Years of Upheaval, 1973-77

Henry Kissinger's Memoirs #2

by Henry Kissinger

Very good first edition hardcover in like, unclipped and mylar-protected dustjacket. Part of an exceptional private collection recently purchased.

Genres: History, Politics, Biography, Nonfiction, International Relations, Memoir, American History

1392 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1979

About the author

Henry Alfred Kissinger (born Heinz Alfred Kissinger) was a German-born American bureaucrat, diplomat, and 1973 Nobel Peace Prize laureate. He served as National Security Advisor and later concurrently as Secretary of State in the Richard Nixon administration. Kissinger emerged unscathed from the Watergate scandal, and maintained his powerful position when Gerald Ford became President.

A proponent of Realpolitik, Kissinger played a dominant role in United States foreign policy between 1969 and 1977. During this period, he pioneered the policy of détente.

During his time in the Nixon and Ford administrations he cut a flamboyant figure, appearing at social occasions with many celebrities. His foreign policy record made him a nemesis to the anti-war left and the anti-communist right alike.

Reviews

[Aaron · Rating 3 out of 5]

Volume II of Kissinger's years in the Nixon White House, this one beginning with the start of Nixon's second (doomed) term in January 1973 and ending with his resignation on 8/9/74. In between, Kissinger discusses the conclusion of the Vietnam War; Egypt and Syria's surprise attack on Israel in 1973, followed by Kissinger's "Shuttle Diplomacy" in an attempt to bring peace to the Middle East; SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union; his talks with Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong in China; his appointment as Secretary of State; and his complex, distant, relationship with Nixon.

A large portion of this volume is spent on the Middle East War and Kissinger's subsequent back-breaking efforts to forge a peace between Israel, Egypt, and Syria. It is amazing that anyone had the stamina required to sit through and conduct negotiations night after night, week after week, and then factor in all of the traveling. Plus, he still had his other responsibilities as Secretary of State. However, a few hundred pages of reading about the negotiations does become a tad dry.

Kissinger devotes one chapter to Chile, specifically the overthrow of Salvador Allende. This chapter seems forced, and really does not fit in with the rest of the book. It reads more as a constant defense that neither he nor the CIA had anything to do with the coup that brought the dictator Augusto Pinochet to power. His assertions of innocence seem to ring hollow.

Kissinger's biting sense of humor is present here, and welcome at times to help get through some of the more dense parts of the book. On page 683, writing about Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, of Pakistan: Bhutto had seen me off at Islamabad airport with a flattering parade of horse guards normally reserved for heads of state. Bhutto explained on television that given the number of 'nincompoops' occupying that office who had visited Pakistan, it was only fair to the horses that they get to see an intelligent example of the human species." And on page 1094, talking about potentially meeting Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, he writes: "Gromyko was now scheduled to arrive in Damascus on May 27 - my birthday. I could have wishes myself a better present."

At 1,214 pages (not including the Appendix), this volume is - incredibly - shorter than the prior volume, White House Years. Kissinger's ego is apparent throughout, particularly when he speaks of his disagreements with Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger over arms control, and when he and Chief of Staff Alexander Haig fight over who gets the quarters closest to Nixon's at San Clemente. Things such as this prolong the book and make it start to drag - especially after the reader gets bogged down in interminable discussions about SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) negotiations that features Kissinger going on for page after page using terms such as "throw weight" and "MIRVs."

Near the end, Kissinger writes an excellent character study of Nixon, bordering on psychoanalysis. But he keeps it respectful, and seems to go out of his way to equally recognize both Nixon's flaws and greatness and the seeming contradiction of the man. While never close to Nixon personally, Kissinger struggles with seeing someone who had accomplished so many great things while President implode from the inside due to his unending insecurities.

For anyone interested in Kissinger, Nixon, the Mideast War of 1973, or American foreign policy during this period, this book is essential reading. However, while immensely interesting at times, it does not quite pack the punch of the first volume.

[Jonnie Enloe · Rating 4 out of 5]

You can only say so many things about Kissinger. He is a very learned, experienced man. His subjects are not to be taken lightly and are certainly not light reads. His books go on and on almost a minute by minute account of politics at the highest levels. If there is truly a man that knows everyone in the world, that matters, it is Kissinger. When he writes we are priviledged to be an evesdropper to contempary history as in happened in our lifetimes.

[Jordan Maloney · Rating 2 out of 5]

Henry Kissinger is the definition of an unreliable narrator. I have no idea why I read this book and I would recommend it to quite literally nobody.

This gets two stars instead of one solely for Kissinger's effort in producing nearly 1300 pages of manuscript.

[SALAH · Rating 3 out of 5]

مفيد

[Bill Manzi · Rating 4 out of 5]

The recent death of Henry Kissinger has brought all sorts of writing on his career, and in death the controversy and arguments over his impacts, his actions while in power, and even his actions and writing after leaving office, have been renewed with some level of vigor. I do believe that Kissinger, always looking to be in the limelight, would have been delighted with the attention he has been receiving.

Kissinger was, without question, and by his own admission, someone with a very healthy ego. His memoirs are in three volumes, with this volume (2) coming in at 1214 pages. I have read the first two, and as observed for the first volume this book will not be for everyone. The other similarity to be noted is that Kissinger uses his memoirs to burnish his reputation, and to justify some fairly controversial decisions reached during his tenure. Critics point to this as if it would be unusual for a memoir writer to justify actions taken during his tenure. It must be taken into account but does not take away from the vast historical importance of his writings here.

