Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism

by Robert A. Pape

Includes a new Afterword

Finalist for the Council on Foreign Relations Arthur Ross Book Award

One of the world’s foremost authorities on the subject of suicide terrorism, the esteemed political scientist Robert Pape has created the first comprehensive database of every suicide terrorist attack in the world from 1980 until today. In Dying to Win , Pape provides a groundbreaking demographic profile of modern suicide terrorist attackers–and his findings offer a powerful counterpoint to what we now accept as conventional wisdom on the topic. He also examines the early practitioners of this guerrilla tactic, including the ancient Jewish Zealots, who in A.D. 66 wished to liberate themselves from Roman occupation; the Ismaili Assassins, a Shi’ite Muslim sect in northern Iran in the eleventh and twelfth centuries; World War II’s Japanese kamikaze pilots, three thousand of whom crashed into U.S. naval vessels; and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, a secular, Marxist-Leninist organization responsible for more suicide terrorist attacks than any other group in history.

Dying to Win is a startling work of analysis grounded in fact, not politics, that recommends concrete ways for states to fight and prevent terrorist attacks now. Transcending speculation with systematic scholarship, this is one of the most important studies of the terrorist threat to the United States and its allies since 9/11.

“Invaluable . . . gives Americans an urgently needed basis for devising a strategy to defeat Osama bin Laden and other Islamist militants.”
–Michael Scheuer, author of Imperial Hubris

“Provocative . . . Pape wants to change the way you think about suicide bombings and explain why they are on the rise.”
–Henry Schuster, CNN.com

“Enlightening . . . sheds interesting light on a phenomenon often mistakenly believed to be restricted to the Middle East.”
–The Washington Post Book World

“Brilliant.”
–Peter Bergen, author of Holy War, Inc.

Genres: Nonfiction, Politics, Terrorism, History, Middle East, Psychology, War

368 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2005

Reviews

[thelastword · Rating 3 out of 5]

What nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is ... to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland...

And

The data shows that there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world's religions. In fact, the leading instigators of suicide attacks are the Tamil Tigers, a Marxist-Leninist group ... who are adamantly opposed to religion. This group committed 76 of the 315 incidents, more suicide attacks than Hamas.

are what I learnt from this book. The author supports these views with various stats and reports, and has more to say on the topic, but, to me, this seemed to be the gist of the book.

I really hope that one day I won't be influenced by mass media and won't find facts like this surprising.

[Steven Peterson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Robert Pape's study is an important contribution to our understanding of suicide terrorism. He explores the recent evolution and deployment of suicide terrorism as a political tactic.

Some key points: Islamic terrorism is not the only exemplar of suicide terrorism; much suicide terrorism has "popular" support; suicide terrorism is often aimed at forcing occupying forces--especially democracies--to leave the territory that terrorists consider their home territory; perhaps most controversial, suicide terrorism can work, with occupying forces on numerous occasions retreating.

With respect to the latter point, he notes the following (page 61): "The main reason that suicide terrorism is growing is that terrorists have learned that it works. Even more troubling, the encouraging lesson that terrorists have learned from the experience of suicide terrorist campaigns since 1980 are not, for the most part, products of wild-eyed interpretations or wishful thinking." Nonetheless, suicide terrorism is no silver bullet; it works sometimes (as with the United States' withdrawal from Lebanon in the 1980s), but not always.

Pape argues that (page 21) "The logic of suicide terrorism is aimed at political coercion. . . . Suicide terrorist campaigns are primarily nationalistic, not religious, nor are they particularly Islamic." Other reviewers have raised relevant questions about this statement. Nonetheless, Pape emphasizes, rightly, that suicide terrorism is a political tool.

