It's difficult to know where to begin criticizing this jingoistic, paranoid, calculatedly-inexact discussion of US foreign policy. Because the book is short and Flynn will now be the President's National Security Advisor, I thought it wise to read this book. Knowing that Flynn has a reputation for running afoul of political correctness when discussing present US national security, I remained open minded that a military professional might have both a nuanced understanding of what I have no problem calling an enemy (though to what degree the US military is the instrument with which to fight it is debateable) and a respectable, programmatic set of recommendations for addressing it (i.e., at this particular moment, ISIS).
First, the least ridiculous aspects. The authorial voice of Flynn and Ledeen repeatedly urges that Islamists like Al Qaeda and ISIS not be underestimated. They are intelligent, well-connected, tactical, strategic, and motivated. This is all good, and the public sometimes pretends this is not the case; but all military professionals must believe it to be the case. That is to say, merely stating this truism does not tell us anything in particular about Flynn's fitness to make policy or combat decisions in his new role. The authorial voice is also very hung up on the issue of political correctness. Again, if we approach this book wanting to understand what Flynn will do, a sermon against political correctness does not clearly help us. While it is true that certain liberal people and institutions are wary of addressing fascistic political Islam directly (for the good reasons that they hope to avoid a conflation between these political movements and all Muslims, in an atmosphere of resurgent nationalism and hostility between religions), this is not the case of the White House (except, perhaps, as presented by the Press Secretary). Yet this is "Flynn"'s claim: that US policy under Obama is guided by political correctness and a willful ignorance of the dangers of Islamic terror groups, and is therefore weak and likely to make Americans unsafe. One only need to look at a timeline of Obama's drone strikes and other military actions, or the steadfastly jingoistic rhetoric coming from his administration, to know this is not true. While many politically correct Pollyannas may count among Obama supporters, this tells us nothing about actual policy or combat decisions. And this is what Flynn will be in charge of.
Yet these two threads, that of a competent and motivated hostile force and that of a weak Democratic government, are elements of many engineered red state bestsellers. And this is why it's best to read this book as the performance of an attitude concocted by the two named authors, but presumably mostly Ledeen, rather than as a serious discussion by a military professional of what America might do to "deal with" ISIS (i.e. to prevent Americans from being attacked, to deprive them of resources and territory, to aid somehow in Syria and Iraq having secular democratic governments, etc).
Yet the character, Flynn, constructed by the authorial voice is not one to tell us much of use. The book starts with a hamfisted, classic story of bootstrapping American redemption under patriarchal authority (something familiar to anyone accustomed to the American biographical tradition, but here told at a third grade reading level). Much like Malcolm X, Flynn spent A WHOLE NIGHT in a juvenile institution and was released on a year's probation for his "hoodlum" activities (unspecified). As "Flynn" puts it, "Saved!" And he was, not only because of unaddressed aspects of his background that might've helped him receive lenient treatment, but because of "my father's steel hands and mother's piercing eyes of disappointment." Punishment deters, the nuclear family is the source of values. We are told that Flynn's father, Charlie, was a "disciplinarian," and that it was thanks to Charlie's "good seargeant's counsel and near-daily physical interactions" that Flynn has got along so swell in life. "Physical interactions" can be nothing other than a euphemism for child beating. I wonder if an editor objected to "enhanced parenting technique"? (Trick question: the book is clearly unedited).
We are told in excessive and irrelevant detail about Flynn's wholly inconsequential military premier during the wholly inconsequential (in geopolitical terms) invasion of Grenada. Though Flynn is entirely open that nothing was accomplished in Grenada, the theodicy of stopping communism is enough for him to never question its necessity. We are treated to a tale of Flynn rescuing some of his colleagues who, after lounging on the beach of the resort island they invaded, went for a swim and nearly drowned. Kind of a good metaphor for America's foreign policy postwar, but I don't think such a literary device was intended. This feat of derring-do is more likely meant to fill us with awe at Flynn's good will and readiness to risk his life for other good boys like himself. Flynn also explains how the US tapped into Grenada's communication systems; and while Flynn offers no evidence that anything of value was learned from this helping of ourselves to Grenadian information, the episode is hoisted as an apologia for any and all further invasions of privacy on behalf of the war effort. (Since Islamic terrorism is a global phenomenon, the point is that all global information can rightly if not legally be accessed by the US security establishment).
