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A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House
Written by one of our foremost historians and published in 1965, A Thousand Days is still considered the most complete and definitive portrait of John F. Kennedy and his administration. Handpicked by Kennedy to serve as special assistant to the president, historian and Harvard professor Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. witnessed firsthand the politics and personalities that influenced some of the most important and dramatic events in modern history.
The hundreds of photographs and documents included here have been gleaned from such sources as the John F. Kennedy Library, the Library of Congress, the Associated Press, Life magazine, and more. The photos capture private meetings with the president, the Bay of Pigs, the Civil Rights movement, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, as well as official White House memoranda, public speeches, social occasions, and private moments with the Kennedy family. These powerful images add a new dimension to the award-winning text and introduce a new generation to some of the most important and visually iconic moments in our recent past.
The hundreds of photographs and documents included here have been gleaned from such sources as the John F. Kennedy Library, the Library of Congress, the Associated Press, Life magazine, and more. The photos capture private meetings with the president, the Bay of Pigs, the Civil Rights movement, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, as well as official White House memoranda, public speeches, social occasions, and private moments with the Kennedy family. These powerful images add a new dimension to the award-winning text and introduce a new generation to some of the most important and visually iconic moments in our recent past.
384 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1965
657 people are currently reading
6509 people want to read
About the author
Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.
670 books220 followersArthur Meier Schlesinger Jr., born Arthur Bancroft Schlesinger, was a Pulitzer Prize recipient and American historian and social critic whose work explored the liberalism of American political leaders including Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, and Robert F. Kennedy. He served as special assistant and "court historian" to President Kennedy from 1961 to 1963. He wrote a detailed account of the Kennedy Administration, from the transition period to the president's state funeral, titled A Thousand Days. In 1968, he actively supported the presidential campaign of Senator Robert F. Kennedy until Kennedy's assassination in the Ambassador Hotel on June 5, 1968, and wrote the biography Robert Kennedy and His Times several years later.
He popularized the term "imperial presidency" during the Nixon administration by writing the book The Imperial Presidency.
His father was also a well-known historian.
He popularized the term "imperial presidency" during the Nixon administration by writing the book The Imperial Presidency.
His father was also a well-known historian.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 112 reviews
August 11, 2024
A 20th century tragedy, left unresolved in my opinion. JFK remains a fascinating man to read about. People act surprised to find he wasn’t perfect. So, who is, really? But he was a better leader than a lot of others we see on the world stage. Ask the (then) West Germans how much it hurt to lose him.
“Freedom is indivisible, and when one man is enslaved, all are not free. When all are free, then we can look forward to that day when this city will be joined as one and this country and this great Continent of Europe in a peaceful and hopeful globe. When that day finally comes, as it will, the people of West Berlin can take sober satisfaction in the fact that they were in the front lines for almost two decades.
“All free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin, and, therefore, as a free man, I take pride in the words …
“Ich bin ein Berliner."
June 26, 1963
Rudolf Wilde Platz
Berlin
🇩🇪 Kennedy's "Ich bin ein Berliner" speech was seen as a turning point in the Cold War. It was a major morale booster for West Germans, alarmed by the recently-built Berlin Wall. It also gave a strongly defiant message to the Soviet Union and effectively put down Moscow's hopes of driving the Allies out of West Berlin. Two months later, President Kennedy negotiated the first nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union, in what was seen as a first step towards ending the Cold War 🇩🇪
(Amerika Haus)
“Freedom is indivisible, and when one man is enslaved, all are not free. When all are free, then we can look forward to that day when this city will be joined as one and this country and this great Continent of Europe in a peaceful and hopeful globe. When that day finally comes, as it will, the people of West Berlin can take sober satisfaction in the fact that they were in the front lines for almost two decades.
“All free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin, and, therefore, as a free man, I take pride in the words …
“Ich bin ein Berliner."
June 26, 1963
Rudolf Wilde Platz
Berlin
🇩🇪 Kennedy's "Ich bin ein Berliner" speech was seen as a turning point in the Cold War. It was a major morale booster for West Germans, alarmed by the recently-built Berlin Wall. It also gave a strongly defiant message to the Soviet Union and effectively put down Moscow's hopes of driving the Allies out of West Berlin. Two months later, President Kennedy negotiated the first nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union, in what was seen as a first step towards ending the Cold War 🇩🇪
(Amerika Haus)
September 6, 2021
4.75 stars
On January 30th, 1961, Arthur M. Schlesinger, a Harvard historian, accepted a new position as Special Assistant in President John F. Kennedy's administration. For Schlesinger – who had previously worked on presidential campaigns but had never before served a President-elect – it was a transition from the writing of history to the making of such. It would also be the birth of a most fascinating and informative presidential study, for A THOUSAND DAYS is special – it is a brilliant mix of a personal memoir, a presidential biography, an academic history, and a rather romantic, idealistic depiction of JFK.
Schlesinger begins with a vivid description of Kennedy's cold, snowy inauguration day that seemed to portend the somber times ahead. Then, he immediately plunges into an account of Kennedy’s early years, focusing on his intellectual development.
Although Kennedy is not considered one of the great "intellectual presidents," such with Wilson or Jefferson, Kennedy’s knowledge of history and political science was impressive. Moreover, the President possessed a peculiar intellectual curiosity, which had turned his mind into a wonderful treasury of random, but useful, knowledge. For instance, he remembered that there is about the same amount of salt in the human blood as there is in sea water and that this might be a proof of men's origin in the sea, and once used this fact in a speech designed to advocate for sea conservation. Diverse in his interests, Kennedy also filled his White House with an array of young intellectuals – Schlesinger among them. Their presence in his administration showed the world that the US President valued people like them, who were often unappreciated, or even dissidents, in their own countries.
Schlesinger briefly covers the domestic affairs of the Kennedy era and the way the President handled them. He writes about the civil rights struggle, JFK's strained relations with Congress, and the fight with Big Steel.
JFK found crowds to be irrational. Unlike Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the master demagogue, he disliked to play on the emotions of mobs. He did want to help the blacks in America, but he wanted to do it slowly and prudently. By the 1960s, though, the Civil Rights movement was already in a state of almost-revolution, and Martin Luther King, Jr. complained that "[a] sweeping revolutionary force is pressed in a narrow tunnel" because of the President's cautious use of executive powers. Some blacks accused Kennedy of not really caring about their plight. Schlesinger, though, defends JFK by pointing out that the President did begin to act after the violence in Southern cities and towns escalated, that he had been right to wait for the moment when the attention of the American public was actually focused on civil rights. The historian saw that behind Kennedy's coolness, restraint, and dislike for displaying emotions was a committed, involved, deeply caring man.
The main focus of A THOUSAND DAYS is, undoubtedly, Kennedy's foreign policy. First, Schlesinger dives into JFK's complex policy in Latin America and details the administration's efforts to build The Alliance for Progress – a massive foreign aid program – with the frequently mistrustful Latin regimes. Kennedy believed that in the end American influence in the world depended less on American arms than on American ideals. Undertakings like the Peace Corps and the Alliance for Progress were closest to his heart. Especially notable part of the Alliance was his agreement on world coffee production, which gave a crucial boost to the economies of the coffee-producing nations of Latin America.
Then, Schlesinger turns to the Bay of Pigs fiasco for whose initiation he blames the Eisenhower administration. He praises Kennedy's cautiousness, "his capacity to refuse escalation." When the Bay of Pigs invasion appeared to be failing, though under pressure from the military and the CIA to send in American forces, Kennedy refused to do so. Later, he also declined escalation in the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the missile crisis of 1962. The missile crisis was not only the most dangerous moment in the Cold War, but the most dangerous moment in all human history. The Soviet forces in Cuba had tactical missiles equipped with nuclear warheads and the permission to use them in case of an American attack. Had Kennedy yielded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who urged for an invasion, the result would probably have been nuclear war. Fortunately, after the Bay of Pigs embarrassment, Kennedy had little regard for the JCS and their recommendations. Instead, he persistently sought – and successfully achieved – a diplomatic solution. “It quickly became clear,” Schlesinger quotes Khrushchev's memoirs, “he understood better than Eisenhower that an improvement in relations was the only rational course.”
And then came the great quagmire – Vietnam. Although JFK increased the number of American military advisers attached to the South Vietnamese army, he rejected every proposal to send in American combat units. “The last thing he wanted,” said General Maxwell Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, “was to put in ground forces.” On October 11, 1963, Kennedy approved the little-known NSAM-263 directive with recommendations by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to 1) make the government of South Vietnam improve its military performance; 2) train Vietnamese soldiers "so that essential functions can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965 [because it] should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S personnel by that time"; 3) withdraw, as planned by JFK, 1,000 U.S military personnel by the end of 1963. Both McNamara and McGeorge Bundy, JFK's national security adviser, insisted that – unlike what would come to be widely believed later – Kennedy would have never Americanised the war. Unfortunately, they made the mistake to advise President Lyndon B. Johnson to do exactly that, and he sent troops to Vietnam, erroneously concluding that that was what Kennedy would have wanted.
