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Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg
For almost 100 years, analysis of the Gettysburg Campaign has centered around an oversimplified view of Confederate general Robert E. Lee's goals for the battle. Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg presents a provocative new theory regarding Lee's true tactical objectives during this pivotal battle of the American Civil War.
168 pages, Kindle Edition
First published July 1, 2003
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July 3, 2021
Troy Harman's Study Of Gettysburg
From the moment of its conclusion, the Battle of Gettysburg has provoked endless controversy regarding its significance, the plans and strategies employed by the armies, the tactics, and the reasons for the result. It has been said that if a reader doesn't like a particular account of the battle, it is only necessary to read on to find a more appealing version.
Troy Harman is a historian and a ranger with the National Park Service at Gettysburg. He has intimate familiarity with the Battlefield and a thorough grasp of the literature on the Battle. In his book, "Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg" (2003), Mr. Harman takes issue with what he terms the "affirmed version" of the Battle and offers what he believes to be a new and competing account. His account is well and lucidly presented and will provoke thought among students.
Mr. Harman argues that most students of the Battle have tended to focus on the details of the three days of fighting and have failed to understand the plan that the Confederate commander, Robert E. Lee, developed for the Battle and pursued during its entirety. According to Mr. Harman, Lee's focus throughout was on the heights of Cemetery Hill on the Union right. At the conclusion of the first day's fighting, the Confederates did not attempt to capture Cemetery Hill. But in the second day of fighting on the Union left, (Little Round Top, primarily) and in Pickett's Charge on the third day, the objective of Lee's plans, Mr. Harman maintains, was Cemetery Hill, due to its height, its control of the town and roads, and its vulnerability as a salient exposed to potential attack on three sides.
This is a challenging claim, particularly as it involves the second day of the Battle. Mr. Harmon argues that Longstreet's troops were to advance along the Emmitsburg Road, which essentially parallels the Union line and take Cemetery Hill, giving only slight attention to Little Round Top. Mr. Harmon argues that the objective of Pickett's famous charge on day 3 was Zeigler's grove on the right of the Union line rather than the more famous Angle and Copse of Trees.
There is a great deal to be learned from this, and from any attempt to revisit a received and too comfortably accepted account. But I think Mr. Harman tends to overemphasize the originality of his approach and to type-cast the account with which he takes issue. The basic points in Mr. Harman's approach, involving the alleged importance of Little Round Top, the advance of the Third Corps of the Union Army to the Peach Orchard, and the focus of Pickett's Charge have been addressed by many writers. These points are and will remain highly controversial, and Mr. Harman's understanding of each of them is shared with (and also disputed by) many other scholars. Mr. Harman's primary claim -- the importance of Cemetery Hill -- has also been addressed in a slightly different way in a book called "Last Chance for Victory" by Bowden and Ward which likewise challenges the received account of Gettysburg.
Mr. Harman also is too quick, I think, in forulating his understanding of the "affirmed version" of Gettysburg. Most of the accounts of the battle I have read take a more nuanced view than that indicated in Mr Harman's summations. They recognize, I think, the changing nature of the Battle and the choices these changes forced on commanders North and South. Lee does seem to me to have ordered a charge up the Emmitsburg Road, based on the faulty information he had about the size and position of the Union troops, but this plan had to change on the spot when Longstreet discovered the location of Sickles and his third Corps. Pickett's charge on the third day may well have had Zeigler's grove as its objective, but the fact remains that the Southern attack crested at the Copse of Trees, thus entitling it to its reputation as the "High Water Mark".
Mr Harman has taken a fresh, lively approach to the Battle which taught me a great deal and which will inspire the interested reader to learn more. It will instill in the reader a sense of fluidity and a reluctance to dogmatize over significant historical events.
Robin Friedman
From the moment of its conclusion, the Battle of Gettysburg has provoked endless controversy regarding its significance, the plans and strategies employed by the armies, the tactics, and the reasons for the result. It has been said that if a reader doesn't like a particular account of the battle, it is only necessary to read on to find a more appealing version.
