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The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State
Includes details on how private sector institutions can support social order, foster cooperation and reduce violent confrontations.
397 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1990
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Displaying 1 - 16 of 16 reviews
July 8, 2015
The Enterprise of Law is somewhat less accessible overall than Benson's more recent To Serve and Protect but the final four chapters of the book are excellent and sum up the argument of the book very well. Potential new readers may jump straight to Parts IV and V (chapters 11 to 14) on a first reading and only thereafter turn to the detailed and thorough economic and historical analysis found in Parts I, II, and III.
August 1, 2012
One of the most important books that I have read this year. Benson makes a strong case for the privatization of law as a more just, more efficient, as well as more natural system. He gives the history of how our authoritarian system of law developed (mostly for the purpose of aggrandizing the state at the expense of the victim) and provides an economic analysis of our current system by raising questions about incentives and who benefits. After exposing the corruption which is a natural product of authoritarian law, Benson then analyses the recent growth in private firms that now provide security, arbitration, and conflict resolution due to the growing recognition of the inadequacy of the public system. This book was originally published in 1990. The Independent Institute has done well to republish it. I highly recommend this to anyone looking for answers to solve the problems of our current justice system.
September 7, 2014
Interesting Quotes:
"The Norman kinds used law and law enforcement to generate revenues needed to finance their military operations, to enhance their own wealth, and to buy the support of powerful groups . . . As the business of justice increasingly became the accumulation of royal revenues, voluntary participation in the justice process naturally declined . . .
"Revenues from law enforcement were obviously the most important consideration in royal law By this time, fines had become very complex. 'The claims of the lords, the claims of the church, the claims of the king are adding to the number of various fines and mulcts that can be exacted, and are often at variance with each other . . . the old law . . . is falling to pieces under the pressure of those new elements which feudalism has brought with it.' . . .
"The Norman kinds also brought the concept of felony to England, by making it a feudal crime for a vassal to betray or commit treachery against a feudal lord. Feudal felonies were punishable by death, and all the felon's land and property were forfeited to the lord. Soon felony began to develop a broader meaning: 'Again royal greed seems to be the best explanation for the expansion of the concept of felony. Any crime called a felony meant that if the appellee was found guilty his possessions escheated to the king. The more crimes called felonies, the greater the income, and so the list of felonies continued to grow throughout the twelfth century.'"
-Bruce Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State
-------------------------------------------------------------
"Henry and his judges defined an ever-growing number of actions as violating the king's peace. These offenses came to be known as 'crimes' and the contrast between criminal and civil causes developed, with criminal causes referring to offenses that generated revenues for the kind or the sheriffs rather than payment to the victim."
-Bruce Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State
--------------------------------------------------------------
"The prevailing opinion of the day was that trial by jury meant a guilty verdict, so there was considerable resistance to acceptance of a jury trial. The justices began to search for ways to force defendants to accept a jury trial. Some defendants were locked in prison for a year and a day with little food and water, but still many refused the trial. In 1275, the first statute of Westminster declared that those accused of a felony who refused to accept a jury inquest would be 'put in strong and hard imprisonment.' Accused felons were loaded with heavy chains and stones, placed in the worst part of the prison, given a little water one day and a little bread the next, until they agreed to trial by jury or died. Many chose to die. If found guilty in a trial, the accused would be executed and forfeit all property to the crown. Death under 'hard and severe pressure' meant that he was not convicted and his property went to his family."
-Bruce Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State
---------------------------------------------------------------
"By the end of the reign of Edward I, the basic institutions of government law had been established, and in many instances older custom had been altered or replaced by authoritarian rules to facilitate the transfer of wealth to relatively powerful groups. 'Public interest' justifications for a government-dominated legal system and institutions *must* be viewed as *ex post* rationalization rather than as *ex ante* explanations of their development."
-Bruce Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State
--------------------------------------------------------------
"So far, a major component of the crime picture has been almost completely ignored: the victims. Why? simply because they have been almost completely ignored by the politicized criminal justice system . . . This is in stark contrast with the legal system's historical concern for obtaining restitution for victims. And because of the incentives arising with restitution, victims willingly pursued and prosecuted offenders. But the politicization of crime has led to an ever-diminishing role of and concern for victims . . .
