This book should be required reading for every American of voting age.
This book is fundamentally an economic history of the United States, from about 1970 to the present, but with some background information going back to the WWII. It is well written and easily understood by the lay person. It lays out a timeline of economic and business thinking, and the relationships between Wall Street, the governing political class, and economists. Very few of them emerge unscathed. In fact, bankers and economists come across as self-centered and short sighted, while the politicians cherry pick ideas to suit their ideology. The theory of unintended consequences also makes its first appearance here (S&L fiasco; Garn-St Germaine bill). This author seems to take a truly "fair and balanced" approach, with no particular axe to grind on either side of the political aisle. Both Republicans and Democrats get their well-deserved lambasting. It is also clear that economists haven't a clue; predicting economic results much beyond two months in advance is clearly beyond their capabilities. So far, the only person to emerge relatively unscathed is Paul Volcker, probably because he is a pragmatist, not an ideolog, and takes the long view.
Financial Crisis Synopsis
1982: Third World debt defaults, where loans are primarily from American banks recycling petrodollars as loans to developing nations.
1987: Stock market crash; Dow loses about 30% in one day; speculative bubble.
1989 - 1990: Thrift failures (Garn - St Germaine bill) and junk bond collapse (Milken)
1994: Mexican debt crisis; more loans peddled to a third world country that couldn't afford them.
1997: Asian financial crisis; currency traders betting against Asian currencies, and yanking their investments ("hot money" is the phrase here); too many loans for the countries to realistically service.
1998: Russian debt default; similar to the Asian financial crisis.
1998: Collapse of Long Term Capital Management; large bets on the wrong side of interest rates, without a good hedge strategy.
2000: Burst of the high tech bubble; highly leveraged "investments" in businesses that were no more than someone's wishful thinking.
2007: Bursting of the housing bubble, leading directly to the current crisis.
Each of these crises sounds different but they all have the same two underlying causes:
1. Continued erosion of the regulatory statutes and enforcements. Each crisis is worse than the one before it because of that continued erosion.
2. Failure of the financial community to fully comprehend what was happening and what could happen if the current trends at the time continued.
The loosening of the laws and regulations was done specifically at the request (lobbying) of Wall Street, who claimed that the free market was the best process for allocating capital, and therefore should be free of government regulations. But then when things go sour, these same bankers turn to the government for rescue. This cognitive dissonance appears again and again.
Just for the record, I'm a firm believer in capitalism; it's less than perfect but the best we have. But it is the government and the regulatory agencies to make certain the playing field is level and honest, that people's money and investments are placed at risk with only their informed consent, and that the financial system is safeguarded, without creating a moral hazard.
Finished the opening section on Milton Friedman, the monetarist. I remember his writings in the Wall Street Journal and always wondered how he came to his conclusions. He was always able to show correlations, but high correlations do not imply causality. I never felt that he established root cause. I'm glad to read that other people agreed with me. The review of his thinking reveals a man who thinks everything should be left to market forces: schools, roads, libraries, commerce, etc. He makes the broad, and to me entirely unwarranted assumption, that market forces will balance everything out, without the need for government regulation. He totally ignores human nature: most people want to tilt the playground in their favor. Government is there to provide equal opportunity by making certain that everyone plays by the same rules. Under Friedman utopia, Bernie Madoff was perfectly legal; people would have caught on sooner or later and left his company in the lurch.
On to the next section: Richard Milhous Nixon. This section was a reminder of just how cynical and self-centered Nixon was. Much of this I remember, having lived through the oil shocks, price controls, driving at 55 mph to conserve gas, etc. I distinctly remember his second campaign: Nixon's the one! It was all about Nixon, with very little to do with the Republican party and what the party stood for. But then, me and my buddies were really into Watergate, and could not understand why anyone would even consider Nixon for president. This inside look at the manipulation of the economy to ensure re-election just reinforces my dislike for the man.
Joe Flom and the hostile takeover: I didn't recognize the name but certainly remember the age of conglomerate building and the first use of "synergism". LBO's and hostile takeovers enabled by cheap loans became the rage. And of course they never lasted. Thorough research by economists reveals that many companies bought at a premium were later sold off at a loss because the synergism never occurred; the same thing is happening now. The same concept: Citibank and one stop shopping for all things financial. It's not working and Citibank has been struggling for over 3 years to stay afloat.
