The Crimean War: A History

by Orlando Figes

From "the great storyteller of modern Russian historians," (Financial Times) the definitive account of the forgotten war that shaped the modern age

The Charge of the Light Brigade, Florence Nightingale—these are the enduring icons of the Crimean War. Less well-known is that this savage war (1853-1856) killed almost a million soldiers and countless civilians; that it enmeshed four great empires—the British, French, Turkish, and Russian—in a battle over religion as well as territory; that it fixed the fault lines between Russia and the West; that it set in motion the conflicts that would dominate the century to come.

In this masterly history, Orlando Figes reconstructs the first full conflagration of modernity, a global industrialized struggle fought with unusual ferocity and incompetence. Drawing on untapped Russian and Ottoman as well as European sources, Figes vividly depicts the world at war, from the palaces of St. Petersburg to the holy sites of Jerusalem; from the young Tolstoy reporting in Sevastopol to Tsar Nicolas, haunted by dreams of religious salvation; from the ordinary soldiers and nurses on the battlefields to the women and children in towns under siege..

Original, magisterial, alive with voices of the time, The Crimean War is a historical tour de force whose depiction of ethnic cleansing and the West's relations with the Muslim world resonates with contemporary overtones. At once a rigorous, original study and a sweeping, panoramic narrative, The Crimean War is the definitive account of the war that mapped the terrain for today's world..

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Russia, War, European History, Military History, Russian History

575 pages, Hardcover

First published October 1, 2010

About the author

Orlando Figes is an English historian of Russia, and a professor of history at Birkbeck, University of London.

Reviews

[William2 · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent. This is actually three books. The first one--up to p. 140 or so--is about the origins of the Crimean war. At the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem Catholic and Orthodox Christians would fight each other to the death for the right to, say, be the first to celebrate the Easter Mass. Disingenuously, Nicholas I of Russia used a concern for the Orthodox living under Turkish rule as an opportunity for imperialist expansion. He really wanted to partition Turkey. Russophobic Britain was having none of it. They believed, not without reason, that Russia wanted India. This pushed them into an alliance with France to challenge Russia when it occupied the Danubian Principalities, Ottoman territory.

The second book is an account of the conflict itself, which was brutal and marked by an appalling lack of planning and leadership on all but the French side. For the British it devolves to the point of travesty. The incompetence of British officers leaves one astonished, gaping. For example, no provision was made for the Crimea's harsh winter because British leaders thought it would be a short campaign. When the harsh weather came the ensuing tragedy had to make headlines in London before asses were gotten in gear and the appropriate supplies made available. By then of course it was too late for the first winter. The tommies in their made-for-summer tents, soaked through for months at a time, died in their thousands.

The third and final book is on the aftermath of the war. How it affected the principal combatants (France, Britain, Russia, Turkey) economically and politically. Russia's humiliating loss became a significant factor in her decision to free the serfs. One can't after all fight with an army of slaves; there's a certain problem of motivation. Tolstoy was at the Siege of Sevastopol and his comments, taken from Sevastopal Sketches as well as his letters, deepen the book in surprising ways. The first great battle, fought in the fog at Balaclava, is a breathtaking read.

What I liked most was the way the book served as a linking narrative for me to many events I had already read about--from Napoleon's Retreat from Moscow in 1812 through World War II. Written in simple, declarative prose there is little or no use of tedious novelistic devices. I warmly recommend The Crimean War. Now, if you would be so kind, please sign the Charter for Compassion.

Paix Peace мир barış

[Dmitri · Rating 4 out of 5]

“Nicholas I placed the defense of Orthodoxy at the center of foreign policy. Throughout his reign he was governed by an absolute conviction in his divine mission to save Orthodox Europe from the Western heresies of liberalism, rationalism and revolution. He was led by this calling to fantastic dreams of a religious war against the Turks to liberate Christians and unite them with Russia in an Orthodox empire, it’s spiritual centers in Constantinople and Jerusalem.”
- Orlando Figes

*************

British historian Orlando Figes wrote this book in 2010 after his celebrated 1996 work on the Russian Revolution. He is a professor at Birkbeck College in London. He makes the case the 1853-56 Crimean war, although less well known during our time, was the major international conflict between the Napoleonic Wars and WWI, waged with ‘modern’ technology and tactics. It ended a Russian and Austrian alliance, created new nations, promulgated Russophobia, hastening an end of the Ottoman Empire. Figes proposes that beyond the political goals a struggle of the Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim faiths was a key cause.

Religious Tensions
On Easter in Jerusalem 1846 Christians from Latin and Greek churches rioted over rights to hold the first service in the Holy Sepulcher. The Holy Land was under Ottoman control since 1516. Railways and steamships eased travel in the mid 19th century, increasing competition to attract endowments and converts. Pilgrims from Britain, France, Austria and Russia came in tens of thousands. Russian Orthodox were the most fanatical, often at odds with the western ideas of worship. Foreign countries began to intervene. It resembled a religious version of the Great Game, as European nations vied for advantage.

Eastern Questions
France harkened to a Crusader heritage, threatening arms in Jerusalem if the Orthodox didn’t capitulate on church rights. The Tsar warned the Sultan that he would cut off diplomatic relations if the matter was not resolved in favor of Russia. Wars between Russia and Turkey went on for centuries after the fall of Constantinople in 1453. Since shaking the Mongol yoke off in 1480 Tsars waged crusades against the Ottoman Muslims for territory and religion. Crimea was essential for access to the Black Sea and was taken in 1783 by Catherine the Great. Her treaties included rights for Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire.

Sultan Abdulmejid I
Constantinople’s Sublime Porte gradually lost influence and land in Europe. Russian sponsored Balkan uprisings revealed the sick man of Europe’s days were numbered. Abdul labored under an outdated government controlled by Muslim clerics and a corrupt bureaucracy that sold tax collection privileges in the provinces. Military reforms were crucial but they were impossible without centralized control. The foreign powers interfered with domestic affairs, ostensibly to protect their Christian minorities. The Tsar fostered Greek independence movements, instigating massive Turkish reprisals in Greece and south of the Danube.

Tsar Nicholas I
The Holy Alliance of 1815 was an agreement to prevent the overthrow of monarchies. In 1825 the Sultan sent his vassal Muhammad Ali of Egypt on a punitive mission to Greece. Ali’s navy was sunk by Britain, France and Russia in the Battle of Navarino. Ali demanded control of Egypt, Palestine and Syria; denied he marched on Constantinople. He was deterred by the Tsar in exchange for Russian rights in the Dardanelles Straight. Britain imposed free trade on Turkey by threats and promises, in competition with Russia. This coincided with the fear of Russian advances in Asia Minor jeopardizing British India.

Queen Victoria
To guard against the perceived threat of Russian presence in the Caucasus, Britain set up a puppet regime in Afghanistan leading to war in 1842. The British had a hand in the Turkish Tanzimat Reforms, without endorsing a fully constitutional monarchy, but aspiring to liberal ideals and modernization. Equal rights for non-Muslims were codified, yet Christians remained second class citizens to Muslim elites. The Tsar visited Britain seeking a pact against France. Queen Victoria met him but Parliament balked at his proposal. The Foreign Secretary Palmerston was for war while PM Aberdeen was reluctant to defend Turkey.

Emperor Napoleon III
During the revolutions of 1848 Russia put down rebellions in Romania and Hungary at the request of the Sultan and then demanded further control in the territories. Polish soldiers in the Austrian army rebelled and were given haven in Turkish provinces to the anger of the Tsar. France’s Second Republic overthrew the monarchy in 1849. The reign of Napoleon III in 1852 sought to restore French glory as a world power and protector of Catholicism. Concerns in France over Russia led to ships stationed in the Straight. Pressured, the Sultan gave the key to the Church of the Nativity to the Catholic prelate in Bethlehem.

End of Peace
The Tsar was livid and made plans to attack Constantinople, the lower Danube region and the Balkans, and how the Great Powers would divide the spoils, certain Britain, France and Austria would join him. Russia sent a diplomatic mission to bully Turkey into a new treaty or create a cause for war. The Sultan appealed to Britain and France for protection. Fear of a Russian threat won over historical rivalry, and the British and French formed a pact to defend Turkey and put an end to the Tsar’s ambitions. Failed in his diplomatic goals, the Tsar sent a fleet to threaten the Sultan but aimed to avoid a war with the West.

Beginning of War
In 1853 the Tsar’s troops occupied Moldova and Romania to foment Christian uprisings. Austria mobilized soldiers on its southern borders as Turkey rallied troops from Egypt. The war left nearly a million dead. Figes covers the Battle of Balaclava, the Siege of Sevastopol, Black, Baltic and White Sea theaters, the Danube and Caucasus campaigns. The war ended with return of lands seized by Russia and destruction of its navy. Aberdeen resigned and Palmerston became the PM. France was eager to end the war, and Napoleon III was later deposed by Prussia. The Ottoman Empire hobbled along until 1922.

This book is a reliable source of information but it is also a challenge to follow. If religion was not the main motive for the Crimean War it did offer a ready excuse for expansion of empires. The cluster of competing forces is confusing, but Figes explains the geopolitical considerations well. A more experienced reader of military history would have greater insight into the battles. Who was fighting who, and for what, was the most interesting part. Figes goes into considerable details of the war over the bulk of the book and describes the 1856 Paris treaty where Russia was weakened. A good history for those interested.

[Brett C · Rating 4 out of 5]

Orlando Figes wrote a detailed account on a conflict I knew nothing about. He gave a very thorough back drop of events leading up to the conflict that initially was a Russian and Ottoman war. The start for conflict was motivated by religious factors (Orthodox, Muslim, and Catholic) and geopolitical (the Black Sea, expansion of the Russian Empire). Eventually politics and world influence led to an alliance of the Ottomans, French, English, and Sardinian forces against the Russian armed forces.

