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The General vs. the President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War
From master storyteller and historian H. W. Brands, twice a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize, comes the riveting story of how President Harry Truman and General Douglas MacArthur squared off to decide America's future in the aftermath of World War II.
At the height of the Korean War, President Harry S. Truman committed a gaffe that sent shock waves around the world. When asked by a reporter about the possible use of atomic weapons in response to China's entry into the war, Truman replied testily, "The military commander in the field will have charge of the use of the weapons, as he always has." This suggested that General Douglas MacArthur, the willful, fearless, and highly decorated commander of the American and U.N. forces, had his finger on the nuclear trigger. A correction quickly followed, but the damage was done; two visions for America's path forward were clearly in opposition, and one man would have to make way.
Truman was one of the most unpopular presidents in American history. Heir to a struggling economy, a ruined Europe, and increasing tension with the Soviet Union, on no issue was the path ahead clear and easy. General MacArthur, by contrast, was incredibly popular, as untouchable as any officer has ever been in America. The lessons he drew from World War II were absolute: appeasement leads to disaster and a showdown with the communists was inevitable--the sooner the better. In the nuclear era, when the Soviets, too, had the bomb, the specter of a catastrophic third World War lurked menacingly close on the horizon.
The contest of wills between these two titanic characters unfolds against the turbulent backdrop of a faraway war and terrors conjured at home by Joseph McCarthy. From the drama of Stalin's blockade of West Berlin to the daring landing of MacArthur's forces at Inchon to the shocking entrance of China into the war, The General and the President vividly evokes the making of a new American era.
At the height of the Korean War, President Harry S. Truman committed a gaffe that sent shock waves around the world. When asked by a reporter about the possible use of atomic weapons in response to China's entry into the war, Truman replied testily, "The military commander in the field will have charge of the use of the weapons, as he always has." This suggested that General Douglas MacArthur, the willful, fearless, and highly decorated commander of the American and U.N. forces, had his finger on the nuclear trigger. A correction quickly followed, but the damage was done; two visions for America's path forward were clearly in opposition, and one man would have to make way.
Truman was one of the most unpopular presidents in American history. Heir to a struggling economy, a ruined Europe, and increasing tension with the Soviet Union, on no issue was the path ahead clear and easy. General MacArthur, by contrast, was incredibly popular, as untouchable as any officer has ever been in America. The lessons he drew from World War II were absolute: appeasement leads to disaster and a showdown with the communists was inevitable--the sooner the better. In the nuclear era, when the Soviets, too, had the bomb, the specter of a catastrophic third World War lurked menacingly close on the horizon.
The contest of wills between these two titanic characters unfolds against the turbulent backdrop of a faraway war and terrors conjured at home by Joseph McCarthy. From the drama of Stalin's blockade of West Berlin to the daring landing of MacArthur's forces at Inchon to the shocking entrance of China into the war, The General and the President vividly evokes the making of a new American era.
424 pages, Kindle Edition
First published October 11, 2016
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About the author
H.W. Brands
103 books1,177 followersH.W. Brands is an acclaimed American historian and author of over thirty books on U.S. history, including Pulitzer Prize finalists The First American and Traitor to His Class. He holds the Jack S. Blanton Sr. Chair in History at the University of Texas at Austin, where he earned his PhD. Originally trained in mathematics, Brands turned to history as a way to pursue his passion for writing. His biographical works on figures like Franklin, Jackson, Grant, and both Roosevelts have earned critical and popular praise for their readability and depth. Raised in Oregon and educated at Stanford, Reed College, and Portland State, he began his teaching career in high schools before entering academia. He later taught at Texas A&M and Vanderbilt before returning to UT Austin. Brands challenges conventional reverence for the Founding Fathers, advocating for a more progressive and evolving view of American democracy. In addition to academic works, his commentary has featured in major documentaries. His books, published internationally and translated into multiple languages, examine U.S. political, economic, and cultural development with compelling narrative force. Beyond academia, he is a public intellectual contributing to national conversations on history and governance.
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September 28, 2017
“We know what we are in for. The Americans can bomb us, they can destroy our industries, but they cannot defeat us on land…They may even drop atom bombs on us. What then? They may kill a few million people. Without sacrifice, a nation’s independence cannot be upheld.”
- General Nieh Yen-jung, Chief of Staff of China’s People’s Liberation Army, to Indian Ambassador K.M. Panikkar, September 1950.
“North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.”
- President Donald J. Trump, August 2017
The last several weeks have seen a drastic increase in tension between the United States and North Korea, with each nation’s respective leadership treating the delicate art of nuclear diplomacy with all the subtlety of a schoolyard brawl. Am I worried? Not actively. Nuclear war with North Korea does not make my (very extensive) list of anxiety inducers. However, whenever there is a non-zero chance of a world-altering (perhaps ending) war, it is, at the very least, worth paying attention.
Of course, nuclear tensions on the Korean Peninsula are nothing new. Rather, it is a reality that stretches back all the way to the Korean War, which began in June 1950. This is the story told by H.W. Brands in The General vs. the President, his lively, fast-paced account of Douglas MacArthur in Korea, and the forbidden weapons he wanted to use to turn the tide.
In 1950, North Korean troops poured across the 38th Parallel, steamrolling the South Korean troops that stood in their way. The United Nations Security Council voted to repel the invasion, and UN troops – including U.S. soldiers – were dispatched to do just that. General MacArthur, hero of World War II, the Supreme Allied Commander in Japan, and the commander-in-chief of the UN command, rose to the occasion. At Inchon, he unleashed a brilliant counteroffensive with a daring amphibious that almost immediately flipped the table on North Korea.
Suddenly, what began as an ignominious route, showed signs of being the capstone to MacArthur's career. His troops pushed inland, driving the NKA north of the 38th Parallel, right back from where they'd come. Not content with the status quo ante bellum, MacArthur pursued the fleeing NKA (with permission) north towards the Yalu, a river on the border of North Korea and China. This triggered a massive Chinese response, tens of thousands of troops, reversed the course of the war once again.
The Chinese intervention, which MacArthur had discounted, dramatically changed the calculus of the conflict. To counter it, MacArthur wanted to try a variety of stratagems, including using Formosan troops (under Chiang Kai-shek); making cross-border aerial attacks into China; and even, fatefully, using atomic weapons. This did not sit well in Washington, D.C., which was trying to limit, rather than widen, the conflict. MacArthur, unsurprising given his ego, believed that President Harry Truman’s administration hampered his conduct in Korea. But instead of fuming about that in his diary ("Dear Journal, Harry is a jerk!"), MacArthur (always his own worst enemy) took his grievances public, openly advocating for contrary policies. The image of a general dictating political questions did not sit well with Truman. Eventually, the President fired MacArthur, dramatically ending both MacArthur’s illustrious military career, as well as Truman’s own political life.
Brands tackles this whole jam-packed tale in 398 pages of text. In that sense, the book’s title is a bit misleading. While it promises a very narrow focus, Brand’s coverage is actually pretty broad. This is popular history, written in narrative fashion with a thriller’s pace. It gives you the full context, starting with mini-bios of both MacArthur and Truman, a recounting of the events leading to the Korean War, and a macro sketch of the ebb and flow of battle, before finally getting to the central clash of character between the Old Soldier and the Man from Independence. The General vs. the President also includes the aftermath of MacArthur’s termination, including his appearance before the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees. (The wake of the firing, with MacArthur making famous speeches while unknowingly undermining his own chance at the presidency, is as fascinating as any of the stuff that happened while he was still in uniform).
I liked this. I really did. But there is a part of me that wanted much more. In my opinion, Brands sacrifices depth for scope, and in doing so, never quite fulfills the promise in the subtitle, of explaining how (or even if) we got to “the brink of nuclear war.”
Part of the reason the book reads so fast is that Brands is narrating from the points of view of his characters. As Brands jumps back and forth between MacArthur and Truman, you see things through their eyes, and get the perspectives and rationalizations for their decisions. (It should be noted that Brands is pretty non-partisan here; he is not out to destroy either the General or the President. In tone, Brands – as is his wont – is rather dispassionate). What Brands doesn’t really do, and which I consider a rather important failing, is analyze the decisions of Truman or MacArthur with any sort of hindsight. We know a lot more about the Cold War today than we ever did before. Historians have access to files and documents that Korean War contemporaries could only have imagined. I wanted Brands to use that expanded knowledge to amplify his narrative. I wanted a bit more critical analysis of the situation. Certain questions I had – such as the actual extent of Soviet participation, much debated at the time – went unanswered.
Moreover, the central hook of The General vs. the President is that MacArthur’s actions brought us close to the use of nuclear weapons, an act that might have turned a limited war into an uncontainable holocaust of infinitely splitting atoms. Brands’ narrative is so concerned with its central dramatic arc that it never takes the time to explore this facet. I wanted more details, including what contingency plans, if any, were being made for the use of nuclear arms. Too often, I sensed that Brands was telling me what happened, but not why; he provides a good literary ride, but one that lacks deeper insights.
With that said, I recognize this was probably aimed at a more general audience. Certainly it succeeds on the level of clarity and readability. I’m confident that someone who has never read a sentence about the Korean War could finish this without getting lost or bogged down.
The General vs. the President also contains important lessons. As I’ve said here and elsewhere, Brands is not an axe-grinder or a firebrand, and this is not a polemic. His writing is carefully balanced. If he has a strong opinion about Doug MacArthur – and most people interested in this era do – he is careful to hide it.
Brands does, however, come to the very reasonable conclusion that MacArthur’s firing was not only justified, but important. From the founding of the republic, Americans saw the wisdom in putting a civilian in charge of the Armed Forces. It’s hard to believe in this day and age, but America used to harbor a powerful skepticism about funding a permanent army. That skepticism has, of course, eroded, to an almost comical degree. A nation that relied almost entirely on a modest internal constabulary until the 20th century now spends as much on the military as the next seven countries combined. This is not necessarily a criticism, only an observation, but it means the strength of the military, in terms of budget and political capital, is enormous. That makes the threat of praetorianism very, very real.
Truman stood up to that. As Brands writes: “Truman’s bold stroke in firing MacArthur ended his own career as surely as it terminated MacArthur’s, but it sustained hope that humanity might survive the nuclear age.”
We are, right now, in a very different set of circumstances, still hoping that humanity might survive the nuclear age. The General vs. the President illustrates some of the difficult decisions required to make that possible.
- General Nieh Yen-jung, Chief of Staff of China’s People’s Liberation Army, to Indian Ambassador K.M. Panikkar, September 1950.
“North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.”
- President Donald J. Trump, August 2017
The last several weeks have seen a drastic increase in tension between the United States and North Korea, with each nation’s respective leadership treating the delicate art of nuclear diplomacy with all the subtlety of a schoolyard brawl. Am I worried? Not actively. Nuclear war with North Korea does not make my (very extensive) list of anxiety inducers. However, whenever there is a non-zero chance of a world-altering (perhaps ending) war, it is, at the very least, worth paying attention.
Of course, nuclear tensions on the Korean Peninsula are nothing new. Rather, it is a reality that stretches back all the way to the Korean War, which began in June 1950. This is the story told by H.W. Brands in The General vs. the President, his lively, fast-paced account of Douglas MacArthur in Korea, and the forbidden weapons he wanted to use to turn the tide.
In 1950, North Korean troops poured across the 38th Parallel, steamrolling the South Korean troops that stood in their way. The United Nations Security Council voted to repel the invasion, and UN troops – including U.S. soldiers – were dispatched to do just that. General MacArthur, hero of World War II, the Supreme Allied Commander in Japan, and the commander-in-chief of the UN command, rose to the occasion. At Inchon, he unleashed a brilliant counteroffensive with a daring amphibious that almost immediately flipped the table on North Korea.
Suddenly, what began as an ignominious route, showed signs of being the capstone to MacArthur's career. His troops pushed inland, driving the NKA north of the 38th Parallel, right back from where they'd come. Not content with the status quo ante bellum, MacArthur pursued the fleeing NKA (with permission) north towards the Yalu, a river on the border of North Korea and China. This triggered a massive Chinese response, tens of thousands of troops, reversed the course of the war once again.