"Conviction statistics are of primary concern to prosecutors, so the role that victims play in prosecution is generally conceived in terms of their function as witnesses. If the victim is likely to appear unconvincing or unsympathetic, if he has 'done something stupid' and appears to deserve what he got, or if he has a criminal record, the prosecutor will dismiss the case or plea bargain in order to generate a conviction or avoid a loss. There is one perverse implication of this tendency. Lower-income individuals are victims of a disproportionate umber of crimes but are also more likely to have criminal records themselves and to make less articulate witnesses. 'Thus, it is more likely that these cases are given away by prosecutors than those of higher income victims.' Ironically, of course, one *rhetorical* justification for public prosecution is to ensure that poor victims receive the same justice as rich victims would be able to purchase if private prosecution still existed. Instead, the opposite has occurred. Under private prosecution, rich and poor victims acted as prosecutors themselves and were generally on a relatively equal footing . . .
"The victims' cost of cooperating with prosecutors can be staggering. In *addition* to the initial loss to the criminal, victims face the costs of transportation, babysitting, and parking. More importantly, they can lose wages and they endure seemingly endless delays and continuances. There are also considerable emotional and psychological costs of having to confront an assailant, for example, or enduring a defense attorney's questions . . .
"[T]here are few offsetting benefits for the cost of cooperating in prosecution except a desire for revenge, since stolen property is often not recovered, money loss is not restored, and there is generally no compensation for injury . . . It should be clear that the typical crime victim has little to gain from participating in the criminal justice system . . .
"Many victims respond to those incentives by opting out, which clearly reduces the effectiveness of the public sector in achieving criminal justice. After all, 'to the extent that there is less victim involvement than there would be if other sorts of remedies were available - such as restitution - then fewer crimes will be reported, fewer criminals will be successfully prosecuted, and more rights violating conduct will result.'"
-Bruce Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State
---------------------------------------------------------------
"In 1970, for example, Westminster Place in St. Louis was dying economically. Middle income residents had seen property values plummet during the 1960s as 'urban blight' set in . . . But in 1970 the remaining residents petitioned the city to deed the streets to them . . .
"The city complied with the requests for privatization in return for the residents' assumption of responsibility for street, sewer, and streetlight maintenance, garbage pickup, and any security services above normal fire and police response. The titles to the streets are vested in an incorporated street association to which all property owners must belong and pay dues. The street associations, most of which own one or two blocks, have the right to close the street to traffic, so the only cars on the street belong to residents and their visitors. 'It is *their* street and that ownership gives the neighborhood a high degree of cohesiveness.' . . . [S]uch cooperative behavior has substantially reduced crime. A comparison of crime rates on private streets and adjacent public streets found significantly lower crime on private streets in virtually every category. The crime rate was 108 percent higher on an adjacent public street than on Ames Place, a private street . . .
"Such private street arrangements are becoming increasingly common, although few examples are documented to the same degree as the St. Louis arrangement. Many residential and commercial developments involve private streets and private security arrangements . . . In California and Florida, entire developments have been walled and security guards are posted at the gates. Large commercial developments generally have their own security force and traffic enforcement, and shopping centers typically have lanes for traffic flow in their expansive parking lots, with stop signs, fire lanes, and other traffic control rules. Private streets are not very unusual."
-Bruce Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State
-----------------------------------------------------------------
"Businessmen wanted speedy, inexpensive dispute resolution based on business custom and practice but the New York Bar and the Chamber of Commerce joined forces to pass a 1920 New York statute that made arbitration agreements binding under New York law and enforceable in New York courts. Since then, all the other states have passed similar laws . . .