Most importantly, Schlesinger does a great job portraying Kennedy's mature, pragmatic side, thus dispelling the false image of the President as a young, naive, idealistic dreamer. According to him, Kennedy rarely lost sight of other people’s motives and problems. His mind was always critical; his thinking always retained "the cutting edge of decision." When he was told something, he wanted to know what he could do about it. He did not like abstractions, testing the meaning of every idea by the results it would produce. "Kennedy simply could not be reduced to the usual complex of sociological generalizations," writes Schlesinger. He was Irish, Catholic, New England, Harvard, Navy, Palm Beach, Democrat etc., and at the same time he was so much more than that. He carried an appealing individuality, which kept him self-determined, affected in his actions by no outside forces.
Of course, it cannot be denied that Schlesinger for whom President John F. Kennedy had been a lifelong hero and who was deeply shaken by the young leader's assassination, is biased in his judgements. His work reads more like an ode to the Kennedy era than as an objective historical study. The author often interrupts his narrative with passages dedicated to extolling JFK, and he seems to have omitted or glossed over all the President's mistakes and negative qualities. For instance, he vigorously denies Kennedy's womanizing, although it was true. Such drawbacks deprive A Thousand Days of the neutrality the reader might expect from such an account. Nevertheless, Schlesinger's compelling, elegant style and his perspective of an insider make this work a must-read for all Kennedy buffs.
On January 30th, 1961, Arthur M. Schlesinger, a Harvard historian, accepted a new position as Special Assistant in President John F. Kennedy's administration. For Schlesinger – who had previously worked on presidential campaigns but had never before served a President-elect – it was a transition from the writing of history to the making of such. It would also be the birth of a most fascinating and informative presidential study, for A THOUSAND DAYS is special – it is a brilliant mix of a personal memoir, a presidential biography, an academic history, and a rather romantic, idealistic depiction of JFK.
Schlesinger begins with a vivid description of Kennedy's cold, snowy inauguration day that seemed to portend the somber times ahead. Then, he immediately plunges into an account of Kennedy’s early years, focusing on his intellectual development.
Although Kennedy is not considered one of the great "intellectual presidents," such with Wilson or Jefferson, Kennedy’s knowledge of history and political science was impressive. Moreover, the President possessed a peculiar intellectual curiosity, which had turned his mind into a wonderful treasury of random, but useful, knowledge. For instance, he remembered that there is about the same amount of salt in the human blood as there is in sea water and that this might be a proof of men's origin in the sea, and once used this fact in a speech designed to advocate for sea conservation. Diverse in his interests, Kennedy also filled his White House with an array of young intellectuals – Schlesinger among them. Their presence in his administration showed the world that the US President valued people like them, who were often unappreciated, or even dissidents, in their own countries.
Schlesinger briefly covers the domestic affairs of the Kennedy era and the way the President handled them. He writes about the civil rights struggle, JFK's strained relations with Congress, and the fight with Big Steel.
JFK found crowds to be irrational. Unlike Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the master demagogue, he disliked to play on the emotions of mobs. He did want to help the blacks in America, but he wanted to do it slowly and prudently. By the 1960s, though, the Civil Rights movement was already in a state of almost-revolution, and Martin Luther King, Jr. complained that "[a] sweeping revolutionary force is pressed in a narrow tunnel" because of the President's cautious use of executive powers. Some blacks accused Kennedy of not really caring about their plight. Schlesinger, though, defends JFK by pointing out that the President did begin to act after the violence in Southern cities and towns escalated, that he had been right to wait for the moment when the attention of the American public was actually focused on civil rights. The historian saw that behind Kennedy's coolness, restraint, and dislike for displaying emotions was a committed, involved, deeply caring man.
The main focus of A THOUSAND DAYS is, undoubtedly, Kennedy's foreign policy. First, Schlesinger dives into JFK's complex policy in Latin America and details the administration's efforts to build The Alliance for Progress – a massive foreign aid program – with the frequently mistrustful Latin regimes. Kennedy believed that in the end American influence in the world depended less on American arms than on American ideals. Undertakings like the Peace Corps and the Alliance for Progress were closest to his heart. Especially notable part of the Alliance was his agreement on world coffee production, which gave a crucial boost to the economies of the coffee-producing nations of Latin America.
Then, Schlesinger turns to the Bay of Pigs fiasco for whose initiation he blames the Eisenhower administration. He praises Kennedy's cautiousness, "his capacity to refuse escalation." When the Bay of Pigs invasion appeared to be failing, though under pressure from the military and the CIA to send in American forces, Kennedy refused to do so. Later, he also declined escalation in the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the missile crisis of 1962. The missile crisis was not only the most dangerous moment in the Cold War, but the most dangerous moment in all human history. The Soviet forces in Cuba had tactical missiles equipped with nuclear warheads and the permission to use them in case of an American attack. Had Kennedy yielded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who urged for an invasion, the result would probably have been nuclear war. Fortunately, after the Bay of Pigs embarrassment, Kennedy had little regard for the JCS and their recommendations. Instead, he persistently sought – and successfully achieved – a diplomatic solution. “It quickly became clear,” Schlesinger quotes Khrushchev's memoirs, “he understood better than Eisenhower that an improvement in relations was the only rational course.”
And then came the great quagmire – Vietnam. Although JFK increased the number of American military advisers attached to the South Vietnamese army, he rejected every proposal to send in American combat units. “The last thing he wanted,” said General Maxwell Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, “was to put in ground forces.” On October 11, 1963, Kennedy approved the little-known NSAM-263 directive with recommendations by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to 1) make the government of South Vietnam improve its military performance; 2) train Vietnamese soldiers "so that essential functions can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965 [because it] should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S personnel by that time"; 3) withdraw, as planned by JFK, 1,000 U.S military personnel by the end of 1963. Both McNamara and McGeorge Bundy, JFK's national security adviser, insisted that – unlike what would come to be widely believed later – Kennedy would have never Americanised the war. Unfortunately, they made the mistake to advise President Lyndon B. Johnson to do exactly that, and he sent troops to Vietnam, erroneously concluding that that was what Kennedy would have wanted.
Most importantly, Schlesinger does a great job portraying Kennedy's mature, pragmatic side, thus dispelling the false image of the President as a young, naive, idealistic dreamer. According to him, Kennedy rarely lost sight of other people’s motives and problems. His mind was always critical; his thinking always retained "the cutting edge of decision." When he was told something, he wanted to know what he could do about it. He did not like abstractions, testing the meaning of every idea by the results it would produce. "Kennedy simply could not be reduced to the usual complex of sociological generalizations," writes Schlesinger. He was Irish, Catholic, New England, Harvard, Navy, Palm Beach, Democrat etc., and at the same time he was so much more than that. He carried an appealing individuality, which kept him self-determined, affected in his actions by no outside forces.
Of course, it cannot be denied that Schlesinger for whom President John F. Kennedy had been a lifelong hero and who was deeply shaken by the young leader's assassination, is biased in his judgements. His work reads more like an ode to the Kennedy era than as an objective historical study. The author often interrupts his narrative with passages dedicated to extolling JFK, and he seems to have omitted or glossed over all the President's mistakes and negative qualities. For instance, he vigorously denies Kennedy's womanizing, although it was true. Such drawbacks deprive A Thousand Days of the neutrality the reader might expect from such an account. Nevertheless, Schlesinger's compelling, elegant style and his perspective of an insider make this work a must-read for all Kennedy buffs.
May 15, 2020
A Thousand Days garnered Schlesinger the Pulitzer Prize for Biography in 1965.
Schlesinger had a front row seat to one of the most extraordinary periods in America’s history. He was the Special Assistant to President John F Kennedy and already had won a Pulitzer Prize for History.
This book stands out for its excellent coverage of the numerous foreign policy issues and crises that confronted the administration from 1961-1963.
Below are the major events that arose during Kennedy's tenure that were covered by Schlesinger in some depth in this book.
1. Campaign. The latter days of the Kennedy campaign in 1960. Some interesting and dramatic material on the Democratic convention in Los Angeles where Kennedy squeaked out the nomination and chose LBJ as his running mate. Then on to the General Election where Kennedy won the presidency. Theodore White's book on The Making of a President 1960 covered this campaign period much better in my opinion.
2. The President-elect period. This is when Schlesinger came on board. This was the most personal part of the book detailing the period when Schlesinger was recruited by Kennedy. He spent many days with JFK and Jackie and others in Hyannis Port . The immediate urge envy was how to fill the thousands of vacancies in the government and prep for the transition.I would have liked to see more coverage around the Inauguration.
3. Bay of Pigs Invasion. The first major crisis of the Kennedy administration resulted in an embarrassing defeat
4. Laos. Perhaps the most surprising portion of the book. Laos was in the midst of a civil war in 1961 and was viewed as a key pathway for Communists to get men and supplies to Vietnam and Thailand. Southeast Asia was a major concern of the U.S. to stem the spread of communism. But Kennedy and Kruschev each agreed to not intervene materially.