The Chinese intervention, which MacArthur had discounted, dramatically changed the calculus of the conflict. To counter it, MacArthur wanted to try a variety of stratagems, including using Formosan troops (under Chiang Kai-shek); making cross-border aerial attacks into China; and even, fatefully, using atomic weapons. This did not sit well in Washington, D.C., which was trying to limit, rather than widen, the conflict. MacArthur, unsurprising given his ego, believed that President Harry Truman’s administration hampered his conduct in Korea. But instead of fuming about that in his diary ("Dear Journal, Harry is a jerk!"), MacArthur (always his own worst enemy) took his grievances public, openly advocating for contrary policies. The image of a general dictating political questions did not sit well with Truman. Eventually, the President fired MacArthur, dramatically ending both MacArthur’s illustrious military career, as well as Truman’s own political life.
Brands tackles this whole jam-packed tale in 398 pages of text. In that sense, the book’s title is a bit misleading. While it promises a very narrow focus, Brand’s coverage is actually pretty broad. This is popular history, written in narrative fashion with a thriller’s pace. It gives you the full context, starting with mini-bios of both MacArthur and Truman, a recounting of the events leading to the Korean War, and a macro sketch of the ebb and flow of battle, before finally getting to the central clash of character between the Old Soldier and the Man from Independence. The General vs. the President also includes the aftermath of MacArthur’s termination, including his appearance before the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees. (The wake of the firing, with MacArthur making famous speeches while unknowingly undermining his own chance at the presidency, is as fascinating as any of the stuff that happened while he was still in uniform).
I liked this. I really did. But there is a part of me that wanted much more. In my opinion, Brands sacrifices depth for scope, and in doing so, never quite fulfills the promise in the subtitle, of explaining how (or even if) we got to “the brink of nuclear war.”
Part of the reason the book reads so fast is that Brands is narrating from the points of view of his characters. As Brands jumps back and forth between MacArthur and Truman, you see things through their eyes, and get the perspectives and rationalizations for their decisions. (It should be noted that Brands is pretty non-partisan here; he is not out to destroy either the General or the President. In tone, Brands – as is his wont – is rather dispassionate). What Brands doesn’t really do, and which I consider a rather important failing, is analyze the decisions of Truman or MacArthur with any sort of hindsight. We know a lot more about the Cold War today than we ever did before. Historians have access to files and documents that Korean War contemporaries could only have imagined. I wanted Brands to use that expanded knowledge to amplify his narrative. I wanted a bit more critical analysis of the situation. Certain questions I had – such as the actual extent of Soviet participation, much debated at the time – went unanswered.
Moreover, the central hook of The General vs. the President is that MacArthur’s actions brought us close to the use of nuclear weapons, an act that might have turned a limited war into an uncontainable holocaust of infinitely splitting atoms. Brands’ narrative is so concerned with its central dramatic arc that it never takes the time to explore this facet. I wanted more details, including what contingency plans, if any, were being made for the use of nuclear arms. Too often, I sensed that Brands was telling me what happened, but not why; he provides a good literary ride, but one that lacks deeper insights.
With that said, I recognize this was probably aimed at a more general audience. Certainly it succeeds on the level of clarity and readability. I’m confident that someone who has never read a sentence about the Korean War could finish this without getting lost or bogged down.
The General vs. the President also contains important lessons. As I’ve said here and elsewhere, Brands is not an axe-grinder or a firebrand, and this is not a polemic. His writing is carefully balanced. If he has a strong opinion about Doug MacArthur – and most people interested in this era do – he is careful to hide it.
Brands does, however, come to the very reasonable conclusion that MacArthur’s firing was not only justified, but important. From the founding of the republic, Americans saw the wisdom in putting a civilian in charge of the Armed Forces. It’s hard to believe in this day and age, but America used to harbor a powerful skepticism about funding a permanent army. That skepticism has, of course, eroded, to an almost comical degree. A nation that relied almost entirely on a modest internal constabulary until the 20th century now spends as much on the military as the next seven countries combined. This is not necessarily a criticism, only an observation, but it means the strength of the military, in terms of budget and political capital, is enormous. That makes the threat of praetorianism very, very real.
Truman stood up to that. As Brands writes: “Truman’s bold stroke in firing MacArthur ended his own career as surely as it terminated MacArthur’s, but it sustained hope that humanity might survive the nuclear age.”
We are, right now, in a very different set of circumstances, still hoping that humanity might survive the nuclear age. The General vs. the President illustrates some of the difficult decisions required to make that possible.
February 11, 2024
“If you should get kicked in the teeth, I shall not lift a finger. You’ll have to ask Mao for help.” - USSR General Secretary Josef Stalin to North Korean President Kim Il-Sung, April 1950 before his invasion of South Korea
“Nothing could be more fallacious than the threadbare arguments by those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific, that if we defend Formosa [Taiwan] we alienate continental Asia. They do not understand that it is in the pattern of the Oriental psychology to respect and follow aggressive, resolute and dynamic leadership, to quickly turn on leadership characterized by timidity or vacillation. Nothing in the last five years has so inspired the Far East as the American determination to preserve the bulwarks of our Pacific Ocean strategic position from future encroachment. It would shift future battle areas five thousand miles eastward to the coasts of the American continents; it would expose our friends in the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia and Japan to the lustful thrusts of those who stand for slavery against liberty, for atheism against God.” - General Douglas MacArthur, August 1950 Address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars
"The President of the United States directs that you will withdraw your message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars because various features with respect to Formosa are in conflict with the policy of the United States and its position in the United Nations." - Communication from the White House to MacArthur, August 1950
“Your military objective is the destruction of the North Korean armed forces. In attaining this objective you are authorized to conduct operations, including amphibious and airborne landings and ground operations north of the 38th Parallel in Korea, provided that at the time of such operation there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations in North Korea. Under no circumstances will your forces cross Manchurian or Russian borders and as a matter of policy no non-Korean ground forces will be used in northeast provinces bordering the USSR or along the Manchurian border. Furthermore, the support of your operations either north or south of the 38th parallel will not include air or naval action against Russian or Chinese territory.” - MacArthur’s orders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 1950
“General MacArthur was at the airport with his shirt unbuttoned, wearing a greasy ham and eggs cap that been evidently had been in use for twenty years.” - from Truman’s diary after flying 7000 miles to meet him, October 1950
“Do you mind if I smoke, Mr. President, producing a corn cob pipe. No, Truman replied. I suppose I've had more smoke blown in my face than any other man alive." - from a transcript of Truman and MacArthur’s meeting on Wake Island, October 1950
“We have now cleared Korea of Communist forces. The enemy's human wave tactics failed and is showing less stamina than our troops. Of greater significance than our tactical success has been that this new enemy, Red China, of such exaggerated military power, lacks industrial capacity, manufacturing bases and raw materials needed to produce, maintain and operate even moderate air and naval power, and cannot provide essentials for ground operations. The disparity cannot be overcome by bravery, however fanatical, or gross indifference to human loss. A decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to Korea would doom China to the risk of military collapse. There should be no difficulty arriving at decisions if issues are resolved on their own merits without being burdened by matters such as Formosa and China's seat in the United Nations. I stand ready to confer with the enemy forces to find any means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea might be accomplished without further bloodshed." - MacArthur’s offer of a ceasefire in March 1951 pre-empting Truman on the eve of the President’s announcement
“With deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties. In view of the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided I must make a change of command in the Far East. I have therefore relieved General MacArthur of his commands.” - President Harry S. Truman, April 1951
“I fired him because he wouldn't respect the authority of the President. I didn't fire him because he was a dumb son of a bitch, although he was, but that's not against the law for generals. If it was, half to three-quarters of them would be in jail.” - Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman (from unaired 1962 television interviews)
************
Popular historian and University of Texas professor H. W. Brands provides intimate character sketches of Douglas MacArthur and Harry S. Truman during the Korean War. They were at odds over Truman’s foreign policy, a subject outside of MacArthur’s purview as military commander. In addition to the five star general’s hubris he had become a national hero for his leading role in winning the war in the Pacific and the peace in Japan. Truman became president when FDR died in 1945 and was elected in 1949. His goals were to use the UN aegis to fight communist aggression in Korea, avoiding a greater war with China and the USSR, but he was faced with early ‘50s red baiting and McCarthyism.
The plan was to skirt a nuclear disaster by not attacking the Chinese beyond the Yalu River border or allowing Chiang Kai-shek to take advantage of the conflict by crossing the Taiwan Straight from Formosa, where 800,000 Nationalist troops had taken refuge once Mao’s People’s Republic was founded in 1949. After a successful military campaign by MacArthur that regained Seoul and captured Pyongyang in the north 100,000’s of Chinese soldiers crossed the border at Yalu, eventually numbering 1.5 million. Without the mandate to strike bases on Chinese soil UN forces were driven back south until a change in command reversed the tide. Borders were restored at the 38th parallel where the war had begun.
Congressional meetings with MacArthur, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Bradley, Secretary of Defense Marshall and Secretary of State Acheson devolved into bitter partisan squabbles. Republicans and southern Democrats went on the attack towards Truman’s administration. Marshall noted the differences that arose between MacArthur and the President, Defense Dept and Pentagon were of a local field commander versus those responsible for global security of the US. Ticker tape parades followed MacArthur on his homecoming and denunciation of Truman for firing a modern day Caesar. His polls fell to 22% and he declined to run again. Later analysis is that he may have averted WWIII, his concern at the time.
“Nothing could be more fallacious than the threadbare arguments by those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific, that if we defend Formosa [Taiwan] we alienate continental Asia. They do not understand that it is in the pattern of the Oriental psychology to respect and follow aggressive, resolute and dynamic leadership, to quickly turn on leadership characterized by timidity or vacillation. Nothing in the last five years has so inspired the Far East as the American determination to preserve the bulwarks of our Pacific Ocean strategic position from future encroachment. It would shift future battle areas five thousand miles eastward to the coasts of the American continents; it would expose our friends in the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia and Japan to the lustful thrusts of those who stand for slavery against liberty, for atheism against God.” - General Douglas MacArthur, August 1950 Address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars
"The President of the United States directs that you will withdraw your message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars because various features with respect to Formosa are in conflict with the policy of the United States and its position in the United Nations." - Communication from the White House to MacArthur, August 1950
“Your military objective is the destruction of the North Korean armed forces. In attaining this objective you are authorized to conduct operations, including amphibious and airborne landings and ground operations north of the 38th Parallel in Korea, provided that at the time of such operation there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations in North Korea. Under no circumstances will your forces cross Manchurian or Russian borders and as a matter of policy no non-Korean ground forces will be used in northeast provinces bordering the USSR or along the Manchurian border. Furthermore, the support of your operations either north or south of the 38th parallel will not include air or naval action against Russian or Chinese territory.” - MacArthur’s orders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 1950
“General MacArthur was at the airport with his shirt unbuttoned, wearing a greasy ham and eggs cap that been evidently had been in use for twenty years.” - from Truman’s diary after flying 7000 miles to meet him, October 1950
“Do you mind if I smoke, Mr. President, producing a corn cob pipe. No, Truman replied. I suppose I've had more smoke blown in my face than any other man alive." - from a transcript of Truman and MacArthur’s meeting on Wake Island, October 1950
“We have now cleared Korea of Communist forces. The enemy's human wave tactics failed and is showing less stamina than our troops. Of greater significance than our tactical success has been that this new enemy, Red China, of such exaggerated military power, lacks industrial capacity, manufacturing bases and raw materials needed to produce, maintain and operate even moderate air and naval power, and cannot provide essentials for ground operations. The disparity cannot be overcome by bravery, however fanatical, or gross indifference to human loss. A decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to Korea would doom China to the risk of military collapse. There should be no difficulty arriving at decisions if issues are resolved on their own merits without being burdened by matters such as Formosa and China's seat in the United Nations. I stand ready to confer with the enemy forces to find any means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea might be accomplished without further bloodshed." - MacArthur’s offer of a ceasefire in March 1951 pre-empting Truman on the eve of the President’s announcement
“With deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties. In view of the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided I must make a change of command in the Far East. I have therefore relieved General MacArthur of his commands.” - President Harry S. Truman, April 1951
“I fired him because he wouldn't respect the authority of the President. I didn't fire him because he was a dumb son of a bitch, although he was, but that's not against the law for generals. If it was, half to three-quarters of them would be in jail.” - Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman (from unaired 1962 television interviews)
************
Popular historian and University of Texas professor H. W. Brands provides intimate character sketches of Douglas MacArthur and Harry S. Truman during the Korean War. They were at odds over Truman’s foreign policy, a subject outside of MacArthur’s purview as military commander. In addition to the five star general’s hubris he had become a national hero for his leading role in winning the war in the Pacific and the peace in Japan. Truman became president when FDR died in 1945 and was elected in 1949. His goals were to use the UN aegis to fight communist aggression in Korea, avoiding a greater war with China and the USSR, but he was faced with early ‘50s red baiting and McCarthyism.