Volume two begins with the advent of Richard Nixon’s second term. This term, for Nixon, would end in disaster, and that disaster would be a significant factor in Kissinger amassing as much influence and power that he came to have. Kissinger does not ignore the political storm that came to destroy the Nixon Administration in his writings, bemoaning the fact that Nixon’s preoccupation with Watergate, and his diminishing political authority, caused serious problems for him as he tried to maneuver in so many areas of critical foreign policy decision making. Kissinger treats Nixon gently, but in his own way makes clear that Nixon’s effectiveness, and his stability, were clearly at issue as Watergate accelerated.

Many have mocked the three volumes as a testament to Kissinger’s massive ego, and in reading this volume there is no doubt that the twelve hundred pages could have come in a bit lighter. In fairness Kissinger (and Nixon) dealt with some enormous issues over the course of Kissinger’s tenure, and Kissinger deals with these in detail, and I believe contributes greatly to the ultimate historical understanding of some critical events.

Kissinger is the only man to serve jointly as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, and will likely be the only man that will ever do so. Nixon’s appointment of him as Secretary starts this volume, and Kissinger gets right into Cambodia, a subject that has engendered massive criticism of his actions to this very day. Kissinger, for all the criticism, lays out the actions undertaken to counter the North Vietnamese intrusion, and semi-occupation, of Cambodia. The Kissinger/Nixon prescription to the North Vietnamese utilization of Cambodia as a safe haven for its troops, and as a transit route for supplying its troops in the South, was to introduce U.S. air power, and eventually troops, into Cambodia. This expansion of the war to Cambodia came with enormous criticism, which Kissinger took on directly.

“The absurd myth by which guilt for abandoning Cambodia has been assured runs like this: Cambodia was a peaceful, happy land until America attacked it. There was no reason for this attack: it was the product of the psychosis of two American leaders determined to act out their own insecurities on the prostrate body of an innocent people. They covertly dislodged the only political leader, Sihanouk, who held the fabric of the country together. Then American bombing turned a group of progressive revolutionaries, the Khmer Rouge, into demented murderers. By this elaborate hypothesis American actions in 1969 and 1970 are held principally responsible for the genocide carried out by the Cambodian Communist rulers after we left in 1975-two years after all American military actions ceased-as well as for the suffering imposed by the North Vietnamese invasion of 1978.”

“On March 18, 1970, the neutralist chief of state Norodom Sihanouk was deposed by his own government and national assembly. The reason was Cambodian popular outrage at the continued presence of the North Vietnamese occupiers, and Sihanouk’s inability to get them to leave. When Cambodia’s new leadership demanded the departure of the North Vietnamese , the latter responded by a wave of attacks all over eastern Cambodia designed to topple the new government in Phnom Penh- a month before the U.S.-South Vietnamese “incursion” into the sanctuaries, which lasted eight weeks. It was Hanoi that had spurned our proposal to immediately restore Cambodia’s neutrality, which I made to Le Doc Tho in a secret meeting on April 4, 1970.”

Kissinger, Henry “Years of Upheaval” pg. 336

Kissinger did not directly address whether the United States, also frustrated by Sihanouk’s inability to deal with the North Vietnamese bases in Cambodia, had a hand in the Lon Nol coup that deposed Sihanouk. That action, whether encouraged or not, was not the right prescription for Cambodia, and brought what had to be the anticipated military backlash from Hanoi. Kissinger is correct on the facts as he outlines them above, but they are not the only facts to be considered. The U.S. errors in Indochina are too numerous to list here, and Nixon/Kissinger inherited the war, but the American groupthink mindset, and failure to grasp nuance, and the evolving relationship between the North Vietnamese and China, led in some respects to the vast debacle of Cambodia. That viewpoint cannot excuse the cynical and ruthless exploitation of Cambodia by the North Vietnamese.

Kissinger gives us a view of the Chinese perspective of the evolving Cambodian situation, and in so doing makes a stark admission. As China carefully walked the diplomatic tightrope in advance of the ultimate Khmer Rouge victory they gave subtle clues that they were open to something less than a full victory for the communist insurgency. Of course this was due to the Chinese aversion to North Vietnamese hegemony in Indochina. Kissinger acknowledged that a true master of diplomacy, Zhou Enlai, had left the diplomatic clues of potential convergence of Chinese and American interests in Cambodia, but that the American side (read him) had failed to appreciate or understand those clues, which were couched in denunciations of U.S. actions.

“Zhou Enlai tried to cut through these perplexities-at first a bit too obliquely for us to grasp.”

Kissinger, Henry “Years of Upheaval” pg. 349

The story did not end well for Cambodia, and eventually for Zhou as well. Kissinger believes, likely correctly, that the Zhou diplomatic play, which ended up not working for either the U.S. or China, was the ultimate cause of the downfall of Premier Zhou Enlai in China. Kissinger blamed the inability of the U.S. to hold up its end of the bargain, by maintaining military pressure on the Khmer Rouge, for the ultimate failure. This he attributed to Congressional action prohibiting financial support for this pressure.

China, North Vietnam, and Cambodia. Enough to fill the plate of any diplomat. Kissinger was dealing with the opening to China, detente and arms control with the Soviet Union, a very tenuous relationship with our European allies, “The Year of Europe” initiative, the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile (for which he is vilified strenuously today) and of course a major part of the book, the advent of the Yom Kippur War, and Kissinger’s monumental shuttle efforts that brought disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt, as well as Israel and Syria. Kissinger’s efforts on this issue alone were herculean, and to this day held up as the gold standard in diplomacy. Kissinger’s goals here not only included reaching these stage one disengagements but through them the vast diminishment of Soviet influence in the Middle East. As the Middle East suffers through another breakout of war today and some strains begin to show between U.S. and Israeli viewpoints on what the proper actions should be Kissinger’s experiences dealing with the Israeli leadership are instructive, and show that there has always been a bit of strain at points between the countries. A great additional source of information on this issue is the Martin Indyk book “Master of the Game: Henry Kissinger and the Art of Middle East Diplomacy” which also gives us a great vantage point on the true extent of Kissinger’s achievements here.