Troy Harman is a historian and a ranger with the National Park Service at Gettysburg. He has intimate familiarity with the Battlefield and a thorough grasp of the literature on the Battle. In his book, "Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg" (2003), Mr. Harman takes issue with what he terms the "affirmed version" of the Battle and offers what he believes to be a new and competing account. His account is well and lucidly presented and will provoke thought among students.
Mr. Harman argues that most students of the Battle have tended to focus on the details of the three days of fighting and have failed to understand the plan that the Confederate commander, Robert E. Lee, developed for the Battle and pursued during its entirety. According to Mr. Harman, Lee's focus throughout was on the heights of Cemetery Hill on the Union right. At the conclusion of the first day's fighting, the Confederates did not attempt to capture Cemetery Hill. But in the second day of fighting on the Union left, (Little Round Top, primarily) and in Pickett's Charge on the third day, the objective of Lee's plans, Mr. Harman maintains, was Cemetery Hill, due to its height, its control of the town and roads, and its vulnerability as a salient exposed to potential attack on three sides.
This is a challenging claim, particularly as it involves the second day of the Battle. Mr. Harmon argues that Longstreet's troops were to advance along the Emmitsburg Road, which essentially parallels the Union line and take Cemetery Hill, giving only slight attention to Little Round Top. Mr. Harmon argues that the objective of Pickett's famous charge on day 3 was Zeigler's grove on the right of the Union line rather than the more famous Angle and Copse of Trees.
There is a great deal to be learned from this, and from any attempt to revisit a received and too comfortably accepted account. But I think Mr. Harman tends to overemphasize the originality of his approach and to type-cast the account with which he takes issue. The basic points in Mr. Harman's approach, involving the alleged importance of Little Round Top, the advance of the Third Corps of the Union Army to the Peach Orchard, and the focus of Pickett's Charge have been addressed by many writers. These points are and will remain highly controversial, and Mr. Harman's understanding of each of them is shared with (and also disputed by) many other scholars. Mr. Harman's primary claim -- the importance of Cemetery Hill -- has also been addressed in a slightly different way in a book called "Last Chance for Victory" by Bowden and Ward which likewise challenges the received account of Gettysburg.
Mr. Harman also is too quick, I think, in forulating his understanding of the "affirmed version" of Gettysburg. Most of the accounts of the battle I have read take a more nuanced view than that indicated in Mr Harman's summations. They recognize, I think, the changing nature of the Battle and the choices these changes forced on commanders North and South. Lee does seem to me to have ordered a charge up the Emmitsburg Road, based on the faulty information he had about the size and position of the Union troops, but this plan had to change on the spot when Longstreet discovered the location of Sickles and his third Corps. Pickett's charge on the third day may well have had Zeigler's grove as its objective, but the fact remains that the Southern attack crested at the Copse of Trees, thus entitling it to its reputation as the "High Water Mark".
Mr Harman has taken a fresh, lively approach to the Battle which taught me a great deal and which will inspire the interested reader to learn more. It will instill in the reader a sense of fluidity and a reluctance to dogmatize over significant historical events.
Robin Friedman
January 18, 2024
This book posits an intriguing question; what if Lee's objective at Gettysburg wasn't Little Round Top?
What if it was Cemetery Hill instead? The author makes a very compelling argument supporting this thesis. Along the way he tackles other related matters, but the Cemetery Hill argument remains front and center. If you were raised on books by Glenn Tucker and the old school Gettysburg intelligentsia, this book is definitely nearly heretical to that school of thought. But maybe we need to reappraise our historic interpretation of Gettysburg. This book certainly does that, and it brings up more questions than it answers.
