What do you think?
Rate this book
The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas
Isaiah Berlin is regarded by many as one of the greatest historians of ideas of his time. In The Crooked Timber of Humanity, he argues passionately, eloquently, and subtly, that what he calls 'the Great Goods' of human aspiration - liberty, justice, equality - do not cohere and never can. Pluralism and variety of thought are not avoidable compromises, but the glory of civilisation. In an age of increasing ideological fundamentalism and intolerance we need to listen to Isaiah Berlin more carefully than ever before.
276 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1990
176 people are currently reading
2885 people want to read
About the author
Isaiah Berlin
165 books777 followersSir Isaiah Berlin was a philosopher and historian of ideas, regarded as one of the leading liberal thinkers of the twentieth century. He excelled as an essayist, lecturer and conversationalist; and as a brilliant speaker who delivered, rapidly and spontaneously, richly allusive and coherently structured material, whether for a lecture series at Oxford University or as a broadcaster on the BBC Third Programme, usually without a script. Many of his essays and lectures were later collected in book form.
Born in Riga, now capital of Latvia, then part of the Russian Empire, he was the first person of Jewish descent to be elected to a prize fellowship at All Souls College, Oxford. From 1957 to 1967, he was Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at the University of Oxford. He was president of the Aristotelian Society from 1963 to 1964. In 1966, he helped to found Wolfson College, Oxford, and became its first President. He was knighted in 1957, and was awarded the Order of Merit in 1971. He was President of the British Academy from 1974 to 1978. He also received the 1979 Jerusalem Prize for his writings on individual freedom. Berlin's work on liberal theory has had a lasting influence.
Berlin is best known for his essay Two Concepts of Liberty, delivered in 1958 as his inaugural lecture as Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at Oxford. He defined negative liberty as the absence of constraints on, or interference with, agents' possible action. Greater "negative freedom" meant fewer restrictions on possible action. Berlin associated positive liberty with the idea of self-mastery, or the capacity to determine oneself, to be in control of one's destiny. While Berlin granted that both concepts of liberty represent valid human ideals, as a matter of history the positive concept of liberty has proven particularly susceptible to political abuse.
Berlin contended that under the influence of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel (all committed to the positive concept of liberty), European political thinkers often equated liberty with forms of political discipline or constraint. This became politically dangerous when notions of positive liberty were, in the nineteenth century, used to defend nationalism, self-determination and the Communist idea of collective rational control over human destiny. Berlin argued that, following this line of thought, demands for freedom paradoxically become demands for forms of collective control and discipline – those deemed necessary for the "self-mastery" or self-determination of nations, classes, democratic communities, and even humanity as a whole. There is thus an elective affinity, for Berlin, between positive liberty and political totalitarianism.
Conversely, negative liberty represents a different, perhaps safer, understanding of the concept of liberty. Its proponents (such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill) insisted that constraint and discipline were the antithesis of liberty and so were (and are) less prone to confusing liberty and constraint in the manner of the philosophical harbingers of modern totalitarianism. It is this concept of Negative Liberty that Isaiah Berlin supported. It dominated heavily his early chapters in his third lecture.
This negative liberty is central to the claim for toleration due to incommensurability. This concept is mirrored in the work of Joseph Raz.
Berlin's espousal of negative liberty, his hatred of totalitarianism and his experience of Russia in the revolution and through his contact with the poet Anna Akhmatova made him an enemy of the Soviet Union and he was one of the leading public intellectuals in the ideological battle against Communism during the Cold War.
Born in Riga, now capital of Latvia, then part of the Russian Empire, he was the first person of Jewish descent to be elected to a prize fellowship at All Souls College, Oxford. From 1957 to 1967, he was Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at the University of Oxford. He was president of the Aristotelian Society from 1963 to 1964. In 1966, he helped to found Wolfson College, Oxford, and became its first President. He was knighted in 1957, and was awarded the Order of Merit in 1971. He was President of the British Academy from 1974 to 1978. He also received the 1979 Jerusalem Prize for his writings on individual freedom. Berlin's work on liberal theory has had a lasting influence.
Berlin is best known for his essay Two Concepts of Liberty, delivered in 1958 as his inaugural lecture as Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at Oxford. He defined negative liberty as the absence of constraints on, or interference with, agents' possible action. Greater "negative freedom" meant fewer restrictions on possible action. Berlin associated positive liberty with the idea of self-mastery, or the capacity to determine oneself, to be in control of one's destiny. While Berlin granted that both concepts of liberty represent valid human ideals, as a matter of history the positive concept of liberty has proven particularly susceptible to political abuse.
Berlin contended that under the influence of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel (all committed to the positive concept of liberty), European political thinkers often equated liberty with forms of political discipline or constraint. This became politically dangerous when notions of positive liberty were, in the nineteenth century, used to defend nationalism, self-determination and the Communist idea of collective rational control over human destiny. Berlin argued that, following this line of thought, demands for freedom paradoxically become demands for forms of collective control and discipline – those deemed necessary for the "self-mastery" or self-determination of nations, classes, democratic communities, and even humanity as a whole. There is thus an elective affinity, for Berlin, between positive liberty and political totalitarianism.
Conversely, negative liberty represents a different, perhaps safer, understanding of the concept of liberty. Its proponents (such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill) insisted that constraint and discipline were the antithesis of liberty and so were (and are) less prone to confusing liberty and constraint in the manner of the philosophical harbingers of modern totalitarianism. It is this concept of Negative Liberty that Isaiah Berlin supported. It dominated heavily his early chapters in his third lecture.
This negative liberty is central to the claim for toleration due to incommensurability. This concept is mirrored in the work of Joseph Raz.
Berlin's espousal of negative liberty, his hatred of totalitarianism and his experience of Russia in the revolution and through his contact with the poet Anna Akhmatova made him an enemy of the Soviet Union and he was one of the leading public intellectuals in the ideological battle against Communism during the Cold War.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 104 reviews
January 21, 2019
It was absurd to desire to take as prisoners the Emperor, kings, and dukes, since the possession of such prisoners would have greatly enhanced the difficulty of the Russian position, as was recognized by the most clear-sighted diplomatists of the time (J. Maistre and others).
L. Tolstoy, War and Peace
Maistre’s works are regarded as interesting rather than important, the last despairing effort of feudalism and the dark ages to resist the march of progress. He excites the sharpest reactions: scarcely any of his critics can repress their feelings. He is represented by conservatives as a brave but doomed paladin of a lost cause, by liberals as a foolish or odious survival of an older and more heartless generation. Both sides agree that his day is done, his world has no relevance to any contemporary or any future issue.
Isaiah Berlin
The first quote is from Part XIV, chapter XIX, the second from the longest essay (over 80 pages) in the book here reviewed: ”Joseph de Maistre and the Origins of Fascism”.
Maistre’s name is not terribly familiar any more. Given that, here’s a brief quote from his Wiki article.
The fact is, when I read the passage from War and Peace above, I immediately underlined Maistre’s name, and drew a long line from it to the bottom of the page, connecting it to a large circled asterisk, with that blob followed by one of these: “!” Not only did I recognize his name from having read Crooked Timber, but I know for certain why I remembered it.
Berlin writes that Maistre “looked to the Society of Jesus to act as the elite of Platonic Guardians to save the states of Europe from the fashionable and fatal aberrations of his time. But the central figure in it all, the keystone of the arch on which the whole of society depends, is a far more frightening figure than king or priest or general: it is the Executioner. The most celebrated passage in [Maistre’s] Soirees is devoted to him.”
Berlin’s very long quote of this celebrated passage contains the following, which has thankfully never given me a nightmare, but has more than once kept me from sleep for a while.
As can be guessed by the title of this essay, Berlin attempts to show that the traditional assessment of Maistre, that “his day is done, his world has no relevance to any contemporary or any future issue”, is inadequate.
This painting by Vogelstein of Maistre, ca. 1810, seems to me to capture something of the darkness in his outlook.
Original review
This is one of those books that when you are done reading it, you say to yourself "If only I could remember every bit of knowledge & wisdom in that book, my life would be so enriched". Of course you can't.
Hopefully I will take the time during the next few years to dip into this book again and try writing an essay or a real review or a summary of some type. If I do, the first of Berlin's essays that I will revisit are "Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century European Thought" and "The Apotheosis of the Romantic Will: The Revolt against the Myth of an Ideal World".
L. Tolstoy, War and Peace
Maistre’s works are regarded as interesting rather than important, the last despairing effort of feudalism and the dark ages to resist the march of progress. He excites the sharpest reactions: scarcely any of his critics can repress their feelings. He is represented by conservatives as a brave but doomed paladin of a lost cause, by liberals as a foolish or odious survival of an older and more heartless generation. Both sides agree that his day is done, his world has no relevance to any contemporary or any future issue.
Isaiah Berlin
The first quote is from Part XIV, chapter XIX, the second from the longest essay (over 80 pages) in the book here reviewed: ”Joseph de Maistre and the Origins of Fascism”.
Maistre’s name is not terribly familiar any more. Given that, here’s a brief quote from his Wiki article.
Joseph-Marie, comte de Maistre (1753 – 1821) was a Savoyard philosopher, writer, lawyer, and diplomat. He defended hierarchical societies and a monarchical State in the period immediately following the French Revolution. Maistre was a subject of the King of Piedmont-Sardinia, whom he served as member of the Savoy Senate (1787–1792), ambassador to Russia (1803–1817), and minister of state to the court in Turin (1817–1821).His long sojourn in Russia, during the Napoleonic years, could be assumed as the way he has crept into Tolstoy’s masterpiece; though Berlin points out several similarities of view between Maistre and Tolstoy, the latter of whom he studied in depth (see his The Hedgehog and the Fox). I’m not going to discuss Berlin’s views of these similarities. But I have brought Tolstoy into this expanded review because I want to relate the rather curious way that I came to add these new words.
The fact is, when I read the passage from War and Peace above, I immediately underlined Maistre’s name, and drew a long line from it to the bottom of the page, connecting it to a large circled asterisk, with that blob followed by one of these: “!” Not only did I recognize his name from having read Crooked Timber, but I know for certain why I remembered it.
Berlin writes that Maistre “looked to the Society of Jesus to act as the elite of Platonic Guardians to save the states of Europe from the fashionable and fatal aberrations of his time. But the central figure in it all, the keystone of the arch on which the whole of society depends, is a far more frightening figure than king or priest or general: it is the Executioner. The most celebrated passage in [Maistre’s] Soirees is devoted to him.”
Berlin’s very long quote of this celebrated passage contains the following, which has thankfully never given me a nightmare, but has more than once kept me from sleep for a while.
… in a public square covered by a dense, trembling mob. A poisoner, a parricide, a man who has committed sacrilege is tossed to him [the Executioner]: he seizes him, stretches him, ties him to a horizontal cross, he raises his arm; there is a horrible silence; there is no sound but that of bones cracking under the bars, and the shrieks of the victim. He unties him. He puts him on the wheel; the shattered limbs are entangled in the spokes; the head hangs down; the hair stands up, and the mouth gaping open like a furnace from time to time emits only a few bloodstained words to beg for death. He has finished. His heart is beating, but it is with joy: he congratulates himself, he says in his heart ‘Nobody breaks on the wheel as well as I.’ He steps down… He sits down to table, and he eats. Then he goes to bed and sleeps.At the end of his more extensive quote of the passage, Berlin writes,
This is not a mere sadistic meditation about crime and punishment, but the expression of a genuine conviction, coherent with all the rest of Maistre’s passionate but lucid thought, that men can only be saved by being hemmed in by the terror of authority. They must be reminded at every instant of their lives of the frightening mystery that lies at the heart of creation; must be purged by perpetual suffering, must be humbled by being made conscious of their stupidity, malice and helplessness at every turn. War, torture, suffering are the inescapable human lot; men must bear them as best they can. Their appointed masters must do the duty laid upon them by their maker (who has made nature a hierarchical order) by the ruthless imposition of the rules – not sparing themselves – and equally ruthless extermination of the enemy.
As can be guessed by the title of this essay, Berlin attempts to show that the traditional assessment of Maistre, that “his day is done, his world has no relevance to any contemporary or any future issue”, is inadequate.
Maistre may have spoken the language of the past, but the content of what he had to say presaged the future… His doctrine, and still more his attitude of mind, had to wait a century before they came (as come they all too fatally did) into their own. This thesis … clearly needs evidence … This study is an endeavor to provide support for it.… to provide support, that is, for the view that Maistre’s works and thoughts are closely connected to the development of fascism in the twentieth century.
This painting by Vogelstein of Maistre, ca. 1810, seems to me to capture something of the darkness in his outlook.
Original review
This is one of those books that when you are done reading it, you say to yourself "If only I could remember every bit of knowledge & wisdom in that book, my life would be so enriched". Of course you can't.
Hopefully I will take the time during the next few years to dip into this book again and try writing an essay or a real review or a summary of some type. If I do, the first of Berlin's essays that I will revisit are "Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century European Thought" and "The Apotheosis of the Romantic Will: The Revolt against the Myth of an Ideal World".
May 14, 2023
Lemnul strâmb al omenirii a fost cea mai complexă carte pe care am citit-o anul ăsta. Pentru a-i putea extrage esența nu se poate citi decât cu o lentoare prin pagini aproape sisifică. M-am întors de multe ori asupra pasajelor sau am recitit capitole întregi, astfel am putut înțelege mai bine nuanțele ideologice, diferendele școlilor de gândire, dihotomiile filosofilor sau aporiile iscate. În mod cert nu e o lectură de relaxare. Aș spune în același timp că e superioară unei asemenea literaturi, compensând prin satisfacția cunoașterii. Isaiah Berlin reușește să pună o lumină mai bună asupra istoriei ideilor care au stat la baza transformărilor culturale, sociale și economice de-a lungul secolelor, dar mai cu seamă, structurează prin erudiția sa - cu adevărat fascinantă- o întreagă schelărie, pornind de la primele schițe despre societățile utopice, până la concretizarea lor în state totalitare.
Pentru a înțelege conceptele primelor utopii nu se poate începe decât în Grecia Antică, unde a existat o perioadă în care filosofii au scris numeroase opere care au avut la bază structura unor astfel de state. Însă, în antichitatea greacă, se dezvoltase o puternică credință că existase o astfel de lume, o epocă de aur, a societăților care atinseseră idealul cândva. Platon vorbește despre Atlantida, iar Vergiliu, în Eneida, descrie Saturnia Regna.
A urmat apoi o altă epocă, în care decăderea lor a fost din ce în ce mai cruntă, până în prezentul considerat o rămășiță îndepărtată a ceea ce fusese în trecut. Astfel ideația filosofilor se concentrează asupra întoarcerii în paradisul pierdut.
Câteva exemple de opere utopice începând cu cea mai cunoscută, ar fi:
•Republica lui Platon.
•Utopia lui Euhemeros
•Utopiile satirice ale lui Aristofan.
• Societatea egalitaristă a lui Iambulos.
Stoicul Zenon, descris ca primul anarhist utopist, considera că dacă oamenii sunt raționali nu au nevoie de stat sau bani, curți judecătorești ori altă formă de control. "În societatea perfectă, bărbații și femeile vor purta haine identice și se vor hrăni de pe aceeași pășune după o lege comună ".