Kissinger, in all his writings, always left observations that are worth repeating. This book has more than a few:

“One of the arts of diplomacy is to clothe a rejection in the form of an acceptance in principle.”

Kissinger, Henry “Years of Upheaval” pg. 843-844

“The political dilemma of democracy is that the time span needed for solutions to contemporary economic problems is far longer than the than the electoral cycle by which leaders performance is judged at the polls. ……The way is open for demagoguery, political polarization and violence.”

Kissinger, Henry “Years of Upheaval” pg. 886

I offer one last tidbit that displays Kissinger’s rather wry sense of humor, and actually got a laugh from me as I read it. As mentioned above Kissinger, in his Middle East dealings, sought to remove Soviet influence from the region. This effort was not made via a frontal diplomatic assault on the Soviets, but rather through a diplomatic dance that appeared to offer U.S. partnership with the Soviets to achieve a settlement between the parties (the Soviets were the major arms suppliers to Egypt and Syria, and considered to be their diplomatic patrons.) With the Soviets getting a bit uncomfortable with the Kissinger maneuvering and not at all happy at being marginalized through the process Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko paid a visit to discuss these matters with President Nixon. Kissinger’s description:

“The Oval Office meeting was made to order for Nixon’s skills at obfuscation; he was a master of the philosophical explanation that explained nothing but created the impression that he was sharing a confidence with his interlocutor. So Nixon blithely expressed his satisfaction with the diplomatic progress that had been made. The United States had been active because the parties wanted it that way. There was no record that we had discouraged this development, but that did not keep Nixon from avowing his general preference for cooperative endeavors with the USSR. On the other hand, the concrete circumstances differed for each superpower: ‘Some areas we can get into where you can’t. We must consider this.’ In other words Nixon favored superpower cooperation in the Middle East except where it did not serve his purpose. Where and how to work jointly, mused Nixon, was a tactical problem to be solved by Gromyko and me-thus neatly getting himself out of the line of fire. All this was presented in Nixon’s best country-boy manner, as if there had been some terrible misunderstanding about a subject too trivial for him to focus on.”


Kissinger, Henry “Years of Upheaval” pg. 942

Kissinger was a major figure in U.S. diplomatic history, and this second volume of his memoirs, for those interested in history, is well worth the long read. The career of Henry Kissinger provides us with a critical view, for better or worse, of some policy decisions still impacting us to this very day. On to volume 3.

[Julio The Fox · Rating 4 out of 5]

A world spinning out of control, and only one man can save it! The second volume of Henry Kissinger's memoirs tackles the worst economic crisis for the West since the Great Depression, Watergate, war exploding in the Middle East, the unraveling of the Vietnam Peace Accords, and the fall of Henry's old friends and allies in Germany, Britain, France, and Israel. Bookending this tale of woe is the falling figure of Richard Nixon, on top of the world after his re-election landslide in November of 1972, and under siege over the Watergate burglary and cover-up at the start of 1973, when, unexpectedly, to Henry anyway, he names Kissinger Secretary of State while maintaining him as the National Security Advisor (NSA). No man had ever held so much power over American foreign policy, and no man had more difficulty wielding power during the years 1973-1974, when everything Kissinger endeavored in diplomacy was overshadowed and hindered by Nixon's growing incapacity to govern. Kissinger calls this the Greek tragedy of the Nixon years, for the president and the nation. An opportunity was lost to reshape the world order in the manner of Metternich at the Congress of Vienna. Henry's idol drafted a coalition of powers, including defeated France, to forge a peace that lasted for the next one hundred years. Nixon and Kissinger should have been allowed, by destiny if not the U.S. Congress, to do the same. Kissinger rightly insists that 1973 was the most critical and consequential year of the post-war era. Nineteen-sixty-eight witnessed the Tet Offensive, signaling the failure of the U.S. in Vietnam, but the collapse of the world built by Truman and Acheson, of containing Communism in Europe, fighting subversion in Asia, and leading Europe and Japan down the road to security and prosperity, did not begin until the second Nixon administration, when American hegemony lay in tatters.

In 1973, like a character in Dickens, Kissinger is grabbed on the throat by fate and recalled to life. After demanding the resignation of all his cabinet members following his re-election in 1972, Nixon had talked Kissinger into staying on as NSA. Now, the boss had other plans. Returning from a solitary walk on the beach at his California home, Nixon startled Kissinger by telling him he planned to announce his becoming Secretary of State. This was typical of the man, Kissinger confides. Nixon was capable of sudden, startling actions, born of his own sense of fate. But the dark side of Nixon revealed his insecurity and jittery sense of self. This duality, Kissinger concludes, is what led to Watergate. Nixon demanded total control over his subordinates and also deeply feared their disapproval. His first instinct on hearing of the Watergate burglary was to circle the wagons, hide the truth, and try to smother any Justice Department or media investigation. Kissinger's concern is what impact this paranoia had on foreign policy. Nixon hated the details of domestic affairs, yet every month that passed in 1973 he had to spend more time on defending himself from public scrutiny while letting diplomacy go hang. Typically, Kissinger blames not Nixon himself but Congress and the press for the malevolent neglect in foreign affairs over these years of chaos; a maelstrom caused to a large degree by an absence of U.S. leadership. What foreign leader, friend or foe, could trust Nixon anymore, and by extension, Kissinger himself?

