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The Coldest Winter
"In a grand gesture of reclamation and remembrance, Mr. Halberstam has brought the war back home."
--The New York Times
--The New York Times
David Halberstam's magisterial and thrilling The Best and the Brightest was the defining book about the Vietnam conflict. More than three decades later, Halberstam used his unrivaled research and formidable journalistic skills to shed light on another pivotal moment in our history: the Korean War. Halberstam considered The Coldest Winter his most accomplished work, the culmination of forty-five years of writing about America's postwar foreign policy.
Halberstam gives us a masterful narrative of the political decisions and miscalculations on both sides. He charts the disastrous path that led to the massive entry of Chinese forces near the Yalu River and that caught Douglas MacArthur and his soldiers by surprise. He provides astonishingly vivid and nuanced portraits of all the major figures-Eisenhower, Truman, Acheson, Kim, and Mao, and Generals MacArthur, Almond, and Ridgway. At the same time, Halberstam provides us with his trademark highly evocative narrative journalism, chronicling the crucial battles with reportage of the highest order. As ever, Halberstam was concerned with the extraordinary courage and resolve of people asked to bear an extraordinary burden.
The Coldest Winter is contemporary history in its most literary and luminescent form, providing crucial perspective on every war America has been involved in since. It is a book that Halberstam first decided to write more than thirty years ago and that took him nearly ten years to complete. It stands as a lasting testament to one of the greatest journalists and historians of our time, and to the fighting men whose heroism it chronicles.
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First published January 1, 2007
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About the author
David Halberstam
98 books871 followersDavid Halberstam was an American journalist and historian, known for his work on the Vietnam War, politics, history, the Civil Rights Movement, business, media, American culture, and later, sports journalism. He was awarded a Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting in 1964.
Halberstam graduated from Harvard University with a degree in journalism in 1955 and started his career writing for the Daily Times Leader in West Point, Mississippi. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, writing for The Tennessean in Nashville, Tennessee, he covered the beginnings of the American Civil Rights Movement.
In the mid 1960s, Halberstam covered the Vietnam War for The New York Times. While there, he gathered material for his book The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam during the Kennedy Era. In 1963, he received a George Polk Award for his reporting at the New York Times. At the age of 30, he won a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting on the war. He is interviewed in the 1968 documentary film on the Vietnam War entitled In the Year of the Pig.
Halberstam's most well known work is The Best and the Brightest. Halberstam focused on the paradox that those who shaped the U.S. war effort in Vietnam were some of the most intelligent, well-connected and self-confident men in America—"the best and the brightest"—and yet those same individuals were responsible for the failure of the United States Vientnam policy.
After publication of The Best and the Brightest in 1972, Halberstam plunged right into another book and in 1979 published The Powers That Be. The book provided profiles of men like William Paley of CBS, Henry Luce of Time magazine, Phil Graham of The Washington Post—and many others.
Later in his career, Halberstam turned to the subjects of sports, publishing The Breaks of the Game, an inside look at the Bill Walton and the 1978 Portland Trailblazers basketball team; an ambitious book on Michael Jordan in 1999 called Playing for Keeps; and on the pennant race battle between the Yankees and Red Sox called Summer of '49.
Halberstam published two books in the 1960s, three books in the 1970s, four books in the 1980s, and six books in the 1990s. He published four books in the 2000s and was on a pace to publish six or more books in that decade before his death.
David Halberstam was killed in a car crash on April 23, 2007 in Menlo Park, California.
Halberstam graduated from Harvard University with a degree in journalism in 1955 and started his career writing for the Daily Times Leader in West Point, Mississippi. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, writing for The Tennessean in Nashville, Tennessee, he covered the beginnings of the American Civil Rights Movement.
In the mid 1960s, Halberstam covered the Vietnam War for The New York Times. While there, he gathered material for his book The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam during the Kennedy Era. In 1963, he received a George Polk Award for his reporting at the New York Times. At the age of 30, he won a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting on the war. He is interviewed in the 1968 documentary film on the Vietnam War entitled In the Year of the Pig.
Halberstam's most well known work is The Best and the Brightest. Halberstam focused on the paradox that those who shaped the U.S. war effort in Vietnam were some of the most intelligent, well-connected and self-confident men in America—"the best and the brightest"—and yet those same individuals were responsible for the failure of the United States Vientnam policy.
After publication of The Best and the Brightest in 1972, Halberstam plunged right into another book and in 1979 published The Powers That Be. The book provided profiles of men like William Paley of CBS, Henry Luce of Time magazine, Phil Graham of The Washington Post—and many others.
Later in his career, Halberstam turned to the subjects of sports, publishing The Breaks of the Game, an inside look at the Bill Walton and the 1978 Portland Trailblazers basketball team; an ambitious book on Michael Jordan in 1999 called Playing for Keeps; and on the pennant race battle between the Yankees and Red Sox called Summer of '49.
Halberstam published two books in the 1960s, three books in the 1970s, four books in the 1980s, and six books in the 1990s. He published four books in the 2000s and was on a pace to publish six or more books in that decade before his death.
David Halberstam was killed in a car crash on April 23, 2007 in Menlo Park, California.
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May 6, 2023
“The Americans who fought in Korea often felt cut off from their countrymen, their sacrifices unappreciated, their faraway war of little importance in the eyes of contemporaries. It had none of the glory and legitimacy of World War II, so recently concluded, in which the entire country had seemed to share in one great purpose and every serviceman was seen to be an extension of the country’s democratic spirit and the best of its values, and was so honored. Korea was a grinding, limited war. Nothing very good, the nation quickly decided, was going to come out of it. When servicemen returned from their tours, they found their neighbors generally not very interested in what they had seen and done. The subject of the war was quickly dispensed with in conversation. Events on the home front, promotions at the office, the purchase of a new house or a new car were more compelling subjects. In part this was because the news from Korea was almost always so grim. Even when the war went well, it did not go very well…This vast disconnect between those who fought and the people at home, the sense that no matter the bravery they showed, or the validity of their cause, the soldiers of Korea had been granted a kind of second-class status compared to that of the men who had fought in previous wars, led to a great deal of quiet – and enduring – bitterness…”
- David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War
The Korean War represents a black hole in the American historical memory. Part of this is its chronological placement, caught between the “good” Second World War and the “bad” Vietnam War. Part of it is its complexity, a strange new kind of “limited” war, fought without a formal declaration or any clearly stated goal, occurring in the tangled web of geopolitics spun by the Cold War.
The biggest reason that Korea is the “forgotten war,” however, is that we’ve let it slip away.
At the time – 1950-53 – one could be forgiven for failing to understand the causes of the conflict and the reasoning behind American intervention, and to accept the easy interpretation that it was unnecessary and quixotic, a rollercoaster war eventually fought to a stalemate, in which the soldiers were asked to “die for a tie.”
But now, decades later, we know so much more. We know that Kim Il Sung invaded North Korea with the backing of Joseph Stalin and Mao Tse-tung. We know what Mao ended up doing in China, and what Stalin did in the Soviet Union. We know how North Korea ended up, and how South Korea could have ended up the same.
We now know that the soldiers of South Korea, the United States, and the United Nations deserve much better than the treatment they received.
In The Coldest Winter, David Halberstam points out the numerous political miscalculations and military blunders that marked America’s role in the Korean conflict. But he also leaves no doubt that the ordinary soldiers who risked – and often lost – their lives for South Korean independence deserve far better than they have received.
***
Full disclosure: this is my second reading of The Coldest Winter. The first time around I was ambivalent. I recognized Halberstam’s talent and effort, but found two things profoundly wanting: structure and focus.
Now in the midst of studying the Cold War, I gave this a second chance. Typically, I don’t read books twice. Life is too short, there are too many titles, and I read too slow. But when it comes to the Korean War, there’s just not many options that come with Halberstam’s pedigree.
Upon second reading, I really enjoyed this. Nevertheless, the issues of structure and focus are still prevalent. Depending on your prior knowledge of the Korean War, this can make for a frustrating experience.
***
Let’s talk structure first.
The Coldest Winter is divided into eleven “parts,” each part consisting of several chapters, and all of this bookended by an introduction and an epilogue. So far, this is pretty standard.
The first part, however, starts in mid-October 1950, roughly four months after the Korean War had already commenced with North Korea’s premeditated invasion of the South. In other words, Halberstam – knowing that the Korean War is understudied – decides to plop the reader into the midst of the fight without any attempt at contextualization.
Narrative histories do this all the time, of course. A typical prologue will open with a dramatic scene, to get you to invest, and then loop back in time. Here, though, the first part lasts 35 pages, which is kind of a long time to not really know what’s going on.
Having read a bit more on Korea since my first go round, this didn’t bother me as much. Yet it still bothered me a bit.
Beyond this needlessly-confusing opening, Halberstam also tests the reader’s attention and memory by constant intercutting from the battlefields, to Washington, D.C., and to China. In and of itself, the switching of perspectives is a positive. It really demonstrates how the errors unfolded, with everyone from Mao to Douglas MacArthur misreading the situation. Still, Halberstam can spend so much time away from a particular point that you start to forget what happened when he returns to it.
***
The second issue I mentioned is “focus,” and its close cousin “expectations.”
The title of The Coldest Winter – with its allusion to the famously frosty backwards advance at the Chosin Reservoir – implies an emphasis on the course of battle, which surged up and down and down and up the Korean Peninsula.
In reality, Halberstam attempts to balance military history with geopolitics, and ends up tilting far more toward the politics. You definitely see this after part one, when Halberstam circles back from his in-media-res opener to give us the war’s deep background.
It’s fascinating stuff, and Halberstam does an excellent job of showing how the Korean War had its roots in the Chinese Civil War, the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek, and the American domestic politics that cast the Democratic Party as the ones responsible for “losing” China itself. Suddenly accused of being soft on Communists, President Harry Truman did not meditate long before deciding to intervene in Korea.
The thing is, this lengthy discussion – encompassing a wide cast of characters – means that some 250 pages go by until we finally return to the fighting that is introduced in the first couple pages.
Depending on what interests you – the soldiers or the politicians – this can be a selling point or a non-starter. When I first read this sixteen years ago – yikes! – I found this a struggle, since this was essentially the first Korean War book I ever picked up. With a better understanding of things – and having grown more interested in how wars start, than how they’re fought – I now recognize its brilliance.
***
If the military aspect is what you want, this might disappoint. The coverage is spotty. Sometimes, Halberstam will indulge in an insanely detailed tactical description. Other times, he will be super vague about major operations, such as Inchon, which is dealt with cursorily. Sometimes he will skip over major engagements; other times, he will dwell on them at length, as he does with a fine account of Chipyongni.
I should add that while Halberstam has many strengths, creating a vivid battle scene is not one of them. The descriptions of combat tend to be flat, matter-of-fact, and understated. This can be partly attributable to his interview subjects – and Halberstam researched the heck out of this – who generally come across as humble, grounded soldiers who often did extraordinary things, but don’t like to brag. That said, there are some stellar standalone accounts of Korean War battles – such as those by Martin Russ and Hampton Sides – and this does not rank among them.
It should also be noted that The Coldest Winter ends shortly after MacArthur’s well-deserved sacking. Thus, everything that happened from April 1951 to July 1953 is disposed of in the epilogue. Despite being a hefty 657 pages of text, this is far from comprehensive.
***
Leaving aside the curious lifelessness of the battles, Halberstam actually has a distinct prose style, which takes some getting used to. He uses that style – the long sentences, broken up into many clauses; the curious rhythms they convey – along with his ingrained incisiveness, to create some indelible portraits of the men involved. Indeed, I’d go so far as to say the character sketches alone make The Coldest Winter worthwhile.
Obviously, the powerful men at the top of the hierarchy get the most time on stage: the angry and rigid Kim Il Sung; the blindly driven Mao; an insufferably egotistical MacArthur, living in his own fantasy world in Tokyo; and a politically-sharp – but fatally wavering – President Truman, who recalled too late that he was the commander-in-chief.
Beyond these titans, we meet the racist MacArthur acolyte General Ned Almond; MacArthur’s criminally incompetent intelligence chief Charles Willoughby; and the hopelessly out-of-his-depth Walton Walker, who led the Eighth Army until a jeep accident freed him of his burdens.
While these men are far from inspiring, Halberstam introduces us to many damn good soldiers, including General Peng Dehuai, who led the underequipped Chinese counteroffensive; Colonel Paul Freeman, the hero of Chipyongni; and General Matthew Ridgeway, who took over from MacArthur and – according to Halberstam – should be counted among the greatest of America’s military leaders.
***
It is the ordinary soldiers that Halberstam cares about the most. Having talked with many of them in person, it is clear he intends to honor them. Late in the book, he writes what can almost be a paean:
This evolution, as Halberstam makes abundantly clear, occurred fast, but did not come cheap.
***
Though he is best known as a chronicler of Vietnam – in his classic The Best and the Brightest – Halberstam recognizes that Korea was not Vietnam.
This is an important point.
Every historian who’s ever penned a word about the Korean War feels compelled to remind you that it ended like it started, with Korea divided at the 38th Parallel. This is technically true; it is also glib and supercilious. Three days after the invasion, North Korea captured Seoul. The first American troops thrown into the fray were chewed up, giving their lives for time. By August, the North Koreans were at Pusan, on the southern tip of the Peninsula. If Truman had pulled out his troops, if he had decided to call it quits, that would’ve been the end of it.
So it’s not really the 38th Parallel that was preserved; it was the 38th Parallel regained. It was South Korea reconquered.
Seventy years later, it’s time to look at North Korea, and how it is today; to look at South Korea, and how it is today; and to reevaluate the Korean War, and what it accomplished.
- David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War
The Korean War represents a black hole in the American historical memory. Part of this is its chronological placement, caught between the “good” Second World War and the “bad” Vietnam War. Part of it is its complexity, a strange new kind of “limited” war, fought without a formal declaration or any clearly stated goal, occurring in the tangled web of geopolitics spun by the Cold War.
The biggest reason that Korea is the “forgotten war,” however, is that we’ve let it slip away.
At the time – 1950-53 – one could be forgiven for failing to understand the causes of the conflict and the reasoning behind American intervention, and to accept the easy interpretation that it was unnecessary and quixotic, a rollercoaster war eventually fought to a stalemate, in which the soldiers were asked to “die for a tie.”
But now, decades later, we know so much more. We know that Kim Il Sung invaded North Korea with the backing of Joseph Stalin and Mao Tse-tung. We know what Mao ended up doing in China, and what Stalin did in the Soviet Union. We know how North Korea ended up, and how South Korea could have ended up the same.
We now know that the soldiers of South Korea, the United States, and the United Nations deserve much better than the treatment they received.
In The Coldest Winter, David Halberstam points out the numerous political miscalculations and military blunders that marked America’s role in the Korean conflict. But he also leaves no doubt that the ordinary soldiers who risked – and often lost – their lives for South Korean independence deserve far better than they have received.
***
Full disclosure: this is my second reading of The Coldest Winter. The first time around I was ambivalent. I recognized Halberstam’s talent and effort, but found two things profoundly wanting: structure and focus.
Now in the midst of studying the Cold War, I gave this a second chance. Typically, I don’t read books twice. Life is too short, there are too many titles, and I read too slow. But when it comes to the Korean War, there’s just not many options that come with Halberstam’s pedigree.
Upon second reading, I really enjoyed this. Nevertheless, the issues of structure and focus are still prevalent. Depending on your prior knowledge of the Korean War, this can make for a frustrating experience.
***
Let’s talk structure first.
The Coldest Winter is divided into eleven “parts,” each part consisting of several chapters, and all of this bookended by an introduction and an epilogue. So far, this is pretty standard.