The plan was to skirt a nuclear disaster by not attacking the Chinese beyond the Yalu River border or allowing Chiang Kai-shek to take advantage of the conflict by crossing the Taiwan Straight from Formosa, where 800,000 Nationalist troops had taken refuge once Mao’s People’s Republic was founded in 1949. After a successful military campaign by MacArthur that regained Seoul and captured Pyongyang in the north 100,000’s of Chinese soldiers crossed the border at Yalu, eventually numbering 1.5 million. Without the mandate to strike bases on Chinese soil UN forces were driven back south until a change in command reversed the tide. Borders were restored at the 38th parallel where the war had begun.
Congressional meetings with MacArthur, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Bradley, Secretary of Defense Marshall and Secretary of State Acheson devolved into bitter partisan squabbles. Republicans and southern Democrats went on the attack towards Truman’s administration. Marshall noted the differences that arose between MacArthur and the President, Defense Dept and Pentagon were of a local field commander versus those responsible for global security of the US. Ticker tape parades followed MacArthur on his homecoming and denunciation of Truman for firing a modern day Caesar. His polls fell to 22% and he declined to run again. Later analysis is that he may have averted WWIII, his concern at the time.
June 7, 2017
In another of his wonderful pieces, H.W. Brands takes the reader into the world of the Korean War, alongside a battle that superseded that country's geographic and ideological fate. The true clash arose between the military and political wings of the United States, more specifically, General Douglas MacArthur and President Harry Truman. Opening the narrative, Brands provides the reader with context necessary to understand how both men reached their respective commands. MacArthur had been working on keeping the Pacific Theatre under control as Japan surrendered at the end of the Second World War, showing compassion over aggression during the victory claimed by the United States. Truman, on the other hand, was hoisted into his position as a late choice to serve as Roosevelt's running mate in the '44 election, only to ascend when the POTUS died in office a few months into the new term. When the outbreak of aggression on the Korean Peninsula threatened to turn into a full war, the infant United Nations turned to the military strength of the US, and MacArthur in particular, to head-up ground troops in the region. Truman held firm that he, as Commander-in-Chief, would liaise directly with the UN and his military forces, though MacArthur seemed to have his own opinions, working directly in the region. With technology what it was in the early 1950s and the speed at which things moved from a Korean Conflict into a potential Third World War, all eyes were watching what might happen. China and the Soviets began arming troops and the entire region seemed ready to host the ultimate ideological war, with nuclear weapons at the fingertips of both sides. MacArthur, whose eyes were solely focussed on the war effort, made decisions he felt were best, at times ignoring the political chess game taking place. This contradiction in commands sent by Truman left the White House fuming, as the president was apparently unable to keep his own general in line. Press reports emerged from both arenas, making a mockery of the American control of the situation and leaving the Communist forces to sit back, if only momentarily, and watch the implosion. One defiance too many saw Truman remove MacArthur from command and send him stateside, though the repercussions by the American people was astoundingly in favour of the general, while vilifying Truman. A ticker tape parade awaited MacArthur, who also testified to his actions in front of Congress, only further creating tension within the American sphere. The final blow came as the 1952 Presidential Election loomed. Had Truman soured the hopes of any Democrat? Could MacArthur ride the wave of his popularity into something even larger? Only time would tell. Brands offers a wonderfully detailed account of this, with the Korean War as a sensational backdrop, and presents the reader with the ability to choose for themselves, who was right in this most intense stand-off. A captivating piece that will pull the reader to the centre of what could have been a disaster and the end of the world as we know it. Perfect for history and war buffs alike, Brands shows off his superior abilities with this well-paced piece.
Admittedly, I have been trying to secure a piece of historical fiction that relates to the Korean War. While patiently twiddling my thumbs, I thought I ought to invest in a little historical background reading, which would offer up some facts and a better understanding of the regional struggle. Brands not only provides a wonderful backgrounder, but he brings the story to life, pulling on history as it relates to all the key players: MacArthur, China, USSR, Truman, as well as a slew of others who influenced both central characters. Using a wonderfully alternating chapter sequence to begin, the reader learns not only the thoughts of one man, but a contrast between the two, as they synthesised the same information. When the two came together on Wake Island, the reader could see the clash of titans and the apparent unspoken dislike the two had for one another. Brands pulls on historical documents to create this seamless narrative that offers more than factual presentation, but serves to lay the groundwork for the eventual clash that cost one man his job and likely buried the other from being seen as an effective world leader. Brands pulls no punches, but also does not seek to smear either man, allowing the reader to weigh in and potentially fuelling many discussions about these historic events. The tome offers some key questions throughout: Could Korea have ended differently had MacArthur stayed? Was Truman out of his depth? Who makes the ultimate military policy decision in the middle of a conflict? The reader becomes the ultimate judge, though history offers a a single pathway in determining its solution. There is no doubt that the world stood on the brink at this time, an event that was eventually replaced by the Cuban Missile Crisis, but it is worth remembering how tense things were in the years just after the Second World War. And for a history buff like myself, I was in complete awe.
Kudos, Mr. Brands for delivering such a wonderful story and pulling on so many powerful sources to give readers something to consider.
Like/hate the review? An ever-growing collection of others appears at:
http://pecheyponderings.wordpress.com/
Admittedly, I have been trying to secure a piece of historical fiction that relates to the Korean War. While patiently twiddling my thumbs, I thought I ought to invest in a little historical background reading, which would offer up some facts and a better understanding of the regional struggle. Brands not only provides a wonderful backgrounder, but he brings the story to life, pulling on history as it relates to all the key players: MacArthur, China, USSR, Truman, as well as a slew of others who influenced both central characters. Using a wonderfully alternating chapter sequence to begin, the reader learns not only the thoughts of one man, but a contrast between the two, as they synthesised the same information. When the two came together on Wake Island, the reader could see the clash of titans and the apparent unspoken dislike the two had for one another. Brands pulls on historical documents to create this seamless narrative that offers more than factual presentation, but serves to lay the groundwork for the eventual clash that cost one man his job and likely buried the other from being seen as an effective world leader. Brands pulls no punches, but also does not seek to smear either man, allowing the reader to weigh in and potentially fuelling many discussions about these historic events. The tome offers some key questions throughout: Could Korea have ended differently had MacArthur stayed? Was Truman out of his depth? Who makes the ultimate military policy decision in the middle of a conflict? The reader becomes the ultimate judge, though history offers a a single pathway in determining its solution. There is no doubt that the world stood on the brink at this time, an event that was eventually replaced by the Cuban Missile Crisis, but it is worth remembering how tense things were in the years just after the Second World War. And for a history buff like myself, I was in complete awe.
Kudos, Mr. Brands for delivering such a wonderful story and pulling on so many powerful sources to give readers something to consider.
Like/hate the review? An ever-growing collection of others appears at:
http://pecheyponderings.wordpress.com/
June 8, 2023
William Manchester has written a biography of Douglas MacArthur titled American Caesar. That title is an apt metaphor for the events described in this history involving Harry Truman and Douglas MacArthur at the height of the Korean War. Julius Caesar, after waging a campaign to conquer Gaul, sought tributes and political power on his return to Rome. Tensions began when the Roman Senate demanded that Caesar give up his provinces and armies. He refused and marched on Rome. After defeating Pompey in a civil war he was made dictator for life. The word “Caesar” has become a synonym for Emperor or Dictator.
There are parallels between this history and the events in Rome in 45 BC. Here MacArthur ran afoul of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staffs by publicly expressing his disagreement with the policies in Korea. This violated the principle of the United States Military that it must be controlled by civilian authority. The United States and its allies in the United Nations wanted to confine the conflict to Korea and avoid it spreading into a third world war. Their objective was to defeat the aggressors and restore peace. In this history MacArthur refuses to accept civilian control of his campaign.
The book opens with a description of the fear by Britain, France and other allies of the United States that a nuclear war might be possible. The fear was raised when President Harry Truman stated in a press conference that nuclear weapons were under consideration, and even more threatening was his statement that the use of those weapons rested with the theater commander Douglas MacArthur.
When the United Nations ordered the defense of South Korea, Truman knew he had to respond with the American military that the allies demanded. The United States would survive without Korea, but it could not survive without its allies. They would forgive defeat, but not forgive a refusal to fight.
MacArthur maintained a stubborn confidence in his own judgment. Diplomacy and the concerns for the opinions of others were the qualities that General MacArthur had been lacking in the past. He continued his old habit of doing things his own way without too much concern about orders from Washington.
The involvement of Chinese forces brought the difficulties between Washington and MacArthur to a head. MacArthur did not agree with Washington’s decision to limit the conflict to Korea. This led to his dismissal by Truman.
George Marshall in his testimony before the Senate stated: “General MacArthur, on the other hand, would have us, on our own initiative, carry the conflict beyond Korea against the mainland of Communist China.” (Page 355) Among the risks would be losing our allies, exposing Western Europe to attack by millions of Soviet troops, and thermonuclear war.
The fall of South Korea was seen as another step of the domino theory. The Truman Doctrine recognized that communism could not be defeated, but it must be contained. Gen. Omar Bradley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated the doctrine required methods short of war. The costs of defending Greece, Berlin and South Korea were less expensive than the vast destruction which would be caused by a total war.
There are parallels between this history and the events in Rome in 45 BC. Here MacArthur ran afoul of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staffs by publicly expressing his disagreement with the policies in Korea. This violated the principle of the United States Military that it must be controlled by civilian authority. The United States and its allies in the United Nations wanted to confine the conflict to Korea and avoid it spreading into a third world war. Their objective was to defeat the aggressors and restore peace. In this history MacArthur refuses to accept civilian control of his campaign.
The book opens with a description of the fear by Britain, France and other allies of the United States that a nuclear war might be possible. The fear was raised when President Harry Truman stated in a press conference that nuclear weapons were under consideration, and even more threatening was his statement that the use of those weapons rested with the theater commander Douglas MacArthur.
When the United Nations ordered the defense of South Korea, Truman knew he had to respond with the American military that the allies demanded. The United States would survive without Korea, but it could not survive without its allies. They would forgive defeat, but not forgive a refusal to fight.
MacArthur maintained a stubborn confidence in his own judgment. Diplomacy and the concerns for the opinions of others were the qualities that General MacArthur had been lacking in the past. He continued his old habit of doing things his own way without too much concern about orders from Washington.
The involvement of Chinese forces brought the difficulties between Washington and MacArthur to a head. MacArthur did not agree with Washington’s decision to limit the conflict to Korea. This led to his dismissal by Truman.
George Marshall in his testimony before the Senate stated: “General MacArthur, on the other hand, would have us, on our own initiative, carry the conflict beyond Korea against the mainland of Communist China.” (Page 355) Among the risks would be losing our allies, exposing Western Europe to attack by millions of Soviet troops, and thermonuclear war.
