arrangements to ease the Russia domestic angle.”

The NATO Summit in 1997 was when the organisation put forward the “Madrid Declaration” which formally invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to join the alliance. They became members in 1999. 

“Yeltsin asked Clinton’s advice on whether he should come [to Madrid],” the telegram noted. “He was worried about the domestic downside (ie being accused of blessing NATO expansion). His advisors…were cautioning against attendance.”

Clinton said it would be good if Yeltsin could come. “He recognised the Russian arguments for and against. But there was scope for Yeltsin to make this another personal and political success. Madrid would not focus only on NATO expansion. The Alliance would also be adapting itself, which should be congenial to Russia.” 

Yelstin listened carefully and said “he would reflect”. The UK National Security Council concluded: “Yeltsin is personally keen to go to Madrid, provided he can devise the right presentational strategy.”

Founding Act

Also in 1997, the NATO/Russia Founding Act was signed, ostensibly to build up trust and habits of consultation and cooperation. 

But the declassified files show that the Act, which NATO refused to make legally binding, was a public relations exercise requested by Yeltsin to help him dampen domestic opposition to NATO expansion. 

One UK document noted that NATO expansion was “the catalyst for the NATO/Russia agreement, although we have been careful not to link the two issues.”

UK foreign secretary Robin Cook commented that Yeltsin continued to publicly oppose NATO expansion. However, the Russian leader was privately focusing efforts “on negotiating a joint document with NATO that would enable him to claim that NATO had taken Russian security concerns fully into account before proceeding with enlargement.”

Cook revealed that the Russians had wanted the document to be legally binding and allow for Russia to “enjoy wide-ranging joint decision-making with NATO”. The Russians also requested that the agreement state that the Baltic states and Ukraine should be ruled off-limits for future NATO expansion. 

NATO refused all these requests, but the Russians signed anyway. 

Cook concluded: “I judge that the NATO/Russia agreement has considerable net political benefits to UK and NATO interests. Russian opposition to NATO’s decision, at its Madrid Summit, to invite some countries to begin accession negotiations, is likely to be considerably more muted than it might otherwise have been.”

He added: “Russia’s leaders will have a vested interest in presenting the NATO/Russia deal in a positive light, and in portraying NATO not as a threat or adversary, but as a partner, sensitive to Russian security concerns.”

‘Develop his domestic defence’

The declassified documents also show the US was concerned with helping Yeltsin defend himself against domestic Russian attacks on NATO expansion. 

A January 1997 message from Washington to London noted that the US government “would like to help Yeltsin develop his domestic defence of NATO enlargement”. 

It added: “The underlying American objective was to reinforce Russian leaders (and particularly the younger generation) whose aim was to ‘normalise’ Russia.”

The US was focused on “finding ways to help Yeltsin minimise the domestic damage which NATO enlargement would cause by letting him claim victory on the basis of what could be negotiated with NATO in 1997”. 

It added: “Yeltsin would want to be able to tell the Russian people that Russian interests had been secured”. The newly appointed US ambassador to Russia, James F. Collins “believed the West should help Yeltsin find the right formula to use domestically.”

Collins thought this “was one reason why Yeltsin liked the idea of a Five Power meeting”, which would include France, Germany, Russia, the US and the UK. “It could”, he said, “provide a good platform for Yeltsin to explain the NATO/Russia deal to his domestic constituency.”

Warnings of NATO expansion

But Yeltsin’s position was not official Russian policy. Dire warnings about the dangers of NATO expansion were being communicated to the British at the time by other senior figures in the Russian government. 

A private 1996 conversation between the Major and Russian prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin gives a window into the risks NATO knew they were taking to move forward with post-Soviet expansion. 

Russia’s prime minister told his British counterpart that NATO expansion “could explode” across Europe in a passionate diatribe against the policy. 

The Cassandra-like warning offers a remarkable account of the dangers and risk for European security and domestic reform in Russia if NATO expansion was pursued. 

Russian president Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated that NATO’s eastward expansion is one of the reasons for his invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which has been condemned as illegal and has involved extensive war crimes. 

Chernomyrdin was Russian prime minister from 1992-98, and was seen as a force for moving Moscow closer to the West and forging a friendship with the US. The Yeltsin administration was highly regarded by the British. 