Ceva mai târziu, în perioada romană, operele s-au împuținat, dispărând aproape complet din imaginația înțelepților odată cu ascensiunea creștinismului și viziunea diferită despre om și societate, și anume, că omul nu poate atinge perfecțiunea în această lume. Trăise, de asemenea într-un rai pierdut, descris mai înainte de filosofii greci, dar cunoașterea păcatului l-a făcut pe om să se prăbușească în starea sa mizerabilă.
Din rămășițele acestei lumi perfecte, distruse de prostia omului, lăcomie sau neglijență, tema centrală a filosofiei europene va fi aceeași recompunere a stării umane pierdute cândva.
În Renaștere operele utopiilor filosofilor greci au fost redescoperite, dar mai presus, au fost considerate ca un adevăr ascuns timp de atâtea secole. Va urma o perioadă în care operele utopice vor suferi timp de secole transformări din ce în ce mai solide și aduse în concret.
Istoria ideilor aflate în fundația sistemelor totalitare ar fi incompletă fără a-l aminti pe Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821). A fost un filosof reacționar, care a stat împotriva raționaliștilor ca unul dintre ultimele bastioane ale unei lumi aflate în schimbare. Cei doi piloni ideologici ai săi au avut bazele în monarhie și catolicism. Îi desconsidera pe naturaliști, fiind de părere că oamenii trebuie constrânși prin autoritate și disciplină. Susținea răspicat că maselor nu trebuie să li se dea dreptul la autoguvernare. Oamenilor de rând nu le poate fi încuviințată cunoașterea, căci, pe lângă că nu sunt capabili de a gândi liber, mai important, vor folosi greșit puterea dobândită din aceasta.
Ideile lui, refractare unei epoci înnoitoare, cea a Iluminismului, vor intra în conflict cu gânditorii vremii, pe care îi disprețuia sincer; acei filosofi care aveau idealul comun de a scoate omul din bezna gândirii, ce-i guverna mintea.
În epocă descoperirile din domeniul științelor au pus într-o ordine înțelegerea asupra materiei. Apoi, îndeosebi filosofii naturaliști, s-au întrebat dacă nu s-ar putea aplica o asemenea știință și asupra omului pentru a-l scoate din barbarie și superstiții și a-l așeza, studiat și catalogat pe măsură, acolo unde îi este locul, într-o ierarhie analizată minuțios prin disciplinele ce se dezvoltau tot mai mult.
Astfel, două lumi, una în schimbare și alta înrădacinată într-o veche certitudine, se vor ciocni inevitabil.
Jacques-Benigne Bossuet spunea la rândul său că dacă oamenii refuză să recunoască autoritatea legitimă, cea în monarhie și biserică, atunci ei vor cădea în cea mai rea tiranie dintre toate, cea a poporului. De aceeași părere era și Maistre care scria:
"Țesătura socială ține doar întrucât oamenii își recunosc superiorii, se supun pentru că simt o autoritate firească, pe care nici o filosofie raționalistă nu o poate îndepărta. Nu poate exista societate fără stat, nici un stat fără suveranitate."
De altfel, considera democrația ca fiind a celor slabi, libertățile umane, fără sens, iar drepturile omului absurde; în opinia sa ele trebuiau rămase nescrise, "intuite doar metafizic, căci oricine trăiește potrivit unui text este slăbit de acesta".
Numai istoria poate rămâne singura "politică experimentală", pe care omul o cunoște suficient de bine, cu drepturile divine acordate monarhului, prin domnia lui autoritară, care își exercită asupra supușilor puterea astfel primită. Ea, puterea, trebuie înnobilată numai de Biserica Romei, singura menită a fi stabilă și dreaptă, aparte de abominabilul protestantism care a adus scindări, reforme și revolte în sânul ei.
Maistre conchidea că " Ludovic XIV a stârpit protestantismul și a murit în patul lui, bătrân și încununat de glorie. Ludovic XVI a mângâiat protestantismul pe cap și a murit pe eșafod".
A locuit cinsprezece ani în Rusia, ca ambasador, unde observațiile cu privire la autocrație, ortodoxism și naționalitate au fost înglobate în sistemul de învățământ de către Contele Uvarov, iar iobăgiei îi revenea păstrarea la locul său în tabloul statal.
"Dacă ne trece prin minte să eliberăm treizeci şi șase de milioane de astfel de oameni, și o facem - nu putem insista îndeajuns asupra acestui fapt -, într-o clipă va izbucni un război total,
în care Rusia va fi nimicită."
Elocvent în exprimări a intuit bine pericolul intelighenției a cărei influență se va abate la mai bine de un secol distanță asupra vechii și slăbitei orânduiri țariste. Din această cauză, prevăzător, milita pentru o încetinire a implementării științelor în Rusia, care se dezoltau cu avânt în Occident.
"Dacă rușii, care au o anumită tendință de a face orice în glumă (nu vreau să spun prin asta că fac glume despre orice), se vor juca și ei cu acest șarpe, nici un popor nu va fi muşcat mai crud."
Filosofia sa despre societate și politică ocupă o parte însemnată din conținutul cărții. Sunt deopotrivă idei reacționare, dar și fascinante, bineînțeles, văzute prin lentilele epocii. Reminiscențele filosofiei lui Maistre, simbiotic unite curentelor ce vor urma, dar mai cu seamă romantismului german, vor bătători calea către fascismul apărut la un secol după moartea sa. Mai mult de atât, vor sta la baza tuturor formelor de guvernare totalitare ale secolului XX. Joseph de Maistre a fost un om de geniu, descris ca blând și de o considerabilă elocvență, dar și un reacționar violent, îndeosebi prin scrierile sale, împotriva unei noi epoci ce își insinua rațiunea, științele și ateismul tot mai puternice prin mijlocirea filosofilor vremii.
A apărat de multe ori dogmatic gândirea irațională, natura umană brutală și nedreaptă în care credea, susținea frenetic inalterabilul drept divin care guverna lumea după principii neîmpărtașite omului de rând. A fost însă un observator lucid și a prevăzut pericolele ce se abateau în zorii noii epoci, un răsărit ce lumina drumul totalitarismelor în diversele lor forme.
"Mor odată cu Europa, sunt în bună companie"; scria cu doi ani înainte de moartea sa. Cu siguranță observa și întristătoarea moarte a lui Dumnezeu, dar poate că n-a îndrăznit s-o spună primul și, cu siguranță, nu într-o manieră blasfematoare pentru un catolic înveterat.
Isaiah Berlin scrie mai apoi, într-un alt capitol: "aceste iluzii sunt, ele însele, produsul secundar, inevitabil al cramponarii de o ordine pe care istoria a condamnat-o".
Isaiah Berlin identifică bine și resorturile care acționează asupra societăților în momentele când raționalismul depășește un anumit prag, imperceptibil conștientului. Spune că "tinde să apară un soi de rezistență emoțională, o reacție ostilă, care izvorăște din ce e irațional în om". Unul dintre exemple este Grecia secolelor IV și III când școlile socratice au produs sistemele raționaliste.
"Rareori altcândva, ne spun istoricii cultelor grecești, au înflorit atât de bogat religiile, misteriile, ocultismul, iraționalismul, misticismele de orice fel."
"În Evul Mediu Târziu a existat, în mod similar, o reacție la marile construcții logice ale scolasticilor. Ceva nu foarte diferit a survenit în timpul Reformei; și în sfârșit, în urma triumfurilor spiritului științific în Occident, o contramișcare puternică a apărut în urmă cu două secole".
Deseori în istorie popoarele considerate înapoiate au dezvoltat o rezistență culturală din mândrii naționale. Romantismul german s-a născut ca un astfel de contra-curent al Iluminismului, reactiv acelor filosofi francezi înfumurați, cu raționalismul și materialismul lor.
Curentele romantice promovau printre altele suferința, eroismul sau chiar martiriul, ocultul și misticul cu accentele sale în iraționalismul ce amintesc de Maistre. Vor contura dihotomiile ulterioare și crea noi ramuri în gândirea europeană.
Sistemul filosofic creat de Karl Marx comportă însă atât influențe din Iluminismul Francez, Romantismul German, dar și din Socialismul Utopic teoretizat de Henri de Saint Simon și Charles Fourier. Cele două curente vor duce la naționalism, populism, militarism și socialismul egalitar; drumul statelor absolutiste n-a mai fost decât unul normal, culminând cu războaiele ce vor mătura continentul.
O concluzie personală.
Filosofia a înnobilat gândirea și a conturat cu greu drumul către rațiune, dar cu cât citesc mai mult despre ideile și diferendele școlilor de gândire de-a lungul secolelor, cu atât realizez că ciocnirea dintre aceste structuri ideatice, pe lângă progresul evident, lasă unele cratere la granița impactului dintre ele. Mai mult de atât, sunt intrinsec incomplete și dispun de nervuri firave, de interstiții prin care se pot insinua cangrenele înțelegerilor eronate ori ale interpretărilor răuvoitoare.
Și, deși e posibil ca un anumit sistem filosofic să nu fie nociv per se, el poate deveni periculos prin însăși umplerea acelor goluri din puținătatea minților sau din malițiozitatea și voința de putere a celor ce preiau precar sau dogmatic principiile de bază. Aceste carențe arată limitele oricărei filosofii și imperfecțiunile minții umane, dacă mai era nevoie de încă o banală aserțiune pe această temă.
Gânditorii nu de puține ori s-au îndrăgostit de ideile în care au crezut. De aici aș remarca susținerea cu fervoare sau indiferența cinică a unor intelectuali de seamă în fața hitlerismului, leninismului, stalinsimului, maoismului, ba chiar a pol potismului. Au conceput sacrificiul uman ca o purificare a lumii lor ideale, o lume în care credeau mai mult decât în mizeria și durerile le concrete, din moment ce nu erau suferințele lor. E cert că structurile societale perfecte nu pot fi decât niște himere. O societate care a atins idealul nu mai poate fi una a dezvoltării, este edenul pe pământ, plină de pace și prosperitate. O astfel de societate a atins finalitatea. Isaiah Berlin o descrie ca fiind statică. Din moment ce e desăvârșită, nimic nu se mai transformă, nu mai e nevoie de înnoire și schimbare.
Însă o asemenea lume aduce o lâncezire a fizicului, spiritului și minții. Cunoscând natura umană, nu poate fi decât o cădere în ludic și irațional, sau în abisul altor state hiper-militarizate.
Ce poate fi mai înfiorător? Coeziunea firavă nu se poate destructura decât într-o nouă dezordine socială, menită să creeze și mai multă entropie în paradisul obținut, o dezordine a minții sau haosul războiului, tocmai pentru că "din lemnul strâmb al omenirii n-a ieșit niciodată ceva drept."
Pentru a înțelege conceptele primelor utopii nu se poate începe decât în Grecia Antică, unde a existat o perioadă în care filosofii au scris numeroase opere care au avut la bază structura unor astfel de state. Însă, în antichitatea greacă, se dezvoltase o puternică credință că existase o astfel de lume, o epocă de aur, a societăților care atinseseră idealul cândva. Platon vorbește despre Atlantida, iar Vergiliu, în Eneida, descrie Saturnia Regna.
A urmat apoi o altă epocă, în care decăderea lor a fost din ce în ce mai cruntă, până în prezentul considerat o rămășiță îndepărtată a ceea ce fusese în trecut. Astfel ideația filosofilor se concentrează asupra întoarcerii în paradisul pierdut.
Câteva exemple de opere utopice începând cu cea mai cunoscută, ar fi:
•Republica lui Platon.
•Utopia lui Euhemeros
•Utopiile satirice ale lui Aristofan.
• Societatea egalitaristă a lui Iambulos.
Stoicul Zenon, descris ca primul anarhist utopist, considera că dacă oamenii sunt raționali nu au nevoie de stat sau bani, curți judecătorești ori altă formă de control. "În societatea perfectă, bărbații și femeile vor purta haine identice și se vor hrăni de pe aceeași pășune după o lege comună ".
Ceva mai târziu, în perioada romană, operele s-au împuținat, dispărând aproape complet din imaginația înțelepților odată cu ascensiunea creștinismului și viziunea diferită despre om și societate, și anume, că omul nu poate atinge perfecțiunea în această lume. Trăise, de asemenea într-un rai pierdut, descris mai înainte de filosofii greci, dar cunoașterea păcatului l-a făcut pe om să se prăbușească în starea sa mizerabilă.
Din rămășițele acestei lumi perfecte, distruse de prostia omului, lăcomie sau neglijență, tema centrală a filosofiei europene va fi aceeași recompunere a stării umane pierdute cândva.
În Renaștere operele utopiilor filosofilor greci au fost redescoperite, dar mai presus, au fost considerate ca un adevăr ascuns timp de atâtea secole. Va urma o perioadă în care operele utopice vor suferi timp de secole transformări din ce în ce mai solide și aduse în concret.
Istoria ideilor aflate în fundația sistemelor totalitare ar fi incompletă fără a-l aminti pe Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821). A fost un filosof reacționar, care a stat împotriva raționaliștilor ca unul dintre ultimele bastioane ale unei lumi aflate în schimbare. Cei doi piloni ideologici ai săi au avut bazele în monarhie și catolicism. Îi desconsidera pe naturaliști, fiind de părere că oamenii trebuie constrânși prin autoritate și disciplină. Susținea răspicat că maselor nu trebuie să li se dea dreptul la autoguvernare. Oamenilor de rând nu le poate fi încuviințată cunoașterea, căci, pe lângă că nu sunt capabili de a gândi liber, mai important, vor folosi greșit puterea dobândită din aceasta.
Ideile lui, refractare unei epoci înnoitoare, cea a Iluminismului, vor intra în conflict cu gânditorii vremii, pe care îi disprețuia sincer; acei filosofi care aveau idealul comun de a scoate omul din bezna gândirii, ce-i guverna mintea.
În epocă descoperirile din domeniul științelor au pus într-o ordine înțelegerea asupra materiei. Apoi, îndeosebi filosofii naturaliști, s-au întrebat dacă nu s-ar putea aplica o asemenea știință și asupra omului pentru a-l scoate din barbarie și superstiții și a-l așeza, studiat și catalogat pe măsură, acolo unde îi este locul, într-o ierarhie analizată minuțios prin disciplinele ce se dezvoltau tot mai mult.
Astfel, două lumi, una în schimbare și alta înrădacinată într-o veche certitudine, se vor ciocni inevitabil.
Jacques-Benigne Bossuet spunea la rândul său că dacă oamenii refuză să recunoască autoritatea legitimă, cea în monarhie și biserică, atunci ei vor cădea în cea mai rea tiranie dintre toate, cea a poporului. De aceeași părere era și Maistre care scria:
"Țesătura socială ține doar întrucât oamenii își recunosc superiorii, se supun pentru că simt o autoritate firească, pe care nici o filosofie raționalistă nu o poate îndepărta. Nu poate exista societate fără stat, nici un stat fără suveranitate."
De altfel, considera democrația ca fiind a celor slabi, libertățile umane, fără sens, iar drepturile omului absurde; în opinia sa ele trebuiau rămase nescrise, "intuite doar metafizic, căci oricine trăiește potrivit unui text este slăbit de acesta".