Kissinger believes the collapse of American prestige after 1973 lay behind every foreign policy crisis he confronted as Secretary of State. The U.S. still had the power create a new international order based on mutual interests; what it lacked was backing from Congress and the approval of the American people to maintain the detente forged with China and Russia in Nixon's first term that allowed the U.S. to confront threats to its hegemony. No better illustration of this crisis of confidence existed than Vietnam. Kissinger seriously thought the Vietnam Peace Accords of January 1973 between the U.S., North Vietnam, South Vietnam and the Viet Cong could have endured if only the American people had not come to doubt their leaders. Should North Vietnam launch another offensive in the South after 1973 the U.S. was pledged to resume bombing and provide military assistance to Saigon. Congressional opposition to both promises, really threats, made that impossible. There were inklings that he should have heeded that pointed towards a renewal of war. Kissinger shared the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize with his North Vietnamese counterpart in Paris, Le Duc Tho, who turned down the award saying, "peace has not really been achieved in Vietnam". A bizarre visit to Hanoi at the invitation of the North Vietnamese leadership has Kissinger looking at photos and death tolls of the U.S. bombing under Nixon and receiving "lessons in guerilla warfare" from the Communists, in a sure sign they were ready to sustain more pain if it meant reunification on their terms. Down in the South, President Thieu refused to take talks with the Viet Cong on future elections seriously, and both parties, plus the North Vietnamese, began to violate the 1973 cease fire on a daily basis. But, without the means to punish North Vietnam or pressure Thieu, the best Kissinger could do was forestall the inevitable collapse of the Saigon regime.

The Middle East was was another lost opportunity to forge peace on American terms, and occupies the bulk of this volume. Israel's crushing defeat of her Arab enemies in the 1967 Six-Day War took Jordan out of the anti-Israel camp for good, cast doubts in Sadat's mind, if not Nasser's, as to the efficacy of Egypt's military ties to the Soviet Union, and isolated intransigent Syria. Yet, the danger of another war persisted due to the feeling among the Arabs that they had to regain all of what thy had lost, and Israel's position that it had survived an existential threat in 1967, created defensible borders for itself, and stood to gain nothing from negotiations. Kissinger's diplomatic moves in the region rested on three inter-woven premises that mutatis mutandis largely still hold to this day: There can be no Arab-Israeli war without Egypt, the most populous and best armed Arab state; The Soviet Union must be ejected from the region for a Pax Americana to take hold; Israel has to be convinced to trade part of the territory it seized in 1967---the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights in Syria and the West Bank of the Jordan River---for a permanent peace with the Arabs. Jordan and King Hussein, legally the owner of the West Bank, could be written off by 1973, and Hafez Assad of Syria, who had come to power through a coup in 1971, was at that point too weak at home and too reliant on the Soviets for the U.S. to negotiate with. That left Kissinger to try his brand of diplomacy, self-interest can lead to mutual interests prevailing, on Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir.

Kissinger does little to hide his joy at the death of Egypt's Nasser in 1970. He was a firm ally of the Soviets, an adventurer who intervened in the internal affairs of his neighbors, notably during the civil war in Yemen, a pan-Arabist who dreamed of one Arab nation built around himself, and an irreconcilable enemy of Israel who followed his ego in stumbling into the 1967 Six-Day War. His successor, Sadat, was a political unknown whom Kissinger admits he underestimated for keeping mum during Nasser's eccentric follies. America's first task was to unwed him from the Soviets and the Egyptian preference for war. If the first was achieved, the second would follow. Through back door diplomatic channels, Kissinger tried to impress upon Sadat the persuasive argument of, "the Soviets can give you weapons; only America can bring you peace". It never occurred to Kissinger that Sadat might want both, playing the superpowers against each other. He kept moving troops up to and away from the occupied Sinai Peninsula, so that Washington and Tel Aviv could never be sure if he was bluffing or truly wanted war. He did. Sadat agreed with Kissinger that Egypt was better off in the U.S. camp, but first had to demonstrate that on the battlefield she could recover lost lands and threaten Israel itself. This he could do only by accepting more Soviet weapons even while he denounced the Soviets for meddling in Egyptian affairs. The U.S., meaning Kissinger, needed Egypt to make a Middle East peace, not vice versa. Frustrated in Cairo, Kissinger moved on to Tel Aviv. His portrait of Golda Meir is of a woman exile survivor shaped in her views by the pogroms in her birthplace in Russia and the Holocaust. Personal history made her ill disposed to ceding one inch of land gained in 1967. Dealing with antagonists of such furious vision, Kissinger could only pause and wait for developments.

He did not have to wait long. Sadat and Assad's blitz by land and air against Israel in October of 1973 took Kissinger and Meir completely by surprise. Nixon, already crippled by Watergate, opted for the dangerous gambit of rushing tons of military aid to Israel daily. Kissinger approved, but taking a longer view realized the Russians would do the same for their Arab allies, turning a regional flare-up into a superpower standoff. When Israel reversed Arab battlefield gains, trapped an Egyptian army in the Sinai, and moved towards Cairo and Damascus, Brezhnev declared that the U.S. and Soviet Union must send joint peacekeepers to the Middle East, or Russia might do so unilaterally. Nixon answered by moving up the U.S. armed forces to DEFCON 2, one step away from nuclear war. The world faced its greatest danger since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. But Kissinger knew his adversary. The Soviets backed off their threat, and he was free to indulge in shuttle diplomacy between Cairo, Tel Aviv and Damascus, promoting a negotiated ceasefire and the good offices of the U.S. in moving towards a comprehensive peace. Sadat and Meir sign on quickly, having a domestic audience to worry about, while Assad hedged his bets.