The conversation with Major took place in the margins of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) summit on 2 December 1996. At the time Yeltsin was recovering from illness, but Chernomyrdin said he had been talking to him “almost every day”. 

When Major asked Chernomyrdin what he thought of the OSCE summit, the Russian prime minister said the organisation’s “importance should be increased” as it could “lay the foundations for the new architecture of European security”. 

He added: “It should be the pivotal organisation, rather than NATO, which had too obvious a military component to it.”

Nuclear ramp up

On NATO expansion Chernomyrdin conceded that Russia could not stop it but made clear “this would create a fragile situation which could explode”. 

He added that “even those countries which wanted to join NATO could not explain why, and where the danger to them came from. Russia might have been seen as a danger in the past. This was no longer appropriate.” 

But it was clear that NATO expansion was perceived as a significant threat to Russian security even by those in the Yeltsin administration prepared to acquiesce in that expansion. This meant that the scale down of nuclear weapons at the end of the Cold War would also be adversely affected by expanding NATO, Chernomyrdin said. 

“If Russia had to face a unified Europe alone, she would need full nuclear protection, and nuclear reductions would no longer be appropriate,” he told Major. 

Chernomyrdin warned that the proposed expansion would damage European security, which had been improving in the post-Soviet period. 

“What would Europe and the new members gain in practice from NATO enlargement?” he asked Major. “Russia did not have a veto, but Russia was in danger of being vetoed by the rest of Europe. This would recreate volatility in Europe, just when peace and stability had been reestablished. Russia was not an enemy now but could become one.”

Damage to Russian reform

Major told Chernomyrdin: “We did not wish to do anything to unsettle Russia. The Russian leadership’s achievements of recent years were huge.”

But the Russian prime minister outlined the risks to the stability of the Yeltsin administration if new NATO members were invited in.

“The situation in Russia in those circumstances would not be controllable,” he said. “There would be a very negative reaction, as the public hostility – unifying Communists and fascists (Zhirinovksky) – to the latest decree on withdrawal from Chechnya had shown.”

Yeltsin had the previous month ordered the withdrawal of virtually all Russian forces in Chechnya. Vladimir Zhirinovsky was a Russian ultra-nationalist politician and the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia.

The withdrawal from Chechnya “had produced calls for the impeachment of Yeltsin, so the reaction to NATO enlargement could easily be imagined,” Chernomyrdin added. “Russian patience should not be tested again.”

He concluded: “An extreme reaction to NATO enlargement would also damage democracy and economic reform in Russia.”

New cooperation

NATO was at the time trying to create a new cooperation framework to soften the impact of its expansion on Russian opinion. But Chernomyrdin said Russia “was not clear about the path of cooperation, unless the functional core of NATO was changed. Russia could not rush into a partnership with NATO unless the ways of working together had been properly defined.”

At the time, NATO was pushing a new Charter with Russia.

“Russia could not be bought by a Charter – that would not convince the Russian people that NATO enlargement was not dangerous,” Chernomyrdin said. 

For his part, John Major “repeated that sincere Russian fears were well understood” and conceded that “enlargement was obviously a sensitive issue, on which discussions would need to continue. Russian fears were well understood. He certainly did not brush them aside.”  

But, he added, “enlargement would be an evolutionary and transparent process, moving in parallel with a better and broader security relationship with Russia.”

The final note in the document notes that “Chernomyrdin’s comments on NATO enlargement were both longer and more emotional than the above account would suggest. He was beginning to work himself up into quite a lather when lunch finally intervened.”

Jimmy Dore: South Africa Invites Putin To Summit & REFUSES To Arrest Him

Link here.

George D. O’Neill, Jr.: Death of a Myth

Manifest Destiny

By George D. O’Neill, The American Conservative, 3/9/23

As we witness the collapse of various mainstream narratives, especially those surrounding the U.S./NATO war with Russia in Ukraine, Americans should begin to reassess their understanding of U.S. national leadership. Most American citizens have no notion of the great disparity between what their government does overseas and the stories they hear from its mouthpieces. As a result, Americans unwittingly support all sorts of foreign operations with little or no understanding of what is actually going on. For years, they have been misled by a non-stop propaganda campaign that is only now beginning to crumble.