"*Arbitration became a less attractive alternative to the public courts than it would have otherwise been in the absence of these laws.* How can this be? . . . Some of the most attractive aspects of the arbitration alternative were substantially weakened as a direct result of the statutory legalization of the process. In particular, arbitration has taken a much more complex 'legalistic; character, arbitration is less a summary proceeding, concern for government-imposed laws is relatively more significant, and arbitration is costlier. The government has not eliminated arbitration as a competitor, but the arbitration statutes have limited its competitiveness . . . 'There is irony in the fate of one who takes precautions to avoid litigation by submitting to arbitration, and who, as a reward for his pain, finds himself in court fighting not on the merits of his case but on the merits of arbitration . . . [this] monumental tragicomedy [demonstrates the success of the government legal process at] thwarting legitimate efforts to escape its tortuous procedure.' . . .
"While the character of private arbitration has been substantially influenced by the efforts of government to subjugate it, by the 1950s almost 75 percent of all commercial disputes were being adjudicated before arbitrators rather than public courts."
-Bruce Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State
----------------------------------------------------------------
"Suppose that fines are set equal to the full cost to the victim plus the full cost of bringing the offender to justice, all divided by the probability that the offender will be brought to justice. For example, the fine for stealing a car would be the value of the loss plus the cost of pursuit, court time and so on associated with solving and prosecuting the offense, all divided by the probability of successful solution and prosecution. If half the car thefts are solved, the long list of costs would be divided by .5 or, in effect, multiplied by two. The fine would be double the damages . . . Private courts may not determine fines in precisely the manner discussed here, but private citizens who contract with courts and enforcers will be attracted to firms that are effective at preventing offenses - that is, to enforcers who make significant efforts to recover for the victim and to judges whose fines are high enough to compensate the victim and the enforcer (naturally, a judge will be concerned about recovering his own costs as well)."
-Bruce Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State
------------------------------------------------------------------
"One activity that will be subject to fines is offenses by private law enforcers against innocent citizens. Because falsifying violations, falsely charging innocent people of wrongdoing, and bullying citizens violate the rights of those who are innocent, a private, victim-oriented system of law will require full compensation from enforcers for anyone who is mistreated or acquitted of a charge. The loser in a court case would pay the full cost of the court appearance. Fines for restitution will not only deter the potential abuses of police, they will also deter frivolous and unfounded lawsuits."
-Bruce Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State
"The Norman kinds used law and law enforcement to generate revenues needed to finance their military operations, to enhance their own wealth, and to buy the support of powerful groups . . . As the business of justice increasingly became the accumulation of royal revenues, voluntary participation in the justice process naturally declined . . .
"Revenues from law enforcement were obviously the most important consideration in royal law By this time, fines had become very complex. 'The claims of the lords, the claims of the church, the claims of the king are adding to the number of various fines and mulcts that can be exacted, and are often at variance with each other . . . the old law . . . is falling to pieces under the pressure of those new elements which feudalism has brought with it.' . . .
"The Norman kinds also brought the concept of felony to England, by making it a feudal crime for a vassal to betray or commit treachery against a feudal lord. Feudal felonies were punishable by death, and all the felon's land and property were forfeited to the lord. Soon felony began to develop a broader meaning: 'Again royal greed seems to be the best explanation for the expansion of the concept of felony. Any crime called a felony meant that if the appellee was found guilty his possessions escheated to the king. The more crimes called felonies, the greater the income, and so the list of felonies continued to grow throughout the twelfth century.'"
-Bruce Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State
-------------------------------------------------------------
"Henry and his judges defined an ever-growing number of actions as violating the king's peace. These offenses came to be known as 'crimes' and the contrast between criminal and civil causes developed, with criminal causes referring to offenses that generated revenues for the kind or the sheriffs rather than payment to the victim."
-Bruce Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State
--------------------------------------------------------------
"The prevailing opinion of the day was that trial by jury meant a guilty verdict, so there was considerable resistance to acceptance of a jury trial. The justices began to search for ways to force defendants to accept a jury trial. Some defendants were locked in prison for a year and a day with little food and water, but still many refused the trial. In 1275, the first statute of Westminster declared that those accused of a felony who refused to accept a jury inquest would be 'put in strong and hard imprisonment.' Accused felons were loaded with heavy chains and stones, placed in the worst part of the prison, given a little water one day and a little bread the next, until they agreed to trial by jury or died. Many chose to die. If found guilty in a trial, the accused would be executed and forfeit all property to the crown. Death under 'hard and severe pressure' meant that he was not convicted and his property went to his family."
