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Network Propaganda: Manipulation, Disinformation, and Radicalization in American Politics
This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.
Is social media destroying democracy? Are Russian propaganda or "Fake news" entrepreneurs on Facebook undermining our sense of a shared reality? A conventional wisdom has emerged since the election of Donald Trump in 2016 that new technologies and their manipulation by foreign actors played a decisive role in his victory and are responsible for the sense of a "post-truth" moment in which disinformation and propaganda thrives.
Network Propaganda challenges that received wisdom through the most comprehensive study yet published on media coverage of American presidential politics from the start of the election cycle in April 2015 to the one year anniversary of the Trump presidency. Analysing millions of news stories together with Twitter and Facebook shares, broadcast television and YouTube, the book provides a comprehensive overview of the architecture of contemporary American political communications. Through data analysis and detailed qualitative case studies of coverage of immigration, Clinton scandals, and the Trump Russia investigation, the book finds that the right-wing media ecosystem operates fundamentally differently than the rest of the media environment.
The authors argue that longstanding institutional, political, and cultural patterns in American politics interacted with technological change since the 1970s to create a propaganda feedback loop in American conservative media. This dynamic has marginalized centre-right media and politicians, radicalized the right wing ecosystem, and rendered it susceptible to propaganda efforts, foreign and domestic. For readers outside the United States, the book offers a new perspective and methods for diagnosing the sources of, and potential solutions for, the perceived global crisis of democratic politics.
Is social media destroying democracy? Are Russian propaganda or "Fake news" entrepreneurs on Facebook undermining our sense of a shared reality? A conventional wisdom has emerged since the election of Donald Trump in 2016 that new technologies and their manipulation by foreign actors played a decisive role in his victory and are responsible for the sense of a "post-truth" moment in which disinformation and propaganda thrives.
Network Propaganda challenges that received wisdom through the most comprehensive study yet published on media coverage of American presidential politics from the start of the election cycle in April 2015 to the one year anniversary of the Trump presidency. Analysing millions of news stories together with Twitter and Facebook shares, broadcast television and YouTube, the book provides a comprehensive overview of the architecture of contemporary American political communications. Through data analysis and detailed qualitative case studies of coverage of immigration, Clinton scandals, and the Trump Russia investigation, the book finds that the right-wing media ecosystem operates fundamentally differently than the rest of the media environment.
The authors argue that longstanding institutional, political, and cultural patterns in American politics interacted with technological change since the 1970s to create a propaganda feedback loop in American conservative media. This dynamic has marginalized centre-right media and politicians, radicalized the right wing ecosystem, and rendered it susceptible to propaganda efforts, foreign and domestic. For readers outside the United States, the book offers a new perspective and methods for diagnosing the sources of, and potential solutions for, the perceived global crisis of democratic politics.
472 pages, Paperback
First published October 15, 2018
203 people are currently reading
2429 people want to read
About the author
Yochai Benkler
13 books55 followersYochai Benkler (born 1964) is an Israeli-American author and the Berkman Professor of Entrepreneurial Legal Studies at Harvard Law School. He is also a faculty co-director of the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University.
From 1984 to 1987, Benkler was a member and treasurer of the Kibbutz Shizafon. He received his LL.B. from Tel-Aviv University in 1991 and J.D. from Harvard Law School in 1994. He worked at the law firm Ropes & Gray from 1994–1995. He clerked for U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen G. Breyer from 1995 to 1996. Benkler is the last person to clerk for a U.S. Supreme Court justice without having prior judicial clerkship experience.
He was a professor at New York University School of Law from 1996 to 2003, and visited at Yale Law School and Harvard Law School (during 2002–2003), before joining the Yale Law School faculty in 2003. In 2007, Benkler joined Harvard Law School, where he teaches and is a faculty co-director of the Berkman Center for Internet & Society. Benkler is on the advisory board of the Sunlight Foundation. In 2011, his research led him to receive the $100,000 Ford Foundation Social Change Visionaries Award.
From 1984 to 1987, Benkler was a member and treasurer of the Kibbutz Shizafon. He received his LL.B. from Tel-Aviv University in 1991 and J.D. from Harvard Law School in 1994. He worked at the law firm Ropes & Gray from 1994–1995. He clerked for U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen G. Breyer from 1995 to 1996. Benkler is the last person to clerk for a U.S. Supreme Court justice without having prior judicial clerkship experience.
He was a professor at New York University School of Law from 1996 to 2003, and visited at Yale Law School and Harvard Law School (during 2002–2003), before joining the Yale Law School faculty in 2003. In 2007, Benkler joined Harvard Law School, where he teaches and is a faculty co-director of the Berkman Center for Internet & Society. Benkler is on the advisory board of the Sunlight Foundation. In 2011, his research led him to receive the $100,000 Ford Foundation Social Change Visionaries Award.
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October 12, 2018Review in the New Yorker, August 2018 - looks interesting.
Haven't watched it all yet, but a one and a half hour debate with the authors at the Cato Institute of all places. Perhaps just a chance for them to gloat over their propaganda successes?
Haven't watched it all yet, but a one and a half hour debate with the authors at the Cato Institute of all places. Perhaps just a chance for them to gloat over their propaganda successes?
October 26, 2019
I would rate this book as more suited, in many ways, to academics than to a general public. But I also think the core findings of the research performed are essential for the general public to know.
Put simply, the argument, supported by empirical research is as follows: there is significant radicalisation in American politics online, but it is very one-sided: the "media ecosystem" most aligning with a right-wing view is polarised and cut off from the rest of the "media ecosystem" in the way that is simply not present to anywhere near the same degree on the left. The empirical research entailed examination of links shared by Twitter and Facebook users broken down by political alignment, and examination of weblinks by public websites according to political alignment. It's here that I do find an objection to their methodology, although it is not a fatal one.
Their classification of news sources depends on a measure derived from users' retweets of either Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump, and the ratio of retweets. The exact methodology is described in chapter 2, but it concerns me that an analysis of left vs right that is examining media insularity neglects to take supporters of Bernie Sanders or Jill Stein into account. My suspicion is that this is where left-wing insularity would be most pronounced. Despite this, the broader point remains valid, in that the "mainstream" (Republican, Trump-supporting) right's media ecosystem is insular in a way that the "mainstream" (Democratic, Clinton-supporting) left's media ecosystem is not.
This is not to say that media other than the right are perfect. But in mainstream media, there is a tension between telling people what they want to hear , and telling people things they don't want to hear but are true. The problem, on the right that they see in some case studies, is that the right-wing media ecosystem is set up almost exclusively to tell people who tune into it what they want to hear. Worse, they present evidence that the people tuning into this media ecosystem are doing so exclusively. Their data shows that the people they classify as "left" and "centrist" have significant overlap in the media they consume: the left contains more partisan sources, but not at the expense of sources rated more "centrist".
Their other major claim is that the effect they observe cannot be placed primarily, or even necessarily at all, on the usual suspects of contemporary media manipulation. Part three of the book takes up, and rejects, the primacy of, in turn, propaganda online, Russian hackers, or algorithmic curation, as causing the effects they see. Instead, in part four, they present historical evidence to suggest that an insular right-wing media ecosystem has been pursued by right-wingers since the 1940s, and pursued with some success since the 1980s. The current situation, per their argument, started with Rush Limbaugh's radio show and has steadily turned in on itself since.
Lest left-wingers get too smug, part of their argument about this insularity is that the insularity is one-sided only because of "first mover advantage" given to the side that turns in on itself first. There is no guarantee that, given a slightly different history, things could have turned out differently.
I would say this is a very important book. I rate it down a little because it somewhat awkwardly tries to straddle the line between academic book and a book for the general public, falling a little too heavily on the academic side. I also, as I said, have some concerns with their methodology. But it is extremely important, in the contemporary political environment, to have empirical evidence that documents the asymmetry of how media in America is currently configured.
Put simply, the argument, supported by empirical research is as follows: there is significant radicalisation in American politics online, but it is very one-sided: the "media ecosystem" most aligning with a right-wing view is polarised and cut off from the rest of the "media ecosystem" in the way that is simply not present to anywhere near the same degree on the left. The empirical research entailed examination of links shared by Twitter and Facebook users broken down by political alignment, and examination of weblinks by public websites according to political alignment. It's here that I do find an objection to their methodology, although it is not a fatal one.
Their classification of news sources depends on a measure derived from users' retweets of either Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump, and the ratio of retweets. The exact methodology is described in chapter 2, but it concerns me that an analysis of left vs right that is examining media insularity neglects to take supporters of Bernie Sanders or Jill Stein into account. My suspicion is that this is where left-wing insularity would be most pronounced. Despite this, the broader point remains valid, in that the "mainstream" (Republican, Trump-supporting) right's media ecosystem is insular in a way that the "mainstream" (Democratic, Clinton-supporting) left's media ecosystem is not.
This is not to say that media other than the right are perfect. But in mainstream media, there is a tension between telling people what they want to hear , and telling people things they don't want to hear but are true. The problem, on the right that they see in some case studies, is that the right-wing media ecosystem is set up almost exclusively to tell people who tune into it what they want to hear. Worse, they present evidence that the people tuning into this media ecosystem are doing so exclusively. Their data shows that the people they classify as "left" and "centrist" have significant overlap in the media they consume: the left contains more partisan sources, but not at the expense of sources rated more "centrist".
Their other major claim is that the effect they observe cannot be placed primarily, or even necessarily at all, on the usual suspects of contemporary media manipulation. Part three of the book takes up, and rejects, the primacy of, in turn, propaganda online, Russian hackers, or algorithmic curation, as causing the effects they see. Instead, in part four, they present historical evidence to suggest that an insular right-wing media ecosystem has been pursued by right-wingers since the 1940s, and pursued with some success since the 1980s. The current situation, per their argument, started with Rush Limbaugh's radio show and has steadily turned in on itself since.
Lest left-wingers get too smug, part of their argument about this insularity is that the insularity is one-sided only because of "first mover advantage" given to the side that turns in on itself first. There is no guarantee that, given a slightly different history, things could have turned out differently.
I would say this is a very important book. I rate it down a little because it somewhat awkwardly tries to straddle the line between academic book and a book for the general public, falling a little too heavily on the academic side. I also, as I said, have some concerns with their methodology. But it is extremely important, in the contemporary political environment, to have empirical evidence that documents the asymmetry of how media in America is currently configured.
February 23, 2019
This is the best book I have read so far on the interaction between right wing politics and media. The authors adopt a relatively neutral tone, are scrupulously transparent in describing their methods, and offer insights hard to find elsewhere. The authors admirably avoid hyperbolic narratives about Russian influence, the Alt-right, commercial algorithms and "internet echo chambers" while demonstrating the ways in which all of these factors are currently at play.
November 2, 2018
This is by far the best explanation I've read of what happened in the 2016 election, and how politics has been fundamentally changed. Yes, the Russians were a factor. Yes, the alt-right factions became more vocal. Yes, there was fake news. Yes, Facebook has created echo chambers and disinformation campaigns. But the chaos and partisanship we're experiencing now are the culmination of a decades-long trend that started with Rush Limbaugh and culminated in Fox News and its powerful propaganda feedback loop--one that was able to amplify its partisan narrative through the alt-right, Facebook and fake news. This is the megaphone behind Pizzagate and the Clintons' Lolita Express and other conspiracy theories. This is uniquely American, and it's threatening democracy.
The authors use data sets of thousands of articles and news segments, analyzing millions of shares from the open web, Twitter, and Facebook to determine how peoples' thinking is manipulated with narrative-reinforcing stories no matter how true (and mostly they were blatantly false). See how mainstream media sometimes unwittingly played a role in validating and keeping such stories in the public eye. And read case studies of how Breitbart, Infowars and other fringe sites fed off of each other so that stories, no matter how far-fetched, were repeated so often by so many right-wing sources that people couldn't help but believe them.
Only if people understand the root cause of our crazy media and social media ecosystems is there any hope of being able to fix it and maybe save democracy. I highly recommend this book for that purpose.
The authors use data sets of thousands of articles and news segments, analyzing millions of shares from the open web, Twitter, and Facebook to determine how peoples' thinking is manipulated with narrative-reinforcing stories no matter how true (and mostly they were blatantly false). See how mainstream media sometimes unwittingly played a role in validating and keeping such stories in the public eye. And read case studies of how Breitbart, Infowars and other fringe sites fed off of each other so that stories, no matter how far-fetched, were repeated so often by so many right-wing sources that people couldn't help but believe them.
Only if people understand the root cause of our crazy media and social media ecosystems is there any hope of being able to fix it and maybe save democracy. I highly recommend this book for that purpose.
April 26, 2024
I never will understand why this book has not been adopted like "Nudge" was.
This hypothesis is backed by transparent and robust evidence.
The conclusion may be controversial, the methods are sound.
This hypothesis is backed by transparent and robust evidence.
The conclusion may be controversial, the methods are sound.
September 20, 2018
Must Read for all journalists and political activists
Very well researched and alarming. Whilst the focus of much concern has been in the Russian meddling this book makes clear it has been the decades long growth of far right media in the form of Fox News which is the rampaging Gorilla destroying U.S. democracy.
