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Modern War Studies
Winfield Scott: The Quest for Military Glory
One of the most important public figures in antebellum America, Winfield Scott is known today more for his swagger than his sword. "Old Fuss and Feathers" was a brilliant military commander whose tactics and strategy were innovative adaptations from European military theory; yet he was often underappreciated by his contemporaries and, until recently, overlooked by historians.
Although John Eisenhower's recently published Agent of Destiny provides a solid summary of Scott's remarkable life, Timothy D. Johnson's much deeper critical exploration of this flawed genius will become the standard work. Thoroughly grounded in an essential understanding of nineteenth-century military professionalism, Johnson's work draws extensively on unpublished sources to reveal neglected aspects of Scott's life, present a complete view of his career, and accurately balance criticism and praise.
Johnson dramatically relates the key features of Scott's career: how he led troops to victory in the War of 1812 and the Mexican War, fought against the Seminoles and Creeks, and was instrumental in professionalizing the U.S. Army, which he commanded for two decades. He also tells how Scott tried to introduce French methods into army tactical manuals, and how he applied his study of the Napoleonic Wars during the Mexico City campaign but found European strategy of little use against Indians. Johnson further suggests that Scott's creation of an officer corps that boasted Grant, Lee, McClellan, and other veterans of the Mexican War raises important questions about his influence on Civil War generalship.
More than a military history, this book explains how Scott's aristocratic pretensions were out of place with emerging notions of equality in Jacksonian America and made him an unappealing political candidate in his bid for the presidency. Johnson recounts the details of Scott's personality that alienated nearly every one who knew him, as well as the unsavory methods Scott used to promote his career and the scandalous ways he attempted to alleviate his lifelong financial troubles.
Although Scott's legendary vanity has tarnished his place among American military leaders, he also possessed great talent and courage. Johnson's biography offers the most balanced portrait available of Scott, by never losing sight of the whole man.
Although John Eisenhower's recently published Agent of Destiny provides a solid summary of Scott's remarkable life, Timothy D. Johnson's much deeper critical exploration of this flawed genius will become the standard work. Thoroughly grounded in an essential understanding of nineteenth-century military professionalism, Johnson's work draws extensively on unpublished sources to reveal neglected aspects of Scott's life, present a complete view of his career, and accurately balance criticism and praise.
Johnson dramatically relates the key features of Scott's career: how he led troops to victory in the War of 1812 and the Mexican War, fought against the Seminoles and Creeks, and was instrumental in professionalizing the U.S. Army, which he commanded for two decades. He also tells how Scott tried to introduce French methods into army tactical manuals, and how he applied his study of the Napoleonic Wars during the Mexico City campaign but found European strategy of little use against Indians. Johnson further suggests that Scott's creation of an officer corps that boasted Grant, Lee, McClellan, and other veterans of the Mexican War raises important questions about his influence on Civil War generalship.
More than a military history, this book explains how Scott's aristocratic pretensions were out of place with emerging notions of equality in Jacksonian America and made him an unappealing political candidate in his bid for the presidency. Johnson recounts the details of Scott's personality that alienated nearly every one who knew him, as well as the unsavory methods Scott used to promote his career and the scandalous ways he attempted to alleviate his lifelong financial troubles.
Although Scott's legendary vanity has tarnished his place among American military leaders, he also possessed great talent and courage. Johnson's biography offers the most balanced portrait available of Scott, by never losing sight of the whole man.
328 pages, Hardcover
First published November 1, 1998
About the author
Timothy D. Johnson
17 books3 followersTimothy D. Johnson is University Research Professor in History at Lipscomb University, where he has taught since 1991. Johnson earned his B.S. in history, his M.Ed. in education, and his M.A. and Ph.D., History from the University of Alabama.
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November 23, 2024
He was the longest serving general officer in American history, with a military career that spanned more than half a century. During that time, he commanded American forces in two major wars, devised the winning strategy for a third, and waged campaigns that earned him praise as the greatest solider of his age. Over the course of his career, he spearheaded the transformation of the United States Army into a professional force, averted war with Great Britain, and ran for president as the nominee of a major political party. Yet even in spite of these manifold achievements Winfield Scott’s name is one that is largely unknown to Americans today, and often goes unmentioned in discussions of the nation’s greatest military leaders.
One reason for this, in Timothy D. Johnson’s estimation, is that Scott’s victories were won in wars that are less familiar to modern Americans than the conflicts that currently dominate the popular imagination. Nor does it help that many of Scott’s personal papers were destroyed in a fire, and that the remainder are so dispersed as to make it challenging to write a modern biography of him based on the available primary sources. That Johnson attempted such a task is in itself laudatory, and simply in filling this gap he has provided a useful service. Fortunately, his book goes beyond this to provide a valuable assessment of Scott’s life and achievements, one based upon not only the contemporary documentation but the considerable scholarly research written about the era for context.
Among the questions Johnson addresses is how Scott attained such a successful career given his unremarkable background. Though born into a middle-class Virginia family, his father’s death at an early age left young Winfield and his siblings to be raised by his mother, Ann. Her death when Scott was only 17 left the young man with little more than her lessons on self-reliance. Following in his father’s footsteps, Scott studied the law and became an attorney, but found that the grind of legal work did little to satisfy his ambitions. The growing tensions with Great Britain soon offered him an outlet for his ambitions. Enrolling in the state militia, Scott participated in patrols of the Virginia coastline and even netted in one of them a party of unarmed British tars who had landed to procure provisions.