Uniquely enough this was a war seen with technology such as photography, medicine from Florence Nightingale and Russian field triage techniques, and the telegraph. On the other side the war was marred with disease (dysentery, cholera, typhus) that claimed more lives than combat casualties, the ripple effect of Russian defeat and the Great Reforms, and much more.

Overall this was an enlightening book for someone like me who knew nothing about this subject. I would highly recommend it to anyone interested or new to this conflict. Thanks!

[Anthony · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Last Crusade

If you only read one book on Russian history it should be A People’s Tragedy by Orlando Figes. But that should spur you onto his other works as he is one of the shining stars of modern historians. He may not have been able to recreate the magic of his first book, but he is able to tackle hard and complex topics, private life in Stalinist USSR and a cultural history of Russia. Then we come to Crimea, using Russian sources previously unavailable to English readers, Figes tells us this story from his perspective. From a man who understands Russia.

Using all of his gifts, Figes tells the story of the Crimean War, one of ordinary people, high politics and strange diplomacy. The origins of which are born in 1066. This was a religious war which begin with the rights of Christians in the a Holy Land and who had the right to protect the sacred sites. Russia naturally wanted to challenge the upstart president-come-emperor of Napoleon III, who had grand ideas for France. England wanted to maintain a ‘weak’ Ottoman Empire, so inevitably all four collided. Today we remember The Charge of Light Brigade and Florence Nightingale but little else. Figes tells these stories, but also so much more. In a war that dragged on for nearly two and a half years and cost over 750,000 lives. It achieved nothing and changed nothing. The only real loser is in fact Austria-Hungary which found itself internally isolated as it failed to pick a side. The beginning of the end for the old empire had started.

Orlando Figes is a fantastic writer. The language used and style of writing kept me glued to this book. Figes book shows how The Crimean War was in fact a religious war that had been born in Jerusalem and eventually dragged Great Britain into it, against popular opinion, to maintain the balance of power in Europe. It was the the first major war in Europe since The Congress of Vienna and the first test against a ‘European Army’ for many for both Britain and France. In the generation after the hero’s of the Napoleonic Wars, the failures, incompetence and tragedies are ever more poignant and reprehensible. One can only read in shock at the horrors and suffering the soldiers went through and Figes does not hold back on showing the reader war in all of its barbarity.

This is history I seek, to show how humans from different ages are similar to us, they make mistakes and bad decisions and display all the characteristics that we and our leaders make today. A real sense of knowledge of Russia flows through the book, which is expected as Figes is a Russian Historian and I can only feel that I wish that he wrote more on 19th Century Russia. I came away with a feeling bleakness and depression, much as I imagine the war to be in the cold rolling plains around Balaclava and Sevastopol. I recommend this book.

[David Eppenstein · Rating 4 out of 5]

A GR friend recently read and reviewed this book and it intrigued me. Aside from the the fact that the Crimean War was where Florence Nightingale came to fame and where Errol Flynn led the Charge of the Light Brigade I knew nothing about this bit of history. Feeling that this was another opportunity to correct my ignorance (even with my wife's enthusiastic assistance a daunting task) I ordered a copy of the book. Now having finished reading this more than thorough treatment I am impressed with the author's efforts. He rendered a pointless war that didn't need to be fought; that resulted in only trivial alterations of European borders and then only for a short time; that was politically and militarily insignificant and whose expense in lives, property, and national treasure defied any rational excuse for the effort in a way that made studying this war necessary.

One thing that was puzzling is that what I do know about this sad little war is all about the English involvement. I never knew that there were other nations involved and that all of them were allied to resist the Russian invasion of what were territories of the Ottoman Empire. At the end of the book the author does explain this problem but nevertheless the French general was the commander-in-chief of the allied armies, the French supplied 3 times the number of troops than the English did, the French did most of the fighting and had the greatest battlefield successes, and the French suffered greater casualties, 33% compared to the English 20%. Yet what we know of this war is all from the English point of view. The author's explanation makes sense but I think there is more to the story and deserves pondering.

The author, unfortunately, begins his treatment by engaging in a rather labored dissection of the cause for the war which was a historically common European reason for war, religion. Considering this war's value I think this area of the history could have been far less detailed as it had me nodding off several times. What caused the confrontation between Russia and the Ottomans was the fact that Russia had a treaty with the Ottoman Empire in which Russia became the protector of all Christians living in the Ottoman Empire. A very curious arrangement that I can only imagine resulted from the Ottoman Empire's perceived weakness and fear of antagonizing a major power like Russia. Sadly, the Ottoman muslims had a history of regarding non-muslims and Christians in particular as inferiors and subject to excessive taxations and assorted degradations and violence. As a result of such actions against Christians and especially the orthodox Christians of Southeastern Europe under the dominion of the Ottomans Tsar Nicholas I invaded the Ottoman territory of the Danube tributaries. Nicholas did so as the protector of Christians as per his treaty with the Muslims. Nicholas characterized this invasion as a holy war.

Nicholas' religious reasons may have been genuine but the English weren't buying it. It was no secret that the days of the Ottoman Empire were numbered and all the major powers expected it to collapse at almost anytime. England saw Nicholas' move as a pretense to be at the bedside when grandpa kicks the bucket. The Ottoman sultan also suspected the Russian motives and asked England for help and England was only too willing to lend support and grab a spot at the bedside as well. England however did not want to make this move alone and asked France to come along. France was not very interested but believed that if they didn't participate then if the Ottoman Empire did collapse then England would take full advantage of the situation and become the dominant power in the Eastern Mediterranean. That possibility was unacceptable so France decided to participate and now we have the makings for a lovely little war.

The military details of this war are covered in depth but most of the war is the siege of Sevastopol which lasts for nearly a year in an 18 month long war. Those interested in the details of the various engagements will not be disappointed but the actual fighting is not what redeems this war and makes it noteworthy. This was the first war in which public opinion played a significant role in shaping the motives and direction of the war. England's free press was able to cover the war and accurately report the progress or lack thereof via the new technology of the telegraph. The combination of the uncensored reporting and public opinion along with letters from frontline troops and officers brought the horrors of this war and the incompetence of its management by unqualified aristocratic officers to the attention of the folks at home. English troops were at a staging area when it was decided to attack a particular location 2 days march away. When the troops arrived at this location they hadn't eaten or slept in a couple of days but were immediately sent on the attack. Following the attack it was learned that all medical supplies were left at the staging area 2 days march away and that their rations were there as well. Without ambulances the dead and wounded remained on the battlefield for days. Incidents like this reoccurred and were exceeded in their stupidity and cruelty among the aristocratic leaders on both sides. The outrage of the home front is what begins to make this war significant.

The siege of Sevastopol will seem familiar to any reader of military history because the English and French engage in trench warfare in their attempts to take this city. There are several attacks of troops into the face of massed cannon and small arms fire with no realistic chance of achieving much except enormous casualties. After reading this, one will wonder why didn't this war make WWI impossible? How could the military and political leaders not have learned the lessons of this war? They didn't learn because this was the way war was always fought and since the generals and politicians aren't the ones dying then there was no reason to change. Instead of being a warning 1854 was a smaller scale dress rehearsal for 1914 with the same results.

What makes this war really significant is that it clearly demonstrates that to the royal and imperial houses of Europe war was a perpetual game of chess with European territories temporarily changing hands at the expense of countless lives. The industrialization of Europe and especially in England resulted in the creation of large middle class that was now better educated and affluent. The free press informed the people of the criminal incompetence of officers whose commissions were purchased without regard for qualification. The public learned of the mistreatment and neglect of their soldiers and sailors and the public demanded reforms. This is the first war in English history in which the valor of the common soldier was given public honor and inspired Queen Victoria to create the Victoria Cross, England's highest military honor given without regard to social station or rank. This war inspired all sorts of military reforms but the question remains, why didn't this war prevent or at least mitigate WWI?

[Jill H. · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book began rather slowly for me but I soon became engrossed in Figes' narrative of this somewhat "forgotten" war which claimed so many lives for so little. I have always been fascinated by the Crimean War and this book added to my knowledge as the author had access to sources not previously available to other authors. It was a war of incompetent leadership, missed opportunities, outdated military tactics, and rampant disease. Much mystique and legend regarding the war has grown over the years based solely on the suicidal charge of the Light Brigade, a perfect example of the miscommunication and lack of military leadership so prevalent in the Crimea. The author gives equal attention to the battles of Inkerman, the river Alma, and the siege of Sevastopol which were of much more importance than the infamous charge. Highly recommended for the lover of military history.

[Andrew · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Crimean War: A History, by Orlando Figes, is a large history of the Crimean War between Russia on one side, and France, Britain and the Ottoman Empire on the other. The war began over religious scuffling between Catholic and Greek Orthodox pilgrims in Jerusalem - then part of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman's had recently passed policy favourable to Catholic pilgrims at the expense of Orthodox pilgrims in the city, with religious rights and priorities being granted to Catholic churches at the behest of the French government. Previously, Russia had imposed similar measures on the Ottoman government for their pilgrims, and this tit-for-tat led to a strong response by the Russian government. An ultimatum was sent, and Russian troops sent into the Danubian principalities (Wallachia and Moldova), which were Romanian states under Ottoman suzerainty. France and Britain were both alarmed by this move, and sent their backing to the Ottoman government. Britain was quite concerned with growing Russian power in the region, and was afraid that the balance of power would shift to Russia on the continent. France, under the newly crowned Emperor Napoleon III, needed a strong military showing to gain prestige at home, and quell growing unrest within the army.