Very well researched and alarming. Whilst the focus of much concern has been in the Russian meddling this book makes clear it has been the decades long growth of far right media in the form of Fox News which is the rampaging Gorilla destroying U.S. democracy.
June 9, 2019
A well-researched book investigating the factors of polarization, misinformation and propaganda that were seen during the 2016 American presidential election. The authors look at intentional misinformation, conspiracy theories, bullshit and the amplification and spread of stories to look for methods and factors. Contrary to some of the common theories they did not show that Facebook specifically or the internet more generally were of significant impact. The voters most likely to be using these services were less likely to be Trump voters, and the types of influence that were attempted is shown to be of minimal impact. The authors use a great analogy 'If $5000 is stolen from a billionaire, it doesn't make it less illegal even if the billionaire might not notice it's loss' - cautioning that these tactics are likely in the future and likely to become more effective over time. The authors convincingly show that the internet echoes trends that are present in television and radio.
Network Propaganda identifies and examines several more powerful trends that impacted the 2016 election using machine learning assisted word maps and other tools with information gathered from Twitter data, traditional polling, close examination of newspaper, television, and other medias. The asymmetric relationship with truth between the left and the right is shown in a variety of contexts. This shows the left exists in a "Reality Check" dynamic that penalizes the spread of misinformation and says 'well, actually..' meaning that even if a story is shared, it will be corrected. The right does not share this habit, and that gives the right what they call a first-mover advantage. The American right-wing media, described as Rush Limbaugh, Fox News and tv evangelicals among others, established a separate media ecosystem that does not have the same penalties and disadvantages for propaganda. They intimately review the ways individual stories would rise from a suspicious source and become propagated into the larger news cycle through reactions to this false story. They examine politifact and it's data, and ways that it is both useful and could be improved. Don't imagine that this book is entirely complimentary about the left - they do show several efforts to duplicate the right's information tactics, they just show that it hasn't been as successful.
The book is mostly research and evidence but it does have a few specific proposals that seem reasonable. An open database containing the ads placed on a platform, with purchaser data available for customers above a certain amount of purchases, would combat 'dark ads' - ads tightly targeted to be less public such as neonazi support. They also enjoin reporters to put more emphasis on truth and accountability over norms of balance and neutrality to overcome the asymmetric way affinity and identity-confirming networks amplifies extreme and uninformed views. This is in part because a diffuse information ecosystem allows a small segment of viewers to become immersed in identity-confirming news where they are not confronted by potentially uncomfortable news stories.
Overall very interesting for the technical discussion of different types of internet misinformation and those who share it, with a lighter discussion of issues brought up in The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power but only in the context of how behavioral marketing can endanger democracy as it becomes more effective, as well as the description of more traditional propagandistic methods.
Read via audiobook from the SF Public Library and the Libby app, with references to the free book here https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/vie...
Network Propaganda identifies and examines several more powerful trends that impacted the 2016 election using machine learning assisted word maps and other tools with information gathered from Twitter data, traditional polling, close examination of newspaper, television, and other medias. The asymmetric relationship with truth between the left and the right is shown in a variety of contexts. This shows the left exists in a "Reality Check" dynamic that penalizes the spread of misinformation and says 'well, actually..' meaning that even if a story is shared, it will be corrected. The right does not share this habit, and that gives the right what they call a first-mover advantage. The American right-wing media, described as Rush Limbaugh, Fox News and tv evangelicals among others, established a separate media ecosystem that does not have the same penalties and disadvantages for propaganda. They intimately review the ways individual stories would rise from a suspicious source and become propagated into the larger news cycle through reactions to this false story. They examine politifact and it's data, and ways that it is both useful and could be improved. Don't imagine that this book is entirely complimentary about the left - they do show several efforts to duplicate the right's information tactics, they just show that it hasn't been as successful.
The book is mostly research and evidence but it does have a few specific proposals that seem reasonable. An open database containing the ads placed on a platform, with purchaser data available for customers above a certain amount of purchases, would combat 'dark ads' - ads tightly targeted to be less public such as neonazi support. They also enjoin reporters to put more emphasis on truth and accountability over norms of balance and neutrality to overcome the asymmetric way affinity and identity-confirming networks amplifies extreme and uninformed views. This is in part because a diffuse information ecosystem allows a small segment of viewers to become immersed in identity-confirming news where they are not confronted by potentially uncomfortable news stories.
Overall very interesting for the technical discussion of different types of internet misinformation and those who share it, with a lighter discussion of issues brought up in The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power but only in the context of how behavioral marketing can endanger democracy as it becomes more effective, as well as the description of more traditional propagandistic methods.
Read via audiobook from the SF Public Library and the Libby app, with references to the free book here https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/vie...
November 24, 2024
I read this book to better understand the 2024 election results. Across so many national and international issues, Kamala Harris was the better candidate, yet Trump won. Why? While much of it is simply the result of people still feeling shook by post-COVID inflation, disinformation on the right is a significant part of the answer. This book explains how disinformation and propaganda influenced the 2016 election.
Through a data-driven approach, the authors clearly show how the United States has an asymmetrically polarized media ecosystem: the left wing of the American media ecosystem is highly interconnected with the center of the media ecosystem (centrist and non-partisan media) - whereas the right wing is highly insular and disconnected from the center. As a result, left-leaning media experiences feedback loops that self-correct, fact check, and balance misinformation and disinformation. Whereas right-leaning media lacks that balance, and is instead an echo chamber that is much more prone to propaganda feedback loops.
The authors persuasively document this case through extensive data analysis of Facebook shares, Twitter tweets, examples of how disinformation on the left and right sides of the media fared differently, and historical analysis. 2016 - and now, 2024 - was in large measure the result of the successes of partisan right-wing media from Rush Limbaugh from 1988 onwards, Fox News from 1996 onwards, and a large number of smaller right-wing media actors (including Breitbart). The asymmetric polarization and radicalization of the American right has been fed by the echo chambers of the right wing media system - which have in the process made a significant part of the American population susceptible to internal and external disinformation and bullshit, loony conspiracy theories, and other anti-science and anti-reality perspectives.
The authors recognize that the majority of Americans do not consume much political media but do not treat that larger population here. After all, uninformed voters on the left and right are likely still influenced, to some degree or another, by people they know who are influenced by media. Still, I think it's important to keep in mind that the idiocy of American voters is due to both disinformation and to ignorance. We need to do better as a country in investing in education, critical thinking, and civic-mindedness to tackle both.
"Network Propaganda" also illustrates that the internet itself is not primarily the reason for our democratic malaise. They persuasively demonstrate that hackers, Russian bots, and algorithmic manipulation isn't what's resulted in our hyperpartisan condition, though they note that the latter has potential to become more significant. Rather, it's the influence of the internet on top of an already asymmetrically polarized media ecosystem that's the issue. Other countries with more symmetric information systems are unlikely to experience the degree of polarization and propaganda that the United States faces.
The last chapter of the book covers proposed solutions, which are mostly minor adjustments to improve professional journalism and public regulations. The disappointing conclusion is that the main solution to the problem is unlikely to happen: the right wing media would have to reform itself. But for that to happen, the right wing would have to fail politically for an extended period of time. 2024 has shown that this isn't in the cards anytime soon. Unfortunately, this means that we are likely to continue to experience political extremism and idiocy on the right, probably for decades to come.
Through a data-driven approach, the authors clearly show how the United States has an asymmetrically polarized media ecosystem: the left wing of the American media ecosystem is highly interconnected with the center of the media ecosystem (centrist and non-partisan media) - whereas the right wing is highly insular and disconnected from the center. As a result, left-leaning media experiences feedback loops that self-correct, fact check, and balance misinformation and disinformation. Whereas right-leaning media lacks that balance, and is instead an echo chamber that is much more prone to propaganda feedback loops.
The authors persuasively document this case through extensive data analysis of Facebook shares, Twitter tweets, examples of how disinformation on the left and right sides of the media fared differently, and historical analysis. 2016 - and now, 2024 - was in large measure the result of the successes of partisan right-wing media from Rush Limbaugh from 1988 onwards, Fox News from 1996 onwards, and a large number of smaller right-wing media actors (including Breitbart). The asymmetric polarization and radicalization of the American right has been fed by the echo chambers of the right wing media system - which have in the process made a significant part of the American population susceptible to internal and external disinformation and bullshit, loony conspiracy theories, and other anti-science and anti-reality perspectives.
The authors recognize that the majority of Americans do not consume much political media but do not treat that larger population here. After all, uninformed voters on the left and right are likely still influenced, to some degree or another, by people they know who are influenced by media. Still, I think it's important to keep in mind that the idiocy of American voters is due to both disinformation and to ignorance. We need to do better as a country in investing in education, critical thinking, and civic-mindedness to tackle both.
"Network Propaganda" also illustrates that the internet itself is not primarily the reason for our democratic malaise. They persuasively demonstrate that hackers, Russian bots, and algorithmic manipulation isn't what's resulted in our hyperpartisan condition, though they note that the latter has potential to become more significant. Rather, it's the influence of the internet on top of an already asymmetrically polarized media ecosystem that's the issue. Other countries with more symmetric information systems are unlikely to experience the degree of polarization and propaganda that the United States faces.
The last chapter of the book covers proposed solutions, which are mostly minor adjustments to improve professional journalism and public regulations. The disappointing conclusion is that the main solution to the problem is unlikely to happen: the right wing media would have to reform itself. But for that to happen, the right wing would have to fail politically for an extended period of time. 2024 has shown that this isn't in the cards anytime soon. Unfortunately, this means that we are likely to continue to experience political extremism and idiocy on the right, probably for decades to come.
May 19, 2019
“[T]he touchstone of propaganda is the intention of the propagandist” (p. 104, Nook version).
I have no doubt budding PSYOPers at West Point are writing papers on this very topic semester after semester, but the authors here have performed perhaps the most clinical diagnoses of such a complex, asymmetrical topic with such scientific methodology that it is a laborious act to read and digest the results, and like all complex subjects, the results are surprising on some levels, occasionally mind-blowing, and blatantly obvious on others. Network Propaganda is exhaustive in its framework, with strong adherence to professional, scientific standards, and this must be considered a seminal work for further research.
Mike Godwin from Techdirt wrote a very nice review which summarizes the book well, so why should I bother because I’ll probably get mean-spirited about the whole thing:
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/201...
Godwin’s reasoning is sound, and he speaks directly to the slathering Right wishing to blacklist this book as “liberal” pap (like so much scientific research is by those who wish to live in their thin bubbles of delusion), as much as the wild-eyed Left pointing fingers and shaking fists, screaming “Ah-ha!”: “The progress of knowledge, and of problem-solving in the real world, requires us, regardless of political preferences and philosophical approaches, to come together in recognizing the value of facts.” Facts, objective truths, hard data. These are the tools that push us past this ugly era of disinformation, psychological operations messaging, and the wanton war on Truth.
Americans by the millions, and so many countless millions of others world-wide, are being manipulated on a daily, if not hourly, basis. Troll farms, hackers, and Alex-Jones-deplorables are important to understand and neutralize, but this book highlights convincingly that it is the mainstream networks and their online platforms which have done the lion’s share of mass manipulation, the fomenting of false narratives, and the stoking of phantom fears rooted in elemental racism and xenophobia, all perpetuated by ignorance and a dearth of quality education among portions of the citizenry. I’ve said it before and maybe it’ll be my deathbed decree, but the ill-informed voter is the greatest hazard of a republic (i.e., “democracy”). The 4chan/Reddit to Drudge Report/Infowars to Breitbart/Fox News pipeline is painstakingly illustrated through rigorous forensics, while the 1930s radio evangelist to 1980s televangelists to Rush Limbaugh to Fox News to Donald Trump is also influentially explained. Jane Mayer of The New Yorker wrote about the Fox White House in March, 2019 (https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/20...).
Don’t get me wrong. Wringing the truths out of politicians—and the powers that pull their strings—isn’t easy, but there are incredibly competent journalists out there doing the heavy lifting. You just have to choose which ones to follow, support, and aid. We certainly are in an epistemic crisis unlike anything before, with the social-psychological mechanics of the internet creating rolling waves of feedback loops spurred onward by dim bulbs with pocket computers and Captain Ahab fixations on their deep-diving whales, unable or unwilling to vet their sources or critically analyze the info before them. Loads of papers and a stack of books have already been written in the past few years about human behavior in the Now, so seek them out. To know thyself is a powerful step towards comprehension of the world around you, and your terribly tiny place within it. The lies we tell ourselves, staring into the mirror darkly, is vexing enough on its own. Start there (you don’t need a psychology degree; you just need penetratingly deep self-reflection), then dig into the “Deep State” and “Fake News” and all those other wonderful catch-phrases and doublespeak of the propaganda machinery.