Scott’s brief service whetted his interests in a military career, and led him to pursue a commission in the army. Entering as a captain of artillery, he soon found peacetime duties dull, and was court-martialed for withholding his men’s pay. Scott used the year’s suspension he received as punishment to study military science and history, making up for his lack of professional training by reading through the standard texts of the era. This self-education soon came in good stead, as less than a year after the end of Scott’s suspension the United States declared war against Great Britain. In an army commanded by aged veterans of the American Revolution Scott’s youth and aggressiveness ensured his rapid ascent through the ranks, as he rose from captain to major general in just two years thanks to his distinguished combat record in the Niagara theater.
In the aftermath of the war Scott became one of just a handful of active-duty generals remaining in the peacetime force, a status that enhanced his influence. Over the next several decades, he used this position to turn the army into a professional force modeled along European lines. Johnson devotes considerable space to detailing Scott’s efforts during this period, describing his attention to writing and revising the regulations that would train generations of soldiers. While little of this work was original, this did not make it any less influential in terms of shaping the army into the force Scott envisioned. This vision proved a limiting one in several respects, as Johnson notes that Scott’s preference for Napoleonic-era tactics and campaigning proved ill-suited for the operations he conducted against the Seminole in Florida in 1836. Here the author’s analysis of what this setback revealed about Scott’s flaws is disappointingly constrained, as he limits it to an assessment of his subject’s inflexibility and ignores the insights it offers into the issues of status and respectability that permeated Scott’s career.
Scott subsequently proved more successful in defusing tensions along the Canadian border in the aftermath of the “Patriot War,” an achievement that sparked talk of a possible presidential nomination for the first time. Though he was denied the Whig Party’s nomination in 1840, Scott attained his professional goal a year later by becoming commanding general of the army, an office he would hold for the next two decades. Scott’s new position gave full reign to the vanity that justified his nickname “Old Fuss and Feathers,” yet it was one the responsibility for which he took seriously. Scott’s status was such that it made it difficult for James K. Polk to deny him command of American forces when war with Mexico broke out in 1846, as the president’s inability to find anyone better suited to lead the proposed expedition to capture the port of Veracruz led him reluctantly to grant Scott an opportunity to demonstrate his talents.
The campaign that followed proved the triumph of Scott’s career. Johnson recounts the Veracruz landing and subsequent capture of Mexico City in considerable detail, showing how its success was due in no small part to Scott’s careful preparations and wise policies. Cognizant of the political dimensions of his mission and having learned from his failures in Florida a decade earlier, Scott demanded that his men respect Mexican citizens and their property, which helped to negate the threat a major guerrilla movement would have posed to his small and overstretched force. Scott’s political skills also contributed to the successful negotiation of an end to the war, further adding to his luster. Though Whigs awarded the 1848 presidential nomination instead to his rival, Zachary Taylor, Scott finally received his chance to run for president four years later, only to be defeated as the nominee of a political party in terminal decline.
Scott may well have served out his final years quietly but for the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861. Loyal to the Union, his plan to cripple the embryonic Confederacy through a campaign of economic strangulation was largely a copy of his strategy in Mexico fourteen years earlier. Yet while the “Anaconda Plan” as it was dubbed would shape Union strategy throughout the war, less than a year into it Scott himself was unceremoniously forced into retirement by George McClellan – a man whose ambition, organizational ability and arrogance was every bit the equal of Scott’s. That McClellan failed despite basing his 1862 Peninsula campaign on Scott’s campaign in Mexico reflected in Johnson’s judgment the crucial element Scott possessed which his successor lacked: the moral courage to execute a bold operation. It’s a conclusion that squares with his overall assessment of Scott’s gifted leadership but flawed personality. And in Johnson’s biography of him readers have an informative introduction to his life and achievements, one that is a good starting point for anyone seeking to learn about this unjustly neglected figure.
One reason for this, in Timothy D. Johnson’s estimation, is that Scott’s victories were won in wars that are less familiar to modern Americans than the conflicts that currently dominate the popular imagination. Nor does it help that many of Scott’s personal papers were destroyed in a fire, and that the remainder are so dispersed as to make it challenging to write a modern biography of him based on the available primary sources. That Johnson attempted such a task is in itself laudatory, and simply in filling this gap he has provided a useful service. Fortunately, his book goes beyond this to provide a valuable assessment of Scott’s life and achievements, one based upon not only the contemporary documentation but the considerable scholarly research written about the era for context.
Among the questions Johnson addresses is how Scott attained such a successful career given his unremarkable background. Though born into a middle-class Virginia family, his father’s death at an early age left young Winfield and his siblings to be raised by his mother, Ann. Her death when Scott was only 17 left the young man with little more than her lessons on self-reliance. Following in his father’s footsteps, Scott studied the law and became an attorney, but found that the grind of legal work did little to satisfy his ambitions. The growing tensions with Great Britain soon offered him an outlet for his ambitions. Enrolling in the state militia, Scott participated in patrols of the Virginia coastline and even netted in one of them a party of unarmed British tars who had landed to procure provisions.
Scott’s brief service whetted his interests in a military career, and led him to pursue a commission in the army. Entering as a captain of artillery, he soon found peacetime duties dull, and was court-martialed for withholding his men’s pay. Scott used the year’s suspension he received as punishment to study military science and history, making up for his lack of professional training by reading through the standard texts of the era. This self-education soon came in good stead, as less than a year after the end of Scott’s suspension the United States declared war against Great Britain. In an army commanded by aged veterans of the American Revolution Scott’s youth and aggressiveness ensured his rapid ascent through the ranks, as he rose from captain to major general in just two years thanks to his distinguished combat record in the Niagara theater.