The first part, however, starts in mid-October 1950, roughly four months after the Korean War had already commenced with North Korea’s premeditated invasion of the South. In other words, Halberstam – knowing that the Korean War is understudied – decides to plop the reader into the midst of the fight without any attempt at contextualization.
Narrative histories do this all the time, of course. A typical prologue will open with a dramatic scene, to get you to invest, and then loop back in time. Here, though, the first part lasts 35 pages, which is kind of a long time to not really know what’s going on.
Having read a bit more on Korea since my first go round, this didn’t bother me as much. Yet it still bothered me a bit.
Beyond this needlessly-confusing opening, Halberstam also tests the reader’s attention and memory by constant intercutting from the battlefields, to Washington, D.C., and to China. In and of itself, the switching of perspectives is a positive. It really demonstrates how the errors unfolded, with everyone from Mao to Douglas MacArthur misreading the situation. Still, Halberstam can spend so much time away from a particular point that you start to forget what happened when he returns to it.
***
The second issue I mentioned is “focus,” and its close cousin “expectations.”
The title of The Coldest Winter – with its allusion to the famously frosty backwards advance at the Chosin Reservoir – implies an emphasis on the course of battle, which surged up and down and down and up the Korean Peninsula.
In reality, Halberstam attempts to balance military history with geopolitics, and ends up tilting far more toward the politics. You definitely see this after part one, when Halberstam circles back from his in-media-res opener to give us the war’s deep background.
It’s fascinating stuff, and Halberstam does an excellent job of showing how the Korean War had its roots in the Chinese Civil War, the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek, and the American domestic politics that cast the Democratic Party as the ones responsible for “losing” China itself. Suddenly accused of being soft on Communists, President Harry Truman did not meditate long before deciding to intervene in Korea.
The thing is, this lengthy discussion – encompassing a wide cast of characters – means that some 250 pages go by until we finally return to the fighting that is introduced in the first couple pages.
Depending on what interests you – the soldiers or the politicians – this can be a selling point or a non-starter. When I first read this sixteen years ago – yikes! – I found this a struggle, since this was essentially the first Korean War book I ever picked up. With a better understanding of things – and having grown more interested in how wars start, than how they’re fought – I now recognize its brilliance.
***
If the military aspect is what you want, this might disappoint. The coverage is spotty. Sometimes, Halberstam will indulge in an insanely detailed tactical description. Other times, he will be super vague about major operations, such as Inchon, which is dealt with cursorily. Sometimes he will skip over major engagements; other times, he will dwell on them at length, as he does with a fine account of Chipyongni.
I should add that while Halberstam has many strengths, creating a vivid battle scene is not one of them. The descriptions of combat tend to be flat, matter-of-fact, and understated. This can be partly attributable to his interview subjects – and Halberstam researched the heck out of this – who generally come across as humble, grounded soldiers who often did extraordinary things, but don’t like to brag. That said, there are some stellar standalone accounts of Korean War battles – such as those by Martin Russ and Hampton Sides – and this does not rank among them.
It should also be noted that The Coldest Winter ends shortly after MacArthur’s well-deserved sacking. Thus, everything that happened from April 1951 to July 1953 is disposed of in the epilogue. Despite being a hefty 657 pages of text, this is far from comprehensive.
***
Leaving aside the curious lifelessness of the battles, Halberstam actually has a distinct prose style, which takes some getting used to. He uses that style – the long sentences, broken up into many clauses; the curious rhythms they convey – along with his ingrained incisiveness, to create some indelible portraits of the men involved. Indeed, I’d go so far as to say the character sketches alone make The Coldest Winter worthwhile.
Obviously, the powerful men at the top of the hierarchy get the most time on stage: the angry and rigid Kim Il Sung; the blindly driven Mao; an insufferably egotistical MacArthur, living in his own fantasy world in Tokyo; and a politically-sharp – but fatally wavering – President Truman, who recalled too late that he was the commander-in-chief.
Beyond these titans, we meet the racist MacArthur acolyte General Ned Almond; MacArthur’s criminally incompetent intelligence chief Charles Willoughby; and the hopelessly out-of-his-depth Walton Walker, who led the Eighth Army until a jeep accident freed him of his burdens.
While these men are far from inspiring, Halberstam introduces us to many damn good soldiers, including General Peng Dehuai, who led the underequipped Chinese counteroffensive; Colonel Paul Freeman, the hero of Chipyongni; and General Matthew Ridgeway, who took over from MacArthur and – according to Halberstam – should be counted among the greatest of America’s military leaders.
***
It is the ordinary soldiers that Halberstam cares about the most. Having talked with many of them in person, it is clear he intends to honor them. Late in the book, he writes what can almost be a paean:
No one entirely understood the odd process – perhaps the most primal on earth – that turned ordinary, peace-loving, law-abiding civilians into very good fighting men; or one of its great sub-mysteries – how quickly it could take place. One day troops were completely raw and casually disrespectful of whatever training they had received. In basic training, the machine gun bullets that whistled overhead were designed not to hit you. Then they found themselves on a battlefield in places like the Naktong, in situations that were terrifying, where any mistake might be fatal for them and their friends, and they became tough, experienced soldiers, knowing the elemental rules of survival. Suddenly they could fight almost by pure instinct…
This evolution, as Halberstam makes abundantly clear, occurred fast, but did not come cheap.
***
Though he is best known as a chronicler of Vietnam – in his classic The Best and the Brightest – Halberstam recognizes that Korea was not Vietnam.
This is an important point.
Every historian who’s ever penned a word about the Korean War feels compelled to remind you that it ended like it started, with Korea divided at the 38th Parallel. This is technically true; it is also glib and supercilious. Three days after the invasion, North Korea captured Seoul. The first American troops thrown into the fray were chewed up, giving their lives for time. By August, the North Koreans were at Pusan, on the southern tip of the Peninsula. If Truman had pulled out his troops, if he had decided to call it quits, that would’ve been the end of it.
So it’s not really the 38th Parallel that was preserved; it was the 38th Parallel regained. It was South Korea reconquered.
Seventy years later, it’s time to look at North Korea, and how it is today; to look at South Korea, and how it is today; and to reevaluate the Korean War, and what it accomplished.
January 20, 2026
The cold of that winter became an enemy in its own right, along with the Chinese and North Korean troops that American and allied soldiers were fighting; and the testimony of U.S. servicemen bore out the brutal, punishing, unrelenting quality of the winter of 1950-51. A tanker from the 38th Tank Company, a veteran who survived the German World War II Ardennes winter offensive that is more generally known as the Battle of the Bulge, recalled how “he had thought the German cold was the worst cold in the world, but Korea eventually was worse than the Ardennes, lasting longer and dominating your life as the Ardennes cold never did. In the Ardennes you always believed that the cold would break in a day or so; in Korea you never did” (p. 400). Firsthand testimony of this kind gives David Halberstam’s book The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War much of its power.
Halberstam - a veteran journalist and Pulitzer Prize winner who gained much of his early reputation through his reporting on the Vietnam War - was a skilled interviewer, and through his diligent interviewing he sets forth the story of the Korean War clearly and effectively. An in medias res recounting of the battle of Unsan, the first engagement that indicated that Chinese troops were going to be entering the war on the North Korean side, is followed by a look back at the many miscalculations on all sides that resulted in the Korean War. Pre-eminent among those miscalculations was North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung’s erroneous belief that, if he invaded the South, hundreds of thousands of pro-Communist peasants would rise up to welcome his forces. They did not.
But the invading North Korean troops nonetheless enjoyed a great degree of initial success against unprepared Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) soldiers, until U.S. President Harry S Truman’s top advisers “all knew…that they were moving closer and closer to using ground troops on the Asian mainland, the last thing anyone, civilian or military, wanted to do” (p. 100).
A long chapter titled “The Politics of Two Continents” may cause some readers to wonder if they could please have some more Korean War history in their Korean War history book; but Halberstam’s recounting of political developments in several countries – the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and both North and South Korea – does provide a valuable sense of the Cold War political order taking shape, with “American mistrust of the Soviets matching Soviet mistrust of the Americans, which would in turn create a cycle of ever expanding mistrust and ever greater defense spending on both sides” (p. 201).
The strategic and tactical abilities of General Douglas MacArthur, that “brilliant, highly original, temperamental commander” (p. 300), showed in his planning for a landing behind enemy lines at the port of Incheon – a successful campaign that turned the tide of the war, and prompted the virtual collapse of the North Korean forces. But the temperamental, even mercurial, part of MacArthur also showed through when he insisted that U.S. and South Korean forces could safely cross north of the 38th parallel and pursue the North Koreans all the way to the Yalu River that marks the border between North Korea and China; Chinese forces, MacArthur insisted, would never cross the river and fight on the North Koreans’ behalf. When 2nd Lieutenant Sam Mace discovered evidence that a prisoner shot while trying to escape was Chinese rather than North Korean, he “told the intelligence people that he thought they had killed a Chinese soldier. But no one seemed very interested” (p. 401).
Halberstam is strongly critical of MacArthur, but praises other officers – for example, General Matthew B. Ridgway, who realized, as MacArthur could not, that the U.S.A. was involved in a new kind of war, one that could not be pursued to a World War II-style unconditional surrender. Accordingly, Ridgway decided that the war would be about “bleeding enemy forces, inflicting maximum casualties on them….What he now sought was an ongoing confrontation in which every battle resulted in staggering losses for the Chinese. At a certain point, even a country with a demographic pool like China’s had to feel the pain from the loss of good troops” (p. 501).
It was not MacArthur’s kind of war, to be sure – in the sort of insubordination to which MacArthur seemed prone, he publicly challenged his own president’s policies, declaring that “There is no substitute for victory” (p. 601) – but soon MacArthur was out, fired by an angry President Truman who once supposedly said of MacArthur that “I wanted to kick him into the North China Sea” (p. 600). Ridgway’s strategy was successfully pursued to a resolution that avoided a wider war with China and/or the Soviet Union, preserved South Korean independence, and ensured that a Communist invasion of a non-Communist nation did not work out as the aggressor had envisioned.
The book is well-illustrated with maps of the various phases of the Korean War. I was somewhat surprised by the lack of photographs, but that by itself does not take away from the quality of this fine work of history.
Sadly, this book was Halberstam’s last; the veteran journalist died in an auto accident in California in 2007, just after turning this book in, and while at work on another. The Coldest Winter provides a fine coda to a brilliant career.
I originally read The Coldest Winter while visiting with family in Pyeongtaek, South Korea. It was summertime, and therefore I was not experiencing the rigors of a Korean winter. Yet I had the opportunity to visit a number of sites associated with the Korean War - including the Joint Security Area (J.S.A.) where soldiers of the North Korean dictatorship still face off against soldiers of South Korea and the United States of America, in a singularly tense armistice zone.
Throughout my time in South Korea, I reflected on the lovely country and wonderful people that I saw around me, and I thought with gratitude of the American soldiers who gave their lives to ensure that these good and kind people would not be consigned to the bizarre and cruel oppression of the North Korean regime. Halberstam’s The Coldest Winter may do much to ensure that America’s “forgotten war” will henceforth be better remembered.
Halberstam - a veteran journalist and Pulitzer Prize winner who gained much of his early reputation through his reporting on the Vietnam War - was a skilled interviewer, and through his diligent interviewing he sets forth the story of the Korean War clearly and effectively. An in medias res recounting of the battle of Unsan, the first engagement that indicated that Chinese troops were going to be entering the war on the North Korean side, is followed by a look back at the many miscalculations on all sides that resulted in the Korean War. Pre-eminent among those miscalculations was North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung’s erroneous belief that, if he invaded the South, hundreds of thousands of pro-Communist peasants would rise up to welcome his forces. They did not.
But the invading North Korean troops nonetheless enjoyed a great degree of initial success against unprepared Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) soldiers, until U.S. President Harry S Truman’s top advisers “all knew…that they were moving closer and closer to using ground troops on the Asian mainland, the last thing anyone, civilian or military, wanted to do” (p. 100).
A long chapter titled “The Politics of Two Continents” may cause some readers to wonder if they could please have some more Korean War history in their Korean War history book; but Halberstam’s recounting of political developments in several countries – the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and both North and South Korea – does provide a valuable sense of the Cold War political order taking shape, with “American mistrust of the Soviets matching Soviet mistrust of the Americans, which would in turn create a cycle of ever expanding mistrust and ever greater defense spending on both sides” (p. 201).
The strategic and tactical abilities of General Douglas MacArthur, that “brilliant, highly original, temperamental commander” (p. 300), showed in his planning for a landing behind enemy lines at the port of Incheon – a successful campaign that turned the tide of the war, and prompted the virtual collapse of the North Korean forces. But the temperamental, even mercurial, part of MacArthur also showed through when he insisted that U.S. and South Korean forces could safely cross north of the 38th parallel and pursue the North Koreans all the way to the Yalu River that marks the border between North Korea and China; Chinese forces, MacArthur insisted, would never cross the river and fight on the North Koreans’ behalf. When 2nd Lieutenant Sam Mace discovered evidence that a prisoner shot while trying to escape was Chinese rather than North Korean, he “told the intelligence people that he thought they had killed a Chinese soldier. But no one seemed very interested” (p. 401).
Halberstam is strongly critical of MacArthur, but praises other officers – for example, General Matthew B. Ridgway, who realized, as MacArthur could not, that the U.S.A. was involved in a new kind of war, one that could not be pursued to a World War II-style unconditional surrender. Accordingly, Ridgway decided that the war would be about “bleeding enemy forces, inflicting maximum casualties on them….What he now sought was an ongoing confrontation in which every battle resulted in staggering losses for the Chinese. At a certain point, even a country with a demographic pool like China’s had to feel the pain from the loss of good troops” (p. 501).
It was not MacArthur’s kind of war, to be sure – in the sort of insubordination to which MacArthur seemed prone, he publicly challenged his own president’s policies, declaring that “There is no substitute for victory” (p. 601) – but soon MacArthur was out, fired by an angry President Truman who once supposedly said of MacArthur that “I wanted to kick him into the North China Sea” (p. 600). Ridgway’s strategy was successfully pursued to a resolution that avoided a wider war with China and/or the Soviet Union, preserved South Korean independence, and ensured that a Communist invasion of a non-Communist nation did not work out as the aggressor had envisioned.
The book is well-illustrated with maps of the various phases of the Korean War. I was somewhat surprised by the lack of photographs, but that by itself does not take away from the quality of this fine work of history.
Sadly, this book was Halberstam’s last; the veteran journalist died in an auto accident in California in 2007, just after turning this book in, and while at work on another. The Coldest Winter provides a fine coda to a brilliant career.
I originally read The Coldest Winter while visiting with family in Pyeongtaek, South Korea. It was summertime, and therefore I was not experiencing the rigors of a Korean winter. Yet I had the opportunity to visit a number of sites associated with the Korean War - including the Joint Security Area (J.S.A.) where soldiers of the North Korean dictatorship still face off against soldiers of South Korea and the United States of America, in a singularly tense armistice zone.
Throughout my time in South Korea, I reflected on the lovely country and wonderful people that I saw around me, and I thought with gratitude of the American soldiers who gave their lives to ensure that these good and kind people would not be consigned to the bizarre and cruel oppression of the North Korean regime. Halberstam’s The Coldest Winter may do much to ensure that America’s “forgotten war” will henceforth be better remembered.
June 12, 2017
David Halberstam's The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War
Should you read any history of the Korean War it should be The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War by David Halberstam. It was Halberstam's last book. Shortly after publication, Halbertsam was killed in an automobile accident April 23, 2007. He was on his way to interview a subject for his next book.