Numai istoria poate rămâne singura "politică experimentală", pe care omul o cunoște suficient de bine, cu drepturile divine acordate monarhului, prin domnia lui autoritară, care își exercită asupra supușilor puterea astfel primită. Ea, puterea, trebuie înnobilată numai de Biserica Romei, singura menită a fi stabilă și dreaptă, aparte de abominabilul protestantism care a adus scindări, reforme și revolte în sânul ei.
Maistre conchidea că " Ludovic XIV a stârpit protestantismul și a murit în patul lui, bătrân și încununat de glorie. Ludovic XVI a mângâiat protestantismul pe cap și a murit pe eșafod".
A locuit cinsprezece ani în Rusia, ca ambasador, unde observațiile cu privire la autocrație, ortodoxism și naționalitate au fost înglobate în sistemul de învățământ de către Contele Uvarov, iar iobăgiei îi revenea păstrarea la locul său în tabloul statal.
"Dacă ne trece prin minte să eliberăm treizeci şi șase de milioane de astfel de oameni, și o facem - nu putem insista îndeajuns asupra acestui fapt -, într-o clipă va izbucni un război total,
în care Rusia va fi nimicită."
Elocvent în exprimări a intuit bine pericolul intelighenției a cărei influență se va abate la mai bine de un secol distanță asupra vechii și slăbitei orânduiri țariste. Din această cauză, prevăzător, milita pentru o încetinire a implementării științelor în Rusia, care se dezoltau cu avânt în Occident.
"Dacă rușii, care au o anumită tendință de a face orice în glumă (nu vreau să spun prin asta că fac glume despre orice), se vor juca și ei cu acest șarpe, nici un popor nu va fi muşcat mai crud."
Filosofia sa despre societate și politică ocupă o parte însemnată din conținutul cărții. Sunt deopotrivă idei reacționare, dar și fascinante, bineînțeles, văzute prin lentilele epocii. Reminiscențele filosofiei lui Maistre, simbiotic unite curentelor ce vor urma, dar mai cu seamă romantismului german, vor bătători calea către fascismul apărut la un secol după moartea sa. Mai mult de atât, vor sta la baza tuturor formelor de guvernare totalitare ale secolului XX. Joseph de Maistre a fost un om de geniu, descris ca blând și de o considerabilă elocvență, dar și un reacționar violent, îndeosebi prin scrierile sale, împotriva unei noi epoci ce își insinua rațiunea, științele și ateismul tot mai puternice prin mijlocirea filosofilor vremii.
A apărat de multe ori dogmatic gândirea irațională, natura umană brutală și nedreaptă în care credea, susținea frenetic inalterabilul drept divin care guverna lumea după principii neîmpărtașite omului de rând. A fost însă un observator lucid și a prevăzut pericolele ce se abateau în zorii noii epoci, un răsărit ce lumina drumul totalitarismelor în diversele lor forme.
"Mor odată cu Europa, sunt în bună companie"; scria cu doi ani înainte de moartea sa. Cu siguranță observa și întristătoarea moarte a lui Dumnezeu, dar poate că n-a îndrăznit s-o spună primul și, cu siguranță, nu într-o manieră blasfematoare pentru un catolic înveterat.
Isaiah Berlin scrie mai apoi, într-un alt capitol: "aceste iluzii sunt, ele însele, produsul secundar, inevitabil al cramponarii de o ordine pe care istoria a condamnat-o".
Isaiah Berlin identifică bine și resorturile care acționează asupra societăților în momentele când raționalismul depășește un anumit prag, imperceptibil conștientului. Spune că "tinde să apară un soi de rezistență emoțională, o reacție ostilă, care izvorăște din ce e irațional în om". Unul dintre exemple este Grecia secolelor IV și III când școlile socratice au produs sistemele raționaliste.
"Rareori altcândva, ne spun istoricii cultelor grecești, au înflorit atât de bogat religiile, misteriile, ocultismul, iraționalismul, misticismele de orice fel."
"În Evul Mediu Târziu a existat, în mod similar, o reacție la marile construcții logice ale scolasticilor. Ceva nu foarte diferit a survenit în timpul Reformei; și în sfârșit, în urma triumfurilor spiritului științific în Occident, o contramișcare puternică a apărut în urmă cu două secole".
Deseori în istorie popoarele considerate înapoiate au dezvoltat o rezistență culturală din mândrii naționale. Romantismul german s-a născut ca un astfel de contra-curent al Iluminismului, reactiv acelor filosofi francezi înfumurați, cu raționalismul și materialismul lor.
Curentele romantice promovau printre altele suferința, eroismul sau chiar martiriul, ocultul și misticul cu accentele sale în iraționalismul ce amintesc de Maistre. Vor contura dihotomiile ulterioare și crea noi ramuri în gândirea europeană.
Sistemul filosofic creat de Karl Marx comportă însă atât influențe din Iluminismul Francez, Romantismul German, dar și din Socialismul Utopic teoretizat de Henri de Saint Simon și Charles Fourier. Cele două curente vor duce la naționalism, populism, militarism și socialismul egalitar; drumul statelor absolutiste n-a mai fost decât unul normal, culminând cu războaiele ce vor mătura continentul.
O concluzie personală.
Filosofia a înnobilat gândirea și a conturat cu greu drumul către rațiune, dar cu cât citesc mai mult despre ideile și diferendele școlilor de gândire de-a lungul secolelor, cu atât realizez că ciocnirea dintre aceste structuri ideatice, pe lângă progresul evident, lasă unele cratere la granița impactului dintre ele. Mai mult de atât, sunt intrinsec incomplete și dispun de nervuri firave, de interstiții prin care se pot insinua cangrenele înțelegerilor eronate ori ale interpretărilor răuvoitoare.
Și, deși e posibil ca un anumit sistem filosofic să nu fie nociv per se, el poate deveni periculos prin însăși umplerea acelor goluri din puținătatea minților sau din malițiozitatea și voința de putere a celor ce preiau precar sau dogmatic principiile de bază. Aceste carențe arată limitele oricărei filosofii și imperfecțiunile minții umane, dacă mai era nevoie de încă o banală aserțiune pe această temă.
Gânditorii nu de puține ori s-au îndrăgostit de ideile în care au crezut. De aici aș remarca susținerea cu fervoare sau indiferența cinică a unor intelectuali de seamă în fața hitlerismului, leninismului, stalinsimului, maoismului, ba chiar a pol potismului. Au conceput sacrificiul uman ca o purificare a lumii lor ideale, o lume în care credeau mai mult decât în mizeria și durerile le concrete, din moment ce nu erau suferințele lor. E cert că structurile societale perfecte nu pot fi decât niște himere. O societate care a atins idealul nu mai poate fi una a dezvoltării, este edenul pe pământ, plină de pace și prosperitate. O astfel de societate a atins finalitatea. Isaiah Berlin o descrie ca fiind statică. Din moment ce e desăvârșită, nimic nu se mai transformă, nu mai e nevoie de înnoire și schimbare.
Însă o asemenea lume aduce o lâncezire a fizicului, spiritului și minții. Cunoscând natura umană, nu poate fi decât o cădere în ludic și irațional, sau în abisul altor state hiper-militarizate.
Ce poate fi mai înfiorător? Coeziunea firavă nu se poate destructura decât într-o nouă dezordine socială, menită să creeze și mai multă entropie în paradisul obținut, o dezordine a minții sau haosul războiului, tocmai pentru că "din lemnul strâmb al omenirii n-a ieșit niciodată ceva drept."
January 7, 2019
Τρομερά ενδιαφέρον βιβλίο. Συλλογή επτά δοκιμίων για τον διαφωτισμό και εξέταση του συσχετισμού αντιδιαφωτιστών με τους εθνικισμούς του 20ού αιώνα. Ο λόγος του Berlin είναι στιβαρός και τεκμηριωμένος. Είναι χαρακτηριστική η οξύτητα του πνεύματός του. Το συνιστώ σε όσους ενδιαφέρονται για το θέμα.
February 10, 2020
در شرحها و ریویوهایی که از 《سرشت تلخ بشر》 خواندم، عمدتا بر وجه ضد آرمانشهرگرایانه کتاب تاکید شده است. آیزایا برلین معتقد است که نمیتوان آرمانشهری با اصول جهانشمول متصور شد که در نهایت همه را راضی نگه دارد. بسیاری از ویژگیهایی که به محققشدنشان در آرمانشهر امیدواریم، اساسا با یکدیگر متضاد هستند. ما باید انتخاب کنیم. از نظر برلین از یک جایی به بعد، برای تحقق آزادی باید عدالت را قربانی کنیم و برای تحقق عدالت، باید آزادی را. از این رو، تصور آرمانشهری جهانشمول که در آن همه ویژگیهای مطلوب مورد نظر بشر به حد کمال تحقق یافته باشند، و تلاش و مبارزه در راه دستیابی به آن، در نهایت به فاجعه منجر خواهد شد. برلین به تکثر و تنوع فرهنگها معتقد است، اما این اعتقاد را با نسبیگرایی یکسان نمیداند. او معتقد است که فرهنگهای مختلف، ارزشهای مختلفی دارند، اما ما بر حسب اوضاع و احوال زمانه، میتوانیم دریابیم که چرا این ارزشهای خاص و نه ارزشهایی دیگر به مرجع یک فرهنگ مبدل میشوند و همین موضعِ برلین را از نسبیگرایی متمایز میکند. نسبیگرایی به شکلی که مثلا تمایل فردی به رنگ آبی را صرفا ناشی از سلیقه او میداند که درک علت آن امکانپذیر نیست یا اینکه اساسا علت خاصی ندارد.
چیزی که در بیشتر ریویوهایی که دیدم، نادیده گرفته شده است، نقد برلین به رمانتیسیسم، فاشیسم و ریشههای شکلگیری آن است. برلین در عین اعتقاد به تنوع و تکثر، وجه دیگر ماجرا و تبعات آن را نیز مورد نقد و بررسی قرار میدهد. در نبود ارزشهای جهانشمولی که انسانها به آن چنگ بزنند و با ستایش صرف اراده بشری که باید به شکلی آزادانه تحقق پیدا کند، این امکان فراهم میشود که افرادی با اراده برتر بر سایرین تسلط پیدا کنند و این مشروعیت را داشته باشند که به جامعه و مردم به مثابه ماده خام یک اثر هنری بیندیشند. اثری هنری که در نبود معیارهای جهان شمول، صرفا تابع خلاقیتهای فرد قدرتمندی است که توانسته است اراده خود را بر سایر ارادهها مستولی سازد. این دقیقا همان فرآیندی است که فاشیسم از دل آن رشد میکند.
چیزی که در بیشتر ریویوهایی که دیدم، نادیده گرفته شده است، نقد برلین به رمانتیسیسم، فاشیسم و ریشههای شکلگیری آن است. برلین در عین اعتقاد به تنوع و تکثر، وجه دیگر ماجرا و تبعات آن را نیز مورد نقد و بررسی قرار میدهد. در نبود ارزشهای جهانشمولی که انسانها به آن چنگ بزنند و با ستایش صرف اراده بشری که باید به شکلی آزادانه تحقق پیدا کند، این امکان فراهم میشود که افرادی با اراده برتر بر سایرین تسلط پیدا کنند و این مشروعیت را داشته باشند که به جامعه و مردم به مثابه ماده خام یک اثر هنری بیندیشند. اثری هنری که در نبود معیارهای جهان شمول، صرفا تابع خلاقیتهای فرد قدرتمندی است که توانسته است اراده خود را بر سایر ارادهها مستولی سازد. این دقیقا همان فرآیندی است که فاشیسم از دل آن رشد میکند.
March 19, 2019
آیزایا برلین در این کتاب خواننده را بطور واضح از سه اندیشۀ سیاسی- اجتماعی عبور می دهد، دوران سیطرۀ ایدئولوژی، فاشیسم، و ملی گرایی. در هر سه مرحله از نویسندگان و اندیشمندانی گمنام ولی تاثیرگذار مثال می زند. کسانی چون، ویکو، هردر، دو مستر و ...
در نگاه اول شاید وی را بدبین بدانیم. بخصوص که با تئوری افلاطونی آرمانشهر و آزادی انسان مخالفت می کند اما با مطالعه استدلال ها، حق را به وی می دهیم. انسان همیشه به پایگاهی جمعی نیاز دارد و در طی اشتراک به انواع نابسامانی ها مبتلا می شود تا نهایتا به فاشیسم و استبداد هم برسد. نقل قول وی از زبان جان استوارت میل که هر کس که به دنبال انقلاب و اصلاح شرایط است خود به نوعی مستبد تبدیل می گردد قابل تأمل است.
عقلانیت در طی برقراری نظام سیاسی نیز خطرناک و غیر قابل دسترس است. بخصوص جوامعی که به پیشرفت علمی رسیده و سعی دارند برای هر مولفه ای با کمک علم پشتوانه و توجیهی بتراشند.
درخشان ترین سطور این کتاب را در پاراگراف زیر نقل می کنم. در بحثی که در باب ماهیت دین و تقابل آن با علم و موضع گیری آن در برابر نقد از زبان ژوزف دو مستر نقل می کند:
«دین بر خرد برتری دارد، نه به این دلیل که پاسخهایی قانع کنندهتر به ما میدهد، بلکه به این دلیل که هیچ پاسخی نمیدهد. دین به قانع کردن ما یا استدلال کردن نمیپردازد، تنها فرمان میدهد. ایمان فقط زمانی واقعی است که کورکورانه باشد؛ اگر به دنبال توجیه بگردد کارش تمام است! در دنیا هر چیز قوی، ابدی و مؤثر فراتر از عقل و به معنایی مغایر با آن است. حکومت سلطنتی موروثی، جنگ و ازدواج به این دلیل دوام میآورند که نمیتوانیم از آنها دفاع کنیم، و به همین دلیل نمیتوانیم آنها را از صفحۀ زندگی پاک کنیم. خردستیزی ضمانت بقایش را با خود دارد، ولی خرد هرگز نمیتواند به اینگونه بقا امیدوار باشد . تمام پارادوکسهای هولناک مستر به نوعی بسط همین نکتههاست، که در روزگار وی فرضیههایی بسیار نو بودند.» (ص 189-190)
در نگاه اول شاید وی را بدبین بدانیم. بخصوص که با تئوری افلاطونی آرمانشهر و آزادی انسان مخالفت می کند اما با مطالعه استدلال ها، حق را به وی می دهیم. انسان همیشه به پایگاهی جمعی نیاز دارد و در طی اشتراک به انواع نابسامانی ها مبتلا می شود تا نهایتا به فاشیسم و استبداد هم برسد. نقل قول وی از زبان جان استوارت میل که هر کس که به دنبال انقلاب و اصلاح شرایط است خود به نوعی مستبد تبدیل می گردد قابل تأمل است.
عقلانیت در طی برقراری نظام سیاسی نیز خطرناک و غیر قابل دسترس است. بخصوص جوامعی که به پیشرفت علمی رسیده و سعی دارند برای هر مولفه ای با کمک علم پشتوانه و توجیهی بتراشند.