What if it was Cemetery Hill instead? The author makes a very compelling argument supporting this thesis. Along the way he tackles other related matters, but the Cemetery Hill argument remains front and center. If you were raised on books by Glenn Tucker and the old school Gettysburg intelligentsia, this book is definitely nearly heretical to that school of thought. But maybe we need to reappraise our historic interpretation of Gettysburg. This book certainly does that, and it brings up more questions than it answers.
March 4, 2025
This analysis is a must read for anyone studying the events that unfolded at Gettysburg. The author presents a very compelling case, based on multiple sources, that Cemetery Hill was Lee's main objective.
Additionally, I highly recommend this as a companion piece should you travel to the battlefield. It is a fast read, and being able to reference the text while standing on the battlefield provides eye-opening context. It is difficult for anyone who has not walked the battlefield to understand the terrain, the points of interest, and open space involved.
I found myself agreeing with Harman's main conclusions as they simply make logical, strategical sense. As he points out, Cemetery Hill's strategic importance to the Union has been overshadowed by Lincoln's most famous address. The copse of trees have become an immortal shrine to the "high watermark of the rebellion;" a line that is still used on tours today. Longstreet and Sickles who've both received overblown criticism have led to the focus on strategically unimportant parts of the battlefield. Lastly, the true purpose of Pickett's Charge has been lost to time.
Those pivotal days in early July have been tainted by post-event recollections and suggestions by nearly everyone left alive to share their story. While the black powder filled air has cleared long ago, a cloud of mystery and mythology lingers over America's most prominent battleground.
Additionally, I highly recommend this as a companion piece should you travel to the battlefield. It is a fast read, and being able to reference the text while standing on the battlefield provides eye-opening context. It is difficult for anyone who has not walked the battlefield to understand the terrain, the points of interest, and open space involved.
I found myself agreeing with Harman's main conclusions as they simply make logical, strategical sense. As he points out, Cemetery Hill's strategic importance to the Union has been overshadowed by Lincoln's most famous address. The copse of trees have become an immortal shrine to the "high watermark of the rebellion;" a line that is still used on tours today. Longstreet and Sickles who've both received overblown criticism have led to the focus on strategically unimportant parts of the battlefield. Lastly, the true purpose of Pickett's Charge has been lost to time.
Those pivotal days in early July have been tainted by post-event recollections and suggestions by nearly everyone left alive to share their story. While the black powder filled air has cleared long ago, a cloud of mystery and mythology lingers over America's most prominent battleground.
July 26, 2023
The battle goes on.
March 26, 2019
This short 152-page book takes the reader on a completely different tour of a subject that seems very familiar to us. Of course, I am talking about the most famous battle of the Civil War at Gettysburg on July 1-3rd of 1863. There have been many books written about Gettysburg, a famous novel followed by a movie and the Gettysburg Address is etched in American history. We are familiar with heroics of the 7th Maine at Little Round Top and the ultimate failure of Pickett’s Charge which doomed the Confederacy. But what if our basic understanding of the battle is wrong? What if we are missing the actual story of how the battle actually unfolded? This is precisely what Troy Harman is arguing in “Lee’s Real Plan at Gettysburg”.
Harman makes a strong effort to distinguish between the “affirmed” version of the event and the actual event that took place. The “affirmed” event is the version of the battle that has gone into the history books and has been repeated over and over so that we all accept it as gospel truth. The actual version of the battle is much more fleeting; many of the men that fought there were killed or died of their wounds. The survivors may only know about their part of the battle and may only put their memories into writing many years later. The victor’s version usually prevails and the story that gets into the newspaper first is accepted more readily. All of these facts and the ever-changing landscape of Gettysburg seemingly worked together to obscure the actual battle.