Lest the reader pick up this volume thinking it is a history of the compete Korean War, it is not. It is a masterful treatment of the background of the War and its principal players. Here are careful portraits of the division of the Korean peninsula into North and South following the end of World War II, the respective leaders, Kim Il Sung, indoctrinated by the Soviets during World War II, and Synghman Rhee, considered friendly to the United States. Throw in detailed sketches of Dean Acheson and Averell Harriman, original Cold War warriors for the United States, and Harry Truman in his second term as President, the man under estimated by his political opponents. Most of all, General Douglas McArthur seems to tower over them all, the Supreme Commander in World War II's Pacific Theater, and America's ruler of Occupied Japan from his headquarters in the Dai Ichi.
But Korea was long ignored by the United States. McArthur considered the country to be the problem of the State Department, not an issue of his concern. He was wrong. As time passed he would realize how wrong he was, but he would not accept responsibility for his errors. Rather he would attack the Truman Administration for not having fulfilled his request for more support and permission to widen the war that began in June, 1950, with an attack by North Korean forces across the Thirty-Eighth Parallel that caught the South Korean government and United States by surprise.
North Korean forcess threatened to push American troops off the Korean Peninsula at Pusan. It was a war of strategic mistakes, divided commands, largely the responsibility of Ned Almond, a McArthur man. Almond primarily attempted to wage war by surveying maps rather than studying the actual terrain which favored North Korean forces. McArthur waged war from his headquarters in Japan. He never spent an entire day in Korea while in command. American casualties were horrific.
An American defeat was avoided by McArthur's last hurrah. An amphibious landing at Inchon, behind the North Korean forces who had cornered American troops far south in the area of Pusan. The North Korean Assault was halted. American commands pushed the North Koreans back beyond the Thirty-Eighth Parallel. McArthur planned an American drive all the way to the Yalu River on the Manchurian Border.
McArthur promised the war would be over by Christmas and American boys would be coming home. In Washington the Administration was worried about intervention by Mao's Communist Chinese. Intelligence reports indicated massive Chinese Divisions forming along the Yalu River.
But McArthur only believed in truth as he decided it should be. The Chinese would not intervene.
American forces continued to race North. McArthur's head of Intelligence, Charles Willoughby, suppressed information of the Chinese presence. Nor was Washington any the wiser of the presence of Chinese forces. If there is a villain of the Korean War, Willoughby is one. A colleague, knowing of Willoughby's deception said Willoughby should be in jail.
On October 25 and 26, 1950, Chinese forces actively intervened, carving up American Units. Many American troops fought in summer uniforms. They were equipped with bazookas incapable of piercing the armor of Soviet T-34 tanks. The treads of American Sherman tanks froze to the ground. Soldier's carbines and M-1 rifles locked in the cold. Willoughby continued to suppress information about Chinese intervention. Division Commanders on the ground insisted they knew a Chinese when they saw one. They were ignored.
The secret presence of Chinese troops could not be kept. Not by Willoughby or McArthur. No, the troops would not be home for Christmas. McArthur argued that a widened war was absolutely essential, proposing an invasion of China and the use of atomic weapons if necessary.
McArthur's political thrusts against the Truman Administration that his hands were tied by Democrats who wanted to fight a war of appeasement ultimately led to his recall by Truman. McArthur never seemed to grasp that America was no longer alone in the nuclear age. The Soviets had successfully exploded their first atomic device in 1949.
Some military histories can be remarkably dry. David Halberstam never wrote anything that was a turgid stream of facts. This is an exceptional book filled with the stories of men, heroes and cowards both. And as with any good history, it has its lessons. It leads us to the frightening conclusion that Kim Jong-Un is the grandson of the man who launched the surprise attack on South Korea in June, 1950. There will be no easy answers to today's problems on the Korean Peninsula.
Highly recommended.
Should you read any history of the Korean War it should be The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War by David Halberstam. It was Halberstam's last book. Shortly after publication, Halbertsam was killed in an automobile accident April 23, 2007. He was on his way to interview a subject for his next book.
Lest the reader pick up this volume thinking it is a history of the compete Korean War, it is not. It is a masterful treatment of the background of the War and its principal players. Here are careful portraits of the division of the Korean peninsula into North and South following the end of World War II, the respective leaders, Kim Il Sung, indoctrinated by the Soviets during World War II, and Synghman Rhee, considered friendly to the United States. Throw in detailed sketches of Dean Acheson and Averell Harriman, original Cold War warriors for the United States, and Harry Truman in his second term as President, the man under estimated by his political opponents. Most of all, General Douglas McArthur seems to tower over them all, the Supreme Commander in World War II's Pacific Theater, and America's ruler of Occupied Japan from his headquarters in the Dai Ichi.
But Korea was long ignored by the United States. McArthur considered the country to be the problem of the State Department, not an issue of his concern. He was wrong. As time passed he would realize how wrong he was, but he would not accept responsibility for his errors. Rather he would attack the Truman Administration for not having fulfilled his request for more support and permission to widen the war that began in June, 1950, with an attack by North Korean forces across the Thirty-Eighth Parallel that caught the South Korean government and United States by surprise.
North Korean forcess threatened to push American troops off the Korean Peninsula at Pusan. It was a war of strategic mistakes, divided commands, largely the responsibility of Ned Almond, a McArthur man. Almond primarily attempted to wage war by surveying maps rather than studying the actual terrain which favored North Korean forces. McArthur waged war from his headquarters in Japan. He never spent an entire day in Korea while in command. American casualties were horrific.
An American defeat was avoided by McArthur's last hurrah. An amphibious landing at Inchon, behind the North Korean forces who had cornered American troops far south in the area of Pusan. The North Korean Assault was halted. American commands pushed the North Koreans back beyond the Thirty-Eighth Parallel. McArthur planned an American drive all the way to the Yalu River on the Manchurian Border.
McArthur promised the war would be over by Christmas and American boys would be coming home. In Washington the Administration was worried about intervention by Mao's Communist Chinese. Intelligence reports indicated massive Chinese Divisions forming along the Yalu River.
But McArthur only believed in truth as he decided it should be. The Chinese would not intervene.
American forces continued to race North. McArthur's head of Intelligence, Charles Willoughby, suppressed information of the Chinese presence. Nor was Washington any the wiser of the presence of Chinese forces. If there is a villain of the Korean War, Willoughby is one. A colleague, knowing of Willoughby's deception said Willoughby should be in jail.
On October 25 and 26, 1950, Chinese forces actively intervened, carving up American Units. Many American troops fought in summer uniforms. They were equipped with bazookas incapable of piercing the armor of Soviet T-34 tanks. The treads of American Sherman tanks froze to the ground. Soldier's carbines and M-1 rifles locked in the cold. Willoughby continued to suppress information about Chinese intervention. Division Commanders on the ground insisted they knew a Chinese when they saw one. They were ignored.
The secret presence of Chinese troops could not be kept. Not by Willoughby or McArthur. No, the troops would not be home for Christmas. McArthur argued that a widened war was absolutely essential, proposing an invasion of China and the use of atomic weapons if necessary.
McArthur's political thrusts against the Truman Administration that his hands were tied by Democrats who wanted to fight a war of appeasement ultimately led to his recall by Truman. McArthur never seemed to grasp that America was no longer alone in the nuclear age. The Soviets had successfully exploded their first atomic device in 1949.
Some military histories can be remarkably dry. David Halberstam never wrote anything that was a turgid stream of facts. This is an exceptional book filled with the stories of men, heroes and cowards both. And as with any good history, it has its lessons. It leads us to the frightening conclusion that Kim Jong-Un is the grandson of the man who launched the surprise attack on South Korea in June, 1950. There will be no easy answers to today's problems on the Korean Peninsula.
Highly recommended.
August 4, 2020
I love Halberstam's books and this is no exception. I did not know enough about the Korean War and was engrossed by the futility of that conflict. It is a riveting book which provides colorful and insightful portraits of the major political and military players in the "forgotten war" and also contains anecdotes and memories of the "common" soldiers who endured that hell on earth called the Korean War. This book was a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize in 2007 and a fitting testament to Mr. Halberstam's talent. Unfortunately, he was killed in a car accident that same year.
December 18, 2007
Any book that fills the void of our knowledge concerning the Korean War is a welcome addition to any library. There are too few available and on that basis I would recommend this one. It is well written, easy to read and for the general public disgorges a wealth of information, although to some critics, nothing new and therefore disappointing.
Essentially, Halberstam launches a scathing and deserved attack on MacArthur and Gen. Ned Almond. From the very first sentence of Part 1, he blames MacArthur for the War, continues his attack non-stop throughout the remainder of the book and does it with great fervor. And yet, shouldering these faults, MacArthur’s brilliant landing at Inchon ranks on a par with Hannibal, Scipio Africanus, Genghis Khan, Von Manstein, Jackson, Allenby and others. ……and yes he should have bypassed Seoul.
The author lost his focus too, I thought, when he rambled on and on with all the biographical material about MacArthur and his family. For that I could have read a different book.
In only fleeting glimpses does he ascribe any fault to Truman and then leaves these comments exposed with no substantive development. This is where I was most discouraged as I was expecting a more objective portrayal of all participants. Where Clay Blair in “The Forgotten War” levels criticism at Truman and MacArthur, Halberstam simply cannot bring himself to realistically criticize Truman.
The United States went to war totally unprepared and the first hint of responsibility for the President comes on page 138 where Halberstam, in a paragraph, finally acknowledges that Truman must assume full responsibility. Truman harbored a visceral distrust and dislike of men in uniform and worked diligently to slash manpower and materiel levels after WWII.
He was afraid to call the War, a war. “No, we are not at war” “This is a police action” He was afraid of MacArthur. Early in his presidency, he twice ordered MacArthur to report to him and MacArthur refused by claiming he was too busy. Truman did nothing. When Truman was advised by John Foster Dulles, a republican, to get rid of MacArthur, Halberstam informs us that “He (Truman) feared replacing MacArthur for political reasons” This was gross insubordination on MacArthur’s part; he should have been relieved on the spot. And gross negligence on Truman’s part, buck passing at its finest. More than twenty pages are devoted near the end of the book to justify relieving MacArthur of his command. After 6 years replete with instances of insubordination, no justification was necessary.
Here is a revelation Halberstam missed. Page 786 of “Truman” (hardcover) by David McCullough. Shortly after the war started and US forces suffering heavy loses McCullough writes: “He, (Truman), was also fed up with the way reporters spilled ink from their fountain pens on the rug in his office” What a tragic juxtaposition!! While American soldiers are spilling their blood and guts on the soil of the Korean frontier, Truman is worried about ink spilling on his carpet!!!
MacArthur was an egotistical desk general and it is unconscionable that as Commander he never spent a single night on the Korean peninsula; he should have been relieved long before he actually was. Regrettably, he was no Eisenhower.
Truman was little more than a provincial police chief. Regrettably, he was no Roosevelt.
How did our Nation survive these two during this crises? It survived in spite of them by the actions of valiant small unit commanders and the brave and courageous men that served under them but at a huge, huge cost!
From a Former Officer who served with the 2nd Infantry in Korea but not during the war I render a salute to Korean War Veterans everywhere:
“All gave some
Some gave all”
Essentially, Halberstam launches a scathing and deserved attack on MacArthur and Gen. Ned Almond. From the very first sentence of Part 1, he blames MacArthur for the War, continues his attack non-stop throughout the remainder of the book and does it with great fervor. And yet, shouldering these faults, MacArthur’s brilliant landing at Inchon ranks on a par with Hannibal, Scipio Africanus, Genghis Khan, Von Manstein, Jackson, Allenby and others. ……and yes he should have bypassed Seoul.
The author lost his focus too, I thought, when he rambled on and on with all the biographical material about MacArthur and his family. For that I could have read a different book.
In only fleeting glimpses does he ascribe any fault to Truman and then leaves these comments exposed with no substantive development. This is where I was most discouraged as I was expecting a more objective portrayal of all participants. Where Clay Blair in “The Forgotten War” levels criticism at Truman and MacArthur, Halberstam simply cannot bring himself to realistically criticize Truman.
The United States went to war totally unprepared and the first hint of responsibility for the President comes on page 138 where Halberstam, in a paragraph, finally acknowledges that Truman must assume full responsibility. Truman harbored a visceral distrust and dislike of men in uniform and worked diligently to slash manpower and materiel levels after WWII.
He was afraid to call the War, a war. “No, we are not at war” “This is a police action” He was afraid of MacArthur. Early in his presidency, he twice ordered MacArthur to report to him and MacArthur refused by claiming he was too busy. Truman did nothing. When Truman was advised by John Foster Dulles, a republican, to get rid of MacArthur, Halberstam informs us that “He (Truman) feared replacing MacArthur for political reasons” This was gross insubordination on MacArthur’s part; he should have been relieved on the spot. And gross negligence on Truman’s part, buck passing at its finest. More than twenty pages are devoted near the end of the book to justify relieving MacArthur of his command. After 6 years replete with instances of insubordination, no justification was necessary.
Here is a revelation Halberstam missed. Page 786 of “Truman” (hardcover) by David McCullough. Shortly after the war started and US forces suffering heavy loses McCullough writes: “He, (Truman), was also fed up with the way reporters spilled ink from their fountain pens on the rug in his office” What a tragic juxtaposition!! While American soldiers are spilling their blood and guts on the soil of the Korean frontier, Truman is worried about ink spilling on his carpet!!!
MacArthur was an egotistical desk general and it is unconscionable that as Commander he never spent a single night on the Korean peninsula; he should have been relieved long before he actually was. Regrettably, he was no Eisenhower.
Truman was little more than a provincial police chief. Regrettably, he was no Roosevelt.
How did our Nation survive these two during this crises? It survived in spite of them by the actions of valiant small unit commanders and the brave and courageous men that served under them but at a huge, huge cost!
From a Former Officer who served with the 2nd Infantry in Korea but not during the war I render a salute to Korean War Veterans everywhere:
“All gave some
Some gave all”
July 30, 2012
This is a must read. I liked it so much that I bought it twice. The 2nd time I purchased Coldest Winter was after I left my first copy on a plane on a flight returning from Brazil. Watch out as it is liable to make you angry, however. Why? First, how could the US give so much money and support to China’s Chiang Ki Shek and get so little in return when it was obvious he was an incompetent thief? The end result was to supply Red China with all the equipment that Chang’s forces surrendered which were used against the US in Korea. Second, how can a US statesman be so careless with his public comments to make the communists believe that the US would not defend South Korea in the first place? Third, how can the US go into the Korean War so unprepared? After his success at Inchon, how could MacArthur (who never spent a single night in Korea) be so arrogant to ignore all the intelligence that indicated that the Chinese would enter the war? MacArthur insisted all units continue on the offensive and ignore the obvious. The book teaches about heroes such as Marine general O.P. Smith who saved the first Marine Division and maybe all of X Corp from total destruction in the Chosin Reservoir. The 1st Mar Div was spared because Smith disobeyed orders from MacArthur’s incompetent sycophant Edward Almond and concentrated his forces. Meanwhile, the Army units were sacrificed. Finally, MacArthur was sacked in favor of Ridgeway. If you are Chinese, you will be angry that your man-God Mao was so eager to sacrifice 1.5 MM casualties to stop the Americans in Korea. Meanwhile, Mao kept busy by sleeping with the teenage girl of his choice at every village he visited. Furthermore, Halberstam explains that the Democrats, who had a lock on the presidency for several years finally lost it due to political fallout from losing China to communism and the Korean War. He draws parallels to the US involvement in Vietnam which was politically motivated so that the Democrats could counter republican rhetoric by demonstrating that they were doing something to combat communism in Asia.
Years later, the reader can decide for themselves if the 33,000 US casualties in Korea were worth it. Halberstam points out the stark contrast between the bustling economy in South Korean and the isolated North Korea, barely able to feed itself and the failure of communism in the Soviet Union and China. The book is a testament to why parents should be leery of allowing their children to volunteer in the US armed forces so they can be used as the expendable pawns that they are while politicians seek reelection.