5. Berlin Airlift. Another moment of tension for the new administration when the Soviets ordered the wall to be built and shoot any who attempted to escape to West Berlin.
6. Vietnam. Less coverage of Vietnam than I was expecting. JFK takes no credit for the Diem assassination.
7. Peace Corps to the rescue.
Attwood persuaded the President to send Sargent Shriver to Guinea in June. Shriver and Touré hit it off immediately. Guinea, which had been attacking the Peace Corps as a CIA subsidiary, now invited it into the country; the government radio stopped reviling the United States; and personal relations between Guineans and Americans began to improve.
8. Congo
The previous administration, especially Dulles’ CIA strategies, made a mess of many nations around Africa.
Of all the African problems, the one that most commanded the President’s attention was the Congo. Independence had descended like a hurricane on the unprepared country in July 1960. In a few days the new state was in chaos: the Force Publique had mutinied; Katanga and other provinces were proclaiming their independence; Belgian paratroopers were coming back to restore order. In desperation Prime Minister Lumumba appealed to the United Nations.
9. South Africa
JFK was quite appalled at the Apartheid situation in South Africa .
The American President’s gallant leadership in the civil rights fight sealed the vast regard and affection for him in African hearts.
10. Peace Corps continued
Kennedy began the Peace Corps to help the third world countries. He had a genuine antipathy towards colonialism.
KENNEDY’S THIRD WORLD POLICY—the policy of helping the new nations to strength and independence—involved more than a change in American attitudes toward colonialism and non-alignment.
Eisenhower called the Peace Corps a “juvenile experiment,” and Nixon, with customary taste, observed solemnly that Kennedy “proposed to send as America’s representatives to other nations young men whom he calls volunteers but who in truth in many instances would be trying to escape the draft.”
11. The Cuban Missile Crisis.
The granddaddy of all the crises.
What worried Kennedy particularly was the inconceivable way each superpower had lost hold of the reality of the other: the United States absolutely persuaded that the Soviet Union would never put nuclear missiles into Cuba; the Soviet Union absolutely persuaded that it could do so and the United States would not respond. Remembering Barbara Tuchman’s enumeration in The Guns of August of the misjudgments which caused the First World War, he used to say that there should be a sequel entitled “The Missiles of October.”
12. de Gaulle. In late 1962 a flood of European problems blindsided the administration and at the top of the list was the Charles deGaulle problem.
if Cuba were to be followed by a détente, de Gaulle wanted to be in on the peacemaking; he could never forget Yalta when in his absence non-Europeans (by his definition) imposed what he considered a wicked settlement on Europe. Moreover, if Western Europe were irrevocably tied to the Atlantic, the division of Europe would become permanent, and de Gaulle’s dream of rebuilding “Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals” would be forever frustrated. And within the Common Market Britain was steadily acquiring the votes for admission—a result which, if achieved, would end French primacy in the Economic Community.
13. European tour. In another chapter Kennedy decided it was a good time to shore up America’s allies in Europe. From Ireland and Britain to West Germany and Italy Kennedy he received enormous turnout and fanfare. It was through this goodwill mission that many Europeans became convinced in America’s commitment to democracy in Europe.
14. Bobby. As far as domestic issues, Schlesinger had positive things to say about Robert Kennedy the Attorney General. Of course Bobby was still alive when this book was written.
In the Washington judgment, he turned out to be the best Attorney General since Francis Biddle twenty years earlier. But this was a lesser part of his services to the President. When he first decided to appoint his brother to the cabinet, I do not know how much John Kennedy expected Robert to do besides run the Department of Justice and be available for private advice and commiseration. The Bay of Pigs, however, changed all that. Thereafter the President wanted Bobby at every crucial meeting.
15. Civil Rights
This section contained the only real criticism lodged by Schlesinger against JFK in the book. While JFK genuinely wanted Civil Rights to move forward he often appeared irritated by Martin Luther King and the many protests. JFK was quite concerned about the controversy over James Meredith’s enrollment at Ole Miss which required Bobby and JFK to order troops to protect Meredith. Essentially JFK wanted it all to proceed on his terms. Despite his earlier misgivings, in June 1963 JFK spoke passionately about Civil Rights. It was one of the great speeches by an American President and Dr. King was elated. Of course it ultimately would be LBJ who loyally carried the torch regarding JFK’s vision for a more diverse America and in 1965 got the votes to pass the Civil Rights Bill.
The book ends with the assassination in November of 1963.
1000 Days was a much better history book than I envisioned and it has held up reasonably well over the past fifty years. Because it was written so soon after the assassination, it does not have the benefit of deep analysis.
I found Dallek's book An Unfinished Life: to be the best biography covering JFK the person. Dallek’s book and Schlesinger’s book are actually quite complimentary. Several other excellent books also helped me round out the Kennedy story: Theodore White's book Making of the President 1960 on the campaign, Robert Caro's book The Passage of Power on the brooding LBJ as JFK's vice president, David Halberstam's The Best and Brightest about the Kennedy whiz kids who mismanaged the Vietnam conflict, and finally Vincent Bugliosi's book Parkland about the JFK assassination.
4.5 stars.
Schlesinger had a front row seat to one of the most extraordinary periods in America’s history. He was the Special Assistant to President John F Kennedy and already had won a Pulitzer Prize for History.
This book stands out for its excellent coverage of the numerous foreign policy issues and crises that confronted the administration from 1961-1963.
Below are the major events that arose during Kennedy's tenure that were covered by Schlesinger in some depth in this book.
1. Campaign. The latter days of the Kennedy campaign in 1960. Some interesting and dramatic material on the Democratic convention in Los Angeles where Kennedy squeaked out the nomination and chose LBJ as his running mate. Then on to the General Election where Kennedy won the presidency. Theodore White's book on The Making of a President 1960 covered this campaign period much better in my opinion.
2. The President-elect period. This is when Schlesinger came on board. This was the most personal part of the book detailing the period when Schlesinger was recruited by Kennedy. He spent many days with JFK and Jackie and others in Hyannis Port . The immediate urge envy was how to fill the thousands of vacancies in the government and prep for the transition.I would have liked to see more coverage around the Inauguration.
3. Bay of Pigs Invasion. The first major crisis of the Kennedy administration resulted in an embarrassing defeat
4. Laos. Perhaps the most surprising portion of the book. Laos was in the midst of a civil war in 1961 and was viewed as a key pathway for Communists to get men and supplies to Vietnam and Thailand. Southeast Asia was a major concern of the U.S. to stem the spread of communism. But Kennedy and Kruschev each agreed to not intervene materially.
5. Berlin Airlift. Another moment of tension for the new administration when the Soviets ordered the wall to be built and shoot any who attempted to escape to West Berlin.
6. Vietnam. Less coverage of Vietnam than I was expecting. JFK takes no credit for the Diem assassination.
7. Peace Corps to the rescue.
Attwood persuaded the President to send Sargent Shriver to Guinea in June. Shriver and Touré hit it off immediately. Guinea, which had been attacking the Peace Corps as a CIA subsidiary, now invited it into the country; the government radio stopped reviling the United States; and personal relations between Guineans and Americans began to improve.
8. Congo
The previous administration, especially Dulles’ CIA strategies, made a mess of many nations around Africa.
Of all the African problems, the one that most commanded the President’s attention was the Congo. Independence had descended like a hurricane on the unprepared country in July 1960. In a few days the new state was in chaos: the Force Publique had mutinied; Katanga and other provinces were proclaiming their independence; Belgian paratroopers were coming back to restore order. In desperation Prime Minister Lumumba appealed to the United Nations.
9. South Africa
JFK was quite appalled at the Apartheid situation in South Africa .
The American President’s gallant leadership in the civil rights fight sealed the vast regard and affection for him in African hearts.
10. Peace Corps continued
Kennedy began the Peace Corps to help the third world countries. He had a genuine antipathy towards colonialism.
KENNEDY’S THIRD WORLD POLICY—the policy of helping the new nations to strength and independence—involved more than a change in American attitudes toward colonialism and non-alignment.
Eisenhower called the Peace Corps a “juvenile experiment,” and Nixon, with customary taste, observed solemnly that Kennedy “proposed to send as America’s representatives to other nations young men whom he calls volunteers but who in truth in many instances would be trying to escape the draft.”
11. The Cuban Missile Crisis.
The granddaddy of all the crises.
What worried Kennedy particularly was the inconceivable way each superpower had lost hold of the reality of the other: the United States absolutely persuaded that the Soviet Union would never put nuclear missiles into Cuba; the Soviet Union absolutely persuaded that it could do so and the United States would not respond. Remembering Barbara Tuchman’s enumeration in The Guns of August of the misjudgments which caused the First World War, he used to say that there should be a sequel entitled “The Missiles of October.”