Harman puts his case together carefully and his book is based on both historical information from and after the battle. His main premise is that Lee had one plan at Gettysburg and that was to dislodge the Union army from Cemetery Hill. All three days of Confederate attacks were based on this main purpose and each attack failed for a variety of reasons. This version of Gettysburg minimizes the most dramatic scene of the battle that have been burned into history: Little Round Top and also forces us to re-evaluate the actual target of Pickett’s charge. He puts his case together carefully, drawing upon existing documents, drawings and maps and pointing out that many of the features of the battlefield had been changed before the affirmed version was accepted. Harman also notes that there is a shortage of reports from the battle because so many of the Confederate officers were killed during the battle. Is Harman correct or not? Will we ever know for sure? Probably not, but this book is certainly worth reading as it looks into the “why?” instead of just the “what?” about these monumental three days in American history.
Harman makes a strong effort to distinguish between the “affirmed” version of the event and the actual event that took place. The “affirmed” event is the version of the battle that has gone into the history books and has been repeated over and over so that we all accept it as gospel truth. The actual version of the battle is much more fleeting; many of the men that fought there were killed or died of their wounds. The survivors may only know about their part of the battle and may only put their memories into writing many years later. The victor’s version usually prevails and the story that gets into the newspaper first is accepted more readily. All of these facts and the ever-changing landscape of Gettysburg seemingly worked together to obscure the actual battle.
Harman puts his case together carefully and his book is based on both historical information from and after the battle. His main premise is that Lee had one plan at Gettysburg and that was to dislodge the Union army from Cemetery Hill. All three days of Confederate attacks were based on this main purpose and each attack failed for a variety of reasons. This version of Gettysburg minimizes the most dramatic scene of the battle that have been burned into history: Little Round Top and also forces us to re-evaluate the actual target of Pickett’s charge. He puts his case together carefully, drawing upon existing documents, drawings and maps and pointing out that many of the features of the battlefield had been changed before the affirmed version was accepted. Harman also notes that there is a shortage of reports from the battle because so many of the Confederate officers were killed during the battle. Is Harman correct or not? Will we ever know for sure? Probably not, but this book is certainly worth reading as it looks into the “why?” instead of just the “what?” about these monumental three days in American history.
April 20, 2024
A real valuable piece of revisionism that refocuses the attention at Gettysburg away from Little Round Top and the copse of trees on Cemetery Ridge toward the bend in the “fishhook“ at Cemetery Hill. Harman makes a convincing case that Lee’s objective at Gettysburg was to collapse the salient in the union line at Cemetery Hill, which explains his actions on July 2 and 3. Since this book’s publication this has become much more widely accepted by historians, though many myths still endure in the general public.
While I do disagree with some of his interpretations, particularly those related to Sickles’s actions on July 2 and Longstreet’s performance, he supports his main points with solid bits of evidence that are often overlooked in Gettysburg scholarship. I will say that this is probably an essay that was expanded about as far as it could be, but I found it to be a much more readable than his other book, All Roads Led to Gettysburg. Also, I wish he had dealt a little more directly with the existing historiography. He does mention a few works in the introduction, and occasionally will reference a previously written books such as Harry Pfanz’s Gettysburg: The Second Day and Carol Reardon’s Pickett Charge in History and Memory.
While I do disagree with some of his interpretations, particularly those related to Sickles’s actions on July 2 and Longstreet’s performance, he supports his main points with solid bits of evidence that are often overlooked in Gettysburg scholarship. I will say that this is probably an essay that was expanded about as far as it could be, but I found it to be a much more readable than his other book, All Roads Led to Gettysburg. Also, I wish he had dealt a little more directly with the existing historiography. He does mention a few works in the introduction, and occasionally will reference a previously written books such as Harry Pfanz’s Gettysburg: The Second Day and Carol Reardon’s Pickett Charge in History and Memory.