Years later, the reader can decide for themselves if the 33,000 US casualties in Korea were worth it. Halberstam points out the stark contrast between the bustling economy in South Korean and the isolated North Korea, barely able to feed itself and the failure of communism in the Soviet Union and China. The book is a testament to why parents should be leery of allowing their children to volunteer in the US armed forces so they can be used as the expendable pawns that they are while politicians seek reelection.
March 26, 2016
In this epic piece, David Halberstam offers a thorough analysis of the Korean War and its effects on America. As is laid out in the introduction, there is little written or produced about the conflict, overshadowed by both the Second World War and Vietnam, bookends of opposing sentiment on America's military capabilities. However, as Halberstam elucidates, this was more than military incursion across the 38th Parallel. It stood to represent much in an era of new ideas, emerging politics, and waning sentiments about the Asian region and its vast land-grab. Halberstam argues the importance of the Korean War through three separate but highly intertwined theatres: the political actors involved on both sides of the Pacific, the inherent political and ideological clashes taking place, and the military battles themselves. Working in concert, they significantly increase the importance of the War, especially to America, and proved a turning point in history, even if it has not been previously explored or argued with such vigour. Halberstam makes his case with strong examples, thorough analysis, and poignant backstories, all to sway the reader to give the Korean War a second examination. This better understanding supports that while temperatures on the open lands plummeted, the importance of this conflict rose exponentially behind the scenes. A fascinating look into a forgotten period that will leave readers in awe.
The 'stage' was set with a number of political actors playing essential roles on either side of the Pacific. The War was not simply about the leaders of North and South Korea, but those who influenced both sides throughout the conflict. Halberstam uses intermittent chapters of the tome to discuss the various backstories and biographies of the key players, offering the reader a more comprehensive look at the larger picture. By doing so, one need not feel parachuted into this war without the necessary context. The highlighted actors come from all walks of life: world leaders, politicians, cabinet officials, military leaders, and soldiers. While the importance of some actors surpasses others, Halberstam does not place anyone on a particular pedestal. Aside from simply denoting the actors and offering insight, Halberstam offers interesting interactions that some faced with one another, which provides telling stories themselves. Most notably, the analysis of the Stalin-Kim Il Sung relationship strengthened the imagery surrounding some of the core reasons for the North's insurgence into the South in June, 1950. One cannot also leave a reading of this book without seeing clashes between Truman and General Douglas MacArthur, which led to the latter's dismissal. The pompous approach taken, between Commander-in-Chief and military mastermind, exemplifies the power this conflict had to create kingmakers and ruin illustrious careers. Perhaps one of the more surprising conflict-filled interactions within key chapters of this piece comes from the Mao-Stalin clashes, showing the different takes on the communist approach, where the latter sought to criticise his ally as a 'peasant-centric leader with little interest in the worker'. With wonderful tales and sentimental pieces to illustrate their states of mind, Halberstam allows the reader to relate to the key players, which provides a better foundation for sentiments going into the War and decisions made during the conflict. Halberstam effectively argues that there were many actors, each playing their specific role, that led to a build-up of tensions before the conflict and whose passions propelled Korea into a war, sustaining it for a significant period of time.
While the Iron Curtain fell during the Cold War, its presence at the centre of the Korean War helps explain the lead-up to key events in the region. The War was the first formal clash between the two Cold War superpowers, pitting Soviet Communism against America's Capitalism. However, as Halberstam argues, there was a rift within the Communist family between Stalin and China's Mao, which supports that this was less a direct Cold War fight, but one between the ideological variants, especially since the Soviets did not actively participate in the conflict by sending troops. Korea was less about the country falling to the communist forces than a delayed chance for America to flex its muscle and offer a stance against Mao's Communist take-over in the Chinese Civil War. Halberstam presents a perspective that Truman sought a chance to voice, both to Congress and the world that America did have an issue with Mao's removal of Chiang Kai-shek. This ideological war grew in importance both on the Cold War level, as well as within the United States, where Truman faced crippling attacks for letting China fall to the Communists. Halberstam shows how Mao's victory and America's failure to stop it fuelled the communist witch hunt in Washington and created great animosity within Republican circles as they sought to rally around a Democratic Party that had been leading the country since 1932. Korea was Truman's (and America's) chance to turn the tables on communism in the region, whose stranglehold was turning the map stronger shades of pink with each passing day. To call the Korean War the first and most important ideological clash in the early years of the Cold War era would not be an exaggeration, as victory would surely solidify a stance in this diametrically opposed World Order.
Bloodshed and highly-choreographed movements on the battlefield played into success and failure for both sides in the conflict. At the heart of the conflict, there were those in the trenches (or open fields) who lost their lives fighting for the cause. Halberstam offers detailed narratives about the battles, the military manoeuvres, and the struggle to justify fighting in the desolate areas of Korea. Weary from intense fighting both in Europe and the Pacific, many in the US military could not understand their role or presence in the region so soon after victory. Troop size was down, morale was tepid, and organisation was top-heavy for the conflict. Korea proved not only to be a misunderstood war, but also one with troops who lacked the vigour to fight. While lines were drawn and ideological stances firm, there was little justification offered troops or the general public about the need to be there. Even with a weak UN Security Council Resolution, this did not buoy the spirits of the men sent to the region. Add to that, there was a vacuum in the power structure at the top as well, with many generals who had made names for themselves in the Second World War fighting for positions of importance, be it on the ground or in the ivory tower. Halberstam shows how the likes of MacArthur, Ridegway, and even former greats Marshall and Eisenhower (though fully divorced from the military by now) all had strong stances from a military point of view about the power structure of the military presence in the region. Citing that there were thousands pushing paper in Tokyo while hundreds of men fought to their bloody end along the frozen tundra helps to support that even the US military could not bring itself to staff the war effectively. With a massive Chinese Army holding firm, there did not seem any quick solution to the conflict, but it was resilience and determination that led to a neutralizing of the conflict, where both sides agreed to leave, their blood staining all parts of Korea. Halberstam pulls no punches and does not try to dress up these skirmishes, choosing instead to let the reader act as jury about how those with numerous stars on their shoulders handled directing men against those whose greatest interest was death for country and region. The struggle to justify the war to the American people turned it into 'page ten news' in an era before television news reporting. Though scattered and poorly organised from the top down, the Korean War was a military conflict at its foundation.
As with any significant tome that tackles a collection of historical events, its length is significant and content not always easily digested. Any reader who ventures into this book must do so at their own risk. The content is not superfluous, nor is the discussion found therein. This is surely one of the benefits, as Halberstam offers a sobering look into a conflict that changed so much about America, China, Asia, and the Cold War. While many may look to M*A*S*H as their dose of Korean reality, Halberstam seeks an academic exploration, complete with well-weighted arguments on both sides, as well as an explanation that many history books do not examine. Even as the nuances of battle formations and strategy come into play, the language is such that any reader can process the text with ease, which makes the book all the more inviting. I would surely recommend this to anyone with a passion for history, a curiosity for American politics, and those who enjoy learning a great deal. Powerfully written and sure to be a great addition to bookshelves to offset the supersaturation of analyses from the Second World War and Vietnam.
Kudos, Mr. Halberstam for this extremely powerful piece. I cannot thank you enough for the education you have provided with this sobering tome.
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The 'stage' was set with a number of political actors playing essential roles on either side of the Pacific. The War was not simply about the leaders of North and South Korea, but those who influenced both sides throughout the conflict. Halberstam uses intermittent chapters of the tome to discuss the various backstories and biographies of the key players, offering the reader a more comprehensive look at the larger picture. By doing so, one need not feel parachuted into this war without the necessary context. The highlighted actors come from all walks of life: world leaders, politicians, cabinet officials, military leaders, and soldiers. While the importance of some actors surpasses others, Halberstam does not place anyone on a particular pedestal. Aside from simply denoting the actors and offering insight, Halberstam offers interesting interactions that some faced with one another, which provides telling stories themselves. Most notably, the analysis of the Stalin-Kim Il Sung relationship strengthened the imagery surrounding some of the core reasons for the North's insurgence into the South in June, 1950. One cannot also leave a reading of this book without seeing clashes between Truman and General Douglas MacArthur, which led to the latter's dismissal. The pompous approach taken, between Commander-in-Chief and military mastermind, exemplifies the power this conflict had to create kingmakers and ruin illustrious careers. Perhaps one of the more surprising conflict-filled interactions within key chapters of this piece comes from the Mao-Stalin clashes, showing the different takes on the communist approach, where the latter sought to criticise his ally as a 'peasant-centric leader with little interest in the worker'. With wonderful tales and sentimental pieces to illustrate their states of mind, Halberstam allows the reader to relate to the key players, which provides a better foundation for sentiments going into the War and decisions made during the conflict. Halberstam effectively argues that there were many actors, each playing their specific role, that led to a build-up of tensions before the conflict and whose passions propelled Korea into a war, sustaining it for a significant period of time.
While the Iron Curtain fell during the Cold War, its presence at the centre of the Korean War helps explain the lead-up to key events in the region. The War was the first formal clash between the two Cold War superpowers, pitting Soviet Communism against America's Capitalism. However, as Halberstam argues, there was a rift within the Communist family between Stalin and China's Mao, which supports that this was less a direct Cold War fight, but one between the ideological variants, especially since the Soviets did not actively participate in the conflict by sending troops. Korea was less about the country falling to the communist forces than a delayed chance for America to flex its muscle and offer a stance against Mao's Communist take-over in the Chinese Civil War. Halberstam presents a perspective that Truman sought a chance to voice, both to Congress and the world that America did have an issue with Mao's removal of Chiang Kai-shek. This ideological war grew in importance both on the Cold War level, as well as within the United States, where Truman faced crippling attacks for letting China fall to the Communists. Halberstam shows how Mao's victory and America's failure to stop it fuelled the communist witch hunt in Washington and created great animosity within Republican circles as they sought to rally around a Democratic Party that had been leading the country since 1932. Korea was Truman's (and America's) chance to turn the tables on communism in the region, whose stranglehold was turning the map stronger shades of pink with each passing day. To call the Korean War the first and most important ideological clash in the early years of the Cold War era would not be an exaggeration, as victory would surely solidify a stance in this diametrically opposed World Order.
Bloodshed and highly-choreographed movements on the battlefield played into success and failure for both sides in the conflict. At the heart of the conflict, there were those in the trenches (or open fields) who lost their lives fighting for the cause. Halberstam offers detailed narratives about the battles, the military manoeuvres, and the struggle to justify fighting in the desolate areas of Korea. Weary from intense fighting both in Europe and the Pacific, many in the US military could not understand their role or presence in the region so soon after victory. Troop size was down, morale was tepid, and organisation was top-heavy for the conflict. Korea proved not only to be a misunderstood war, but also one with troops who lacked the vigour to fight. While lines were drawn and ideological stances firm, there was little justification offered troops or the general public about the need to be there. Even with a weak UN Security Council Resolution, this did not buoy the spirits of the men sent to the region. Add to that, there was a vacuum in the power structure at the top as well, with many generals who had made names for themselves in the Second World War fighting for positions of importance, be it on the ground or in the ivory tower. Halberstam shows how the likes of MacArthur, Ridegway, and even former greats Marshall and Eisenhower (though fully divorced from the military by now) all had strong stances from a military point of view about the power structure of the military presence in the region. Citing that there were thousands pushing paper in Tokyo while hundreds of men fought to their bloody end along the frozen tundra helps to support that even the US military could not bring itself to staff the war effectively. With a massive Chinese Army holding firm, there did not seem any quick solution to the conflict, but it was resilience and determination that led to a neutralizing of the conflict, where both sides agreed to leave, their blood staining all parts of Korea. Halberstam pulls no punches and does not try to dress up these skirmishes, choosing instead to let the reader act as jury about how those with numerous stars on their shoulders handled directing men against those whose greatest interest was death for country and region. The struggle to justify the war to the American people turned it into 'page ten news' in an era before television news reporting. Though scattered and poorly organised from the top down, the Korean War was a military conflict at its foundation.
As with any significant tome that tackles a collection of historical events, its length is significant and content not always easily digested. Any reader who ventures into this book must do so at their own risk. The content is not superfluous, nor is the discussion found therein. This is surely one of the benefits, as Halberstam offers a sobering look into a conflict that changed so much about America, China, Asia, and the Cold War. While many may look to M*A*S*H as their dose of Korean reality, Halberstam seeks an academic exploration, complete with well-weighted arguments on both sides, as well as an explanation that many history books do not examine. Even as the nuances of battle formations and strategy come into play, the language is such that any reader can process the text with ease, which makes the book all the more inviting. I would surely recommend this to anyone with a passion for history, a curiosity for American politics, and those who enjoy learning a great deal. Powerfully written and sure to be a great addition to bookshelves to offset the supersaturation of analyses from the Second World War and Vietnam.
Kudos, Mr. Halberstam for this extremely powerful piece. I cannot thank you enough for the education you have provided with this sobering tome.
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July 31, 2012
The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War gets a 4 Star rating in the end. I so wanted it to be 5 Stars but could not get there. Halberstam is one of my most admired authors but I had some problems with this book. This book covers the lead up to the start of the Korean War, the geopolitical arena and the US domestic situation impacting the war. This book ends with the firing of MacArthur with a short postscript on the consequences of that action. First the good stuff.
Halberstam really stands out as he covers the tactical and operational levels of the war. He spends a great deal of time discussing the various commanders and staffs, how they are organized and how well or how poorly they performed. He also spends time down at the infantryman level, bringing the war to its lowest common denominator. Here are two accounts of the fighting near Chipyongni, where the UN forces finally stopped the southern thrusts of the Chinese after the terrible ambushes and retreats up north at the Chosin Reservoir and Kunuri. The first account is of a brave BAR man holding off the Chinese attackers:
The second account is about a platoon a short time later in the same area, fighting to hold what was later known as McGee’s Hill:
You will see some incredible stupidity and arrogance in the beginning of the war. It was shocking to see how poorly the forces performed a short 4.5 years after winning WWII. Halberstam highlights many of the incompetent commanders, as well as some of the good ones. You will be alternately pissed off or amazed at various players. His accounts of the 8th Army’s retreat on the western side of North Korea illuminates a lesser known part of the intervention of the Chinese Army. He spends much less time on the far better known Chosin Reservoir battles.
The main conflict between MacArthur and Truman is not well covered in my view. Halberstam seems to excuse Truman’s actions at every point while he paints MacArthur as a truly vile person. Perhaps he was, I am certainly no fan. I came away with the impression Halberstam was making every excuse possible for Truman’s inaction with MacArthur.
The worst part of the book was the liberal agenda Halberstam clearly brings to his discussion of domestic politics in the era. Every Republican is a vile, animalistic, bombastic, shallow, opportunistic and stupid right winger while every Democrat is a thoughtful, honest, selfless, calm, mainstream, small town patriot. His effort to blame the start of the Korean War on the Republicans was so intense that I practically expected him to say “it’s George Bush’s fault”! And then he brought George Bush into the discussion! No sh#t! After a long section showing how MacArthur’s intelligence chief lied and misrepresented indications of Chinese intervention into Korea, Halberstam states Bush did the same thing in Iraq. Halberstam clearly has an agenda in this book that did not need to be there. I have read many of his books and this is the first one where I thought he slanted his accounts for a personal vendetta. I was sad to see this.
His epilogue is intriguing because he starts to connect the Democratic Party defensive posture on “losing China”, the Korean War and the initial stages of Kennedy’s escalation into Vietnam, followed by Johnson’s actions. Only a few pages of this. I wanted more, connecting his seminal “The Best and the Brightest” with this earlier conflict. Sadly, this is only briefly covered.