Russia's aims were many. First, they wished to gain the status of Protector of the Orthodox in the Ottoman Empire, in order to encourage an end to anti-Christian policies in the Porte, and give the Russian's a means to meddle in internal Ottoman affairs. The Russians also had pan-Slavic intentions, and were interested in seeing nation states created in Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania - all then under Ottoman control. Russia's borders with the Ottoman's were also contested in the Caucus mountains and in Bessarabia - in Romania/Moldova. Russia did not believe that Britain would join in the hostilities, and was also counting on the support of Austria, their long time ally. Russia had made diplomatic maneuvers in Britain that seemed to suppose an indifferent response from the British, but in fact Russophobes had become influential in the government, and Britain sided strongly with the Ottomans.

The first maneuvers of the war were in Romania, but the pan-Slavic elements of the early war disquieted the Austrian government, which had Slavic populations in Croatia and Bohemia. The Austrian government did not join the Russian war, and even mobilized troops to threaten the Russians into a withdrawal from the Danubian principalities. At this point in the war, the Russians also used their Black Sea fleet to bombard the Turkish coast, and destroyed the city of Sinope. The Turks encouraged an uprising by Muslim tribes in the Circassian and Caucus regions of Russia, and sent men and material in support. The other allies - France and Britain, began to debate plans for attack. Sorties into the Baltic (to encourage the Swedes to join the war against Russia) and toward St. Petersburg were rejected as too dangerous. Marching a land army into Poland to support a Polish uprising was strongly favoured by the French government, but ultimately rejected as it would have had a hostile reaction in Prussia and Austria, both states with their own Polish minorities.

The Crimea was the region chosen. This valuable peninsula allowed Russia to control Black Sea trade, and put pressure on the Ottoman government due to its important position in the Black Sea trading routes and its transportation capacities to Constantinople. If Britain and France could take the region from Russia, this valuable spot could be shaved off the Russian Empire and reduce its power in the region, and weaken it as a whole. War aims were grand from the allies, who wanted nothing more than the removal of Russian influence from Western Europe. Allied troops landed in the Crimea and quickly engaged the Russians in the Battle of Alma, in which the allies handed the Russian's their first defeat. However, allied mismanagement of the war would become clear soon after.

The allies then settled in for the Siege of Sevastopol, which would last many months and lead to thousands upon thousands of allied and Russian deaths. These deaths were the result of tragic mismanagement of logistics and supplies - most notably from the British. Greatcoats were not supplied to troops in the winter, tents were not weather proof, food was scarce and of poor quality, and hospital ships were incompetently equipped to the point of malicious neglect. The British public learned of these tidings through the press, and both mobilized in support of the troops and brought down the British government in support of a more rational approach to the war. British performance in the Crimean War was notably lacking, and the shortcomings encouraged a modernization of the army toward WWI.

France suffered from shortcomings as well, but the French army was much better equipped during the war. The French paved roads from the landing sight to the French camps around Sevastopol, and the French army was well supplied with winter gear, food and luxuries. French rifles were also far superior to Russian arms during the war, and could outpace the Russian's by hundreds of meters. The French, like the Russians and British, fell short in warfare. The Crimean War saw the eclipse of cavalry as a valuable fighting unit, with notable massacres of British and French cavalry units a commonality in early skirmishes. Siege works, trenches and artillery, as well as infantry bayonet charges against fortified trench lines, was the common maneuver during the war, leading to high casualties on both sides. These maneuvers were the per-cursors of trench warfare in the early twentieth century.

Russia's military was far behind in terms of military technology in the 1850's. It had peaked during the defeat of Napoleon in 1812, and had done little to improve since then. Russian rifles were horribly incompetent during the war, and a similar incompetency beset the Russian high command as that of the allies. Russian casualties were massive during the war, as generals changed plans mid maneuver, battalion commanders ignored orders, and Russian troops struggled to survive with little supplies. Russia made up for this in its sophisticated defensive engineering at Sevastopol, which kept the allies at bay for many months, and ground their armies to a halt. Russian field pieces and artillery were also up to standard during the war, and performed well against the allies, giving as good as they got during bombardments. The fall of Sevastopol marked the end of the war, as Russia, diplomatically isolated and humiliated by its loss, as well as recently facing the death of Tsar Nicholas I, was willing to seek peace. The French were also craving an end to hostilities. Popular opinion in France for the war was stagnant to hostile, and rumors of coup attempts began to alarm Emperor Napoleon. French rapprochement with Russia was swift, and their mutual hostility with Austria began to transcend even the war itself. Peace came in Paris, with Russia ceding a chunk of Bessarabia to the Ottomans, the Black Sea domination by Russian fleets coming to and end, and a mutual guarantee of the rights of Christians in the Ottoman Empire signed by all parties at the table.

Russia lost some territory, and its valuable hold over the Ottoman Empire. However, Russia was able to gain back all it had lost and more within about 20 years of the wars conclusion. Unrest and reprisal between Christian and Muslim communities in the Ottoman Empire led to the collapse of good-will to the Porte by Western powers, and allowed Russia to orchestrate the independence of Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Romania from the Ottomans, with a subsequent return of Bessarabian territories lost in the war. The growing power of Prussia/Germany and its defeat of Austria and France in land wars gave way to an agreement between Austria, Germany and Russia renouncing the Black Sea clauses in the peace treaty. Russia also stepped up its game in the Caucus, defeating rebels in the region and pushing back British influence in Persia. Even so, the dominance of Russia in European affairs had ended. The Concert of Europe alliance between Austria and Russia was broken and never repaired. French and British interests would remain aligned, and Russia would ultimately lose the game in the Ottoman Empire to the two Western powers interests. Russia held some sway in the Balkan's, but these fractious states would drag Russia into many dangerous wars, leading ultimately to the collapse of the Russian Empire after WWI. The Crimean War had minor territorial consequences, but massive consequences for the peace and stability of Europe.

Figes has written an interesting and in-depth account of the war, moving past legends like the Light Brigade and Florence Nightingale (although he talks about them) and instead examines the war through the eyes of the various belligerents in the war. The diplomatic and religious precursors to the war are examined, as well as the opening maneuvers and the immediate and future consequences. Battles are described in blow by blow accounts, examining maneuvers by each army, defensive lines, sorties and charges and so on in an in-depth look at the battles. The logistical considerations (or lack thereof) are examined. The politics and diplomacy behind the war are looked at in depth. This is a really well written account of the war and features good criticism, great analysis and an interesting comparison of perspective between the belligerents. I had some small concerns about sourcing in a few of the chapters, but aside from this, this is a great history book, and one worth a read for those interested in European history from this era, as well as those looking for a good, chunky military history book. A great read, and easily recommended to history buffs.

[Eric Byrd · Rating 4 out of 5]

The reputation of Nicholas I, the man who led the Russians into the Crimean War against the world, has been restored in Putin’s Russia. Today, on Putin’s orders, Nicholas’s portrait hangs in the antechamber of the presidential office in the Kremlin.

Putin repeated his crime - may he share his fate!

In her intimate diary of life at court, Anna Tiutcheva presents enough details of the Tsar’s final hours to rule out the serious possibility of suicide. But she also makes clear that Nicholas was broken morally, that he was so filled with remorse for his mistakes, for the disastrous war that he had brought on Russia through his impulsive foreign policy, that he welcomed death. Perhaps he thought that he no longer had God on his side.

[Jamie Smith · Rating 5 out of 5]

In this history of the Crimean War by Orlando Figes, the fighting does not begin until about a third of the way into the book. This is not a weakness, however, because understanding the events that led to the war is essential for making sense of what followed. It was a complex mix of politics, economics, imperial ambitions, and religion in its most arrogant, intolerant forms. Protestants, Roman Catholics, multiple minor Catholic sects, Russian Orthodox, and both moderate and fanatical Muslims were competing, often violently, for influence and control over the holy sites around Jerusalem. Tsar Nicholas I, who was rapidly succumbing to hereditary mental instability, was convinced by his priests that he was god’s chosen agent to expel the Muslims from Europe, conquer Constantinople and reconsecrate the Hagia Sophia as a church, and extend his empire all the way to Egypt.

Georges Clemenceau famously said that, “War is a series of catastrophes that results in a victory.” This statement encapsulates the Crimean War perfectly. It was badly planned, badly led, and badly supported. It was the first of the modern wars, where the killing power of the weapons vastly outran the development of tactical doctrine, and none of the armies were prepared for the huge numbers of terribly wounded soldiers that resulted. The Allies could not even agree on what they were fighting for or what intermediate objectives they should pursue. Napoleon III wanted a quick victory to silence criticism at home; the British government didn’t want to fight at all but found themselves hounded into it by the baying of an irresponsible press and politicians more concerned with their own advancement than the good of the country.

Lord Raglan was chosen to lead the British army. Sixty-five years old, a veteran of Waterloo, where he lost an arm to French canon fire, he was entirely unequal to the task. He was not the most incompetent general ever to command an army (there is a lot of competition for that distinction), but he made terrible decisions which cost the British important advantages, and threw away lives by the thousands. Any halfway competent general would have walked all over him. Fortunately, he was fighting the Russians, who had their own crippling military weaknesses, including a commanding general who faked being wounded so that he could turn over command and flee the battlefield. As always, the Russian soldiers were brave, hardy, and resourceful, but their training had consisted almost entirely of parade ground drill, and they were badly led at every level. They were also initially equipped with muskets, with an effective range of 300 yards, against the the French and British Minié rifles, which were far more accurate and lethal to 1200 yards.

The Ottoman Empire, correctly dubbed “the sick man of Europe” by the Tsar in the years before the war, was a collapsing state. Fundamentalist factions opposed all forms of modernization, leaving it militarily, industrially, and technically far behind the European powers, and corruption was endemic at all levels. The Russians had defeated them repeatedly in wars since the 16th century, conquering the Crimea and pushing them back on both sides of the Black Sea.