We are experiencing the death throes of the United States’ unipolar hegemony over large parts of world. Until citizens begin to realize the magnitude of their government’s policy deceptions, it will become increasingly difficult to understand the United States’ changing global position and adjust to the effects of the growing negative perception of our country held by many people around the world.

Since World War II, and particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States was the dominant and unrivaled world power. Instead of being a peacekeeper and honest “world’s policeman,” the U.S. has increasingly been a destabilizing bully. Many leaders worldwide have been reluctant to speak up about the increasingly destructive nature of U.S. foreign policy for fear of being punished. But as U.S. stature and power declines, large parts of the world have been seeking arrangements to protect themselves from U.S. predation.

Most Americans do not understand why such realignments are occurring, thanks to a constant stream of propaganda about America being the “most generous,” the “exceptional nation,” a “nation that sets aside its interests for the benefit of the world,” an “important source of good” around the globe as the “protector of the rules based order,” always shouldering the heavy responsibility to protect the international system and weak nations from bad actors, ad nauseam. According to a number of sources, U.S.-caused wars have been directly responsible for the deaths of more than 10 million people since World War II. The neoconservatives will scoff at these facts and their sources, but most of the rest of the world believes this to be true.

Most Americans cannot accept these observations because they contradict the narrative given them by the omnipresent state propaganda machine. While the ever growing list of American misdeeds abroad has for years been largely unchallenged at home, it has become increasingly obvious to many across the globe. Americans should take note. For example, the Chinese Foreign Ministry has just published an overview of what they see as U.S. misbehavior. The U.S. establishment and well-meaning patriots may dismiss the Chinese observations, but they ring true to many who live outside of the neoconservative propaganda bubble.

Contrary to establishment mythology, the U.S. is famous for breaking its promises, violating treaties, and abandoning agreements. The list is long: the U.S.’s 1990 promise not to move NATO east into former Warsaw Convention countries, the abrogation of the ABM, INF, Open Skies, START treaties, the JCPOA, the  agreement with Libya, and others. The U.S. has also repeatedly flouted international law by invading countries that do not bow to U.S. hegemony.

There are a number of U.S. agencies that covertly fund NGO election interference operations. Most Americans have no idea that the Cold War–era National Endowment for Democracy was created to influence elections in countries around the world, and has interfered in many. (The National Endowment for Democracy was spending money in Russia until the Russians expelled them.) Then there are the famous “Color Revolutions” sponsored by various U.S. agencies. Some estimate the U.S. has interfered in as many as fifty countries.

The days of pretending to ignore this destructive behavior are drawing to a close. We are entering a period in which the populations of many countries may decide that being subject to American hegemony is not in their interests. Increasing numbers of countries have joined and formed alternative alliances outside U.S. influence. SCO, BRICS+, OPEC+, and others have experienced growing membership as countries that believe their interests are better protected by these non-U.S. affiliated alliances sign on.

The fallout of the tragic and unnecessary Ukraine war has accelerated this movement to seek other cooperative associations. As America’s European allies are learning, there can be huge political and economic costs to being associated with the U.S. The populations of Europe have watched their own economies suffer and paid dearly for energy because of the ten rounds of self-destructive sanctions imposed on Russia.

The purveyor and protector of the “rules-based order” decided that Germany should not import cheap Russian natural gas. America’s president and a senior State Department official threatened to cut off the pipeline supplying Russian natural gas if Russia did not bow to Washington’s wishes. Coincidentally, the Nord Stream gas pipelines were blown up not long after. The U.S. Secretary of State said the sabotage was an “opportunity,” and the assistant secretary of State appeared to be satisfied. The neoconservatives lauding this act of terrorism against an ally of the U.S. may believe pretending Washington was not responsible will reassure America and Europe, but the rest of the world believes otherwise.

Many will ignore or diminish the consequences of a possible U.S. role in the destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines. But this addition to the list of callous acts believed abroad to be perpetrated by the U.S. further would undermine the narrative of America as the “generous nation,” “leader of the free world,” “protector of the rules-based order.” For years, these contradictions were skillfully finessed and ignored by a compliant press and complicit institutions that profited from these deceptions. But as the U.S. appears less powerful, the rest of the world is beginning to take notice and are moving to seek other protective friendships.