There was, however, little time to rejoice. The war had exposed the vulnerability of both Nixon and Israel. Nixon won a short respite from Watergate, only to see his attempted cover-up crumble. Congress dismissed the call to DEFCON 2 as a Nixon ploy, and demanded a greater say over foreign affairs. The Israelis had looked dazed and puny at war's start, and needed Washington to survive. The Russians began to doubt Nixon's ability to stay in office, and backed away from any moves towards a SALT II treaty. They also stepped up arms shipments to Syria and weaved a friendship with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The Arab petroleum states, through the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) decided to punish the U.S. and its European allies for supplying Israel during the war through an oil embargo that triggered the 1973 energy crisis and the worst global recession since 1929. The Europeans blamed Nixon, not the Arabs, for their plight. Kissinger, who once said economics baffled and bored him, made largely toothless gestures to coordinate a common energy strategy between North America and Western Europe. The U.S. found itself at once distanced from Israel, Europe, Japan, also suffering from high oil prices, and the Arab world. China became distrustful of American guarantees too. The political toll of this global crisis was astounding. By 1974 Nixon, Ed Heath of Britain, Willy Brandt of West Germany and Golda Meir had all resigned. (French President Georges Pompidou died of cancer that year, and the Gaullist political tradition was broken.) Kissinger's plans for ending the Cold War on American terms had been shot down.

Ah, well. There was still the Third World to subdue. Chile under Allende remained a thorn in the flesh to Kissinger and Nixon, despite C.I.A. attempts to stymie his presidency. It was time to step up the pressure. Kissinger uses the euphemism "support to democratic forces in Chile" to hide what was, in fact, a massive destabilization effort. The Nixon administration funneled millions to subsidize a national truckers strike that paralyzed the nation. The American embargo on loans to Chile and pressure on other countries to boycott Chilean goods drove prices skyward and enraged the middle class. After Allende secured a victory for his Popular Unity coalition in parliamentary elections in 1972 a military coup was the next logical and lethal step. Kissinger won't say if he was in contact with Pinochet before that infamous day of September 11, 1973, only that the administration "welcomed the change in government". Chile was a warning to all Third World nations not to step outside the U.S. orbit and, in K.'s mind, the caveat worked. Off Kissinger goes to visit reliable dictators like the Shah of Iran, happy to break the OPEC oil embargo, and a short visit to an aging Mao, who urged Kissinger to get tougher with the Soviet Union. K. subtly reminded Mao that China was part of the Third World, and America would decide on its own foreign policy. And the rest of the world, outside the West? Africa does not exist for him, and with Allende gone, Latin America was just a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica.

Kissinger does not say if he believes in karma, but it found him out. At the start of 1974 he could no longer conduct foreign policy at all, given Nixon's incapacity to govern. A presidential jaunt to Egypt and visit by Brezhnev to Washington proved pathetic in trying to revive Nixon's sagging credibility with the American people. The White House tapes showed his boss had been ordering the Watergate coverup for two years to no avail. Smelling blood, the American media turned its hungry eyes on Henry. Hadn't he ordered wiretaps of State Department aides he suspected of leaking secrets? Wasn't he in on the plot to slime Daniel Ellsberg for stealing the Pentagon Papers? And, what about the secret bombing of Cambodia back in 1969-70, when he and Nixon had lied to Congress? K. went passive-agressive: At a press conference in Salzburg, Austria he pronounced his innocence of these charges, and announced he would resign if such ugly stories about him continued to flourish. He looked petty and mean bu the stunt worked. America could not do without the man NEWSWEEK magazine called "Super K". Meanwhile, the Chief was going off the deep end; drinking and cursing his subordinates, although not Kissinger at least to his face. Gently Kissinger told Nixon the nation could not continue rudderless in foreign affairs for another two years. Nixon took the hint, and it contributed to his decision to resign in August of 1974. Reeling from the revelations in Woodward and Bernstein's THE FINAL DAYS, Kissinger confirms Nixon did break down in the Oval Office and asked Kissinger, a non-observant Jew, to pray with him. Now, you know who leaked that story. Still, Kissinger had reassuring words for Nixon: "History will treat you more kindly than your critics". The next day, in his capacity as Secretary of State, he accepted the president's curt letter of resignation. America had won a respite from her Vietnam induced nightmare, and Kissinger was free to start from scratch in rebuilding trust in her among allies and foes, if new president Gerald Ford wanted him.

Kissinger was often accused by critics of indulging in "Spenglerian doom" in his view of global politics, yet that is not the sign-off he gives this book. Yes, American foreign policy lay in pieces, but the U.S. was still the only country others, including adversaries, could rely on. America had survived a constitutional crisis in a way few democracies, and no dictatorship, could. Her greatest temptation was flirting with nihilism, or the conviction that no convictions matter. Downgrading and degrading the government, and its conduct of foreign policy, was a sure mark towards national, and international, disaster. Kissinger saves identifying the culprits for volume three of his memoirs, but the reader can already guess. YEARS OF UPHEAVAL is a recollection of being "present at the destruction", to paraphrase Dean Acheson; a world destroyed by misleaders and miscalculations. The tome is sobering, and well-worth pondering.

[Shawn · Rating 4 out of 5]

This second volume of Henry Kissinger’s monumental memoirs covers his years as President Richard Nixon’s Secretary of State (1972–1974), including the ending of the Vietnam War, the 1973 Middle East War and oil embargo, Watergate, and Nixon’s resignation. Years of Upheaval opens with Dr. Kissinger being appointed Secretary of State.

Among other events of these turbulent years that he recounts are his trip to Hanoi after the Vietnam cease-fire, his efforts to settle the war in Cambodia, the “Year of Europe,” two Nixon-Brezhnev summit meetings and the controversies over arms control and détente, the military alert and showdown with the Soviet Union over the Middle East war, the subsequent oil crisis, the origins of shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East, the fall of Salvador Allende in Chile, and the tumultuous events surrounding Nixon’s resignation. Throughout are candid appraisals of world leaders, including Nixon, Golda Meir, Anwar Sadat, King Faisal, Hafez al-Asad, Chairman Mao, Leonid Brezhnev, Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, Georges Pompidou, and many more.