His policy prescription? It is from a realist poisition and may not convince the reader (as it does not convince me): withdraw from those countries where the United States (and other countries) are perceived as occupiers and use "off-shore balancing" tactics. That is, to quote Pape (page 247): ". . .our objective should be to withdraw all American combat forces from the region expeditiously. . .while working with Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and other Persian Gulf states to ensure that they maintain the critical infrstructure for a rapid return of U. S. forces should that prove necessary." While I have some sympathy for the United States maintaining a low profile, we are leaning upon weak reeds if we depend upon the Iraqi etc., governments to serve as our surrogates/allies.

At any rate, this is a provocative book and well worth reading as a means of thinking about the political logic of suicide terrorism.

[Kellsie · Rating 4 out of 5]

“The stationing of tens of thousands of American combat troops on the Arabian Peninsula from 1990 to 2001 probably made al-Qaeda suicide attacks… including the horrible crimes committed on September 11, 2001, from five to twenty times more likely.” WHAT.

Pape’s methodical, data-driven theory on suicide terrorism is hugely enlightening, even for those who fancy themselves knowledgeable about the implications of American involvement in the Middle East. Once again, I’m shocked at how ignorant American/western policy makers have been in their dealings in the region.

[Maher Razouk · Rating 5 out of 5]

الإرهاب الانتحاري يتصاعد في جميع أنحاء العالم ، ولكن هناك ارتباك كبير حول السبب. نظرًا لأن العديد من هذه الهجمات - بما في ذلك ، بالطبع ، هجمات 11 سبتمبر 2001 - تم ارتكابها من قبل إرهابيين مسلمين يعتنقون دوافع دينية ، فقد يبدو من الواضح أن الأصولية الإسلامية هي السبب الرئيسي. لقد غذى هذا الافتراض الاعتقاد بأنه لا يمكن تجنب أحداث الحادي عشر من سبتمبر المستقبلية إلا من خلال التحول الشامل للمجتمعات الإسلامية ، وهو سبب أساسي للدعم العام الواسع في الولايات المتحدة للغزو الأخير للعراق.
ومع ذلك ، فإن الصلة المفترضة بين الإرهاب الانتحاري والأصولية الإسلامية مضللة وربما تشجع السياسات الداخلية والخارجية التي من المحتمل أن تؤدي إلى تفاقم الوضع الأمريكي وإلحاق الأذى بالعديد من المسلمين دون داع.

لقد قمت بجمع قاعدة بيانات لكل تفجير وهجوم انتحاري في جميع أنحاء العالم من عام 1980 حتى عام 2003 - 315 هجومًا بالإجمال . وهي تتضمن كل هجوم قام فيه إرهابي واحد على الأقل بقتل نفسه أو نفسها أثناء محاولته قتل الآخرين ؛ يستثني الهجمات التي تصرح بها حكومة وطنية ، على سبيل المثال من قبل كوريا الشمالية ضد الجنوب. قاعدة البيانات هذه هي أول عالم كامل للهجمات الإرهابية الانتحارية في جميع أنحاء العالم. لقد جمعت وتحققت بشكل مستقل من جميع المعلومات ذات الصلة التي يمكن العثور عليها باللغة الإنجليزية واللغات الأخرى (على سبيل المثال ، العربية والعبرية والروسية والتاميلية) مطبوعة وعلى الإنترنت. المعلومات مستمدة من الجماعات الإرهابية الانتحارية نفسها ، ومن المنظمات الرئيسية التي تجمع مثل هذه البيانات في البلدان المستهدفة ، ومن وسائل الإعلام الإخبارية حول العالم. أكثر من مجرد "قائمة قوائم" ، ربما تمثل قاعدة البيانات هذه الدراسة الأكثر شمولاً وموثوقية للهجمات الإرهابية الانتحارية المتوفرة الآن.