I could fill up this space with quotations to pull you in, but I’d prefer that you support the authors and their research (or your local public library) and get this book/ebook/audiobook. What’s the most obvious component to this important work is how Fox News and its subsidiaries are the prime propaganda driver, and the authors illustrate it conclusively, in play-by-play detail. Sean Hannity says something factually moronic and 3 million Americans nod in agreement like puppets with little American flags stitched into their hands. What’s worse, they grab their smartphones and spread the disease. (Ah, see, I’ve gone down the vitriolic rabbit hole and cast mean-spiritedness towards others. Sigh. Unfortunately, not all people are intelligent.) Thankfully, there are crucial bastions of fact-checking out there, PolitiFact (https://www.politifact.com/) being the one most known to me because I listen to Sacramento’s NPR station. To be an informed voter and citizen, one has to do some hard labor, but the tools exist to empower oneself, no matter what part of the political spectrum you identify with; however, as the anti-vaxers and flat-earthers demonstrate painfully, the war for Truth is going to be a long, hard slog through the trenches of an organized and insidious enemy that knows its target demographics all too well. It will be a slog of attrition, education, and accountability. Which side will you be on?
Voltaire warned that “those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities” (“Questions sur les Miracles”, 1765). We have plenty of evidence for this. Can the internet be policed effectively? Can networks be bound by integrity and accountability to the information they dispense? Will the small percentage of the population identifying with the far right realize they’re being played by powers with their own agendas, while the majority of us exist in self-segregated ecosystems? The cynic in me says no, but I hope to be proven wrong. As the authors explain, “[e]xisting in a media ecosystem dominated by media whose role is to confirm your preconceptions and lead you to distrust any sources that might challenge your beliefs is a recipe for misinformation and susceptibility to disinformation. At the end of the day, if one side most trusts Fox News, Hannity, Limbaugh, and Beck, and the other side most trusts NPR, the BBC, PBS, and the New York Times, one cannot expect both sides to be equally informed or equally capable of telling truth from identity-confirming fiction” (p. 306, Nook version). We exist in an era of surveillance capitalism, the likes of which Cambridge Analytica mastered beautifully. Do we have the capabilities to holistically correct the system?
The authors conclude that “we see longer-term dynamics of political economy: ideology and institutions interacting with technological adoption as the primary drivers the present epistemic crisis. These dynamics which play out across television, radio, and mainstream professional journalism at least as much as through the internet and social media, have been developing for 30 years and have resulted in a highly asymmetric media ecosystem that is the primary driver of disinformation and propaganda in the American public sphere” (p. 330, Nook version). Solutions are offered, each with a price that some will find intolerable, but legislation is already in the works, including the “Honest Ads Act”. It takes Congress, Silicon Valley, and every Joe/Jill Q. Public to demand action in order to create systemic change in how information is created, properly labeled (transparency), controlled, regulated, and digested. Institutionalized fact-checking is also a Herculean dream, but one AI could help with. The software educators use to scan papers for plagiarism seems to me a great starting point, and this book lists projects already underway. Ideally, taking the money we waste on mindless wars, tax havens for mega-corporations, and tax breaks for the filthy rich, and giving that money to our collective public education systems—well-paid teachers; safe and vibrant school environs; the support structure for mental health, family involvement, and physical fitness; and a gateway to college, a trade school, and/or civil service for every capable child—would ultimately lead to a better-educated, more worldly, critical-thinking, and hopefully more compassionate citizenry in a few decades. That is the future I hope for.
I have no doubt budding PSYOPers at West Point are writing papers on this very topic semester after semester, but the authors here have performed perhaps the most clinical diagnoses of such a complex, asymmetrical topic with such scientific methodology that it is a laborious act to read and digest the results, and like all complex subjects, the results are surprising on some levels, occasionally mind-blowing, and blatantly obvious on others. Network Propaganda is exhaustive in its framework, with strong adherence to professional, scientific standards, and this must be considered a seminal work for further research.
Mike Godwin from Techdirt wrote a very nice review which summarizes the book well, so why should I bother because I’ll probably get mean-spirited about the whole thing:
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/201...
Godwin’s reasoning is sound, and he speaks directly to the slathering Right wishing to blacklist this book as “liberal” pap (like so much scientific research is by those who wish to live in their thin bubbles of delusion), as much as the wild-eyed Left pointing fingers and shaking fists, screaming “Ah-ha!”: “The progress of knowledge, and of problem-solving in the real world, requires us, regardless of political preferences and philosophical approaches, to come together in recognizing the value of facts.” Facts, objective truths, hard data. These are the tools that push us past this ugly era of disinformation, psychological operations messaging, and the wanton war on Truth.
Americans by the millions, and so many countless millions of others world-wide, are being manipulated on a daily, if not hourly, basis. Troll farms, hackers, and Alex-Jones-deplorables are important to understand and neutralize, but this book highlights convincingly that it is the mainstream networks and their online platforms which have done the lion’s share of mass manipulation, the fomenting of false narratives, and the stoking of phantom fears rooted in elemental racism and xenophobia, all perpetuated by ignorance and a dearth of quality education among portions of the citizenry. I’ve said it before and maybe it’ll be my deathbed decree, but the ill-informed voter is the greatest hazard of a republic (i.e., “democracy”). The 4chan/Reddit to Drudge Report/Infowars to Breitbart/Fox News pipeline is painstakingly illustrated through rigorous forensics, while the 1930s radio evangelist to 1980s televangelists to Rush Limbaugh to Fox News to Donald Trump is also influentially explained. Jane Mayer of The New Yorker wrote about the Fox White House in March, 2019 (https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/20...).
Don’t get me wrong. Wringing the truths out of politicians—and the powers that pull their strings—isn’t easy, but there are incredibly competent journalists out there doing the heavy lifting. You just have to choose which ones to follow, support, and aid. We certainly are in an epistemic crisis unlike anything before, with the social-psychological mechanics of the internet creating rolling waves of feedback loops spurred onward by dim bulbs with pocket computers and Captain Ahab fixations on their deep-diving whales, unable or unwilling to vet their sources or critically analyze the info before them. Loads of papers and a stack of books have already been written in the past few years about human behavior in the Now, so seek them out. To know thyself is a powerful step towards comprehension of the world around you, and your terribly tiny place within it. The lies we tell ourselves, staring into the mirror darkly, is vexing enough on its own. Start there (you don’t need a psychology degree; you just need penetratingly deep self-reflection), then dig into the “Deep State” and “Fake News” and all those other wonderful catch-phrases and doublespeak of the propaganda machinery.
I could fill up this space with quotations to pull you in, but I’d prefer that you support the authors and their research (or your local public library) and get this book/ebook/audiobook. What’s the most obvious component to this important work is how Fox News and its subsidiaries are the prime propaganda driver, and the authors illustrate it conclusively, in play-by-play detail. Sean Hannity says something factually moronic and 3 million Americans nod in agreement like puppets with little American flags stitched into their hands. What’s worse, they grab their smartphones and spread the disease. (Ah, see, I’ve gone down the vitriolic rabbit hole and cast mean-spiritedness towards others. Sigh. Unfortunately, not all people are intelligent.) Thankfully, there are crucial bastions of fact-checking out there, PolitiFact (https://www.politifact.com/) being the one most known to me because I listen to Sacramento’s NPR station. To be an informed voter and citizen, one has to do some hard labor, but the tools exist to empower oneself, no matter what part of the political spectrum you identify with; however, as the anti-vaxers and flat-earthers demonstrate painfully, the war for Truth is going to be a long, hard slog through the trenches of an organized and insidious enemy that knows its target demographics all too well. It will be a slog of attrition, education, and accountability. Which side will you be on?
Voltaire warned that “those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities” (“Questions sur les Miracles”, 1765). We have plenty of evidence for this. Can the internet be policed effectively? Can networks be bound by integrity and accountability to the information they dispense? Will the small percentage of the population identifying with the far right realize they’re being played by powers with their own agendas, while the majority of us exist in self-segregated ecosystems? The cynic in me says no, but I hope to be proven wrong. As the authors explain, “[e]xisting in a media ecosystem dominated by media whose role is to confirm your preconceptions and lead you to distrust any sources that might challenge your beliefs is a recipe for misinformation and susceptibility to disinformation. At the end of the day, if one side most trusts Fox News, Hannity, Limbaugh, and Beck, and the other side most trusts NPR, the BBC, PBS, and the New York Times, one cannot expect both sides to be equally informed or equally capable of telling truth from identity-confirming fiction” (p. 306, Nook version). We exist in an era of surveillance capitalism, the likes of which Cambridge Analytica mastered beautifully. Do we have the capabilities to holistically correct the system?
The authors conclude that “we see longer-term dynamics of political economy: ideology and institutions interacting with technological adoption as the primary drivers the present epistemic crisis. These dynamics which play out across television, radio, and mainstream professional journalism at least as much as through the internet and social media, have been developing for 30 years and have resulted in a highly asymmetric media ecosystem that is the primary driver of disinformation and propaganda in the American public sphere” (p. 330, Nook version). Solutions are offered, each with a price that some will find intolerable, but legislation is already in the works, including the “Honest Ads Act”. It takes Congress, Silicon Valley, and every Joe/Jill Q. Public to demand action in order to create systemic change in how information is created, properly labeled (transparency), controlled, regulated, and digested. Institutionalized fact-checking is also a Herculean dream, but one AI could help with. The software educators use to scan papers for plagiarism seems to me a great starting point, and this book lists projects already underway. Ideally, taking the money we waste on mindless wars, tax havens for mega-corporations, and tax breaks for the filthy rich, and giving that money to our collective public education systems—well-paid teachers; safe and vibrant school environs; the support structure for mental health, family involvement, and physical fitness; and a gateway to college, a trade school, and/or civil service for every capable child—would ultimately lead to a better-educated, more worldly, critical-thinking, and hopefully more compassionate citizenry in a few decades. That is the future I hope for.
January 26, 2022
The authors of Network Propaganda provide ample evidence to quantitatively prove that the right-wing media ecosystem in the US “differs categorically from the rest of the media environment and [is] much more susceptible” to “disinformation, lies, and half-truths” (13). They argue that the right-wing media ecosystem operates in a propaganda feedback loop and prioritizes identity confirmation over truth-seeking, whereas the rest of the media ecosystem, from the center-right to the left, operates in a reality-check dynamic and prioritizes truth-seeking over identity confirmation. They acknowledge that individual entities within this center-right to left ecosystem are still prone to mistakes, but that mistakes are more meticulously critiqued, corrected, and weeded out by other entities within this ecosystem than usually happens within the corresponding insulated right-wing ecosystem. Among the examples which the authors give to prove this, they cite instances in which conspiracy theories appear on both fringe right and left-wing websites, and how the corresponding larger institutions respond to such appearances. Left-wing conspiracy theories are usually not amplified by larger media institutions, but right-wing conspiracy theories are often picked up and amplified by large right-wing media institutions, notably Fox News. “Dynamics on the right tend to reinforce partisan statements, irrespective of their truth, and to punish actors—be they media outlets or politicians and pundits—who insist on speaking truths that are inconsistent with partisan frames and narratives dominant within the ecosystem. Dynamics in the rest of the media landscape, including the left, tend to dampen and contain partisan statements that are demonstrably false” (75). Taking advantage of their audiences’ desires to have their identities confirmed, partisan media also seeks to convince them that other outlets providing disconfirming news are not trustworthy, leading the propaganda feedback loop to become more and more insulated and less truth-seeking over time. The authors give some history as to how this institutional change within American right-wing media evolved, beginning with the repeal of the Fairness Doctrine in 1987, the year before Rush Limbaugh became a nationally syndicated radio host. Three decades of progressively more polarized partisan media has led many Americans to believe that truth is relative and unknowable and that bias and dishonesty is pervasive to the same extent across the entire media landscape and within public institutions. At the end of the book, the authors provide some ideas about how to fix this.
Ultimately, Network Propaganda is persuasive and very detailed, often going a bit too “in the weeds” for the casual reader, but its findings are welcome and much needed in today’s polarized political environment. It should be read by anyone interested in the negative effects of right-wing partisan media and shared with anyone negatively affected by such media. It’s available to download for free at this link: Network Propaganda.
Ultimately, Network Propaganda is persuasive and very detailed, often going a bit too “in the weeds” for the casual reader, but its findings are welcome and much needed in today’s polarized political environment. It should be read by anyone interested in the negative effects of right-wing partisan media and shared with anyone negatively affected by such media. It’s available to download for free at this link: Network Propaganda.
April 15, 2022
This is the best explanation of what’s happening in American politics I’ve read yet. The idea that both sides of the political spectrum are equally polarizing or that right wing media “balances out” the biases of mainstream media is a myth. A balanced political spectrum does not accurately describe the ideological landscape of American politics, but we can get a much better idea of what’s happening by looking at the landscape of political media outlets and how they interact with each other.
The authors of this book have looked at data that shows how people interact with political media outlets and how media outlets interact with each other. It tells a story of how the right wing media ecosystem is distinct and separate from the mainstream. It follows a different set of rules, operating on what the authors call a “propaganda feedback loop” mechanism rather than the “reality check” mechanisms that the mainstream media ecosystem follows.
There is no counterpart to this right wing media network on the left. There are left wing media outlets, but they are bound by the rules and mechanisms of the mainstream.
The result of these dynamics is that consumers of right wing media are becoming ever more radicalized and insular. This serves to explain a number of phenomena we are witnessing on the right—the proliferation of conspiracy theories, the increasing detachment from reality, the cult-like devotion to demagogues.