Less than two years ago, the “most powerful military in the history of man” was chased out of Afghanistan by a group of ragtag militants armed with small arms and mounted on donkeys, bicycles, and motor scooters. The Taliban now has $80 billion worth of U.S. military equipment our leaders left behind. The excuses may have been convincing to the Washington elites and were sold strenuously by regime-aligned media outlets. The rest of the world knows better. The old post-Vietnam collapse tropes, claiming “we would have won if only we were really allowed to fight,” ring hollow after twenty years, hundreds of thousands killed and made homeless, and several trillion dollars spent on that disaster.

Contrary to the many assertions that the Russians would collapse from the shock and awe of the “sanctions from Hell,” the ruble has not turned into rubble as Joe Biden predicted. The U.S. and its NATO clients are running out of ammunition and arms to send to Ukraine, which is being bled white at their behest. It appears that Russia will steadily grind down the Ukrainian military. All of this is reminiscent of World War I. The proto-neoconservatives sold that war as a quick engagement that would be over by Christmas 1914. Four years later, 20 million were dead and many more were wounded or displaced; subsequently most of the European Christian monarchies collapsed, Russia descended into communism’s seventy-year nightmare, and the “War to End all Wars” to make the world “safe for democracy” set the stage for the even more horrific World War II.

A century later, we are sleepwalking into World War III. Americans should ignore the state-sponsored propaganda (eerily similar to that which led up to WWI), wake up, look at what their leaders have wrought, and do all they can to end support for this cruel war before we face a Great War–like conflagration or worse.

Vitaly Shevchenko – Ukraine war: Life in Mariupol under Russian occupation

By Vitaly Shevchenko, BBC, March 12, 2023

Finding people willing to speak to me from Mariupol was never going to be easy.

After 10 months of Russian occupation, fear and distrust are the two most frequent responses I encountered when looking for someone who could tell me how things really are in Mariupol, in Ukraine’s south-east.

“I think you are a Russian journalist. You won’t like what I’ve got to say. People like you kill if you tell them the truth,” said one social media user who claimed to be from the port city.

Russian forces put the people of Mariupol through a horrific months-long siege, before finally capturing it last May.

I eventually found three residents willing to speak to me at length: a local city councillor, a retired pensioner and an engineer. All spoke on condition of anonymity, fearing reprisals from the local authorities installed by Russia (who block access to occupied Ukraine by Western journalists).

They paint a picture of a massively expensive campaign conducted by Russia to win over the hearts and minds of the people of Mariupol, and rebuild a city damaged beyond recognition by Russia’s own troops.

The purpose of this campaign is to assimilate Mariupol and make it Russia’s own.

Their accounts corroborate each other, and are confirmed by social media posts about recent developments in Mariupol.

Before this war began about half a million people lived in the city.

According to UN estimates, 90% of residential buildings were damaged or destroyed, and 350,000 people were forced to leave after Russia attacked in February 2022.

It is difficult to estimate the exact number of people killed as a result of the relentless shelling of Mariupol, but Ukrainian authorities say more than 20,000 died there.

Russian-installed authorities in Mariupol say some 300,000 people are now living there.

The people who spoke to me from Mariupol said their city had been inundated with labourers from across Russia, as well as from Central Asia.

Oleg Morgun, the Russia-installed “mayor” of Mariupol, says some 70,000 of those currently in the city are construction workers and members of the Russian military.

Rebuilding

New buildings have appeared and many buildings damaged during the bombardment have gone.

For example, the Russian military has built a whole new district comprised of a dozen apartment blocks in the western part of Mariupol. It is called Nevsky, after the River Neva, on which President Vladimir Putin’s home city of St Petersburg stands. According to Russian state media, St Petersburg is the main sponsor of the reconstruction of Mariupol.

“It says on the bus: St Petersburg and Mariupol are twinned cities. There are slogans everywhere telling us that we’re part of Russia now,” pensioner Maria (not her real name) told me.

“I liked things the way they used to be. Now we live in fear. We have no idea what to expect.”

In the houses that escaped relatively unscathed after months of fierce fighting, the Russians are replacing windows, radiators and sometimes heating and sewage pipes.