تظهر البيانات أن هناك علاقة قليلة بين الإرهاب الانتحاري والأصولية الإسلامية ، أو أي من ديانات العالم. في الواقع ، المحرضون الرئيسيون على الهجمات الانتحارية هم نمور التاميل في سريلانكا ، وهي جماعة ماركسية لينينية ينتمي أعضاؤها إلى عائلات هندوسية لكنهم يعارضون الدين بشدة. وقد ارتكبت هذه المجموعة 76 من أصل 315 عملية انتحارية .
ما تشترك فيه جميع الهجمات الإرهابية الانتحارية تقريبًا هو استراتيجي محدد: إجبار الديمقراطيات الحديثة على سحب القوات العسكرية من الأراضي التي يعتبرها الإرهابيون وطنهم. نادرًا ما يكون الدين هو السبب الجذري ، على الرغم من استخدامه غالبًا كأداة من قبل المنظمات الإرهابية في التجنيد وفي جهود أخرى لخدمة الهدف الاستراتيجي الأوسع.
.
Robert Pape
Dying To Win
Translated By #Maher_Razouk

[Dave · Rating 4 out of 5]

I first of heard of this book by way of the immutable Scott Horton at antiwar.com/radio / http://www.kaosradioaustin.org/statio...

When I realized that Ron Paul used it as a primary source when he countered the ridiculous claims by Rudy Guiliani that "they hate us for our freedoms" and over-used anti-logic about Islamic fundamentalism.

Well researched and well presented prose details a picture that many of glaze over in the haze of media propaganda. I had some disagreement with the final chapter and Afterword that somehow the US still has moral claims to intervene and simply should reform its modus operendi.

Overall a refreshing read and I am glad I took the to complete it.

[Leftbanker · Rating 5 out of 5]

Do we want to end the seemingly endless cycle of attacks and counter-attacks in our endless war against Muslim extremists? Or maybe we want to just talk tough and keep invading countries the result of which thus far has been devastating in countless ways? Or do we want to try something crazy and new and pull out of the Middle East militarily?

9/11 was a response to American occupation of Saudi Arabia and not some bullshit fantasy that they hate us for our freedoms. How do I know this? Because this is what those maniacs said.

I like what the author said about not proving something by showing something with facts and research. This book does that and I highly recommend it to anyone wishing to better understand the current situation of the Muslim world and the West.

[Jason · Rating 4 out of 5]

Suicide terrorists are not mostly Muslim, and they don't all do it because of religious reasons. Rather, the motives are more nationalistic and sophisticated than we think, and are often part of a larger campaign. Fascinating and accurate account of every single known suicide bombing attack in recent history and their effect on society. It's hard being the only one to have read this book.

[sofía malfoy · Rating 4 out of 5]

yo soy como una democracia

[Steven H · Rating 1 out of 5]

A PROVOCATIVE AND INFORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF SUCH TERRORISM

Robert Anthony Pape Jr. is professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He wrote in the first chapter of this 2005 book, “I have compiled a database of every suicide bombing and attack around the globe from 1980 through 2003---315 attacks in all. It includes every attack in which at least one terrorist killed himself or herself while attempting to kill others; it excludes attacks authorized by a national government, for example North Korea against the South. This database is the first complete universe of suicide terrorist attacks worldwide… The data show that there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism , or any one of the world’s religions… Rather, what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland. Religion is rarely the root cause, although it is often used as a tool by terrorist organizations in recruiting and in other efforts in service of the broader strategic objective.” (Pg. 3-4)

He adds, “Since September 11, 2001, the United States has responded to the growing threat of suicide terrorism by embarking on a policy to conquer Muslim countries---not simply rooting out existing havens for terrorists in Afghanistan but going further to remake Muslim societies in the Persian Gulf…the close association between foreign military occupations and the growth of suicide terrorist movements in the occupied regions should make us hesitate over any strategy centering on the transformation of Muslim societies by means of heavy military power… the sustained presence of heavy American combat forces in Muslim countries is likely to INCREASE the odds of the next 9/11. To win the war on terrorism, we must have a new conception of victory. The key to lasting security lies not only in rooting out today’s generation of terrorists who are actively planning to kill Americans, but also in preventing the next, potentially larger generation from rising up.” (Pg. 6-7)