[John Harder]

I have to give this monster of a book only two stars. This is unfair in a way, but I think Dr. Kissinger’s ego can sustain the blow. As a historical reference Years of Upheaval is an indispensible resource. However, this could never be a popular history (a la David McCullough) for the layman -- 1,300 pages of the minutia involved in shuttle diplomacy is a bit of a slog.

[Nolan · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is the second volume in Kissinger’s memoirs, and despite its length, I’m glad I read it. The book left me with much to think about, and I’m glad I spent the time with it.

The book opens with Kissinger and Nixon at a poolside where Nixon rather nonchalantly announces that Kissinger is to be named secretary of state. It then provides a sometimes day-by-day account of a not-quite two-year period in which he carried out those duties.

Early chapters include a fascinating look at Hanoi as negotiations continued to end the war. There's a section on Watergate and its legacy on foreign policy that was interesting indeed. Kissinger’s ability to craft agreements among often-hostile governments was inextricably tied to Nixon’s political fortunes. As the president floundered in the rising waters of impeachment, the secretary scrambled to pull together agreements he believed were in the best interest of the nation.

It is the very nature of the memoir to attempt to put the best foot forward where the writer is concerned. I was rather impatient by the ego here--some of it silly and narcissistic. Kissinger and Nixon's Chief of Staff, Al Haig, actually quarreled over who could have sleeping quarters closest to Nixon's while on a trip. Seriously? Grown adults carrying on about where the bedroom is and whether they get to be closer to big daddy? I’ll lay serious money that’s a bi-partisan trait.

The behind-the-scenes information that accompanied the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973 was exciting and fascinating to me. I was a clueless high-school sophomore that year, and naturally, I had no idea how close we came to war with the Soviet Union. This almost reads like military fiction in parts, and I suppose Kissinger's detractors would argue that's exactly what some of it is. But it felt vividly real and truthful. It looks to me as I read this that we were much closer to potential nuclear war with the Soviet Union than I ever realized.

The sections on mid-east diplomacy were a bit slow for me, but the interconnectedness between energy supplies and disunity among traditional allies was fascinating. The French discord and strident efforts at destroying Kissinger's work regarding unified energy policies was more than a little intriguing. What struck me most about this were the historic parallels. Granted today may actually be more discordant than were those days in 1973 and 1974, but the two time periods aren’t so different that we can’t learn valuable lessons for our day from theirs.

If the thought of reading a Kissinger book horrifies you, at least look at the final chapter, which walks you through the last week of the Nixon presidency. Regardless of your political orientation, this last chapter will be a somber experience for you. Underneath the schadenfreude reactions of those who think the former president got his comeuppance there is a human factor that is undeniable and shouldn’t be ignored. Nixon, the man, was shattered. And while he seemed to despise Kissinger for capturing the limelight and for being known for peace initiatives when the initiatives were arguably Nixon’s, it was to Kissinger that he turned late on the night of August 7, 1974, 24 hours before he made the resignation speech. Unless your heart is hermetically sealed and is entirely devoid of any connection to others, you will experience the pathos of that final night prior to the resignation announcement.

Kissinger candidly remembers Nixon; he doesn’t cut him lots of breaks. But he also retains unwavering respect for Nixon. The half hour or so in which the two prayed at the Lincoln bedroom is a touching scene.

The bottom line is that while this was as long a book as I’ve read in years, it was mostly a great experience. The chapter on Europe bored me; it almost felt irrelevant somehow. But the descriptions of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict were every bit as exciting as descriptions of fictional battles from the likes of Robert Jordan. Fascinating, too, are the portraits of political leaders of the day. Perhaps the most sympathetic portrait is Kissinger’s obvious love and respect for Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir. He described her as a kind of mother figure for the nation; she is someone who had adopted the nation as her family and fiercely defended it.

He provides wonderful glimpses into the life and thoughts of Egypt’s Anwar Sadat and Jordan’s King Hussein. I was a little creeped out by his generosity toward people who I’m sure were murderers—men like Syria’s Hafez al-Assad, whom he admits to liking despite his iron-fisted rule over the country.

The Middle East shuttle diplomacy left me reeling and dizzy in places, but if you stay with that section, you’ll understand why it was included. The chapter on Chilean dictator Salvador Allende looked to me a lot like Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela. Again, proof that we can learn much from even our recent history.

[Amani Yamani · Rating 5 out of 5]

#هنري_كيسنجر_الجزء_الثاني
‏الكتاب رقم (٢٢) من قائمة ⁧‫#تحدي_القراءة‬⁩ لعام ٢٠٢٢/٢٠٢٣ وهو من مقتنياتي من ⁧‫#معرض_الرياض_الدولي_للكتاب_2022‬⁩
‏المؤلف: ⁧‫#هنري_كيسنجر
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‏عدد الصفحات: ٢١٧
‏المدة المستغرقة لقراءة الكتاب: ٣ أسابيع


هذا هو المجلد الثاني في مذكرات #كيسنجر ، وعلى الرغم من طوله ، إلا أنني سعيدة لأنني قرأته أخيرا لقد ترك الكتاب لي الكثير لأفكر فيه..

يبدأ الكتاب بكيسنجر ونيكسون عند حوض السباحة

تشمل الفصول الأولى نظرة على هانوي حيث استمرت المفاوضات لإنهاء الحرب، هناك قسم عن ووترجيت وإرثها في السياسة الخارجية وكان مثيرًا للاهتمام بالفعل.