The fall of South Korea was seen as another step of the domino theory. The Truman Doctrine recognized that communism could not be defeated, but it must be contained. Gen. Omar Bradley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated the doctrine required methods short of war. The costs of defending Greece, Berlin and South Korea were less expensive than the vast destruction which would be caused by a total war.
Six decades after the general and the president, standing at the brink of nuclear war, wrestled over Korea and China; six decades after their contest brought to a head the issue of whether the president or a general determines American policy; six decades after MacArthur received a hero’s reception from Congress and ticker-tape parades from an adoring public while Truman was castigated as an appeaser and howled into retirement, it was hard to find any knowledgeable person who didn’t feel relief that the president, and not the general, had been the one with the final say in their fateful struggle.
October 23, 2022
Much like Nathaniel Philbrick, Hampton Sides, and the late David McCullough, H.W. Brands is a meticulous researcher, and a talented writer, who writes narrative histories in which his storytelling skills are on display. He specializes in biographies, especially presidential biographies. In this case, we not only get a presidential biography, but also a biography of one of America’s most famous and most decorated soldiers.
It is hard to think of two famous Americans, forced into a critical relationship, who were more unlike in just about every way that one could imagine, including background, personality, and outlook. They truly were a historical odd couple.
The forced relationship, of course, was the Korean War, and it set up a clash between two strong-willed men in a struggle between a democratically elected civilian leader of the nation and a powerful and popular military general.
General MacArthur never quite accepted the concept of civilian control of the military even though the Constitution clearly gives the president that power as commander in chief. President Truman, on the other hand, was bound and determined to prove to the general that he was in charge when it came to setting the policies that would be pursued in the war.
Finally, the general went a step too far when he publicly aired his opposition to the policies formulated by the president and his advisors, which included the military Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a result, the commander in chief fired the general.
This is only a brief synopsis of the book, of course. There is much, much more to the story, which is obvious, since it takes Brands over four hundred pages to tell the story.
It is hard to think of two famous Americans, forced into a critical relationship, who were more unlike in just about every way that one could imagine, including background, personality, and outlook. They truly were a historical odd couple.
The forced relationship, of course, was the Korean War, and it set up a clash between two strong-willed men in a struggle between a democratically elected civilian leader of the nation and a powerful and popular military general.
General MacArthur never quite accepted the concept of civilian control of the military even though the Constitution clearly gives the president that power as commander in chief. President Truman, on the other hand, was bound and determined to prove to the general that he was in charge when it came to setting the policies that would be pursued in the war.
Finally, the general went a step too far when he publicly aired his opposition to the policies formulated by the president and his advisors, which included the military Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a result, the commander in chief fired the general.
This is only a brief synopsis of the book, of course. There is much, much more to the story, which is obvious, since it takes Brands over four hundred pages to tell the story.
November 11, 2016
This is a great comparison study. Professor Brands is a master storyteller. I thoroughly enjoyed reading this book.
After World War II MacArthur was extremely popular. The lessons he learned from WWII were absolute: appeasement leads to disaster, and a showdown with the communists was inevitable and as far as Douglas MacArthur was concerned the sooner the better. At the time, Truman was an unpopular president. Truman faced a struggling economy, a ruined Europe and increasing hostilities with the Soviet Union. Senator Joseph McCarthy was in full swing and he had a hostile divided Congress. Also, Truman had to deal with Stalin’s blockade of West Berlin with the airlift of food. Then the Korean War began.
Brands reveals the contest of wills between these two strong characters against the backdrop of the Korean peacekeeping action, the drama with Stalin and the entrance of China into the Korean conflict triggered by MacArthur. The critical conflict between the two was the civilian rule over the military, which MacArthur defied.
This is a well written and meticulously researched comparison study of two of American leaders during the Korean War. Truman thought MacArthur was egotistical, reckless, lacked foresight and was willing to use nuclear weapons. MacArthur thought Truman was like all politicians, spineless, afraid and corrupt. Brands reveals both the strong and weak points of each man. MacArthur did wonders in Japan, but was extremely naïve about global geopolitics; and Truman did wonders in Europe, but was in over his head and made some mistakes. The book has some flaws. I noted some inaccurate statements; for example, Brands states that Truman and Treasury Secretary John Snyder, whom he consulted on MacArthur’s firing, “had served together in WWI”. They actually met at Fort Riley, Kansas in 1928. I enjoyed the Senate hearings of the Army particularly that of General Marshall. The book reads like a novel, is easy to read but has lots of critical detail.
Scott Brick does an excellent job narrating the book. Brick is an actor, writer and award winning audiobook narrator.
After World War II MacArthur was extremely popular. The lessons he learned from WWII were absolute: appeasement leads to disaster, and a showdown with the communists was inevitable and as far as Douglas MacArthur was concerned the sooner the better. At the time, Truman was an unpopular president. Truman faced a struggling economy, a ruined Europe and increasing hostilities with the Soviet Union. Senator Joseph McCarthy was in full swing and he had a hostile divided Congress. Also, Truman had to deal with Stalin’s blockade of West Berlin with the airlift of food. Then the Korean War began.
Brands reveals the contest of wills between these two strong characters against the backdrop of the Korean peacekeeping action, the drama with Stalin and the entrance of China into the Korean conflict triggered by MacArthur. The critical conflict between the two was the civilian rule over the military, which MacArthur defied.
This is a well written and meticulously researched comparison study of two of American leaders during the Korean War. Truman thought MacArthur was egotistical, reckless, lacked foresight and was willing to use nuclear weapons. MacArthur thought Truman was like all politicians, spineless, afraid and corrupt. Brands reveals both the strong and weak points of each man. MacArthur did wonders in Japan, but was extremely naïve about global geopolitics; and Truman did wonders in Europe, but was in over his head and made some mistakes. The book has some flaws. I noted some inaccurate statements; for example, Brands states that Truman and Treasury Secretary John Snyder, whom he consulted on MacArthur’s firing, “had served together in WWI”. They actually met at Fort Riley, Kansas in 1928. I enjoyed the Senate hearings of the Army particularly that of General Marshall. The book reads like a novel, is easy to read but has lots of critical detail.
Scott Brick does an excellent job narrating the book. Brick is an actor, writer and award winning audiobook narrator.
October 12, 2017
Interesting and informative look at the controversial decision to relieve Douglas MacArthur of command during the Korean War. Perhaps too much time was spent on the 'introductory' phase, but once the war began, the story picked up. MacArthur's ego certainly played a great part in what happened. In some ways, the situation reminded of that experienced between McClellan and Lincoln during the Civil War. MacArthur seemed to have the same contempt for the civilians who ran the government. Perhaps the fact that he was thousands of miles from Washington gave MacArthur a feeling of being the one in control, the one who SHOULD be making the decisions.
The author does a good job explaining the politics of the time and the investigation following the firing. All in all, I learned a great deal from this book.
The author does a good job explaining the politics of the time and the investigation following the firing. All in all, I learned a great deal from this book.
July 6, 2022
From historian H. W. Brands, twice a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize, comes the riveting story of how President Harry S Truman and General Douglas MacArthur squared off to decide America's future in the aftermath of World War II.
At the height of the Korean War, President Harry S. Truman committed a gaffe that sent shock waves around the world. When asked by a reporter about the possible use of atomic weapons in response to China's entry into the war, Truman replied testily, "The military commander in the field will have charge of the use of the weapons, as he always has." This suggested that General Douglas MacArthur, the willful, fearless, and highly decorated commander of the American and U.N. forces, had his finger on the nuclear trigger.
Truman was one of the most unpopular presidents in American history. Heir to a struggling economy, a ruined Europe, and increasing tension with the Soviet Union, on no issue was the path ahead clear and easy. General MacArthur, by contrast, was incredibly popular, as untouchable as any officer has ever been in America. The lessons he drew from World War II were absolute: appeasement leads to disaster and a showdown with the communists was inevitable--the sooner the better. In the nuclear era, when the Soviets, too, had the bomb, the specter of a catastrophic third World War lurked menacingly close on the horizon.
The contest of wills between these two titanic characters unfolds against the turbulent backdrop of a faraway war and terrors conjured at home by Joseph McCarthy. From the drama of Stalin's blockade of West Berlin to the daring landing of MacArthur's forces at Inchon to the shocking entrance of China into the war, " The General and the President vividly evokes the making of a new American era."
At the height of the Korean War, President Harry S. Truman committed a gaffe that sent shock waves around the world. When asked by a reporter about the possible use of atomic weapons in response to China's entry into the war, Truman replied testily, "The military commander in the field will have charge of the use of the weapons, as he always has." This suggested that General Douglas MacArthur, the willful, fearless, and highly decorated commander of the American and U.N. forces, had his finger on the nuclear trigger.
Truman was one of the most unpopular presidents in American history. Heir to a struggling economy, a ruined Europe, and increasing tension with the Soviet Union, on no issue was the path ahead clear and easy. General MacArthur, by contrast, was incredibly popular, as untouchable as any officer has ever been in America. The lessons he drew from World War II were absolute: appeasement leads to disaster and a showdown with the communists was inevitable--the sooner the better. In the nuclear era, when the Soviets, too, had the bomb, the specter of a catastrophic third World War lurked menacingly close on the horizon.
The contest of wills between these two titanic characters unfolds against the turbulent backdrop of a faraway war and terrors conjured at home by Joseph McCarthy. From the drama of Stalin's blockade of West Berlin to the daring landing of MacArthur's forces at Inchon to the shocking entrance of China into the war, " The General and the President vividly evokes the making of a new American era."
June 14, 2023
This entire book can be summed up with a single sentence, “The differences between Truman and MacArthur were [that] the president wanted to contain the war, the general to expand it.”
What a piece of work Douglas MacArthur was. He was a charismatic, inspirational leader; he was personally brave to the point of recklessness; and he had moments of brilliance. Mark Perry, in The Most Dangerous Man in America, writes that MacArthur had a brilliant grasp of the art of combined land-sea-air warfare and a notable ability to coordinate vast forces across an enormous theater of war. And yet, he was vain to the point of pathological narcissism. For instance, during World War II the road to Japan did not necessarily involve the reconquest of the Philippines, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended another approach that would be faster and cost fewer lives, but that would mean MacArthur would not be able to go ashore, gaze off into the distance, and solemnly announce for the cameras, “I have returned.”
It was Franklin Roosevelt who called MacArthur the most dangerous man in America (he considered Huey Long the second most dangerous). In 1932, in the depths of the Depression, destitute World War I veterans who had been promised service bonuses payable in 1945 came to Washington to demand early payment. They stayed for months before President Hoover ordered their encampment cleared on 28 July 1932. This was clearly a police action, but Douglas MacArthur, then serving as the Chief of Staff of the Army, mounted his horse to personally oversee the removal of the demonstrators and the destruction of their belongings. It was ridiculous for a four-star general to take part in this, and his aide Colonel Dwight Eisenhower begged him not to do it, but MacArthur was never one to pass up an opportunity to preen and strut before the cameras. Franklin Roosevelt, observing all this, and knowing his history, saw parallels to events with Caesar in Rome and Napoleon in France. In both cases people had been frightened by the chaos around them and begged the generals to restore stability, even though it meant giving up their liberty. MacArthur looked like another of these, another “man on a white horse” riding in to save the day but destroy the country. It is no wonder that Roosevelt thought he was dangerous.
He had done a good job as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan after World War II, surprising people with his leniency and determination to bring democratic reforms to the country. He was also famous for his hard work – he was in his office every day of the year, often till ten or eleven o’clock at night. And yet even though the invasion of South Korea happened in his area of responsibility, it came as a surprise to everyone, MacArthur included. All eyes had been focused on Formosa, where Chiang Kai-Shek’s forces had landed when they were driven out of mainland China the previous year. American politics was roiled by accusations over who “lost” China, and the Communists wanted very much to capture the island, because it would give them a dominant position in the western Pacific and allow them to threaten Japan and the Philippines. Those strategic considerations remain valid today.