In the aftermath of the war Scott became one of just a handful of active-duty generals remaining in the peacetime force, a status that enhanced his influence. Over the next several decades, he used this position to turn the army into a professional force modeled along European lines. Johnson devotes considerable space to detailing Scott’s efforts during this period, describing his attention to writing and revising the regulations that would train generations of soldiers. While little of this work was original, this did not make it any less influential in terms of shaping the army into the force Scott envisioned. This vision proved a limiting one in several respects, as Johnson notes that Scott’s preference for Napoleonic-era tactics and campaigning proved ill-suited for the operations he conducted against the Seminole in Florida in 1836. Here the author’s analysis of what this setback revealed about Scott’s flaws is disappointingly constrained, as he limits it to an assessment of his subject’s inflexibility and ignores the insights it offers into the issues of status and respectability that permeated Scott’s career.
Scott subsequently proved more successful in defusing tensions along the Canadian border in the aftermath of the “Patriot War,” an achievement that sparked talk of a possible presidential nomination for the first time. Though he was denied the Whig Party’s nomination in 1840, Scott attained his professional goal a year later by becoming commanding general of the army, an office he would hold for the next two decades. Scott’s new position gave full reign to the vanity that justified his nickname “Old Fuss and Feathers,” yet it was one the responsibility for which he took seriously. Scott’s status was such that it made it difficult for James K. Polk to deny him command of American forces when war with Mexico broke out in 1846, as the president’s inability to find anyone better suited to lead the proposed expedition to capture the port of Veracruz led him reluctantly to grant Scott an opportunity to demonstrate his talents.
The campaign that followed proved the triumph of Scott’s career. Johnson recounts the Veracruz landing and subsequent capture of Mexico City in considerable detail, showing how its success was due in no small part to Scott’s careful preparations and wise policies. Cognizant of the political dimensions of his mission and having learned from his failures in Florida a decade earlier, Scott demanded that his men respect Mexican citizens and their property, which helped to negate the threat a major guerrilla movement would have posed to his small and overstretched force. Scott’s political skills also contributed to the successful negotiation of an end to the war, further adding to his luster. Though Whigs awarded the 1848 presidential nomination instead to his rival, Zachary Taylor, Scott finally received his chance to run for president four years later, only to be defeated as the nominee of a political party in terminal decline.
Scott may well have served out his final years quietly but for the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861. Loyal to the Union, his plan to cripple the embryonic Confederacy through a campaign of economic strangulation was largely a copy of his strategy in Mexico fourteen years earlier. Yet while the “Anaconda Plan” as it was dubbed would shape Union strategy throughout the war, less than a year into it Scott himself was unceremoniously forced into retirement by George McClellan – a man whose ambition, organizational ability and arrogance was every bit the equal of Scott’s. That McClellan failed despite basing his 1862 Peninsula campaign on Scott’s campaign in Mexico reflected in Johnson’s judgment the crucial element Scott possessed which his successor lacked: the moral courage to execute a bold operation. It’s a conclusion that squares with his overall assessment of Scott’s gifted leadership but flawed personality. And in Johnson’s biography of him readers have an informative introduction to his life and achievements, one that is a good starting point for anyone seeking to learn about this unjustly neglected figure.
November 3, 2024
Just finished:
"Winfield Scott: The Quest for Military Glory"
By: Timothy D. Johnson
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998.
An engrossing account of a walking contradiction. Scott's ego could give anyone throughout history a run for their money. He was a germophobe who pitied the sick, challenged at least one man to a duel when he himself wrote in military code that it was unbecoming for officers to duel. He was a man from middling means who lost his parents at a young age but married into a wealthy family. For all his flaws, he helped modernize a small army. He also learned from the history of the Napoleonic Wars, and the Peninsula Campaign in particular. He decided the best way to win in Mexico was to treat the Roman Catholic Church with respect and that his soldiers would buy what they needed. He disciplined soldiers for wrongdoing in Mexico.
I'd recommend this book.
"Winfield Scott: The Quest for Military Glory"
By: Timothy D. Johnson
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998.
An engrossing account of a walking contradiction. Scott's ego could give anyone throughout history a run for their money. He was a germophobe who pitied the sick, challenged at least one man to a duel when he himself wrote in military code that it was unbecoming for officers to duel. He was a man from middling means who lost his parents at a young age but married into a wealthy family. For all his flaws, he helped modernize a small army. He also learned from the history of the Napoleonic Wars, and the Peninsula Campaign in particular. He decided the best way to win in Mexico was to treat the Roman Catholic Church with respect and that his soldiers would buy what they needed. He disciplined soldiers for wrongdoing in Mexico.
I'd recommend this book.
July 24, 2025
A clear, thoughtful and readable biography of Scott, with a focus on his military career.
Johnson ably describes Scott’s vanity, arrogance and self-confidence and how it followed Scott throughout his life. He also covers Scott’s ability to combine aggressive military action with diplomatic overtures, his ability to pacify conquered territory, and how his pomposity and elitism cost him his chance at the presidency. The Mexican-American War is probably the best part of the book.
The narrative flows well, the pace is pretty comfortable, and he does a good job balancing Scott’s life with the times he lived in. He does indulge in some psychobabble when talking about the death of Scott’s parents, but this is easy to get through. The narrative also seems rushed once the Mexican War ends. Also at one point John Eaton is called “James.”
A well-written, well-researched, and enjoyable biography.