12. de Gaulle. In late 1962 a flood of European problems blindsided the administration and at the top of the list was the Charles deGaulle problem.
if Cuba were to be followed by a détente, de Gaulle wanted to be in on the peacemaking; he could never forget Yalta when in his absence non-Europeans (by his definition) imposed what he considered a wicked settlement on Europe. Moreover, if Western Europe were irrevocably tied to the Atlantic, the division of Europe would become permanent, and de Gaulle’s dream of rebuilding “Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals” would be forever frustrated. And within the Common Market Britain was steadily acquiring the votes for admission—a result which, if achieved, would end French primacy in the Economic Community.
13. European tour. In another chapter Kennedy decided it was a good time to shore up America’s allies in Europe. From Ireland and Britain to West Germany and Italy Kennedy he received enormous turnout and fanfare. It was through this goodwill mission that many Europeans became convinced in America’s commitment to democracy in Europe.
14. Bobby. As far as domestic issues, Schlesinger had positive things to say about Robert Kennedy the Attorney General. Of course Bobby was still alive when this book was written.
In the Washington judgment, he turned out to be the best Attorney General since Francis Biddle twenty years earlier. But this was a lesser part of his services to the President. When he first decided to appoint his brother to the cabinet, I do not know how much John Kennedy expected Robert to do besides run the Department of Justice and be available for private advice and commiseration. The Bay of Pigs, however, changed all that. Thereafter the President wanted Bobby at every crucial meeting.
15. Civil Rights
This section contained the only real criticism lodged by Schlesinger against JFK in the book. While JFK genuinely wanted Civil Rights to move forward he often appeared irritated by Martin Luther King and the many protests. JFK was quite concerned about the controversy over James Meredith’s enrollment at Ole Miss which required Bobby and JFK to order troops to protect Meredith. Essentially JFK wanted it all to proceed on his terms. Despite his earlier misgivings, in June 1963 JFK spoke passionately about Civil Rights. It was one of the great speeches by an American President and Dr. King was elated. Of course it ultimately would be LBJ who loyally carried the torch regarding JFK’s vision for a more diverse America and in 1965 got the votes to pass the Civil Rights Bill.
The book ends with the assassination in November of 1963.
1000 Days was a much better history book than I envisioned and it has held up reasonably well over the past fifty years. Because it was written so soon after the assassination, it does not have the benefit of deep analysis.
I found Dallek's book An Unfinished Life: to be the best biography covering JFK the person. Dallek’s book and Schlesinger’s book are actually quite complimentary. Several other excellent books also helped me round out the Kennedy story: Theodore White's book Making of the President 1960 on the campaign, Robert Caro's book The Passage of Power on the brooding LBJ as JFK's vice president, David Halberstam's The Best and Brightest about the Kennedy whiz kids who mismanaged the Vietnam conflict, and finally Vincent Bugliosi's book Parkland about the JFK assassination.
4.5 stars.
July 30, 2017
https://bestpresidentialbios.com/2017...
Arthur Schlesinger Jr.’s “A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House” was published in 1965 and received a Pulitzer Prize the following year. Schlesinger was a prominent historian and social critic who served as Special Assistant to President Kennedy. He was also a prolific author whose works include a Pulitzer Prize-winning book on Andrew Jackson and a series on Franklin D. Roosevelt. Schlesinger died in 2007 at the age of 89.
Written by an insider with a unique window into events, “A Thousand Days” is widely considered an invaluable, if selective, review of the three-year Kennedy presidency. Weighing in at a hefty 1,031 pages, this tome is part autobiography, part biography, and part interpretive history.
Schlesinger begins by reviewing JFK’s 1960 nomination for the presidency before proceeding carefully through Kennedy’s presidency up to his death. There are few interruptions along the way; only a brief examination of his early life, a review of his near-nomination as Adlai Stevenson’s 1956 running mate and some thematic diversions toward the end of the book interrupt what is otherwise a generally chronological flow.
Despite its intimidating length there is much to recommend in this classic. Schlesinger’s review of the 1960 Democratic Convention in Los Angeles was extraordinarily fascinating as was his account of discussions between Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev at the Vienna summit in 1961.
The author provides an engaging (if too brief) discussion of Secretary McNamara’s efforts to reorganize and streamline the Department of Defense and a particularly interesting examination of the decline of the Department of State following World War II. And, in general, Schlesinger is able to provide interesting (and often unique) insight into nearly everything he witnessed first-hand.
Unfortunately, despite Schlesinger’s skill as a historian and writer, this book will not provide a consistently engaging or carefree journey for many readers. “A Thousand Days” is frequently dry and dense and is more geared toward a political philosopher or history graduate student than a fan of colorful presidential biographies.
By design the reader is exposed to very little of Kennedy’s pre-presidency and even less of his family or personal life. The best material in this book derives from Schlesinger’s personal observations – but this only offers a partial view of Kennedy and his administration. Schlesinger “fills in the gaps” by reporting history he did not directly observe; this is when the book morphs from memoir to biography to history text.
But while some topics are discussed in heroic detail, others receive scant attention. And the extraordinary level of detail Schlesinger sometimes provides usually fails to translate into a lucid understanding of events. The Bay of Pigs fiasco, for example, absorbs about seventy pages. But with this level of detail the episode is almost unrecognizable – the reader is flown so close to the ground that there is no feel for the bigger picture. And yet there is hardly any mention of Kennedy’s effort to land Americans on the moon and virtually no discussion of farm policy or other domestic challenges.
Finally, Schlesinger is clearly an unabashed fan of his subject; he shows a nearly unbridled enthusiasm for Kennedy. The reader almost always sees JFK at his very best: his most charming, his most eloquent, his most perceptive and astute. Never do we observe (directly or indirectly) Kennedy’s notorious indiscretions and flaws. Although Schlesinger’s is a valuable public perspective, it is decidedly one-sided and exceedingly generous.
Overall, Arthur Schlesinger’s “A Thousand Days” is unique, insightful and revealing… but it is also weighty, uneven, occasionally tedious and often obsequious. For readers with patience and persistence it provides an exceptional window into the Kennedy presidency from the perspective of a perceptive and articulate insider. But as an efficient and balanced account of Kennedy’s presidency it proves highly imperfect.
Overall rating: 3 stars
Arthur Schlesinger Jr.’s “A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House” was published in 1965 and received a Pulitzer Prize the following year. Schlesinger was a prominent historian and social critic who served as Special Assistant to President Kennedy. He was also a prolific author whose works include a Pulitzer Prize-winning book on Andrew Jackson and a series on Franklin D. Roosevelt. Schlesinger died in 2007 at the age of 89.
Written by an insider with a unique window into events, “A Thousand Days” is widely considered an invaluable, if selective, review of the three-year Kennedy presidency. Weighing in at a hefty 1,031 pages, this tome is part autobiography, part biography, and part interpretive history.
Schlesinger begins by reviewing JFK’s 1960 nomination for the presidency before proceeding carefully through Kennedy’s presidency up to his death. There are few interruptions along the way; only a brief examination of his early life, a review of his near-nomination as Adlai Stevenson’s 1956 running mate and some thematic diversions toward the end of the book interrupt what is otherwise a generally chronological flow.
Despite its intimidating length there is much to recommend in this classic. Schlesinger’s review of the 1960 Democratic Convention in Los Angeles was extraordinarily fascinating as was his account of discussions between Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev at the Vienna summit in 1961.
The author provides an engaging (if too brief) discussion of Secretary McNamara’s efforts to reorganize and streamline the Department of Defense and a particularly interesting examination of the decline of the Department of State following World War II. And, in general, Schlesinger is able to provide interesting (and often unique) insight into nearly everything he witnessed first-hand.
Unfortunately, despite Schlesinger’s skill as a historian and writer, this book will not provide a consistently engaging or carefree journey for many readers. “A Thousand Days” is frequently dry and dense and is more geared toward a political philosopher or history graduate student than a fan of colorful presidential biographies.
By design the reader is exposed to very little of Kennedy’s pre-presidency and even less of his family or personal life. The best material in this book derives from Schlesinger’s personal observations – but this only offers a partial view of Kennedy and his administration. Schlesinger “fills in the gaps” by reporting history he did not directly observe; this is when the book morphs from memoir to biography to history text.
But while some topics are discussed in heroic detail, others receive scant attention. And the extraordinary level of detail Schlesinger sometimes provides usually fails to translate into a lucid understanding of events. The Bay of Pigs fiasco, for example, absorbs about seventy pages. But with this level of detail the episode is almost unrecognizable – the reader is flown so close to the ground that there is no feel for the bigger picture. And yet there is hardly any mention of Kennedy’s effort to land Americans on the moon and virtually no discussion of farm policy or other domestic challenges.
Finally, Schlesinger is clearly an unabashed fan of his subject; he shows a nearly unbridled enthusiasm for Kennedy. The reader almost always sees JFK at his very best: his most charming, his most eloquent, his most perceptive and astute. Never do we observe (directly or indirectly) Kennedy’s notorious indiscretions and flaws. Although Schlesinger’s is a valuable public perspective, it is decidedly one-sided and exceedingly generous.
Overall, Arthur Schlesinger’s “A Thousand Days” is unique, insightful and revealing… but it is also weighty, uneven, occasionally tedious and often obsequious. For readers with patience and persistence it provides an exceptional window into the Kennedy presidency from the perspective of a perceptive and articulate insider. But as an efficient and balanced account of Kennedy’s presidency it proves highly imperfect.