The book makes some suggestions for what should be done about this problem, but I see it as an important wake up call to recognize how influential our media really is, and that not all media is the same. Both sides are not the same. There is something very pernicious happening in right wing media. We need to be able to recognize it before we can ever address it.
The authors of this book have looked at data that shows how people interact with political media outlets and how media outlets interact with each other. It tells a story of how the right wing media ecosystem is distinct and separate from the mainstream. It follows a different set of rules, operating on what the authors call a “propaganda feedback loop” mechanism rather than the “reality check” mechanisms that the mainstream media ecosystem follows.
There is no counterpart to this right wing media network on the left. There are left wing media outlets, but they are bound by the rules and mechanisms of the mainstream.
The result of these dynamics is that consumers of right wing media are becoming ever more radicalized and insular. This serves to explain a number of phenomena we are witnessing on the right—the proliferation of conspiracy theories, the increasing detachment from reality, the cult-like devotion to demagogues.
The book makes some suggestions for what should be done about this problem, but I see it as an important wake up call to recognize how influential our media really is, and that not all media is the same. Both sides are not the same. There is something very pernicious happening in right wing media. We need to be able to recognize it before we can ever address it.
February 15, 2021
Discusses media-induced asymmetric polarization. Basically describes how the center and the left came to depend on reality-oriented mainstream media for factual content (if not the opinion in the case of the left) while the right became more detached from reality and only looks at alternate content that is primarily propaganda divorced from fact. In other words, one side fact checks and trusts academia and science, and journalists, and the other is in a partisan identity-driven propaganda feedback loop. This development happened in the 1980s and 1990s with the demise of the fairness doctrine and Telecommunications act of 1996 before the rise of the internet and social media when media outlets like Fox and right-wing talk radio emerged in response to the new legal environment. Good analysis of what happened to US politics and media.
Here is the author in a zoom interview at the end of 2020.
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=cAMsXN9...
Here is the author in a zoom interview at the end of 2020.
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=cAMsXN9...
January 19, 2025
Must-read for everyone interested in understanding propaganda and disinformation in the US. Offers original insights that resist the techno deterministic and/or foreign interference framing pervasive in this field. Highly recommend. I am very fortunate to have one of the authors of this book as my doctoral supervisor.
April 24, 2020
Really good analysis of the American media system and how Trump got elected. Scary too!
July 28, 2024
[This book is open-source from Oxford Academic and can be downloaded in PDF from https://academic.oup.com/book/26406/b...]
The outcome of the 2016 election has been a hot topic ever since. The reasons behind a political novice, Mr. Trump, emerging as the Republican candidate, the 45th President of the United States, and a dominant figure of right-wing institutions are elusive. Many attribute Trump’s rise to disinformation. When voters believe lies and conspiracy theories, they make poor decisions. Furthermore, without a shared understanding of facts, public discourse breaks down, and democracy degenerates into chaos.
To combat the disinformation threat to democracy, we need to understand its origin and nature. In their 2018 book “Network Propaganda,” Harvard professors Benkler, Faris, and Roberts propose a new perspective: the rampant misinformation in 2016 and beyond is not a result of the Internet and Big Data but a continuation of partisan dynamics over the past several decades. Therefore, technical solutions alone are insufficient; we need to revamp U.S. political institutions to break the feedback loop of propaganda. The book lays out its conclusions with detailed support from data and case studies. Although it lacks a prescriptive solution, the book provides a valuable framework for understanding disinformation and democratic institutions.
The book's primary premise is that the landscape of misinformation is asymmetrical between the left and right wings. The left side is well-connected with reality-constrained media, while the right wing forms a self-contained propaganda network. This asymmetry results from partisan dynamics since the 1960s and is the main cause of the prevalence of disinformation operations. Furthermore, the book argues that the “usual suspects” of disinformation, such as big data algorithms, Internet trolls and bots, and foreign operations, play a limited role in the propaganda network.
This book focuses on disinformation, which the authors define as intentional lies serving a political agenda. It is synonymous with propaganda. The analyses in the book ignore other types of untruths, such as clickbait (sensational stories regardless of factuality and without political intention) and misinformation (unintentionally wrong information). The book draws its conclusions primarily based on connectivity measurements. One measurement is the “open-web map,” which shows how media quote each other as sources, indicating information flow in the network. The other measurement, the “Twitter map,” examines how readers share news articles from multiple media, showing how these media share common users.
The book defines two types of media. One is “reality-constrained,” which the book also calls mainstream media. These media follow journalistic practices and consider factuality an important brand asset. The other type is partisan media, which advances political agendas regardless of factuality. The mainstream media tend to be centrist, although some lean to the left (such as PBS and CNN) and some to the right (such as the Wall Street Journal). The partisan media typically take extreme political positions.
Based on data analyses, the book demonstrates an asymmetry of the media landscape. While partisan media exist on both wings (e.g., MSNBC on the left and Fox News on the right), they belong to different networks. The left-partisan media are connected to the mainstream ones by both information flow and reader sharing. Thus, they are constrained by mainstream media practices. Disinformation advanced by left-wing partisan media does not go far before being quenched by mainstream media fact-checkers. By contrast, the right-wing partisan media are separated from the rest in both readership and information flow. They focus more on ideology confirmation than factuality.
The book demonstrates the feedback loops in both types of networks. In the reality-constrained network, a media institute attracts readers with its reputation for truthfulness. Factual errors damage its brand name and should be avoided. The media are also incentivized to call out factual errors committed by others, forming a check-and-balance plurality. On the other hand, the partisan media cater to the readers’ need for preconception confirmation. These readers are not interested in seeking facts but are satisfied by receiving information that agrees with their preconceptions. At the same time, the lies and conspiracy theories are so incongruent with the information provided by the mainstream media that the readers must choose between the two. Those who join the partisan network will not trust mainstream media anymore, thus losing the ability to fact-check, even if they are still motivated to do so. In this ecosystem, the more extreme media win out, and there is no penalty for disinformation. Therefore, disinformation perpetuates and grows in such networks.
The information network also includes politicians and voters who subscribe to the networks, forming an even stronger feedback loop. With a partisan information network, the voters devalue truth and factuality, and the politicians are unconstrained in telling lies. These behaviors further incentivize information networks to either stay with reality or become extremely partisan.
As we can see, the reality-constrained network and partisan network are both stable configurations. Once formed, it is very difficult to change the operational mode from one to another. Therefore, the current asymmetry may be due to incidental historical reasons. In the U.S., after the Civil Rights Acts and the “Southern strategy,” both parties became more aligned with ideologies, creating ever-increasing polarization. However, the Democratic Party is more or less a broad tent, with people advocating racial equity, LGBT rights, environmental protection, income equality, etc. The party is kept together by compromises and tolerance. On the other hand, the Republican Party is based on a homogeneous ideology of Christianity, white supremacy, etc. Even their economic agendas of low taxes and small government have become rigid ideologies. Since ideologies are less open to change and correction based on facts, it is natural for the media catering to Republicans to be “fact-free.”
The book further demonstrates that the “usual suspects,” Russian propagandists, Internet clickbait, and data-driven targeted deceiving campaigns, are not the primary factors for disinformation. These players are undeniable, and they can theoretically play important roles with today’s technologies. However, evidence shows that their actual impact is much lower than we commonly believe. Furthermore, these players are effective only when their voices are amplified by the propaganda network. Therefore, the current attention paid to these technical threats may be misguided and distracting.
The book further discusses possible solutions. The best one, of course, is reforming political institutions (especially those of the GOP) and removing the incentives for the propaganda network. However, this is hardly realistic. The next best option is strengthening the mainstream media, which still exerts significant influence even on a large portion of voters on the right. The mainstream media should recognize the asymmetrical ecosystem and abandon the formulaic “balance” doctrine that amplifies the lies from the right-wing partisan media. They should prioritize factuality over neutrality. In addition, the book analyzes several technical measures under consideration and concludes that they all have fundamental difficulties and are unlikely to be effective. Overall, the book does not provide an optimistic outlook on the misinformation problem.
“Network Propaganda” is both academic and accessible. It provides a concise narrative supported by data. In addition to the network maps described above, the book also utilizes many supporting case studies, tracing how a lie was generated and propagated. As a nonexpert, I cannot assess the links between the data presented and the conclusions advanced in the book. However, I have not seen any expert review questioning these links. Regardless, the book also mixes data-supported statements and unsupported commentaries to build narratives. It is important for readers to distinguish between them.
The authors’ effort to create a coherent and clear flow is apparent. The book is divided into four parts, each containing three to five chapters. Introductory materials, statements of the main points, and summaries are provided for each part and each chapter. Metadiscourses are frequently provided to remind the readers of the book's roadmap. However, the book is still very repetitive, with the main points stated over and over again. If one randomly goes to a point in the book, one will have a hard time determining whether they have read that part before. If the authors’ data analyses are deemed trustworthy, one can just read the concluding chapter and get all the necessary information from the book.
While “Network Propaganda” does a good job of making its case, it still leaves some topics undiscussed. The most important ones are the impact of misinformation in U.S. politics, the role and performance of the mainstream media, and the role of information consumers.
The book takes for granted that misinformation and the propaganda network played critical roles in Trump’s win in 2016 and the GOP politics thereafter. However, the book does not present data to support this claim. This question is important for two reasons. First, as the book states, a large portion of conservative voters still take mainstream media as their information source. Do these voters behave differently from those solely relying on the right-wing propaganda network? This is a researchable question and sheds light on the importance of misinformation. Providing an answer would make the book’s analyses more complete and self-consistent. Second, misinformation is not the whole story. In 2018, journalist Salena Zito interviewed many Trump voters and published the book “The Great Revolt.” Her profiles of Trump voters include disappointed Obama supporters, first-time voters, independent voters who used to support Ross Perot, and suburban white moms who were expected to vote for Clinton. One would expect these groups were not sucked into the right-wing propaganda network. Therefore, there must be other reasons why people voted for Trump.
The book leaves out another significant issue: the loss of trust in the mainstream media. While the mainstream media do observe journalistic practices ensuring factuality, they can still be biased by selecting what to report, using misleading headlines and emotion-inducing vocabulary, and framing events. To a reader, a media agency is untrustworthy if it is biased in any way. In fact, according to a Gallup survey in 2022 (https://news.gallup.com/poll/403166/a...), the proportion of Americans who trust mass media has decreased from about 70% in 1974 to 34% in 2022. The portion that “do not trust at all” jumped from 5% to 38% in the same period. The portion of Democrats and Republicans who trust media was similar in 1974 (75% vs. 70%) but very different in 2022 (70% vs. 14%). More tellingly, the portion of independents who trust media dropped from 60% to 27% during the same period, at a similar pace as those for Republicans. Within the independent group, there is a big difference today between those identified as liberal and conservative. We speculate that the “independent” group is unlikely to join the right-wing propaganda network. Therefore, their shift in attitude reflects the behavior of the media instead of the influence of the propaganda network. These data show that the mass media (primarily the mainstream media) appeal differently to people with different political standings. This is consistent with the assertion that the mainstream media developed a bias toward the left in the past decades, an assertion raised by many others, such as “Slanted” by Sharyl Attkisson.
The book introduces the concept of “disorientation,” meaning people lose the ability to tell truth from falsehood. The concept was used in the book to describe the objective of Russian interference. Mainstream media bias also can cause disorientation in right-wing readers and push them towards partisan media. If nothing can be trusted anyway, they might as well listen to things they find comfortable and validating. Thus, the reformation of mainstream media is not only about increasing the value of facts but also curbing the tendency of bias toward the left.
The book classifies media as reality-constrained and partisan based on whether they adhere to journalistic practices. However, reality is more complex. First, few, if any, media claim they disregard journalism. So, how do we determine if a particular news agency is reality-constrained or partisan, and by whom? The authors seem certain in their classification, but they did not reveal the methodology. Even if we trust the author's list—CNN good, Fox bad, etc.—the list is not inclusive. What about right-wing think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation? Second, in reality, the classification is likely to be a continuum instead of binary. Partisan media are not completely “fact-free”; the players have varying limits on their fabrication and distortion. On the other hand, mainstream media have varying standards of factuality. For example, “Trust Me, I’m Lying” by Ryan Holiday exposed the lax fact-checking practices on CNN.
“Network Propaganda” envisions no effective and realistic solution to the problem of propaganda networks and their damaging effect on democracy. However, what about individuals? If one is committed to receiving truthful information and engaging in fact-based public discourse, what guidance and tools are available to them? This book would be much more valuable to its targeted audience, ordinary citizens, if it discussed this topic or at least acknowledged it as an open question.
"Network Propaganda" by Benkler, Faris, and Roberts offers a rigorous analysis of disinformation in the context of U.S. politics, providing valuable insights into the partisan dynamics that have fueled the spread of misinformation. The book is well-supported by data and case studies, making a compelling case for the need to understand and address the asymmetrical media landscape. While the book is thorough and informative, it is also repetitive and leaves some significant topics unexplored, such as the impact of misinformation on different voter groups and the role of mainstream media bias. Despite these shortcomings, "Network Propaganda" remains a critical resource for understanding the complexities of modern political communication and the ongoing challenge of disinformation.