Johnson ably describes Scott’s vanity, arrogance and self-confidence and how it followed Scott throughout his life. He also covers Scott’s ability to combine aggressive military action with diplomatic overtures, his ability to pacify conquered territory, and how his pomposity and elitism cost him his chance at the presidency. The Mexican-American War is probably the best part of the book.
The narrative flows well, the pace is pretty comfortable, and he does a good job balancing Scott’s life with the times he lived in. He does indulge in some psychobabble when talking about the death of Scott’s parents, but this is easy to get through. The narrative also seems rushed once the Mexican War ends. Also at one point John Eaton is called “James.”
A well-written, well-researched, and enjoyable biography.
August 31, 2016
This is a good book for giving the reader an overview of the life of Winfield Scott. The author does not try to hide the fact that Scott had a giant ego nor that he believed it was his way or the highway. The author does not go into great detail of Scott's military campaigns. There is just about as much detail on Scott writing the first army manual and his struggles to be given back pay as there is coverage of the Mexico City campaign. If the reader is looking for justin overview of the development of the US Army from the War of 1812 till the end of the Mexican-American War and Scott's involvement in it, with little background knowledge, then this is a good book to start with.
August 17, 2026
Winfield Scott is a woefully neglected figure in American history. Having decided to delve into the history of the US-Mexican border and the emergence of immigration laws and border patrols, I thought I'd start by getting some background in the way the Mexican-American War was fought and how the border was established in the first place.
So I read this in conjunction with Jack Bauer's monograph on the Mexican War, since Scott was a pivotal figure in that conflict.
But this book covers far more than just that war. It encompasses Scott's entire career from beginning to end. Interestingly he originally wanted to be a lawyer, but by the strange vagaries of fate found himself swept up in a military career.
The interesting thing about Scott is that though he was a towering physical presence, standing at 6'5," a height that would be impressive even today, but which must have been especially impressive in his own time, he was also a serious scholar who eagerly studied the art of war.
Johnson suggests that Scott was familiar with all of the French authors that so influenced Napoleon and were influenced by Napoleon, like Guibert, Folard, Jomini, etc. Scott learned to speak French fluently and had a traveling library accompany him on campaign.
What is fascinating here is that Johnson suggests that many standard studies of the US Civil War are flawed in that they assume the generals of that conflict read these works themselves, or were taught French tactics and strategy at West Point by Dennis Hart Mahan. But Johnson says that it's more likely that many of these generals learned these precepts indirectly through their experiences with Scott in Mexico.
Surely the Mexican War was a fundamental formative experience for many of these men, some one hundred of which are listed by Johnson in the endnotes.
But we're getting ahead of ourselves. Scott was really a brilliant soldier, who learned from experience as well as from study. For example after experiencing the difficulties of fighting on the defensive he chose to always take the offensive. This was Napoleon's idea too.
Many students of war like to quote Clausewitz in that the defensive is the stronger form of warfare. This is too simplistic, and I myself on reflection felt that there are a number of advantages that accrue to the offensive against which the defensive can have no answer.
One of these is initiative, which Scott saw clearly. He drove events and decided when and where and how his battles would be fought, and he was skillful enough to conduct them as he wanted them to be conducted.
His campaign in Mexico is really a masterpiece on so many levels, and it's incredible that it has been almost forgotten by the American public today.
Before starting this work I had drawn in my head some comparisons between Scott and MacArthur, and it's curious that on the back cover one of the reviewers refers to Scott as a nineteenth century MacArthur, though Johnson does not discuss this theme.
But both men were tall, of striking appearance, vainglorious, egotistic, and brilliant in their eccentric ways. Both were promoted to high rank at a young age.
Some time ago I found a thesis examining the landing at Vera Cruz as a nineteenth century D-Day (people like to retroject on Scott apparently), but keeping in line with this comparison would it not be better to suggest that Vera Cruz was a nineteenth century Inchon?
The similarities are very striking to me. This is especially fascinating for my own interests because both Scott and MacArthur were fully aware of the flexibility and advantages offered by seapower. Walton Walker's pinning the North Korean Army at Pusan to enable MacArthur's lethal blow at Inchon is very similar to how Taylor distracted Santa Anna and the Mexican Army while Scott carried out the mortal strike at Vera Cruz, using the sea to bypass all of the obstacles between the Rio Grande and Mexico City.
Also like MacArthur, Scott was often outnumbered and used skillful maneuver to dislodge a strongly entrenched opponent. I wonder if MacArthur even thought about Scott while he was in New Guinea.
One might suggest here that their triumphs have also been largely forgotten. A number of works refer to the Korean War as America's forgotten war, and the Mexican War is even more so.
But these conflicts have much to teach. I especially appreciated Johnson's in-depth explanation of how Scott managed to pacify Mexico and prevent a guerrilla war like the one in Spain under Napoleon. Scott treated the Mexicans with respect and severely punished American transgressors.
Another factor that went a long way towards disarming any possible revolt was that the Americans paid for supplies with ready money. Wellington argued that the French would fail in Spain because they would seize supplies from the population, which was barely above subsistence level as it was, so that the Spanish would be driven to either resisting or starving to death. This was not a problem in Mexico where the Americans did not requisition supplies but bought them.
This is never really explicitly mentioned in the text, but it's also curious how often the Mexicans welcomed the Americans, due to, I suspect, weak nationalist sentiments at the time.
Mexico was still a young state and was still largely decentralized. Many of her components did not feel much loyalty to the central government, and Santa Anna has always been an ambiguous and polarizing figure in Mexican history. Even at the time many Mexicans were not fans of the general.
So as a result, the Mexican people did not put up as much resistance as they might have had they been more nationally conscious. This was a great advantage for Scott who could rely on supplies from friendly Mexicans and a secure line of communications.