درخشان ترین سطور این کتاب را در پاراگراف زیر نقل می کنم. در بحثی که در باب ماهیت دین و تقابل آن با علم و موضع گیری آن در برابر نقد از زبان ژوزف دو مستر نقل می کند:
«دین بر خرد برتری دارد، نه به این دلیل که پاسخهایی قانع کنندهتر به ما میدهد، بلکه به این دلیل که هیچ پاسخی نمیدهد. دین به قانع کردن ما یا استدلال کردن نمیپردازد، تنها فرمان میدهد. ایمان فقط زمانی واقعی است که کورکورانه باشد؛ اگر به دنبال توجیه بگردد کارش تمام است! در دنیا هر چیز قوی، ابدی و مؤثر فراتر از عقل و به معنایی مغایر با آن است. حکومت سلطنتی موروثی، جنگ و ازدواج به این دلیل دوام میآورند که نمیتوانیم از آنها دفاع کنیم، و به همین دلیل نمیتوانیم آنها را از صفحۀ زندگی پاک کنیم. خردستیزی ضمانت بقایش را با خود دارد، ولی خرد هرگز نمیتواند به اینگونه بقا امیدوار باشد . تمام پارادوکسهای هولناک مستر به نوعی بسط همین نکتههاست، که در روزگار وی فرضیههایی بسیار نو بودند.» (ص 189-190)
January 14, 2020
Andalgás az eszmék erdejében, csupa szűk ösvény, némelyiket már be is nőtte az aljnövényzet. Berlin professzor mindazonáltal magabiztosnak tűnik, úgyhogy reméljük, nem tévedünk el.
Kezdjük ott, hogy réges-régen, egy messzi-messzi galaxisban még abban hittek a gondolkodók, hogy van egyetlen igazság, amihez egy út vezet. Léteznek tehát válaszok a kérdésekre - legfeljebb nem tudjuk pontosan, mi a kérdés –, és ezek a válaszok szükségszerűen összeegyeztethetőek egymással. Persze az ember gyarló, tévedni ezerféleképpen tud, akár azért, mert nincs kellőképpen kiművelve, akár azért, mert sújtja az eredendő bűn, de ez a lényegen nem változtat: legalábbis elméletben elképzelhető egy tökéletesen harmonikus, kiegyensúlyozott jövő, ami mindenki számára elérhető, az utópiák hegedűszótól hangos hona. Jegyezzük meg: se Berlin, se én nem állítom, hogy ez a filozófiai aranykor jobb vagy szebb volt. Ugyanúgy követtek el az univerzális igazságra hivatkozva bűnöket, mint a lokális igazságokra, akit pedig máglyán égettek meg, valószínűleg nem volt különösebben kíváncsi elpusztításának mélyebb motivációjára. Mindenesetre akárhogy is, ez a szemlélet sokáig, a XVIII. századig egyeduralkodó volt a gondolkodásban, és még a felvilágosodás sem szüntette meg, hisz végtére is az sem állított mást, mint hogy az igazság egyetemes, csak épp annyit tett hozzá, hogy nem a vallás spiritualitása és az arisztokrácia hierarchikus gondolkodása birtokolja, hanem a józan ész, a ráció, és a tudományos vizsgálódás.
Berlin tehát nem kevesebbet állít, mint hogy eszmetörténeti szempontból nem is a francia forradalom volt forradalmi, hanem inkább az, amit válaszul rá kitaláltak. Mégpedig a németek. Merthogy szegény németeket annyira frusztrálta a francia gondolkodók egyetemességre törekvése, illetve az, hogy saját fejedelemségeik egyszerűen kimaradtak a kontinentális szellemi pezsgésből, hogy kitalálták a romantikát. A romantika pediglen azt állítja, hogy nem holmi egyetemes maszlag a lényeg, hanem az egyén a maga szubjektív magánvilágával*. A kulcsszava pedig az akarat – hogy hinnie kell ennek a magánvilágnak a mindenek felettiségében, sutba kell dobnia a külvilág ítéletét, és csak saját zsenialitásával kell törődnie. Ilyen a tipikus romantikus hős: makacs, szenvedő, tragikus, magányos, és gyakran velejéig irracionális. Ezzel együtt semmi baj nincs vele, amíg a regények lapjain marad... ám sajnos nem marad. Találkozik ugyanis a nacionalizmus ideológiájával, ami szintúgy elveti az univerzális igazságokat, abban hisz, hogy a nemzet saját kis szuverén igazsága a lényeg, azt kell elfogadni, azért kell küzdeni. Már nem az a kérdés tehát, hogy mi az az egyetlen igazság, amiről meg kell győznünk másokat (hisz egy német bajosan győzhetne meg egy angolt, hogy az ún. „német igazság” jobb az angoloknak, mint az „angol igazság”), hanem hogy van-e bennünk elég akarat ahhoz, hogy a mi igazságunk legyőzze a mások (érdektelen) igazságát. Nem az már a lényeg, hogy mi is az, ami mindannyiunkban közös. Hanem hogy mi az, amiben mi mások (többek?) vagyunk a többieknél. Ez pedig már a fasizmus** előszobája.
(A kötet leghosszabb tanulmánya egy káprázatos esszé Joseph de Maistre tanairól, akiben Berlin szintúgy megtalálja a protofasisztát. Az úriember a felvilágosulás racionalista tanaira válaszul dolgozta ki a maga ultramontán válaszát, ám olyan szenvedéllyel és pártos gyűlölettel, hogy az még a pápapártiaknak is gyakran a torkán akadt. De Maistre világában az értelem a bűnös, mert csak a világ felszínét kapargatja, de nem jut el a mélységig. A mélység igazsága viszont ésszel nem felfogható, ezért a legokosabb, ha elfogadjuk, amit a vezető – ebben az esetben a pápa – mond. Tilos tehát kételkednünk, aki kételkedik, az a világ elpusztítására tör, és joggal szolgáltatjuk ki a hóhérnak. Odáig is elmegy elmélkedéseiben, hogy azt állítja: az igazi igazságot pont arról ismerni fel, hogy nem értjük, hisz pont ez az irracionalitás a legfontosabb tulajdonsága. Ez a szent düh, ami a kételkedőket célozza, valamint a hatalmi tekintély elfogadása még akkor is, ha az irracionálisan viselkedik – sőt, pont azért, mert irracionálisan viselkedik –, később a fasizmusban és a nácizmusban támad fel újra.)
Sok szempontból zavarba ejtő esszégyűjtemény – nem igazán törekszik lineáris eszmetörténet megalkotására, inkább csak arra, hogy ábrázolja, megragadja, érzékeltesse egy gondolat átalakulásának megfoghatatlan folyamatát. (Épp ezért értékelésem sem törekedhet vele szemben teljességre, inkább csak néhány alapvonal megragadását kíséreltem meg. Csak hogy mentegetőzzek.) Végig azt éreztem, áthatja az a gondolat, hogy nem is az a lényeg, mi milyen igazságnak vagyunk a birtokában. Hisz az igazságok már csak olyanok – ma már tudjuk –, hogy akár ki is zárhatják egymást. Hihetek abban, hogy a tökéletes egyenlőség igazságos, és hihetek abban, hogy a tökéletes szabadság is kívánatos, de a kettőt mégsem lehet összeegyeztetni. A lényeg inkább az, hogyan reagálok a más vélelmezett igazságára. Elfogadom-e azt, mint akceptálható módszert egy jó élet megéléséhez. És ez nem relativizmus, mert a relativizmus azt jelenti, hogy saját életelveinket kérdőjelezi meg az, hogy más életelvek ugyanolyan joggal létezhetnek. Ez inkább pluralizmus: hinni magunkban, a saját moralitásunkban, és elfogadni közben a másokét is, amíg az nem veszélyeztet minket. És ez a szövegen végighúzódó motívum, bevallom, nekem nagyon tetszett. Szeretem Berlin gondolkodását. Szeretem, hogy elutasítja a totális konzekvenciát - mert egy társadalmi rend sosem lehet totálisan konzekvens, hiszen különböző, akár az övétől eltérő elvárások között kell mozognia. Ami totálisan konzekvens, az csak totálisan diktatórikus lehet. Vagy ha az nem, hát totálisan halott.
* Alapvetően ez a kanti kategorikus imperatívusz világa („cselekedj úgy, hogy akaratod maximája mindenkor egyszersmind általános törvényadás elveként érvényesülhessen”), ugyanakkor fontos közbevetni, hogy maga Kant egész életében élesen kikelt a romantika túlkapásai ellen, és eszében sem volt azt állítani, hogy nincsenek univerzális értékek – egyszerűen azt állította, hogy ezeket az embernek magának, külső kényszerítés nélkül kell ellenőriznie.
** Az ember (mármint én) azt gondolná, hogy akkor ez egy lényeges különbség a kommunizmus és a fasizmus között. Hogy utóbbi a romantika gyermeke, előbbi viszont a racionalizmusé. Ám Berlin okfejtése szerint a kommunizmusra is erősen hatottak a nacionalista eszmék, és alapvetően meghatározzák a marxista államok viselkedését.
Kezdjük ott, hogy réges-régen, egy messzi-messzi galaxisban még abban hittek a gondolkodók, hogy van egyetlen igazság, amihez egy út vezet. Léteznek tehát válaszok a kérdésekre - legfeljebb nem tudjuk pontosan, mi a kérdés –, és ezek a válaszok szükségszerűen összeegyeztethetőek egymással. Persze az ember gyarló, tévedni ezerféleképpen tud, akár azért, mert nincs kellőképpen kiművelve, akár azért, mert sújtja az eredendő bűn, de ez a lényegen nem változtat: legalábbis elméletben elképzelhető egy tökéletesen harmonikus, kiegyensúlyozott jövő, ami mindenki számára elérhető, az utópiák hegedűszótól hangos hona. Jegyezzük meg: se Berlin, se én nem állítom, hogy ez a filozófiai aranykor jobb vagy szebb volt. Ugyanúgy követtek el az univerzális igazságra hivatkozva bűnöket, mint a lokális igazságokra, akit pedig máglyán égettek meg, valószínűleg nem volt különösebben kíváncsi elpusztításának mélyebb motivációjára. Mindenesetre akárhogy is, ez a szemlélet sokáig, a XVIII. századig egyeduralkodó volt a gondolkodásban, és még a felvilágosodás sem szüntette meg, hisz végtére is az sem állított mást, mint hogy az igazság egyetemes, csak épp annyit tett hozzá, hogy nem a vallás spiritualitása és az arisztokrácia hierarchikus gondolkodása birtokolja, hanem a józan ész, a ráció, és a tudományos vizsgálódás.
Berlin tehát nem kevesebbet állít, mint hogy eszmetörténeti szempontból nem is a francia forradalom volt forradalmi, hanem inkább az, amit válaszul rá kitaláltak. Mégpedig a németek. Merthogy szegény németeket annyira frusztrálta a francia gondolkodók egyetemességre törekvése, illetve az, hogy saját fejedelemségeik egyszerűen kimaradtak a kontinentális szellemi pezsgésből, hogy kitalálták a romantikát. A romantika pediglen azt állítja, hogy nem holmi egyetemes maszlag a lényeg, hanem az egyén a maga szubjektív magánvilágával*. A kulcsszava pedig az akarat – hogy hinnie kell ennek a magánvilágnak a mindenek felettiségében, sutba kell dobnia a külvilág ítéletét, és csak saját zsenialitásával kell törődnie. Ilyen a tipikus romantikus hős: makacs, szenvedő, tragikus, magányos, és gyakran velejéig irracionális. Ezzel együtt semmi baj nincs vele, amíg a regények lapjain marad... ám sajnos nem marad. Találkozik ugyanis a nacionalizmus ideológiájával, ami szintúgy elveti az univerzális igazságokat, abban hisz, hogy a nemzet saját kis szuverén igazsága a lényeg, azt kell elfogadni, azért kell küzdeni. Már nem az a kérdés tehát, hogy mi az az egyetlen igazság, amiről meg kell győznünk másokat (hisz egy német bajosan győzhetne meg egy angolt, hogy az ún. „német igazság” jobb az angoloknak, mint az „angol igazság”), hanem hogy van-e bennünk elég akarat ahhoz, hogy a mi igazságunk legyőzze a mások (érdektelen) igazságát. Nem az már a lényeg, hogy mi is az, ami mindannyiunkban közös. Hanem hogy mi az, amiben mi mások (többek?) vagyunk a többieknél. Ez pedig már a fasizmus** előszobája.
(A kötet leghosszabb tanulmánya egy káprázatos esszé Joseph de Maistre tanairól, akiben Berlin szintúgy megtalálja a protofasisztát. Az úriember a felvilágosulás racionalista tanaira válaszul dolgozta ki a maga ultramontán válaszát, ám olyan szenvedéllyel és pártos gyűlölettel, hogy az még a pápapártiaknak is gyakran a torkán akadt. De Maistre világában az értelem a bűnös, mert csak a világ felszínét kapargatja, de nem jut el a mélységig. A mélység igazsága viszont ésszel nem felfogható, ezért a legokosabb, ha elfogadjuk, amit a vezető – ebben az esetben a pápa – mond. Tilos tehát kételkednünk, aki kételkedik, az a világ elpusztítására tör, és joggal szolgáltatjuk ki a hóhérnak. Odáig is elmegy elmélkedéseiben, hogy azt állítja: az igazi igazságot pont arról ismerni fel, hogy nem értjük, hisz pont ez az irracionalitás a legfontosabb tulajdonsága. Ez a szent düh, ami a kételkedőket célozza, valamint a hatalmi tekintély elfogadása még akkor is, ha az irracionálisan viselkedik – sőt, pont azért, mert irracionálisan viselkedik –, később a fasizmusban és a nácizmusban támad fel újra.)
Sok szempontból zavarba ejtő esszégyűjtemény – nem igazán törekszik lineáris eszmetörténet megalkotására, inkább csak arra, hogy ábrázolja, megragadja, érzékeltesse egy gondolat átalakulásának megfoghatatlan folyamatát. (Épp ezért értékelésem sem törekedhet vele szemben teljességre, inkább csak néhány alapvonal megragadását kíséreltem meg. Csak hogy mentegetőzzek.) Végig azt éreztem, áthatja az a gondolat, hogy nem is az a lényeg, mi milyen igazságnak vagyunk a birtokában. Hisz az igazságok már csak olyanok – ma már tudjuk –, hogy akár ki is zárhatják egymást. Hihetek abban, hogy a tökéletes egyenlőség igazságos, és hihetek abban, hogy a tökéletes szabadság is kívánatos, de a kettőt mégsem lehet összeegyeztetni. A lényeg inkább az, hogyan reagálok a más vélelmezett igazságára. Elfogadom-e azt, mint akceptálható módszert egy jó élet megéléséhez. És ez nem relativizmus, mert a relativizmus azt jelenti, hogy saját életelveinket kérdőjelezi meg az, hogy más életelvek ugyanolyan joggal létezhetnek. Ez inkább pluralizmus: hinni magunkban, a saját moralitásunkban, és elfogadni közben a másokét is, amíg az nem veszélyeztet minket. És ez a szövegen végighúzódó motívum, bevallom, nekem nagyon tetszett. Szeretem Berlin gondolkodását. Szeretem, hogy elutasítja a totális konzekvenciát - mert egy társadalmi rend sosem lehet totálisan konzekvens, hiszen különböző, akár az övétől eltérő elvárások között kell mozognia. Ami totálisan konzekvens, az csak totálisan diktatórikus lehet. Vagy ha az nem, hát totálisan halott.