The outcome of the 2016 election has been a hot topic ever since. The reasons behind a political novice, Mr. Trump, emerging as the Republican candidate, the 45th President of the United States, and a dominant figure of right-wing institutions are elusive. Many attribute Trump’s rise to disinformation. When voters believe lies and conspiracy theories, they make poor decisions. Furthermore, without a shared understanding of facts, public discourse breaks down, and democracy degenerates into chaos.
To combat the disinformation threat to democracy, we need to understand its origin and nature. In their 2018 book “Network Propaganda,” Harvard professors Benkler, Faris, and Roberts propose a new perspective: the rampant misinformation in 2016 and beyond is not a result of the Internet and Big Data but a continuation of partisan dynamics over the past several decades. Therefore, technical solutions alone are insufficient; we need to revamp U.S. political institutions to break the feedback loop of propaganda. The book lays out its conclusions with detailed support from data and case studies. Although it lacks a prescriptive solution, the book provides a valuable framework for understanding disinformation and democratic institutions.
The book's primary premise is that the landscape of misinformation is asymmetrical between the left and right wings. The left side is well-connected with reality-constrained media, while the right wing forms a self-contained propaganda network. This asymmetry results from partisan dynamics since the 1960s and is the main cause of the prevalence of disinformation operations. Furthermore, the book argues that the “usual suspects” of disinformation, such as big data algorithms, Internet trolls and bots, and foreign operations, play a limited role in the propaganda network.
This book focuses on disinformation, which the authors define as intentional lies serving a political agenda. It is synonymous with propaganda. The analyses in the book ignore other types of untruths, such as clickbait (sensational stories regardless of factuality and without political intention) and misinformation (unintentionally wrong information). The book draws its conclusions primarily based on connectivity measurements. One measurement is the “open-web map,” which shows how media quote each other as sources, indicating information flow in the network. The other measurement, the “Twitter map,” examines how readers share news articles from multiple media, showing how these media share common users.
The book defines two types of media. One is “reality-constrained,” which the book also calls mainstream media. These media follow journalistic practices and consider factuality an important brand asset. The other type is partisan media, which advances political agendas regardless of factuality. The mainstream media tend to be centrist, although some lean to the left (such as PBS and CNN) and some to the right (such as the Wall Street Journal). The partisan media typically take extreme political positions.
Based on data analyses, the book demonstrates an asymmetry of the media landscape. While partisan media exist on both wings (e.g., MSNBC on the left and Fox News on the right), they belong to different networks. The left-partisan media are connected to the mainstream ones by both information flow and reader sharing. Thus, they are constrained by mainstream media practices. Disinformation advanced by left-wing partisan media does not go far before being quenched by mainstream media fact-checkers. By contrast, the right-wing partisan media are separated from the rest in both readership and information flow. They focus more on ideology confirmation than factuality.
The book demonstrates the feedback loops in both types of networks. In the reality-constrained network, a media institute attracts readers with its reputation for truthfulness. Factual errors damage its brand name and should be avoided. The media are also incentivized to call out factual errors committed by others, forming a check-and-balance plurality. On the other hand, the partisan media cater to the readers’ need for preconception confirmation. These readers are not interested in seeking facts but are satisfied by receiving information that agrees with their preconceptions. At the same time, the lies and conspiracy theories are so incongruent with the information provided by the mainstream media that the readers must choose between the two. Those who join the partisan network will not trust mainstream media anymore, thus losing the ability to fact-check, even if they are still motivated to do so. In this ecosystem, the more extreme media win out, and there is no penalty for disinformation. Therefore, disinformation perpetuates and grows in such networks.
The information network also includes politicians and voters who subscribe to the networks, forming an even stronger feedback loop. With a partisan information network, the voters devalue truth and factuality, and the politicians are unconstrained in telling lies. These behaviors further incentivize information networks to either stay with reality or become extremely partisan.
As we can see, the reality-constrained network and partisan network are both stable configurations. Once formed, it is very difficult to change the operational mode from one to another. Therefore, the current asymmetry may be due to incidental historical reasons. In the U.S., after the Civil Rights Acts and the “Southern strategy,” both parties became more aligned with ideologies, creating ever-increasing polarization. However, the Democratic Party is more or less a broad tent, with people advocating racial equity, LGBT rights, environmental protection, income equality, etc. The party is kept together by compromises and tolerance. On the other hand, the Republican Party is based on a homogeneous ideology of Christianity, white supremacy, etc. Even their economic agendas of low taxes and small government have become rigid ideologies. Since ideologies are less open to change and correction based on facts, it is natural for the media catering to Republicans to be “fact-free.”
The book further demonstrates that the “usual suspects,” Russian propagandists, Internet clickbait, and data-driven targeted deceiving campaigns, are not the primary factors for disinformation. These players are undeniable, and they can theoretically play important roles with today’s technologies. However, evidence shows that their actual impact is much lower than we commonly believe. Furthermore, these players are effective only when their voices are amplified by the propaganda network. Therefore, the current attention paid to these technical threats may be misguided and distracting.
The book further discusses possible solutions. The best one, of course, is reforming political institutions (especially those of the GOP) and removing the incentives for the propaganda network. However, this is hardly realistic. The next best option is strengthening the mainstream media, which still exerts significant influence even on a large portion of voters on the right. The mainstream media should recognize the asymmetrical ecosystem and abandon the formulaic “balance” doctrine that amplifies the lies from the right-wing partisan media. They should prioritize factuality over neutrality. In addition, the book analyzes several technical measures under consideration and concludes that they all have fundamental difficulties and are unlikely to be effective. Overall, the book does not provide an optimistic outlook on the misinformation problem.
“Network Propaganda” is both academic and accessible. It provides a concise narrative supported by data. In addition to the network maps described above, the book also utilizes many supporting case studies, tracing how a lie was generated and propagated. As a nonexpert, I cannot assess the links between the data presented and the conclusions advanced in the book. However, I have not seen any expert review questioning these links. Regardless, the book also mixes data-supported statements and unsupported commentaries to build narratives. It is important for readers to distinguish between them.
The authors’ effort to create a coherent and clear flow is apparent. The book is divided into four parts, each containing three to five chapters. Introductory materials, statements of the main points, and summaries are provided for each part and each chapter. Metadiscourses are frequently provided to remind the readers of the book's roadmap. However, the book is still very repetitive, with the main points stated over and over again. If one randomly goes to a point in the book, one will have a hard time determining whether they have read that part before. If the authors’ data analyses are deemed trustworthy, one can just read the concluding chapter and get all the necessary information from the book.
While “Network Propaganda” does a good job of making its case, it still leaves some topics undiscussed. The most important ones are the impact of misinformation in U.S. politics, the role and performance of the mainstream media, and the role of information consumers.
The book takes for granted that misinformation and the propaganda network played critical roles in Trump’s win in 2016 and the GOP politics thereafter. However, the book does not present data to support this claim. This question is important for two reasons. First, as the book states, a large portion of conservative voters still take mainstream media as their information source. Do these voters behave differently from those solely relying on the right-wing propaganda network? This is a researchable question and sheds light on the importance of misinformation. Providing an answer would make the book’s analyses more complete and self-consistent. Second, misinformation is not the whole story. In 2018, journalist Salena Zito interviewed many Trump voters and published the book “The Great Revolt.” Her profiles of Trump voters include disappointed Obama supporters, first-time voters, independent voters who used to support Ross Perot, and suburban white moms who were expected to vote for Clinton. One would expect these groups were not sucked into the right-wing propaganda network. Therefore, there must be other reasons why people voted for Trump.
The book leaves out another significant issue: the loss of trust in the mainstream media. While the mainstream media do observe journalistic practices ensuring factuality, they can still be biased by selecting what to report, using misleading headlines and emotion-inducing vocabulary, and framing events. To a reader, a media agency is untrustworthy if it is biased in any way. In fact, according to a Gallup survey in 2022 (https://news.gallup.com/poll/403166/a...), the proportion of Americans who trust mass media has decreased from about 70% in 1974 to 34% in 2022. The portion that “do not trust at all” jumped from 5% to 38% in the same period. The portion of Democrats and Republicans who trust media was similar in 1974 (75% vs. 70%) but very different in 2022 (70% vs. 14%). More tellingly, the portion of independents who trust media dropped from 60% to 27% during the same period, at a similar pace as those for Republicans. Within the independent group, there is a big difference today between those identified as liberal and conservative. We speculate that the “independent” group is unlikely to join the right-wing propaganda network. Therefore, their shift in attitude reflects the behavior of the media instead of the influence of the propaganda network. These data show that the mass media (primarily the mainstream media) appeal differently to people with different political standings. This is consistent with the assertion that the mainstream media developed a bias toward the left in the past decades, an assertion raised by many others, such as “Slanted” by Sharyl Attkisson.
The book introduces the concept of “disorientation,” meaning people lose the ability to tell truth from falsehood. The concept was used in the book to describe the objective of Russian interference. Mainstream media bias also can cause disorientation in right-wing readers and push them towards partisan media. If nothing can be trusted anyway, they might as well listen to things they find comfortable and validating. Thus, the reformation of mainstream media is not only about increasing the value of facts but also curbing the tendency of bias toward the left.
The book classifies media as reality-constrained and partisan based on whether they adhere to journalistic practices. However, reality is more complex. First, few, if any, media claim they disregard journalism. So, how do we determine if a particular news agency is reality-constrained or partisan, and by whom? The authors seem certain in their classification, but they did not reveal the methodology. Even if we trust the author's list—CNN good, Fox bad, etc.—the list is not inclusive. What about right-wing think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation? Second, in reality, the classification is likely to be a continuum instead of binary. Partisan media are not completely “fact-free”; the players have varying limits on their fabrication and distortion. On the other hand, mainstream media have varying standards of factuality. For example, “Trust Me, I’m Lying” by Ryan Holiday exposed the lax fact-checking practices on CNN.
“Network Propaganda” envisions no effective and realistic solution to the problem of propaganda networks and their damaging effect on democracy. However, what about individuals? If one is committed to receiving truthful information and engaging in fact-based public discourse, what guidance and tools are available to them? This book would be much more valuable to its targeted audience, ordinary citizens, if it discussed this topic or at least acknowledged it as an open question.
"Network Propaganda" by Benkler, Faris, and Roberts offers a rigorous analysis of disinformation in the context of U.S. politics, providing valuable insights into the partisan dynamics that have fueled the spread of misinformation. The book is well-supported by data and case studies, making a compelling case for the need to understand and address the asymmetrical media landscape. While the book is thorough and informative, it is also repetitive and leaves some significant topics unexplored, such as the impact of misinformation on different voter groups and the role of mainstream media bias. Despite these shortcomings, "Network Propaganda" remains a critical resource for understanding the complexities of modern political communication and the ongoing challenge of disinformation.
October 15, 2020
A great detailed overview of research focusing on the digital political partisanship in the United States, as it related to the 2016 presidential election, as well as the immediate digital political landscape up to 1 ½ years post election. The book is not at the level of a formal research paper or monograph in the topic since it does not include good details on methodology nor provide any statistical summarization of the data, though summarizations/visualizations are amply supplied in the form of box plots of categories, line-charts, and basic time series plots. Still, the level of treatment of the material is significantly more rigorous than typical non-fiction mass-marketed books on this topic, and with a full appendix included, can serve as a first-read for an interested technical person looking to understand this phenomena more in-depth.
The summary of the findings of the analysis are interesting, they can be understood in broadly 3 points:
1. The network topology of various digital artifacts, be they out/in-link of websites
Or topic graphs derived from social media posts, greatly inform the nature of
digital propaganda, specifically the Pareto-distribution of links/edges towards
certain nodes, relative to others, means the monopolization of the message can
be achieved through command of these nodes (websites, accounts, etc.)
2. Digital partisanship is more a function of the nature of people’s behaviors and
less the platform by which they interact. Thus, social media like Twitter, FB, exacerbate the challenges of intra-societal propaganda within the United States, they do not enable them, and the researchers conclude that the platforms themselves provide significantly less marginal effect on the output of propaganda relative to things exogenous to the platform
3. By-in-large the “Left” is made up of disparate groups of people who are loosely
connected based on common cause to coordinate achievement of goals (climate
change, economic inequality, racial justice etc.), whereas the “right” are far more
homogeneous with respect to the characteristic of the groups that have formed it
(in its contemporary form circa 2013-2018), thus platforms that services either
“side” differ significantly in their nature and behavior with respect to transporting
and reporting information (e.g. the news).
Of course like any academic study in the social sciences, this one has some assumptions on the nature of human behavior with respect to digital partisanship in the United States, though taking a cue from more axiomatic treatments of social sciences, there are relatively sparse and can be summarized: individuals have a propensity to watch bias/values validating news information intrinsically, and this essential nature of human behavior with respect to information consumption for politics partially informs the Pareto-distribution of link-nodes found on the web, and the hub-like structures amplify this desire in the “signal back” to the individuals. This two kinds of hubs that forms can be partitioned broadly into two “types” of information hubs, those that reinforce a “reality check” dynamic, and those that reinforce a “propaganda feedback” dynamic.