Overall rating: 3 stars
March 15, 2022
A fascinating, well written and researched account of JFK and his presidency!
April 12, 2009
I am still actually reading this book. I am about halfway through. It is about 1000 pages. So I want to record what I can remember now, because by the time I finish I'll probably have forgotten it all.
Well, Schlesinger is clearly brilliant. His prose is superb. This book is so valuable because it's an insider's account, but he has obviously done a lot of additional research to supplement his own experiences and memories. He has a gift for politics--for analyzing the situation trenchantly, including all the personalities and egos involved--but also a sense of irony about it. It seems the same was true of Kennedy.
The parallels between Kennedy and Obama are striking. I know it's almost a cliche, but as I read Schlesinger's descriptions of Kennedy's character, it was uncanny. He was intellectual yet pragmatic, young and handsome. His campaign promised change and his administration excited hope throughout the country and the world.
The story of the Democratic Convention was dramatic and taught me a lot I hadn't known. It all happened very differently then. The nominee was chosen at the convention by the delegates. Johnson was running for president too. Adlai Stevenson wasn't running, but he had a lot of support and apparently could have been nominated anyway. But ultimately Kennedy prevailed. And then, exhausted by this process, he had to choose his running mate immediately! Within a day or two, I think. He offered it to Johnson on the assumption that he'd say no. LBJ was already extremely powerful as the Senate majority leader, and the vice presidency was not seen as especially desirable. The liberals didn't want him on the ticket. Kennedy didn't particularly want him on the ticket, but felt he had to make the offer to appease him. Schlesinger speculates that Johnson accepted because he was getting tired of his job, and because he felt a responsibility to keep the South in the Democratic party.
I also learned about the Bay of Pigs. I will write more on this later. I know this review is long and probably boring, but I'm writing it for myself to refresh my memory later. More soon...
OK, so there was this nebulous plan developed under the Eisenhower administration to train Cuban dissidents in the mountains of Nicaragua to overthrow the Castro regime. The aim of this training was just to keep the option open, not necessarily to execute the plan. But, as Schlesinger points out, these things develop their own momentum that can be hard to stop. The dissidents themselves, having invested all this time and energy under difficult circumstances, wanted to go through with the plot. They were also isolated and developed a group-think mentality, convincing themselves the task would be easier than it really would. The Americans--specifically the CIA--were susceptible to similar logic. And in the White House, there was intense pressure to accept the arguments of these experts. There was also pressure to seem tough; it was always harder to argue for diplomacy and "soft" power than to go with the military option. Schlesinger was against it, and wrote a memo to that effect, but nearly everyone else was for it. Kennedy was adamant that the US could not contribute any forces; this would be an operation conducted by Cubans, in the name of the revolution (which the Americans and these dissidents believed Castro had betrayed). The fantasy was that once the invasion made some progress, all the other anti-Castro Cubans would spontaneously join them and overcome Castro's forces.
The result was a fiasco. In addition to the major miscalculations--underestimating both the strength of Castro's forces and his popular support--there were myriad minor errors, as trivial but crucial as forgetting about the time difference between Cuba and Nicaragua. There had also been serious miscommunication, with the Cubans expecting the American military to intervene and help them if things didn't go well--but Kennedy did not want it to turn into an American coup. Actually, I wish Schesinger had provided more specifics on what happened to the Cubans. He doesn't say how many were killed. He implies that a lot of them rotted in prison. Kennedy felt terrible, but learned important lessons he would apply in the future, especially in the Cuban Missile Crisis. More soon...
Well, Schlesinger is clearly brilliant. His prose is superb. This book is so valuable because it's an insider's account, but he has obviously done a lot of additional research to supplement his own experiences and memories. He has a gift for politics--for analyzing the situation trenchantly, including all the personalities and egos involved--but also a sense of irony about it. It seems the same was true of Kennedy.
The parallels between Kennedy and Obama are striking. I know it's almost a cliche, but as I read Schlesinger's descriptions of Kennedy's character, it was uncanny. He was intellectual yet pragmatic, young and handsome. His campaign promised change and his administration excited hope throughout the country and the world.
The story of the Democratic Convention was dramatic and taught me a lot I hadn't known. It all happened very differently then. The nominee was chosen at the convention by the delegates. Johnson was running for president too. Adlai Stevenson wasn't running, but he had a lot of support and apparently could have been nominated anyway. But ultimately Kennedy prevailed. And then, exhausted by this process, he had to choose his running mate immediately! Within a day or two, I think. He offered it to Johnson on the assumption that he'd say no. LBJ was already extremely powerful as the Senate majority leader, and the vice presidency was not seen as especially desirable. The liberals didn't want him on the ticket. Kennedy didn't particularly want him on the ticket, but felt he had to make the offer to appease him. Schlesinger speculates that Johnson accepted because he was getting tired of his job, and because he felt a responsibility to keep the South in the Democratic party.
I also learned about the Bay of Pigs. I will write more on this later. I know this review is long and probably boring, but I'm writing it for myself to refresh my memory later. More soon...
OK, so there was this nebulous plan developed under the Eisenhower administration to train Cuban dissidents in the mountains of Nicaragua to overthrow the Castro regime. The aim of this training was just to keep the option open, not necessarily to execute the plan. But, as Schlesinger points out, these things develop their own momentum that can be hard to stop. The dissidents themselves, having invested all this time and energy under difficult circumstances, wanted to go through with the plot. They were also isolated and developed a group-think mentality, convincing themselves the task would be easier than it really would. The Americans--specifically the CIA--were susceptible to similar logic. And in the White House, there was intense pressure to accept the arguments of these experts. There was also pressure to seem tough; it was always harder to argue for diplomacy and "soft" power than to go with the military option. Schlesinger was against it, and wrote a memo to that effect, but nearly everyone else was for it. Kennedy was adamant that the US could not contribute any forces; this would be an operation conducted by Cubans, in the name of the revolution (which the Americans and these dissidents believed Castro had betrayed). The fantasy was that once the invasion made some progress, all the other anti-Castro Cubans would spontaneously join them and overcome Castro's forces.
The result was a fiasco. In addition to the major miscalculations--underestimating both the strength of Castro's forces and his popular support--there were myriad minor errors, as trivial but crucial as forgetting about the time difference between Cuba and Nicaragua. There had also been serious miscommunication, with the Cubans expecting the American military to intervene and help them if things didn't go well--but Kennedy did not want it to turn into an American coup. Actually, I wish Schesinger had provided more specifics on what happened to the Cubans. He doesn't say how many were killed. He implies that a lot of them rotted in prison. Kennedy felt terrible, but learned important lessons he would apply in the future, especially in the Cuban Missile Crisis. More soon...
July 29, 2009
Read in the fall of 1969, when I was a high-school sophomore in Mississippi.
February 15, 2021
Arthur Schlesinger Jr. was the Special Assistant and Court Historian to President Kennedy. He won the Pulitzer Prize in 1966 for this book which chronicles Kennedy's presidential nomination in 1960 to his assassination November 23, 1963. The book is over 1,000 pages but is worth the journey as you get a behind the scenes glimpse into President Kennedy's thoughts about the key decisions he made as president. You will also better understand Kennedy's intellect, optimism, sense of humor and focus on racial equality. Ironically, many of the issues President Kennedy dealt with were the same as we have today including China, Russia, foreign aid, racial equality & economic prosperity to name a few. I give this book 5 stars.
February 3, 2022
I enjoyed the history, but Mr. Schlesinger arrogance and overflowing admiration of his fellow Harvard and beltway intellectuals and New Frontier brothers was tiresome.
August 4, 2023
I dream of being people to write like this. Spine-tingling stuff. Yes, Schlesinger is sometimes obnoxiously fawning towards JFK and yes, there are a number of topics he barely touches because he wasn't personally involved in them. There are probably more rounded biographies out there. But for a deep understanding of the Kennedy mythologisation and some of the key issues at the heart of his presidency, this is as close to perfect as you can imagine.
June 7, 2015
Monumental account of John F. Kennedy's presidency, written by someone who had inside access to the Kennedy White House. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. was already a famous historian by 1960, having won a Pulitzer Prize for his 1945 work The Age of Jackson. He had worked on Adlai Stevenson's losing presidential campaigns in the 1950s, and eventually became acquainted with the Kennedys. His primary role in the Kennedy White House was as a Special Assistant to the President, and occasional speechwriter. Kennedy typically used him concerning Latin American affairs, but also in other miscellaneous areas.
Schlesinger was a great writer. Despite the book's length (1,031 pages), it read quickly for the most part. At times, he got carried away with naming who was appointed to what post. This was especially true of the Department of State, where we are treated to an endless succession of who was appointed Under Secretary of African Affairs (as an example). There is far too much of this in the book, and - coupled with his decision to go deep into the background on many foreign affairs situations - it bogged down the narrative heavily at times. He also, despite being a historian, was certainly biased in his presentation of the Kennedys. The ruthlessness of RFK is seldom seen, and any of JFK's failings are either not mentioned at all (his impatience at meetings, and his womanizing (Schlesinger says in the Forward to this updated 2002 version that he never saw anything like that in the White House)), or they are quickly dismissed (his pattern of not utilizing Lyndon Johnson with the Congress).