* Alapvetően ez a kanti kategorikus imperatívusz világa („cselekedj úgy, hogy akaratod maximája mindenkor egyszersmind általános törvényadás elveként érvényesülhessen”), ugyanakkor fontos közbevetni, hogy maga Kant egész életében élesen kikelt a romantika túlkapásai ellen, és eszében sem volt azt állítani, hogy nincsenek univerzális értékek – egyszerűen azt állította, hogy ezeket az embernek magának, külső kényszerítés nélkül kell ellenőriznie.
** Az ember (mármint én) azt gondolná, hogy akkor ez egy lényeges különbség a kommunizmus és a fasizmus között. Hogy utóbbi a romantika gyermeke, előbbi viszont a racionalizmusé. Ám Berlin okfejtése szerint a kommunizmusra is erősen hatottak a nacionalista eszmék, és alapvetően meghatározzák a marxista államok viselkedését.
November 28, 2018
با وجود اینکه نوع کنارهم نشستن مقالات باعث تکرارشدن برخی مضامین شده است، ولی آموختن از برلین، آموختن از محضر حکیمی دنیادیده و مواجههی شگفتانگیزی بود
با این کتاب فهمیدم که چرا یوتوپیاها از بین رفتند، اینکه تکثر فرهنگی چیست و ویکو و هردر چه کمکی به آن کردهاند و نهایتا چرا اروپا دچار چنان جنگهایی شد. ضمنا نباید از تکنگاری در مورد دومستر گذشت که شخصیت بسیار جذابی برای آشنایی بود
با این کتاب فهمیدم که چرا یوتوپیاها از بین رفتند، اینکه تکثر فرهنگی چیست و ویکو و هردر چه کمکی به آن کردهاند و نهایتا چرا اروپا دچار چنان جنگهایی شد. ضمنا نباید از تکنگاری در مورد دومستر گذشت که شخصیت بسیار جذابی برای آشنایی بود
June 23, 2022
“The universe is not a jigsaw puzzle of which we try to piece together the fragments, in the knowledge that one pattern exists, and one alone, in which they must all fit. We are faced with conflicting values; the dogma that they must somehow, somewhere be reconcilable is mere pious hope; experience shows that it is false. We must choose, and in choosing one thing lose another, irretrievably perhaps. If we choose individual liberty, this may entail a sacrifice of some form of organization which might have led to greater efficiency. If we choose justice, we may be forced to sacrifice mercy. If we choose knowledge we may sacrifice innocence and happiness.”
By the 1820s the world view of the Age of Reason, of Voltaire, Diderot, and the philosophes, was dying, having become stifling, trifling, and restrictive, no longer responsive to a rapidly changing culture. The Romantic movement came as a powerful new force, emphasizing emotion and personal commitment. Over time, however, it changed into something darker and more narcissistic, moving from “I must be true to myself” to “I must be true to an idea, whether it is right or wrong, and regardless of what harm it might cause to others or to myself.” Finally, under fascism and communism, it became, “How many people do we need to kill to remake the world? As many as it takes, all of them if necessary, and any show of pity or remorse makes you a traitor to the cause, unworthy to be among the Elect who will inherit our glorious new world.” This book explains the hundred year slide from high-minded idealism to genocidal murder, and reminds us that the murderers never stopped thinking of themselves as high-minded idealists.
To be more precise, this is simply Volume Five of the collected works of Isaiah Berlin, and includes journal articles, correspondence, responses to critics, and even a book review. The heart of the book, however, is in the essays Joseph de Maistre and the Origins of Fascism and European Unity and Its Vicissitudes.
Joseph de Maistre lives on in the pantheon of conservative thinkers like Friedrich Hayek who are passionately praised by people who haven’t read him and wouldn’t understand him if they did. He was nevertheless an influential thinker in his time, an ardent defender of absolutism in religion, government, and society, and a committed enemy of science and progress. He was prepared to die in the last ditch to save the world he could already see passing away, and his writings became a source of inspiration for conservative theorists, as well as communist and fascist polemicists.
This book shows Isaiah Berlin at his best, presenting ideas with clarity and forcefulness, and I can’t speak for him any better than he speaks for himself, so I am going to quote some of the passages that I found insightful and illuminating.
- Both liberty and equality are among the primary goals pursued by human beings through many centuries; but total liberty for wolves is death to the lambs, total liberty of the powerful, the gifted, is not compatible with the rights to a decent existence of the weak and less gifted....Equality may demand the restraint of the liberty of those who wish to dominate; liberty...may have to be curtailed in order to make room for social welfare, to feed the hungry, to clothe the naked, to shelter the homeless, to leave room for the liberty of others, to allow justice or fairness to be exercised.
- Revolutions, wars, assassinations, extreme measures may in desperate situations be required. But history teaches us that their consequences are seldom what is anticipated; there is no guarantee, not even, at times, a high enough probability, that such acts will lead to improvement.
- Voltaire said that history ‘is a pack of tricks which we play upon the dead.’
- both the English and the German Romantics looked on mankind without contempt or pessimism, whereas Maistre...is consumed by the sense of original sin, the wickedness and worthlessness of the self-destructive stupidity of men left to themselves.
- Maistre’s passionate but lucid thought [was] that men can be saved only by being hemmed in by the terror of authority. They must be reminded at every instant of their lives of the frightening mystery that lies at the heart of creation; must be purged by perpetual suffering, must be humbled by being made conscious of their stupidity, malice and helplessness at every turn. War, torture, suffering are the inescapable human lot; men must bear them as best they can.
- [In Maistre’s view] religion is superior to reason not because it returns more convincing answers than reason, but because it returns no answer at all. It does not persuade or argue, it commands. Faith is truly faith only when it is blind; once it looks for justification it is done for.
- Maistre maintains that all suffering, whether it falls on the heads of the guilty or the innocent, must be expiation of sin committed by someone at some time. Why is this so? Because pain must have a purpose, and since its only purpose is penal, there must, somewhere in the universe, exist a sum of transgression sufficient to cause a corresponding sum of suffering to occur; else the existence of evil could not be explained or justified, and the universe would lack moral government.
- The Fascists and National Socialists did not expect inferior classes, or races, or individuals to understand or sympathise with their own goals; their inferiority was innate, ineradicable, since it was due to blood, or race, or some other irremovable characteristic; any attempt on the part of such creatures to pretend to equality with their masters, or even to comprehension of their ideals, was regarded as arrogant and presumptuous.
- Nationalism is not consciousness of the reality of national character, nor pride in it. It is a belief in the unique mission of a nation, as being intrinsically superior to the goals or attributes of whatever is outside it, so that if there is a conflict between my nation and other men, I am obliged to fight for my nation no matter what cost to other men.
- All men will not be saved: the proletariat, justly intent upon its own salvation, had best ignore the fate of their oppressors; even if they wish to return good for evil, they cannot save their enemies from ‘liquidation’. They are ‘expendable’ – their destruction can be neither averted nor regretted by a rational being, for it is the price that mankind must pay for the progress of reason itself: the road to the gates of Paradise is necessarily strewn with corpses ….Although it has been reached by a different road, this conclusion is curiously similar to the nationalist or Fascist point of view, and different from the outlook of previous ages. However bitter the hatreds between Christians, Jews and Muslims, or between different sects within these faiths, the argument for the extermination of heretics always rested on the belief that it was in principle possible to convert men to the truth, which was one and universal.
- presuppositions which had ruled Western thought since classical antiquity, were no longer taken for granted in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. By that time a new and immensely influential image began to take possession of the European Mind. This is the image of the heroic individual, imposing his will upon nature or society: of man not as the crown of a harmonious cosmos, but as a being ‘alienated’ from it, and seeking to subdue and dominate it.
- In the sixteenth century Calvin and Luther asked theological questions similar to those asked by, say, Loyola or Bellarmine; because their answers were different, they fought bitter wars against each other. Neither side had, or could have had, any respect for the position of the other – on the contrary, the more stubbornly and violently the enemy fought, the more deeply damned he was in the eyes of the true believer, who knew that he, and not the other possessed the truth; indeed the more deeply your adversary believed in his heresies, the more hateful he must be in the sight or God and man.
- By, say, 1820 a very different view prevails….The ideal presents itself in the form of a categorical imperative: serve the inner light within you because it burns within you, for that reason alone...[Romantics] do not state facts, they cannot be verified or falsified, they are not discoveries which you may have made and other can check: they are goals.
- The end of a man [under Romanticism] now is to realise the personal vision within him at whatever cost; his worst crime is to be untrue to this inner goal that is his, and his alone. What the effect of this vision may be on others does not concern him; he must be faithful to his inner light; that is all he knows and all he needs to know.
- What is the common ideal of life? The very notion has lost relevance. Questions of behaviour have no answers, since they are no longer conceived as questions….the answer lies not in knowledge conceived as reflective but in action itself.
- Are my values compatible with one another? Perhaps not….Justice and mercy are not compatible, yet I must seek both; must, because I have no choice: to deny either is to lie, to sin against the light. To realize what such values are is at times to recognise that they are both absolute and irreconcilable. In this way tragedy enters into life as part of its essence, not as something which can be resolved by rational adjustment: to hope to eliminate it is merely to cheat oneself.
- So too in my relations with others: I have an ideal to which I consecrate my life, you have another; our lives are not intelligible save in terms each of its own inner pattern; if these ideals come into conflict, it is incomparably better that we fight a duel, in which one of us may kill the other or we both die, than that either of use should compromise his beliefs. I respect you far more for fighting for your ideal, which I detest, that for any form of compromise, reconciliation, attempt to evade your responsibility to your true self.
- Idealism (a word which acquires its modern significance only in the course of this revolution of ideas)...acquired in the early nineteenth century an absolute value of its own, which we still respect: to say of a man the he is an idealist is to say that, although his goals may seem to us absurd or even repellent, if his behaviour is disinterested and he is ready to sacrifice himself in the name of a principle and against his obvious material interests, we think him worthy of deep respect.
- The Romantic outlook condemns success as such as both vulgar and immoral; for it is built, as often as not, on a betrayal of ones’ ideals, on a contemptible arrangement with the enemy. A correspondingly high value is placed upon defiance for its own sake, idealism, sincerity, purity of motive, resistance in the face of all odds, noble failure, which are contrasted with...peace bought at morally too high a cost. This is the doctrine of heroism and martyrdom, as against that of harmony and wisdom. It is inspiring, audacious, splendid, and sinister too.
- If self-realisation is aimed at as the ultimate goal, then might it not be that the transformation of the world by violence and skill is itself a kind of aesthetic act?….The victims of these great creative operations must take comfort, and indeed be exalted, by the consciousness that they are thereby lifted to a height which their own lower natures could never by themselves have achieved. This is the justification of acts which in terms of an older morality might be called brutal interference, imperialism, the crushing and maiming of individual human beings for the glory of a conqueror, or a State, or an ideology, the genius of the race.
- From this to extreme nationalism and to Fascism is but a short step. Once the assumption is made that life must be made to resemble a work of art, that the rules that apply to paints or sounds or words also apply to men, that human beings can be looked on as so much ‘human material’, a plastic medium to be wrought at will by the inspired creator, the notion of individuals as each constituting an independent source of ideals and goals – and end in himself – is overthrown….Hence the war of all against all, and the end of European unity.
- The tidal wave of feeling rose above its banks, and overflowed into the neighbouring provinces of politics and social life with literally devastating results. All forms of going to the bitter end were thought more worthy of man than peaceful negotiation, stopping halfway; extremism, conflict, war were glorified as such.
- The heroic individual, the free creator, became identified not with the unpolitical artist, but with leaders of men bending others to their indomitable will, or with classes, or races, or movement, or nations that asserted themselves against other, and identified their own liberty with the destruction of all that opposed them.
- In Hegel it is the nation organised as a State. In Marx it is the class organised as a revolutionary force. In both cases a large number of human beings must be sacrificed and annihilated if the ideal is to triumph. Unity may be the ultimate goal of humanity, but its method of attaining it is war and disintegration. The path may lead to a terrestrial paradise, but it is strewn with the corpses of the enemy, for whom no tear must be shed, since right and wrong, good and bad, success and failure, wisdom and folly, are all in the end determined by the objective ends of history, which has ‘condemned’ half mankind – unhistoric nations, members of obsolete classes, inferior races – to what Proudhon called ‘liquidation’, and Trotsky, in an equally picturesque phrase, described as the rubbish heap of history.
By the 1820s the world view of the Age of Reason, of Voltaire, Diderot, and the philosophes, was dying, having become stifling, trifling, and restrictive, no longer responsive to a rapidly changing culture. The Romantic movement came as a powerful new force, emphasizing emotion and personal commitment. Over time, however, it changed into something darker and more narcissistic, moving from “I must be true to myself” to “I must be true to an idea, whether it is right or wrong, and regardless of what harm it might cause to others or to myself.” Finally, under fascism and communism, it became, “How many people do we need to kill to remake the world? As many as it takes, all of them if necessary, and any show of pity or remorse makes you a traitor to the cause, unworthy to be among the Elect who will inherit our glorious new world.” This book explains the hundred year slide from high-minded idealism to genocidal murder, and reminds us that the murderers never stopped thinking of themselves as high-minded idealists.
To be more precise, this is simply Volume Five of the collected works of Isaiah Berlin, and includes journal articles, correspondence, responses to critics, and even a book review. The heart of the book, however, is in the essays Joseph de Maistre and the Origins of Fascism and European Unity and Its Vicissitudes.
Joseph de Maistre lives on in the pantheon of conservative thinkers like Friedrich Hayek who are passionately praised by people who haven’t read him and wouldn’t understand him if they did. He was nevertheless an influential thinker in his time, an ardent defender of absolutism in religion, government, and society, and a committed enemy of science and progress. He was prepared to die in the last ditch to save the world he could already see passing away, and his writings became a source of inspiration for conservative theorists, as well as communist and fascist polemicists.
This book shows Isaiah Berlin at his best, presenting ideas with clarity and forcefulness, and I can’t speak for him any better than he speaks for himself, so I am going to quote some of the passages that I found insightful and illuminating.
- Both liberty and equality are among the primary goals pursued by human beings through many centuries; but total liberty for wolves is death to the lambs, total liberty of the powerful, the gifted, is not compatible with the rights to a decent existence of the weak and less gifted....Equality may demand the restraint of the liberty of those who wish to dominate; liberty...may have to be curtailed in order to make room for social welfare, to feed the hungry, to clothe the naked, to shelter the homeless, to leave room for the liberty of others, to allow justice or fairness to be exercised.
- Revolutions, wars, assassinations, extreme measures may in desperate situations be required. But history teaches us that their consequences are seldom what is anticipated; there is no guarantee, not even, at times, a high enough probability, that such acts will lead to improvement.
- Voltaire said that history ‘is a pack of tricks which we play upon the dead.’
- both the English and the German Romantics looked on mankind without contempt or pessimism, whereas Maistre...is consumed by the sense of original sin, the wickedness and worthlessness of the self-destructive stupidity of men left to themselves.
- Maistre’s passionate but lucid thought [was] that men can be saved only by being hemmed in by the terror of authority. They must be reminded at every instant of their lives of the frightening mystery that lies at the heart of creation; must be purged by perpetual suffering, must be humbled by being made conscious of their stupidity, malice and helplessness at every turn. War, torture, suffering are the inescapable human lot; men must bear them as best they can.