The analysis that follows takes the form of a series of relevant case-studies leading up to the 2016 presidential elections that demonstrate the phenomena concretely in the data. Much of what is known to observers of politics over the past 3 years is covered here including various “fake-news” and partisan-infused news-cycles phenomena like the “Pizza-gate” pedophilia story of 2015-16, the Trump beauty show pedophilia story of the same time, various immigration-related news cycles, as well as closely related Islamophobia news cycles, and of course the Russia hacking news cycles.
In each case, the authors cover how the cycle can be understood in 2 - 4 different (but related) digital datasets, including the aforementioned website in/out link data, Twitter/FB social media data, and search-engine volume data. For each type of dataset the authors explain how they featurized/transformed the data for visualization or modeling briefly. For example, in the case of link-data, transformation amounts to aggregation into counts, and an the application of community-detection algorithms on the graph (mostly for visualization), whereas for social media post, the authors opted for TF-IDF/Word2Vec for basic NLP to extract topics, with some kind of clustering done on the resultant topics/word groupings of the post. Although the nature of these procedures are only mentioned, enough of the process is outlined for a sufficiently novice data scientist or computationally literate person to recreate some elements of these studies if need be.
Much of the output of this analysis demonstrates consistently that websites and social media accounts from the right-of-center behave as “propaganda feedback nodes” and this phenomena, though amplified in the digital/web 2.0 era, are consistent with behavior in earlier eras post the ascension of Newt Gingrich and the 1994 GOP-congressional class, although the phenomena of increasing political polarization is shown both graphically and in the literature to be consistent as early back as the 1950s.
This identification of the divergent behaviors between the two political camps naturally leads to the question of how/why? This leads back to the conclusion that the network topology of the information seems to be the major culprit, though this is merely the abstract mechanisms and effects, as to a more concrete why, they outline several hypothesis which involve some brief discussions of the difference between the rational-voter theory and the in-group/out-group identification theory of voting, as well as a history of the development of conservative media from the 70s moral-majority era to the cable-news revolution of the 80s/90s, and of course the emergence of AM-talk radio.
They discuss the original strict laws put in place with respect to the news, and it’s information-content and it’s accuracy. Initially news broadcasts were viewed more in a utilitarian light, but through the dismemberment of these laws and guidelines in the 60s and 70s, they were eventually used as a tool of information warfare, mostly by right-of-center actors, both within the religious evangelical groups, and the associated conservative revolution which eventually led to the creation of Fox News.
As to why conservatives were first to mobilize resources in this way, there’s some suggestion at a game-theoretic analysis of this phenomena, but no real formal analysis is made manifest in this text. There’s also a question as to whether what is observed in the data is the partisanship between groups of “elites” vs groups of “normal people”. Studies for both hypotheses are mentioned, though the authors state evidence for one or the other are currently inconclusive.
However, it seems clear that conservative were the first mover to weaponize media in this way primarily because they have consistently been the minority in the various media spaces from FM radio, television, film, and to some extent the web, and the purposeful design to build bias-validating information sources were an attempt to mitigate their diminishment. In essence, conservatives have acknowledged that they lost the culture wars, and cannot compete apples-to-apples in the same environment and thus must make new environments in a kind of ‘oblique defense’ to take a term from Von Clausewitz.
Nothing in this book should be surprising for an observer of politics. The value of the text is that it quantifies the phenomena which until now was very “fuzzy”, mostly because much of our activity is now artifacted on the web. Both the kindle and the audible are worth purchasing for this title, the audible to “force” yourself to read the entire thing cover-to-cover and to digest the high-level information, and the kindle to dig deeper. I haven’t yet re-read the book by eye, and so may have missed some pertinent details, but look forward to a more deliberate reading. The visualizations are good, and can be recreated probably with a GUI like Gephi or leveraging some library like NetworkX via Python. In fact, this book would be a good guide for a deliberate exercise to re-create for practice/research, as everything outputted here seems achievable both from a results-standpoint and a visual standpoint. Overall, I’m happy with this book and recommend it to either technical people working in media or the social sciences, or observers of politics who wish to test their intuition on the data. Highly recommended.
The summary of the findings of the analysis are interesting, they can be understood in broadly 3 points:
1. The network topology of various digital artifacts, be they out/in-link of websites
Or topic graphs derived from social media posts, greatly inform the nature of
digital propaganda, specifically the Pareto-distribution of links/edges towards
certain nodes, relative to others, means the monopolization of the message can
be achieved through command of these nodes (websites, accounts, etc.)
2. Digital partisanship is more a function of the nature of people’s behaviors and
less the platform by which they interact. Thus, social media like Twitter, FB, exacerbate the challenges of intra-societal propaganda within the United States, they do not enable them, and the researchers conclude that the platforms themselves provide significantly less marginal effect on the output of propaganda relative to things exogenous to the platform
3. By-in-large the “Left” is made up of disparate groups of people who are loosely
connected based on common cause to coordinate achievement of goals (climate
change, economic inequality, racial justice etc.), whereas the “right” are far more
homogeneous with respect to the characteristic of the groups that have formed it
(in its contemporary form circa 2013-2018), thus platforms that services either
“side” differ significantly in their nature and behavior with respect to transporting
and reporting information (e.g. the news).
Of course like any academic study in the social sciences, this one has some assumptions on the nature of human behavior with respect to digital partisanship in the United States, though taking a cue from more axiomatic treatments of social sciences, there are relatively sparse and can be summarized: individuals have a propensity to watch bias/values validating news information intrinsically, and this essential nature of human behavior with respect to information consumption for politics partially informs the Pareto-distribution of link-nodes found on the web, and the hub-like structures amplify this desire in the “signal back” to the individuals. This two kinds of hubs that forms can be partitioned broadly into two “types” of information hubs, those that reinforce a “reality check” dynamic, and those that reinforce a “propaganda feedback” dynamic.
The analysis that follows takes the form of a series of relevant case-studies leading up to the 2016 presidential elections that demonstrate the phenomena concretely in the data. Much of what is known to observers of politics over the past 3 years is covered here including various “fake-news” and partisan-infused news-cycles phenomena like the “Pizza-gate” pedophilia story of 2015-16, the Trump beauty show pedophilia story of the same time, various immigration-related news cycles, as well as closely related Islamophobia news cycles, and of course the Russia hacking news cycles.
In each case, the authors cover how the cycle can be understood in 2 - 4 different (but related) digital datasets, including the aforementioned website in/out link data, Twitter/FB social media data, and search-engine volume data. For each type of dataset the authors explain how they featurized/transformed the data for visualization or modeling briefly. For example, in the case of link-data, transformation amounts to aggregation into counts, and an the application of community-detection algorithms on the graph (mostly for visualization), whereas for social media post, the authors opted for TF-IDF/Word2Vec for basic NLP to extract topics, with some kind of clustering done on the resultant topics/word groupings of the post. Although the nature of these procedures are only mentioned, enough of the process is outlined for a sufficiently novice data scientist or computationally literate person to recreate some elements of these studies if need be.
Much of the output of this analysis demonstrates consistently that websites and social media accounts from the right-of-center behave as “propaganda feedback nodes” and this phenomena, though amplified in the digital/web 2.0 era, are consistent with behavior in earlier eras post the ascension of Newt Gingrich and the 1994 GOP-congressional class, although the phenomena of increasing political polarization is shown both graphically and in the literature to be consistent as early back as the 1950s.
This identification of the divergent behaviors between the two political camps naturally leads to the question of how/why? This leads back to the conclusion that the network topology of the information seems to be the major culprit, though this is merely the abstract mechanisms and effects, as to a more concrete why, they outline several hypothesis which involve some brief discussions of the difference between the rational-voter theory and the in-group/out-group identification theory of voting, as well as a history of the development of conservative media from the 70s moral-majority era to the cable-news revolution of the 80s/90s, and of course the emergence of AM-talk radio.
They discuss the original strict laws put in place with respect to the news, and it’s information-content and it’s accuracy. Initially news broadcasts were viewed more in a utilitarian light, but through the dismemberment of these laws and guidelines in the 60s and 70s, they were eventually used as a tool of information warfare, mostly by right-of-center actors, both within the religious evangelical groups, and the associated conservative revolution which eventually led to the creation of Fox News.
As to why conservatives were first to mobilize resources in this way, there’s some suggestion at a game-theoretic analysis of this phenomena, but no real formal analysis is made manifest in this text. There’s also a question as to whether what is observed in the data is the partisanship between groups of “elites” vs groups of “normal people”. Studies for both hypotheses are mentioned, though the authors state evidence for one or the other are currently inconclusive.
However, it seems clear that conservative were the first mover to weaponize media in this way primarily because they have consistently been the minority in the various media spaces from FM radio, television, film, and to some extent the web, and the purposeful design to build bias-validating information sources were an attempt to mitigate their diminishment. In essence, conservatives have acknowledged that they lost the culture wars, and cannot compete apples-to-apples in the same environment and thus must make new environments in a kind of ‘oblique defense’ to take a term from Von Clausewitz.
Nothing in this book should be surprising for an observer of politics. The value of the text is that it quantifies the phenomena which until now was very “fuzzy”, mostly because much of our activity is now artifacted on the web. Both the kindle and the audible are worth purchasing for this title, the audible to “force” yourself to read the entire thing cover-to-cover and to digest the high-level information, and the kindle to dig deeper. I haven’t yet re-read the book by eye, and so may have missed some pertinent details, but look forward to a more deliberate reading. The visualizations are good, and can be recreated probably with a GUI like Gephi or leveraging some library like NetworkX via Python. In fact, this book would be a good guide for a deliberate exercise to re-create for practice/research, as everything outputted here seems achievable both from a results-standpoint and a visual standpoint. Overall, I’m happy with this book and recommend it to either technical people working in media or the social sciences, or observers of politics who wish to test their intuition on the data. Highly recommended.
March 5, 2019
4.5 stars. The primary argument in this book is that the current American media environment is not polarized (i.e., a symmetric division of co-equal, differing positions) but instead includes a fringe right-wing bubble encased in a propaganda feedback loop with no way to check their self-reinforcing views, set against a traditional media environment of centrist journalists and left-wing partisans who are concerned with fact-checking that resists the spread of misinformation. Whereas falsehoods, misinformation, and disinformation are tamped down and corrected in the traditional media and on the partisan left (the “reality-check dynamic”), they are amplified and built into the system as “design features of the network” on the right. Any attempt on to the right to use facts to correct such false information is punished.
The result is that media sources on the right identify and propagate “identity confirmation” rather than truth. Instead of factual checks, their audience is offered an echo chamber of misinformation. The authors refer to this as the “propaganda feedback loop.”
The authors come to this conclusion based on analyses of clicks and links into and out of Facebook, twitter, and blogs, using a huge number of graphs to present their findings. This is a long, detailed book, and sometimes it gets a little repetitive, but ultimately the authors succeed in making their case. My one minor criticism is that many of the graphs include text that is so microscopically small as to be impossible to read. Even when tracking down the free Open Access version of the book and zooming in, some of the text is impossible to read for all the smaller nodules in the graphs. But this is a minor criticism, since the point of the graphs is to highlight the major connections (which can be easily read) and to present a visually dynamic version of the collated evidence. In this case, the authors are also successful.
Recommended for anyone interested in propaganda in the Trump age, political rhetoric, and media studies in general.
The result is that media sources on the right identify and propagate “identity confirmation” rather than truth. Instead of factual checks, their audience is offered an echo chamber of misinformation. The authors refer to this as the “propaganda feedback loop.”
The authors come to this conclusion based on analyses of clicks and links into and out of Facebook, twitter, and blogs, using a huge number of graphs to present their findings. This is a long, detailed book, and sometimes it gets a little repetitive, but ultimately the authors succeed in making their case. My one minor criticism is that many of the graphs include text that is so microscopically small as to be impossible to read. Even when tracking down the free Open Access version of the book and zooming in, some of the text is impossible to read for all the smaller nodules in the graphs. But this is a minor criticism, since the point of the graphs is to highlight the major connections (which can be easily read) and to present a visually dynamic version of the collated evidence. In this case, the authors are also successful.
Recommended for anyone interested in propaganda in the Trump age, political rhetoric, and media studies in general.
Read
December 23, 2019This was both a horrible book to take in as an audiobook and desperately needed a more ruthless editor. The combination made it a struggle for me to finish.
I think some of the takeaways are sound: they way that extreme right wing partisan media has gone in the US is different in kind from what exists on the left, the split has been gestating at least since Regan, and is not really the result of the existence of the internet, neither purely monetarily motivated nor politically motivated bot/sockpuppet attempts to manipulate the 2016 election were likely to have had a statistically significant effect.
I wish it had spent more time engaging with the psychological factors for individuals caught in the "propaganda feedback loop", as well as engaging more seriously with the line between the (aggressive) critique of mainstream media from the left and the right wing propaganda network's "critique" of mainstream media.
I think some of the takeaways are sound: they way that extreme right wing partisan media has gone in the US is different in kind from what exists on the left, the split has been gestating at least since Regan, and is not really the result of the existence of the internet, neither purely monetarily motivated nor politically motivated bot/sockpuppet attempts to manipulate the 2016 election were likely to have had a statistically significant effect.