South Korea is a place you either love or don’t. I love it, having been stationed there and traveled the length and breadth of the southern half of the peninsula. Did it at slow speed and low altitude in my OV-10 and also on the ground. This addition to the shamefully small Korean War anthology is well worth your time and will help understand how we got involved and why things went as they did.
Halberstam really stands out as he covers the tactical and operational levels of the war. He spends a great deal of time discussing the various commanders and staffs, how they are organized and how well or how poorly they performed. He also spends time down at the infantryman level, bringing the war to its lowest common denominator. Here are two accounts of the fighting near Chipyongni, where the UN forces finally stopped the southern thrusts of the Chinese after the terrible ambushes and retreats up north at the Chosin Reservoir and Kunuri. The first account is of a brave BAR man holding off the Chinese attackers:
The second account is about a platoon a short time later in the same area, fighting to hold what was later known as McGee’s Hill:
You will see some incredible stupidity and arrogance in the beginning of the war. It was shocking to see how poorly the forces performed a short 4.5 years after winning WWII. Halberstam highlights many of the incompetent commanders, as well as some of the good ones. You will be alternately pissed off or amazed at various players. His accounts of the 8th Army’s retreat on the western side of North Korea illuminates a lesser known part of the intervention of the Chinese Army. He spends much less time on the far better known Chosin Reservoir battles.
The main conflict between MacArthur and Truman is not well covered in my view. Halberstam seems to excuse Truman’s actions at every point while he paints MacArthur as a truly vile person. Perhaps he was, I am certainly no fan. I came away with the impression Halberstam was making every excuse possible for Truman’s inaction with MacArthur.
The worst part of the book was the liberal agenda Halberstam clearly brings to his discussion of domestic politics in the era. Every Republican is a vile, animalistic, bombastic, shallow, opportunistic and stupid right winger while every Democrat is a thoughtful, honest, selfless, calm, mainstream, small town patriot. His effort to blame the start of the Korean War on the Republicans was so intense that I practically expected him to say “it’s George Bush’s fault”! And then he brought George Bush into the discussion! No sh#t! After a long section showing how MacArthur’s intelligence chief lied and misrepresented indications of Chinese intervention into Korea, Halberstam states Bush did the same thing in Iraq. Halberstam clearly has an agenda in this book that did not need to be there. I have read many of his books and this is the first one where I thought he slanted his accounts for a personal vendetta. I was sad to see this.
His epilogue is intriguing because he starts to connect the Democratic Party defensive posture on “losing China”, the Korean War and the initial stages of Kennedy’s escalation into Vietnam, followed by Johnson’s actions. Only a few pages of this. I wanted more, connecting his seminal “The Best and the Brightest” with this earlier conflict. Sadly, this is only briefly covered.
South Korea is a place you either love or don’t. I love it, having been stationed there and traveled the length and breadth of the southern half of the peninsula. Did it at slow speed and low altitude in my OV-10 and also on the ground. This addition to the shamefully small Korean War anthology is well worth your time and will help understand how we got involved and why things went as they did.
August 29, 2021
I am starting to think that I'm a closet Korean War enthusiast.
This is probably the third book on the Korean War that I've read over the past 2-3 years and I've enjoyed every one of them.
This being the best of the lot. This may be the best book I've read this year.
Halberstam covers subects and areas that most books on the Korean War omit or fail to cover. While I was familiar with General Arthur MacArthur Jr---the father of Gen Douglas MacArthur--I did not know too much about him or his wife. Arthur MacArthur is one of only two father-son combinations to earn the Medal of Honor. Arthur was also the military commander in the Phillipines when Taft was appointed the Civilian Governor. Taft and Arthur butted heads and both wrote secret letters to the Secretary of War Elihu Root complaining about the other. Root sided with Taft and Arthur was reassigned elsewhere. Needless to say when Taft went on to become Roosevelt's Secretary of War and later President of the United States, Arthur's carreer came to an end.
But Arthur played a major role in his son's growing up. When Douglas MacArthur was assigned to the Phillipines, he felt as if he was picking up where his father left off. Same thing when he was assigned to Japan. Arthur's wife and Douglas' mother, Mary, was one of those women who helped those they loved succeed. She campaigned openly and behind the scenes to help Arthur and Douglas to achieve greatness. When Douglas was promoted to General of the Army (5 star), his success was seen by the family as the culmination of what Arthur MacArthur started.
Arthur's views on Civilian Authorities and conflicts with Taft set the tone for Douglas' future relationships with civilian and other military leaders. There is a reason why when Truman wanted to relieve MacArthur from office that he had 100% support from the Joint Chief of Staff---they hated the man.
Douglas MacArthur demanded absolute loyalty. He did not tolerate insubordination and he knew what needed to be done. If one did not agree with him, they were shipped out. With very few exceptions, his inner circle during the Korean War were the same men who served on his staff during World War II. Eisenhower said that he studied dramatics under MacArthur for seven years.
Another aspect of the war that doesn't get discussed much is the start of World War II or the fall of China. When Hitler started expanding German interest, the Allies didn't react. "Appeasement" became the word of the day. By failing to act, they allowed Germany to solidify its base and develop an effective war machine. Similarly, during the Chinese Civil War, the Allied did not get too involved. There was not a sense of urgency in defending China from the Communist. But when China became a Communist country, the entire Pacific Theater of operations changed.
When North Korea invaded South Korea, there was a belief by those in the United States (and in MacArthur's camp) that thought that North Korea was a Chinese puppet. That China was testing to water to see how much land Communist could acquire before the Allies would try to stop them. The allied didn't want to have a repeat of WWII, and were thus more driven to respond in force.
The book is full of stories and incidents that occurred on the battle field, in the political arena, in the press, and in MacArthur's HQ that makes this book a great highlevel introduction to the subject of the Korean War.
This is probably the third book on the Korean War that I've read over the past 2-3 years and I've enjoyed every one of them.
This being the best of the lot. This may be the best book I've read this year.
Halberstam covers subects and areas that most books on the Korean War omit or fail to cover. While I was familiar with General Arthur MacArthur Jr---the father of Gen Douglas MacArthur--I did not know too much about him or his wife. Arthur MacArthur is one of only two father-son combinations to earn the Medal of Honor. Arthur was also the military commander in the Phillipines when Taft was appointed the Civilian Governor. Taft and Arthur butted heads and both wrote secret letters to the Secretary of War Elihu Root complaining about the other. Root sided with Taft and Arthur was reassigned elsewhere. Needless to say when Taft went on to become Roosevelt's Secretary of War and later President of the United States, Arthur's carreer came to an end.
But Arthur played a major role in his son's growing up. When Douglas MacArthur was assigned to the Phillipines, he felt as if he was picking up where his father left off. Same thing when he was assigned to Japan. Arthur's wife and Douglas' mother, Mary, was one of those women who helped those they loved succeed. She campaigned openly and behind the scenes to help Arthur and Douglas to achieve greatness. When Douglas was promoted to General of the Army (5 star), his success was seen by the family as the culmination of what Arthur MacArthur started.
Arthur's views on Civilian Authorities and conflicts with Taft set the tone for Douglas' future relationships with civilian and other military leaders. There is a reason why when Truman wanted to relieve MacArthur from office that he had 100% support from the Joint Chief of Staff---they hated the man.
Douglas MacArthur demanded absolute loyalty. He did not tolerate insubordination and he knew what needed to be done. If one did not agree with him, they were shipped out. With very few exceptions, his inner circle during the Korean War were the same men who served on his staff during World War II. Eisenhower said that he studied dramatics under MacArthur for seven years.
Another aspect of the war that doesn't get discussed much is the start of World War II or the fall of China. When Hitler started expanding German interest, the Allies didn't react. "Appeasement" became the word of the day. By failing to act, they allowed Germany to solidify its base and develop an effective war machine. Similarly, during the Chinese Civil War, the Allied did not get too involved. There was not a sense of urgency in defending China from the Communist. But when China became a Communist country, the entire Pacific Theater of operations changed.
When North Korea invaded South Korea, there was a belief by those in the United States (and in MacArthur's camp) that thought that North Korea was a Chinese puppet. That China was testing to water to see how much land Communist could acquire before the Allies would try to stop them. The allied didn't want to have a repeat of WWII, and were thus more driven to respond in force.
The book is full of stories and incidents that occurred on the battle field, in the political arena, in the press, and in MacArthur's HQ that makes this book a great highlevel introduction to the subject of the Korean War.
November 30, 2024
Having read several of David Halberstam's books, I can say that this is one of his best works. In this book, he does an outstanding job of closely examining the lead up to and the first ten months of the Korean War. While this book is classified as military history – and it certainly is that – it is much more. Halberstam delves into the political sides of the struggle, and examines the inner workings of the Truman Administration, as well as the calculations of Mao Zedong, Kim Il Sung, and Joseph Stalin. And looming over all of this is the egomania of General Douglas MacArthur, his fights with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, George Marshall, Harry Truman and junior and even some senior officers in the Army.
Halberstam adeptly mixes in battlefield exploits and gut-wrenching battle descriptions with political wrangling in Washington, Mao's iron grip on China, Stalin's hope that the U.S. and China would enmesh themselves in a long, bloody war, and MacArthur's atrocious and selfish decision-making. History, while acknowledging MacArthur's boldness in WWII and his brilliant move on Inchon, has not treated him well. Nor should it. How many men needlessly died because of his hubris? How many officers' careers were damaged or ruined because they somehow were not sycophants? MacArthur isn't the only villain here: Truman, Dean Acheson, George Marshall, Omar Bradley, and everyone one else let him run amok, did not even try to control him when he clearly violated direct orders, and refused to oppose him. All of them did a major disservice to the men who fought in Korea, in Truman's self-described “police action” that was anything but.
All of those segments were incredibly engaging to read about. But perhaps the best parts of the book were the battle segments, where Halberstam skillfully recreates the battles via interviews with the surviving participants and numerous maps showing the various positioning of American and Chinese forces. The horrible conditions that the men had to face, the inept leadership shown by MacArthur's golden boy, Ned Almond, the underestimation of Chinese forces, the lack of ammunition and top-notch equipment, is all described in riveting detail. Some military history books are littered with dry or complex descriptions of battle maneuvers and logistics. Halberstam does not write like that at all. To me, he helps to honor the men who fought there by making sure that their sacrifices and exploits are documented and remembered.
It was at times appalling to read about the extreme hardships faced by U.S. troops – hardships that did not need to happen. What if Truman had not acted unilaterally, without seeking a war declaration from Congress? What if MacArthur had not been an egomaniac, well past his prime and needing to retire? What if the right-wing Republicans had not falsely accused Truman and Acheson of “losing” China, as if somehow the U.S. possessed that gigantic country? What if Marshall and the Joint Chiefs had stood up to MacArthur? What if Matt Ridgway had been put in command from the beginning? This war could have went so many different directions, all of them probably better than how it ended up: a stalemate, with both sides inflicting heavy casualties on each other, and gaining basically nothing in the end.
There are a few things that I would have liked to have seen Halberstam discuss, or write about more than he did. While he does review North Korean society very acutely early in the book, he does not discuss how the war affected that society while it was ongoing. Nor does he talk about South Korean society until his very good epilogue to close out the book. Why were their troops so poorly trained and lacking in discipline? What did civilian South Koreans think of the war? What did the British, French and other UN allies think of Truman's decision? But these are minor... I would not call them complaints, simply other areas that it would have been interesting to see dissected by Halberstam. This is an excellent work that, sadly, was his last book.
Grade: A
Halberstam adeptly mixes in battlefield exploits and gut-wrenching battle descriptions with political wrangling in Washington, Mao's iron grip on China, Stalin's hope that the U.S. and China would enmesh themselves in a long, bloody war, and MacArthur's atrocious and selfish decision-making. History, while acknowledging MacArthur's boldness in WWII and his brilliant move on Inchon, has not treated him well. Nor should it. How many men needlessly died because of his hubris? How many officers' careers were damaged or ruined because they somehow were not sycophants? MacArthur isn't the only villain here: Truman, Dean Acheson, George Marshall, Omar Bradley, and everyone one else let him run amok, did not even try to control him when he clearly violated direct orders, and refused to oppose him. All of them did a major disservice to the men who fought in Korea, in Truman's self-described “police action” that was anything but.
All of those segments were incredibly engaging to read about. But perhaps the best parts of the book were the battle segments, where Halberstam skillfully recreates the battles via interviews with the surviving participants and numerous maps showing the various positioning of American and Chinese forces. The horrible conditions that the men had to face, the inept leadership shown by MacArthur's golden boy, Ned Almond, the underestimation of Chinese forces, the lack of ammunition and top-notch equipment, is all described in riveting detail. Some military history books are littered with dry or complex descriptions of battle maneuvers and logistics. Halberstam does not write like that at all. To me, he helps to honor the men who fought there by making sure that their sacrifices and exploits are documented and remembered.
It was at times appalling to read about the extreme hardships faced by U.S. troops – hardships that did not need to happen. What if Truman had not acted unilaterally, without seeking a war declaration from Congress? What if MacArthur had not been an egomaniac, well past his prime and needing to retire? What if the right-wing Republicans had not falsely accused Truman and Acheson of “losing” China, as if somehow the U.S. possessed that gigantic country? What if Marshall and the Joint Chiefs had stood up to MacArthur? What if Matt Ridgway had been put in command from the beginning? This war could have went so many different directions, all of them probably better than how it ended up: a stalemate, with both sides inflicting heavy casualties on each other, and gaining basically nothing in the end.
There are a few things that I would have liked to have seen Halberstam discuss, or write about more than he did. While he does review North Korean society very acutely early in the book, he does not discuss how the war affected that society while it was ongoing. Nor does he talk about South Korean society until his very good epilogue to close out the book. Why were their troops so poorly trained and lacking in discipline? What did civilian South Koreans think of the war? What did the British, French and other UN allies think of Truman's decision? But these are minor... I would not call them complaints, simply other areas that it would have been interesting to see dissected by Halberstam. This is an excellent work that, sadly, was his last book.
Grade: A
November 29, 2024
― “The Korean War was never seen in isolation as just a small war in a small country; it was never just about Korea. It was always joined to something infinitely larger—China, a country inspiring the most bitter kind of domestic political debate. As the Truman administration sent troops to Korea, there was always a vast dark unanswered question haunting them, which was the threat of the entry of Chinese Communist troops into the war, something the President and most of the men around him greatly feared, and that the general commanding in the field and some of his supporters seemed on occasion ready to welcome.”
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War
The Korean War is sometimes referred to as the “forgotten war” because of the lack of public attention it received, having been overshadowed by the global scale of World War II, which preceded it, and the costly and divisive Vietnam War, which succeeded it. Congress never declared war on North Korea.
From 1910 to 1945, Korea had been occupied by the Empire of Japan. Following World War II, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to a dual administration of the Korean peninsula, with the Soviets above the 38th parallel and the Americans below it. The arbitrary split created problems from the start. The Soviet government began building up the North's military strength.
On June 25, 1950, the North Korean army crossed the 38th parallel in a full-scale invasion, destroying or pushing back any resistance it encountered. General Walton “Walker’s troops were being systematically pushed back to the Naktong River.” Inside the Pusan Perimeter, it was unclear whether they could hold the Perimeter at all or simply be pushed off the peninsula.
Something had to be done, and General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the United Nations Forces, devised a plan to encircle the North Koreans by making an amphibious invasion at their rear. Inchon harbor was chosen in part because of its proximity to the capital at Seoul. The harbor city fell quickly, and from this position the UN forces pushed the North Koreans back across the 38th parallel within a matter of weeks.