Flynn's discussion of recent Middle East history is a fantasy. For example, Flynn refers obliquely to some indications that al-Zarqawi had been in Iraq during 2002 as a way of insinuating the preposterous idea that radical Islam's arrival in Iraq was not made possible in any direct way by the US invasion. We are told that Baathism was not secular and was at best latently Islamist; the implication is we'd have to invade sooner or later, why not 2003? While Flynn (in a mood of political correctness) acknowledges that the main victims of Islamism are Muslims and that not all Muslims are Islamists and all that, by denying that Pan-Arab Nationalism is at least DIFFERENT than what's going on with Al Qaeda and ISIS, Flynn effectively flattens all the distinctions he limp-wristedly invokes. The only good Muslim, it seems, is an apolitical subject of an American client state. (Flynn's overwhelming zeal for military solutions, his willful ignorance of history, and his disinterest in respecting either national sovereignty or the dignity of non-Americans has him bemoaning the fact that the US did not invade Iran during the Green Movement -- in Flynn's ahistorical perspective, it's possible to gloss over tragedy and move straight to farce).
Finally, Flynn's recommendations (pp. 116-118) are unlimited military spending, worldwide military deployment, and complete disregard for international law and public sentiment. Flynn fancifully concocts an "Axis of Evil" spreading from Pyongyang to Russia to Tehran to Havana (Havana?? Really?). This Axis vaguely includes actors like the Assad regime in Syria, but it is all in service of ISIS and like groups. He points out the absurdity of this claim, but then asserts that it is nonetheless true, without spelling out how all the contradictions (let alone lack of evidence of any kind of serious cooperation) resolve themselves. That's one way of preempting your critics, I guess.
When it comes to actual supporters of ISIS and like groups, like US ally Saudi Arabia, Flynn says the US must offer Saudi Arabia "evidence" of its official and well known policy of support for radical Islamist terrorist groups, and then give it an ultimatum to "arrest" terrorists or face the "consequences." Presumably, Flynn wants to skip levers like, you know, no longer giving Saudi Arabia tons of money or using sanctions (the weak strategy Obama used against Iran rather than invading it like a man who was the object of "physical interactions" as a child would) and move straight to an actual war with Saudi Arabia. This is how the character created by Ledeen thinks, and maybe how America's new National Security Adviser thinks.
And yet, behind all the rhetoric, don't we just get a continuation of the same? There will not be a war with Saudi Arabia; this is the right wing version of virtue signalling, in which an impossible demand or stipulation is presented more for self-expressive than for programmatic ends. The US will maintain its alliances, maintain or increase military spending, continue to disregard international law, and generally go along with Flynn's global contention in this book: everything that was once done in the name of the Cold War can now be done in the name of the war on Islamic terrorism. There are no limits, no prices too high.
I began this book with an open mind. I had no idea it would be so poorly written (it actually is painful, and so despite its brevity and the fact that its ostensible subject is now a major figure in American politics, I don't recommend anyone try to read it), but more than that I had no idea it would be such a vacuum of ideas. One expects high ranking military officers to be jingoistic and maintain some of the naive American exceptionalist notion that the US is "always surprised by war" (a paraphrase of something Flynn actually writes in this book) and never seeks it out or does anything to make it more likely. Yet even if one expects the innocence-of-America narrative to be relatively unquestioned by lifelong military professionals, one expects that, simply to do their jobs correctly, they have to have a nuanced view of the world and an appreciation of contingency and the limits of military power. The question then becomes: is Flynn emblematic of his profession, or is he really the "maverick" (he actually calls himself this, illustrating the point with reference to an Apple commercial) he claims to be? One hopes it's the latter, if only because that means there are fewer Flynns in the world.