Things started out very badly in Korea. Seoul was taken by the second day of the invasion, and the South Korean army would not fight. Officially, the reason was that the North was attacking with tanks and they had no anti-tank weapons, but there were not many tanks initially. Just the rumor of them was enough to cause panic and terrified retreat. The small American force that initially landed was really not much better, accustomed to soft duty in occupation Japan, they broke and ran too. Even the overwhelming advantage in air power was not much good because inexperienced pilots were hitting friendly troops as often as the enemy. It was only after more men and equipment arrived to stabilize the small pocket of South Korea that remained that the balance of power began to shift.
With more and more American troops arriving, and the North Koreans facing long supply lines that American airpower was beginning to successfully interdict, the South Korean and American forces, bolstered by contingents from other UN countries, broke out of the encirclement and began pushing the Communist forces back north.
The landings at Inchon was MacArthur’s finest hour. He had chosen such an unpromising spot that the North Koreans were only lightly guarding it, and hadn’t even bothered to mine most of the approaches. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were unanimously against it, but MacArthur pressed ahead, and it was a resounding victory. Then, with a growing American force in their rear, it was the turn of the North Koreans to panic and run, with the UN forces in hot pursuit.
From the beginning MacArthur had ignored the chain of command, acted without authorization, and sometimes in direct contravention of orders. However, by this time his popularity was so great that neither the Truman administration nor the Joint Chiefs felt they could do much about him. He was furious at anything he considered interference with his operational decisions, as when he was ordered not to bomb within five miles of the Yalu River, the border between North Korea and China. As far as he was concerned, bridges, air fields, bases, and power stations in China were legitimate targets. If attacking them caused China to declare war and invade, and the Soviet Union were to send in its armies as well, that was an acceptable risk, even a desirable one if led to the destruction of the Communist government and the restoration of Chiang to power. He did not shrink from the possible consequences. “Was it World War III? Not yet. But if a lifetime at arms had taught Douglas MacArthur anything, it was that an inordinate fear of war was the surest guarantor of war. Hadn’t the democracies learned anything from Hitler? Appeasement of the fascists had caused World War II; appeasement of the communists would cause World War III. Only the brave deserved to live free.”
He was also infuriatingly, contemptuously, deceptive. Military men can disagree among themselves, but their job is to follow orders. Any officer who takes his complaints public would be fired on the spot, but that is what MacArthur did, even after he had received a direct order to clear all statements regarding political decisions with the State Department. When he did so anyway, he pretended to be astonished that his actions could in any way be interpreted as a violation of orders; he was, he claimed, merely responding to questions sent him by members of Congress.
And then came the great debacle, as hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops attacked. Just weeks before he had met Truman, who later wrote that he said “There was no danger of Chinese intervention. At Wake Island he had told me categorically that he had no evidence that a massed intervention was threatening. More important still, he had told me that he could easily cope with the Chinese Communists if they actually came in.” MacArthur would deny that he had said anything of the kind, despite the presence of meeting minutes.
The Chinese attack was a disaster for the American, South Korean, and UN forces, sending them in a disordered 200 mile retreat all the way back past the 38th Parallel before a defensive line could be established and held. Truman was furious at the intelligence failures that had caused this to happen, saying “Even before he started his ill-fated offensive of November 24, he still talked as if he had the answer to all the questions. But when it turned out that it was not so, he let all the world know that he would have won except for the fact that we would not let him have his way.”
How did they get caught so unaware? The claim was that the Chinese infiltrated at night in small groups, but 300,000 men, their camps, and supply depots should have been visible if the Intelligence people had looked hard enough. But MacArthur did not believe they were there, so the analysts did not look for them. The author provides a good summary of the various possible reasons for this:
The Allied forces were eventually able to regroup and mount offensives that pushed the Chinese and North Korean forces back to the 38th Parallel, where the line remains today. MacArthur remained insubordinate as ever and finally Truman decided he had to be fired. His actions had raised concerns among the allies about who spoke for American policy, the general or the White House. The allies were willing to help South Korea, but they had not signed up for World War III, and MacArthur’s saber rattling came close to causing the coalition to collapse.
As would be expected, MacArthur accepted no responsibility for the actions which led to his dismissal. To William Sebald, a senior State Dept official in Japan, “He intimated that his removal was a plot in Washington; that Formosa would be handed over to Red China; that the Philippines would fall next; Japan would be isolated and fall too; that our whole position in the Far East would crumble.”
He came home to a reception so tumultuous that it once again raised concerns about whether there was a new Caesar to contend with. His ticker-tape parade route through New York City had to be lengthened to nineteen miles to accommodate all the spectators, and nearly 3000 tons of paper were tossed into the street. His appearance before Congress was a masterpiece of drama and self-justification, ending with the famous line “old soldiers never die, they just fade away.” He was the presumptive candidate for the Republican nomination for 1952, and Truman always believed that he had engineered his own firing so that he could come home in glory to run for president.
His undoing came in his testimony before Congress. The public portion of it did nothing to diminish his reputation, but parts of the hearings were classified, and those were what did him in. His own testimony came first, and he reiterated his position that he was a loyal soldier following orders, but hamstrung by the incompetent, if not treasonous, decisions of those above him. He was followed, however, by General George C. Marshall, the Secretary of Defense, and members of the Joint Chiefs, and they set the record straight. As Marshall said
Although MacArthur had complained furiously about his hands being tied by political restrictions, the follow-on testimony painted a different picture. The Americans had held off from bombing in China, but just as importantly, the Chinese had refrained from using their own large air and naval forces to attack the Americans. As Marshall testified
The classified portions of the testimony were never released to the public, who continued their support of MacArthur, but his fate was sealed. It had become so apparent that he had behaved recklessly, dangerously, and insubordinately, that critical support by the Republican leadership was withdrawn.
Truman would not run for re-election in 1952. His approval rating sunk to 22%; firing MacArthur had ended his career as well. The old general would campaign furiously for the nomination, but his support at the highest levels of the Republican party was evaporating, and the party went with Dwight Eisenhower, who would be elected by a large margin. MacArthur and Eisenhower met once, with MacArthur presenting an insane plan that called for spreading radioactive waste across northern North Korea to poison the land and water so that troops could not cross. Eisenhower thanked his old boss for the recommendation, and never spoke with him again. MacArthur, still wildly popular with the common people, continued to give speeches and continued to fade away, dying in 1964.
Truman’s reputation never recovered during his lifetime, but in the political nadir of the 1970s, with Nixon, Watergate, and Vietnam, his simple, straightforward style of leadership came to be recognized and appreciated. “Americans concluded, after all, that the everyman-president, in crafting the policy of containment, had known better than his critics what defeating communism required: firmness and patience, in balanced measure. Truman hadn’t yielded to communist aggression in Korea, but neither had he panicked and let himself be stampeded into World War III, by Douglas MacArthur or others.”
I highly recommend this book. Anyone with an interest in history should know about these turbulent months, when the world hung in the balance of a World War between nuclear-equipped antagonists, as MacArthur was pushing for a wider war, and the Truman administration was desperately trying to keep it from happening.
What a piece of work Douglas MacArthur was. He was a charismatic, inspirational leader; he was personally brave to the point of recklessness; and he had moments of brilliance. Mark Perry, in The Most Dangerous Man in America, writes that MacArthur had a brilliant grasp of the art of combined land-sea-air warfare and a notable ability to coordinate vast forces across an enormous theater of war. And yet, he was vain to the point of pathological narcissism. For instance, during World War II the road to Japan did not necessarily involve the reconquest of the Philippines, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended another approach that would be faster and cost fewer lives, but that would mean MacArthur would not be able to go ashore, gaze off into the distance, and solemnly announce for the cameras, “I have returned.”
It was Franklin Roosevelt who called MacArthur the most dangerous man in America (he considered Huey Long the second most dangerous). In 1932, in the depths of the Depression, destitute World War I veterans who had been promised service bonuses payable in 1945 came to Washington to demand early payment. They stayed for months before President Hoover ordered their encampment cleared on 28 July 1932. This was clearly a police action, but Douglas MacArthur, then serving as the Chief of Staff of the Army, mounted his horse to personally oversee the removal of the demonstrators and the destruction of their belongings. It was ridiculous for a four-star general to take part in this, and his aide Colonel Dwight Eisenhower begged him not to do it, but MacArthur was never one to pass up an opportunity to preen and strut before the cameras. Franklin Roosevelt, observing all this, and knowing his history, saw parallels to events with Caesar in Rome and Napoleon in France. In both cases people had been frightened by the chaos around them and begged the generals to restore stability, even though it meant giving up their liberty. MacArthur looked like another of these, another “man on a white horse” riding in to save the day but destroy the country. It is no wonder that Roosevelt thought he was dangerous.
He had done a good job as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan after World War II, surprising people with his leniency and determination to bring democratic reforms to the country. He was also famous for his hard work – he was in his office every day of the year, often till ten or eleven o’clock at night. And yet even though the invasion of South Korea happened in his area of responsibility, it came as a surprise to everyone, MacArthur included. All eyes had been focused on Formosa, where Chiang Kai-Shek’s forces had landed when they were driven out of mainland China the previous year. American politics was roiled by accusations over who “lost” China, and the Communists wanted very much to capture the island, because it would give them a dominant position in the western Pacific and allow them to threaten Japan and the Philippines. Those strategic considerations remain valid today.
Things started out very badly in Korea. Seoul was taken by the second day of the invasion, and the South Korean army would not fight. Officially, the reason was that the North was attacking with tanks and they had no anti-tank weapons, but there were not many tanks initially. Just the rumor of them was enough to cause panic and terrified retreat. The small American force that initially landed was really not much better, accustomed to soft duty in occupation Japan, they broke and ran too. Even the overwhelming advantage in air power was not much good because inexperienced pilots were hitting friendly troops as often as the enemy. It was only after more men and equipment arrived to stabilize the small pocket of South Korea that remained that the balance of power began to shift.
With more and more American troops arriving, and the North Koreans facing long supply lines that American airpower was beginning to successfully interdict, the South Korean and American forces, bolstered by contingents from other UN countries, broke out of the encirclement and began pushing the Communist forces back north.
The landings at Inchon was MacArthur’s finest hour. He had chosen such an unpromising spot that the North Koreans were only lightly guarding it, and hadn’t even bothered to mine most of the approaches. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were unanimously against it, but MacArthur pressed ahead, and it was a resounding victory. Then, with a growing American force in their rear, it was the turn of the North Koreans to panic and run, with the UN forces in hot pursuit.
From the beginning MacArthur had ignored the chain of command, acted without authorization, and sometimes in direct contravention of orders. However, by this time his popularity was so great that neither the Truman administration nor the Joint Chiefs felt they could do much about him. He was furious at anything he considered interference with his operational decisions, as when he was ordered not to bomb within five miles of the Yalu River, the border between North Korea and China. As far as he was concerned, bridges, air fields, bases, and power stations in China were legitimate targets. If attacking them caused China to declare war and invade, and the Soviet Union were to send in its armies as well, that was an acceptable risk, even a desirable one if led to the destruction of the Communist government and the restoration of Chiang to power. He did not shrink from the possible consequences. “Was it World War III? Not yet. But if a lifetime at arms had taught Douglas MacArthur anything, it was that an inordinate fear of war was the surest guarantor of war. Hadn’t the democracies learned anything from Hitler? Appeasement of the fascists had caused World War II; appeasement of the communists would cause World War III. Only the brave deserved to live free.”
He was also infuriatingly, contemptuously, deceptive. Military men can disagree among themselves, but their job is to follow orders. Any officer who takes his complaints public would be fired on the spot, but that is what MacArthur did, even after he had received a direct order to clear all statements regarding political decisions with the State Department. When he did so anyway, he pretended to be astonished that his actions could in any way be interpreted as a violation of orders; he was, he claimed, merely responding to questions sent him by members of Congress.
And then came the great debacle, as hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops attacked. Just weeks before he had met Truman, who later wrote that he said “There was no danger of Chinese intervention. At Wake Island he had told me categorically that he had no evidence that a massed intervention was threatening. More important still, he had told me that he could easily cope with the Chinese Communists if they actually came in.” MacArthur would deny that he had said anything of the kind, despite the presence of meeting minutes.