I wish he had balanced the book out with more focus on domestic concerns (I realize the Kennedy himself was primarily interested and concerned with foreign policy). For example, he does not delve deeply into the Civil Rights crises that Kennedy had to contend with, and even when he does write about them, it is not until very late in the book. He also continually makes derogatory references to "the Eisenhower years" as being a time of poor policies benefitting only the rich. While there is some truth to some of his criticisms, after awhile I tired of reading it over and over again.
Despite those flaws, the book is a must-read for any presidential history lover, or anyone who has an interest in the Kennedys or the 1960s. There are many vivid personalities throughout the book (Jacqueline, Charles de Gaulle, McNamara, Nixon, Eisenhower, Dean Rusk (whom the reader can tell that Schlesinger did not care for at all), RFK, LBJ, Khrushchev, Castro). Schlesinger was witnessing history as it happened, and his first-person narrative of meetings with Kennedy cannot be dismissed. I found the two strongest parts of the book to be the narrative about the 1960 Democratic convention in LA, and the final (incredibly sad) chapter dealing with the assassination. Over fifty years later, reading what he wrote leading up to the fateful day in Dallas still gave me a distinct feeling of dread. This is the eighth Schlesinger book that I have read; the ending talking about his emotions upon being informed of JFK's assassination might be his best writing that I have read. It was very similar to how he concluded his biography of RFK - another one with a tragic ending.
Grade: B-
Schlesinger was a great writer. Despite the book's length (1,031 pages), it read quickly for the most part. At times, he got carried away with naming who was appointed to what post. This was especially true of the Department of State, where we are treated to an endless succession of who was appointed Under Secretary of African Affairs (as an example). There is far too much of this in the book, and - coupled with his decision to go deep into the background on many foreign affairs situations - it bogged down the narrative heavily at times. He also, despite being a historian, was certainly biased in his presentation of the Kennedys. The ruthlessness of RFK is seldom seen, and any of JFK's failings are either not mentioned at all (his impatience at meetings, and his womanizing (Schlesinger says in the Forward to this updated 2002 version that he never saw anything like that in the White House)), or they are quickly dismissed (his pattern of not utilizing Lyndon Johnson with the Congress).
I wish he had balanced the book out with more focus on domestic concerns (I realize the Kennedy himself was primarily interested and concerned with foreign policy). For example, he does not delve deeply into the Civil Rights crises that Kennedy had to contend with, and even when he does write about them, it is not until very late in the book. He also continually makes derogatory references to "the Eisenhower years" as being a time of poor policies benefitting only the rich. While there is some truth to some of his criticisms, after awhile I tired of reading it over and over again.
Despite those flaws, the book is a must-read for any presidential history lover, or anyone who has an interest in the Kennedys or the 1960s. There are many vivid personalities throughout the book (Jacqueline, Charles de Gaulle, McNamara, Nixon, Eisenhower, Dean Rusk (whom the reader can tell that Schlesinger did not care for at all), RFK, LBJ, Khrushchev, Castro). Schlesinger was witnessing history as it happened, and his first-person narrative of meetings with Kennedy cannot be dismissed. I found the two strongest parts of the book to be the narrative about the 1960 Democratic convention in LA, and the final (incredibly sad) chapter dealing with the assassination. Over fifty years later, reading what he wrote leading up to the fateful day in Dallas still gave me a distinct feeling of dread. This is the eighth Schlesinger book that I have read; the ending talking about his emotions upon being informed of JFK's assassination might be his best writing that I have read. It was very similar to how he concluded his biography of RFK - another one with a tragic ending.
Grade: B-
August 17, 2007
The "insider" story is always an interesting one. From my few experiences reading books written by presidential aides, the one thing I've noticed is the tendency for the author to write about themselves instead of the subject readers are more interested in (case in point Sidney Blumenthal's "The Clinton Wars.") Schlesinger does not fall into this prose. His subject is clear and thorough, beginning with the nominating process selecting Kennedy as the presidential candidate in Los Angeles, 1960. The long and short of it is that Schlesinger is a member of the Kennedy staff and simultaneously also a historian. Given this characterization his work can be seen as a piece that protects the Kennedy memory for the public. Considering the president's death in 1963, the book was written very quickly, a feat that is all the more remarkable given the depth and detail Schlesinger assigns to some choice events. This book is a good, straightforward introduction to the JFK White House albeit a forgiving and generous depiction.
December 27, 2019
A massive, detailed account of Kennedy’s time in office. Perhaps too detailed at some points; the book definitely gets into the policy weeds. Interesting if you find that level of detail interesting. Also does well to establish the state of the world in relation to each of the policies of the administration. So it’s a wonderful look at the state of national and world affairs at that time. Since it was published in 1965, it’s a nice contemporary look at the world during his presidency that’s not tarnished with current politics or hindsight you’d find in something written about that period today.
March 13, 2009
It all began, as it ended, in the cold. And we were left without our hero and on our own...like sheep without their shepard...Why did you leave us, why did you die?
June 1, 2013
Schlesinger was involved in the Kennedy administration. In this work Kennedy's political agenda is discussed. A Camelot cult ccame about due to first Kennedy's charisma and then his assassination.
Read
February 16, 2025Arthur Schlesinger war von 1961 bis 1964 Sonderberater für John F. Kennedy und Lyndon B. Johnson. In seinem Buch beschreibt er seine Arbeit mit John F. Kennedy von dessen Wahl bis zu seiner Ermordung.
Auch wenn seine Zeit mit Kennedy erst kurz vor seiner Wahl zum Präsidenten begann, erzählt Schlesinger auch von der Zeit davor. Anders als bei den Berichten aus der gemeinsamen Zeit benutzt er die Ausflüge in die Vergangenheit aber hauptsächlich, um Dinge aus der Gegenwart zu erklären. So zum Beispiel dass Kennedys Wunsch, etwas für sein Land zu tun, aus einer Reise nach Europa entsprang. Der Aufenthalt dort gab ihm eine andere Sicht auf sein Heimatland.
Schlesinger beschreibt Kennedy als einen zielstrebeigen jungen Mann mit klaren Zielen und großen Plänen. Er war ein unermüdlicher Arbeiter und erwartete von seinen Mitarbeitern das Gleiche. Oft kam es mir so vor, als ob er zu leicht zu begeistern und dann enttäuscht war, wenn sein Umfeld nicht die gleiche Begeisterung hatte. Seine Erwartungen waren sehr hoch, manchmal zu hoch gesteckt.
Auch wenn die Regierungszeit Kennedys sicherlich sehr interessant war, waren mir die meisten Ereignisse unbekannt. Ich hatte davon gelesen, wenn überhaupt nur die Auswirkungen davon erlebt. Gerade den Konflikt USA-UDSSR habe ich nur noch am Rand erlebt. Wie groß die Angst vor dieser Bedrohung war, konnte ich trotzdem deutlich spüren.
Schlesinger schreibt fast nur über den Präsidenten und nur wenig über den Privatmann. Manchmal könnte man fast vergessen, dass der Präsident auch eine Familie hat. Trotzdem ist es kein nüchterner Bericht, sondern zeigt einen Mann mit vielen Facetten und Emotionen.
Auch wenn seine Zeit mit Kennedy erst kurz vor seiner Wahl zum Präsidenten begann, erzählt Schlesinger auch von der Zeit davor. Anders als bei den Berichten aus der gemeinsamen Zeit benutzt er die Ausflüge in die Vergangenheit aber hauptsächlich, um Dinge aus der Gegenwart zu erklären. So zum Beispiel dass Kennedys Wunsch, etwas für sein Land zu tun, aus einer Reise nach Europa entsprang. Der Aufenthalt dort gab ihm eine andere Sicht auf sein Heimatland.
Schlesinger beschreibt Kennedy als einen zielstrebeigen jungen Mann mit klaren Zielen und großen Plänen. Er war ein unermüdlicher Arbeiter und erwartete von seinen Mitarbeitern das Gleiche. Oft kam es mir so vor, als ob er zu leicht zu begeistern und dann enttäuscht war, wenn sein Umfeld nicht die gleiche Begeisterung hatte. Seine Erwartungen waren sehr hoch, manchmal zu hoch gesteckt.
Auch wenn die Regierungszeit Kennedys sicherlich sehr interessant war, waren mir die meisten Ereignisse unbekannt. Ich hatte davon gelesen, wenn überhaupt nur die Auswirkungen davon erlebt. Gerade den Konflikt USA-UDSSR habe ich nur noch am Rand erlebt. Wie groß die Angst vor dieser Bedrohung war, konnte ich trotzdem deutlich spüren.