I wish it had spent more time engaging with the psychological factors for individuals caught in the "propaganda feedback loop", as well as engaging more seriously with the line between the (aggressive) critique of mainstream media from the left and the right wing propaganda network's "critique" of mainstream media.
November 25, 2020
Thoughts during reading:
1) The authors assume NY Times, CNN and Washington Post is both truth seeking and adhere to traditionel journalistic standards, functions as a buffer against lies AND that they are left or center-left. How is this compatible? Left leaning meaning biased somewhat AND unbiased and professional.
2) The authors rightly warn other countries to do their own research on the matter - no results can be tranferred directly. This is because the partizanship we see online is not due to social media itself but rather due to the media landscape in America in general.
3) Where do you draw the line between politicians arguing their case with all kinds of measures, including lies, (which is OK under Freedom of Speech) and so-called online propaganda, if the propaganda originates from a politician / political view (which is not OK for leftists)?
4) It seems there is no conclusion as to how the social media affected the citizenry during the election of Trump. So why all the fuss/fuzz?
5) It seems the data is from a certain period in American media landscape - during the rise of Breitbart. Also, did Breitbart create its prominence or did the citizenry, since Breitbart where the only media outlet that brought news of interest to them?
6) I do not think their Propaganda Feedback Loop is as airtight as they describe: They do not describe what could break the PFL. And: The description of the PFL indicates that partisan media is mostly untruthful, which is absurd. They acknowledges this on page 80: People actually hear both sides. So people choose to be manipulated? Is that not the same as: I decide for my self?
7) Is this a lie?: Islam is an oppressive political ideology and most women in islam are certainly not free as we understand freedom in most of Western Europe. is this a right wing view or a left wing view? Fighting for womens rights seems as a starting point to be mostly a left wing view.
8) Have they established a link between social media linking and voter behavior that is not user generated so that it is possible to say that social media in and of itself is affecting voter behavior? i am still looking for it in the book.
9) Occams razor: Maybe the citizenry is not stupid. Maybe they actually have a good general idea of what is going on in their society and they are therefore interested in politicians who can voice their concerns and consequently click on the media outlets that gives room for those politicians or views? Would that not be an easier solution instaed of goiung the long way round and focus on some sort of implicit idea that the media are manipulating the citizenry and then go out of your way to prove (and still not being able to do that)?
10) The authors ideal is mediw that operate under the "reality-check dynamic" (p. 80) so lying costs something. Well, how about the 1619-project made by the NYT? How about the suppression of the Biden crime family- story? What about the impeachment of Trump and how CNN ran with that one? The good news putlets of 2015 - 2018 are no longer the good news outlets they might have been once.
11) Liberals get their "craziness" from Colbert and the like - there is no "funny guy" on the right rightwingers tend to get it all rolled up one place.
12) How would The Daily Wire be assessed under the reality-check dynamic criteria?
13) Can you be classified as 100 % truthful on the premises of the book, if everything you bring is correct, but you do not bring stories about terror attacks by muslims? If yes, the book is nonsense.
14) Does it qualify you to be a truth-seeking outlet, if you have an unbiased news section but a biased opinion section? Unclear.
15) P. 132: They go full conspiracy theory here. The word "globalist" is documented to have been used first as an anti-semit slur on crazy right wing pages and then is used in NYT through Breitbart later that year. And the authors seem to think this is the same as white supremacy ideology inserting itself as a type of 5th column activist/sleeper cells in the main stream media. This is a book about how lies and SoMe affected the election and then they themselves are proponents of a conspiracy theory. Bleeping idiots. I cannot believe the low level of intelligence and low level of common sense put into this work. It seems they just do not care about putting out good work. Another abhorrent book from Havard researchers. What a clown show.
16) P. 214: Not enough voters are in the right-wing media ecosystem to win an election.
17) Having read part two I am convinced that Fox + Breitbart ran untruthful stories with the purpose of undermining Clinton. However, I find it to be a weakness of the book that the authors focus so strongly on a few news stories. What about the opinionating? Is there no opinionationg on CNN? Do the citizenry really distinguish like good academics between news and opinion?
18) CNN also bring lies but they retract and correct faster. That is obviously good. However, do politicians not lie on either side? So if we should cancel liers in general, we should start with all politicians. And replace them with what?
19) Outiside of inciting to violence free speech should be allowed, including free lying. If not, then start by cancelling politicians.
20) I do not think we should touch FB + Twitter. People have choice. They can go somewhere else to other platforms. One of the central points of Mill was exactly that free speech creates stupid results some times. But that is the price. trying to always get it right all the time poses the question of who's "right"? And then we are back to politics.
21) So yes Fox News is crap, but CNN also lies - and again the point is that SoMe had very little to do with the election result in 2016. It might have played a significant role in 2020, but the point is that we do not know so we should not regulate it.
22) Unless the second half of the book is better, this is another clown show from Harvard.
23) How can Breitbart and Fox create make the narrative of immigration and islam an election issue when Trump spoke about at least immigration in 2013 according to Wikipedia? Maybe the voters thought this was a fitting subject for the times and the trouble they see?
24) P. 223 - 225: FB and ads did nothing to the election result in 2016.
25) How about other countries? Should FB + be told to protect them from its own politicians?
26) Would you accept censoring books like you would SoMe? Probably not.
27) P. 236: They say it themselves: There is a difference between proof of existence and proof of impact.
1) The authors assume NY Times, CNN and Washington Post is both truth seeking and adhere to traditionel journalistic standards, functions as a buffer against lies AND that they are left or center-left. How is this compatible? Left leaning meaning biased somewhat AND unbiased and professional.
2) The authors rightly warn other countries to do their own research on the matter - no results can be tranferred directly. This is because the partizanship we see online is not due to social media itself but rather due to the media landscape in America in general.
3) Where do you draw the line between politicians arguing their case with all kinds of measures, including lies, (which is OK under Freedom of Speech) and so-called online propaganda, if the propaganda originates from a politician / political view (which is not OK for leftists)?
4) It seems there is no conclusion as to how the social media affected the citizenry during the election of Trump. So why all the fuss/fuzz?
5) It seems the data is from a certain period in American media landscape - during the rise of Breitbart. Also, did Breitbart create its prominence or did the citizenry, since Breitbart where the only media outlet that brought news of interest to them?
6) I do not think their Propaganda Feedback Loop is as airtight as they describe: They do not describe what could break the PFL. And: The description of the PFL indicates that partisan media is mostly untruthful, which is absurd. They acknowledges this on page 80: People actually hear both sides. So people choose to be manipulated? Is that not the same as: I decide for my self?
7) Is this a lie?: Islam is an oppressive political ideology and most women in islam are certainly not free as we understand freedom in most of Western Europe. is this a right wing view or a left wing view? Fighting for womens rights seems as a starting point to be mostly a left wing view.
8) Have they established a link between social media linking and voter behavior that is not user generated so that it is possible to say that social media in and of itself is affecting voter behavior? i am still looking for it in the book.
9) Occams razor: Maybe the citizenry is not stupid. Maybe they actually have a good general idea of what is going on in their society and they are therefore interested in politicians who can voice their concerns and consequently click on the media outlets that gives room for those politicians or views? Would that not be an easier solution instaed of goiung the long way round and focus on some sort of implicit idea that the media are manipulating the citizenry and then go out of your way to prove (and still not being able to do that)?
10) The authors ideal is mediw that operate under the "reality-check dynamic" (p. 80) so lying costs something. Well, how about the 1619-project made by the NYT? How about the suppression of the Biden crime family- story? What about the impeachment of Trump and how CNN ran with that one? The good news putlets of 2015 - 2018 are no longer the good news outlets they might have been once.
11) Liberals get their "craziness" from Colbert and the like - there is no "funny guy" on the right rightwingers tend to get it all rolled up one place.
12) How would The Daily Wire be assessed under the reality-check dynamic criteria?
13) Can you be classified as 100 % truthful on the premises of the book, if everything you bring is correct, but you do not bring stories about terror attacks by muslims? If yes, the book is nonsense.
14) Does it qualify you to be a truth-seeking outlet, if you have an unbiased news section but a biased opinion section? Unclear.
15) P. 132: They go full conspiracy theory here. The word "globalist" is documented to have been used first as an anti-semit slur on crazy right wing pages and then is used in NYT through Breitbart later that year. And the authors seem to think this is the same as white supremacy ideology inserting itself as a type of 5th column activist/sleeper cells in the main stream media. This is a book about how lies and SoMe affected the election and then they themselves are proponents of a conspiracy theory. Bleeping idiots. I cannot believe the low level of intelligence and low level of common sense put into this work. It seems they just do not care about putting out good work. Another abhorrent book from Havard researchers. What a clown show.
16) P. 214: Not enough voters are in the right-wing media ecosystem to win an election.
17) Having read part two I am convinced that Fox + Breitbart ran untruthful stories with the purpose of undermining Clinton. However, I find it to be a weakness of the book that the authors focus so strongly on a few news stories. What about the opinionating? Is there no opinionationg on CNN? Do the citizenry really distinguish like good academics between news and opinion?
18) CNN also bring lies but they retract and correct faster. That is obviously good. However, do politicians not lie on either side? So if we should cancel liers in general, we should start with all politicians. And replace them with what?
19) Outiside of inciting to violence free speech should be allowed, including free lying. If not, then start by cancelling politicians.
20) I do not think we should touch FB + Twitter. People have choice. They can go somewhere else to other platforms. One of the central points of Mill was exactly that free speech creates stupid results some times. But that is the price. trying to always get it right all the time poses the question of who's "right"? And then we are back to politics.
21) So yes Fox News is crap, but CNN also lies - and again the point is that SoMe had very little to do with the election result in 2016. It might have played a significant role in 2020, but the point is that we do not know so we should not regulate it.
22) Unless the second half of the book is better, this is another clown show from Harvard.
23) How can Breitbart and Fox create make the narrative of immigration and islam an election issue when Trump spoke about at least immigration in 2013 according to Wikipedia? Maybe the voters thought this was a fitting subject for the times and the trouble they see?
24) P. 223 - 225: FB and ads did nothing to the election result in 2016.
25) How about other countries? Should FB + be told to protect them from its own politicians?
26) Would you accept censoring books like you would SoMe? Probably not.
27) P. 236: They say it themselves: There is a difference between proof of existence and proof of impact.
November 10, 2021
As far as academic books go, this one was actually pretty good. They should definitely make an abridged version though because it's simply too long and detailed.
December 31, 2018
A new book with rigorous analysis of how millions of stories were published, linked and shared over the last three years yields some surprising findings and valuable insights into dangerous trends that are posing risks to American democracy.
In Network Propaganda, Yochai Benkler, Robert Faris and Hal Roberts at Harvard’s Berkman Center used a variety of analysis tools to track the links and sharing of over 4 million pieces of content during and after the 2016 US presidential election. They find - to their surprise - that while social media serves as a vector for the spread of false and pernicious stories, and bad actors including state-sponsored Russian trolls and commercially motivated clickbait farms contributed to the fog of misinformation, it turns out that to date, these haven’t been the main agents contributing to the proliferation of of untruth.
Mainstream media with fact-based journalistic norms are still by far the most powerful voices; and are able to reach a substantial majority of the population. So important solutions to the spread of misinformation lie in the practices of mainstream journalism.
The custom of bringing voices from “both sides” should be deemphasized when one side of the discussion is further from verification, for example quoting vaccination opponents and climate deniers for "balance" Instead, reputable journalists should place greater emphasis on objectivity by showing verification.
The authors do find evidence of a “filter bubble”, but the phenomenon is asymmetrical, concentrated on the far right of the political spectrum, where people tend to rely exclusively on right-wing media and not on other media with stronger orientation toward facts. "The right side of the spectrum... has Breitbart and Fox News as its basin of attraction, has almost no overlap with the center, and is sharply separated from the rest of the map." There are also conspiracy theories and other false stories that come from the left side of the spectrum, but the stories tend not to spread as far because misinformation gets fact-checked by other publications.
And the filter bubble on the right isn’t new, and it wasn’t created by Facebook or YouTube or Russian internet trolls. The book traces how the right wing filter bubble goes back decades, to the rise of televangelism, Rush Limbaugh, and right wing media ecosystem that prides itself in denouncing mainstream media, science and academia. This set of circumstances is distinctive to the US media ecosystem, not generalized in other parts of the world.
Benkler et al don’t discount the risks of social media sharing of disinformation, and have some policy recommendations to add to that important discussion and debate. But based on the analysis in the book, it’s not - yet - the main problem threatening democratic discourse in the US.
Because its conclusions rely on robust analysis of lots of data, I strongly recommend Network Propaganda to anyone concerned about the risks of today’s media environment to democratic discourse.
In Network Propaganda, Yochai Benkler, Robert Faris and Hal Roberts at Harvard’s Berkman Center used a variety of analysis tools to track the links and sharing of over 4 million pieces of content during and after the 2016 US presidential election. They find - to their surprise - that while social media serves as a vector for the spread of false and pernicious stories, and bad actors including state-sponsored Russian trolls and commercially motivated clickbait farms contributed to the fog of misinformation, it turns out that to date, these haven’t been the main agents contributing to the proliferation of of untruth.