كانت قدرة كيسنجر على صياغة الاتفاقات بين الحكومات المعادية في كثير من الأحيان مرتبطة ارتباطًا وثيقًا بالثروات السياسية لنيكسون.

ويغطي هذا المجلد الثاني من مذكرات هنري كيسنجر الضخمة السنوات التي قضاها كوزير خارجية للرئيس ريتشارد نيكسون (1972-1974) ، بما في ذلك انتهاء حرب فيتنام ، وحرب الشرق الأوسط عام 1973 ، والحظر النفطي ، ووترغيت ، واستقالة نيكسون. بدأت سنوات الاضطرابات مع تعيين الدكتور كيسنجر وزيراً للخارجية.

من بين الأحداث الأخرى في هذه السنوات المضطربة التي يرويها, رحلته إلى هانوي بعد وقف إطلاق النار في فيتنام ، وجهوده لتسوية الحرب في كمبوديا ، و "عام أوروبا" ، واجتماعين قمة نيكسون وبريجنيف ، والخلافات حول الحد من الأسلحة ، والاستنفار العسكري والمواجهة مع الاتحاد السوفيتي بشأن حرب الشرق الأوسط ، وأزمة النفط اللاحقة ، وأصول الدبلوماسية في الشرق الأوسط ، وسقوط سلفادور أليندي في تشيلي ، والأحداث المضطربة المحيطة باستقالة نيكسون.

في جميع أنحاء العالم ، هناك تقييمات صريحة لقادة العالم ، بما في ذلك نيكسون ، وغولدا مئير ، وأنور السادات ، والملك فيصل ، وحافظ الأسد ، والرئيس ماو ، وليونيد بريجنيف ، وويلي براندت ، وهيلموت شميدت ، وجورج بومبيدو ، وغيرهم الكثير.

كانت المعلومات من وراء الكواليس التي صاحبت الحرب العربية الإسرائيلية في أكتوبر 1973 مثيرة ، وكانت الأقسام المتعلقة بدبلوماسية الشرق الأوسط بطيئة الأحداث ، لكن الترابط بين إمدادات الطاقة والانقسام بين الحلفاء التقليديين كان رائعًا.

إن طبيعة المذكرات هي محاولة تقديم أفضل ما في الأمر فيما يتعلق بالكاتب، وبها نو�� من النرجسية والأنا العالية.


إذا كانت فكرة قراءة كتاب كيسنجر تزعجك ، فعلى الأقل انظر إلى الفصل الأخير ، الذي يعلمك الأسبوع الأخير من رئاسة نيكسون. بغض النظر عن توجهك السياسي. تحت ردود الفعل الشماتة من أولئك الذين يعتقدون أن الرئيس السابق قد حصل على عقوبته ، هناك عامل بشري لا يمكن إنكاره ولا ينبغي تجاهله. لقد تحطم نيكسون.

وبينما بدا أنه يحتقر كيسنجر لأنه استولى على الأضواء وكونه معروفًا بمبادرات السلام عندما كانت المبادرات يمكن القول إن نيكسون ، فقد تحول إلى كيسنجر في وقت متأخر من ليلة 7 أغسطس 1974 ، قبل 24 ساعة من إلقاء خطاب الاستقالة. .

خلاصة القول هي أنه على الرغم من أن هذا كان كتابًا طويلاً، إلا أنه كان في الغالب تجربة رائعة. لقد شعرت بالملل في الفصل الخاص بأوروبا. شعرت أنه غير ذي صلة إلى حد ما.

بالقرب من النهاية ، كتب كيسنجر دراسة شخصية ممتازة لنيكسون ، لكنه يحافظ على الاحترام ، ويبدو أنه يبذل قصارى جهده للاعتراف بنفس القدر بعيوب نيكسون وعظمته والتناقض الظاهري للرجل. بينما لم يكن قريبًا من نيكسون شخصيًا ، يكافح كيسنجر لرؤية شخص قد أنجز الكثير من الأشياء العظيمة بينما ينهار الرئيس من الداخل بسبب مخاوفه التي لا تنتهي.

بالنسبة لأي شخص مهتم بكيسنجر ، أو نيكسون ، أو حرب الشرق الأوسط عام 1973 ، أو السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية خلال هذه الفترة ، فإن هذا الكتاب ضروري للقراءة. ومع ذلك ، على الرغم من أنها مثيرة للاهتمام للغاية في بعض الأحيان ، إلا أنها لا تحزم تمامًا المجلد الأول.

من الكتاب:
- أهمية الاستقرار الداخلي لنفوذ السياسة الخارجية للإدارة.
- دعم الصين لمشاركة الولايات المتحدة في فيتنام وعملية سلام ناجحة بسبب اهتمامهم الجيوسياسي بفيتنام شيوعي موحد صديقة للسوفييت.
- كيف أضرت مواعيد انسحاب الكونجرس الصارمة بعملية السلام في فيتنام لأنها أزالت نفوذ الولايات المتحدة للتهديد بمواصلة القصف
- النظرة المحترمة بصدق التي اتخذها كيسنجر تجاه السادات وكيف كان ينظر إليه على أنه رجل دولة تقدمي وحكيم.
- إحجام أوروبا عن التعامل مع الولايات المتحدة ورغبتها في إظهار استقلالها عن الولايات المتحدة ، وخاصة فرنسا.