He outlines, “The strategic logic of suicide terrorism is aimed at political coercion. The vast majority of suicide terrorist attacks … occur in clusters as part of a larger campaign by an organized group to achieve a specific political goal… Suicide terrorist campaigns are primarily nationalistic, not religious, nor are they particularly Islamic… Further, all of the target states have been democracies, which terrorists see as more vulnerable to coercion than other types of regimes… There is a disturbing reason why suicide terrorism has been rising rapidly: over the past two decades, suicide terrorists have learned that this strategy pays.” (Pg. 21-22)

He continues, “suicide terrorism is mainly a response to foreign occupations… Religion plays a role. However, modern suicide terrorism is best understood as an extreme strategy for national liberation against democracies with troops that pose an imminent threat to control the territory the terrorists view as their homeland.” (Pg. 23)

He summarizes, “At its core, suicide terrorism is a strategy of coercion, a means to compel a target government to change policy… suicide terrorism attempts to inflict enough pain on the opposing society to overwhelm its interest in resisting the terrorists’ demands, and so induce the government to concede, or the population to revolt against the government… Suicide terrorists’ willingness to die magnifies the coercive effects of punishment in three ways. First, suicide attacks are generally more destructive than other terrorist attacks… Second, suicide attacks are an especially convincing way to signal the likelihood of more pain to come… Third, suicide terrorist organizations are better positioned than other terrorist groups to heighten expectations of escalating future costs by deliberately violating norms in the use of violence… by breaching taboos concerning legitimate targets, and by broadening recruitment to confound expectations about the limits of possible terrorists… it suggests the attackers cannot be deterred… Americans would have to expect that future al-Qaeda attackers would be equally willing to die.” (Pg. 27-29)

He acknowledges, “The main reason that suicide terrorism is growing is that terrorists have learned that it works. Even more troubling, the encouraging lessons that terrorists have learned from the experience of suicide terrorist campaigns since 1980 are not, for the most part, products of wild-eyed interpretations or wishful thinking. They are, rather, quite reasonable assessments of the relationship between terrorists’ coercive efforts and the political gains that the terrorists have achieved in many of these cases.” (Pg. 61)

He points out, “of the thirteen suicide terrorist campaigns that were completed during 980-2003, seven correlate with significant policy changes by the target state toward the terrorists’ major political goals… Even a 50 percent success rate is remarkable: international military and economic coercion generally works less than a third of the time, and is especially rare for groups with few other options.” (Pg. 64-65)

He argues, “Suicide terrorism rarely evolves from tiny bands of ordinary terrorists, but instead commonly arises from broad-based nationalist liberation movements, those that typically have pursued guerilla warfare and found that a guerilla strategy is inadequate to achieve their nationalist aspirations… suicide terrorist groups are … deciding whether to use suicide attack as an extension of a broader guerilla warfare strategy.” (Pg. 93)

He suggests, “If al-Qaeda’s truly transnational support were to dry up tomorrow, the group would remain a robust threat to the United States. However, if al-Qaeda no longer drew recruits from the Sunni Muslim countries where there is a heavy American military presence or where the government receives strong U.S. support, the remaining transnational network would pose a far smaller threat and might well simply collapse.” (Pg. 125)

He summarizes, “My theory argues that national resistance to foreign occupation, a democratic political system in the occupying power, and a religious difference between the occupied and occupying societies are the main causal factors leading to the rise of suicide terrorist campaigns… It also explains why a DIFFERENCE in the predominate religion of the two societies… is a main cause for why some foreign occupations by a democratic state escalate to suicide terrorism and others do not.” (Pg. 126)

He notes, “The prevalence of team suicide attacks strongly indicates the presence of altruistic motives among a significant number of suicide attackers. Even if all suicide attackers had some personal motive to die, suicide attackers who work together as a team must also be motivated, at least partly, to achieve a collective purpose, the completion of a group mission that serves a cause beyond their own personal death.” (Pg. 186)