Mainstream media with fact-based journalistic norms are still by far the most powerful voices; and are able to reach a substantial majority of the population. So important solutions to the spread of misinformation lie in the practices of mainstream journalism.
The custom of bringing voices from “both sides” should be deemphasized when one side of the discussion is further from verification, for example quoting vaccination opponents and climate deniers for "balance" Instead, reputable journalists should place greater emphasis on objectivity by showing verification.
The authors do find evidence of a “filter bubble”, but the phenomenon is asymmetrical, concentrated on the far right of the political spectrum, where people tend to rely exclusively on right-wing media and not on other media with stronger orientation toward facts. "The right side of the spectrum... has Breitbart and Fox News as its basin of attraction, has almost no overlap with the center, and is sharply separated from the rest of the map." There are also conspiracy theories and other false stories that come from the left side of the spectrum, but the stories tend not to spread as far because misinformation gets fact-checked by other publications.
And the filter bubble on the right isn’t new, and it wasn’t created by Facebook or YouTube or Russian internet trolls. The book traces how the right wing filter bubble goes back decades, to the rise of televangelism, Rush Limbaugh, and right wing media ecosystem that prides itself in denouncing mainstream media, science and academia. This set of circumstances is distinctive to the US media ecosystem, not generalized in other parts of the world.
Benkler et al don’t discount the risks of social media sharing of disinformation, and have some policy recommendations to add to that important discussion and debate. But based on the analysis in the book, it’s not - yet - the main problem threatening democratic discourse in the US.
Because its conclusions rely on robust analysis of lots of data, I strongly recommend Network Propaganda to anyone concerned about the risks of today’s media environment to democratic discourse.
September 3, 2019
Very interesting, a bit repetitive. The main thesis seems to be borne out by clear evidence, and matches the currently prevailing narrative:
Right wing media led by Fox News and talk radio has developed a strangle hold on ~30% of the US population. Consumers show high levels of trust in these sources, low levels of mixed consumption from other sources, and low levels of trust in other sources. The narrative that other sources are untrustworthy is a common one. These sources are highly biased, have much higher rates of misinformation, and are insular in referencing within their circles and not without.
Each of these ideas is qualitatively and quantitatively describes in this book.
On the left, there is not the same problem. News sources are less biased, the most consumed sources are less prone to spreading misinformation, and consumers of these sources trust media more as well as consume from wider ranges of sources.
If you look at how stories propagate on the left and center vs on the right, you see more evidence that the dynamics of propaganda are inverted - false propaganda quickly dies on the center and left sources while it is amplified in the right.
Most of these ideas relate to sources like MSNBC, Fox News, CNN, ABC, NBC, Wall Street journal, Washington Post, NYTimes. Both sides have a fair share of extremist small players outside the core sources, which are prone to conspiracies and propaganda. However only the right (Fox News) amplifies this (and MSNBC). Since center and left sources quench propaganda, MSNBCs effect is not large on audiences with diverse consumption habits. Since right wing viewers only consume Fox News and further right sources, the effect is huge.
Looking at trolls and Russian bots, and specifically at the stories arising from these sources, it becomes clear the most impactful stories in the 2016 election and the first year of Trump were not from Russia or trolls, but form the standard actors and propagandists (campaigns, PACs, etc). The media ecosystem and it’s faults were much larger players in the election than the other boogeymen. Further, if you consider the domestic politics at the time beyond just myopically thinking of the media, the boogeyman impact is even smaller.
Right wing media led by Fox News and talk radio has developed a strangle hold on ~30% of the US population. Consumers show high levels of trust in these sources, low levels of mixed consumption from other sources, and low levels of trust in other sources. The narrative that other sources are untrustworthy is a common one. These sources are highly biased, have much higher rates of misinformation, and are insular in referencing within their circles and not without.
Each of these ideas is qualitatively and quantitatively describes in this book.
On the left, there is not the same problem. News sources are less biased, the most consumed sources are less prone to spreading misinformation, and consumers of these sources trust media more as well as consume from wider ranges of sources.
If you look at how stories propagate on the left and center vs on the right, you see more evidence that the dynamics of propaganda are inverted - false propaganda quickly dies on the center and left sources while it is amplified in the right.
Most of these ideas relate to sources like MSNBC, Fox News, CNN, ABC, NBC, Wall Street journal, Washington Post, NYTimes. Both sides have a fair share of extremist small players outside the core sources, which are prone to conspiracies and propaganda. However only the right (Fox News) amplifies this (and MSNBC). Since center and left sources quench propaganda, MSNBCs effect is not large on audiences with diverse consumption habits. Since right wing viewers only consume Fox News and further right sources, the effect is huge.
Looking at trolls and Russian bots, and specifically at the stories arising from these sources, it becomes clear the most impactful stories in the 2016 election and the first year of Trump were not from Russia or trolls, but form the standard actors and propagandists (campaigns, PACs, etc). The media ecosystem and it’s faults were much larger players in the election than the other boogeymen. Further, if you consider the domestic politics at the time beyond just myopically thinking of the media, the boogeyman impact is even smaller.
October 2, 2024
hmm idk if it was necessary for me to read/listen to this whole thing with all the formal definitions and anecdotes but i guess it’s helpful to establish that while polarization might be kind of facilitated by technology it’s really rooted in pre-existing partisanship and ideological motivations (which i was already coming to terms to through other things i have read). i also liked that there were some ideas for how to address what is termed “network propaganda” via technology means, it’s cautiously optimistic but i think the emphasis on media literacy is also important. but then i also think the degree of media literacy that people bother to have is also affected by where they lie on the political spectrum.
one thing i was a little not fully satisfied with was that the network aspect of this book related more with somewhat static online connections between links to news sources on social media platforms and their readers/users and maybe qualitative observations about how certain stories were spread but i kind of wanted to know more about whether there’s a general numerical predictable model-able pattern to how propaganda or just stories or points of view traverse people and become widely adopted through some kinda markov process but maybe this would be hard to quantify in a more scientific network model bc of all the politics and historical context and formats of information delivery at play. wow i wish i was better at math.
one thing i was a little not fully satisfied with was that the network aspect of this book related more with somewhat static online connections between links to news sources on social media platforms and their readers/users and maybe qualitative observations about how certain stories were spread but i kind of wanted to know more about whether there’s a general numerical predictable model-able pattern to how propaganda or just stories or points of view traverse people and become widely adopted through some kinda markov process but maybe this would be hard to quantify in a more scientific network model bc of all the politics and historical context and formats of information delivery at play. wow i wish i was better at math.
February 28, 2021
this is a weird book. i read the kindle version, and the graphs were essentially useless because they are meant to be color coded but kindle is black and white... and the graphs were tiny, so i couldn't read any of them.
the thesis (it's not the internet, its decades of priming right wing audiences to distrust other media sources and feeding them identity confirming hyper partisan propaganda by talk radio and fox news) seems obvs correct. corollary is that mainstream news does a disservice when they focus on "balanced" aka equally negative coverage, because it creates a false equivalency between both sides when one side is fundamentally more engaged in truth telling and the other side is fundamentally more engaged in actively lying and deceiving. we all saw this play out with with the false equivalence between dt's absolute insanity and hilary clinton's emails.
anyway idk who this book was written for, outside of other academics and potentially journalism professors. the language is extremely inaccessible and it took a huge amount of effort to read. given the relatively simple message... well. i think that the book could have benefitted from a strong editor. idk.
the thesis (it's not the internet, its decades of priming right wing audiences to distrust other media sources and feeding them identity confirming hyper partisan propaganda by talk radio and fox news) seems obvs correct. corollary is that mainstream news does a disservice when they focus on "balanced" aka equally negative coverage, because it creates a false equivalency between both sides when one side is fundamentally more engaged in truth telling and the other side is fundamentally more engaged in actively lying and deceiving. we all saw this play out with with the false equivalence between dt's absolute insanity and hilary clinton's emails.
anyway idk who this book was written for, outside of other academics and potentially journalism professors. the language is extremely inaccessible and it took a huge amount of effort to read. given the relatively simple message... well. i think that the book could have benefitted from a strong editor. idk.
March 1, 2019
Using multiple case studies of 2016/2018 false political narratives; how they emerged; how they were propagated; how they were challenged or not challenged; authors build out a convincing case that it was not Russia or new technological factors that were most responsible, but rather an asymmetry in the US’ media ecosystem where the right-wing conservative side is not subject to the same fact-checking and standards as the left. There are times when I feel authors get over their skis making the argument, for example on page 144, where they highlight an episode of Hannity speaking on the possibility of the Clinton Foundation being a vector for foreign influence : https://books.google.com/books?id=MVR...
Not enough time is spent on how the Iraq War was legitimized. I read it and came away skeptical of the authors criticality and more skeptical of mainstream blue narratives.
Not enough time is spent on how the Iraq War was legitimized. I read it and came away skeptical of the authors criticality and more skeptical of mainstream blue narratives.
February 28, 2021
Very smart and well reasoned book about how political misinformation and disinformation spreads throughout our media ecosystem. Fascinating case studies (the book is academic, but the case studies are accessible) show specific examples. Authors make convincing case that state actors in Russia, or data mining by companies like Cambridge analytica, or bad actors deliberately inserting bad info into the system and seeking profit... all of them pale in their impact, at least up until now, when compared with the structure of the right wing media and political ecosystem... there are no incentives for either politicians or media on the right to moderate or self-correct the baseless claims (nobody is punished). The right media is untethered from fact-checking mainstream media. In contrast, media and politicians on the left are subject to punishment for spreading falsehoods. Possible solutions are not easy... could a billionaire create a new, powerful right wing source connected to truth? Can mainstream media do more to clearly label untruth, or simply ignore it?
April 11, 2019
A really interesting book that taught me something about the American media landscape.
The first third of the book I found the most informative, but it is all worth reading.
Mostly about how right wing media do not have built in, fact checking mechanisms in their landscape
While the left is more integrated with the centre, reinforced by journalistic practices
Refreshing to see direct language that calls out certain organizations and individuals
The ending surprised me since they promote truth seeking institutions, but warn against left-wing criticism of objectivity
Which I think is a bit contradictory
Also, kinda surprised that 538 and NPR are described a left wing rather than in the middle
I wonder if I am biased :P
Overall though
A book worth reading for people who fell into an existential political abyss after the 2016 election, like me.
The first third of the book I found the most informative, but it is all worth reading.
Mostly about how right wing media do not have built in, fact checking mechanisms in their landscape
While the left is more integrated with the centre, reinforced by journalistic practices
Refreshing to see direct language that calls out certain organizations and individuals
The ending surprised me since they promote truth seeking institutions, but warn against left-wing criticism of objectivity
Which I think is a bit contradictory
Also, kinda surprised that 538 and NPR are described a left wing rather than in the middle
I wonder if I am biased :P
Overall though
A book worth reading for people who fell into an existential political abyss after the 2016 election, like me.
January 18, 2020
Incredible data driven analysis of media and Internet/digital media on American democracy. The largest most thoughtful scope I’ve seen considered in this space. Solutions chapter is a little muddy at the discussion of a centralized public database - who would run this? And mixing in external efforts of platform manipulation conducted by state actors or PR firms muddies the waters unless careful consideration is given to how the database tables are laid out...and this would require some stakeholder consensus with platforms to achieve successful shared context.
Overall, highly recommend as a first step in starting this discussion with platforms, governments, NGO’s, researchers, and academics. This is a conversation we need to have sooner than later. Thank you to the authors for the rigorous work involved in getting a constructive discussion started!
Overall, highly recommend as a first step in starting this discussion with platforms, governments, NGO’s, researchers, and academics. This is a conversation we need to have sooner than later. Thank you to the authors for the rigorous work involved in getting a constructive discussion started!
July 21, 2021
very detailed study of the right-wing vs. the mainstream media ecosystems. the right-wing media is pretty much propaganda untethered from reality or fact-checking while far left and centrist media still hews to some journalistic standards and ethics hence still reality-based. The author painstakingly shows the evidence that this is the case and points to the history of this development and traces it to the economic model adopted by the right in the 1970s and 1980s with talk radio and cable that adopted amenable propaganda over journalism in its business model. The authors don't go into why this was such a hit with the right but I would venture to say it is integral to authoritarian psychology which likes a story that flatters their prejudices over an accurate picture of reality. The left still thinks that the truth will set you free while the right loves its make-believe.
July 5, 2025
I'm really not into the book as I thought. I finished it yes, but it was dragging on and was actually glad for it to end. It's not that it's uninformative, it is, but it took forever to finish, and it was a bit less engaging than I would like. The information is good, backed up by real research, but the tone and pacing of the book made me glad it was over with. I liked the topic, but it could have been more engaging and less scientifically oriented, which some books have conveyed some of the same information, but in a better way. Again don't let the review fool you, there is a lot of graphs and the like that show the point of the chapter, but I thought it was just boring to read. I like to be engaged like any other reader, and the information presented was again well done, but it was just a thing to finish and move on thankfully.
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