December 6, 2021
Visitors to the Gettysburg battlefield are drawn, as if by gravity itself, to certain sites: Little Round Top; the Copse of Trees; the fields of Pickett's Charge. Cemetery Hill, looming over much of the northern portion of the battlefield, may be missed, or simply acknowledged as the site of President Lincoln's powerful address. Troy Harman reverses course on years and years of Gettysburg historiography, arguing that General Robert E. Lee's master plan for Gettysburg was not Little Round Top or that clump of trees on Cemetery Ridge, but rather Cemetery Hill. Harman's book is quite "in the weeds" on these issues, but for Gettysburg and Civil War scholars, it is a refreshing bit of revisionism and an important reminder that Lee's true plan was not aimed at the flanks, but rather the northern salient of the Gettysburg battlefield. When Lee's plan is appreciated, the unimaginable slaughter and carnage of the three days of the battle are put into their proper context.
December 10, 2019
Disappointing, the author took an idea that would have been all right for an essay & tries to write a book around it, which doesn't quite work. The premise of the book is that Lee's plan on Day 2 & Day 3 of Gettysburg was to attack Cemetery Hill The logic works for Day 2--although I am not sure is particularly new news--but less so for Day 3. For anyone looking for new insights into Gettysburg, I much preferred Cory Pfarr's Longstreet at Gettysburg: A Critical Reassessment.
July 16, 2025
We met Troy on the battlefield just before this book was published. He only mentioned it in passing after the tour when he shared time for questions and answers. Was impressed with his expertise of what it was like for the soldiers and tactics at the time and enthralled with his book when it came out!
September 18, 2017
logically argued with evidence Lee's objective was Cemetery Hill throughout the battle rather than the Copse of Trees. I agree with the premise and argument but one question is why did the bulk of the day 3 fighting then occur at the Angle? not in front of cemetery hill?
Read
July 6, 2022More than any of the other (dozens ?) of books I've read on GETTYSBURG, this is more analytical than descriptive. It places Lee's actions and decisions in a broader context.
A must-read for the a GETTYSBURG fan.
Well done Mr Harman!
A must-read for the a GETTYSBURG fan.
Well done Mr Harman!
August 8, 2023
High praise for a short book
If this book had greater depth it would easily be 5 stars. It proceeds much too fast to absorb the overall battle plan. There are great details, and the book deserves to be read, but it should develop the thesis at far different pace.
If this book had greater depth it would easily be 5 stars. It proceeds much too fast to absorb the overall battle plan. There are great details, and the book deserves to be read, but it should develop the thesis at far different pace.
March 8, 2019
Very differant look at the battle and what the author believes the Lees battle plan was . Really has me looking at the confederates attack differently
January 1, 2020
A very unique perspective of Lee's plan on the third day. Thought provoking for sure. Not quite sure I agree with his take but worth considering.
September 11, 2020
Compelling read. A must have for anyone interested in the War of Northern Aggression.
January 12, 2024
What you learn is that you can interpret the battle in any one of a number of ways.
April 1, 2016
"No plan survives contact with the enemy." - Helmuth von Moltke the Elder
"Everybody has a plan until they get punched in the mouth." - Mike Tyson
Harman's book is a rambling affair meant for the expert. It explains that the battle of Gettysburg is best understood as Lee's attempt to gain Cemetery Hill. Harman unlocks the key to Lee's thinking and explains his plans for July 2 and in particular July 3. The other point, made indirectly, is that the plan was too complicated. It fell apart as the battle developed, the Union reacted, Lee's commanders failed to coordinate, and Lee failed to take a commanding role in overseeing the battle.
Harman's book is a return of sorts to an older understanding of the battle, where Meade's generalship is more suspect. I cannot swallow that Sickles' move to Peach Orchard saved the day. I understand why he did it but it still seems as a blunder; it destroyed III Corps. By the same token, Longstreet comes in for criticism, but Harman is careful not to take this too far. After all, by the time the book is done it is clear that Lee expected far too much.
Anyone interested in the details of the battle should read this flawed but enlightening take on the most famous and retold battle in American history. Hopefully this interpretation, and others, will be incorporated into a new comprehensive study of the campaign.