He points out, “In general, suicide attackers are rarely socially isolated, clinically insane, or economically destitute individuals, but are most often educated, socially integrated, and highly capable people who could be expected to have a good future. The profile of a suicide terrorist resembles that of a politically conscious individual who might join a grassroots movement more than it does the stereotypical murderer, religious cult member, or everyday suicide.” (Pg. 200)

He concludes, “Although many had hoped that American and Western counterterrorism efforts would have reduced the threat, the facts show otherwise… the West’s strategy for the war on terrorism is fundamentally flawed… the strategic logic of suicide terrorism---along with the presence of Western combat forces in Iraq and on the Arabian peninsula---remains the core factor driving the threat we face.” (Pg. 251-252) He adds, “[This book] suggests a simple, effective strategy… a return to our traditional policy of ‘offshore balancing’ in the Persian Gulf.” (Pg. 261)

This is a very thought-provoking analysis, that will be “must reading” for anyone interested in the subject of terrorism.

[Ietrio · Rating 1 out of 5]

A parody study of a true believer. Fanaticism and pseudo-logic primes, the rest could and should go to heck.

"THE TARGETS OF modern suicide terrorist campaigns have been democratic states which have stationed heavy combat troops on the territory that the terrorists viewed as their national homeland." No. Those with the homeland are the pan-arabism supporters, which are secular and want to use ethnicity as a support for a larger, more powerful union. What hysterical white old men call terrorists in 2016 are islamists who try to resurrect the caliphate. For a bureaucrat like Pape, there is no difference: dark skinned people who try to blow up his big screen TV or raise the gas prices so he won't be able to buy the next Summer cruise de luxe version. Pan Arabs would include all Arabs. Islamists, even the most lax, will not include christian Arabs.

Add the self-gratification with the "democratic states". Well, given enough time, even half the time it took the "Western nations" and the caliphate might become more democratic than theocratic compared with Ireland, France or the Bible Belt States.

Add that in the case of Europe, the so called terrorists are born and raised in Europe and the whole book becomes a mere rant.

[Dipa Raditya · Rating 5 out of 5]

"Suicide terrorist groups are [not] religious cults isolated from the rest of their society, ... Rather, suicide terrorist organizations often command broad social support within the national communities from which they recruit, because they are seen as pursuing legitimate nationalist goals, especially liberation from foreign occupation."

If you still believe that suicide terrorist groups are always intact with religious fundamentalism at play, you should consider reading this books. Robert Pape spends most of his life to study suicide terrorists groups and classified using statistics. The reason to use suicide as a method merely to induce more fears, to create a sense of terror and strike the very line of social structure. He is also implying some arguments that people who join terrorist groups are not just because they're brainwashed but also having slight motivation to drive anger towards something. They're just angry induced cocktail met with modern dilemma of existential angst.

[Ari Moel · Rating 2 out of 5]

Pape’s thesis—that suicide terrorism is primarily a rational response to military occupation rather than religious fanaticism—becomes increasingly problematic when examined alongside psychological evidence presented in works like Lankford’s “The Myth of Martyrdom,” which I have just read. Pape’s repeated emphasis on the Tamil Tigers as a secular template obscures the theological mechanisms that differentiate Islamic suicide operations from other forms of political violence. His analysis fails to adequately address how Islamic concepts of shahada (martyrdom) and jihad provide constitutive paths that transform suicidal ideation into religiously sanctioned action. Pape’s rational-actor model cannot adequately explain the dimensions of groups like Al-Qaeda or the takfiri logic that renders mass civilian casualties theologically permissible.

A regularly cited piece of work, but one that feels flawed and biased.

[Sean Rosenthal · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting Quote:

The close association between foreign military occupations and the growth of suicide terrorist movements in the occupied regions should make us hesitate over any strategy centering on the transformation of Muslim societies by means of heavy military power...we should recognize that the sustained presence of heavy American combat forces in Muslim countries is likely to INCREASE the odds of the next 9/11."