It was at this point that MacArthur made a grievous error in judgment. Following the Inchon invasion, Allied forces chased the North Korean army to within a few miles of the Yalu River, the border with mainland China. Mao Zedong, fearing that an invasion of Chinese Manchuria would follow, joined the war on the North Korean side. The Chinese armies began pouring across the Yalu River, surprising the Allied army. In moving north, the Allies had made the same error as the North Koreans had in moving south—they had overextended their resources. Hundreds of Americans were slaughtered at Unsan, one of the worst defeats of the Korean War.
The error was the result of a catastrophic intelligence failure. Worse, it was a self-imposed disaster—the result of terrible intelligence management, not the poor collection or analysis of information. MacArthur was hesitant to use the CIA because he wanted to have direct control over intelligence operations and did not trust civilian agencies. He believed that relying on the CIA could compromise his authority and decision-making process.
Joseph Alsop, a columnist normally sympathetic to the general, said that “No one had more toadies and sycophants than MacArthur.” It was the value MacArthur placed on sycophancy that tripped him up in the end. Halberstam makes it clear that MacArthur was a man of massive ego who bears responsibility for one of the Army’s biggest military disasters. In some circles, MacArthur had come to be known as “the Big Ego.”
MacArthur’s desire for intelligence that confirmed his personal beliefs was the source of most of the failures of Charles Willoughby, MacArthur’s Chief Intelligence Officer. MacArthur did not think that China would enter the war, and Willoughby demonstrated an overriding commitment to prove his boss correct. Willoughby’s shortcomings as an intelligence leader were the result of more than a decade of exposure under MacArthur’s egocentric command.
The result was that MacArthur and the ever-aggressive Maj. Gen. Edward Almond disregarded growing evidence that a sizeable Chinese force had crossed the Yalu to oppose the UN advance approaching its Manchurian border. As the temperatures in the mountains of North Korea plummeted, the self-important, highly impatient Almond continued to direct his commanders to advance faster. Stealthily, the Chinese army – roughly 120,000 soldiers – took up positions near the UN troops. Almond’s troops were caught by surprise.
― “(Tenth Corps Commander O.P.) Smith (and most of the other senior Marines) came to believe that Almond was an unrealistic commander, a man who listened only to the voice of the man above him and was careless with his orders, insensitive to the lives of the men in his command, and far, far too concerned with public relations.”
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War
There were other problems that existed with Allied forces in Korea. Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker's Eighth Army, consisted of four divisions based in Japan. These divisions, however, were occupation, not combat, forces, and were not even up to their authorized strengths of 12,500 men each. Shortages of everything from competent officers to rifles to tanks also plagued the Eighth Army.
David Halberstam was a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and author of one of my favorite works of history, The Children, a book about the Civil Rights movement. In The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War, Halberstam provides a thorough analysis of America’s first modern war without victory. The reader will come away with a comprehensive understanding of the causes of the war, as well as the geopolitical background on the major players, including China. The only shortcoming, in my opinion, is that the background material might have been overdone. The reader is approximately 250 pages into the book before the author covers the battles.
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War
The Korean War is sometimes referred to as the “forgotten war” because of the lack of public attention it received, having been overshadowed by the global scale of World War II, which preceded it, and the costly and divisive Vietnam War, which succeeded it. Congress never declared war on North Korea.
From 1910 to 1945, Korea had been occupied by the Empire of Japan. Following World War II, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to a dual administration of the Korean peninsula, with the Soviets above the 38th parallel and the Americans below it. The arbitrary split created problems from the start. The Soviet government began building up the North's military strength.
On June 25, 1950, the North Korean army crossed the 38th parallel in a full-scale invasion, destroying or pushing back any resistance it encountered. General Walton “Walker’s troops were being systematically pushed back to the Naktong River.” Inside the Pusan Perimeter, it was unclear whether they could hold the Perimeter at all or simply be pushed off the peninsula.
Something had to be done, and General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the United Nations Forces, devised a plan to encircle the North Koreans by making an amphibious invasion at their rear. Inchon harbor was chosen in part because of its proximity to the capital at Seoul. The harbor city fell quickly, and from this position the UN forces pushed the North Koreans back across the 38th parallel within a matter of weeks.
It was at this point that MacArthur made a grievous error in judgment. Following the Inchon invasion, Allied forces chased the North Korean army to within a few miles of the Yalu River, the border with mainland China. Mao Zedong, fearing that an invasion of Chinese Manchuria would follow, joined the war on the North Korean side. The Chinese armies began pouring across the Yalu River, surprising the Allied army. In moving north, the Allies had made the same error as the North Koreans had in moving south—they had overextended their resources. Hundreds of Americans were slaughtered at Unsan, one of the worst defeats of the Korean War.
The error was the result of a catastrophic intelligence failure. Worse, it was a self-imposed disaster—the result of terrible intelligence management, not the poor collection or analysis of information. MacArthur was hesitant to use the CIA because he wanted to have direct control over intelligence operations and did not trust civilian agencies. He believed that relying on the CIA could compromise his authority and decision-making process.
Joseph Alsop, a columnist normally sympathetic to the general, said that “No one had more toadies and sycophants than MacArthur.” It was the value MacArthur placed on sycophancy that tripped him up in the end. Halberstam makes it clear that MacArthur was a man of massive ego who bears responsibility for one of the Army’s biggest military disasters. In some circles, MacArthur had come to be known as “the Big Ego.”
MacArthur’s desire for intelligence that confirmed his personal beliefs was the source of most of the failures of Charles Willoughby, MacArthur’s Chief Intelligence Officer. MacArthur did not think that China would enter the war, and Willoughby demonstrated an overriding commitment to prove his boss correct. Willoughby’s shortcomings as an intelligence leader were the result of more than a decade of exposure under MacArthur’s egocentric command.
The result was that MacArthur and the ever-aggressive Maj. Gen. Edward Almond disregarded growing evidence that a sizeable Chinese force had crossed the Yalu to oppose the UN advance approaching its Manchurian border. As the temperatures in the mountains of North Korea plummeted, the self-important, highly impatient Almond continued to direct his commanders to advance faster. Stealthily, the Chinese army – roughly 120,000 soldiers – took up positions near the UN troops. Almond’s troops were caught by surprise.
― “(Tenth Corps Commander O.P.) Smith (and most of the other senior Marines) came to believe that Almond was an unrealistic commander, a man who listened only to the voice of the man above him and was careless with his orders, insensitive to the lives of the men in his command, and far, far too concerned with public relations.”
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War
There were other problems that existed with Allied forces in Korea. Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker's Eighth Army, consisted of four divisions based in Japan. These divisions, however, were occupation, not combat, forces, and were not even up to their authorized strengths of 12,500 men each. Shortages of everything from competent officers to rifles to tanks also plagued the Eighth Army.
David Halberstam was a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and author of one of my favorite works of history, The Children, a book about the Civil Rights movement. In The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War, Halberstam provides a thorough analysis of America’s first modern war without victory. The reader will come away with a comprehensive understanding of the causes of the war, as well as the geopolitical background on the major players, including China. The only shortcoming, in my opinion, is that the background material might have been overdone. The reader is approximately 250 pages into the book before the author covers the battles.
May 3, 2013
I picked up this book as the Korean War was something I'd never really taken the time to investigate, while my interest in history lay mainly in the Second World War and before that. I had seen on Goodreads that it had a great reputation, and came highly recommended, and I thought that it was a good introduction to the Korean War. I had never read any of Halberstam's other books, but that's not uncommon in non-fiction circles.
My main issue with the book was that it is a book of big things, of grand sweeping gestures, of the big people in the Korean War. The primary players being General Douglas Macarthur and Harry Truman. So much of this book is devoted to the political machinations and failures of leadership both at a military and a political level.
The thing that bothered me the most in retrospect was the Afterword to the book, wherein David Halberstam's virtues as an interviewer are extolled. Be that as it may, the personal stories is precisely what I felt was missing from the book.
Halberstam opens the book with a battle scene, and I felt as though I was right in there in the action. GREAT! But then he almost immediately cuts away (in movie terms) to a long and extensive description of the history of South East Asia, the Macarthur family, and sundry other matters which are relevant, yes, but their position at this point is questionable at best.
The author spends an enormous amount of space detailing the continuous and overwhelming litany of failures that led to the abysmal situation that existed in Korea. The failure of people on all sides to accept that the Chinese firstly were in country, and were there in force. Macarthur's obstinacy and failures as a collaborative commander, and the fraternal appointment of useless officers over competent and capable ones, purely out of personal loyalty.
There are some very interesting little people in the war, people such as Paul Macgee. But the telling of these stories gets lost as Halberstam clearly uses these to leverage into his true argument regarding the macro-level management of the war. While it is told in a mostly-chronological form,
One of the biggest failings I found with the book was the way that Halberstam tended to in large ignore, or describe only in the vaguest terms, the actual fighting. Yes there were a few choice narratives regarding particular battles, but he tended to skip over the actual events, and concentrate on the aftermath, or political fallout.
One that particularly springs to mind was the relief column sent to save the American forces engaged at Chipyong-ni. Halberstam goes into great detail about the setup of that, and how much the officers involved would regret doing this, or that, the dangers of putting the soldiers on top of tanks, etc etc. Then he glosses over what happened on the way, and talks about the aftermath, the horrendous loss of life, and the military fallout. This left me asking aloud "So what the F**K actually happened?" He was far too eager to cut away to the bitch fighting between the senior generals and officers.
I found it difficult to tell when things were happening in relation to others. He also proceeds to gloss over the second half of the conflict, resorting to making oblique references to ongoing fighting and skirmishes, and these were the nails in the coffin which got it into my head what the book was truly about.
If you knew nothing else about the conduct of the Korean War, from reading this book, you might walk away with the idea that the United States did not have a navy or an air force. Halberstam talks about the Chinese trying to obtain air support from Russia, and talks repeatedly about US air superiority. But whenever Halberstam mentions the Air Force, they are always "unavailable" or "engaged elsewhere" or "providing support to another unit". Which left me begging the question... what else is going on in this place that he's not telling me about?
The Korean War was really the dawn of the jet age, with the first serious dogfighting between jet air craft. Yes, this might not have fit nicely into Halberstam's grand overview of the whole thing, but come on? I wanted to know about Mig Alley, about the air war. Surely it's an iconic enough part of history to warrant a mention.
This is a book which is only secondarily related to actual warfare, and people looking for a book which actually tells the story of the fighting man on the ground should probably look elsewhere. This is a book about the politics of war, and the wars of politics which go on behind the scenes in any conflict. The battle between Macarthur trying to maintain his independence (either through vainglory, or arrogance) from the civilian government is Halberstam's central interest in this book, and to what he devotes most of the 700+ pages.
While I recognise that he was an American author, and the war was primarily conducted by Americans, it was a United Nations force which was fighting there, and as an Australian, I think it's a little disingenuous to those other countries who were there also.
As a political science book, this is instructive and frightening. Some time ago I read a book regarding the first world war, which was in a similar vein, and it is apparent that little was learned between these two wars. When I read a book about a war, though, I would like to think it would devote more time to the actual war.
My main issue with the book was that it is a book of big things, of grand sweeping gestures, of the big people in the Korean War. The primary players being General Douglas Macarthur and Harry Truman. So much of this book is devoted to the political machinations and failures of leadership both at a military and a political level.
The thing that bothered me the most in retrospect was the Afterword to the book, wherein David Halberstam's virtues as an interviewer are extolled. Be that as it may, the personal stories is precisely what I felt was missing from the book.
Halberstam opens the book with a battle scene, and I felt as though I was right in there in the action. GREAT! But then he almost immediately cuts away (in movie terms) to a long and extensive description of the history of South East Asia, the Macarthur family, and sundry other matters which are relevant, yes, but their position at this point is questionable at best.
The author spends an enormous amount of space detailing the continuous and overwhelming litany of failures that led to the abysmal situation that existed in Korea. The failure of people on all sides to accept that the Chinese firstly were in country, and were there in force. Macarthur's obstinacy and failures as a collaborative commander, and the fraternal appointment of useless officers over competent and capable ones, purely out of personal loyalty.
There are some very interesting little people in the war, people such as Paul Macgee. But the telling of these stories gets lost as Halberstam clearly uses these to leverage into his true argument regarding the macro-level management of the war. While it is told in a mostly-chronological form,
One of the biggest failings I found with the book was the way that Halberstam tended to in large ignore, or describe only in the vaguest terms, the actual fighting. Yes there were a few choice narratives regarding particular battles, but he tended to skip over the actual events, and concentrate on the aftermath, or political fallout.
One that particularly springs to mind was the relief column sent to save the American forces engaged at Chipyong-ni. Halberstam goes into great detail about the setup of that, and how much the officers involved would regret doing this, or that, the dangers of putting the soldiers on top of tanks, etc etc. Then he glosses over what happened on the way, and talks about the aftermath, the horrendous loss of life, and the military fallout. This left me asking aloud "So what the F**K actually happened?" He was far too eager to cut away to the bitch fighting between the senior generals and officers.
I found it difficult to tell when things were happening in relation to others. He also proceeds to gloss over the second half of the conflict, resorting to making oblique references to ongoing fighting and skirmishes, and these were the nails in the coffin which got it into my head what the book was truly about.
If you knew nothing else about the conduct of the Korean War, from reading this book, you might walk away with the idea that the United States did not have a navy or an air force. Halberstam talks about the Chinese trying to obtain air support from Russia, and talks repeatedly about US air superiority. But whenever Halberstam mentions the Air Force, they are always "unavailable" or "engaged elsewhere" or "providing support to another unit". Which left me begging the question... what else is going on in this place that he's not telling me about?
The Korean War was really the dawn of the jet age, with the first serious dogfighting between jet air craft. Yes, this might not have fit nicely into Halberstam's grand overview of the whole thing, but come on? I wanted to know about Mig Alley, about the air war. Surely it's an iconic enough part of history to warrant a mention.
This is a book which is only secondarily related to actual warfare, and people looking for a book which actually tells the story of the fighting man on the ground should probably look elsewhere. This is a book about the politics of war, and the wars of politics which go on behind the scenes in any conflict. The battle between Macarthur trying to maintain his independence (either through vainglory, or arrogance) from the civilian government is Halberstam's central interest in this book, and to what he devotes most of the 700+ pages.
While I recognise that he was an American author, and the war was primarily conducted by Americans, it was a United Nations force which was fighting there, and as an Australian, I think it's a little disingenuous to those other countries who were there also.
As a political science book, this is instructive and frightening. Some time ago I read a book regarding the first world war, which was in a similar vein, and it is apparent that little was learned between these two wars. When I read a book about a war, though, I would like to think it would devote more time to the actual war.
January 28, 2014
I really liked The Best and the Brightest, and this book contains contains the same behind the scenes accounts of the policy decisions that shape America's part on the world stage. Like The Best and the Brightest, it also delves beneath the current actions and attitudes of the major players to explain as much of the way their psychological makeup shapes their current part in history as is possible in a series of excellent mini-biographies.
Unlike The Best and the Brightest, which, if memory serves, stayed mainly with policy discussions in the corridors of power, this one follows their implications to ground level. Halberstam has spent thorough hours talking to ordinary soldiers at every level about what it was really like to fight in Korea, and this shows. He offers penetrating analysis of how taking on the military mantel changes erstwhile civilians as well as how it might shift larger geopolitical forces. Halberstam also deftly takes his ground-level, detailed focus Stateside to show the war's impact on the culture at home. He shows an American populace that is both increasingly confident of its position of preeminence in the world and increasingly wary of the constant, wearying duty that involves.
If I am to offer any criticism of this book, it is that the very breadth that makes it attractive also makes it daunting to finish. Sometimes, the vignettes he offers seem like rabbit trails it could have been eliminated while keeping the main story intact and the links of the book under the 720 pages at which it weighs in.