[Aspar · Rating 3 out of 5]

Very detailed account of Kissinger as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor during the end of the Nixon presidency in the Vietnam/Cambodia war, attempted Year of Europe, and shuttle diplomacy, among other notable events. Insightful into the personalities of the major Middle Eastern players and the nuts and bolts of the peace process. However, Kissinger, as he is known to do, rarely if ever discusses his faults or mistakes. We never see an acknowledgement of the civilian casualties the bombing campaign in Cambodia caused. This is campaign which Kissinger personally formulated, which he also does not admit.
Kissinger also glosses over, naturally, his real opinions of Nixon and those around him. As attested to by reliable sources like Eagleburger and Scowcroft, Kissinger is renown for his paranoia, political intriguing, obsession with is image, and absolute disdain for Nixon and co's intellect and foreign policy acumen. Although this leaks out a bit when Kissinger discusses his own experience being grilled by the media for his alleged knowledge of the Nixon tape recordings. An allegation Kissinger vigorously denies in the book, while neglecting to mention how he had his own tape recording system.

On whole, while the book does not paint an anywhere near complete picture of Kissinger's personality or his actual involvement in some of the more sordid events of the later Nixon years, it is an excellent reference for a detailed look into the diplomacy of the Nixon years.

Some nuggets that I remember even now (11 months or so after reading) are:
- The importance of domestic stability to an administration's foreign policy clout. Watergate had serious foreign policy repercussions, with the Soviet's disengaging from serious talk on arms reductions in the final year of Nixon's presidency.
- China's tacit support for US involvement in Vietnam and a successful peace process because of their geopolitical concern of a united Communist Vietnam friendly to the Soviets.
- How Congress' strict withdrawal deadlines damaged the Vietnam peace process because it removed US leverage of the threat to continue bombing (similar to the deadlines for Afghanistan withdrawal under Obama).
- The genuinely respectful view Kissinger took towards Sadat and how he viewed him as a progressive and willy statesman.
- Europe's reluctance to engage with the US and desire to demonstrate their independence from the US, especially France. Kissinger bemoans the geopolitical dangers of a Europe that flirts with the Soviets.

[Toby Philpott · Rating 5 out of 5]

Another Fascinating Read

I might not always agree with Kissinger but I certainly love his candour. This volume covers the end of the Vietnam War, the other conflicts in Indo-China, developing relationships with China (despite the demise of Zhou Enlai), the Soviet Union and the end of the Nixon Presidency. It also covers at length the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the subsequent peace process.

As always, a fascinating insight into Kissinger’s thought processes, observations on Richard Nixon, and a range of other actors in international relations. Highly recommended!

[René · Rating 3 out of 5]

While the chapters on diplomacy during and following the 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and its neighbors read like a first-rate thriller, much of this sequel to Dr. Kissinger's memoirs while being responsible for foreign relations under Richard Nixon is spent not only on his high self-esteem, but mainly on how much more he could have done without Watergate (a word one reads in this huge book every second or third page). Great book for PhD students of US history. but not so much for the average history readers.

[Mark · Rating 5 out of 5]

By far the best book I have read in my life, this intensely detailed report on one of the most interesting times in this nation’s history. Kissinger has expert views that bring the international side into American politics. This book still stands up today, with insight into issues today, such as the rivalries in the Middle East. This book never gets old, and is perfect all around. 5/5 stars

[ياسر · Rating 3 out of 5]

وصف هنري كيسنجر الرئيس عبدالناصر بالمتناقض والازدواجية في قرارته وگأنه يفضل السادات في الإدارة ..
الضجيج الإعلامي كان له دور في إبراز شخصية عبدالناصر وتتويجه بالبطولات المزيفة رغم هزيمته في جميع المعارك التي خاضها

[Daphne Lin · Rating 3 out of 5]

The narration was entertaining (unless you think about the impact of the policies/decisions that were made within the timeline of this book). But Henry Kissinger, I do not like you. I know you cannot read this, and that kind of makes me happy!

[Dymbula · Rating 5 out of 5]

Perfektní přehled moderních a docela bouřlivých dějin. Velmi čtivé a dobře ozdrojované.

[محمد فكري · Rating 3 out of 5]

مذكرات وافية ومفصلة جدا بطريقة مملة خصوصا في الاحداث التي عافها الزمن مثل المفاوضات مع السوفيت والتي ذكرت تفصيليا بطريقة مستفزة والمفاوضات مع فيتنام
والغريب انه اوجز في الكثير من احداث ووترجيت ركز على ردود فعل الادارة على فضح الاحداث بطريقة تبدو متعجلة وتجاهل موقعه في خلال وقت وقوع احداث التصنت
اما الموضوع الذي كان اكثر اثارة لي طبعا هو حرب اكتوبر الذي تكلم فيها بطريقة تبدو شخصية وصريحة اعتقد انه كان مفيدا للكثير لمعرفة طريقة تعامل القادة العرب والاجانب مع الحرب وتجلت فيه شخصيته الصهيونية بوضوح

[Eric_W]

“A critic who can suck like that, as was once dryly said by one of my moral mentors, need never dine alone. Nor need his subject. Except that, every now and then, the recipient (and donor) of so much sycophancy feels a tremor of anxiety. He leaves the well-furnished table and scurries to the bathroom.”

Christopher Hitchens referring to a review by Norman Podhoretz of Henry Kissinger’s second volume of memoirs. Harper’s, February 2000.

[Jeff Keehr · Rating 4 out of 5]

Again, this was another Kissinger tome but I found it fascinating. I believe this covers the period during and after Nixon's resignation. Kissinger was never implicated in any of Nixon's dirty work.

[Danny · Rating 4 out of 5]

“Years of Upheaval” by Henry Kissinger is striking in the conspicuous waning of Nixon’s presence within these pages vis-à-vis the collapse of his executive authority during Watergate. “Shuttle Diplomacy,” while fascinating, at times grew monotonous. His tribute to Nixon was most memorable.

[Cws]

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