Schlesinger schreibt fast nur über den Präsidenten und nur wenig über den Privatmann. Manchmal könnte man fast vergessen, dass der Präsident auch eine Familie hat. Trotzdem ist es kein nüchterner Bericht, sondern zeigt einen Mann mit vielen Facetten und Emotionen.
February 23, 2023
Finally finished reading this, I thought it was very good. Schlesinger is overly uncritical in my opinion (he was also writing in 1965 and he obviously took pains in the book to not be critical of LBJ). The only official he’s clearly somewhat critical of Secretary of State Dean Rusk (who Kennedy basically bypassed for most of foreign policy because he rarely offered a conclusive opinion on issues and the state department seemed to be working to impede Kennedy’s vision of foreign policy. Kennedy was planning to ask him to resign in 1964). He had a lot of plans for 1964 and thought he would beat Goldwater easily (he was greatly relieved he was not running against Nelson Rockefeller, who he thought had a good chance of beating him). He had a lot of plans for legislation in 1964 and some of his major pieces of legislation were already winding through congress (civil rights, poverty bill, etc). He also was seeking a further softening of tensions with the Soviet Union. He hoped to visit the Soviet Union if tensions eased enough. Regarding Vietnam, while he escalated the war, I don’t think he would have ever gotten so heavily involved as LBJ, especially during the freedom of a second term. Overall, a really compelling book of what could have been for the United States and the world if he had had another term. I believe firmly he was killed because he went against the interests of the military-industrial complex and rocked the boat too much foreign policy wise challenging entrenched Cold War mindsets.
June 1, 2021
AMSJr won a Pulitzer for this book back in the day, and over half a century later it's still a great book.
A Long As Fuck book, but I think those who read it in its abridged form, (which would have been me had I know that was an option), missed a lot of context.
The immediacy and the lack of distance are the book's biggest strengths. Schlesinger writes using his historian mind, but could not use a historian's hindsight. And so you get chapters on what would in later books on JFK become paragraphs or mere sentences.
It's the strength of this book, but for someone who usually avoids Long As Fuck books it also is a bit of a weakness. I had to take breaks (in which I'd read other books).
I could be wrong but it seems to me important historical figures often become disconnected from their environment as if they lived in their own realm. They become drama-fied. It's just them and a few others they can play off of. People love a good story, self included.
Schlesinger makes a point (unconsciously, I'm almost sure), that even such pragmatic intellectuals/micromanagers as JFK seemed to have been, live in a context full of existing structures, family support, media, international opinions of all sorts, faulty intelligence, rigidity, stupidity etc etc. So yes, an extremely long book but one that's going to make me look even more for the messiness that went on around The Main Person the next time I read a biography.
A Long As Fuck book, but I think those who read it in its abridged form, (which would have been me had I know that was an option), missed a lot of context.
The immediacy and the lack of distance are the book's biggest strengths. Schlesinger writes using his historian mind, but could not use a historian's hindsight. And so you get chapters on what would in later books on JFK become paragraphs or mere sentences.
It's the strength of this book, but for someone who usually avoids Long As Fuck books it also is a bit of a weakness. I had to take breaks (in which I'd read other books).
I could be wrong but it seems to me important historical figures often become disconnected from their environment as if they lived in their own realm. They become drama-fied. It's just them and a few others they can play off of. People love a good story, self included.
Schlesinger makes a point (unconsciously, I'm almost sure), that even such pragmatic intellectuals/micromanagers as JFK seemed to have been, live in a context full of existing structures, family support, media, international opinions of all sorts, faulty intelligence, rigidity, stupidity etc etc. So yes, an extremely long book but one that's going to make me look even more for the messiness that went on around The Main Person the next time I read a biography.
September 8, 2024
If you’re going to read one JFK biography, it should be this 1966 Pulitzer Prize winner for Biography or Autobiography penned by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., who had a front row seat to the Kennedy administration as Special Assistant to the President. This is a necessarily long book, as it goes into great detail of the tragically short Kennedy presidency. Schlesinger is whip smart and a talented writer. I found this book fascinating. One of the best books I have read this year and the best book about JFK I have read, along with William Manchester’s Death of a President.
December 31, 2020
Definitely the book is a complete and definitive portrait of John F. Kennedy and his administration. Besides that interesting details of political behind the scenes show how decisions are made, great learning of politics.
March 18, 2024
Dit enorme werk van 1160 pagina's - bestaande uit twee fysieke boeken - werd geschreven uit eerste hand door Arthur Schlesinger, speciaal adviseur van John Kennedy, in 1966. Vanzelfsprekend zijn er bepaalde hoofdstukken die wat ver af lijken - in ruimte en tijd - voor een hedendaagse lezer buiten de V.S. De aanloop naar zijn verkiezing, de binnenlandse politiek... vele namen komen aan bod die de geïnteresseerde lezer best even opzoekt. Wat betreft het grote narratief echter, de situaties met Castro, de relaties met Chhroestjsov, het atoomtijdperk, de burgerrechten, Vietnam... is het erg meeslepend geschreven. De lezer volgt chronologisch de duizend dagen dat Kennedy aan de macht was, krijgt een idee wat het moet zijn geweest om destijds president te zijn, om te culmineren in het einde waarbij de lezer met hetzelfde gevoel blijft zitten als wellicht vele mensen nadat Kennedy werd neergeschoten: er was nog zoveel mogelijk... Een echte aanrader.
September 15, 2023
Schlesinger, although somewhat biased by his close personal relationship with Kennedy, is an excellent writer and historian, and this is a great insight into the reality of Camelot, focusing particularly on foreign policy but including the domestic agenda, and civil rights in particular. The hardcover edition is nearly 1100 pages, however, so be prepared to work on this one for a while - it is well worth the time.
August 8, 2024
Schlesinger's partisanship was unrelenting.
July 25, 2010
Possibly the best book about Kennedy's White House years. Also see "Kennedy" by Ted Sorensen.
July 17, 2021
Interesting, great insider details, etc. Suffers due to the author's lack of objectivity. Apparently Kennedy was not only the greatest President ever, but the greatest human to ever walk the earth.
November 2, 2022
Was not a big fan of this book. More personal than objective. Not my kind of book.
January 23, 2018
Arthur M. Schlessinger, Jr.'s book on the Kennedy Presidency is of interest to the historian of foreign policy and diplomacy if for no other reason than the fact that he was close enough to the internal workings of the American presidency that he could write a book of personal reminiscences which would qualify as a history. As one of a general outpouring of reminiscences in the aftermath of the Kennedy assassination it has surprisingly retained its utility.1 Looking back in retrospect nearly 30 years after its publication, The Thousand Days still affords a valuable insider's account. Obviously written for the general educated public, the book has the additional advantage of historical writing has lost in the last several decades.
The U.S.-Soviet Cold War dominates much of Schlessinger's account. Schlessinger shared (as well as shaped) the American Cold War consensus ideology during the years covered in this account. Within the context of this consensus he characterizes Kennedy as a consummate statesman, able to find the correct balance between diplomacy and the recourse to military force and - perhaps most importantly - able to learn from his mistakes. This "memoir" of the Kennedy Presidency, full of first hand accounts of diplomacy at the highest levels of government, also represents an attempt to draw "lessons" from American history. This book bears testimony to Schlessinger's important assumption about the Cold War, which - simply put - is that the Munich analogy applies to U.S.-Soviet relations.
Though it would be unfair to characterize the book as Kennedy-worship pure and simple, there is a great deal to James MacGregor Burns' claim that Kennedy was astute enough to choose his own biographer. The Bay of Pigs, for instance, was Kennedy's "ordeal by fire" in which he learned the lessons vlhich allowed him to emerge successful from the Cuban missile crisis. Even from the jaws of defeat, Schlessinger allows his "hero" to snatch victory (and perhaps vindicate his own performance as author of the famous white paper on Cuba?). the prototypical statesman is the account of the Berlin Crisis of 1961. During the crisis Kennedy sought the advice of subordinates, yet maintained control over policy formulation at all times (in contrast to Eisenhower, who Schlessinger implies gave a free reign to John Foster Dulles). As tensions over Berlin mounted in the aftermath of the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in Vienna, Dean Acheson recommended sending an Army division along the corridor to West Berlin to demonstrate American resolve. Schlessinger and Kissinger stressed the need for more extensive attempts at diplomacy. Kennedy took a middle course, calling up the reserves but threatening no military action when the East Germans erected the wall. JFK also eschcalated hastily beginning negotiations with the Soviets. In the section entitled "Coda," with which Schlessinger concludes the chapter "Trial in Berlin," Schlessinger stresses the continuing process of education which Kennedy underwent in his attempt to combine high ideals with a "realistic" assessment of geopolitics.
"The Berlin crisis of 1961 represented a further step beyond Laos in the education of the President in the controlled employment of force in the use of peace. One never knows, of course, what would have happened if Kennedy had ordered full mobilization, or if he had rushed straight into negotiation; but either extreme might well have invited Soviet miscalculation and ended in war. Instead he applied power and diplomacy in a combination and sequence which enabled him to guard the vital interests of the west and hold off the holocaust." (p. 404)
According to Schlessinger, Kennedy struck just the right balance in his relationship with the Soviets over Berlin.