It is worth noting that there were no good guys in these wars. The Russians behaved like they behaved in Germany in the closing days of World War II, with massacres and mass expulsions everywhere they got the upper hand. The Turks, for their part, were no better. After putting down a revolt on the island of Chios, they hung 20,000 people and expelled 70,000 to slave markets, leaving the island almost depopulated.

The British and the French were reluctant allies. The Napoleonic wars were for them only as distant as the war in Vietnam is for us today, and there were many veterans still alive to keep the fires of distrust burning. However, neither country was willing to allow the Russians to dominate the Middle East, so they entered into a complicated relationship where they spent as much time worrying that their ally was trying to use them to further its own political and economic interests as they did trying to win the war.

The British had the stronger navy, but the French army was vastly superior in training, logistics, leadership, and professionalism. France provided two-thirds of the ground troops, the majority of whom had experience fighting in Algeria. They also had a conscript-based system, so most of their soldiers were peasants and thus adept at shooting, foraging, scouting, and building shelters. Their officers lived among them, sharing their hardships and gaining their confidence. When the French and British armies first put ashore the French arrived with an entire logistical support system: hospitals, bakeries, repair facilities, veterinarians, and everything else needed to sustain an army in the field. The British soldiers arrived with nothing but their packs and rifles.

The British army at this time was at its nadir in terms of professionalism and competence. It was just starting to make the transition from aristocratic pastime to a merit-based organization, and was filled with officers who owed their rank and position to their influence at court. Five of Lord Raglan’s ADCs were nephews of his. At the outbreak of war two-thirds of the regular army was overseas on colonial duties, so there was a rush to recruit anyone who was willing to join up in return for a recruitment bounty. The ranks were filled with debtors and the city underclasses and their performance showed it. Although they were able to learn the simplified rifle drill of the day, they had no experience fending for themselves in the country and suffered greatly. They arrived for the siege of Sevastopol with only their summer uniforms because – how many times has this happened? – the Army was sure the fighting would be over before winter. When the government did realize it needed to provide winter gear, the ships carrying winter coats and other essential cold weather equipment were lost in a freak storm as they sat offshore waiting to unload.

British enlisted personnel suffered horribly during the winter, with thousands dying of exposure, frostbite, and disease. Their situation was not helped by Raglan’s decision to have them spend the winter on the exposed hilltops overlooking Sevastopol rather than keeping most of them in the sheltered valleys below. Medical care for the sick and wounded was nightmarish, almost medieval in its primitive barbarity. Lord Raglan did not want these troops cluttering up his rear area, so he sent them to hospitals in northern Anatolia aboard overloaded transports, many of them crammed onto open decks without so much as a blanket. Mortality rates were what would be expected. Even those who survived to reach the hospitals found them a horrific experience of overcrowded wards and too few competent medical personnel. Florence Nightingale deserves all the praise she has received for bringing order to this chaos, often over the strenuous resistance of the official medical staffs, who could not abide the thought of a woman with authority.

While the enlisted soldiers suffered, the officers did not. Attending to the well-being of their troops was not a priority for officers at this time; that was a matter for the sergeants and the army support staff. Officers lived apart from their units, often miles away. The more senior among them lived comfortably in requisitioned houses, and even junior officers could find the means to construct secure shelters with furniture, stone floors, and stoves. Coal was never a problem. The army brought in vast quantities of it and allocated a daily ration to all personnel, officer and enlisted. For the enlisted, however, it meant a six or seven mile trek to the port, in freezing weather and up and down steep hills and ravines. Few of them made the journey, so there was always plenty for the officers, who could send their servants to get as much as they wanted.

In any case, many officers did not spend the cold months in Sevastopol anyway. They could request to spend the winter in warmer, more cosmopolitan places such as Constantinople, and only returned when spring had arrived. Officers frequently had no idea what their troops were enduring, and expressed surprise when they read about it in newspaper stories from home. This was a time when becoming an officer meant coming from a good family, knowing how to read, and being brave, dashing, and stupid.

Eventually the tide of battle turned from stalemate to favor the Allies. They started to get organized, brought in more and more artillery, and began relying heavily on private contractors to manage logistics, such as building a railroad from the British port to the front line sector. They were successful in cutting off most of the Russian supply lines and their continual bombardments inflicted casualties the Russians could not sustain. The key to the defense of Sevastopol was the powerful bastions that circled the city, and the key to the bastions was the critical and well fortified Malakov heights below which the entire city lay exposed. The French took Malakov with a powerful artillery barrage followed by a massive infantry assault. Casualties were horrendous, as the soldiers charged directly into massed cannon and musket fire, but eventually they were successful. The British attacked and won a smaller bastion to the west of Malakov, but their success was only possible with the French victory.

At that point Sevastopol became indefensible, and plans were made for evacuating the city. The Russians were fortunate to have a brilliant engineer who built a long pontoon bridge that others said was impossible, and what remained of the city was demolished as the troops left. Among the very last to go was Leo Tolstoy, in command of an artillery battery.

Negotiations then began to find a way to end the war. The French public was tired of the fighting, and Napoleon III had had his great victory with the capture of the city, so the sooner the war ended the better for France. Britain wanted to continue fighting because they had sacrificed so many soldiers without ever achieving a clear victory. Russia knew they needed to end the fighting but wanted what they considered honorable terms. Eventually something was worked out. Russia felt the treaty was a national humiliation, and immediately set about undermining it. Within twenty years they had regained everything the treaty had taken away.

If war is a series of catastrophes that end in victory, the catastrophes of the Crimean War did not stop with the peace treaty. Russia began an even greater push to remove Muslims from around the Black Sea, murdering and expelling hundreds of thousands. Meanwhile, armed Muslim bands – too much of a rabble to be called soldiers – attacked the Christian settlements in the Circassian region. In addition to rape and pillage their goal was to kidnap children for sale in the slave markets of Constantinople.

So, what was the cost? For Britain 98,000 soldiers and sailors were sent to the Crimea, and 20,813 died, 80% of them from sickness or disease. France sent 310,000; one in three did not return home. Turkey had 120,000 casualties, almost half of the total troops involved. Russia’s losses can only be guessed; the official count is 450,015 deaths, but estimates run as high as 600,000.

The war started because of the Tsar’s messianic pride; it continued because once soldiers started dying the public demanded pageantry and victories. It ended when the countries involved were losing public support and were willing to settle for whatever terms they could get. Nothing was resolved, no one’s honor was vindicated. Politicians today still make foolish decisions and involve their countries in pointless wars. Nothing gained in the fighting comes remotely close to making up for the bloodshed and loss of national treasure. The Crimean War was not the first meaningless war, and it was not the last. Such is the human condition.

[Mark · Rating 5 out of 5]

On July 18, 1854, two British warships under the command of Captain Erasmus Ommaeny bombarded the monastery on the main island in the Solovetskie Islands in the White Sea. The monastery itself had no real military or political value, but as Ommaney lacked the forces necessary to attack the main Russian base in the area at Archangel he decided that the monastery was a suitable enough target to win his men plaudits at home. After the outdated Russian batteries defending the monastery were destroyed, Ommaney demanded the surrender of the place; when this was refused he launched a second bombardment before sailing away in frustration, his bold military action having caused a total of six casualties, all among his own men.

There is no mention of Ommaney's adventure in Orlando Figes's history of the Crimean War, which is unfortunate considering how nicely it encapsulates the pointlessness that is a dominant theme of his assessment of the conflict. Its absence is also revealing, as it shows Figes's focus to be squarely on the eponymous theater of the war. There is some discussion of the combat in the Caucauses, a couple of passing mentions of fighting in the Baltic and no mention of battles anywhere else. This is also unfortunate, as it would have been interesting to see him employ the same penetrating analysis to these other overlooked theaters that he applies to the fighting in the Crimea. His book offers a reexamination of a often-overlooked conflict, one that demonstrates its underrated significance to the history of Europe in the 19th century.

Figes spends the first part of the book teasing out the complicated origins of the war. While many factors were involved, he considers the role of the Russian tsar Nicolas I to be the most significant one, giving greater weight to religion as a motivating factor in his actions than have previous historians. Yet this only served to define some of the particulars of what was an ongoing struggle between the major European powers over the fate of the Ottoman Empire and her territories. Pressured by Russia, the Ottomans received support from Great Britain and France, each of whom were motivated by different interests and seeking different goals.

Achieving their various goals eventually cost the sides involved far more than they had anticipated. When war did break out in 1854, the British and the French were divided as to what to do to strike at the Ottomans. Eventually an assault on the Russian Black Fleet and their main naval base at Sebastopol became their goal, motivated as much by the allies' desire to move their forces out of cholera-afflicted Bessarabia as anything else. Their landing and subsequent advance soon developed into a ponderous siege of the town. Here Figes excels in describing the siege and the major personalities involved, capturing the bravery of the men and the appalling errors which were made by their leaders in waging it. The fall of Sebastopol, along with Nicholas's death and succession by his reform-minded son Alexander II, led to a negotiated peace that was a humiliation, one which was soon reversed by a combination of adroit diplomacy and fortuitous timing. Figes concludes with a chapter in which he looks at the weight given to the conflict in the national imaginations of the various countries which sent men to fight and die there, a few of whom were immortalized but most ultimately forgotten.

Figes's book is a superb history of a often-overlooked war. His background in Russian history and his command of the Russian-language sources allows him to provide a far more complete examination of the conflict than exists in most English-language accounts, while his abilities as a writer help bring the war to life. In this sense Ommaneny's escapade can go unnoticed, overshadowed as it was by the far larger and bloodier farce that took place further south that Figes recounts with both humanity and insight. The result is a book that, while far from the final word on this complex and multifaceted conflict, is unlikely to be bettered anytime soon for the author's success in providing such an entertaining and informative account of a war that has long been denied its due.