Unlike The Best and the Brightest, which, if memory serves, stayed mainly with policy discussions in the corridors of power, this one follows their implications to ground level. Halberstam has spent thorough hours talking to ordinary soldiers at every level about what it was really like to fight in Korea, and this shows. He offers penetrating analysis of how taking on the military mantel changes erstwhile civilians as well as how it might shift larger geopolitical forces. Halberstam also deftly takes his ground-level, detailed focus Stateside to show the war's impact on the culture at home. He shows an American populace that is both increasingly confident of its position of preeminence in the world and increasingly wary of the constant, wearying duty that involves.
If I am to offer any criticism of this book, it is that the very breadth that makes it attractive also makes it daunting to finish. Sometimes, the vignettes he offers seem like rabbit trails it could have been eliminated while keeping the main story intact and the links of the book under the 720 pages at which it weighs in.
July 23, 2018
4.5*'s
If you have no knowledge of the Korean War this is a complete accounting from all perspectives including all of the political agendas not only from the American POV but also the Russian, Chinese, North and South Korean.
I thought from the title of the book it was going to be more about the battles and struggles in country. Because I already know a lot about the politics of the war I liked those parts a lot more but recognize to tell the full story you have to tell the political story because it was a political war. I simply feel the title is a bit misleading in this regard. Having recently read a book on Ike's political career and both Kennedy's the political side had been covered ad nauseum for me.
One part of the political portion that was fairly new for me was the dismantling of the myth of MacArthur. Some of his brilliance in WWII and Inchon diminished by his petty autocratic methods and where he rewrote the facts to display his intended outcome which by extension lost thousands of lives because of his ego. The parallel Truman drew between McClellan and Lincoln with MacArthur and himself really bearing out having recently read Grant.
I think finally if you want to understand how North Korea got to where it is today reading about the father in this conflict and subsequent events and then handing off power to his son as an autocratic dictator where all culture is directed to the leader is amazing.
If you have no knowledge of the Korean War this is a complete accounting from all perspectives including all of the political agendas not only from the American POV but also the Russian, Chinese, North and South Korean.
I thought from the title of the book it was going to be more about the battles and struggles in country. Because I already know a lot about the politics of the war I liked those parts a lot more but recognize to tell the full story you have to tell the political story because it was a political war. I simply feel the title is a bit misleading in this regard. Having recently read a book on Ike's political career and both Kennedy's the political side had been covered ad nauseum for me.
One part of the political portion that was fairly new for me was the dismantling of the myth of MacArthur. Some of his brilliance in WWII and Inchon diminished by his petty autocratic methods and where he rewrote the facts to display his intended outcome which by extension lost thousands of lives because of his ego. The parallel Truman drew between McClellan and Lincoln with MacArthur and himself really bearing out having recently read Grant.
I think finally if you want to understand how North Korea got to where it is today reading about the father in this conflict and subsequent events and then handing off power to his son as an autocratic dictator where all culture is directed to the leader is amazing.
October 10, 2013
Although Halberstam’s insights are repetitive, the book is interesting and quite readable. He makes a lot of judgment calls that you may or may not agree with, but I found him pretty persuasive. And many of his insights into the motivations and objectives of all sides are penetrating and illuminating.
Halberstam provides an illuminating and insightful portrait of Douglas MacArthur, who doesn’t come off too well as the narrative progresses. MacArthur had an amazing capacity for deception and a huge ego. He didn’t even ask his superiors or subordinates questions simply because it would imply that there was something he didn’t know, and he frequently took credit for the successes of others. He had a split personality: a man of great talent whose agenda was almost always in conflict with that of his superiors, a jealous guarder of information. He was contemptuous of the Joint Chiefs and couldn’t care less about their views. He comes across as a vain, manipulative dinosaur, and he even manipulated the intelligence he reported to Washington just to get what he wanted.
Halberstam’s focus is on the main players of the war: MacArthur, Ridgway, Truman, Aceson, etc. However, he also addresses many topics from all levels of the hierarchy, and moves back and forth very smoothly. He also addresses the actions of the misguided China Lobby (who accused the Democrats of “losing” China, as if America could impose its will on a nation three times its size on the other side of the planet), and the self-appointed Commie-hunter Joe McCarthy, who ruined reputations and imagined his facts.
I also enjoyed Halberstam’s addition of the perspective of the Russians, the Chinese, and the North Koreans. As Americans we tend to view all our wars as exclusively American experiences; in our popular imagination, the other side always gets demonized, and in the scholarly and academic field, they are typically ignored. I think this is why our military failures are always so politically charged: we always look for scapegoats and traitors on our side and wonder why we lost; rarely do we consider why or how the other side won. China did not welcome the outbreak of war in Korea, and intervened only with the greatest reluctance. They had originally intended North Korea to be a buffer state only. The Chinese could easily deploy an army four times that of the US forces in Korea, and their troops were well-disciplined. But when they did intervene, China made several poor decisions that got thousands of their men needlessly killed: they ignored the inadequacy of their volunteer forces, who had almost no artillery, haphazard, ill-suited logistics system, and a rigid, inflexible command structure, and they were extremely vulnerable to US airpower. China suffered horrific casualties during the war. While the Chinese commander Peng Dehaui was a competent professional officer, he eventually met his demise during the “Great Leap Forward”, where his country repaid him for his service by arresting him and beating him to death. Peng had tried to expose the falsified statistics that made up the optimistic reporting on the “Leap” (which, of course, was actually a disaster), and that was how the regime repaid him.
Kim Il Sung, on the other hand, comes off as an incompetent, vainglorious, erratic and insecure oaf. The Chinese had little respect for him; he was easy to flatter, and quite arrogant and brash. He was an ardent nationalist and an ardent communist at the same time, seeing no contradiction in those twin beliefs.
US policymakers viewed the communist bloc as a monolithic entity brought together by shared ideology, but nothing could have been further from the truth. The Soviets and Chinese jockeyed for power in the peninsula and tried to undermine each others’ influence. Also, they viewed Kim Il-Sung as a junior partner. Before the war broke out, Stalin had never viewed Mao and the Chinese communists as allies, only as threats. And the Soviets were actually quite satisfied with the course of the war: MacArthur’s drive to the Yalu threatened their Chinese rivals, and the Soviets could sit on the sidelines as their two rivals got sucked into a seemingly endless land war on the Asian landmass.
Many US officers also underestimated the fighting ability of the Chinese. In the early phase of the war, US troops were in horrible condition, and in no shape to fight a major war. North Korean troops, on the other hand, were battle-hardened, well-motivated, and extremely well-disciplined. North Korean soldiers had very little need for extra gear, while US troops carried a considerable load of it.
However, while Halberstam provides good coverage of the other side, he provides little on the allied troops of the US during the war, such the British or French. There are also a few errors: he writes about B-17's being on ground and destroyed during the initial attack on Wake Island --It should have been Clark Field. There were no B-17's on Wake, and Wake did not have serious attack until several days after Pearl Harbor. Plus Halberstam transposes the December 8 Japanese strike on MacArthur's air force at Clark Field in the Philippines to Wake Island! That's a pretty fantastic error. But in, all, a superb book.
Halberstam provides an illuminating and insightful portrait of Douglas MacArthur, who doesn’t come off too well as the narrative progresses. MacArthur had an amazing capacity for deception and a huge ego. He didn’t even ask his superiors or subordinates questions simply because it would imply that there was something he didn’t know, and he frequently took credit for the successes of others. He had a split personality: a man of great talent whose agenda was almost always in conflict with that of his superiors, a jealous guarder of information. He was contemptuous of the Joint Chiefs and couldn’t care less about their views. He comes across as a vain, manipulative dinosaur, and he even manipulated the intelligence he reported to Washington just to get what he wanted.
Halberstam’s focus is on the main players of the war: MacArthur, Ridgway, Truman, Aceson, etc. However, he also addresses many topics from all levels of the hierarchy, and moves back and forth very smoothly. He also addresses the actions of the misguided China Lobby (who accused the Democrats of “losing” China, as if America could impose its will on a nation three times its size on the other side of the planet), and the self-appointed Commie-hunter Joe McCarthy, who ruined reputations and imagined his facts.
I also enjoyed Halberstam’s addition of the perspective of the Russians, the Chinese, and the North Koreans. As Americans we tend to view all our wars as exclusively American experiences; in our popular imagination, the other side always gets demonized, and in the scholarly and academic field, they are typically ignored. I think this is why our military failures are always so politically charged: we always look for scapegoats and traitors on our side and wonder why we lost; rarely do we consider why or how the other side won. China did not welcome the outbreak of war in Korea, and intervened only with the greatest reluctance. They had originally intended North Korea to be a buffer state only. The Chinese could easily deploy an army four times that of the US forces in Korea, and their troops were well-disciplined. But when they did intervene, China made several poor decisions that got thousands of their men needlessly killed: they ignored the inadequacy of their volunteer forces, who had almost no artillery, haphazard, ill-suited logistics system, and a rigid, inflexible command structure, and they were extremely vulnerable to US airpower. China suffered horrific casualties during the war. While the Chinese commander Peng Dehaui was a competent professional officer, he eventually met his demise during the “Great Leap Forward”, where his country repaid him for his service by arresting him and beating him to death. Peng had tried to expose the falsified statistics that made up the optimistic reporting on the “Leap” (which, of course, was actually a disaster), and that was how the regime repaid him.
Kim Il Sung, on the other hand, comes off as an incompetent, vainglorious, erratic and insecure oaf. The Chinese had little respect for him; he was easy to flatter, and quite arrogant and brash. He was an ardent nationalist and an ardent communist at the same time, seeing no contradiction in those twin beliefs.
US policymakers viewed the communist bloc as a monolithic entity brought together by shared ideology, but nothing could have been further from the truth. The Soviets and Chinese jockeyed for power in the peninsula and tried to undermine each others’ influence. Also, they viewed Kim Il-Sung as a junior partner. Before the war broke out, Stalin had never viewed Mao and the Chinese communists as allies, only as threats. And the Soviets were actually quite satisfied with the course of the war: MacArthur’s drive to the Yalu threatened their Chinese rivals, and the Soviets could sit on the sidelines as their two rivals got sucked into a seemingly endless land war on the Asian landmass.
Many US officers also underestimated the fighting ability of the Chinese. In the early phase of the war, US troops were in horrible condition, and in no shape to fight a major war. North Korean troops, on the other hand, were battle-hardened, well-motivated, and extremely well-disciplined. North Korean soldiers had very little need for extra gear, while US troops carried a considerable load of it.
However, while Halberstam provides good coverage of the other side, he provides little on the allied troops of the US during the war, such the British or French. There are also a few errors: he writes about B-17's being on ground and destroyed during the initial attack on Wake Island --It should have been Clark Field. There were no B-17's on Wake, and Wake did not have serious attack until several days after Pearl Harbor. Plus Halberstam transposes the December 8 Japanese strike on MacArthur's air force at Clark Field in the Philippines to Wake Island! That's a pretty fantastic error. But in, all, a superb book.
February 23, 2016
This is a book about Heroes and Villains, which is how I prefer my military history served. I enjoyed reading of the criminal negligence of Generals MacArthur and Almond as much as I did about many, many individual acts of bravery by names now permanently etched. Few do heartbreaking as well as Halberstam.
There are weaknesses, to be sure. Halberstam is a writer in need of an editor, someone to tighten up the redundancies and to fix a syntax which is, well, gnarly. Sometimes there are little hints that he wants to be one of the guys, such as when he uses "demobe" as a noun instead of demobilization. Moreover, The Coldest Winter runs out of steam with the cashiering of MacArthur; so it is hardly comprehensive, notwithstanding its girth.
I've come to expect all that with Halberstam who is more journalist than historian. He tells great stories, has a keen eye for injustice, and tries really hard to get the big picture right, even if he couldn't survive a spot-checker. I really like reading Halberstam. It's sad that he's gone.
People generally are defined by how they live, not by how they die. Halberstam died in a freak car accident seven days after putting The Coldest Winter to bed. He was going to interview Y.A. Tittle for a book about football.
Which is my windy way of saying: there may be better books out there about the Korean War, but none will be told with Halberstam's joy and sadness. I'm glad he took me there.
Oh. And it's a really cool cover.
There are weaknesses, to be sure. Halberstam is a writer in need of an editor, someone to tighten up the redundancies and to fix a syntax which is, well, gnarly. Sometimes there are little hints that he wants to be one of the guys, such as when he uses "demobe" as a noun instead of demobilization. Moreover, The Coldest Winter runs out of steam with the cashiering of MacArthur; so it is hardly comprehensive, notwithstanding its girth.
I've come to expect all that with Halberstam who is more journalist than historian. He tells great stories, has a keen eye for injustice, and tries really hard to get the big picture right, even if he couldn't survive a spot-checker. I really like reading Halberstam. It's sad that he's gone.
People generally are defined by how they live, not by how they die. Halberstam died in a freak car accident seven days after putting The Coldest Winter to bed. He was going to interview Y.A. Tittle for a book about football.
Which is my windy way of saying: there may be better books out there about the Korean War, but none will be told with Halberstam's joy and sadness. I'm glad he took me there.
Oh. And it's a really cool cover.
January 10, 2016
Another excellent book by Halberstam and, sadly, his last. Although giving an overview of the Korean War 0f 1950-53, most of the text concerns the first months of the war, the violent back-and-forth between communist and U.N. forces. Although some mention is made of politics of Korea, its two dictators and two armies, much more attention is paid the real actors, the militaries of the U.S.A. and of People's China. In the background, of course, is General Douglas MacArthur, locked in his losing struggles with Chairman Mao Zedong and President Harry Truman. In the foreground are a number of very detailed accounts of particularly representative battles substantially based on interviews with surviving American combatants. Overall, an impressionistic account with relevance to American political and military history.
June 11, 2018
3.5
I would really love to rate this book higher. If not for the honor and memory it brings to those who served in Korea then for the details about the war that I learned. I would love to, but I won't because yes, I learned a lot, but the dry style in which this book was written made it a task to trudge through.
The Korean War has been called "the forgotten war" and it was for that reason I sought out a book on the subject. I was talking with a cousin recently about an uncle of ours who had passed and he reminded me that he had served in the Korean War. As much as I think I know about other American wars, I realized I know next to nothing about the Korean War.
The soldiers who served in that conflict coined the phrase "die for a tie" and that's probably the perception that most have about the outcome of the war. We didn't lose, but we didn't win. As for my opinion, as well as others I've heard and read, I think it depends on your perspective of the outcome. No, we didn't conquer Korea and have their leaders surrender to us, but then again, taking over North Korea was never our objective to begin with. North Korea invaded our ally, South Korea with intent to possess it and we prevented that from happening, so they failed, we succeeded.
I feel for those who served there because now that I have learned more about this war, I believe there was some of the most brutal battles, conditions, and valiant acts by our soldiers than almost any other war. We don't know about them because there was no great victory parades, accolades, and televised media did not take off until the Vietnam War. Most Americans knew nothing about the details of the war and probably didn't want to.
If you don't believe the Korean War, 1950-1953, was a forgotten war, ask yourself this; how many movies about the war can you name. I can help you with that because if you don't count the TV series "Mash" there are zero. I'm sure there's no interest in portraying how absolutely negligent and irresponsible our command leadership was during that war. Especially when it involved a WWII hero, General MacArthur, who turned out to be a self serving egomaniac.
So, anyway, now I know. I really did learn a ton more than I ever knew, I just wish the story had been served with a little more heart.
January 9, 2014
DID THE EDITOR GO AWOL?
I have a bad or good habit, judge as you will, of pretty much always finishing a book once I've started it. This was tested sorely to the limits with David Halberstams "The Coldest Winter" which I had borrowed from my local Library in the hope of filling in the ample gaps in my knowledge of the Korean War. Instead, within a few score pages, it became apparent that the book had immense and ultimately fatal problems. The fact that there are 650+ pages meant that my reading endurance was tested to its limits.