The Chinese attack was a disaster for the American, South Korean, and UN forces, sending them in a disordered 200 mile retreat all the way back past the 38th Parallel before a defensive line could be established and held. Truman was furious at the intelligence failures that had caused this to happen, saying “Even before he started his ill-fated offensive of November 24, he still talked as if he had the answer to all the questions. But when it turned out that it was not so, he let all the world know that he would have won except for the fact that we would not let him have his way.”
How did they get caught so unaware? The claim was that the Chinese infiltrated at night in small groups, but 300,000 men, their camps, and supply depots should have been visible if the Intelligence people had looked hard enough. But MacArthur did not believe they were there, so the analysts did not look for them. The author provides a good summary of the various possible reasons for this:
It might have been a result of MacArthur’s excessive confidence in his knowledge of the Asian mind; it probably involved some blinding effect of his own brilliance at Inchon; it doubtless reflected his deep hostility toward communism and his accompanying scorn for all the adherents of that ideology; it certainly showed his dismissal of the integrity and capacity of State Department and other administration officials he deemed dangerously leftist; it possibly indicated aspects of advancing age; it indisputably revealed the hubris that tempts all heroes. But whatever the precise admixture of influences, MacArthur missed crucial signals that should have provoked second thoughts about the war’s imminent end.
The Allied forces were eventually able to regroup and mount offensives that pushed the Chinese and North Korean forces back to the 38th Parallel, where the line remains today. MacArthur remained insubordinate as ever and finally Truman decided he had to be fired. His actions had raised concerns among the allies about who spoke for American policy, the general or the White House. The allies were willing to help South Korea, but they had not signed up for World War III, and MacArthur’s saber rattling came close to causing the coalition to collapse.
As would be expected, MacArthur accepted no responsibility for the actions which led to his dismissal. To William Sebald, a senior State Dept official in Japan, “He intimated that his removal was a plot in Washington; that Formosa would be handed over to Red China; that the Philippines would fall next; Japan would be isolated and fall too; that our whole position in the Far East would crumble.”
He came home to a reception so tumultuous that it once again raised concerns about whether there was a new Caesar to contend with. His ticker-tape parade route through New York City had to be lengthened to nineteen miles to accommodate all the spectators, and nearly 3000 tons of paper were tossed into the street. His appearance before Congress was a masterpiece of drama and self-justification, ending with the famous line “old soldiers never die, they just fade away.” He was the presumptive candidate for the Republican nomination for 1952, and Truman always believed that he had engineered his own firing so that he could come home in glory to run for president.
His undoing came in his testimony before Congress. The public portion of it did nothing to diminish his reputation, but parts of the hearings were classified, and those were what did him in. His own testimony came first, and he reiterated his position that he was a loyal soldier following orders, but hamstrung by the incompetent, if not treasonous, decisions of those above him. He was followed, however, by General George C. Marshall, the Secretary of Defense, and members of the Joint Chiefs, and they set the record straight. As Marshall said
General MacArthur...would have us, on our own initiative, carry the conflict beyond Korea against the mainland of Communist China, both from the sea and from the air. He would have us accept the risk of involvement not only in an extension of the war with Red China but in an all-out war with the Soviet Union. He would have us do this even at the expense of losing our allies and wrecking the coalition of free peoples throughout the world. He would have us do this even though the effect of such action might expose Western Europe to attack by the millions of Soviet troops poised in Middle and Eastern Europe.”
Although MacArthur had complained furiously about his hands being tied by political restrictions, the follow-on testimony painted a different picture. The Americans had held off from bombing in China, but just as importantly, the Chinese had refrained from using their own large air and naval forces to attack the Americans. As Marshall testified
‘our transportation runs without regard to visibility, whereas theirs’—China’s—‘has to be handled only at night, and if the weather is fair, that is illuminated and is subject to destruction.’ China’s decision to yield the air was what allowed America to remain in Korea. ‘We can move reserves with practically no restriction at all, and they have the greatest difficulty in relation to that. If bombing starts, we have a great many conditions that will be far less advantageous to us.’
The classified portions of the testimony were never released to the public, who continued their support of MacArthur, but his fate was sealed. It had become so apparent that he had behaved recklessly, dangerously, and insubordinately, that critical support by the Republican leadership was withdrawn.
Truman would not run for re-election in 1952. His approval rating sunk to 22%; firing MacArthur had ended his career as well. The old general would campaign furiously for the nomination, but his support at the highest levels of the Republican party was evaporating, and the party went with Dwight Eisenhower, who would be elected by a large margin. MacArthur and Eisenhower met once, with MacArthur presenting an insane plan that called for spreading radioactive waste across northern North Korea to poison the land and water so that troops could not cross. Eisenhower thanked his old boss for the recommendation, and never spoke with him again. MacArthur, still wildly popular with the common people, continued to give speeches and continued to fade away, dying in 1964.
Truman’s reputation never recovered during his lifetime, but in the political nadir of the 1970s, with Nixon, Watergate, and Vietnam, his simple, straightforward style of leadership came to be recognized and appreciated. “Americans concluded, after all, that the everyman-president, in crafting the policy of containment, had known better than his critics what defeating communism required: firmness and patience, in balanced measure. Truman hadn’t yielded to communist aggression in Korea, but neither had he panicked and let himself be stampeded into World War III, by Douglas MacArthur or others.”
I highly recommend this book. Anyone with an interest in history should know about these turbulent months, when the world hung in the balance of a World War between nuclear-equipped antagonists, as MacArthur was pushing for a wider war, and the Truman administration was desperately trying to keep it from happening.
October 22, 2016
On June 25, 1950 North Korea unleashed an attack against its southern neighbor that set off a war that resulted in 36,914 American casualties. Many Americans are aware of the role of General Douglas MacArthur in the conflict, in particular his brilliant, but risky landing at Inchon that beat back the North Korean attack, and later in the war pursuing a strategy that led to Chinese intervention. MacArthur’s actions were very controversial and once the Chinese crossed the Yalu River with over 100,000 troops and the military situation deteriorated, America’s allies grew concerned when MacArthur suggested the use of atomic weapons against the Chinese. President Harry S. Truman did his best to reign in his commander to no avail and most historians believe that MacArthur overstepped his authority and allowed his strong belief system guide his actions. Others like the British historian Robert Harvey and the American historian Arthur Herman believe the situation was much more nuanced. The topic has again been explored in H.W. Brands new book, THE GENERAL VS. THE PRESIDENT: MACARTHUR AND TRUMAN AT THE BRINK OF NUCLEAR WAR. Brands position is very clear that Truman’s firing of MacArthur was a “bold stroke” that may have headed off a much wider war with the Chinese.
Brands juxtaposes two personalities with totally different backgrounds and agendas. Truman, reelected president in his own right in 1948 stood up to Stalin after World War II implementing the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and stood fast over Berlin as he pursued the policy of containment of the Soviet Union. With the North Korean attack he was able to blunt their progress until the Chinese crossed the Yalu River in force, but he was faced with a commander who wanted to employ nuclear weapons to send a message to the communist world. On the other hand, MacArthur, the “all knowing general” who held politicians in contempt, especially a “novice” president like Truman. MacArthur saw himself as having saved the Pacific in World War II, rebuilt postwar Japan, and now believed he had the communists right where he wanted them, but a feckless president stood in his way. Brands does his best to explain the issues between the two men in the context of the Cold War in which they lived. Brands has written a general history of their relationship and its ultimate outcome, but does not really add anything new that has not been uncovered by previous works on the topic.
Brands smooth narrative style, refined through the many books he has written is present throughout. Brands is a master story teller who is able to present his narrative and analysis in a concise fashion that the general reader should enjoy, which at times will also satisfy an academic audience. A case in point is how MacArthur gained the support of the Japanese people as he totally reoriented their society away from the militaristic emperor worship to a nation based on liberal democracy. In the constitution he prepared he did away with all pre-war institutions, except the emperor, that had dominated Japan and resulted in World War II. Further evidence of this approach can be seen as Brands reviews Truman’s career that spans his election to the Senate in 1940, his assumption of the presidency in 1945, and Cold War events to the onset of the Korean War. Brands effectively relies on Truman’s correspondence with his daughter Margaret who served as a remarkable conduit into his thoughts and concerns.
A major strength of the book are the character studies that are presented. Discussions of people like Secretary of State Dean Acheson, a rather arrogant individual; General Omar T. Bradley, whose insights into Truman and MacArthur’s personalities are fascinating; General Matthew Ridgeway, a hero at the Battle of the Bulge during World War II whose leadership helped turn around the military balance in Korea; and Marguerite Higgins, a wartime correspondent add to the narrative. Other strengths of the book include Brands’ description of the plight and final breakout of US Marines at the Chosin Reservoir and their two week trek battling the elements which were more dangerous than the Chinese communists to reach Hamhung. Brands coverage of Truman and MacArthur rationalizations when confronted by Congress and the press is eye opening in trying to gain insights into their dysfunctional relationship after the Chinese communists crossed the Yalu into North Korea. MacArthur’s statements at this time concerning administration restraints in dealing with bombing Chinese airfields in Manchuria and other issues is very similar to his rhetoric leaked to the American press after Matthew Ridgeway’s forces saved MacArthur’s reputation in April, 1951. Brands coverage of Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff finally reaching the conclusion to relieve MacArthur of his command points to the final realization that MacArthur’s insubordination and egocentrism could no longer be tolerated. Especially enlightening was the inclusion of a great deal of the testimony of MacArthur and Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall before Congress following MacArthur’s dismissal. However, the report of the hearings would have been enhanced if excerpts of Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s testimony had also been included. This along with the geopolitical analysis of the region and domestic politics in the United States that included the role of Chiang Kai-Shek, Republicans in Congress, and the coming 1952 presidential election are all important pieces in understanding the war and its domestic implications.
Despite the strengths of the book there are a number of areas that could be improved. The bibliography is rather sparse and the endnotes could be enhanced. In the area of analysis, Brands chooses to deal with a number of major issues in a rather superficial manner. His exploration of Soviet motives behind the North Korean attack is weak. His excuse that the Russians were protesting the seating of Formosa over mainland China in the UN Security Council as the reason for their absence to block an American/UN force to stop the North Korean advance does not go far enough. Is it possible that Moscow tried to draw the United States into the conflict in the hope it would cause difficulties with the Chinese at a time when the Sino-Soviet split was emerging is a main motivation? Brands covers all the major topics that come under the umbrella of his overall subject, but he needs to dig down further, or just state up front that he is preparing a general history of the topic, then the reader will not expect more. For example, the Wake Island meeting between Truman and MacArthur covers the basics. Further, he does not drill down far enough when discussing events that led up to the Chinese overrunning UN forces in November, 1950. To his credit he does list the signs of possible Chinese actions that MacArthur missed, but he needs to explore the reaction of America’s allies further, as well as the interaction between MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Overall, Brands has written a very readable account of the Truman-MacArthur relationship in the context of the Cold War. I would agree with Francis P. Sempa’s view published in the New York Journal of Books* that Brands does not present a very clear legacy of the Korean War in terms of future American foreign policy. Truman wanted to have a “police action” or “limited war,” in Korea, MacArthur sought total victory, something the United States has achieved only once since World War II in the first Gulf War in 1990-91, but failed to accomplish in Vietnam, and currently in Iraq and Afghanistan. There are a number of lessons that could have been discussed that relate to future American foreign policy, an important area, which Brands chooses to ignore.
*http://www.nyjournalofbooks.com/book-...
Brands juxtaposes two personalities with totally different backgrounds and agendas. Truman, reelected president in his own right in 1948 stood up to Stalin after World War II implementing the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and stood fast over Berlin as he pursued the policy of containment of the Soviet Union. With the North Korean attack he was able to blunt their progress until the Chinese crossed the Yalu River in force, but he was faced with a commander who wanted to employ nuclear weapons to send a message to the communist world. On the other hand, MacArthur, the “all knowing general” who held politicians in contempt, especially a “novice” president like Truman. MacArthur saw himself as having saved the Pacific in World War II, rebuilt postwar Japan, and now believed he had the communists right where he wanted them, but a feckless president stood in his way. Brands does his best to explain the issues between the two men in the context of the Cold War in which they lived. Brands has written a general history of their relationship and its ultimate outcome, but does not really add anything new that has not been uncovered by previous works on the topic.