[Christopher Saunders · Rating 5 out of 5]

Orlando Figes’ The Crimean War (published in the UK as Crimea: The Last Crusade) brings new perspective to that most baffling of 19th Century conflicts. Figes sketches the background of 19th Century imperial rivalries: religious disputes in the Holy Land, the decline of the Ottoman Empire, Britain’s fear of Russian imperialism, France’s Napoleon III seeking to strengthen his shaky throne with a military victory. Figes stresses the war’s religious dimensions, as indicated in its British title: Russia’s Nicholas I openly claimed the conflict a Holy War between Christian Russia and Muslim Turkey, while the British and French feared the “backward” Orthodox Russians more than the Turks, whose form of secular Islam they compared to Unitarianism. Whether or not one accepts Figes’ focus on religion, it certainly provided. The follies of the Allied campaign at Sevastopol are graphically recounted: the poor leadership, inept tactics, disease and grinding siege warfare which raised a massive outcry in the UK and France. The British Army comes off poorly with its aged aristocrats (including Wellington’s former secretary, Lord Raglan) using Napoleonic tactics in a modern conflict; the French sport a more professional army, and wind up shouldering the burden of the fighting even if their leaders (the sickly St. Arnauld and notorious General Canrobert, aka “Robert Can’t”) aren’t much better than Raglan. But Russian leadership is decidedly uninspired, as well, from botched counterattacks at Balaclava and Inkerman to Prince Menshikov’s decisions to divert much-needed reinforcements to peripheral theaters (redeemed by the brilliant engineering work of Eduard Todleben). All of which will be familiar to Crimean War buffs, and Figes treats peripheral theaters (from Russian punitive expeditions against Muslim tribes in the Caucasus to Britain’s naval campaign in the Baltic) much more superficially than, say, Trevor Royle’s volume. Figes offers little of the Turkish perspective on the war, emphasizing how little material is available to researchers. But for the fluid writing and rich variety of perspectives (profiling key military and political leaders, diarist Fanny Duberly, nurses Florence Nightingale and Mary Seacole and Leo Tolstoy, serving in the Russian trenches) make it a welcome addition to literature on the Crimea, and a solid introduction for newcomers.

[Caroline · Rating 5 out of 5]

A comprehensive history of the war with excellent chapters on the aftermath in world politics and national identity.

[on the aftermath of the war]

The Crimean War reinforced in Russia a long-felt sense of resentment against Europe. There was a feeling of betrayal that the West had sided with the Turks against Russia. It was the first time in history that a European alliance had fought on the side of a Muslim power against another Christian state in a major war. …

All around the Black Sea rim, the Crimean War resulted in the uprooting and transmigration of ethnic and religious groups. They crossed in both directions over the religious line separating Russia from the Muslim world.…

But if the Paris treaty made few immediate changes to the European map, it marked a crucial watershed for international relations and politics, effectively ending the old balance of power, in which Austria and Russia had controlled the Continent between themselves, and forging new alignments that would pave the way for the emergence of nation states in Italy, Romania and Germany.

The Crimean War provides a thorough and engaging explanation of the causes and course of the war. It also lays out subsequent events that were precipitated by its peace settlement as well as by unsettled issues and persistent national attitudes. Figes’s well organized history makes the war seem like the essential pivot point between the Treaty of Vienna after the Napoleonic Wars and the start of WWI. I recommend it very highly.

Figes decides the most important causes of the conflict were a Russian religious fervor to put all Orthodox believers under jurisdiction of Christian nations (if possible Russia itself) and the western European Russophobia that feared the Bear would persist in the expansionist phase started by Catherine the Great until it reached India and gobbled up eastern Europe. The critical players were Nicholas I of Russia, growing increasingly unstable, and the British prime minister, Palmerston. But there were hosts of players on the diplomatic field in the years leading up to hostilities: Turcophile Englishmen like Urquart and Canning, Emperor Napoleon of France who needed legitimization and was thinking strategically to future moves regarding Italian unification, pan-Slavic activists in the Balkans, Polish exiles, etc etc. Figes is meticulous in identifying the motives and communications among these groups.

The war itself could probably have been avoided, but in Figes’s view the role of the press in forming fervent pro-war public opinion made this the first modern war in that sense. The British public was bombarded with scare stories about the Russians, so that cooler heads in the cabinet were forced into a position they didn’t want to be in. On the other side, Nicholas and his successor Alexander were stubborn throughout. It was also a modern war in the need for decision-making power to filter down to smaller units, the use of steamships, and longer-range rifles.

The descriptions of the war itself are horrifying. The British effort was criminally disorganized. The soldiers lived in indescribable conditions, particularly during the winter. The French did much better, and in fact carried on the bulk of the fighting; they were primarily responsible for the victory, such as it was. All sent stupefying numbers of men into sure death, storming enemy strong points. But many, many more died of disease.
And then there were the filthy hospitals—and the arrival of Florence Nightingale. She was not the only one to save lives; there is a nice portrait of a pioneering Russian surgeon, Nikolai Pirogov.

But Figes finest achievement is showing how the war and the peace terms altered the geopolitics of the region. In particular, there were mass relocations of ethnic groups based on religion that affected the Balkans especially. France was in the ascendant again after its post-Napoleonic second-tier position, and Britain’s reputation suffered. Russia felt abused by the western powers, and took Sebastopol as the epitome of the absolute dedication of citizen to country, willing to die for Russia whether in 1812, 1857, or eventually in the siege of Leningrad.

My reading notes:

--The Charge of the Light Brigade was caused by garbled instructions, and personal dislike among the officers, but it actually helped turned the tide of the battle; I had thought it was futile.
--None of the combatants could justify the war with the real reason they were fighting; they all needed cover stories.
--Early on, Turkish soldiers arrived to help the allies, but the allies ordered them forward without provisions or rest, and what provisions they got were not halal, so they could not eat. They carried out a reasonable retreat, were berated and treated terribly for the rest of the war.
--How often both the Russians and the allies lost a chance to end the war by failing to pursue an enemy in retreat.

Again, an extremely useful book. I am not a historian so I have no way to judge how balanced a picture Figes paints, but in comparison to Paul Johnson’s The Birth of the Modern, which I’m also reading and which has a blatant conservative slant, this seems even. This book is very well written; an immense amount of material is just where it ought to be. There are useful maps, and fascinating plates that reflect the first war with photographic evidence, war correspondents, and fairly rapid communication from front to capitols.

[Jan Rice · Rating 4 out of 5]

Sarah C. (S. C. M.) Paine, who has been a professor of history and grand strategy for 23 years at the U.S. Naval War College, had an article in the Wall Street Journal opinion section on Wednesday May 17. The article galvanized me into starting this book review, even though I hadn't fully digested the book. She said Ukraine should retake Crimea not simply because it belongs to Ukraine but because Sevastopol is the best naval base on the Black Sea. She said, "Until Russia loses Sevastopol, the Middle East and the Horn of Africa will continue to churn, as Moscow retains veto power over regional peace, which it has had since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war." She said Russia can remain a power broker as long as the region remains unstable; otherwise a "third-rate economy like Russia" would have little influence in those regions but keeps thing stirred up by "arming the side less willing to settle." The loss of Sevastopol would sever Russia's ability to reach its Syrian bases and areas further along the Eastern Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa. It would have to reach the Mediterranean via its other fleets from more distant ports. Russia currently keeps African dictators in power in return for control of resources that benefit Russia and not Africa. The mercenary Wagner Group plays factions against each other to foment the frozen conflicts that permit wealth to be extracted for the benefit of Russia. As for the Middle East, Paine says Sadat was able to sign the Camp David Accords only in 1978 after breaking its friendship agreement with the USSR, thereafter being able to end the frozen War of Attrition, which had to come before the Accords. Likewise, the Palestinian, Lebanese, Syrian, Libyan, Yemini, Ethiopian, Somali, and Sudanese conflicts remain frozen, as well as other conflicts in Africa. Without Sevastopol, Russia couldn't support its bases and maintain these conflicts for its own benefit.

I've tried to give the gist of the column and an old-fashioned reference because I have the print edition but lack access to the WSJ epaper. And even if I did have the link, nonsubscribers wouldn't be able to open it.

The article is stark. Although I just finished Walter Russell Mead's Arc of a Covenant (2022), in which he said Russia (and China) would continue to disrupt the Western world order any way they can, I did not get this stark, clear picture as presented by Paine. However, Anne Applebaum and Jeffrey Goldberg writing in the June 2023 Atlantic also point to the necessity to maintain the vision of retaking Crimea. They say that a year ago no one believed Ukraine could defend Kyiv either and that the vision regarding Crimea, which Russia has turned into a virtual aircraft carrier, is also no dream. They end their article "The Counteroffensive" with a vision similar to Paine's as to Russia's political impact on the region and world, albeit without specific reference to Sevastopol. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/...

All of which is to say Crimea is important.
...even though none of these articles actually mention the Crimean War.

Orlando Figes' The Crimean War had been on my want-to-read list since 2013, when I saw reviews and/or read discussions by other Goodreads members. I finally acquired the book and listened to the audio version, completing it in February of this year. The prose is clear and the book was well narrated. I had the text which I occasionally referred to. But I didn't really study/break it down. When it came time to review, I struggled. I started studying/reviewing but other books and demands intervened. Now the current world situation has highlighted Crimea once again. And so I was galvanized into studying -- at least the first chapters on the historical backdrop. I am more interested in the causes of the war than on the fighting and strategy, which is not according to Figes' expectations; he thought people would be impatient with the history and might want to skip to the fighting. But for me the history is paramount.