-Robert Pape, Dying to Win


"American military policy in the Persian Gulf was the pivotal factor leading to September 11. Although Islamic fundamentalism mattered, the stationing of tens of thousands of American combat troops on the Arabian peninsula from 1990-2001 probably increased the risk of al-Qaeda suicide attacks against Americans, including the events of September 11, 2001, ten to twenty times."

-Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win

[Mohamed Al Sayyah · Rating 5 out of 5]

درس روبرت بيب كل العمليات الانتحارية بين ١٩٨٠ و ٢٠٠٣، عددها ٣١٥ عملية.
استثنى منها العمليات المدعومة من قبل الحكومات مثل عمليات كوريا الشمالية ضد جارتها الجنوبية.
تظهر قاعدة البيانات هذه ضعف الارتباط بين العمليات الانتحارية والأصولية الاسلامية.
فنمور التاميل وهي حركة ماركسية لينينية قامت بعمليات انتحارية اكثر من حركة حماس بواقع ٧٦ عملية من أصل ٣١٥.
تشترك كل العمليات الانتحارية في كونها تسعى لهدف دنيوي وهو اجبار الديمقراطيات الحديثة لسحب قواتها من أراضي يعتبرها الارهابيين موطناً لهم.
الدين نادراً ما يكون السبب الجذري للعمليات الإرهابية الانتحارية مع أن الدين يستخدم كوسيلة لتجنيد الأفراد.
الارتباط بين الاحتلال الأجنبي والعمليات الانتحارية لا يعني أن الدين لا يلعب أي دور، ولكنها تبين خطأ الفكرة السائدة التي تعتبر الكراهية الدينية والأصولية الإسلامية هي مصدر هذه العمليات.

كتاب مهم جداً، لكنه مُرهق للغاية

[Shiloh H · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is something I thing everyone should read in light of the events on and following 9/11

This idea that somehow the attacks were motivated simply by religious indoctrination is both a flawed and dangerous idea. It's easy for someone like Bin Laden to have won over poor and abused people using God or Allah as a scale tipper, but the real reason are strictly political and territorial in nature.

This book explain this in a clear and concise, a fairly readable format. If you don't "get it" after reading this, perhaps you should consider your own indoctrination.

[Nick · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book examines the known facts about suicide terrorism, using data about suicide bombers ages, social class, education and motivation. Pape offers convincing evidence that suicide bombers are not, as a rule, motivated by desperate personal circumstances but by military or economic occupation or domination of their territory. An excellent read, and a must-read book if we want to truly deal with terrorism.

[N · Rating 2 out of 5]

Initially, Dying to Win seemed fascinating, and I still think its central thesis -- that suicide terrorism shouldn't be thought of as "a religious thing", but rather as something carried out for nationalistic reasons -- is thought-provoking.

However, the book quickly became incredibly repetitive, to the extent that I began to wonder if Robert Pape had enough material to warrant a whole book on this subject.

[Dustin Schroer · Rating 2 out of 5]

Interesting theory that I whole heartedly believe but as others have said, highly repetitive. Also, he constantly uses "statistics" that are very ineffectual or boring. So many times I skipped a section that is statistics heavy mostly because the sample size is so small to make even the most educated guess irrelevant.
I would immensely love for the author to write an update with the last 12 years included and its effect on his thesis.

[Patrick · Rating 4 out of 5]

Does anyone else feel like the episode of South Park satirizing Jersey Shore was using the logic presented in Pape's book?

[Mika · Rating 2 out of 5]

It's a pity that the conversation between this guy and Sam Harris' never happened. I feel like they would have both a lot to learn from each other.

[Kyle Monsees · Rating 3 out of 5]

Robert Pape does a superb job analyzing why terrorist groups turn to suicide attacks and a fine job offering prescriptions for how states can safeguard against these attacks.