-Bruce Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State
---------------------------------------------------------------
"By the end of the reign of Edward I, the basic institutions of government law had been established, and in many instances older custom had been altered or replaced by authoritarian rules to facilitate the transfer of wealth to relatively powerful groups. 'Public interest' justifications for a government-dominated legal system and institutions *must* be viewed as *ex post* rationalization rather than as *ex ante* explanations of their development."
-Bruce Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State
--------------------------------------------------------------
"So far, a major component of the crime picture has been almost completely ignored: the victims. Why? simply because they have been almost completely ignored by the politicized criminal justice system . . . This is in stark contrast with the legal system's historical concern for obtaining restitution for victims. And because of the incentives arising with restitution, victims willingly pursued and prosecuted offenders. But the politicization of crime has led to an ever-diminishing role of and concern for victims . . .
"Conviction statistics are of primary concern to prosecutors, so the role that victims play in prosecution is generally conceived in terms of their function as witnesses. If the victim is likely to appear unconvincing or unsympathetic, if he has 'done something stupid' and appears to deserve what he got, or if he has a criminal record, the prosecutor will dismiss the case or plea bargain in order to generate a conviction or avoid a loss. There is one perverse implication of this tendency. Lower-income individuals are victims of a disproportionate umber of crimes but are also more likely to have criminal records themselves and to make less articulate witnesses. 'Thus, it is more likely that these cases are given away by prosecutors than those of higher income victims.' Ironically, of course, one *rhetorical* justification for public prosecution is to ensure that poor victims receive the same justice as rich victims would be able to purchase if private prosecution still existed. Instead, the opposite has occurred. Under private prosecution, rich and poor victims acted as prosecutors themselves and were generally on a relatively equal footing . . .
"The victims' cost of cooperating with prosecutors can be staggering. In *addition* to the initial loss to the criminal, victims face the costs of transportation, babysitting, and parking. More importantly, they can lose wages and they endure seemingly endless delays and continuances. There are also considerable emotional and psychological costs of having to confront an assailant, for example, or enduring a defense attorney's questions . . .
"[T]here are few offsetting benefits for the cost of cooperating in prosecution except a desire for revenge, since stolen property is often not recovered, money loss is not restored, and there is generally no compensation for injury . . . It should be clear that the typical crime victim has little to gain from participating in the criminal justice system . . .
"Many victims respond to those incentives by opting out, which clearly reduces the effectiveness of the public sector in achieving criminal justice. After all, 'to the extent that there is less victim involvement than there would be if other sorts of remedies were available - such as restitution - then fewer crimes will be reported, fewer criminals will be successfully prosecuted, and more rights violating conduct will result.'"
-Bruce Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State
---------------------------------------------------------------
"In 1970, for example, Westminster Place in St. Louis was dying economically. Middle income residents had seen property values plummet during the 1960s as 'urban blight' set in . . . But in 1970 the remaining residents petitioned the city to deed the streets to them . . .
"The city complied with the requests for privatization in return for the residents' assumption of responsibility for street, sewer, and streetlight maintenance, garbage pickup, and any security services above normal fire and police response. The titles to the streets are vested in an incorporated street association to which all property owners must belong and pay dues. The street associations, most of which own one or two blocks, have the right to close the street to traffic, so the only cars on the street belong to residents and their visitors. 'It is *their* street and that ownership gives the neighborhood a high degree of cohesiveness.' . . . [S]uch cooperative behavior has substantially reduced crime. A comparison of crime rates on private streets and adjacent public streets found significantly lower crime on private streets in virtually every category. The crime rate was 108 percent higher on an adjacent public street than on Ames Place, a private street . . .
"Such private street arrangements are becoming increasingly common, although few examples are documented to the same degree as the St. Louis arrangement. Many residential and commercial developments involve private streets and private security arrangements . . . In California and Florida, entire developments have been walled and security guards are posted at the gates. Large commercial developments generally have their own security force and traffic enforcement, and shopping centers typically have lanes for traffic flow in their expansive parking lots, with stop signs, fire lanes, and other traffic control rules. Private streets are not very unusual."