According to Figes, people have thought the Crimean war (1853-1856) wasn't that important. But if not a world war, its scale was global and impact lasting in ways belied by its localized name. The causes included the Eastern Question -- the response to the deterioration of the Ottoman Empire and how that would imbalance the relationship of the other powers; the causes also encompassed Christian-Muslim relations and the impact of European Russophobia. The British claimed their motives were to defend the Turks from being bullied by Russia, but actually they wanted (a) to weaken Russia's ability to rival them in Asia and (b) to advance their religious and free-trade interests in the Ottoman Empire. Napoleon III wanted to restore the fortunes of France and advance the liberal notion of Europe as a family of independent nations. But meanwhile, his Catholic subjects were pushing him toward a war of religion. Together, the British and French saw the conflict as one of liberty and European civilization against medieval-flavored Russian despotism. Tsar Nicholas I saw himself as on a crusade to defend Christianity against the Ottomans. He miscalculated the response of the other European powers, which sounds familiar in terms of today's politics.

According to the author, Figes, the war was a watershed. Since the prior century, Russia, Austria, and Prussia had maintained their "Holy Alliance" through which they had agreed to unite in suppressing revolutionary nationalist movements within their spheres of influence.

And all that's from the introduction!

In that day and age, empires and their maintenance represented the conservative force in the world, whereas nationalism (= the desire to be governed by one's own = anti-imperialism) was the liberalizing force serving to fracture the foundations of the empires. The alliances made over the Crimean War drove a wedge between Austria and Russia. It was after this war that the new nation states of Italy, Romania, and Germany emerged. The war left the Russians with a grudge against the West for having sided with the Muslim Turks against them and with "frustrated ambitions in the Balkans that would continue to destabilize relations between the powers" and lead to further crises, eventually to WWI. The Crimean War involved the Ottoman Turks, in a big way -- the first major European conflict that did -- "It opened up the Muslim world of the Ottoman Empire to Western armies and technologies, accelerated its integration into the global capitalist economy, and sparked an Islamic reaction against the West which continues to this day."

In 1846 the "Greeks" and "Latins" (Orthodox Christians and Catholics) had an Easter fight in the Church of the Holy Sepulcher that left 40 dead and wounded many others, despite the Ottoman policemen stationed in the church to keep peace. The Holy Land was Ottoman territory, and so it had fallen to the Turks to try and oversee the dispute over who could restore the church's roof, since under Islamic law the roof's owner would own the building. That set-to highlights the often overlooked role of religion in the Crimean War.

But the more I tried to understand the outline of history, the more confused I became. So let me back up for a millennium or so.

The ancient Rus were Norsemen, and Norsemen made their mark all over the known world in the early medieval period -- primarily Danes in the British Isles and Western Europe, where local rulers had to pay Danegeld, and, in Eastern Europe, the Swedes. There is disagreement, of course, but I want a simple outline according to the predominant line of thought.

By the year 1000, most of these Norseman had become Christian. I mention that because Russia has legends about the conversion of the Rus, but it was all the Norsemen, not only the Rus.

In Eastern Europe the Rus broke down into various kingdoms, while Norse and Slavic cultures merged. Then, Mongols inundated Eastern Europe and dominated the area for several centuries beginning in the thirteenth. Perhaps unsurprisingly, tsarist Russia subsequently defined itself in terms of "us-and-them," not having regained its independence until well into the fifteenth century. The Tatars, with whom the Ottomans eventually settled Crimea in order to nail it down, as empires do, are the last remnants of Genghis Khan's Golden Horde. Even after the tide had began to turn from the Muslims (Mongols and Turks) to the Russians, tsarist Russia was left with an us-and-them mentality based on religion more than on borders. Tsarist Russia saw itself as rightful heir to the Byzantine Empire. After Russia's eighteenth century annexation of Crimea under Katherine the Great, fear of the Tatars remained a reality even though the Tatars were not rebellious. The Turks did not let go of Crimea all at once, and there was a subsequent dispute about who would be the khan (governor) of the Tatars In Crimea that led to mutual reprisals and expulsions.

I did wonder if the countries of Western Europe had themselves behaved more nearly medieval during earlier centuries, but by the nineteenth century they were looking down their noses at Russia.

The Mongols, during their centuries in charge, gave power to the Russian Orthodox Church, and it makes sense they went in that direction instead of giving power to various kings or warlords. After those centuries the Church continued to wield power. Similarly it looks like the Ottoman Turks gave power to the various national churches in the European parts of their empire. Thus during the years of revolution, people coalesced under their various national churches.

Regis gives great importance to the "Russophobia" that developed in Western Europe, particularly in Britain and France. Some concerns were realistic, since Russia was invested in extending its power to include their coreligionists, of which there were ten million in the Balkans and in the area that was later to become Romania etc, but some concerns were fantastic, Regis says, for example, that Russia would invade or take over India, or that it would take over portions of Eastern Europe then under the Ottomans and, in essence, treat the Ottomans as the British treated India. The territorial expansion of Russia during the eighteenth century and their military success against Napoleon I magnified their Russophobia. In the eyes of Britain and France, Russians were the Asiatic barbarians aiming to counter Western liberal values, suppress democratic revolution, and destroy civilization.

When Mehmet Ali of Egypt, a vassal of the Ottoman sultan, marched on Constantinople to demand hereditary rule for himself, France and Britain failed to respond to the Turks' cry for help. Only Russia came to their aid, after which the Russians could demand concessions that strengthened their naval position in the Black Sea. Nor were the Russians transparent about all the concessions they received, leading to more fear and paranoia. Britain began to support the Shah in Persia, bolster the Muslim warlords of the Caucuses in their guerilla resistance against Russia, and, most of all, offer support to Turkey, all of which aimed to buffer themselves against Russian power. The British attitude toward the Ottomans was reformist. Western Europeans of the day saw the Ottomans as civilized and cosmopolitans and the Russians as savages. The Ottomans needed to modernize, it was thought -- but that did not happen due to corruption and vested interests in the status quo within the military, the clergy, and even among the church potentates installed under the Ottomans.

Then came the national revolutions of the nineteenth century: Balkan, Polish (trying to break free from Russia), and in Wallachia (Romania), where Russia expected the Turks to restore order. These revolutions were popular causes in the West, and reprisals against Catholics galvanized France. I'm leaving out Mehmet Ali's second march on the Sultan, this time supported by France. But Britain feared Russia more than France, and both sought to protect the Turks from Russian "bullying." Earlier, Russia had seen it couldn't simply take over Eastern European territory from the Ottomans without risking British and French wrath, so had adopted the "weak neighbor" policy toward the Ottomans: keeping them alive but weak. And all and sundry were interfering with the Turks under the guise of caring for their own coreligionist, for example, issuing passports and trade agreements directly to its Christian citizens . Russia's marching into "the principalities" (Ottoman Wallachia and Moldavia) to suppress the revolt there was close to the final straw. Austria wouldn't risk war, turning down Nicholas' proposal on how to divvy up the Ottoman European lands and looking westward instead.

Muslim religious leaders under the Sultan demanded war. Catholic public opinion in France was pro-war. (And Napoleon III wanted to restore French glory by fighting Russia.) British public opinion too was pro-war. Nicholas sent a military person as an envoy instead of a diplomat, adding fuel to the pro-war fire.

The Russophobia ramped up. There was a particular forgery whose oldest versions were from the early part of the eighteenth century, the Testament of Peter the Great, on the Russian plans to take over the world. It was cooked up "by various Polish, Hungarian and Ukrainian figures connected to France and the Ottomans" that especially influenced Napoleon III. While not believed in full in Britain, its general thrust was accepted. Regis says it was published in France in 1812 in advance of Napoleon I's Russian Campaign, and that when Russia invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the Christian Science Monitor, Time magazine and the British House of Commons cited it in explanation of what Russia was doing. Other letters were forged in the decades before the Crimean War.

And this is as far as I can get at present in understanding what happened.

Of course the war was terrible: three-quarters of a million soldiers lost (two-thirds of whom were Russian) and untold civilians, to disease, siege, or massacre. It was the last war in which aristocrats commanded British armies simply because they were aristocrats. Soldiers were not dressed for the seasons. They faced industrial warfare and trench warfare. It seems they were imbued with a sense of duty, so in that regard, "theirs but to do or die" rings true. "The Charge of the Light Brigade" seems better known than other aspects of the war; also Florence Nightingale; medical triage was invented; public opinion and the press were major factors for the first time -- perhaps enough were literate.

Now that I have gotten some semblance of this history into my head, I must go back to the beginning and think about what part of the current situation may be being influenced by Russophobia. At the time, there was a mixture between reality and paranoia. The "realist" position (John J. Mearsheimer) that the West made Russia invade Ukraine has been refuted since Russia isn't attacking Finland or Switzerland, nor is it afraid in Kaliningrad. It knows NATO is defensive. But, does the opinion column with which I began, and which had so galvanized me, contain unrealistic elements?

[Anastasia Fitzgerald-Beaumont · Rating 5 out of 5]

It’s Good Friday, April 10, 1846. Jerusalem is packed with pilgrims on an Easter weekend that happened to fall on the same date in both the Latin and Orthodox calendars. The mood is tense. The two religious communities had been arguing over who has the right to be first to carry out the rituals at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, one of the holiest places in Christendom, standing on the spot where Jesus is said to have been crucified.

That Friday was to be anything but good. The Catholics arrived only to find that the Greeks were there first. A fight broke out, priest against priest, soon to be joined by monks and pilgrims from the respective camps. People fought not just with fists but anything they could get a hold of – crucifixes, candlesticks, chalices, lamps and incense burners. Wood was torn from the sacred shrines and used as clubs. Knives and pistols were smuggled into the church. By the time the Mehemet Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Jerusalem, had restored order forty people lay dead.