Brands smooth narrative style, refined through the many books he has written is present throughout. Brands is a master story teller who is able to present his narrative and analysis in a concise fashion that the general reader should enjoy, which at times will also satisfy an academic audience. A case in point is how MacArthur gained the support of the Japanese people as he totally reoriented their society away from the militaristic emperor worship to a nation based on liberal democracy. In the constitution he prepared he did away with all pre-war institutions, except the emperor, that had dominated Japan and resulted in World War II. Further evidence of this approach can be seen as Brands reviews Truman’s career that spans his election to the Senate in 1940, his assumption of the presidency in 1945, and Cold War events to the onset of the Korean War. Brands effectively relies on Truman’s correspondence with his daughter Margaret who served as a remarkable conduit into his thoughts and concerns.
A major strength of the book are the character studies that are presented. Discussions of people like Secretary of State Dean Acheson, a rather arrogant individual; General Omar T. Bradley, whose insights into Truman and MacArthur’s personalities are fascinating; General Matthew Ridgeway, a hero at the Battle of the Bulge during World War II whose leadership helped turn around the military balance in Korea; and Marguerite Higgins, a wartime correspondent add to the narrative. Other strengths of the book include Brands’ description of the plight and final breakout of US Marines at the Chosin Reservoir and their two week trek battling the elements which were more dangerous than the Chinese communists to reach Hamhung. Brands coverage of Truman and MacArthur rationalizations when confronted by Congress and the press is eye opening in trying to gain insights into their dysfunctional relationship after the Chinese communists crossed the Yalu into North Korea. MacArthur’s statements at this time concerning administration restraints in dealing with bombing Chinese airfields in Manchuria and other issues is very similar to his rhetoric leaked to the American press after Matthew Ridgeway’s forces saved MacArthur’s reputation in April, 1951. Brands coverage of Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff finally reaching the conclusion to relieve MacArthur of his command points to the final realization that MacArthur’s insubordination and egocentrism could no longer be tolerated. Especially enlightening was the inclusion of a great deal of the testimony of MacArthur and Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall before Congress following MacArthur’s dismissal. However, the report of the hearings would have been enhanced if excerpts of Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s testimony had also been included. This along with the geopolitical analysis of the region and domestic politics in the United States that included the role of Chiang Kai-Shek, Republicans in Congress, and the coming 1952 presidential election are all important pieces in understanding the war and its domestic implications.
Despite the strengths of the book there are a number of areas that could be improved. The bibliography is rather sparse and the endnotes could be enhanced. In the area of analysis, Brands chooses to deal with a number of major issues in a rather superficial manner. His exploration of Soviet motives behind the North Korean attack is weak. His excuse that the Russians were protesting the seating of Formosa over mainland China in the UN Security Council as the reason for their absence to block an American/UN force to stop the North Korean advance does not go far enough. Is it possible that Moscow tried to draw the United States into the conflict in the hope it would cause difficulties with the Chinese at a time when the Sino-Soviet split was emerging is a main motivation? Brands covers all the major topics that come under the umbrella of his overall subject, but he needs to dig down further, or just state up front that he is preparing a general history of the topic, then the reader will not expect more. For example, the Wake Island meeting between Truman and MacArthur covers the basics. Further, he does not drill down far enough when discussing events that led up to the Chinese overrunning UN forces in November, 1950. To his credit he does list the signs of possible Chinese actions that MacArthur missed, but he needs to explore the reaction of America’s allies further, as well as the interaction between MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Overall, Brands has written a very readable account of the Truman-MacArthur relationship in the context of the Cold War. I would agree with Francis P. Sempa’s view published in the New York Journal of Books* that Brands does not present a very clear legacy of the Korean War in terms of future American foreign policy. Truman wanted to have a “police action” or “limited war,” in Korea, MacArthur sought total victory, something the United States has achieved only once since World War II in the first Gulf War in 1990-91, but failed to accomplish in Vietnam, and currently in Iraq and Afghanistan. There are a number of lessons that could have been discussed that relate to future American foreign policy, an important area, which Brands chooses to ignore.
*http://www.nyjournalofbooks.com/book-...
July 18, 2018
Fast paced, never dull, this is a fascinating and intriguing story of the rivalry and tension between President Truman and General MacArthur, America’s commanding general in Asia and the UN’s commanding general in the Korean War. The author is not perceptibly biased toward either man, and I found myself switching sides several times. In the end, it finally became clear to me that though he was in many ways a military genius and hero, MacArthur was nuts. Seriously, he ended up advocating nuking China and sowing lines of radioactive waste materials across North Korea as a sort of atomic mine field to disrupt North Korean and Chinese supply lines. He apparently never considered how Koreans were supposed to live in a radioactive wasteland after the war. Though ending MacArthur’s career effectively ended Truman’s own career by tanking his approval ratings and dooming any chance of his re-election, history has proven that Truman’s policy of limited war and containment towards communism was the right choice for America and the world’s democracies. All in all, a wiser and more astute leader with an approach in the middle of these two would have been the best ideal for America. Fortunately, such a leader immediately followed this episode and cleaned it up. That was Eisenhower, but that is another book....
Anyhow, read this excellent offering by the talented and gifted historian author H.W. Brands. It’s a hell of a page turner.
Anyhow, read this excellent offering by the talented and gifted historian author H.W. Brands. It’s a hell of a page turner.
April 29, 2021
This is a wonderful book. Dr. Brands does a wonderful job telling the story. The way he writes, makes you believe that he is sitting next to you telling the story. The writing is easy, the flow is great, and his combination of telling the story and including historical hindsight makes the book seem authentic.
As for the content, Dr. Brands is not a fan of MacArthur, as he seems to believe that he was an egotistical jackass who took all the credit for the success and never bore any responsibility for failures. He shows that Matthew Ridgway single handedly turned the tide during the winter months, and that while politically complicated, Truman did do the right thing by relieving him. Dr. Brands also is not a fan of anyone at the State Department, especially Dean Acheson. Brands believe that he had his own agenda, and was forcing Truman's hand to take unpopular decisions because he thought way too much of himself. The Joint Chiefs of Staff seemed unwilling or unable to stand up to MacArthur, forcing Truman to make unilateral decisions that would fall all on him. Only in private did the Chief's say that MacArthur was a menace and that he had to go because the US Army was ill prepared.
All together, he paints Truman as the tragic hero in all of this. Unable to do what he wanted to do because of a unsupportive inner circle, and hands tied politically, Truman could not have just been Truman. And the end, Brands vindicates Truman as being right all along, and paints him in the most favorable light. MacArthur is portrayed as all hat, no cattle, and fades into irrelevance while all the congressional players seemed to be supporting characters while the feud goes on.
All in all, a very well researched book on the era in terms of relations between the General and the President, but this should not be taken as a history of the Korean War.
As for the content, Dr. Brands is not a fan of MacArthur, as he seems to believe that he was an egotistical jackass who took all the credit for the success and never bore any responsibility for failures. He shows that Matthew Ridgway single handedly turned the tide during the winter months, and that while politically complicated, Truman did do the right thing by relieving him. Dr. Brands also is not a fan of anyone at the State Department, especially Dean Acheson. Brands believe that he had his own agenda, and was forcing Truman's hand to take unpopular decisions because he thought way too much of himself. The Joint Chiefs of Staff seemed unwilling or unable to stand up to MacArthur, forcing Truman to make unilateral decisions that would fall all on him. Only in private did the Chief's say that MacArthur was a menace and that he had to go because the US Army was ill prepared.
All together, he paints Truman as the tragic hero in all of this. Unable to do what he wanted to do because of a unsupportive inner circle, and hands tied politically, Truman could not have just been Truman. And the end, Brands vindicates Truman as being right all along, and paints him in the most favorable light. MacArthur is portrayed as all hat, no cattle, and fades into irrelevance while all the congressional players seemed to be supporting characters while the feud goes on.
All in all, a very well researched book on the era in terms of relations between the General and the President, but this should not be taken as a history of the Korean War.
February 23, 2017
A detailed, readable and engaging history of Truman and MacArthur’s relationship.
Brands treats Truman more favorably, but his treatment of both men is fair and evenhanded. Brands describes the course of the war and MacArthur’s attitude toward the possibility of Chinese intervention, as well as the schism between MacArthur on one side and the administration and the Joint Chiefs on the other, along with the Joint Chief’s apparent lack of concern for the possibility of MacArthur advancing northward. Truman also comes off as in over his head at times. MacArthur’s naivety is often breathtaking. Although Truman was vilified at the time of MacArthur’s firing, Brands argues convincingly that he has been vindicated, and he describes how the “limitations” on US forces were reasonable and actually favored the American side.
Still, there isn’t much new information,and some more maps would have helped. There is little coverage of Truman’s political motives (like the “police action” declaration or Republican criticism of him being soft on communism) or on his background before the war. Brands also suggests that MacArthur’s decisions led to more American deaths, but doesn’t really explain why. Oddly, many events are described without a specific date. And at one point Brands writes that Truman and Clement Attlee had never met before their 1950 meeting (really?)
A strong, well-written and compelling work overall.
Brands treats Truman more favorably, but his treatment of both men is fair and evenhanded. Brands describes the course of the war and MacArthur’s attitude toward the possibility of Chinese intervention, as well as the schism between MacArthur on one side and the administration and the Joint Chiefs on the other, along with the Joint Chief’s apparent lack of concern for the possibility of MacArthur advancing northward. Truman also comes off as in over his head at times. MacArthur’s naivety is often breathtaking. Although Truman was vilified at the time of MacArthur’s firing, Brands argues convincingly that he has been vindicated, and he describes how the “limitations” on US forces were reasonable and actually favored the American side.
Still, there isn’t much new information,and some more maps would have helped. There is little coverage of Truman’s political motives (like the “police action” declaration or Republican criticism of him being soft on communism) or on his background before the war. Brands also suggests that MacArthur’s decisions led to more American deaths, but doesn’t really explain why. Oddly, many events are described without a specific date. And at one point Brands writes that Truman and Clement Attlee had never met before their 1950 meeting (really?)
A strong, well-written and compelling work overall.
November 24, 2021
Spectacular
This was one of the files related books that I have ever read. Brands goes in depth in the backgrounds of both general MacArthur and President Truman and crafts the story in such a way that it’s very easy to read.
He uses a myriad of quotes, it’s well researched and has a large number of pictures to help the reader sink deeper into the story.
I see it as a book that shows the conflict between politics (Truman) and military (MacArthur) on vital points.
I enjoyed this book immensely and gave me a much deeper understanding of the Korean War and the strategy behind it.
I give it my highest rating.
This was one of the files related books that I have ever read. Brands goes in depth in the backgrounds of both general MacArthur and President Truman and crafts the story in such a way that it’s very easy to read.
He uses a myriad of quotes, it’s well researched and has a large number of pictures to help the reader sink deeper into the story.
I see it as a book that shows the conflict between politics (Truman) and military (MacArthur) on vital points.
I enjoyed this book immensely and gave me a much deeper understanding of the Korean War and the strategy behind it.
I give it my highest rating.
June 29, 2021
I had previously read the biography on Truman by David McCullough and was not as impressed as many others are with that book so I've been looking to supplement my Truman knowledge. I'm also fascinated by the lunatic that was General MacArthur so this book seemed like a great fit.
I thought H.W. Brands did a great job of balancing the story between the two. Truman felt move fleshed out to my satisfaction in this work as did MacArthur. MacArthur's motivations to me still seem somewhat mysterious but I think it's because the motivations were almost entirely ego based, i.e. not necessarily logical.