The amount of clichés is simply astounding as well as a blizzard of trite sound bites, sentimentalism and more than a few dubious judgements. Sentences such as "he passed all kinds of secret tests, and he [Kim Il Sung] was a true believer" appear continuously in the text: the stuff of caricature and they occur with regard to everyone who makes an appearance, from the lowliest soldier to such historical figures as General MacArthur, Harry Truman, Mao and General Ridgeway.
The book is subtitled "America and the Korean War" and I expected that the American contribution to the Korean War would have primacy. What I cannot accept is the utterly miserable amount of space that is given to the Koreans. With the exception of the two leading figures of North and South there is only the odd sentence or paragraph on the Korean people themselves. The reader is left, beyond a few shallow generalities, with little idea of what their experience of the War was. There is not even much in the way of detail regarding how partition happened, or the status of the two Koreas in the period between the end of WW2 and the beginning of the Korean War. The War itself is sometimes glossed over and at other times actions are given in excessive detail, every other soldier seems to get his fifteen cliché ridden sentences of fame.
The analysis at times is a little dubious, for example Truman is quoted as saying "If we stand up to them like we did in Greece three years ago, they won't take any next steps. But if just stand by, they'll move into Iran and they'll take over the whole Middle East." Truman is speaking about what the Soviets will do if he doesn't intervene in Korea, but Halberstam does not think to add that the Soviets never supported the Greek communists and had left Iran four or so years before under a minimal amount of external diplomatic pressure.
The book does have a few saving graces but could have been cut in half, or even more, and been a fairly reasonable account of the Korean War. The lunacy of General MacArthur: his extreme right wing views and the personality cult that surrounded him are clearly stated, as are the tensions in Washington between the Democrat adminstration and a right wing Republican opposition in the post Chinese Revolution era (with its endless debates about who lost China) and their McCarthyism in full flow. The abrasive relationship between General MacArthur and the Democrats in Government is made reasonably clear and even at times interesting. The role that the pervasive American racism regarding Asians played in underestimating first the North Korean forces and then the Chinese is a persistant theme, though it is merely explicated as being of "that time".
In brief, I think that this is a book with more than a few interesting points to make but they are few and far between and any reader who undertakes the journey will have to wade through an unbelievable amount of trite quotes and clichés. There must surely be a better general history of the Korean War than this book?
I have a bad or good habit, judge as you will, of pretty much always finishing a book once I've started it. This was tested sorely to the limits with David Halberstams "The Coldest Winter" which I had borrowed from my local Library in the hope of filling in the ample gaps in my knowledge of the Korean War. Instead, within a few score pages, it became apparent that the book had immense and ultimately fatal problems. The fact that there are 650+ pages meant that my reading endurance was tested to its limits.
The amount of clichés is simply astounding as well as a blizzard of trite sound bites, sentimentalism and more than a few dubious judgements. Sentences such as "he passed all kinds of secret tests, and he [Kim Il Sung] was a true believer" appear continuously in the text: the stuff of caricature and they occur with regard to everyone who makes an appearance, from the lowliest soldier to such historical figures as General MacArthur, Harry Truman, Mao and General Ridgeway.
The book is subtitled "America and the Korean War" and I expected that the American contribution to the Korean War would have primacy. What I cannot accept is the utterly miserable amount of space that is given to the Koreans. With the exception of the two leading figures of North and South there is only the odd sentence or paragraph on the Korean people themselves. The reader is left, beyond a few shallow generalities, with little idea of what their experience of the War was. There is not even much in the way of detail regarding how partition happened, or the status of the two Koreas in the period between the end of WW2 and the beginning of the Korean War. The War itself is sometimes glossed over and at other times actions are given in excessive detail, every other soldier seems to get his fifteen cliché ridden sentences of fame.
The analysis at times is a little dubious, for example Truman is quoted as saying "If we stand up to them like we did in Greece three years ago, they won't take any next steps. But if just stand by, they'll move into Iran and they'll take over the whole Middle East." Truman is speaking about what the Soviets will do if he doesn't intervene in Korea, but Halberstam does not think to add that the Soviets never supported the Greek communists and had left Iran four or so years before under a minimal amount of external diplomatic pressure.
The book does have a few saving graces but could have been cut in half, or even more, and been a fairly reasonable account of the Korean War. The lunacy of General MacArthur: his extreme right wing views and the personality cult that surrounded him are clearly stated, as are the tensions in Washington between the Democrat adminstration and a right wing Republican opposition in the post Chinese Revolution era (with its endless debates about who lost China) and their McCarthyism in full flow. The abrasive relationship between General MacArthur and the Democrats in Government is made reasonably clear and even at times interesting. The role that the pervasive American racism regarding Asians played in underestimating first the North Korean forces and then the Chinese is a persistant theme, though it is merely explicated as being of "that time".
In brief, I think that this is a book with more than a few interesting points to make but they are few and far between and any reader who undertakes the journey will have to wade through an unbelievable amount of trite quotes and clichés. There must surely be a better general history of the Korean War than this book?
October 19, 2010
For some time, “The Coldest Winter” sat cold on my shelf... winter after winter after winter. Sometimes a title will kill a good book. Finally by default, I was goaded into reading it. Like most middle-aged American’s, I knew next to nothing about the Korean War. Of course, Halberstam fixed all that. Thanks to his well told and well edited story, I now have a very good sense of this little, lost war. The Korean War is well worth our attention on several levels. It was the very first in a long, sad line of “Communist” wars following World War II. It was also a non-winnable, unpopular war that was fought far from US soil. Living in 2010 and looking back, this old war of my father’s seems way to familiar. Apparently we have learned nothing and therefore, we are once again destined to repeat our selves. Halberstam’s gift is telling a crisp, big, broad, international war story while arranging intimate cameos of the main characters both big and small. He adds a certain pluck to his writing and he has some very critical opinions aimed at the arrogant world leaders of the time; MacArthur, Truman, Mao and Kim high among them. Halberstam paints a surprisingly vivid portrait of each of them. Last year I read and loved MacArthur’s flag waving hero’s manifesto, “American Caesar.” I knew it was unbalanced in it’s depiction of MacArthur but I loved it anyway. Within “The Coldest Winter,” it was devilishly fun to hear a liberal author bring Mac down more then a few pegs. Halberstam details the general’s last, late, futile and bumbling exit from the theater of war. After enjoying Halbertam’s Coldest Winter, I’ll need to go back into his achieves, I know I’ll strike gold again.
Want to read
April 26, 2017
A great piece of investigative journalism, the book presents the testimony of ordinary people, as well as the American leaders and their opponents. David also focus on "the miscalculations" of both sides of the war. Interviewing war veterans adds nobility to those interviewed and to the purpose of the war: freedom.
Right, the "forgotten war"; not for those who fought it, as one of my friends wrote.*
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/bo...
But now, 2017, can History repeat? I mean, those MISCALCULATIONS? whose consequences could be unthinkable; ...unimagined?
May 10, 2015
Amazing! Absolutely amazing!!! It is rare for me to be surprised by a book on 20th century American history. Just when I think I know everything about a subject, a book comes along and sweeps the rug right out from under my feet. This is due in large part to my ignorance of the Korean War itself and Halberstam's incredible synthesis of interviews, personal accounts, history, politics, and multiple biogrpahies from the lowliest corporeal to the President himself. The first few parts on the geopolitical situation that led to, directly or indirectly, the war is first rate and a must read for anyone interested in the early years of the Cold War. His war reporting is visceral and astute. He gives praise to any man who deserves it, sympathy to any man who deserves it, and judgmental contempt for anyone who deserves it. He is particularly harsh on Gen. MacArthur after the Inchon landing who, by failing to take the Chinese into account, turned the great successes of the war into a near disaster. My only complaint about this book is that there is almost nothing about the war after Gen. MacArthur's dismissal. Then again, not much happened after that to really warrant Halberstam's, or the reader's, serious attention as the war ground ever on. I would highly recommend this book to anyone, even if you are not interested in history.
December 30, 2018
The 'Afterword' sums up the book's style: "the use of fictional techniques to interest readers in complex matters that many might otherwise find forbiddingly tedious" (p. 668). I'd put off reading this 3-lb tome for over a decade and only read it now because I just finished reading the work on Mao, Stalin, and the Korean War by Zhihua Shen (now translated into English). I regret that delay for rather than being one of those laborious works it was a page-turner. Halberstam's weaving of men's personal stories with the geo-politics of the time has created one of the best anti-war books ever written while still honouring the men who fought and died in it.
For those of you who only know the names of Douglas MacArthur, George Marshall, Harry Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy, and that there was once a war known as the Korean War, I recommend you fill the gaps. Moreover, the story of Douglas MacArthur, the 'Big Ego' and pathological liar addicted to fame, with an inability to take advice or ever admit being wrong, will hopefully give readers pause for thought. If I knew how, I would put this book on the desk of every incoming U.S. congressman and woman and pray they'd read it.
For those of you who only know the names of Douglas MacArthur, George Marshall, Harry Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy, and that there was once a war known as the Korean War, I recommend you fill the gaps. Moreover, the story of Douglas MacArthur, the 'Big Ego' and pathological liar addicted to fame, with an inability to take advice or ever admit being wrong, will hopefully give readers pause for thought. If I knew how, I would put this book on the desk of every incoming U.S. congressman and woman and pray they'd read it.
September 29, 2019
A fair history of the first year of the Korean War (1950-1953). Halberstam was a pretty good writer, but this book jumps around too much. We get a few chapters in Korea with the troops then we bounce over to Washington D.C. for a few chapters. After that we swing around to the United Nations before returning to Korea and so forth. The biggest heartache I have with the book is that Halberstam fails to cover the last two years of the war. However he isn't alone in this ommission. Many historians cover the first eighteen months and then end their accounts. I understand why that is. After October 1951 the war of movement was over.. The peace talks began and would drag on for almost two years. During this time soldiers fought and died over ridgelines and hilltops. Essentially it was a return to World War One. It doesn't make for dramatic history, but it is part of the Korean War and to give a chapter or two to that phase isn't right. I had higher expectations for this book and it only met about half of them. The book is okay for what it is, but it doesn't deliver fully in the end.
March 27, 2017
Excellent book, I knew next to nothing about the Korean War and I picked this up at my local Habitat for Humanity and decided to rectify that situation. He expertly weaves the political backgrounds, the generals backgrounds, the strategic overviews, and the first hand accounts of the men on the ground into one flowing story. To understand the American politics behind the war he also presents the Russian, North Korean, and Chinese going ons as well. It is (as most books of this kind are) a sad read as well, the amount of human life wasted because of political aspirations and fear is horrible. Excellent in depth overview (if that makes sense) of the war in my opinion.
June 4, 2015
-Un buen vistazo al conflicto en Corea, pero desde arriba y desde ángulos más geopolíticos que militares, estrictamente hablando.-
Género. Historia.
Lo que nos cuenta. Con el subtítulo de “Historia de la guerra de Corea”, aproximación al conflicto desde su gestión hasta su, digamos, conclusión (por llamarlo de alguna manera), principalmente orientado a la visión política del asunto (y del mundo) de los Estados Unidos de América, y centrado en varios personajes que mucho tuvieron que decir al respecto.
¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:
http://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com/...
Género. Historia.
Lo que nos cuenta. Con el subtítulo de “Historia de la guerra de Corea”, aproximación al conflicto desde su gestión hasta su, digamos, conclusión (por llamarlo de alguna manera), principalmente orientado a la visión política del asunto (y del mundo) de los Estados Unidos de América, y centrado en varios personajes que mucho tuvieron que decir al respecto.
¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:
http://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com/...
February 12, 2021
What an amazing book. I have read a few sports books by Halberstam but this was my first history book. I really enjoyed the book on a topic I had never specifically read about before - the Korean War. The author does an outstanding job of weaving in the fighting with the politics in Washington with the leaders in Asia and Europe that were a part of the start of the Cold War. I found the book fascinating and will certainly search out and read more of his other works.
June 2, 2017
This was a fabulous book. It was written in such a way that kept me engaged, and the author's passion for the story is contagious. So glad read it.
February 24, 2021
There are certain professions that the risk of getting yourself killed is much greater than most other professions, such as a soldier, a covert CIA officer, FBI field agents, police officers, and firemen. Making such a statement is obvious, and when I hear of any of these courageous human beings getting killed I am saddened, but I understand that the profession they chose, or in the time of war was chosen for them, I take some comfort in the fact that possibly getting killed was something much more likely to happen, and they understood that.
What I cannot accept, is when a leader (be it the president or a five star general) sends soldiers to their death without any qualms but simply to satisfy his ego... Without any knowledge of the enemy or the terrain and will not listen to his advisors or intelligent agencies because he doesn't like to be second guessed by anyone, including the President of the US, The joint Chief of Staff, and The Department of Defense... That to me is treason and that is exactly what General Douglas MacArthur was guilty of, during the Korean War.
David Halberstam's, "The Coldest Winter," is one of the best, if not the best book I have read about the Korean War, or as it was up to recently called, "The forgotten war." The war where thousands of US soldiers, as young as sixteen, were killed senselessly, in bitter cold conditions, fighting a North Korean army and as many as 500,000 Chinese solders who MacArthur refused to admit were in the country until it was far too late.
MacArthur, who never spend a night in Korea during the time he was in charge, but stayed in the comfort of his Tokyo headquarters, where he routinely called the Chinese 'Laundry soldiers,' and refused to acknowledge how good and disciplined the Chinese performed as soldiers.
"The Coldest Winter," is a thorough examination of the Korean war and how as a nation, we allowed our military to degenerate and the defense budget to be cut to one-fifth the size it was at the end of World War II, and how the soldiers we originally send over to stop the North Korean advance into the south were ill-prepared, poorly supplied, and lacking the right clothing and yet they managed to hold off assault after assault and never get pushed off the peninsula. This is a heart wrenching book that any real student of American history should read. Highly recommend.
What I cannot accept, is when a leader (be it the president or a five star general) sends soldiers to their death without any qualms but simply to satisfy his ego... Without any knowledge of the enemy or the terrain and will not listen to his advisors or intelligent agencies because he doesn't like to be second guessed by anyone, including the President of the US, The joint Chief of Staff, and The Department of Defense... That to me is treason and that is exactly what General Douglas MacArthur was guilty of, during the Korean War.
David Halberstam's, "The Coldest Winter," is one of the best, if not the best book I have read about the Korean War, or as it was up to recently called, "The forgotten war." The war where thousands of US soldiers, as young as sixteen, were killed senselessly, in bitter cold conditions, fighting a North Korean army and as many as 500,000 Chinese solders who MacArthur refused to admit were in the country until it was far too late.
MacArthur, who never spend a night in Korea during the time he was in charge, but stayed in the comfort of his Tokyo headquarters, where he routinely called the Chinese 'Laundry soldiers,' and refused to acknowledge how good and disciplined the Chinese performed as soldiers.
"The Coldest Winter," is a thorough examination of the Korean war and how as a nation, we allowed our military to degenerate and the defense budget to be cut to one-fifth the size it was at the end of World War II, and how the soldiers we originally send over to stop the North Korean advance into the south were ill-prepared, poorly supplied, and lacking the right clothing and yet they managed to hold off assault after assault and never get pushed off the peninsula. This is a heart wrenching book that any real student of American history should read. Highly recommend.
February 15, 2022
In the Halbertsam style, the book views history through the experiences and thoughts of the men and women who lived it. In this case, the topic is 1950 -53 Korean War. It was refreshing to learn of common soldiers (McGee, et. al.) rather than just the Russian and North Korean leaders who started the conflict, the Chinese and American generals who led the fighting, and the various government, diplomatic and military figures who perpetuated the stalemate (that is still with us today).
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