The U.S.-Soviet Cold War dominates much of Schlessinger's account. Schlessinger shared (as well as shaped) the American Cold War consensus ideology during the years covered in this account. Within the context of this consensus he characterizes Kennedy as a consummate statesman, able to find the correct balance between diplomacy and the recourse to military force and - perhaps most importantly - able to learn from his mistakes. This "memoir" of the Kennedy Presidency, full of first hand accounts of diplomacy at the highest levels of government, also represents an attempt to draw "lessons" from American history. This book bears testimony to Schlessinger's important assumption about the Cold War, which - simply put - is that the Munich analogy applies to U.S.-Soviet relations.
Though it would be unfair to characterize the book as Kennedy-worship pure and simple, there is a great deal to James MacGregor Burns' claim that Kennedy was astute enough to choose his own biographer. The Bay of Pigs, for instance, was Kennedy's "ordeal by fire" in which he learned the lessons vlhich allowed him to emerge successful from the Cuban missile crisis. Even from the jaws of defeat, Schlessinger allows his "hero" to snatch victory (and perhaps vindicate his own performance as author of the famous white paper on Cuba?). the prototypical statesman is the account of the Berlin Crisis of 1961. During the crisis Kennedy sought the advice of subordinates, yet maintained control over policy formulation at all times (in contrast to Eisenhower, who Schlessinger implies gave a free reign to John Foster Dulles). As tensions over Berlin mounted in the aftermath of the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in Vienna, Dean Acheson recommended sending an Army division along the corridor to West Berlin to demonstrate American resolve. Schlessinger and Kissinger stressed the need for more extensive attempts at diplomacy. Kennedy took a middle course, calling up the reserves but threatening no military action when the East Germans erected the wall. JFK also eschcalated hastily beginning negotiations with the Soviets. In the section entitled "Coda," with which Schlessinger concludes the chapter "Trial in Berlin," Schlessinger stresses the continuing process of education which Kennedy underwent in his attempt to combine high ideals with a "realistic" assessment of geopolitics.
"The Berlin crisis of 1961 represented a further step beyond Laos in the education of the President in the controlled employment of force in the use of peace. One never knows, of course, what would have happened if Kennedy had ordered full mobilization, or if he had rushed straight into negotiation; but either extreme might well have invited Soviet miscalculation and ended in war. Instead he applied power and diplomacy in a combination and sequence which enabled him to guard the vital interests of the west and hold off the holocaust." (p. 404)
According to Schlessinger, Kennedy struck just the right balance in his relationship with the Soviets over Berlin.
December 27, 2017
I'd started and failed to finish this book years ago. I picked it up again, re-reading where I'd gotten to and continuing on, now in a time of a new president and a different Washington. In the end, this book is an imperfect lens for comparing then to now, but it is still fascinating. I was struck by the ways that civility and circumstance was so very different then. There were, of course, still bitter political disagreements, widely varying opinions, crises galore during the Kennedy years. But the fundamental disrespect of the parties for each other was largely absent. Also, the anti-intellectualism, while endemic to American politics since the very beginning, was not so in evidence as it is today. On these pages, President Kennedy comes across as a thoughtful intellectual, and the argument is made that appearing so helped him politically. Altogether it was a different time.
So many problems from the 1960s are still with us today - poverty, race relations and attacks on the system from the far left and far right (many of each were Democrats back then, believe it or not) at home; nuclear standoffs, strained relationships and a troubling balance of payments abroad. So much seems so very applicable to today.
In brief, if you have an interest in the Kennedy years and haven't read this book you really need to. If you are wondering "What would JFK do?" there too this book can be a useful tool. You come away feeling like you know him better, albeit in an unfailingly positive light. (The author was a "New Frontiersman" serving in the administration and a strong admirer of Kennedy and his aims.)
Despite the age of the book, the proximity to the end of the Kennedy years curtailing any real perspective and analysis, and this being further complicated by the very sympathetic author, this is a book worth the time of anyone interested in the period.
So many problems from the 1960s are still with us today - poverty, race relations and attacks on the system from the far left and far right (many of each were Democrats back then, believe it or not) at home; nuclear standoffs, strained relationships and a troubling balance of payments abroad. So much seems so very applicable to today.
In brief, if you have an interest in the Kennedy years and haven't read this book you really need to. If you are wondering "What would JFK do?" there too this book can be a useful tool. You come away feeling like you know him better, albeit in an unfailingly positive light. (The author was a "New Frontiersman" serving in the administration and a strong admirer of Kennedy and his aims.)
Despite the age of the book, the proximity to the end of the Kennedy years curtailing any real perspective and analysis, and this being further complicated by the very sympathetic author, this is a book worth the time of anyone interested in the period.
October 14, 2022
There has to be better out there on Kennedy, I'm sure. This was a mistake to get at used book sale. Schlesinger's descriptions are boring, I nodded off a few times as I blazed through this 900 page slog, in fact, I ended around page 700 or so. I found that I didn't care much for Kennedy's foreign affairs, I prefer to know how presidents dealt with the home front. Arthur also didn't seem to add all that much in the way of his own personal experience and thoughts. Simply too much information to go through, I guess.
I originally picked this book up to expand my knowledge of Kennedy in preparation for being a high school American history teacher, but since I didn't end up becoming a teacher, this book offered literally nothing of substance to a layperson, a casual, a minorly and formally interested in history type person. I prefer analysis and discussion, revisionist histories and people with a little bit of an axe to grind. I don't care for sanitized and bland palaver. I had picked this book up because the 'THOUSAND DAYS' title threw me off. I assumed (I know, I know) the book was going to have analysis and description of the literal 1000 days of Kennedy in office. A diary of sorts. But it wasn't. "Don't judge a book by its cover" also means don't make assumptions that it is going to be the way you assume it will be based off of the cover and title and author. Don't assume anything until you pick it up and leaf through it. Never assume a book will be good, or insightful, many don't speak to us. I'm not sure the type of person who could have gotten much from this book.
I originally picked this book up to expand my knowledge of Kennedy in preparation for being a high school American history teacher, but since I didn't end up becoming a teacher, this book offered literally nothing of substance to a layperson, a casual, a minorly and formally interested in history type person. I prefer analysis and discussion, revisionist histories and people with a little bit of an axe to grind. I don't care for sanitized and bland palaver. I had picked this book up because the 'THOUSAND DAYS' title threw me off. I assumed (I know, I know) the book was going to have analysis and description of the literal 1000 days of Kennedy in office. A diary of sorts. But it wasn't. "Don't judge a book by its cover" also means don't make assumptions that it is going to be the way you assume it will be based off of the cover and title and author. Don't assume anything until you pick it up and leaf through it. Never assume a book will be good, or insightful, many don't speak to us. I'm not sure the type of person who could have gotten much from this book.
January 1, 2024
What a book! Preface this review with the knowledge Schlesinger was a member of Kennedy’s inner circle and a devoted admirer of JFK.
The book is beautifully written. Despite it being a history of the Kennedy presidency (mostly foreign policy) it’s written with that devotion to the cause that you’d expect from an advocate as entrenched in the Kennedy mystique as Schlesinger. It’s highly detailed. It reminded me of Present at the Creation by Dean Acheson. His passage about the assassination and its aftermath is a particularly beautiful tribute to JFK and his legacy.
I got a whole new impression of Kennedy as a man, politician, and President. He was not the naive unprepared president as he’s so often portrayed. Instead, he’s revealed as highly intelligent, driven, ambitious, highly organized, articulate, and empathetic. The administration had so many serious issues to deal with and their legislative accomplishments are plenty. There was obviously more coming to fruition after the assassination.
I give it four stars for a need for editing and no mention of Kennedy’s sexual dalliances that had a profound impact on his relationship with Jackie and potentially the presidency. Since Schlesinger writes extensively about his family, that part of his life deserved mention.
Great book otherwise. Every Kennedy aficionado should read it.
The book is beautifully written. Despite it being a history of the Kennedy presidency (mostly foreign policy) it’s written with that devotion to the cause that you’d expect from an advocate as entrenched in the Kennedy mystique as Schlesinger. It’s highly detailed. It reminded me of Present at the Creation by Dean Acheson. His passage about the assassination and its aftermath is a particularly beautiful tribute to JFK and his legacy.
I got a whole new impression of Kennedy as a man, politician, and President. He was not the naive unprepared president as he’s so often portrayed. Instead, he’s revealed as highly intelligent, driven, ambitious, highly organized, articulate, and empathetic. The administration had so many serious issues to deal with and their legislative accomplishments are plenty. There was obviously more coming to fruition after the assassination.
I give it four stars for a need for editing and no mention of Kennedy’s sexual dalliances that had a profound impact on his relationship with Jackie and potentially the presidency. Since Schlesinger writes extensively about his family, that part of his life deserved mention.
Great book otherwise. Every Kennedy aficionado should read it.
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