Johnson mentions an extraordinary moment when the people of Mexico City even proposed to make Scott their protector, which highlights this theory of a subdued nationalist consciousness.
It would be interesting to contrast this with the French invasion a few decades later. Did the French requisition supplies? Was the idea of a Mexican nation a stronger sentiment among the population in the 1860s? What is clear is that the Mexicans put up much greater popular resistance to France than to the US, reasons for which we could propose such as the above. But I have not studied the French operations so I cannot do more than make some tentative guesses here.
Above all the lesson is that Scott recognized the truism in Clausewitz's dictum that war is policy by other means. He sought to limit the destruction and always tried to rely on diplomacy.
We see this in early episodes like the Aroostook War, and with Bleeding Kansas. Scott earned a reputation as a master negotiator, and he put this to good use in Mexico where he limited bloodshed and compelled Mexico's defeat through a combination of skillful diplomacy and military strategy.
This sort of limited war as practiced by Scott could teach the American Government quite a lot today.
Scott was a great fan of the French military and tried to increase professionalization, and here this must be considered his greatest failure. He wanted to create a European style army but the Americans were not amenable to the puff and pageantry and the regalia and hierarchy.
They preferred the gruff and democratic style of men like Zachary Taylor and Andrew Jackson. Scott thus lost the presidency to these men because he was too elitist and unable to connect with the common man.
In this he, again, resembles MacArthur. Arrogant and superior and pretentious. People respected his talents but few liked him as a person. This was and is crucial in a democratic society when running for positions of leadership.
The last thing we could say is that Johnson argued McClellan's Peninsular Campaign was an attempt to reproduce Scott's success at Vera Cruz, and Johnson goes into some detail about comparing McClellan and Scott in terms of personality and command style.
But McClellan fell short because he lacked Scott's boldness and confidence. Scott had become the grand old man of the army by the time of Vera Cruz and had gained much wisdom. He pressed the attack home, to its conclusion. McClellan never seemed to grasp what Scott did, that you have to drive your opponent, keep him off balance.
Instead McClellan dithered and was badly defeated by Lee at Seven Pines. This might have happened to Scott in Mexico had he been a less able general, or had another general been in command. Johnson frequently disparages Taylor during the Mexican War, for example, saying he was certainly no Winfield Scott.
Some problems I could mention are that Scott was opposed to immigration, and while he was anti-imperialist in that he did not wish to acquire territory from Mexico, this was less because of any sense of morality and more because he did not want Mexicans in the Union. There is thus this underlying current of Anglo supremacy and racism towards Hispanics (and others) to be found in Scott's worldview.
Scott is nonetheless a very impressive military figure because he was forced to use militia and volunteers, which are always of lower quality than regulars. I have a growing respect for American generals because in Europe armies are usually very efficiently structured in peacetime while in the US they have to be improvised at the outset of war. This poses unique challenges to American military leaders and Scott was wise enough to know the limitations of his men, which inspired the Anaconda Plan for instance.
Scott was virtually the only voice of reason in Washington on the outbreak of the American Civil War. He predicted that it would be very difficult and time-consuming to reconquer the South, he was strongly opposed to any invasion of Virginia and castigated himself as a coward for not opposing Bull Run.
Like MacArthur, he was also skilled at combined operations and amphibious operations. These are very difficult to conduct and successfully carry out. That he achieved it without a hitch at Veracruz is incredible. It seems deceptively easy to just sail to a spot and land, but it is in fact exceedingly problematic and commonly regarded as the most difficult operation in war. In this Scott may have a leg up on Wellington and even on Napoleon, who never conducted these types of operations.
I will end by pointing out that Scott was such a towering influence and monumental presence in the early history of the United States that he had a few namesakes. Winfield Scott Hancock became one of the great corps commanders of the Union Army during the Civil War, and Winfield Scott Schley was an important naval officer in the Spanish-American War.
Strangely enough, though, his name seems to have dropped off and hardly anyone remembers who he was or what he did. This is certainly not fair, because Winfield Scott must be counted among the greatest generals. The Duke of Wellington himself was enormously impressed by Scott's campaign in Mexico.
Scott deserves to be rehabilitated, especially since he had the moral courage to oppose slavery, and was anti-imperialist. Though how he squared this with the fact that he was himself the instrument of imperialist expansion is hard to comprehend. Every American should read this book.
So I read this in conjunction with Jack Bauer's monograph on the Mexican War, since Scott was a pivotal figure in that conflict.
But this book covers far more than just that war. It encompasses Scott's entire career from beginning to end. Interestingly he originally wanted to be a lawyer, but by the strange vagaries of fate found himself swept up in a military career.
The interesting thing about Scott is that though he was a towering physical presence, standing at 6'5," a height that would be impressive even today, but which must have been especially impressive in his own time, he was also a serious scholar who eagerly studied the art of war.
Johnson suggests that Scott was familiar with all of the French authors that so influenced Napoleon and were influenced by Napoleon, like Guibert, Folard, Jomini, etc. Scott learned to speak French fluently and had a traveling library accompany him on campaign.
What is fascinating here is that Johnson suggests that many standard studies of the US Civil War are flawed in that they assume the generals of that conflict read these works themselves, or were taught French tactics and strategy at West Point by Dennis Hart Mahan. But Johnson says that it's more likely that many of these generals learned these precepts indirectly through their experiences with Scott in Mexico.
Surely the Mexican War was a fundamental formative experience for many of these men, some one hundred of which are listed by Johnson in the endnotes.