Ivan Boesky: insider trading driven by simple greed. A short section but provides an inside look at some of the more peculiar aspects of one man's greed.
Walter Wriston again, along with other bankers, the ones who demand a market economy free from government regulation: Americans kept sending dollars to the Saudis to buy oil to turn into gasoline to burn in their cars. Saudi's have to do something with all that money, so they deposit it in the large American banks. Those banks turn around and make loans to developing countries (UDCs). Those countries repay the loan using inflated dollars earned by selling their commodities. The bankers make money and everything is rosey. Except for when recession hits and commodity prices drop like a stone. Loans go sour, banks start losing money, and turn to the government to prop them up. (Sound familiar? only instead of commodities, think mortgage-backed securities.) Apparently bankers are congenitally incapable of learning from their predecessor's mistakes.
Along comes Ronald Reagan: "Government is the problem." To become governor of California, he put together a conservative agenda that included university tuition and proposed a tax limitation amendment to the CA constituion. The latter failed to pass, but not by much. It later was put in place, with far-reaching consequences.
In the meantime, Carter has now become president. Economics is not his strong suit, inflation is rampant and the economy is stagnant. Stagflation was coined, and the Carter administration kept flip flopping on economic policy. Every body wanted a quick fix, but economic growth and stability take time to put in place and become ingrained - think 3-5 years. Flip flops didn't help, neither did Carter's speech about a "crisis of confidence". Carter appoints Volcker as Fed Chairman, who proceeds to clamp down on inflation by raising interest rates, then lowers them, then raises them. But finally, inflation is tamed, but not until the Reagan presidency.
Ronald Reagan presidency: The teflon president. Not knowledgeable in economics, nor does he seem to be widely read. But he came with the ideology of less government, less regulation, and proceeded to remove most to the safe guards covering the banking industry and other industries. As one writer put it, regulations were removed or gutted based on ideology, not on a rational approach to restructuring, streamlining and reform. Remember the S&L fiasco? Lay that at the doorstep of Ronald Reagan, along with a huge increase in the national debt. On the other hand, deregulating the airline industry was definitely the right decision.
Michael Milken, the junk-bond king. "came as close to outright market manipulation as he could." Broke the law by parking stocks with Ivan Boesky; ended up going to jail. Boone Pickens and greenmail, and the LBO craze. Most of the companies that succumbed to the LBO fad were saddled with so much debt that they couldn't survive a recession. It was, overall, a debacle for everyone except for the executives who were well paid for laying off workers and selling business entities all in the name of reducing expenses. All of that borrowed money went to pay interest and salaries, virtually none of it to improve productivity.
Prior to the collapse of LTCM, Brooksley Born, head of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, recommended that derivatives be regulated. She was prevented from doing so by Rubin, Greenspan, Summers, and Levitt, four people who should have known better. As derivatives became more complex (CDS, CMO, etc.) and more numerous, without regulation, much of these invisible loans posed huge risks for the buyers of them. Full disclosure of the associated risks was conspicuous by its absence.
Meanwhile, Sandy Weill picked up where Wriston left off, buying up different businesses to create a one-stop shop for financial services. Obviously it didn't work. But he still retired with millions.
Who can forget Enron? Faked accounting audited and approved by Anderson. What were they thinking? The manipulation of the electrical power spot market in California is described. But at least the worst offenders went to jail and had to disgorge their profits. And Anderson disbanded. But the employees of Enron lost all their savings.
Along comes the dotcom bubble. Does the phrase "new economy" ring a bell? It should. Many financial gurus insisted that it wasn't necessary for the dotcoms to show a profit! Some dotcoms were successful, most were not. The total amount of losses during this period are calculated at about $4 trillion. This is a classic case of the herd mentality; investors followed each other like lemmings, right off the cliff.
All this leads up to the current crisis, about which much has been written. I think this particular book gives the best, most comprehensive explanation because it lays out the path that leads inexorably to the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.
All these events give the lie to the theory of "rational markets." Markets are not rational; they are highly irrational, swinging from one extreme to the other. And as this book makes clear, they are also driven, sometimes manipulated, by self-serving individuals who are only interested in a profit, not an investment. And if the profit comes at someone else's expense, so what? If the loans go sour, the government will bail them out. During the most recent crisis, the American taxpayer had some $12 trillion on the line in loans and loan guarantees to banks that had made bad bets.
Personally, I'm mad as hell and not inclined to take any more of this.