-Bruce Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State
-----------------------------------------------------------------
"Businessmen wanted speedy, inexpensive dispute resolution based on business custom and practice but the New York Bar and the Chamber of Commerce joined forces to pass a 1920 New York statute that made arbitration agreements binding under New York law and enforceable in New York courts. Since then, all the other states have passed similar laws . . .
"*Arbitration became a less attractive alternative to the public courts than it would have otherwise been in the absence of these laws.* How can this be? . . . Some of the most attractive aspects of the arbitration alternative were substantially weakened as a direct result of the statutory legalization of the process. In particular, arbitration has taken a much more complex 'legalistic; character, arbitration is less a summary proceeding, concern for government-imposed laws is relatively more significant, and arbitration is costlier. The government has not eliminated arbitration as a competitor, but the arbitration statutes have limited its competitiveness . . . 'There is irony in the fate of one who takes precautions to avoid litigation by submitting to arbitration, and who, as a reward for his pain, finds himself in court fighting not on the merits of his case but on the merits of arbitration . . . [this] monumental tragicomedy [demonstrates the success of the government legal process at] thwarting legitimate efforts to escape its tortuous procedure.' . . .
"While the character of private arbitration has been substantially influenced by the efforts of government to subjugate it, by the 1950s almost 75 percent of all commercial disputes were being adjudicated before arbitrators rather than public courts."
-Bruce Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State
----------------------------------------------------------------
"Suppose that fines are set equal to the full cost to the victim plus the full cost of bringing the offender to justice, all divided by the probability that the offender will be brought to justice. For example, the fine for stealing a car would be the value of the loss plus the cost of pursuit, court time and so on associated with solving and prosecuting the offense, all divided by the probability of successful solution and prosecution. If half the car thefts are solved, the long list of costs would be divided by .5 or, in effect, multiplied by two. The fine would be double the damages . . . Private courts may not determine fines in precisely the manner discussed here, but private citizens who contract with courts and enforcers will be attracted to firms that are effective at preventing offenses - that is, to enforcers who make significant efforts to recover for the victim and to judges whose fines are high enough to compensate the victim and the enforcer (naturally, a judge will be concerned about recovering his own costs as well)."
-Bruce Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State
------------------------------------------------------------------
"One activity that will be subject to fines is offenses by private law enforcers against innocent citizens. Because falsifying violations, falsely charging innocent people of wrongdoing, and bullying citizens violate the rights of those who are innocent, a private, victim-oriented system of law will require full compensation from enforcers for anyone who is mistreated or acquitted of a charge. The loser in a court case would pay the full cost of the court appearance. Fines for restitution will not only deter the potential abuses of police, they will also deter frivolous and unfounded lawsuits."
-Bruce Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State
November 11, 2023
At least up to the present, this is the most eye-opening books surrounding law-making, the management of police and security, and how the service of justice has been and still continues to be corrupted and monopolized to the core.
I have always lived within countries that use a justice system without the common law. As many may know, a system derived from Roman law depend on its legislators to obtain novel laws, whereas in a common law system, the supreme justice court delves with more complex cases in order to leave a precedent, from which the rest of the judges around the country follows.
The book is divided in a first part that accounts for how the common law system was created, as a slow but steady appropiation of all the rest of the private law institutions. How crime was managed before the Statal-Royal monopoly on justice, with a highlight over compensation to the victims rather than the mere punishment for criminals that we are used to. It narrates how kings started looking over law enforcement as a genuine money machine, therefore presenting itself as a sort of mediator, to then evolve into a punisher of all those that wanted to peacefully settle a crime in order to not lose more precious income (theftbote).
