The Denial of Death straddles the line between astounding intellectual ambition and crackpot theorizing; it is a compendium of brilliant intellectual exercises that are more satisfying poetically than scientifically; it is a desperately self-oblivious and quasi-futile attempt to resurrect the ruins of Freudian psychoanalysis by re-defining certain parameters and ostensibly de-Freudianizing them; there is an unhealthy mixture of jaw-dropping recognition and eye-rolling recognition.
It is important to note, however, that it is grossly unfair to discredit the ingenuity of a vintage intellectual by holding discoveries and findings found post-mortem against him or her. A psychology professor who claims Freud is "an idiot" is, at best, simply being arrogant on a chronological technicality. Freud did not take into account all of that which had debunked, and his findings are so flagrantly untrue; of course, those debunkings occurred after Freud's death. Something about the fact that geniuses have to be omnipotent and stand outside a life narrative is ridiculous, and at best arrogant. At the end of the day Freud revolutionized thought and his myths has carried a heavy cultural resonance, and we can apologize for his after-the-fact falseness. But it is completely unfair to say he had not taken into account all the factors that could have by no means been available to him contemporarily, and so it goes for every genius. No one is a genius when taken out of context, and that's precisely the point of such masturbatory put-downs. Some assert superiority by tearing others down on balderdash presumptions; others gain it through luck; and the rare few gain it on demonstrable merit.
Becker takes great pains to resurrect Freudian thought by moving the focus of "sexual instinct" and placing it under the broader "terror of death." It's mostly an attempt to keep the structural integrity of psychoanalysis intact by retrofitting a new cornerstone. Becker and Freud are both susceptible to the same poetic fervor, bias, and penchant toward romanticizing certain ideas. Whereas Freud took his transcendental principle and squeezed every thought through a prism of sexual instinct, Becker wants to do likewise with fear of mortality. Everything down to "sexual perversions" like fetishism, sadomasochism, and - this is where the book feels dated even for 1973 - homosexuality are all put through the "here's why these exist due to the innate terror of death" schema. It's an intellectual reduction we've seen time and time again, where a certain mythos or belief system can be twisted and turned to accommodate just about everything because it's so rhetorically versatile. While it looks pretty good and is amusing on paper, it should rouse suspicion. The absence of scientific findings hear does likewise; even if this is meant to be a reader-friendly book, the lack of viable citations beyond summations of psychoanalytic theory seems methodically irresponsible.
My other hesitation is in the relentless way by which Becker employs metaphor as transcendent, a priori interpretation. He clearly believes that people think, in short hand, via grand, sweeping metaphors. In other words, projecting his grandiose symbolism onto the thoughts of others. Sometimes his dalliances with figuring out child psychology - the terror of the penis-less mother, or the first experience of total dependence being somewhat violated - are expressed in a metaphorical language, where this gesture "represents" this or "seems to" instill a fear of castration, or that viewing one's parents engaging in a "primal act" strips them of their symbolic, enduring representations and places them in a lowly, carnal context. The act subtly de-idolizes them and traumatizes the child, if one allows for the fact that people sub-consciously think in grandiose metaphors. Breasts represent this, the body symbolizes decay, the mind symbolizes bodily transcendence, etc., etc. But shouldn't these representations be more intuitive and well-ingrained if they just so happen to govern how childhood experience shapes us?
The other problem is Becker's penchant for dualisms: the life is a war between the body and the mind, the failure of reconciliation between the body and the self, that sex is the war between the acceptance and subversion of the body, that love is an internalized and externalized transcendence, etc., etc. Everything is balanced on linearly as a conflict between two disparate entities, or a war between dual things. This form of thinking I don't find particularly viable because it just reeks of the constraints human reason has to place on itself to find a semblance of truth, not the truth itself. The human mind - even according to Becker - has to reduce segments of the vastness of life into smaller, comprehensible fragments. Some behavioral scientists have posited that beyond the number three, humans process numbers relatively. We cannot process 1 million as a concrete number, but only as a contextual anchor against numbers greater or smaller. It is hazily and less concretely defined; beyond three, our brains become exhausted. It is why jokes stop after a priest, a minister, and a rabbi. I'm surprised Becker didn't catch himself falling into this own tendency in his own work. The human mind analyzing itself is a troublesome thing; it just seems that his propensity toward surrogates and representation, in addition to his tendency to parse things down to two dependent variables, are less indicative of psychological truth in principle, and more indicative of a psychological aphorism that can only be teased out once the brain takes its usual short-cuts and acts of its own nature. He didn't turn his evaluation on ideological reductiveness inward, and his argument stems from the same heuristics that he critiques in similarly broad terms.