But we're getting ahead of ourselves. Scott was really a brilliant soldier, who learned from experience as well as from study. For example after experiencing the difficulties of fighting on the defensive he chose to always take the offensive. This was Napoleon's idea too.
Many students of war like to quote Clausewitz in that the defensive is the stronger form of warfare. This is too simplistic, and I myself on reflection felt that there are a number of advantages that accrue to the offensive against which the defensive can have no answer.
One of these is initiative, which Scott saw clearly. He drove events and decided when and where and how his battles would be fought, and he was skillful enough to conduct them as he wanted them to be conducted.
His campaign in Mexico is really a masterpiece on so many levels, and it's incredible that it has been almost forgotten by the American public today.
Before starting this work I had drawn in my head some comparisons between Scott and MacArthur, and it's curious that on the back cover one of the reviewers refers to Scott as a nineteenth century MacArthur, though Johnson does not discuss this theme.
But both men were tall, of striking appearance, vainglorious, egotistic, and brilliant in their eccentric ways. Both were promoted to high rank at a young age.
Some time ago I found a thesis examining the landing at Vera Cruz as a nineteenth century D-Day (people like to retroject on Scott apparently), but keeping in line with this comparison would it not be better to suggest that Vera Cruz was a nineteenth century Inchon?
The similarities are very striking to me. This is especially fascinating for my own interests because both Scott and MacArthur were fully aware of the flexibility and advantages offered by seapower. Walton Walker's pinning the North Korean Army at Pusan to enable MacArthur's lethal blow at Inchon is very similar to how Taylor distracted Santa Anna and the Mexican Army while Scott carried out the mortal strike at Vera Cruz, using the sea to bypass all of the obstacles between the Rio Grande and Mexico City.
Also like MacArthur, Scott was often outnumbered and used skillful maneuver to dislodge a strongly entrenched opponent. I wonder if MacArthur even thought about Scott while he was in New Guinea.
One might suggest here that their triumphs have also been largely forgotten. A number of works refer to the Korean War as America's forgotten war, and the Mexican War is even more so.
But these conflicts have much to teach. I especially appreciated Johnson's in-depth explanation of how Scott managed to pacify Mexico and prevent a guerrilla war like the one in Spain under Napoleon. Scott treated the Mexicans with respect and severely punished American transgressors.
Another factor that went a long way towards disarming any possible revolt was that the Americans paid for supplies with ready money. Wellington argued that the French would fail in Spain because they would seize supplies from the population, which was barely above subsistence level as it was, so that the Spanish would be driven to either resisting or starving to death. This was not a problem in Mexico where the Americans did not requisition supplies but bought them.
This is never really explicitly mentioned in the text, but it's also curious how often the Mexicans welcomed the Americans, due to, I suspect, weak nationalist sentiments at the time.
Mexico was still a young state and was still largely decentralized. Many of her components did not feel much loyalty to the central government, and Santa Anna has always been an ambiguous and polarizing figure in Mexican history. Even at the time many Mexicans were not fans of the general.
So as a result, the Mexican people did not put up as much resistance as they might have had they been more nationally conscious. This was a great advantage for Scott who could rely on supplies from friendly Mexicans and a secure line of communications.
Johnson mentions an extraordinary moment when the people of Mexico City even proposed to make Scott their protector, which highlights this theory of a subdued nationalist consciousness.
It would be interesting to contrast this with the French invasion a few decades later. Did the French requisition supplies? Was the idea of a Mexican nation a stronger sentiment among the population in the 1860s? What is clear is that the Mexicans put up much greater popular resistance to France than to the US, reasons for which we could propose such as the above. But I have not studied the French operations so I cannot do more than make some tentative guesses here.
Above all the lesson is that Scott recognized the truism in Clausewitz's dictum that war is policy by other means. He sought to limit the destruction and always tried to rely on diplomacy.
We see this in early episodes like the Aroostook War, and with Bleeding Kansas. Scott earned a reputation as a master negotiator, and he put this to good use in Mexico where he limited bloodshed and compelled Mexico's defeat through a combination of skillful diplomacy and military strategy.
This sort of limited war as practiced by Scott could teach the American Government quite a lot today.
Scott was a great fan of the French military and tried to increase professionalization, and here this must be considered his greatest failure. He wanted to create a European style army but the Americans were not amenable to the puff and pageantry and the regalia and hierarchy.
They preferred the gruff and democratic style of men like Zachary Taylor and Andrew Jackson. Scott thus lost the presidency to these men because he was too elitist and unable to connect with the common man.
In this he, again, resembles MacArthur. Arrogant and superior and pretentious. People respected his talents but few liked him as a person. This was and is crucial in a democratic society when running for positions of leadership.
The last thing we could say is that Johnson argued McClellan's Peninsular Campaign was an attempt to reproduce Scott's success at Vera Cruz, and Johnson goes into some detail about comparing McClellan and Scott in terms of personality and command style.
But McClellan fell short because he lacked Scott's boldness and confidence. Scott had become the grand old man of the army by the time of Vera Cruz and had gained much wisdom. He pressed the attack home, to its conclusion. McClellan never seemed to grasp what Scott did, that you have to drive your opponent, keep him off balance.
Instead McClellan dithered and was badly defeated by Lee at Seven Pines. This might have happened to Scott in Mexico had he been a less able general, or had another general been in command. Johnson frequently disparages Taylor during the Mexican War, for example, saying he was certainly no Winfield Scott.