"Everybody has a plan until they get punched in the mouth." - Mike Tyson
Harman's book is a rambling affair meant for the expert. It explains that the battle of Gettysburg is best understood as Lee's attempt to gain Cemetery Hill. Harman unlocks the key to Lee's thinking and explains his plans for July 2 and in particular July 3. The other point, made indirectly, is that the plan was too complicated. It fell apart as the battle developed, the Union reacted, Lee's commanders failed to coordinate, and Lee failed to take a commanding role in overseeing the battle.
Harman's book is a return of sorts to an older understanding of the battle, where Meade's generalship is more suspect. I cannot swallow that Sickles' move to Peach Orchard saved the day. I understand why he did it but it still seems as a blunder; it destroyed III Corps. By the same token, Longstreet comes in for criticism, but Harman is careful not to take this too far. After all, by the time the book is done it is clear that Lee expected far too much.
Anyone interested in the details of the battle should read this flawed but enlightening take on the most famous and retold battle in American history. Hopefully this interpretation, and others, will be incorporated into a new comprehensive study of the campaign.
April 23, 2015
This short book questions the affirmed version of the battle of Gettysburg by calling into question the assumption that Lee attacked the flanks on July 2 and then shifted to the Union center on July 3. Using original source documents from both armies, analysis of the terrain, as well as an accounting of how the errors emerged, the author clearly explains that all of Lee's offensive actions on July 2-3 where directed at Cemetery Hill. Little Round Top and the Copse of Trees have been mistakenly canonized as strategic points on the battlefield, partially because most of the Confederate commanders died in this or subsequent battles and never wrote their account. Great read if you are already familiar with the battle.
December 20, 2010
This was a truly excellent book, a must read for any student of the battle. I appreciated the fact that the author did not spend time laying blame for the confederate failures, like most authors do, he is simply attempting to illustrate Lee's grand strategy throughout the second and third days of the battle despite the outcome. It's strange that a picture of that strategy is missing throughout most literature and memory of the battle. I have been studying this campaign and reading most everything I can get my hands on about it for most of my life and still the revelations revealed here have my head reeling about the true nature of the confederate moves throughout the battle.
June 18, 2013
I've studied and read about this battle, as well as visited many times, but this is the first time Lee's actions made sense. Prior to this reading, it always seems like Lee just threw everything at the wall and hoped something stuck. More desperation than the tremendous strategist we saw in previous battles. In fact, he looked feeble in many ways.
Troy dispersed all that and showed his true objective and his masterful attempts to win the war here. Ironically, Sickles...the vane political general...may have saved the Union. And Longstreet was not the brooding child that cost Lee the victory. One of the best books I've read this year on the civil War!
Troy dispersed all that and showed his true objective and his masterful attempts to win the war here. Ironically, Sickles...the vane political general...may have saved the Union. And Longstreet was not the brooding child that cost Lee the victory. One of the best books I've read this year on the civil War!
July 8, 2013
Outstanding groundbreaking text on the previously unwritten master plan of this pivotal battle. Contrary to the traditional story line, Lee did not accidentally fight at Gettysburg, he indeed had a plan that did not change over the three day conflict, the plan was to take Cemetery Hill, he did not change his plan, and Pickett was not supposed to make a suicidal attack on the heavily fortified center of the Union line at the copse of trees but instead was to guide obliquely to Cemetery Hill and ultimately converge with Ewell to crush the Union right flank. I had never heard this before and it is consistent with Lee's prior battle plans and the theories of Jomini.
November 9, 2009
Very good piece of work describing what Lee's true objective was during the three days of fighting at Gettysburg.
March 29, 2016
A superb work, real gem of a book. The entire history of the battle of Gettysburg will have to be re-written. Thank you Troy Harman!
June 8, 2015
Incredibly insightful, changed my perspective of the entire battle. Great read for anyone who wants to take a detailed look at this battle.
Displaying 1 - 24 of 24 reviews