This dreadful incident, all in the name of a shared belief, marks the departure for Orlando Figes’ Crimea, the Last Crusade, the first full account of the Crimean War that I have read. I know Figes well, one of the best specialists on Russian history in the English-speaking world, the author of the superlative A People’s Tragedy: the Russian Revolution, 1891-1924. Although his history of the Crimean War lacks the range and power of the latter book, he has done a tremendous service, placing the conflict firmly within the context of the Eastern Question – the issues arising from the continuing decline of the Ottoman Empire – and European power politics as a whole.

I’m not completely convinced by his ‘crusading hook’, I have to say. Yes the war did begin with a conflict over who had the best claim to protect the holy places within the Turkish empire, the Catholic French or the Orthodox Russians, and again, yes, Tsar Nicholas I was strong in his conviction that he was a defender of the ‘true’ faith, a defender of the Orthodox faithful in all the Turkish lands. But almost immediately, when the fighting started, the religious issue was obscured by more general issues arising from European geopolitics. Besides, a war which involved Turkish Muslims, British Protestants and French Catholics, on one side, against Orthodox Russians, on the other, does not look much like a ‘crusade.’ The Tsar may have begun with crusading thoughts, but before his death in March 1855 he was more preoccupied by the decline in Russian power.

Figes' greatest service has been to rescue the conflict from fragmentation and partiality, the preserve, at best, of amateur military historians, more interested in the clash of arms than the reason for the clash of arms. The war may have been tragic and ‘unnecessary' but it still marks and important stage in the development of European politics and diplomacy. It marks the end of the Concert of Europe, the arrangement between the powers to police the settlement of 1815 emerging from the Napoleonic Wars. It marks the break in the informal alliance between Russia and Austria that helped preserved that settlement in aspic, allowing for the rise of new nations like Italy and Germany. So, in all, it was so much more than the Charge of the Light Brigade, the Thin Red Line and the Lady with the Lamp.

So far as the conflict itself is concerned there was really no need, as the author shows, for the Crimean War ever to have been the Crimean War. There was no need, in other words, for the landing on the Crimean peninsula, followed by the lengthy, and bloody, siege of the port of Sevastopol, for the simple reason that the Russians had suffered a serious tactical and strategic reverse in early 1854.

They had previously occupied the semi-autonomous Ottoman provinces of Moldavia and Walachia, now Romania, with a view to pushing south of the Danube in a march on Constantinople. But unexpectedly tough resistance by the Turks at the fortress of Silistria prevented any further advance. When this was coupled with the landings of the French and British at Varna, in what is now Bulgaria, and the threat of Austrian intervention, the Russians had no choice but to withdraw from the occupied provinces. But the blood was up; the war had to run its course, Russia had to be humbled; Sevastopol had to fall.

Crimea marks a vital stage in the development of warfare, combining elements of the old and the new, combining the Napoleonic Wars at one remove and the First World War at the other. It was the last of the old wars, if you like, containing the seeds of the new. Although it may come as a surprise, the campaign on the Crimea itself, and its eventual outcome, was far more a French than a British affair. The French contributed many more troops. It was their capture of the Malakhov redoubt in September 1855 that led to the fall of Sevastopol and the end of the war.

Diplomatically their role was also decisive. Palmerston, who succeeded the far less militant Aberdeen as prime minister in 1855, rather took on the role of Cato the Elder. Cartago delenda est was his war cry. His Carthage was Russia, which he intended to remove forever as a threat to the British Empire. If he had had his way the Russian borders would have returned to those of 1709, before Peter the Great’s victory over the Swedes at Poltava. The press was behind his war-drive, the people were behind him, even the Queen was behind him; the French were not. He did not have his way because Napoleon III had other visions. Britain may have had the fleet, but the French had the army.

This is a good story, an important story told with verve and style, told in a wholly compelling fashion with plenty of balance and nuance, placing the Crimean War in proper context. The author is to be commended for his industry and his scholarship, for writing a first-class account of an important passage in European history.

[Sotiris Karaiskos · Rating 5 out of 5]

A complete book on the Crimean War that starts from far behind to reveal all its causes and continues to provide a wealth of information on every aspect of this conflict. Interestingly, the author does this in a way that makes the book part of the serious historiography but also completely accessible to the general public. It is certainly ideal for those who know little about this subject, with most of them coming from historical myths, they will learn much, and will leave these myths behind.

[Mike · Rating 3 out of 5]

It’s still a little difficult for me to believe that the French and the British were relying on freaking travel writing for the logistics of their attack on Crimea, that some of the soldiers thought they were headed to a jungle, and a little more than 150 years later we can take virtual walks there. Makes you wonder what Napoleon had to work with. But one of the most interesting parts of this book, for me, was reading that the Crimean War coincided with a sort of information boom. Britain ended the newspaper stamp duty in 1855, allowing for a daily newspaper that could be afforded by the middle class, and the advent of steamships and the telegraph allowed news to travel faster than ever before.

But there was also a difference in the quality of the writing and reporting; in years past, according to Figes, most accounts of war had been written by toadyish specially-designated officers who toed the company line. The Crimean War was one of the first wars in which war correspondents, especially British ones, sent by newspapers, played a large role. One British journalist, William Russell, wrote about the ill-preparedness of the military (especially to equip the soldiers with appropriate winter clothing-seems like everyone makes that mistake when invading Russia) to the extent that it both influenced public opinion (and therefore the thinking of some of those in the British government) and prompted a British commander to suggest that Russell was committing treason.

Some of the earliest photographs of war were also taken here, although it was still difficult or impossible to take pictures of things or people in motion. One famous photograph, included in the book, is called In The Shadow of the Valley of Death, and shows an open field scattered with cannonballs. When I read that the photographer had arranged the cannonballs there for the sake of the picture, I had a strange feeling. It’s not that I blame the photographer; it’s not like he produced the cannonballs out of thin air. But it’s a familiar feeling. Lately I’ve been watching videos and looking at photos from Ukraine. A few days ago, a friend of mine posted a video from YouTube of a man in a military outfit speaking for about a minute, then ordering two men, who were facing the wall, to be shot. I knew who the man ostensibly was, or what side he ostensibly represented, but I had no way of knowing if that was the truth. I also didn’t know who the men who’d been executed were, nor do I know for sure that they were really killed. By contrast actually, now that I think about it, In the Shadow…’s manipulation, if you can even call it that, is much, much more innocent than some of what exists today. And better technology doesn’t necessarily make things less ambiguous.

Another thing I found strange was the formality of the war. After battles, apparently, flags would be raised while men from both sides came out to the clear the field of the dead and wounded. During these truces, according to Figes, the Russians would talk and joke with the English and the French. Occasionally they’d drink together. Sentries on duty at night would meet halfway and share cigarettes and speak to each other in the few words and phrases they had in common. The distance of over a hundred years, as well as how common and habitual it seems it was back then for human life to be sacrificed indiscriminately, sometimes makes me wonder if people valued their lives less or feared death as much as we do now. This book reminded me that, while some attitudes (about the value of physical courage, the worthiness of dying for religion) were different, in general they probably did fear death just as much. And a lot of the soldiers involved in the war, educated or not, were bright enough to realize that it was all bullshit, and that their supposed enemies were just as much helpless pawns as they were.

[Bettie · Rating 3 out of 5]

To look into given the recent developments

Orlando Figes is a somewhat disgraced author, however I would still like a flick through this.

May 2014: President Putin's visit to Crimea was welcomed there but criticised by Washington BBC news

[Gisela · Rating 4 out of 5]

More history told so well. I'm a fan of Mr Figes. I do wonder what might have become of me if I'd have had Mr Figes' books on the school curriculum.

[Liam Ostermann · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is by far the finest Englsih language history of the Crimean War - it is not a crowded field admittedly almost every other work of any note was probably published back in the 1960's and all of them were viewed the war almost exclusively from the UK standpoint and interest. France, the Ottoman empire, never mind the Russians barely got a look-in once war was declared. If there was any author who could drag the Crimean War out of its footnote to a bellicose 19th century poem it is Orlando Figges and he does a wonderful job of presenting a multifaceted portrait of the war, its combatants from all nations and its ramifications.

But unfortunately despite Mr Figges enormous talents the Crimean War remains a ridiculous event which it is very difficult to remain interested in. Mr. Figges tries hard to place the event in a central place in European history - it was the biggest European conflict between Waterloo and WWI but size isn't everything. It cannot supplant the Franco Prussian War and the Paris Commune of 1870-71 as the key 19th century war. Nor can its results be seen as epoch making or radically altering what was going to happen.

In Russia the defeat in Crimea (and Nicholas I convenient death) ensured that Alexander II would be able to launch into the reforms that would eventually bring about the demise of serfdom. But this would have happened anyway - the Tsars since Catherine II had been looking for a way of disentangling the knot of the need of the monarch for the support of the nobility and serfdom which supported the nobles. Even the nobility recognised that serfdom had to go, they travelled throughout Europe and they could see how far Russia was falling behind. Without the defeat Nicholas I might have lived longer which might have delayed reforms but they would have come.

The sad decline of the Ottoman Empire would have continued with or without the war. The failures of the state were rooted in its past glories and more recent defeats in the wars of Potemkin for Catherine II which had stripped the empire of vast tracks of territory. But more importantly, like the Austrian empire it was an empire inimical to the new growth in nationalist feelings. The Ottoman and Austrian empires had multiple challenges all of which existed independent of the Crimean War. That war might have hastened or retarded things but it did not radically change anything.

Figges tries to make a case for the importance of the Crimean War - I just don't see it - it may be explicable, but it is still absurd. This is the best account of the war in English and I couldn't resist reading it but I doubt I would have the desire to read it again.

[Jerome Otte · Rating 4 out of 5]

A solid, well-written general history of the Crimean War.