- [In Maistre’s view] religion is superior to reason not because it returns more convincing answers than reason, but because it returns no answer at all. It does not persuade or argue, it commands. Faith is truly faith only when it is blind; once it looks for justification it is done for.
- Maistre maintains that all suffering, whether it falls on the heads of the guilty or the innocent, must be expiation of sin committed by someone at some time. Why is this so? Because pain must have a purpose, and since its only purpose is penal, there must, somewhere in the universe, exist a sum of transgression sufficient to cause a corresponding sum of suffering to occur; else the existence of evil could not be explained or justified, and the universe would lack moral government.
- The Fascists and National Socialists did not expect inferior classes, or races, or individuals to understand or sympathise with their own goals; their inferiority was innate, ineradicable, since it was due to blood, or race, or some other irremovable characteristic; any attempt on the part of such creatures to pretend to equality with their masters, or even to comprehension of their ideals, was regarded as arrogant and presumptuous.
- Nationalism is not consciousness of the reality of national character, nor pride in it. It is a belief in the unique mission of a nation, as being intrinsically superior to the goals or attributes of whatever is outside it, so that if there is a conflict between my nation and other men, I am obliged to fight for my nation no matter what cost to other men.
- All men will not be saved: the proletariat, justly intent upon its own salvation, had best ignore the fate of their oppressors; even if they wish to return good for evil, they cannot save their enemies from ‘liquidation’. They are ‘expendable’ – their destruction can be neither averted nor regretted by a rational being, for it is the price that mankind must pay for the progress of reason itself: the road to the gates of Paradise is necessarily strewn with corpses ….Although it has been reached by a different road, this conclusion is curiously similar to the nationalist or Fascist point of view, and different from the outlook of previous ages. However bitter the hatreds between Christians, Jews and Muslims, or between different sects within these faiths, the argument for the extermination of heretics always rested on the belief that it was in principle possible to convert men to the truth, which was one and universal.
- presuppositions which had ruled Western thought since classical antiquity, were no longer taken for granted in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. By that time a new and immensely influential image began to take possession of the European Mind. This is the image of the heroic individual, imposing his will upon nature or society: of man not as the crown of a harmonious cosmos, but as a being ‘alienated’ from it, and seeking to subdue and dominate it.
- In the sixteenth century Calvin and Luther asked theological questions similar to those asked by, say, Loyola or Bellarmine; because their answers were different, they fought bitter wars against each other. Neither side had, or could have had, any respect for the position of the other – on the contrary, the more stubbornly and violently the enemy fought, the more deeply damned he was in the eyes of the true believer, who knew that he, and not the other possessed the truth; indeed the more deeply your adversary believed in his heresies, the more hateful he must be in the sight or God and man.
- By, say, 1820 a very different view prevails….The ideal presents itself in the form of a categorical imperative: serve the inner light within you because it burns within you, for that reason alone...[Romantics] do not state facts, they cannot be verified or falsified, they are not discoveries which you may have made and other can check: they are goals.
- The end of a man [under Romanticism] now is to realise the personal vision within him at whatever cost; his worst crime is to be untrue to this inner goal that is his, and his alone. What the effect of this vision may be on others does not concern him; he must be faithful to his inner light; that is all he knows and all he needs to know.
- What is the common ideal of life? The very notion has lost relevance. Questions of behaviour have no answers, since they are no longer conceived as questions….the answer lies not in knowledge conceived as reflective but in action itself.
- Are my values compatible with one another? Perhaps not….Justice and mercy are not compatible, yet I must seek both; must, because I have no choice: to deny either is to lie, to sin against the light. To realize what such values are is at times to recognise that they are both absolute and irreconcilable. In this way tragedy enters into life as part of its essence, not as something which can be resolved by rational adjustment: to hope to eliminate it is merely to cheat oneself.
- So too in my relations with others: I have an ideal to which I consecrate my life, you have another; our lives are not intelligible save in terms each of its own inner pattern; if these ideals come into conflict, it is incomparably better that we fight a duel, in which one of us may kill the other or we both die, than that either of use should compromise his beliefs. I respect you far more for fighting for your ideal, which I detest, that for any form of compromise, reconciliation, attempt to evade your responsibility to your true self.
- Idealism (a word which acquires its modern significance only in the course of this revolution of ideas)...acquired in the early nineteenth century an absolute value of its own, which we still respect: to say of a man the he is an idealist is to say that, although his goals may seem to us absurd or even repellent, if his behaviour is disinterested and he is ready to sacrifice himself in the name of a principle and against his obvious material interests, we think him worthy of deep respect.
- The Romantic outlook condemns success as such as both vulgar and immoral; for it is built, as often as not, on a betrayal of ones’ ideals, on a contemptible arrangement with the enemy. A correspondingly high value is placed upon defiance for its own sake, idealism, sincerity, purity of motive, resistance in the face of all odds, noble failure, which are contrasted with...peace bought at morally too high a cost. This is the doctrine of heroism and martyrdom, as against that of harmony and wisdom. It is inspiring, audacious, splendid, and sinister too.
- If self-realisation is aimed at as the ultimate goal, then might it not be that the transformation of the world by violence and skill is itself a kind of aesthetic act?….The victims of these great creative operations must take comfort, and indeed be exalted, by the consciousness that they are thereby lifted to a height which their own lower natures could never by themselves have achieved. This is the justification of acts which in terms of an older morality might be called brutal interference, imperialism, the crushing and maiming of individual human beings for the glory of a conqueror, or a State, or an ideology, the genius of the race.
- From this to extreme nationalism and to Fascism is but a short step. Once the assumption is made that life must be made to resemble a work of art, that the rules that apply to paints or sounds or words also apply to men, that human beings can be looked on as so much ‘human material’, a plastic medium to be wrought at will by the inspired creator, the notion of individuals as each constituting an independent source of ideals and goals – and end in himself – is overthrown….Hence the war of all against all, and the end of European unity.
- The tidal wave of feeling rose above its banks, and overflowed into the neighbouring provinces of politics and social life with literally devastating results. All forms of going to the bitter end were thought more worthy of man than peaceful negotiation, stopping halfway; extremism, conflict, war were glorified as such.
- The heroic individual, the free creator, became identified not with the unpolitical artist, but with leaders of men bending others to their indomitable will, or with classes, or races, or movement, or nations that asserted themselves against other, and identified their own liberty with the destruction of all that opposed them.
- In Hegel it is the nation organised as a State. In Marx it is the class organised as a revolutionary force. In both cases a large number of human beings must be sacrificed and annihilated if the ideal is to triumph. Unity may be the ultimate goal of humanity, but its method of attaining it is war and disintegration. The path may lead to a terrestrial paradise, but it is strewn with the corpses of the enemy, for whom no tear must be shed, since right and wrong, good and bad, success and failure, wisdom and folly, are all in the end determined by the objective ends of history, which has ‘condemned’ half mankind – unhistoric nations, members of obsolete classes, inferior races – to what Proudhon called ‘liquidation’, and Trotsky, in an equally picturesque phrase, described as the rubbish heap of history.
August 29, 2017
مقالات تطرح كيفية تطوير وتنمية المجتمع وخصوصا الاوروبي .
(اعتقد) بأن الكتاب نال شهرة اكثر مما يستحقها
(اعتقد) بأن الكتاب نال شهرة اكثر مما يستحقها
July 13, 2013
The Crooked Timber of Humanity is not an ode to conformity as some radicals might describe it, but an attempt to show our complexity as human beings.
Isaiah Berlin has a reputation for being a magnificent essayist but this book has exceeded my expectations.
Basically, you' ll get a good grasp of his value pluralism notion and become more skeptical towards utopian ideologies. Enlightenment was the triumph of reason and logic but the romantics soon showed its flaws, depicting the human condition as a warfield where equally valid but contradictory values are in constant conflict towards one another. Soon though, romantic idealism led to the disastrous events of the 20th century, a century with endless bloodshed and suffering.
Our tragedy as human beings is, that we're forced to make choices sacrificing our unreflectiveness and absolutism and perhaps one part of ourselves in this process. Ideologies offering redemption, while necessary in order to broaden our horizons, offer little else, since they fail to encapsulate what makes us who we are. Berlin draws from the counter-enlightenment tradition (a term which I think he was the first to coin) but deals all historical movements and ideas with the outmost respect. His essay on Joseph De-Maistre for example, while critical and bitter towards some of his conclusions, remains a wonderfully balanced approach to a controversial figure. It also works as a prelude towards this book's last essay-also wonderful-, which discussed the then evident rise of fascism in Europe. I wish Berlin was still alive, offering his calm and insightful thoughts in today's similar landscape. From the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made.
Isaiah Berlin has a reputation for being a magnificent essayist but this book has exceeded my expectations.
Basically, you' ll get a good grasp of his value pluralism notion and become more skeptical towards utopian ideologies. Enlightenment was the triumph of reason and logic but the romantics soon showed its flaws, depicting the human condition as a warfield where equally valid but contradictory values are in constant conflict towards one another. Soon though, romantic idealism led to the disastrous events of the 20th century, a century with endless bloodshed and suffering.
Our tragedy as human beings is, that we're forced to make choices sacrificing our unreflectiveness and absolutism and perhaps one part of ourselves in this process. Ideologies offering redemption, while necessary in order to broaden our horizons, offer little else, since they fail to encapsulate what makes us who we are. Berlin draws from the counter-enlightenment tradition (a term which I think he was the first to coin) but deals all historical movements and ideas with the outmost respect. His essay on Joseph De-Maistre for example, while critical and bitter towards some of his conclusions, remains a wonderfully balanced approach to a controversial figure. It also works as a prelude towards this book's last essay-also wonderful-, which discussed the then evident rise of fascism in Europe. I wish Berlin was still alive, offering his calm and insightful thoughts in today's similar landscape. From the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made.
August 22, 2023
A very good book from one of the most intellectual thinkers of the 20 century.
September 26, 2016
الكتاب عبارة عن مجموعة مقالات بتتكلم عن كيفية تطوير المجتمع البشري عامة و الأوروبي خاصة و أزاي ممكن نستغل الطاقة البشرية للوصول إلى مجتمع مثالي أو يوتوبيا بمعنى أصح ، لم تؤثر في إلا المقالة الأولى اللي بتحمل أسم الكتاب و ده عشان هي بتحلل بشكل تفصيلي أزاي ممكن الإنسان العادي يتحول لإنسان فاسد و ماعندوش أدنى مشكلة يشوف الفساد في بلده و يسقفله كمان زي اللي بيحصل عندنا في مصر و المنطقة العربية . نجمتين لأول مقالة و نجمة لباقي المقالات التي لم تقدم أي جديد.
March 9, 2022
O carte uluitoare, la fel și autorul care mi-a devenit noua pasiune (prima interacțiune cu scrierile lui Isaiah Berlin). Fermecătoare este în prim moment istoria lui: având origini evreiești și rusești, își formează din copilărie intuiția și ideile despre ce înseamnă răul politic trăit trăind Revoluția din Octombrie. Mai apoi, se mută cu familia în Marea Britanie, patria individualismului și empirismului și se dezvoltă intelectual în cea mai imună cultură la absolutism a vremii. Devine un Socrate care dialoghează cu gândirea politică, fiind admirat și respectat pentru prelegerile sale (astăzi celebre).
Ce-i cu lucrarea de față? O culegere de texte preponderent din 1972-1981, eseuri și recenzii într-o scriitură pură, limpede – iar acesta este punctul forte al lui Berlin: transformă informația, oricât de complexă ar fi, într-un mesaj ușor de înțeles, accesibil publicului larg. Eseurile sale se înscriu filosofiei politice și sunt o maturizare a intuiției și credințelor dobândite în studenție. Pe scurt, încearcă să demonstreze (printre rânduri) că orice ideologie care încearcă să explice integral lumea este falsă și mincinoasă, căci nu există un singur adevăr, iar fiecare „fereastră” prin care privim nu este integral curată, dar nici integral murdară. Subiectul central este monismul (ideologiile unicului adevăr, cele care cred că există un răspuns adevărat la toate întrebările), iar filosoful arată că sunt false și pledează diplomatic pentru pluralism.
Aceste capitole din istoria ideilor ridică întrebarea „Cum s-a putut ca din scrieri aparent angelice ale filosofilor (iluminiști, utopiști, raționaliști, romantici) să se ajungă la drama secolului XX (și, zic eu, până în prezent)?”. Surprinzător, ce face Berlin nu este să-i condamne în analiza lor, ci încearcă să-i înțeleagă și să privească prin „fereastra”/ lentila lor. Sunt capitole uimitoare (și pe alocuri șocante) prin scriitură, analiză, intensitatea gândirii, precum și prin comparații și sisteme de asemănări. În cazul meu, au fost atâtea lucruri pe care nu le-am știut, personaje despre care nu știam cât de mult ne-au influențat (în rău) gândirea și contemporaneitatea. Un must read în zilele acestea încețoșate.
Ce-i cu lucrarea de față? O culegere de texte preponderent din 1972-1981, eseuri și recenzii într-o scriitură pură, limpede – iar acesta este punctul forte al lui Berlin: transformă informația, oricât de complexă ar fi, într-un mesaj ușor de înțeles, accesibil publicului larg. Eseurile sale se înscriu filosofiei politice și sunt o maturizare a intuiției și credințelor dobândite în studenție. Pe scurt, încearcă să demonstreze (printre rânduri) că orice ideologie care încearcă să explice integral lumea este falsă și mincinoasă, căci nu există un singur adevăr, iar fiecare „fereastră” prin care privim nu este integral curată, dar nici integral murdară. Subiectul central este monismul (ideologiile unicului adevăr, cele care cred că există un răspuns adevărat la toate întrebările), iar filosoful arată că sunt false și pledează diplomatic pentru pluralism.
Aceste capitole din istoria ideilor ridică întrebarea „Cum s-a putut ca din scrieri aparent angelice ale filosofilor (iluminiști, utopiști, raționaliști, romantici) să se ajungă la drama secolului XX (și, zic eu, până în prezent)?”. Surprinzător, ce face Berlin nu este să-i condamne în analiza lor, ci încearcă să-i înțeleagă și să privească prin „fereastra”/ lentila lor. Sunt capitole uimitoare (și pe alocuri șocante) prin scriitură, analiză, intensitatea gândirii, precum și prin comparații și sisteme de asemănări. În cazul meu, au fost atâtea lucruri pe care nu le-am știut, personaje despre care nu știam cât de mult ne-au influențat (în rău) gândirea și contemporaneitatea. Un must read în zilele acestea încețoșate.
January 1, 2022
Cartea este o colecție excepțională de eseuri — și a câtorva răspunsuri și scrisori către critici, prin care Isaiah Berlin își formulează viziunea asupra unor chestiuni de mare însemnătate contemporană acoperind totodată ideile secolelor XVII și XVIII care au condus la aceste transformări sociale și politice. Cartea este o lentilă care trebuie așezată cu grijă — lângă multe altele ce alcătuiesc un adevărat obiectiv de privit realitatea — în fața minții ca să putem vedea mai bine prezentul prin modul în care el ne-a parvenit treptat nouă, adică prin noianul de idei frământate de-a lungul mileniilor de mulțimea de gânditori angajați să dea răspunsuri proprii la schimbările epocii în care au trăit croind noi țeluri, pentru că, spune Berlin;„o cauză a schimbărilor continue din istoria omenirii este faptul că tocmai împlinirea (sau împlinirea parțială) a unei aspirații umane este ceea ce-l transformă pe aspirant și naște, în timp, noi nevoi, scopuri, perspective ex hypotesis imprevizibile.” A se citi încet pentru ca informațiile despre gândirea trecutului să poată fi raportate corespunzător la prezent. Procesul citirii e mai mult ca o digestie și asimilare decât cu o simplă lectură.