Heating, running water and electricity supplies have largely been restored. Buses are running and full of passengers again, although the electric trolley bus and tram networks are still out of action.

Many schools, hospitals and shops have reopened as well, although numerous traders are selling their wares straight from the pavement.

Maria was particularly impressed with one school rebuilt under Russian rule: “It’s so beautiful, covered in multi-coloured squares.” According to her, the number of children in Mariupol now is greater than schools can currently accommodate, so they have classes in two shifts: one in the morning, and another in the afternoon.

Russia has imposed its own Russian-language curriculum in occupied areas – complicating efforts to get children back to school.

The fast-paced rebuilding of Mariupol has provoked envy in Donetsk, the regional capital occupied by pro-Russian forces since 2014, which has been neglected by comparison.

The Russia-installed head of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic, Denis Pushilin, has even had to deny rumours that the capital will be moved to Mariupol.

Assimilation

There are other important ways in which Russia is putting its stamp on Mariupol.

For example, local residents are under pressure to obtain Russian passports.

Ivan, the Mariupol city councillor I spoke to (not his real name), said locals often formed “huge queues” trying to get Russian passports.

They were required if you want to find formal employment, especially with government agencies or in the public sector, he explained.

Also, they made it possible to travel to Russia without additional stringent checks known as “filtration”, he added.

“So they have deliberately created a situation where you get problems if you have Ukrainian papers, you have to deal with red tape, you have to wait. On the other hand, if you get a Russian passport, that’s where your problems end: ‘You’re one of us now’. Things get simpler if you receive a Russian passport,” Ivan said.

Mariupol is also becoming part of Russia’s financial system. The Ukrainian currency, the hryvnya, has been phased out, and now the Russian rouble is the only currency accepted in shops.

Russia is channelling huge amounts of money into pension payments for residents of Mariupol, raising them in many cases compared with what they received from the Ukrainian authorities before the war. So residents of Mariupol are able to draw two pensions – one from Russia, another from Ukraine. Naturally, it is a situation many local pensioners are happy with.

Russian pensions are another reason why elderly residents are queuing up to get Russian passports – many pensioners believe the documents will be required in the future to continue receiving payments from Russia.

The media currently operating in Mariupol are also hard at work promoting a uniformly pro-Russian agenda.

Pro-Russian sentiment

Many current residents of Mariupol are there because they were unable to leave the city when the Russians attacked, due to illness or old age, or because they welcome Russia’s presence.

“We’ve suffered enough under Ukraine. Now we can breathe again,” one social media user told me, before breaking off all contact.

The fast-paced campaign of reconstruction and the resulting sense of restored normality, the generous pension payments and the intensive media campaign targeting the people of Mariupol, all stimulate the spread of pro-Russian sentiment in the city.

“I’m sick of all the propaganda in the papers. They started publishing it from day one, telling us how well things are going,” said Yuri, the engineer (not his real name). “I feel out of place in my own city now. People are different, my city feels different now.”

City councillor Ivan said: “It’s become difficult for me to say pro-Ukrainian things to my voters. It’s tough being pro-Ukrainian in a pro-Russian environment. Unfortunately, Ukraine is losing the hearts and minds of people in Mariupol.”

Those who are still in Mariupol may be happy to see a degree of normality return to their city, but there are those who suspect Russia of pursuing ulterior motives.

Popular Ukrainian journalist Denys Kazansky argues that Russia uses the new houses it has been building in Mariupol to distract attention from all the destruction it caused in the city and elsewhere in his native Donetsk region.

“If they destroyed 10 hospitals and then rebuilt one – this isn’t reconstruction. It’s not something they can be thanked for,” he said.

“You can be happy as much as you like about a school being rebuilt, but what do you do with the thousands of people Russia has killed?” he said.

“You can’t rebuild them. You can’t bring them back.”

Glenn Greenwald – Mask-Off: US Reveals Real Intentions in Ukraine

Link here.