The bits on character-traits as psychoses is just a marvelous section of the book, also, and even the over-the-top, rabid attempts to resuscicate Freudian thinking (e.g. anality as a desperate fear of the acknowledgment of the creatureliness of man and the awful horror that we turn life into excrement) are amusing even if they seem rabidly desperate or intellectually impoverished. The book ought to balled "The Denial of Freud's Death." It so desperately tries to keep the spirit of him alive, with varying degrees of success.
Even in its datedness, its contradictions, and its often unsatisfying or sensational resolutions, The Denial of Death is an excellent demonstration of intellectual heroics; of a man trying, as best he can, to grasp beyond the very limits of the human mind to get to a greater place. The tragedy is that he never quite transcends the unduly habits of an analytical mind, which is hardly to be expected. But it's always marvelous to read something that gives such an impression.
The book is amazing rhetoric, but when it says something like man needs to disown the fortress of the body, throw off the cultural constraints, assassinate his character-psychoses, and come face-to-face with the full-on majesty and chaos of nature in order to transcend, what says: this is rhetorically eloquent, but what does it mean to fully take-on the majesty of nature? Are we supposed to move back into the trees? Are we to run around naked in the woods and constantly think about our own passing? He never quite plans out an agenda for what the eschewing of cultural trappings for full immersion in cosmic oneness would look like. The book has its internal logic and it is good enough to have the opportunity to bear witness to it, but I am doubtful of much of its credibility. A lot of The Denial of Death is saturated in the abstracts of problem-solving; none of its resolutions, conclusions, or even symptoms seem actionable.
Sometimes I don't think it's the denial of death so much as the incomprehensibility of it. Our brains can't even process two people talking simultaneously because it is an over-ride of information intake. Is it really tenable to say that death has taken in and repressed all the majesty and terror of a despairing and lonely, temporary existence? This probably gives the mind too much credit. Or is it more realistic to say that such a wide, cosmic void is perhaps greater than Freudian schematics? Maybe since we can't really look beyond three, stop mistaking metaphor for fundamental truth, or can't stop thinking in dualisms or can't hear more than two people once, we can't find the transcendence because of our own machine-based limitations. Much of what we are meant to be able to take-on fully to confront death and thrive in life is beyond our cognitive capacities. I believe there is repression, but psychology also tells us that the brain must - and does - filter its input. We can't pay attention to a whole scene, or focus on more than one thing, or hear more than such and such thing; I don't believe this is a sub-conscious device meant to save us from the throes of death; I just believe that evolution is stingy enough to grant humans the necessities to function and (at the very least) genetically propagate. It hardly seems necessary to give humans the omniscience to take on the full reality of its predicament. Instead it's given enough to simply go on, erm, living?
So, at the end of the day, I'm not sure The Denial of Death is much more than a grandiose attempt at fitting the grand scheme of things into a more digestible scheme of, yes, it all comes from a fear of dying. But for anyone who can acknowledge the distortions in one's own thinking and the limits of input processing with a brain, such a statement seems reductive, and well, too convenient and un-complicated. This is why it is often backed up with inconvenient and complicated scraps. While I do believe The Denial of Death is valuable because some people may be living under this schematic, it's best to read this as a possibility for some thinking, not as a blanket humanity statement. It's a good guidepost to do some back-of-the-envelope psycho-calculation, but it's just not committed enough to its own purported vastness to be worth much beyond that.
Anxiety, it says, is the dissonance some people feel because their confidence in their invincibility - the delusion given to some with self- esteem - is shaky. It's a natural response to the predicament of self-aware mortality. This is too metaphorical. Anxiety stems from imagined fantasies that have not coalesced into existence; does the brain's penchant for supposition and that subsequent worry really come from that? Given how much self-spun fiction creates worry and sadness...I'm not sure. It's not that I can wholly discredit Becker; I just feel that any categorical imperative is probably not able to grasp the full spectrum of complicating factors. The spidey-sense is triggered at any point objectivity declares carte blanche privileges over subjectivity.
The Denial of Death is a fantastic, provocative, and possibly life-changing read, but just so as an ambitious attempt; a pleasurable intellectual food-for-thought exercise. A valiant attempt, but again, some people kill themselves, and some people fetishize excrement. What of them, Becker? What of them?