Critic al despotismului iraționalist reprezentat de tipul Joseph de Meister, dar și al unei libertăți excesive reprezentate de degenerări ale curentului romantic german de la granița secolelor XVIII-XIX și a unui Iluminism exacerbat, Berlin se poziționează de partea unui liberalism pluralist rațional. El neagă universalitatea ființei umane promovată de Iluminismul francez — „nu există o o ființă centrală, pură, naturală care să iasă la iveală dup ce ai răzuit toate credințele, obiceiurile, valorile, formele artificiale de viață și comportament care au fost, ca să spunem așa, suprapuse peste această ființă pură și naturală”— dar nu neagă o anume bază comună umană de nevoi și valori: nevoia de hrană, adăpost, siguranță, apartenență națională, nevoia de un minim de libertate, de a iubi, de a adera la un cult etc., iar fără de aceste însușiri comune comunicarea între oameni ar fi imposibilă; „Nu există o o natură umană fixă, însă există o natură umană comună”, care a format o serie de valori supreme de la care n-au făcut rabat oamenii de foarte departe din trecut până în prezent, acestea fiind valorile umane.
Asemenea complexitate a naturii umane conferă un grad mare de flexibilitate indivizilor angajați în comunități în diverse spații și timpuri astfel că nu există un scop comun și unic al umanității în general, ci fiecare grup își alege scopul lui de urmărit și propria cultură, care pot fi incompatibile cu scopurile și culturile altor grupuri. De aceea Berlin consideră că impunerea printr-un compromis global al unor reguli unice la care să adere rațional toți oamenii este o utopie și o contradicție. Cu toate acestea, culturile și valorile lor diverse se pot înțelege pe criteriul inteligibilității; pluralismul lui Berlin constă în faptul de a fi suficient de empatic, încât a-i putea pătrunde imaginativ în modul de gândire al culturii concurente și totodată de a-i putea înțelege temeiurile chiar dacă nu ești de acord cu ele.
Critic al despotismului iraționalist reprezentat de tipul Joseph de Meister, dar și al unei libertăți excesive reprezentate de degenerări ale curentului romantic german de la granița secolelor XVIII-XIX și a unui Iluminism exacerbat, Berlin se poziționează de partea unui liberalism pluralist rațional. El neagă universalitatea ființei umane promovată de Iluminismul francez — „nu există o o ființă centrală, pură, naturală care să iasă la iveală dup ce ai răzuit toate credințele, obiceiurile, valorile, formele artificiale de viață și comportament care au fost, ca să spunem așa, suprapuse peste această ființă pură și naturală”— dar nu neagă o anume bază comună umană de nevoi și valori: nevoia de hrană, adăpost, siguranță, apartenență națională, nevoia de un minim de libertate, de a iubi, de a adera la un cult etc., iar fără de aceste însușiri comune comunicarea între oameni ar fi imposibilă; „Nu există o o natură umană fixă, însă există o natură umană comună”, care a format o serie de valori supreme de la care n-au făcut rabat oamenii de foarte departe din trecut până în prezent, acestea fiind valorile umane.
Asemenea complexitate a naturii umane conferă un grad mare de flexibilitate indivizilor angajați în comunități în diverse spații și timpuri astfel că nu există un scop comun și unic al umanității în general, ci fiecare grup își alege scopul lui de urmărit și propria cultură, care pot fi incompatibile cu scopurile și culturile altor grupuri. De aceea Berlin consideră că impunerea printr-un compromis global al unor reguli unice la care să adere rațional toți oamenii este o utopie și o contradicție. Cu toate acestea, culturile și valorile lor diverse se pot înțelege pe criteriul inteligibilității; pluralismul lui Berlin constă în faptul de a fi suficient de empatic, încât a-i putea pătrunde imaginativ în modul de gândire al culturii concurente și totodată de a-i putea înțelege temeiurile chiar dacă nu ești de acord cu ele.
July 24, 2013
برلين در اين اثر از سويى به سير تاريخى اين انديشه هاى آرمان گرايانه نظر دارد و از ديگر سو تحولات انديشه خود را در باباز دوره جوانى تا روزگار پيرى تشريح مىكند. برلين نشان مىدهد كه همان گونه در باب مفهوم و حقيقت آرمانگرايى و عدالتو آزادى و حقوق مسلم انسان، نظريههاى فراوان و گاه ضد و نقيضى وجود دارد، او هم به تناسب رشد فكرى و عقلى خود هردوره به يكى از سويههاى اين مفاهيم مايل بوده است؛ به اين معنا كه روزگارى فكر مىكرد حقيقت برترى وجود دارد كه همهانسانها بايد به آن روى بياورند، اما روزگارى درست عكس آن مىانديشيده و اگر چه به وجود حقيقت ناباور نبوده، اما ديگرنه يك حقيقت بلكه به حقايق متكثر باور داشته است.
برلين در اين اثر مىخواهد به انيجا برسد كه «آزادى» گوهر زندگى بشر است و به وجود آن سرشت راستين انسان، آن گونه كهبايد، تحقق نمىيابد. در عين حال او آزادى را آزادى محدود مىداند؛ چرا كه آزادى تام، آزادى نيست: «گاهى لازمه برابرى،محدود كردن آزدى آن كسانى است كه ميل به سلطه دارند؛ شايد لازم باشد آزادى را محدود كنيم تا بتوانيم براى آزادى ديگران و برقرارى عدالت جايى باز كنيم.
با اين كه برلين چه در اين اثر و چه در ساير آثارش مثل «چهار رساله در باره آزادى» يا «محبوس شمال» در قامت يكفيلسوف سياسى بزرگ و جامعنگر جلوه مىكند، اما جالب است كه خود او تعريف خاصى از فلسفه سياسى دارد «فلسفهسياسى چيزى نيست مگر به كار بستن علم اخلاق در مرود جامعه.» از همين جاست كه مىتوان برلين را يك فيلسوف يا عالماخلاق به شمار آورد و آموزههاى او را در پرتو علم اخلاق خواند و فهميد. او مىگويد: اميد ما بايد بر اين پايه استوار باشد كهدر يك «دنياى اخلاقى مشترك» زندگى كنيم و اين به نوعى تمام تلاش برلين است در تمام تأملات و نوشته هايش
برلين در اين اثر مىخواهد به انيجا برسد كه «آزادى» گوهر زندگى بشر است و به وجود آن سرشت راستين انسان، آن گونه كهبايد، تحقق نمىيابد. در عين حال او آزادى را آزادى محدود مىداند؛ چرا كه آزادى تام، آزادى نيست: «گاهى لازمه برابرى،محدود كردن آزدى آن كسانى است كه ميل به سلطه دارند؛ شايد لازم باشد آزادى را محدود كنيم تا بتوانيم براى آزادى ديگران و برقرارى عدالت جايى باز كنيم.
با اين كه برلين چه در اين اثر و چه در ساير آثارش مثل «چهار رساله در باره آزادى» يا «محبوس شمال» در قامت يكفيلسوف سياسى بزرگ و جامعنگر جلوه مىكند، اما جالب است كه خود او تعريف خاصى از فلسفه سياسى دارد «فلسفهسياسى چيزى نيست مگر به كار بستن علم اخلاق در مرود جامعه.» از همين جاست كه مىتوان برلين را يك فيلسوف يا عالماخلاق به شمار آورد و آموزههاى او را در پرتو علم اخلاق خواند و فهميد. او مىگويد: اميد ما بايد بر اين پايه استوار باشد كهدر يك «دنياى اخلاقى مشترك» زندگى كنيم و اين به نوعى تمام تلاش برلين است در تمام تأملات و نوشته هايش
December 7, 2009
In this compelling examination of the historical roots of modern thinking Isaiah Berlin occupies himself with the clash of ideas between French Enlightenment thinkers on one side and a small group of irrationalist reactionaries on the other. He primarily focuses on Giambattista Vico, Johann Gottfried Herder, Joseph de Maistre and Johann Georg Hamann and discusses how their reaction against the enlightenment concept of universal truth led to the romantic movement and ultimately to fascism. Berlin's conclusion seems to be in favor of pluralism, rejecting the dangerous idea of man-made utopias as well as the equally damaging moral relativism that led to the nihilistic worship of blood, state and leader; both concepts that resulted in the bloodbaths of the 20th century. He also has some interesting views on the rise of the nation-state as a response to colonialism and the utter failure of Marxist Internationalism. He advocates a middle ground of pluralism and acceptance of differences with the realization that there are certain modals of acceptable behavior that cross cultural divides and make us human.
September 17, 2017
الكتاب عبارة عن ٤ مقالات.
المقالة الأولى تناقش مسألة اليوتوبيا، أو بالأصح تنتقد الأفكار الطوباوية، القائمة في الأغلب على أفكار من قبيل أن هناك طريقة واحدة للعيش هي أفضل من كل الطرق غيرها و تناسب كل الناس، و أنا من حيث المبدأ قابلة لأن تُعرف، و أن تُطبق، حتى ولو لم نعرف الإجابة عن الأسئلة المتعلقة بكيفيتها وماهيتها اليوم، لكنها موجودة.
التانية بتناقش مسألة قريبة منها، وهي مسألة وحدة الطبيعة الإنسانية و فرضية أن هناك حقيقة واحدة لها و اهداف واحدة يمكن لكل البشر من ناحية المبدأ إدراكها. و فرضية معاكسة، حديثة نسبياً، بأن "البشر" ليسو جميعاً متساويين في إنسانيتهم، و أن بعض القوميات أو الأعراق صاحبة مرتبة أعلى و أهداف و قيم و مُثُل أعلى، و البشر الأدنى مرتبة ليسو قادرين على تفهم هذه المثل و القيم، مما يخولهم ويبرر لهم أن يقتلوهم مثلا في سبيل هذه القيم بدون معاتبة ضمير.
المقالتين الثالثة و الرابعة تقريباً فيها تكرار لكثير من الأفكار الواردة في المقالتين السابقتين، مع نقاش وتحليل لأسباب نشوء الحركات القومية، ألمانيا القرن الثامن عشر مثالاً، من شعور بالدونية و الاستضعاف و الإذلال على يد الحضارات الأخرى "الأكثر رقياً و تحضراً" -الفرنسيين تحديداً- .
المقالة الأولى تناقش مسألة اليوتوبيا، أو بالأصح تنتقد الأفكار الطوباوية، القائمة في الأغلب على أفكار من قبيل أن هناك طريقة واحدة للعيش هي أفضل من كل الطرق غيرها و تناسب كل الناس، و أنا من حيث المبدأ قابلة لأن تُعرف، و أن تُطبق، حتى ولو لم نعرف الإجابة عن الأسئلة المتعلقة بكيفيتها وماهيتها اليوم، لكنها موجودة.
التانية بتناقش مسألة قريبة منها، وهي مسألة وحدة الطبيعة الإنسانية و فرضية أن هناك حقيقة واحدة لها و اهداف واحدة يمكن لكل البشر من ناحية المبدأ إدراكها. و فرضية معاكسة، حديثة نسبياً، بأن "البشر" ليسو جميعاً متساويين في إنسانيتهم، و أن بعض القوميات أو الأعراق صاحبة مرتبة أعلى و أهداف و قيم و مُثُل أعلى، و البشر الأدنى مرتبة ليسو قادرين على تفهم هذه المثل و القيم، مما يخولهم ويبرر لهم أن يقتلوهم مثلا في سبيل هذه القيم بدون معاتبة ضمير.
المقالتين الثالثة و الرابعة تقريباً فيها تكرار لكثير من الأفكار الواردة في المقالتين السابقتين، مع نقاش وتحليل لأسباب نشوء الحركات القومية، ألمانيا القرن الثامن عشر مثالاً، من شعور بالدونية و الاستضعاف و الإذلال على يد الحضارات الأخرى "الأكثر رقياً و تحضراً" -الفرنسيين تحديداً- .
September 20, 2013
در این کتاب آیزیا برلین سعی می کند تا با بررسی رابطه اندیشهها با تاریخ، ریشههای رخداد امر تاریخی را تبیین کند و در این راه فیلسوف لیبرالیست با باز گذاشتن خوانش برساختی از تاریخ غرب نقش سازهها و اندیشهها را بیش از آنچه که پیشتر تصور می شد به مثابه عاملی در اتفاق تاریخی دخیل می داند، برای مثال او معتقد است که تفکری مانند مارکسیست وقتی نقش انقلاب و ستیز و تضاد را برجسته می سازد، زمینه مناسبی برای شکل گیری فاشیسم و سرکوب دیگری می شود، هر چند خود کتاب قابل نقد و بحثهای بی شماری است اما با این حال ارزش ارزش آن را دارد که به تاریخ از منظری دیگر نگریست.
July 29, 2024
One of the better philosophy books I've read, in the sense that you don't have to think about every sentence twice to understand it. Although it is far from all-encompassing, I would recommend this to someone who is just getting into reading philosophy. It gives you some insight into the major paradigm shifts in philosophical thought over the last few centuries.
May 19, 2008
"From the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made." -- Immanuel Kant
Isaiah Berlin sees human life as necessarily tragic, not because of human depravity in a Christian sense but because of the incompatibility of human goods. Humans will never be able to attain both perfect liberty and perfect equality, for example; they must make a difficult choice between them or seek only a partial measure of each. ("Total liberty for wolves is death to the lambs," in Berlin's famous formulation.) The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw terrifying ideologies arise either in denial of this fact (utopianism) or in relativistic perversion of it (nationalism) or both (fascism).
Berlin suggests that the best response to the incompatibility of different goods is what he calls pluralism. Unlike relativism, he says, pluralism recognizes common human bonds that make communication -- even debate -- possible among different communities. But pluralism also recognizes that there is no comprehensive solution to human problems, and thus that other people may legitimately pursue different priorities from ours. This solution leaves much to be desired, but it might at least keep us from destroying each other.
The collection seems a bit dated now, insofar as these essays were written to address mid-twentieth-century problems. One need not strain one's mind much, however, to imagine applications to the problems posed by political Islam, the "freedom agenda," European unification, or economic globalization. And Berlin's prose is a pleasure to read.
Isaiah Berlin sees human life as necessarily tragic, not because of human depravity in a Christian sense but because of the incompatibility of human goods. Humans will never be able to attain both perfect liberty and perfect equality, for example; they must make a difficult choice between them or seek only a partial measure of each. ("Total liberty for wolves is death to the lambs," in Berlin's famous formulation.) The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw terrifying ideologies arise either in denial of this fact (utopianism) or in relativistic perversion of it (nationalism) or both (fascism).
Berlin suggests that the best response to the incompatibility of different goods is what he calls pluralism. Unlike relativism, he says, pluralism recognizes common human bonds that make communication -- even debate -- possible among different communities. But pluralism also recognizes that there is no comprehensive solution to human problems, and thus that other people may legitimately pursue different priorities from ours. This solution leaves much to be desired, but it might at least keep us from destroying each other.