Christopher McCallion: How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Exposed NATO’s Fault Lines

By Christopher McCallion, The National Interest, 3/13/23

The Russian invasion of Ukraine initially seemed to galvanize the United States’ NATO allies and encourage them to take a more energetic role in Europe’s defense. But some analysts have recently noted that the war actually seems to have had the contrary effect of increasing Europe’s dependence on Washington. This should not be a surprise to anyone, since Europe’s dependence will inevitably increase in proportion to the United States’ own commitment to the continent’s security.

While French president Emmanuel Macron has championed strategic autonomy in recent years, and German chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a historic “Zeitenwende” in defense policy in response to the Russian invasion, both countries have proceeded cautiously over the course of the war. Germany only grudgingly sent Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine following parallel moves by the United States and the UK, while Macron has insisted that a post-war resolution must include a recognition of Russian security concerns.

This has increasingly frustrated Eastern European allies like Poland and the Baltic States, whose hard line on Russia has put them at odds with what they perceive as their Western counterparts’ ambivalence, making them all the more eager to maintain the U.S. presence in Europe.

But the more restrained attitude of France and Germany towards Russia is not based on spinelessness or frugality. Instead, due to geography, relative power, and history, Western and Eastern Europeans have profoundly different threat perceptions of Russia.

This would normally suggest that the two halves of Europe do not in fact make natural treaty allies. Historically, Eastern Europe suffered the misfortune of being a buffer zone between Western Europe and Russia—a role to which Eastern Europeans, all too understandably, do not want to return.

This fundamental asymmetry was introduced into the alliance by enlarging NATO to include Eastern European states from the 1990s onwards—a faultline papered over by the continuing leadership of the United States, but which reduces any incentive for Western Europeans to “step up” the way Washington (officially) wants them to.

The reflexive argument among many Western commentators is to blame France and Germany for not backing Ukraine more aggressively, reducing their credibility in the eyes of Eastern Europe, and compelling the latter to lean even more heavily on Washington to allay their security fears. According to these arguments, Western Europe should instead put itself on a serious war footing and help lead the charge against Russia.

But there are a couple of reasons to view such assertions skeptically. In the first place, the Russian military’s performance makes France and Germany’s response seem relatively proportionate. Russia has been struggling for months to conquer the small regional city of Bakhmut; it is not marching on Warsaw anytime soon. Moreover, while Eastern Europeans would probably like nothing more than for Russian fields to be sowed with salt, France and Germany recognize that Russia will likely always be a power in the region, and that peaceful coexistence requires some sort of reasonable mutual accommodation.

Secondly, the United States shouldn’t expect the over-the-top measures it relies on to prop up the credibility of extended deterrence to be mimicked by Europe should the latter transition towards strategic autonomy and deterring Russia directly. Nor should the Eastern Europeans.

Finally, and more to the point, one would think when listening to American officials and analysts who lament Europe’s security dependence that these folks want the United States out of Europe as quickly as possible. And yet the opposite is the case; most of these same voices are deeply dedicated to America remaining permanently committed to NATO.

According to conventional arguments for greater “burden-sharing” among the allies, the best way for the United States to encourage its capable allies to do more for their own defense is to redouble our own efforts on their behalf and fall over ourselves to insist upon our commitments to them. The causal logic here has never been explained, but it seems self-evidently contradictory: if we do more, we incentivize our allies to do less.

The alternative view is that the best way to encourage the rich and capable countries of Western Europe to assume greater responsibility in a European alliance is to slowly, but steadily and openly, reduce our own contribution to the continent’s security. This would not be greater “burden-sharing,” but rather “burden-shifting.”

If European security is truly the goal, we should expect capable states like France and Germany to act like any other state without a guarantor: to develop the independent capabilities they deem necessary for their own threat environment, and to manage their own alliances. Poland and the Baltic states prefer an American guarantee, but they’ll likely still be able to sleep well at night with a guarantee from their more powerful and nuclear-armed Western neighbors.

If we’re being frank, however, the contradiction at the heart of calls for more “burden-sharing” is probably recognized by those devoted to the permanence of the transatlantic alliance, and this incoherence is precisely its utility. Virtually no one in the American foreign policy establishment actually wants to give up the United States’ seat at the head of the table in NATO, which places Europe within America’s sphere of influence. And for some time, therefore, NATO’s existence, to quote the historian Richard Sakwa, will continue to be “justified by the need to manage the security threats provoked by its [own] enlargement.