Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey II's 1962 Seven Days in May takes place in a world just a decade from its time of writing, not too long after the United States fought the Communist invaders to a draw in a then-contemporary Shah-type Iran. "[T]he partition of that country was the blackest mark in American diplomatic history," causing a "top-heavy majority" of angry voters to sink the reelection bid of "Republican President Edgar Frazier in the 1972 election" (1963 Bantam paperback, page 15).
The current President is Democrat Jordan Lyman, whose stirring speech promised, "We will talk till eternity, but we will never yield an inch of free soil, any place, any time" (page 15). The thing is, though, now Lyman is in hot water, with polls showing only 29% approval after he has "forced" a new disarmament treaty "through the Senate with only two votes to spare over the required two-thirds majority" (page 25). And this treaty is a doozy--high-minded and ambitious, yet fraught with peril.
In this once-near future, the superpowers' deterrent weapon is the "neutron bomb," which from the early year of writing I take to be a simply a new super-duper type of nuclear weapon, as opposed to the enhanced radiation bombs with much lower blast yields that became controversial in our real-life 1980s. In any event, on July 1st both the United States and the Soviet Union,
"under the eyes of Indian and Finnish inspectors, [are] to dismantle ten neutron bombs. Each month more bombs would be dismantled, not only by Russia and the United States, but also by the other Western and Communist nuclear powers. All of them, including Red China, had subsequently ratified the treaty. The process would continue until the nuclear lockers of both East and West were bare. The target date for completion was two years hence." (page 25-26)
Neat trick, huh?
Obviously, even in our own world of mature satellite reconnaissance 60-odd years later, such a treaty could not be monitored without on-site inspections, but...oh, well. At the Washington cocktail-party assertion that "if Russia reneges or cheats, we know it immediately and the deal is off" (page 26), I guess we just have to shrug here. Certainly other party guests do not, however, with an influential Senator grumbling that "[t]he last time" such logic was used, it "was supposed to settle the Iran business," and yet "[s]ix months later the country was flooded with Soviet guerrillas and now we're left with two Irans, one of them Communist" (page 26).
So the treaty has tanked Lyman's popularity, and the country is "in a sullen mood," "apprehensive over the treaty" and "wary" of being left open to a surprise attack, "angered" by a labor strike at the California missile plant that should be producing the new ballistic missile needed in case the treaty fails, and "worried about unemployment and inflation" (page 2). There also is discontent throughout the military at the way "pay and prestige" have been "whittled away" and "half the fringe benefits [are] gone" (page 19), not to mention distrust of a President who, as the pugnacious Senator asserts, "negotiated this treaty in defiance of the facts of life" (page 26).
The Joint Chiefs of Staff had argued strongly against the new disarmament treaty prior to ratification, believing it especially "too vague on the question of the inspection of new nuclear construction" (page 113). And although the Chair of the Joint Chiefs himself, General "Gentleman Jim" Scott of the Air Force, highly decorated and "by all odds the most popular figure in uniform and probably in the United States" (page 6), a man with "Eisenhower's warm personality and appealing grin, plus MacArthur's brilliant mind, tough patriotism and slightly histrionic flair for leadership," in public has always "kept his disagreement in proper bounds" (page 36), in private "[h]e thinks it's a terrible mistake..., a tragic one" (page 73).
In addition to his opposing "testimony on the Hill," Scott appears to have stretched a point and "leaked some stories to the newspapers" (page 73) as well, and upon questioning in executive session of the Armed Services Committee he warns, as if reluctantly, that "we are entering a period so dangerous that we may face some factors that are totally unexpected" (page 113). Even without the treaty, knowledgeable cocktail-party talk sees "reasonable odds that the Republicans nominate General Scott in '76. It's a natural. He's got the personality. If anything goes wrong with the treaty, he's solidly against it. And if it works, people will be worrying about Russia's conventional forces and will want a strong man like Scott" (page 27).
And yet... Well, what if the General believes that the "treaty was the act of a naive boy" and that since "[t]he public has no faith in" Lyman, "[u]nless the country is rallied by a voice of authority and discipline, it can be lost in a month"? After all, as he "snap[s]," "Some men act. Others talk" (page 328).
When Marine Corps Colonel "Jiggs" Casey, "director of the Joint Staff, the select group of two hundred officers that served as the research and planning agency for the Joint chiefs of Staff" (page 2), first hears from a fellow officer of the Pentagon "all-service code room" (page 5) about Scott's coded outgoing message "about some kind of betting pool on the Preakness," Jiggs first merely shrugs, "Well, General Scott knows his horses" (page 7). He dutifully admonishes the Navy man about having made a copy of the message (page 7), but then later, when he gently ribs Colonel Murdock, "Scott's personal aide" (page 10), about the wee peccadillo, Murdock's brush-off is faintly "frost[y]" (page 16).
This isn't any huge issue--in terms of "personal traffic," "the chairman traditionally has been granted some courtesies," explains Scott smoothly later (page 321)--nor is it particularly odd that the next secret "All Red alert" surprise-attack drill has been scheduled for the day of the horserace. In fact, Jiggs thinks the chosen date and the betting pool might be a "cute" way to make those about to be tested "relax an extra notch, surmising that Scott was sure to be up at Pimlico for the race" (page 11).
Now, it is a little interesting, perhaps, that the timing is being "so closely held," known only to the five Joint Chiefs, the President, Murdock, and Jiggs, but the previous "All Red, six weeks ago, had pleased no one," with "[b]its of snafu...leak[ing] into the press," and "Scott, who rarely lost his temper, [getting] mad" (page 10). Clearly, this time the demanding Scott wants a better showing, not one with "[t]two carrier attack forces caught in port" and two-thirds of SAC bombers still caught on their fields (page 10).
But then other little oddities come Casey's way, none of which is particular suspicious at all, yet when added up-- Well, Jiggs finds the "[b]its and pieces...swirl[ing] in [his] mind," and "[h]e struggle[s] to sort them out," feeling "uneasiness" and "anxiety" (page 62)...until finally he makes a very unusual out-of-channels telephone call (page 63).
I won't say any more about the plot, whether the clues Jiggs finds or the actions he and others take, because the reader's journey will be a tense and enjoyable one. Oh-- And I won't comment on any differences between the book and the 1964 film starring Burt Lancaster and Kirk Douglas and Frederic March, by the way, since I've never seen it, but of course the text gives a lot more backstory and supposition and whatnot than a movie ever could.
In short, Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey II's Seven Days in May is a taut and well-crafted thriller with the fate of the very constitutional structure of the nation itself hanging in the balance, a rich and ultimately provocative 5-star read.