As this book has managed to explain, the reason behind the monopoly of justice by a centralized court is not endorsed by merely being the best choice, but due to the public control over resources and people it gives the government. Private law enforcement and arbitration was the norm, and it actually functioned pretty decently before, contrary to what one can think nowadays. The processes were faster, they were perceived as more just, it actually defended what they were supposed to and even deterred others by the means of ostracism. If merchants breached a law of the "lex mercatoria" (merchant law) and did not accept the veredict, no other merchant wanted to do business with them. And the laws that came from this were agreed by a great spectrum of different people with different customs, without the need of a king, legislative chamber nor supreme court, as if it were a "social contract" of the sort. The book posit an interesting case for custom laws and how they were able to deter both the acts of vengeance and future crime. For the latter, it makes an account of how the far west, usually depicted as a very violent and outlawed place, managed to successfully diminish crime, while leaving the freedom to individuals to settle a score with another. It explains how statal sheriffs were corrupt, good-for-nothing officials that deterred nothing, to the point that justice was then taken in hand of civilians. The book tells the story of vigilantes in the XVII and XIX centuries, where William Tel Coleman became famous for formally (albeit illegaly) administering justice when killers and corrupt politicians were being saved by "legal" miscarriages of justice.
The other segment of the book makes a case of how the current justice system functions, with its many contradictions and corruption. The economics behind the huge amount of expenses in the security and judicial system is detailed, arguing how is managed the supply and demand within this services. It interestingly encompasses what are the incentives of the police department versus a private security firm. For instance, police efficiency is measured by the amount of arrests, which means that in order to get more arrests, police may start waiting for crimes to happen instead of deter them, and also will increase the amount of arrest for "crimes without victims" (drug consumption, prostitution, etc.). By contrast, private security firms will not receive any income from consumers if their reputation is tarnished by huge loads of crime, thus, their efficiency is measured by a lower amount of crime within their protected zones. It appears that police system has all the incentives for us to be stolen (plus no proper compensation), due to being associated to a governmental regulation. Conversely, private security firms are held accountable by us, the consumers, therefore, we regulate and punish them by not paying them if they are not doing their job.
This and many other details are made along the book, with data analysis of the second half of the XX century that are still relevant to this day, even in countries with non-common law systems. It describes the inefficiencies, the political whys behind the long delays for a legal procedures, how judges are corruptly chosen, what's the commons problem and how it affects the justice service. It describes how the poor tend to not obtain any justice in our current "public" system, whereas rich magnates can just pay more to their networks to get their own cases treated with diligence.
In sum, an excelent book for history fanatics, specially for those desiring to understand what is behind the need of justice and security control of the government. Also, it propose a novel way to address the otherwise controversial topic of police brutality and crime deterrence.
I have always lived within countries that use a justice system without the common law. As many may know, a system derived from Roman law depend on its legislators to obtain novel laws, whereas in a common law system, the supreme justice court delves with more complex cases in order to leave a precedent, from which the rest of the judges around the country follows.
The book is divided in a first part that accounts for how the common law system was created, as a slow but steady appropiation of all the rest of the private law institutions. How crime was managed before the Statal-Royal monopoly on justice, with a highlight over compensation to the victims rather than the mere punishment for criminals that we are used to. It narrates how kings started looking over law enforcement as a genuine money machine, therefore presenting itself as a sort of mediator, to then evolve into a punisher of all those that wanted to peacefully settle a crime in order to not lose more precious income (theftbote).
As this book has managed to explain, the reason behind the monopoly of justice by a centralized court is not endorsed by merely being the best choice, but due to the public control over resources and people it gives the government. Private law enforcement and arbitration was the norm, and it actually functioned pretty decently before, contrary to what one can think nowadays. The processes were faster, they were perceived as more just, it actually defended what they were supposed to and even deterred others by the means of ostracism. If merchants breached a law of the "lex mercatoria" (merchant law) and did not accept the veredict, no other merchant wanted to do business with them. And the laws that came from this were agreed by a great spectrum of different people with different customs, without the need of a king, legislative chamber nor supreme court, as if it were a "social contract" of the sort. The book posit an interesting case for custom laws and how they were able to deter both the acts of vengeance and future crime. For the latter, it makes an account of how the far west, usually depicted as a very violent and outlawed place, managed to successfully diminish crime, while leaving the freedom to individuals to settle a score with another. It explains how statal sheriffs were corrupt, good-for-nothing officials that deterred nothing, to the point that justice was then taken in hand of civilians. The book tells the story of vigilantes in the XVII and XIX centuries, where William Tel Coleman became famous for formally (albeit illegaly) administering justice when killers and corrupt politicians were being saved by "legal" miscarriages of justice.