The collection seems a bit dated now, insofar as these essays were written to address mid-twentieth-century problems. One need not strain one's mind much, however, to imagine applications to the problems posed by political Islam, the "freedom agenda," European unification, or economic globalization. And Berlin's prose is a pleasure to read.
September 22, 2011
I’ve been intrigued by Isaiah Berlin ever since I found out that he was the author of the seminal essay on Tolstoy, “The Hedgehog and the Fox.” His collection of later essays, The Crooked Timber of History, was equally compelling. The first two essays, “The Pursuit of the Ideal” and “The Decline of Utopian Ideas in the West,” were interesting in the discussion of the inevitable failure of utopian movements like communism and fascism due to the fact that ideals differ from culture to culture. This concept of cultural pluralism dominates the discourse in his essay, “Giambattista and Cultural History,” in which he calls Vico the true father of the modern concept of culture and cultural pluralism. The rest of the essays are equally thought provoking and compelling: “Alleged Relativism in Eighteen-Century European Thought,” Joseph de Mainstre and the Origins of Fascism,” “European Unity and its Vicissitudes,” “The Apotheosis of the Romantic Will,” and “The Bent Twig.” More often than not philosophical texts can be quite dry and hard to follow, however, I found Berlin’s style challenging but accessible.
February 1, 2010
Like The Blank Slate, this book was a life-changer for me. Reading it convinced me that radicalism in politics is ultimately self-defeating, and that irreconcilable political opponents not simply can get along, but they must get along (with some rare exceptions, viz. Nazis). Liberalism isn't acceptance of those boneheads over there, but is rather the idea that failing to give them a voice will lead to something a lot worse.
March 22, 2024
"Out of timber so crooked as that from which Mankind is made, nothing entirely straight can ever be built."-Immanuel Kant.
Isiaiah Berlin was not quite a historian, not quite a philosopher. Instead he styled himself as a Philosopher of the History of Ideas, a role he held at Oxford for many years. He is best known for his widely read and deeply learned analyses of some of the leading Liberal and Reactionary thinkers of the 18th/19th centuries, including Giambattista Vico, Gottfried Herder, J.G Hamann and Joseph de Maistre among others. However he is also known for a couple of his own ideas which have come to be seen as hugely significant contributions to the philosophy of Liberalism. The first is the twin concepts of Positive and Negative Liberty. Simply put, this is the distinction, previously implicit, between 'Freedoms For' and 'Freedoms From'. For example, the right to Freedom of Speech, much heralded nowadays as the chief of our liberties, and the cornerstone of any Constitution, is a positive freedom. It gives the individual the freedom to speak his or her mind, unmolested by violence or fear. Much the same is true for Freedom of Religion, Assembly, Voting and so forth. Conversely, 'Negative Liberty' consists of the Freedom from certain conditions, imposed by external authority. Habeas Corpus for example, the freedom from unlawful and illegal detention, is a classic example of a Negative Liberty. Similarly with the freedom from arbitrary arrest, or the right to a fair trial. This is a useful distinction and one that serves as the crux of the division in Liberalism between those who think that the role of the State is simply to enforce those negative liberties and keep out of the individual's business, and those with a more positive, expanded sense of the role of the State, who may hope to see the Government use its powers to enforce Social Justice.
However Berlin's big breakthrough is his theory of Value Pluralism. This coy little name hides a revolutionary concept and one that I believe, once fully absorbed, entails radical consequences for Political Philosophy. In simple terms, the theory proposes that the Values we hold dear in this world do not naturally cohere and in most cases in fact run up against each other so that we have to choose between them. Whereas Plato had assumed that a natural coherence of values must occur at some level if a Platonic ideal could be conceived, much as the legs support a chair, so it must be with Moral Values. This misunderstanding had led moral philosophers astray for years, in Berlin's view. Perhaps an illustration would serve best here. Liberty and Equality are two of the fundamental values that human beings desire, part of the slogan of the French Jacobins in 1789. However, the two concepts are in some sense contradictory, or at least partial opposition. Total Equality for all would necessarily entail a massive curtailing of individual liberty, while absolute freedom for all would undoubtedly prove destructive of equality. "Total liberty for the wolf means death for the lambs" in Berlin's evocative phrase. Each individual may have their own preference for the ideal balance to be sought between these values, but they cannot eliminate the choice or wish it away. You may prefer more liberty, I, more equality, but some sort of trade off will have to be compromised in order to keep us both happy. The best that any society can do is to manage these trade offs, which will recur with each new individual and each successive generation, who will have to decide for themselves which values they want to live by.
The same is true Berlin argued, with respect to almost all moral values. Justice may be very important to you, but Mercy is more important to your neighbour. Who is to say which of the two is better, and which should predominate? What about Creativity and Discipline? Or Rights vs Responsibilities? Fairness and Merit? Each individual must decide for themselves which values they prefer, and a good society can try to mediate these differences through the rule of Law, but the differences will remain and cannot be dissolved. It follows therefore that all notions of a 'Perfect society' or a world where these conflicts have been perfectly and permanently resolved, is incoherent as a concept. The best that we can do, as Berlin saw it, is to create space for these values to coexist, to honour people's choices and allow them the freedom to choose without imposing on them an external conception of what perfection might look like. The result is a messy, imperfect, scruffy, sometimes unedifying political contest between these values, that must and will play out eternally. As long as there are people, people will disagree over how much freedom should be allowed versus how much equality, or whether Rights or Responsibilities are more important. That is all for the best and the lack of greater perfection that such a society entails is to be greatly preferred to those political solutions which claim to be able to offer us permanent answers to eternal questions but which in in reality offer none.
Isiaiah Berlin was not quite a historian, not quite a philosopher. Instead he styled himself as a Philosopher of the History of Ideas, a role he held at Oxford for many years. He is best known for his widely read and deeply learned analyses of some of the leading Liberal and Reactionary thinkers of the 18th/19th centuries, including Giambattista Vico, Gottfried Herder, J.G Hamann and Joseph de Maistre among others. However he is also known for a couple of his own ideas which have come to be seen as hugely significant contributions to the philosophy of Liberalism. The first is the twin concepts of Positive and Negative Liberty. Simply put, this is the distinction, previously implicit, between 'Freedoms For' and 'Freedoms From'. For example, the right to Freedom of Speech, much heralded nowadays as the chief of our liberties, and the cornerstone of any Constitution, is a positive freedom. It gives the individual the freedom to speak his or her mind, unmolested by violence or fear. Much the same is true for Freedom of Religion, Assembly, Voting and so forth. Conversely, 'Negative Liberty' consists of the Freedom from certain conditions, imposed by external authority. Habeas Corpus for example, the freedom from unlawful and illegal detention, is a classic example of a Negative Liberty. Similarly with the freedom from arbitrary arrest, or the right to a fair trial. This is a useful distinction and one that serves as the crux of the division in Liberalism between those who think that the role of the State is simply to enforce those negative liberties and keep out of the individual's business, and those with a more positive, expanded sense of the role of the State, who may hope to see the Government use its powers to enforce Social Justice.
However Berlin's big breakthrough is his theory of Value Pluralism. This coy little name hides a revolutionary concept and one that I believe, once fully absorbed, entails radical consequences for Political Philosophy. In simple terms, the theory proposes that the Values we hold dear in this world do not naturally cohere and in most cases in fact run up against each other so that we have to choose between them. Whereas Plato had assumed that a natural coherence of values must occur at some level if a Platonic ideal could be conceived, much as the legs support a chair, so it must be with Moral Values. This misunderstanding had led moral philosophers astray for years, in Berlin's view. Perhaps an illustration would serve best here. Liberty and Equality are two of the fundamental values that human beings desire, part of the slogan of the French Jacobins in 1789. However, the two concepts are in some sense contradictory, or at least partial opposition. Total Equality for all would necessarily entail a massive curtailing of individual liberty, while absolute freedom for all would undoubtedly prove destructive of equality. "Total liberty for the wolf means death for the lambs" in Berlin's evocative phrase. Each individual may have their own preference for the ideal balance to be sought between these values, but they cannot eliminate the choice or wish it away. You may prefer more liberty, I, more equality, but some sort of trade off will have to be compromised in order to keep us both happy. The best that any society can do is to manage these trade offs, which will recur with each new individual and each successive generation, who will have to decide for themselves which values they want to live by.
The same is true Berlin argued, with respect to almost all moral values. Justice may be very important to you, but Mercy is more important to your neighbour. Who is to say which of the two is better, and which should predominate? What about Creativity and Discipline? Or Rights vs Responsibilities? Fairness and Merit? Each individual must decide for themselves which values they prefer, and a good society can try to mediate these differences through the rule of Law, but the differences will remain and cannot be dissolved. It follows therefore that all notions of a 'Perfect society' or a world where these conflicts have been perfectly and permanently resolved, is incoherent as a concept. The best that we can do, as Berlin saw it, is to create space for these values to coexist, to honour people's choices and allow them the freedom to choose without imposing on them an external conception of what perfection might look like. The result is a messy, imperfect, scruffy, sometimes unedifying political contest between these values, that must and will play out eternally. As long as there are people, people will disagree over how much freedom should be allowed versus how much equality, or whether Rights or Responsibilities are more important. That is all for the best and the lack of greater perfection that such a society entails is to be greatly preferred to those political solutions which claim to be able to offer us permanent answers to eternal questions but which in in reality offer none.
May 20, 2024
I do enjoy reading Berlin - and I separate this for any sympathy I have for what he says. He is just such a lucid writer who is a pleasure to read even when dealing with complex concepts.
This volume is definitely well titled and volume in the history of ideas. It focuses on topics that are familiar areas for those who have read much Berlin - the ideal, utopias, romanticism and the way this lead to nationalism.
He focuses on thinkers less familiar now, unless perhaps you are deeply involved in the history of political ideas, De Maistre, Ficte, Herder and others.
The essays here were written between 1959 and 1990. A fine collection. I feel I formed and educated through reading them.
This volume is definitely well titled and volume in the history of ideas. It focuses on topics that are familiar areas for those who have read much Berlin - the ideal, utopias, romanticism and the way this lead to nationalism.
He focuses on thinkers less familiar now, unless perhaps you are deeply involved in the history of political ideas, De Maistre, Ficte, Herder and others.
The essays here were written between 1959 and 1990. A fine collection. I feel I formed and educated through reading them.
August 10, 2016
A collection of essays from the renown historian Isaiah Berlin, who essentially offers an entirely reasonable and nuanced argument for abandoning Platonic ideals, absolute ethical values, categorical imperatives, and quests for Utopia. Berlin offers a pluralistic, cultural approach to understanding human affairs, not unlike the Italian historian Vico. As humans, we are capable of understanding other humans, and their values, actions, and customs. We can criticise and condemn other cultures, but we must not pretend that we are incapable of understanding why different peoples act differently. To Berlin, the search for perfection is a recipe for bloodshed. One culture cannot foist values upon another, for the very reason that one cannot legislate unintended consequences, changing values, and the diversity of equally valid human ends.
So it's value pluralism. But aren't there at least a few things which are universal? What are human rights?
So it's value pluralism. But aren't there at least a few things which are universal? What are human rights?
June 5, 2014
الكتاب كتاب صغير بحجمه, وكبير جداً بمضمونه, فهو يتضمن من الفكر الكثير, وكلها موضوعات مهمة وعظيمة منها؛
مقاصد الحياة عند عدد من المفكرين, والأسئلة التي يجب طرحها للوصول إلى تلك المقاصد, وماهية الإجابات وطرق الوصول إليها - إذا كان يمكن للبشر التوصل إليها من حيث المبدأ - ويتحدث عن الأفكار الطوباوية المختلفة في الغرب, وهناك وصف مثير للاهتمام لمسار البشرية عبر التاريخ, كما يتحدث عن الوحدة الأوربية ونشوء القوميات, وعن القيم والمثل العليا للبشر؛ ماذا تعني, وكيف تتصادم, ويتحدث أيضاً عن الهوية وغيرها.
الكاتب ملم بالكثير وهو واسع الاطلاع, تتفاجأ كيف تتسع الصفحات القلال لكل هذه المعرفة وهذا الفكر.
مقاصد الحياة عند عدد من المفكرين, والأسئلة التي يجب طرحها للوصول إلى تلك المقاصد, وماهية الإجابات وطرق الوصول إليها - إذا كان يمكن للبشر التوصل إليها من حيث المبدأ - ويتحدث عن الأفكار الطوباوية المختلفة في الغرب, وهناك وصف مثير للاهتمام لمسار البشرية عبر التاريخ, كما يتحدث عن الوحدة الأوربية ونشوء القوميات, وعن القيم والمثل العليا للبشر؛ ماذا تعني, وكيف تتصادم, ويتحدث أيضاً عن الهوية وغيرها.
الكاتب ملم بالكثير وهو واسع الاطلاع, تتفاجأ كيف تتسع الصفحات القلال لكل هذه المعرفة وهذا الفكر.
April 17, 2020
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
October 7, 2012
ترجمه لیلا سازگار بسیار خوب است. فصل دومستر این کتاب بسیار جذاب است هر چند ظاهرا برلین در اواخر عمر نسبت به این فصل دیدگاه انتقادی داشت.
March 3, 2015
كتاب فلسفي يتحدث عن بعض ثوابت الإنسانية بنظرة نقدية، سائني صعوبة أسلوب الكاتب في ايصال المعلومة ووجهة نظرة بالشكل المطلوب الى القارئ
June 9, 2022
O filosofie... rezonabila, decenta, genul care nu starneste pasiuni prea mari (Berlin insusi e constient de asta, dar o considera o alternativa de preferat extremismelor seducatoare, dezinvolte, sigure pe ele).
La un moment dat ideile devin repetitive, iar asta a mai atenuat din placerea initiala a lecturii, iar unele argumente sunt de o validitate mai... discutabila; diferentierea pe care o face Berlin intre relativism si pluralism mi se pare artificiala, de conjunctura, numai pentru a se potrivi argumentelor lui. Altii probabil ca vad cei doi termeni altcumva.
Cireasa de pe tort a volumului e un lung text despre Joseph de Maistre, foarte bine si elegant scris; mi-au placut de asemenea mentionarile la Vico si Herder, niste filosofi de care nu auzisem inainte.
Per total, o lectura placuta, nu foarte solicitanta, dar nici impresionanta, un mestesug al vorbei, al rationamentului, o etalare a flerului de eseist al lui Iasiah Berlin.
La un moment dat ideile devin repetitive, iar asta a mai atenuat din placerea initiala a lecturii, iar unele argumente sunt de o validitate mai... discutabila; diferentierea pe care o face Berlin intre relativism si pluralism mi se pare artificiala, de conjunctura, numai pentru a se potrivi argumentelor lui. Altii probabil ca vad cei doi termeni altcumva.
Cireasa de pe tort a volumului e un lung text despre Joseph de Maistre, foarte bine si elegant scris; mi-au placut de asemenea mentionarile la Vico si Herder, niste filosofi de care nu auzisem inainte.
Per total, o lectura placuta, nu foarte solicitanta, dar nici impresionanta, un mestesug al vorbei, al rationamentului, o etalare a flerului de eseist al lui Iasiah Berlin.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 104 reviews