I agree with Brands that Truman's firing of MacArthur was both necessary and ended Truman's career. But you must remember:
1. Truman was his boss.
2. MacArthur's plan was insane.
In MacArthur's defense, sure, the world would be a much better place today without North Korea in it but there is NO WAY MacArthur wouldn't have started WWIII with his provocative actions. MacArthur's problem was that he was still fighting the last war (WWII) not the Korean War. Times change and the introduction of the atom bomb changed everything. He never really seemed to understand that these brutal measures could be used against the US as well.
Truman was smarter than folks gave him credit for at the time but not very politically savvy. Even he realizes he should have neutralized MacArthur earlier and subtler. Eisenhower later gave a masterclass about how to do so to MacArthur (and later McCarthy).
All in all, a great book that helped fill in some blanks in my knowledge.
I thought H.W. Brands did a great job of balancing the story between the two. Truman felt move fleshed out to my satisfaction in this work as did MacArthur. MacArthur's motivations to me still seem somewhat mysterious but I think it's because the motivations were almost entirely ego based, i.e. not necessarily logical.
I agree with Brands that Truman's firing of MacArthur was both necessary and ended Truman's career. But you must remember:
1. Truman was his boss.
2. MacArthur's plan was insane.
In MacArthur's defense, sure, the world would be a much better place today without North Korea in it but there is NO WAY MacArthur wouldn't have started WWIII with his provocative actions. MacArthur's problem was that he was still fighting the last war (WWII) not the Korean War. Times change and the introduction of the atom bomb changed everything. He never really seemed to understand that these brutal measures could be used against the US as well.
Truman was smarter than folks gave him credit for at the time but not very politically savvy. Even he realizes he should have neutralized MacArthur earlier and subtler. Eisenhower later gave a masterclass about how to do so to MacArthur (and later McCarthy).
All in all, a great book that helped fill in some blanks in my knowledge.
September 24, 2017
This is the best way to learn history....read!
"The General vs. The President" (H.W. Brands)
#MustRead 5 parts, 68 chapters, 416 pages
#MustListen audio book is also...excellent (15 hrs 22 min)
Review
"The General vs. The President" (H.W. Brands)
#MustRead 5 parts, 68 chapters, 416 pages
#MustListen audio book is also...excellent (15 hrs 22 min)
Review
May 27, 2020
If you don't know much about the relationship between Truman and MacArthur, then this is a good overview. I only had a cursory knowledge, so I learned a lot from Brands. His writing is good; his pace is quick. However, if you have strong knowledge of the subject, then this book might not be for you.
June 20, 2023
Just as a carpenter will view every problem as a nail, and ONLY solve it by use of a hammer, so too will a General (especially an egomaniacal one) see every geopolitical confrontation as irreconcilable hostile aggression that can ONLY be solved by all-out war using the most powerful weapons for massive destruction of the "enemy," big or small.
As always, H.W. Brands hits this historical account out of the ballpark. Lucid, cogent, crisp, balanced, convincing. 5 Stars.
As always, H.W. Brands hits this historical account out of the ballpark. Lucid, cogent, crisp, balanced, convincing. 5 Stars.
December 29, 2025
Excellent history about the dawn of the Cold War
May 13, 2025
H.W. Brands is America’s greatest living historian!
July 27, 2019
In his book, The General Vs. The President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War, renowned historian H.W. Brands takes an in-depth look at the Korean War and the dominating personalities behind U.S. involvement in the conflict. With World War II five years past, Communism is on the march as North Korea invades South Korea and America must face this new threat. Caught off guard and ill prepared, President Truman must respond and do so quickly, while MacArthur already has plans—total victory. Will the President and his General be able to subdue the threat before Communism spreads in Asia and elsewhere?
The General Vs. The President is exceptionally well-written and H.W. Brands proves to be a masterful storyteller. The narrative is engaging and entertaining as the author tells the history of events through the eyes of Truman and MacArthur. Every page has action, drama, and conflict, far from the manuscript of a dry textbook.
However, I find the treatment of Joseph McCarthy, depicted as a fringe character, troubling. As history suggest with the declassification of the Venona Papers, the Senator seems justified in his concern about Communist infiltration into the U.S. government. In addition, President Truman may have been correct in firing General MacArthur for insubordination, however, it is troubling that it was Truman’s piece-meal, police-action foreign policy that caused more bloodshed. The consequences of his limited victory are still being felt today. Ultimately, both men had tremendous egos and the American Forces were caught in the middle of a power struggle.
All in all, The General Vs. The President is written in an intriguing and interesting fashion, even if a bit partial.
I was given a free copy from the publisher in exchange for my honest review.
The General Vs. The President is exceptionally well-written and H.W. Brands proves to be a masterful storyteller. The narrative is engaging and entertaining as the author tells the history of events through the eyes of Truman and MacArthur. Every page has action, drama, and conflict, far from the manuscript of a dry textbook.
However, I find the treatment of Joseph McCarthy, depicted as a fringe character, troubling. As history suggest with the declassification of the Venona Papers, the Senator seems justified in his concern about Communist infiltration into the U.S. government. In addition, President Truman may have been correct in firing General MacArthur for insubordination, however, it is troubling that it was Truman’s piece-meal, police-action foreign policy that caused more bloodshed. The consequences of his limited victory are still being felt today. Ultimately, both men had tremendous egos and the American Forces were caught in the middle of a power struggle.
All in all, The General Vs. The President is written in an intriguing and interesting fashion, even if a bit partial.
I was given a free copy from the publisher in exchange for my honest review.
May 25, 2022
I struggle with how to rate this book - it's one of those reads that I'm glad for having read, but with large stretches the drone on in laborious detail.
I found the play-by-play of the Korean war less compelling, but the 'conflict of personalities' of this story fascinating. Among other things, this came to involve an US general in active service running for president against a sitting US president, his commander in chief.
MacArthur's role in rebuilding postwar Japan, and Truman's sponsorship of the Berlin airlift - both significant Cold War developments preceding the main events of the book - were quite interesting to dig into as well.
I found the play-by-play of the Korean war less compelling, but the 'conflict of personalities' of this story fascinating. Among other things, this came to involve an US general in active service running for president against a sitting US president, his commander in chief.
MacArthur's role in rebuilding postwar Japan, and Truman's sponsorship of the Berlin airlift - both significant Cold War developments preceding the main events of the book - were quite interesting to dig into as well.
April 8, 2020
Douglass MacArthur had many fine qualities that made him the great leader that he was. His accomplishments in two world wars speak for themselves (although his inaction in the hours after Pearl Harbor are as inexplicable as they are inexcusable), and his administration of post-war Japan was perfect. He took a feudal country led by warlords and shattered by war, propped it up, turned it into a liberal democracy, and sent it on its way back to greatness. When the North attacked the South in Korea, he stabilized the situation and then turned it completely around through sheer brilliance and audacity.
Unfortunately, he was also an arrogant SOB who overestimated his genius and undermined his Commander-in-Chief. This arrogance led him into blunders that upended much of the good work he had done in Korea and raised tensions in Asia.
Truman was a very different sort of person. He was a surprisingly humble human being for a president of the United States, and, unlike MacArthur, he didn't usually put himself before all other considerations. Truman lay the groundwork for the policies that would keep the United States out of WWIII while also leading to eventual victory in the Cold War. He didn't have MacArthur's genius, but he was willing to be taught and he was grounded in common sense.
This book tells the story of Truman's relationship with his general leading up to the controversial decision to dismiss MacArthur of command in Korea. It's a good story, populated with big personalities and set in a time of dangerous, potentially apocalyptic, historical events. Brands tells the story well.
Unfortunately, he was also an arrogant SOB who overestimated his genius and undermined his Commander-in-Chief. This arrogance led him into blunders that upended much of the good work he had done in Korea and raised tensions in Asia.
Truman was a very different sort of person. He was a surprisingly humble human being for a president of the United States, and, unlike MacArthur, he didn't usually put himself before all other considerations. Truman lay the groundwork for the policies that would keep the United States out of WWIII while also leading to eventual victory in the Cold War. He didn't have MacArthur's genius, but he was willing to be taught and he was grounded in common sense.
This book tells the story of Truman's relationship with his general leading up to the controversial decision to dismiss MacArthur of command in Korea. It's a good story, populated with big personalities and set in a time of dangerous, potentially apocalyptic, historical events. Brands tells the story well.
August 31, 2023
The more I read about Harry Truman, the more I like him. And the more I read about Douglas MacArthur, while recognizing he was a military genius in a lot of ways, he was also a prima donna dumb ass of epic proportions. A five star dumb ass whose ego and need for acclaim caused him to take huge risks, to take credit for accomplishments of others, to treat the president and the joint chiefs of staff like ignorant lackeys, until finally, when he continued making policy statements to the press that were not sanctioned by or in alignment with the president and the JCS, the JCS told Truman that MacArthur had to go, even though he was incredibly popular as one of the major heroes of World War II and had helped institute a constitution of law into Japan, where he had lived for 14 years and where he was revered is a benevolent conqueror.
I learned so much about the cold war, the “United Nations police action” in Korea, and the delicate balancing act in the new reality of the US not being the only country with the A bomb. It was a great book, deserving five stars, the author really brought history to life in an informative and dramatic way. Plus, biographical information on Truman and MacArthur really helped humanize the book.
I learned so much about the cold war, the “United Nations police action” in Korea, and the delicate balancing act in the new reality of the US not being the only country with the A bomb. It was a great book, deserving five stars, the author really brought history to life in an informative and dramatic way. Plus, biographical information on Truman and MacArthur really helped humanize the book.
August 6, 2020
This book is a wonderful account of two men with strong personalities, firm beliefs and streaks of stubbornness.
MacArthur never doubted the wisdom of the course he pursued and Truman never veered away from being plain spoken in his belief that MacArthur didn’t respect the office of the president.
The background of how each one arrived at this point in their lives if very good. After MacArthur was relieved of duties he became a rather reclusive person perhaps content to fade away. When Truman’s service as president ended, he returned to his home in Independence, MO walking each day to his office in the Truman Library, visiting with neighbors along the way and was perhaps more plain spoken now than what had been allowed as president.
The final sentence of the book provides an appropriate summary of the book, “The courage of Truman’s decision had never been in question; six decades later, its wisdom was apparent as well.”
MacArthur never doubted the wisdom of the course he pursued and Truman never veered away from being plain spoken in his belief that MacArthur didn’t respect the office of the president.
The background of how each one arrived at this point in their lives if very good. After MacArthur was relieved of duties he became a rather reclusive person perhaps content to fade away. When Truman’s service as president ended, he returned to his home in Independence, MO walking each day to his office in the Truman Library, visiting with neighbors along the way and was perhaps more plain spoken now than what had been allowed as president.
The final sentence of the book provides an appropriate summary of the book, “The courage of Truman’s decision had never been in question; six decades later, its wisdom was apparent as well.”
January 28, 2022
Sometimes a book isn't the best book you've ever read, but is so carefully and evenly written with attention to detail and no clear bias that it still gets five stars. Brands is fast becoming a favorite.
August 12, 2018
This was well write history which taught much of the time after WWII And during the Korean War.
December 20, 2024
Book felt a little long, and at times a little boring for me, but it was still interesting to see what happened between the two and didn’t know much about that history.
December 5, 2020
An interesting history of the Korean War that focuses on the tension between General MacArthur and President Truman during the conflict. As Brands explains, the friction between the two leaders arose from the complicated political environment born in the aftermath of WWII. MacArthur, primarily concerned with military matters, believed his hands were being tied by Washington, leading him to engage in borderline insubordination in Korea. Truman, juggling multiple political concerns including a Eurocentric foreign policy and the avoidance of all-out war with China, grew frustrated with MacArthur's strong-willed independence and apparent disregard of political considerations. Brands excellently demonstrates how that tension affected the execution of war in Korea and politics in the United States. The author is a formidable storyteller, and he tackles the story of this famous conflict of personalities with great expertise.
February 11, 2021
An interesting look into the relationship between MacArthur and Truman and the details of an often forgotten war.
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