This little jewel is more complete than a lot of books on video game history which have received more attention. That is not my usual bias with regard to books dealing with console game history. With regard to the history of SEGA, Service Games: The Rise and Fall of SEGA (available on Kindle) is far better than my own co-authored effort (High Score: An Illustrated History of Electronic Games) and similar generalist efforts. I found it more useful than Console Wars, even when they overlap.
I was delighted to have my prejudice confirmed that each generation of Japanese console has been sabotaged by an arrogance within the management of the previous top-dog. Although, as with Console Wars, it seemed like the narrative was written according to the memory of Tom Kalinske more than anyone else, the quotations and statistics quoted by Pettus seem more than sufficient to justify my…er…prejudice. I was rather surprised to see that the author was unfamiliar with the Milia Festival on Interactivity (held in Cannes near the first of the year around the turn of the millennium), calling it the Milla trade show (when it was really more of a conference or symposium on interactive software (multimedia) during the two years where I served on the Milia d’ Or jury for games or as a speaker). Nevertheless, I rather enjoyed the quotations from the gaming press where alleged journalists were completely taken in by press conferences and “dog and pony shows” (like Electronic Gaming Monthly’s Crispin Boyer as quoted on the SegaNet – not to be confused with the Sega Network on cable television).
The best part of this history of Sega is that it clearly demonstrates how losing developer support cost hardware companies the “war” (and still does!). Over and over, observers have noticed how arrogantly ignoring one’s developers creates havoc in the hardware’s future. Why did Nintendo beat out a superior PC Engine launch? “…two reasons for NEC's blunder. First, Nintendo had the best of the Japanese third-party software community happily signed up to its restrictive yet lucrative development contracts. Second, NEC's own stable of programmers were not yet up to speed on the full capabilities of their own system.” (p. 46) Indeed, knowing how important EA was to the fast Genesis launch in the U.S., it was surprising that the company failed to grant the following demand from Electronic Arts, as Bernie Stolar noted: “Larry came to me and said, 'Bernie, we'll do Dreamcast games, but we want sports exclusivity.'” (p. 315) Stolar said, “No!” One wonders if that was a critical miss. Gems such as this observation on the 2001 Tokyo Game Show simply have to stand out: “Sega may have had the public ear at the Tokyo Game Show, but Sony had the developers' support.” (p. 342)
I also had never really thought about the depiction of Sonic before. Sonic was simply a ubiquitous symbol of SEGA during the days I was covering the industry and I never asked the obvious question as to why coloration and appearance was so different from a real hedgehog. Like the rest of the universe, I surrendered my disbelief and didn’t realize: “He would be blue because that was the color of Sega's corporate logo. And as a round ball did not offer much visual impact, and quills could not be easily depicted on screen, he was given spiked hair. As he would be a fast character – and hedgehogs are not known for speed – he was given a pair of running shoes.” (pp. 60-61)
I chuckled, remembering how Nintendo double-crossed Sony by contracting them to develop a “Super Disc” drive for the SNES (to have been called SNES PlayStation) and shifted gears to Philips in order to have full control over its use. The war of words cited here should cover the gamut from Nintendo arrogance to Sony’s original naiveté: “"Nintendo believes in a standard – our standard," Yamauchi later said of the affair. Sony saw it differently. "They stabbed us in the back," Olaffson told one of his confidants.” (p. 182). The double-cross proved to be a near-fatal flaw as Sony took their PlayStation to great heights, well over the sales of Sega or Nintendo.
And I had forgotten that pornography helped 3DO survive a little longer than it might have, otherwise: “…a proliferation of Asian adult-themed software would help boost Far East 3DO sales toward respectable levels.” (p. 185)
But I hadn’t forgotten one of the big reasons for the failure of Sega at a time when they should have been killing the market with both legacy software for the Genesis and new releases for the Saturn. "The Japanese are making the decisions for the U.S. market," Kalinske later grumbled, "and they do not know what they are doing." (p. 192) In one sense, Kalinske’s alibi (quoted in other books, as well) is accurate, but even Kalinske wasn’t doing a good job of listening to U.S. developers at the time. Most developers believed that "working around Saturn's architecture" necessitated “a 25% drop in overall system efficiency due to shared resources, mitigating the benefits parallel processing was supposed bring.” (p. 193) The authors cite both Yu Suzuki of Sega and Peter Molyneaux (then, of Bullfrog) as stating that the only way to get comparable performance between the Sega Saturn and the Playstation was to code in pure assembler (p. 193).
And, as for the Dreamcast, “Surreal's Alan Patmore spoke for all in an interview with NextGen when he said, ’...Dreamcast will stick around until PlayStation 2 really makes its mark. I think it'll be the interim system. It's pretty hot right now.’" (p. 341) Once again, we return to the theme that a platform cannot succeed without developer support.
The Kindle version of the book that I have has an expanded section with factoids toward the end. My very favorite is this one: “…the Dreamcast is home to the most expensive-to-produce games made to date. Shenmue and Shenmue 2 cost more than $70 million at the time; Sega would have needed to sell two copies of each game for each Dreamcast sold, just to break even.” (p. 403)
For my purposes, Service Games: The Rise and Fall of Sega, is superior to most books on the subject because it has a sense of balance, not championing one system over another and not using any one source to the detriment of the others.