Pape systematically dismantles the many erroneous explanations offered for why terrorists commit suicide attacks and why terrorist groups use these methods. Suicide terrorists bear no common demographics across income, education level, religion, or even gender. There is similarly no relationship between the frequently-cited reasons why individuals commit suicide and why terrorists commit suicide. Many victims or suicide express mental health problems, substance abuse, depression, a lack of social support, and view suicide as a way to end this existence. Suicide terrorists commit altruistic suicide meaning they do so in pursuit of a larger goal, in their view, for the common good. Most suicide terrorists, at the time of this writing, were not Islamic fundamentalists, contrary to popular assertion. Nor do terrorist groups seek maximalist goals of world domination. Rather, their goals are often specific, secular and nationalist. This is Pape’s most important contribution to the study of terrorist as our understanding of the causes or terrorism should dictate our response. The target of terrorists’ ire is not our society but our policies, specifically our occupation of foreign lands and stationing of U.S. troops abroad. This, Pape argues, should instruct American policy makers to consider the negative impact our military presence causes on terrorists desire to commit attacks against us as greater than the perceived gain of democratization or the Muslim world.

Most troubling is that terrorist groups are somewhat effective in achieving partial if not total victory of their goals. That being said, removing the conditions/grievances that terrorists use to recruit (if possible to achieve without significantly harming otherwise vital US interests) would be an effective means of reducing their capacity to incite against us.

[Russ Spence · Rating 3 out of 5]

this is a dissection of a number of suicide bombing campaigns from around the world, highlighting the motivations and reasoning behind these actions, and then suggesting a course of action for the US that would deal with this issue in a sensible way. The main issue is that this book ends in 2005, with mention of the 7/7 London attacks, the failed attacks two weeks later and the exponential increase in suicide attacks in Iraq between 2003 and 2005; obviously this leaves the question open as to whether or not what has happened since has been a result of US policy not changing as suggested (which appears on the surface to be a logical conclusion), or if the changes have occurred because of other factors. An updated book would be good...

[Cailee Irving · Rating 3 out of 5]

Spent weeks reading this. Longest one this year, I may add. It's for school stuff, analytical paper for our understanding society, culture, and politics.

Pape's research helped me to understand why this phenomena occurs. It broadened my perspective in a way that I became aware of why they sacrifice their lives. It can be categorized in three forms: Egoistical, Altruistic, and Fatalistic.

I've respect Pape's thorough research but one thing that I didn't like is his repetitiveness.

[Sorin Crăcană · Rating 3 out of 5]

I guess it is brave to say in the US that American occupation breeds suicide terrorism so we should give some points for saying that. Proposed solutions range from energetic independence, removing troops aaaand.... drums.... building a Mexic border fence. The gist of it? Oil is important. Nothing else matters

[Mostafa Markabi · Rating 5 out of 5]

A thorough study on the world of suicide terrorism, delving deep into the topic from different angles politically, socially, and personally.

A great read for debate lovers who are interested in counter arguments against the stereotypical narrative of the relationship between fundamental islam and terrorism.

[Tim · Rating 4 out of 5]

An awesome book that sheds light on a much misunderstood topic. At times it gets a bit redundant but Mr. Pape hammers home the main point. Suicide terrorists are predominantly opposed to foreign occupation, not simply harbor ing strong hatred of the West.

[Kym Murray · Rating 4 out of 5]

“Some are driven by social prestige, some are out for revenge, and others are driven by religion... However, what cuts across these various personal situations is the common motive to end the threat of foreign occupation”.

[AMS · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very well researched

This is a book that is well researched, and sheds light on the topic of suicide terrorism in a new way.
It was a paradigm shifter for me.

[Rebecca Guthrie · Rating 3 out of 5]

This read like a doctoral student took his thesis and published it. Interesting but very dense and you trudge through it.

[Chris Tolve · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good empirical research, bad political commitments.