Some problems I could mention are that Scott was opposed to immigration, and while he was anti-imperialist in that he did not wish to acquire territory from Mexico, this was less because of any sense of morality and more because he did not want Mexicans in the Union. There is thus this underlying current of Anglo supremacy and racism towards Hispanics (and others) to be found in Scott's worldview.
Scott is nonetheless a very impressive military figure because he was forced to use militia and volunteers, which are always of lower quality than regulars. I have a growing respect for American generals because in Europe armies are usually very efficiently structured in peacetime while in the US they have to be improvised at the outset of war. This poses unique challenges to American military leaders and Scott was wise enough to know the limitations of his men, which inspired the Anaconda Plan for instance.
Scott was virtually the only voice of reason in Washington on the outbreak of the American Civil War. He predicted that it would be very difficult and time-consuming to reconquer the South, he was strongly opposed to any invasion of Virginia and castigated himself as a coward for not opposing Bull Run.
Like MacArthur, he was also skilled at combined operations and amphibious operations. These are very difficult to conduct and successfully carry out. That he achieved it without a hitch at Veracruz is incredible. It seems deceptively easy to just sail to a spot and land, but it is in fact exceedingly problematic and commonly regarded as the most difficult operation in war. In this Scott may have a leg up on Wellington and even on Napoleon, who never conducted these types of operations.
I will end by pointing out that Scott was such a towering influence and monumental presence in the early history of the United States that he had a few namesakes. Winfield Scott Hancock became one of the great corps commanders of the Union Army during the Civil War, and Winfield Scott Schley was an important naval officer in the Spanish-American War.
Strangely enough, though, his name seems to have dropped off and hardly anyone remembers who he was or what he did. This is certainly not fair, because Winfield Scott must be counted among the greatest generals. The Duke of Wellington himself was enormously impressed by Scott's campaign in Mexico.
Scott deserves to be rehabilitated, especially since he had the moral courage to oppose slavery, and was anti-imperialist. Though how he squared this with the fact that he was himself the instrument of imperialist expansion is hard to comprehend. Every American should read this book.
June 27, 2026
Why is General Winfield Scott so chronically underrated? Anyone mulling the pantheon of U.S. military leaders needs to come to grips with this issue.
It cannot be because Scott was a bad general. One of the, if perhaps even the, greatest practitioners of maneuver warfare in American history, Scott's amphibious landing at Veracruz built to a detached maneuver campaign that led to the occupation of Mexico City 250 miles inland with remarkably few casualties (given the objective). This was the first large expeditionary military campaign in U.S. history and it was blindingly successful -- rivaling or exceeding the maneuver feats of MacArthur and Patton. Like Washington, he was a notable stickler for health and sanitation among his troops, avoiding mass degradation of his forces in Mexico, New Orleans, Florida, and Canada; his attention to strict discipline and fair treatment of the Mexican population (in the context of an occupying force - as he personally opposed the war's policy aims but implemented them with skill) successfully headed off the type of mass insurgency that destroyed Napoleon in the Peninsular War; and even in his twilight he bequeathed Plan Anaconda, the broad strategic outline that won the Civil War, upon the Lincoln administration.
Was it his well known arrogance and outsized media profile? That is the common argument, but MacArthur, Patton, and Admiral Halsey, too, were known for such antics while their quieter brethren such as Bradley and Spruance often received less approbation. MacArthur clashed directly with the White House yet is still remembered fondly, while Scott's similar clashes with the Polk administration -- which worried that he might become a political rival -- led them to build up Zachary Taylor as "Old Rough and Ready" and tar Scott in comparison using the nickname that is the only thing many remember about him, "Old Fuss and Feathers."
Nor was Scott lacking in lasting institutional influence on the structure, culture, and ethos of the U.S. military. He essentially built the officer corps system that superseded the militia-based Army which had failed spectacularly during the War of 1812, wrote the first uniform doctrinal standards, and is credited with bringing the U.S. military up to contemporary standards such that by the early decades of the nineteenth century they could go toe-to-toe directly with any European force. In doctrine, he institutionalized early preferences for unit initiative and maneuver that belie some twentieth century criticisms of "mechanical" or "centralized" Napoleonic-era thinking. Indeed, Scott's incredibly long tenure virtually allowed him to define what the U.S. Army was and how it worked. With five decades as one of its three general officers and then General of the Army -- stretching all the way to the opening days of the Civil War -- through half a century of its adolescent years, the U.S. military literally grew up under Scott's tutelage. Nearly the entire cast of famous Civil War officers on both sides of the conflict, from Grant to Lee to Longstreet, served under Scott during his Mexico campaign.
And perhaps that in itself was the problem. The nineteenth century organization of the military Services and the Department of War contained no up-or-out requirements of the kind that currently cap all officers' tenures, poorly defined lines of authority regarding the civilian chain of command vs. the role of a General of the Army, and shockingly few limitations on political involvement in an era where famous generals were regularly drafted as presidential standard-bearers. Scott was so dominant for such an extensive period -- in administrations of both parties that treated party membership as a factor in military decision-making -- that his clashes with the political system, infighting with other generals and civilians, conflicts of interest, cultural distance from modern political standards, and petty grievances magnified over time in a way that would not have occurred if he were not such a dominant figure for so long. The very fact that he was allowed to remain General of the Army while running for president as a major party nominee and then continued in his official role under the administration he had run against is enough to make a modern policymaker's skin crawl.
