“Mr. Lincoln’s army” was the Army of the Potomac – the main Union Army in the Eastern Theatre throughout most of the American Civil War. It is an epic history, and historian Bruce Catton recounts that history with a fitting sense of its grand scale, in his three-volume history The Army of the Potomac – the first volume of which, when it was first published in 1951, bore the title Mr. Lincoln’s Army.
The soldiers of the Army of the Potomac were brave soldiers who fought well in every battle, even if the generalship of their commanding officers through much of the early part of the war was not equal to the courage of the army’s ordinary combat soldiers. Catton sums up their experience in this manner:
From first to last, the Army of the Potomac was unlucky. It fought for four years, and it took more killing, proportionately, than any army in American history, and its luck was always out; it did its level best and lost; when it won, the victory was always clouded by a might-have-been; and when at last the triumph came at Appomattox, there were so very, very many of its men who weren’t there to see it. (p. 45).
Bruce Catton may have born to write histories like this one. As a child in Petoskey, Michigan, he saw aged Union veterans, and found himself reflecting that these particular old men impressed him as being somehow special, unique: “[O]nce, ages ago, they had been everywhere and seen everything, and nothing that happened to them thereafter meant anything much” (p. 9). He was a diligent researcher and a mellifluous writer; and long before the Civil War Centennial of 1961-65 came round, he had established himself as the premier Civil War historian for that era. Mr. Lincoln’s Army provides a clear sense of what caused Catton’s work to gain such a large and appreciative audience.
In a manner that is appropriate to the Homeric dimensions of the saga of the Army of the Potomac, Catton provides an in medias res treatment of the army’s disastrous defeat at the Second Battle of Bull Run, or Second Battle of Manassas, in the summer of 1862. The AOP’s commander at the time, General John Pope, had been thoroughly out-thought and outmaneuvered by Confederate General Robert E. Lee, and Catton emphasizes the depth of the disillusionment of the AOP’s soldiers when they realized how the army’s leadership had failed them – “Young men then went to war believing all of the fine stories they had grown up with; and if, in the end, their disillusion was quite as deep and profound as that of the modern soldier, they had to fall farther to reach it” (p. 28).
On their retreat from Bull Run, Catton suggests, the soldiers of the AOP “were learning the reality of war, these youngsters, getting face to face with the sickening realization that men get killed uselessly because their generals are stupid, so that desperate encounters where the last drop of courage has been given serve the country not at all and make the patriot look a fool” (p. 61).
From that in medias res introduction, Catton takes the reader back to the beginnings of the Army of the Potomac – a process that began when the United States of America was reeling from the Union Army’s disastrous defeat at the First Battle of Bull Run or Manassas in July of 1861. The army was in complete disarray, and a talented young general named George B. McClellan, who had enjoyed some military success in what is now West Virginia, came to Washington and was given command of the Union army in the east. He gave the army its new name of “Army of the Potomac,” restored discipline, trained the soldiers thoroughly, and instilled in them a degree of esprit de corps that had never existed in the army before; and the soldiers loved him for it.
McClellan excelled as an organizer, but suffered from two besetting defects. The first was that he possessed an intractable tendency to want to interfere in politics; he wanted to restore the status quo ante bellum under which Union and slavery existed side by side, and actively opposed any possible move toward abolition and emancipation. And the second was that he showed in battle a degree of hesitation and irresolution that stood in stark contrast with his force and energy as an organizer. He could forge a sword of sharp and tempered steel; he simply couldn’t wield it very well.
Focusing on the difficult relationship between President Lincoln and General McClellan gives Catton a suitable way of commenting on how the American Civil War put unique pressures on American democracy itself: “Nobody had yet discovered how a democracy puts all its power and spirit under the discipline of an all-consuming war and at the same time continues to be a democracy” (p. 94). Catton adds that “Of necessity, a democracy deeply distrusts its army, and in all ordinary times it wears its distrust openly on its sleeve – especially a democracy like that of 1861, which was still brash and crude and wore its hat in the parlor” (p. 107).
Catton also places due emphasis on how the war era was a period of distrust, where Union-loyal people might be called “traitor” or accused of “treason” simply because of political differences, meaning that the Civil War generation “was deprived of the one element that is essential to the operation of a free society – the ability to assume, in the absence of good proof to the contrary, that men in public life are generally decent, honorable, and loyal” (p. 110). Few readers, I think, would disagree with Catton’s grim statement that “Sunlight and death were upon the earth in the spring of 1862, and no one was wholly rational” (p. 111).
It was against this strange background that McClellan lost command of the army he had created. His Peninsula Campaign, aimed as it was at taking Richmond from the east, came to naught in the “Seven Days’ Battles” around the rebel capital; Robert E. Lee’s aggressive attacks forced McClellan into a retreat that was euphemistically called a “change of base.” The AOP was withdrawn from that area, and command of the AOP was given to General Pope, who, as mentioned above, came to grief at Second Bull Run/Second Manassas.
War has been called “politics by other means,” and the all-consuming nature of the American Civil War meant that any sort of possible political change in American life would be inextricably linked with the battlefield fortunes of the Union Army. In those early days of the war, Catton notes, there was an important difference between the men who commanded the Union Army in the East, on the one hand, and Confederate generals like “Stonewall” Jackson, James Longstreet, and D.H. Hill, on the other. Catton says of these rebel officers that “The least common denominator of those men was that they fought all-out. If they hit at all, they hit with everything there was. They had an exultant acceptance for the chances of war. They fought as if they enjoyed it, and they probably did. The Army of the Potomac just was not getting that kind of leadership. [General Phil] Kearny had had it, but he was dead [killed at Chantilly, Virginia, in early September of 1862]. Most of the other generals seemed uninspired” (p. 217).
Lee followed his success at Second Manassas/Second Bull Run by invading the slaveholding but Union-loyal border state of Maryland; and President Lincoln, with few other options available to him, restored McClellan to command. Meanwhile, Lincoln’s deliberations during the early days of Lee’s invasion of Maryland took a decisive new turn: “There was but one step possible: the war had to become a war for human freedom, a war to end slavery. Otherwise, it was lost. So he had in his desk the draft of the Emancipation Proclamation – that amazing document which is at once the weakest and the strongest of all America’s state papers” (p. 225).
Mr. Lincoln’s Army reaches its climax at the Battle of Antietam on September 17, 1862. Antietam was the bloodiest single day of the Civil War, and it remains the bloodiest single day in American history. Catton’s criticism of McClellan’s generalship at Antietam is appropriately severe – in his judgment, McClellan completely failed to take tactical command of the engagement, and instead simply let the battle fight itself out across three distinct combat zones, from north to south, over the course of the day – but when the day was over, the Army of the Potomac had forced Lee to take his battered Army of Northern Virginia back across the Potomac, back into Virginia. And the Union victory at Antietam, although bloody and incomplete, was enough of a victory for President Lincoln to issue the Emancipation Proclamation – forever changing the moral ground on which the war was being fought.
Mr. Lincoln’s Army ends with General McClellan’s removal from command of the Army of the Potomac; the ever-irresolute general had been so slow in following Lee across the Potomac that Lincoln’s renowned patience finally ran out. The soldiers of the Army of the Potomac cheered McClellan lustily as he left the army; they knew what he had done to make them an army. At the same time, however, more than a few of those soldiers seem to have realized that McClellan had done all that he could do to help that army. McClellan had forged the sword that was the Army of the Potomac. It would be left to other generals to wield that sword more aggressively and more successfully than McClellan had – as Catton chronicles in his remaining two volumes of The Army of the Potomac.