The other segment of the book makes a case of how the current justice system functions, with its many contradictions and corruption. The economics behind the huge amount of expenses in the security and judicial system is detailed, arguing how is managed the supply and demand within this services. It interestingly encompasses what are the incentives of the police department versus a private security firm. For instance, police efficiency is measured by the amount of arrests, which means that in order to get more arrests, police may start waiting for crimes to happen instead of deter them, and also will increase the amount of arrest for "crimes without victims" (drug consumption, prostitution, etc.). By contrast, private security firms will not receive any income from consumers if their reputation is tarnished by huge loads of crime, thus, their efficiency is measured by a lower amount of crime within their protected zones. It appears that police system has all the incentives for us to be stolen (plus no proper compensation), due to being associated to a governmental regulation. Conversely, private security firms are held accountable by us, the consumers, therefore, we regulate and punish them by not paying them if they are not doing their job.
This and many other details are made along the book, with data analysis of the second half of the XX century that are still relevant to this day, even in countries with non-common law systems. It describes the inefficiencies, the political whys behind the long delays for a legal procedures, how judges are corruptly chosen, what's the commons problem and how it affects the justice service. It describes how the poor tend to not obtain any justice in our current "public" system, whereas rich magnates can just pay more to their networks to get their own cases treated with diligence.
In sum, an excelent book for history fanatics, specially for those desiring to understand what is behind the need of justice and security control of the government. Also, it propose a novel way to address the otherwise controversial topic of police brutality and crime deterrence.
September 13, 2025
Eye-opening and well-researched.
The content of the book definitely deserves a five star rating. I did have a more difficult time reading this book than I do others, but that may just be reflective of my intellectual capacity lol. Oh and someone wrote a comment to read Part IV and V first, then start at Chapter 1. That was really helpful for me so I'm passing that info along.
The content of the book definitely deserves a five star rating. I did have a more difficult time reading this book than I do others, but that may just be reflective of my intellectual capacity lol. Oh and someone wrote a comment to read Part IV and V first, then start at Chapter 1. That was really helpful for me so I'm passing that info along.
March 22, 2018
Phenomenal!
March 27, 2020
Bom livro. Junto com o David Friedman, Benson faz a melhor sintetização das ideias a favor da privatização da lei e da ordem.
January 31, 2021
A bit esoteric in places, repetitive in others. Still definitely a great read.
January 28, 2019
Bruce Benson's book The Enterprise of Law is a deep and exciting foray into the judicial and legal industries, the evolution from voluntary, customary law in medieval England to the compulsory, government law we have today, and the prospect of a re-evolution back to a private law system. Highly recommended for anyone interested in political philosophy, the economics of anarchy, or simply understanding the emergence of mediation, private arbitration, and other private sector alternatives to state-made law.
March 9, 2021
Well researched and written review of law and legal systems and what a mess theyre in today. Highly recommended.
April 4, 2016
This is a mammoth of a book.
The author makes a case for justice without a state. The book contains a historical explanation of the rise of what the author calls "authoritarian law" (law which is created by the state), theoretical explanation of the economics of justice without the state and empirical findings.
I'll post a review of it shortly.
The author makes a case for justice without a state. The book contains a historical explanation of the rise of what the author calls "authoritarian law" (law which is created by the state), theoretical explanation of the economics of justice without the state and empirical findings.
I'll post a review of it shortly.
January 28, 2008
Interesting notion that we don't need the government to have a lawful society. Most valuable for the historical overview of common law.
September 23, 2010
The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State by Bruce L. Benson (1990)
November 7, 2011
Brilliant, challenging.
March 10, 2014
An historical account of how governments ended up monopolizing the provision of law and order, and are there any options to provide the same in the private markets. Really interesting read.
April 4, 2017
18/20
Displaying 1 - 16 of 16 reviews