Of course, accounts of Scott emphasize that he was known to be kind of a jerk, a terrible speechmaker, vain, and a number of other oft repeated sins -- but it is notable that those faults have somehow grown so large as to occlude his military achievements in the public mind. These are the kinds of reactions people have to a presidential candidate of their own party who they so associate with losing that they don't want to hear about what they have to say on any subject. Why do we need your book tour? Just go away! And he was indeed that kind of politician -- a big deal, remembered as a buzzkill that ultimately didn't make it over the top. Yet it is also mind-boggling to consider that he was subject to the kinds of negative campaign attacks that a presidential candidate receives while still functioning as the equivalent of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs -- hardly conducive to a clearheaded freestanding assessment of a military career.
For those reasons, Johnson's biography is valuable. Compared to many other military leaders, few judicious biographies of Scott exist, and observers are sometimes repelled by the fact that some are hagiographies written with unbalanced mien. This is the book you want to read. Johnson's volume builds on archival sources that were not available for those studies and explicitly strives for a broader look at both his successes and his character flaws. And it is a career that is worth, at least, a second look.
It cannot be because Scott was a bad general. One of the, if perhaps even the, greatest practitioners of maneuver warfare in American history, Scott's amphibious landing at Veracruz built to a detached maneuver campaign that led to the occupation of Mexico City 250 miles inland with remarkably few casualties (given the objective). This was the first large expeditionary military campaign in U.S. history and it was blindingly successful -- rivaling or exceeding the maneuver feats of MacArthur and Patton. Like Washington, he was a notable stickler for health and sanitation among his troops, avoiding mass degradation of his forces in Mexico, New Orleans, Florida, and Canada; his attention to strict discipline and fair treatment of the Mexican population (in the context of an occupying force - as he personally opposed the war's policy aims but implemented them with skill) successfully headed off the type of mass insurgency that destroyed Napoleon in the Peninsular War; and even in his twilight he bequeathed Plan Anaconda, the broad strategic outline that won the Civil War, upon the Lincoln administration.
Was it his well known arrogance and outsized media profile? That is the common argument, but MacArthur, Patton, and Admiral Halsey, too, were known for such antics while their quieter brethren such as Bradley and Spruance often received less approbation. MacArthur clashed directly with the White House yet is still remembered fondly, while Scott's similar clashes with the Polk administration -- which worried that he might become a political rival -- led them to build up Zachary Taylor as "Old Rough and Ready" and tar Scott in comparison using the nickname that is the only thing many remember about him, "Old Fuss and Feathers."
Nor was Scott lacking in lasting institutional influence on the structure, culture, and ethos of the U.S. military. He essentially built the officer corps system that superseded the militia-based Army which had failed spectacularly during the War of 1812, wrote the first uniform doctrinal standards, and is credited with bringing the U.S. military up to contemporary standards such that by the early decades of the nineteenth century they could go toe-to-toe directly with any European force. In doctrine, he institutionalized early preferences for unit initiative and maneuver that belie some twentieth century criticisms of "mechanical" or "centralized" Napoleonic-era thinking. Indeed, Scott's incredibly long tenure virtually allowed him to define what the U.S. Army was and how it worked. With five decades as one of its three general officers and then General of the Army -- stretching all the way to the opening days of the Civil War -- through half a century of its adolescent years, the U.S. military literally grew up under Scott's tutelage. Nearly the entire cast of famous Civil War officers on both sides of the conflict, from Grant to Lee to Longstreet, served under Scott during his Mexico campaign.
And perhaps that in itself was the problem. The nineteenth century organization of the military Services and the Department of War contained no up-or-out requirements of the kind that currently cap all officers' tenures, poorly defined lines of authority regarding the civilian chain of command vs. the role of a General of the Army, and shockingly few limitations on political involvement in an era where famous generals were regularly drafted as presidential standard-bearers. Scott was so dominant for such an extensive period -- in administrations of both parties that treated party membership as a factor in military decision-making -- that his clashes with the political system, infighting with other generals and civilians, conflicts of interest, cultural distance from modern political standards, and petty grievances magnified over time in a way that would not have occurred if he were not such a dominant figure for so long. The very fact that he was allowed to remain General of the Army while running for president as a major party nominee and then continued in his official role under the administration he had run against is enough to make a modern policymaker's skin crawl.
Of course, accounts of Scott emphasize that he was known to be kind of a jerk, a terrible speechmaker, vain, and a number of other oft repeated sins -- but it is notable that those faults have somehow grown so large as to occlude his military achievements in the public mind. These are the kinds of reactions people have to a presidential candidate of their own party who they so associate with losing that they don't want to hear about what they have to say on any subject. Why do we need your book tour? Just go away! And he was indeed that kind of politician -- a big deal, remembered as a buzzkill that ultimately didn't make it over the top. Yet it is also mind-boggling to consider that he was subject to the kinds of negative campaign attacks that a presidential candidate receives while still functioning as the equivalent of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs -- hardly conducive to a clearheaded freestanding assessment of a military career.
For those reasons, Johnson's biography is valuable. Compared to many other military leaders, few judicious biographies of Scott exist, and observers are sometimes repelled by the fact that some are hagiographies written with unbalanced mien. This is the book you want to read. Johnson's volume builds on archival sources that were not available for those studies and explicitly strives for a broader look at both his successes and his character flaws. And it is a career that is worth, at least, a second look.
December 12, 2024
Timothy Johnson produced an extremely well-written biography on Gen. Winfield Scott, likely the best Scott biography on the market.
Read
January 18, 2016Worth reading for those interested in U.S. military and political history.
On a personal level, I have photocopies of letters that a maternal ancestor exchanged with Winfield Scott when Scott was considering a run for the White House.
On a personal level, I have photocopies of letters that a maternal ancestor exchanged with Winfield Scott when Scott was considering a run for the White House.
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