One cannot help feeling for the people of Washington, D.C., in December of 1941, whether civilian or military. The imperial Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on the seventh day of that month had plunged a resolutely isolationist United States squarely into war; and the emotions of anxiety and uncertainty felt across the U.S.A. in those days had to resonate with particular intensity in Washington, the capital city from which the war effort would be directed.
It was a Christmas like no other in Washington – particularly as British Prime Minister Winston Churchill would soon be arriving in Washington to confer with U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt on how best to fight the war in which their nations were now allies – and David Bercuson and Holger Herwig capture well the unique tension of Washington life in those days in their book One Christmas in Washington.
Authors Bercuson and Herwig are both Canadian scholars, writing and teaching at the University of Calgary; in a way, they bring together the North American outlook that Roosevelt held and the British Empire/Commonwealth perspective that motivated Churchill. Accordingly, this account of The Secret Meeting Between Roosevelt and Churchill That Changed the World (the book’s subtitle) sets forth the often-conflicting perspectives of these two leaders in a tough-minded and fair-minded manner.
Bercuson and Herwig begin by going back to the time before Pearl Harbor – a time when F.D.R. understood only too well that public opinion at home in the U.S.A. was strongly against American participation in the war then raging in Europe and Asia:
[H]e…had his finger firmly on the pulse of the nation and knew that the country was deeply isolationist. Three hundred students at his alma mater, Harvard, signed a petition informing the president that they would never “follow in the footsteps of the students of 1917”….At Yale University, 1,486 students and faculty vowed never to go to war, “even if England is on the verge of defeat.” The signatories included Kingman Brewster, a future president of Yale, and Gerald R. Ford, a future president of the United States. (p. 57)
Pearl Harbor, of course, changed all that. Eventually, it was arranged that Churchill would make a risky voyage across the Atlantic to confer with Roosevelt at Washington, and “Thus began the conference that was to be called ARCADIA. The code name was chosen by Churchill, likely in an ironic reference to the mythical land of Arcady, where the sun always shown on pastoral landscapes and shepherds played pipes as they tended to flocks of contented sheep”. It was, as Bercuson and Herwig dryly point out, “a sharp contrast” (p. 101) to the brutal reality of the cruel war then being waged largely in bitterly cold locations like Russia and the North Atlantic.
The major focus in One Christmas in Washington is, of course, on Roosevelt and Churchill; but other major figures are sketched with comparable skill and economy – for instance, General George C. Marshall. Nowadays, General Marshall is usually identified with the post-World War II Marshall Plan that bears his name, and that helped the devastated societies of post-war Western Europe rebuild their infrastructure and establish stable democracies. Yet Marshall also provided important service as President Roosevelt’s chief of staff – as when an overenthusiastic Churchill set forth an unrealistic timeline for American participation in a planned British invasion of North Africa:
General Marshall replied cautiously. In essence, Roosevelt’s chief of staff played a delaying game by raising all sorts of American materiel shortcomings from guns to ammunition….In his steady, steely way, Marshall was placing himself at the center of the Anglo-American strategic debate. (p. 151)
As authors Bercuson and Herwig are Canadian scholars, it is good that they emphasize the Canadian dimension of Churchill’s North American excursion of 1941-42. Leaving Washington’s Union Station for a railroad journey northward to Ottawa, Churchill “did not hang about with [Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon] Mackenzie King as he had with Roosevelt. His trip to Ottawa was necessary, not to confer with Mackenzie King, but because Canada was a loyal member of the Commonwealth and a staunch ally in war. Canadians were deserving of Churchillian inspiration” (pp. 199-200).
And the loyal Canadian allies got just the measure of Churchillian inspiration that they needed, as the British Prime Minister went into the Canadian House of Commons and gave a rousing speech that had the Canadian M.P.’s applauding thunderously and “banging on their desks – a Canadian parliamentary tradition of showing approval for a speaker” (p. 204).
A major sticking point during the Arcadia Conference related to the question of allocations of war material, with neither Great Britain nor the United States wanting to give up too much of the power that each nation held over the process. By early January of 1942, “ARCADIA…hung on a test of will between George Catlett Marshall and Winston Spencer Churchill. No one was quite sure whose side Roosevelt would take” (p. 251).
That standoff led into what may have been the most interesting White House dinner in the entire history of the Executive Mansion. Over the course of the evening of that dinner on January 13, 1942, First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt publicly brought up the issue of internment of Japanese Americans, and Churchill was introduced to novelist Louis Adamic, whose recently published book Two-Way Passage had been harshly critical of British imperialism in the modern world.
And then President Roosevelt, not to be outdone, brought up the American Revolution, the War of 1812, the South African War, and the widely unpopular British policy in India; talked about how he had hated Queen Victoria when he had seen her as a child in London; and “allowed [that] he was not anti-British, ‘now’” (p. 256). Given the circumstances of a dinner like that, it may seem miraculous that the British-American alliance ever went forward.
But go forward it did – and Roosevelt and Churchill, each having taken the measure of the other, both found that they had met a sometimes difficult but nonetheless dependable ally.
As a native Washingtonian, I read with particular interest those parts of One Christmas in Washington that conveyed a sense of life in Washington, D.C., at the beginning of U.S. participation in the Second World War. My mother, also a native Washingtonian, was 7 years old when Pearl Harbor was attacked; she and her mother and father and two sisters lived on Garrison Street, N.W., in the Friendship Heights neighborhood. My father, whose parents relocated from Nebraska to D.C. when he was a young boy, was 8; their home was at 16th and Harvard Streets in Mount Pleasant. Both told me about the dramatic changes that Pearl Harbor and its aftermath brought to their lives as young Washingtonians – the blackout curtains and air-raid drills; the rationing; the streets filling with soldiers in uniform, and government clerks with clipboards, and new arrivals looking for housing.
Yet I recognize that most readers of One Christmas in Washington will turn to this book not for those details of local life, but rather for its treatment of diplomatic history – the forging of the Anglo-American wartime alliance that, over the years, has morphed into the “special relationship” of today. One Christmas in Washington certainly succeeds in that regard.