Figes describes the history of the war from all sides and his coverage of the war’s origins is particularly strong. Although many of the wars after the Napoleonic era seemed like minor affairs, Figes stresses that the Crimean War was most definitely not, and he rams home the huge amount of casualties among combatants and civilians, how primitive the Russian war effort could be, and how amateurish the British could be (Figes is not terribly sympathetic to Lord Raglan)

Figes also ably discusses the war’s consequences, describing how it disrupted the post-Napoleonic “Concert of Europe,” how Sardinia’s role contributed to France’s decision to intervene in Italy, and how postwar Russia turned to domestic reform and became even more suspicious of western Europe. Figes also emphasizes the war’s status as the first “to be brought about by the pressure of the press and by public opinion.”

Some more and better maps would have helped, though, and Figes’ coverage of events in the Baltic, Anatolia and the Caucasus might strike some as relatively sparse. Also, Figes writes that the Austro-Hungarians were in constant retreat in the Balkans (they were?) The military operations take up only about a third of the narrative, and Figes doesn’t always provide much analysis or explanation here. Figes also writes that the war was the first “total war,” but this argument seems underdeveloped. He also argues that millet system contributed to the Ottomans’ decline, although the replacement of the millet system with nationalism seems more plausible. Elsewhere Figes writes that the war was primarily religious, but the rhetoric of the time wasn’t terribly unique, and it does seem like empire and the Eastern Question were more significant. He also argues that public opinion was a major factor in the war’s origins, which might be true for Britain, probably less so in France.

A balanced, insightful and engaging history.

[Pavel · Rating 4 out of 5]

I strongly recommend this book to anyone who has any interest in current conflict in Ukraine/Crimea, who wants to understand historical, geopolitical and political roots of idiotic modern strife between Russia and the West and who at the same time is sick of media taking sides and in fact enkindling the conflict by that.

The book itself only covers that old XIX century war between Russia and Allies (GB, France and Turkey) of course, but it reflects current events so much it is even scary. O. Figes, being an English professor, manages to remain almost neutral, at least he finds where Allies and Russia and Turkey went wrong and which stupidity and inability to understand one another have lead to war at those times. When Crimean War itself breaks out Figes is starting to struggle with keeping this neutrality, with Russian soldiers always being wild and cowardly, and Allied soldiers always being brave, but that's a forgivable setback. In the end the books is a thriller, it is so vividly shown in it, how all this war shit builds itself from nothing! I'm liking it a lot! (haven't finished yet)

[James · Rating 4 out of 5]

Figes hits the nail on the head in his introduction, many of the earlier works covered mostly the British battles and didn't touch upon the geopolitical or religious causes of the Crimean War. (I've read a couple in the distant past like this.) How many times can the Charge of the Light Brigade be rehashed? There's a large chunk of history I was unaware of, the initial conditions and the aftermath are covered in detail based on documents from all sides of the conflict.

First bits of interest are the religious aspects, the Russian Orthodox and Roman Catholics were fighting over access to churches in the Holy Land while the Muslim Ottomans tried to keep the peace It seems a bit insane that this is cited as one of the flashpoints for this war but then the Russian Tsar, Nicholas I was a bit wacky and the future British Prime Minister(1855) was a rabid Russophobe. This war forced many from their ancestral lands and remapped much of the religious landscape for this region causing problems that are still present to this day.

Many precursors of modern warfare are here, the French have an experienced, conscription based, well equipped army with logistical support with many middle class officers. Contrast that with the British army, noble half-witted officers enjoying a gentleman's life while the poor line soldier starved and froze because of poor planning and lack of supplies. The remains of the 30 Years War are still around, the Russian and Ottoman armies are trying to modernize but it's a hopeless undertaking given their resources.

One can think of the Crimean War as the preliminary for the British and French chopping up the Ottoman Empire for their own ends while claiming to help the Turks. (Part 1 of many!) It's one of the roots for our current Middle East mess. An excellent history that covers much more than the military aspects.

It's 5 stars if you have an interest in this obscure war.

[Dan Sasi · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent history of the Crimean war which I knew very little about prior to reading this.

[Heinz Reinhardt · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book by Orlando Figes was the first book I have ever read on The Crimean War, and outside of a more detailed, operational and tactical military history, I am not entirely sure I will ever read a more complete one. Figes makes a point to spend a great deal of time relaying that the causes of the conflict, while certainly varied and many layered, had at their center something that the more materialistic modern world finds hard to fathom: faith and spirituality.

To keep this review brief, Mr. Figes points out that at the heart of the coming conflict was the nearly millennia long struggle between Eastern Orthodox and Western Roman Catholic Christianity. Beginning the tale by detailing a violent, lethal, riot between Orthodox and Catholic pilgrims in Jerusalem during Easter, Figes set the tone of his analysis, which sets aside a large percentage of the total to the role of Religion to the causes of the War. 

The Russian Czar seeing himself as the Emperor of the continuation of Byzantium, Holy Russia, the Third Rome, had set himself up as the Sword Protector of Christians, of all Confessions, in the Muslim occupied Holy Land as well as the Balkans. The plight of these Christians were of particular interest to the Ottomans, a slowly decaying, dying superpower who by the middle of the 19th century was in terminal decline, and practically on Death's door. 

However, these Christians were also of great interest to Protestant Great Britain, and Catholic France. Britain under Queen Victoria saw themselves as the missionaries of the Gospel to the entire world, and attempted to flood the Ottoman ruled lands with Evangelical missionaries (some of whom met very bad ends at the hands of outraged Muslims, which more than once forced thoughts in London to linger on fantasies of the destruction of the Ottoman Caliphate, more on that later). 

France, on the other hand, despite the Revolution, and the rule of an agnostic, if Christo-Curious (my invented term, you're allowed to steal it) Emperor Napoleon I, still was majority pius Roman Catholic. And following the final fall of the Bourbons, the restoration of the Republic, and then the coup and restoration of the Empire under Napoleon III (never say that French politics are boring), newly Imperial France sought to set themselves up as the Protector of The Catholic Church in Europe and surrounding areas. 

(The other Great Powers in Europe, Prussia, and Austria, do have a peripheral part to play, but almost exclusively political and diplomatic so they don't matter in the prelude so much). 

It shouldn't take an advanced analyst to comprehend how these competing Holy claims could lead to international tensions and conflict. Throughout the first half of the 19th century Russia, even more so than the Soviet Empire (which was never as powerful as it claimed, having to survive on Western Bank loans, and more internal troubles and systemic weaknesses almost than the Fall of the Western Roman Empire), was at the height of her power and glory. Having defeated Napoleon’s Empire (albeit an impossible task sans British Rothschild money), Russia was the superpower on the European continent.  

For a whole generation following the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, St. Petersburg was the primary arbiter of European affairs. Needless to say, this caused untold amounts of jealousy, mistrust, and not a little bit of resentment amongst the rest of Europe (especially France, more on that in a minute). Austria, for her part, grew ever more nervous of Russian power, especially as a huge percentage of the Habsburg Imperium was Slavic, and the early clarion calls of Pan-Slavism certainly didn't help relations between the two Christian Empires. 

Central Europe would fully turn against Russia thanks to Russian responses to two chief revolts. The first, the Polish Revolt, was crushed so brutally that even those who were enthusiastic supporters of St. Petersburg and the idea of Holy Russia in the rest of Europe began to noticeably cool. The second was Czar Nicholas' intervention, unasked for, in the Hungarian Revolt in 1848. 

Although it was Russian military might that was decisive in defeating the Hungarian Insurgency, doing so permanently damaged relations between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

 Vienna was convinced that Russian intentions were to, eventually, move into Central Europe, and despite the established Treaty of the Holy League, Vienna determined to support only her own interests from that point forward. 

This Russian power, however, was fragile. The Russian economy was unstable, partly due to a dangerous lack of industrialization vis a vis the rest of Europe, but also internal unrest and the occasional outright revolt. 

From a certain perspective far worse was the nature of the Russian military. From an outside perspective, Russia, with the largest Army in the world, and a growing multi-ocean Navy, in total numbers by far the largest armed force on the planet, hid a nature of decay, and the truth that this massive force was already obsolete. 

Resting very much on their hard won laurels from the Napoleonic Wars, the Russians were drastically far behind in the military technology realm, which was being led by the British and the French. Seeing as how it had gotten to the point that no matter what Russia did, and with a headstrong, aggressive Czar like Nicholas I this happened fairly frequently, that the rest of Europe was put off and offended, this military backwardness could only bode ill for the Russian Empire. 

Enter Napoleon III. 

With the Imperial Restoration in France, Napoleon III was determined to restore France to the status of a superpower, and a world cultural shaper. To his credit, he attempted to do this initially through diplomacy and alliances. Ironically, especially considering the near future, it would be the Russians that Emperor Napoleon would reach out to first. 

Much like his far more famous Uncle, Napoleon III was a bit of a Russophile, and someone who saw great promise in the idea of a French and Russian detente. However the Czar, refusing to acknowledge Napoleon III as legitimate (partly due to his lineage), mortally offended Napoleon III, even despite the fact that Napoleon was himself eager to ally with Russia and to ensure that the British were kept away from a major presence in the Mediterranean. Very ironically, this desire of Napoleon’s mirrored Russian ambitions in the region, as well as British ambitions likewise. 

This geostrategic contest, all over who would be the prime defender of Christians, and more importantly the face of Christianity for the rest of the world, could not have come at a worse time for Russia. With an obsolete Army, a growing antagonistic Britain, a France who, much like in 1807, was eager to tie their own interests to Russia's, but with The Czar refusing to grant it, Russia found herself becoming more and more isolated. 

Britain began to conspire not to tear apart the Ottoman Empire, but the Russian. Russian heavy handedness in Poland and in Hungary certainly didn't help matters any, but Russian nibbling at the periphery of the Ottoman Empire caused more than one strategic voice in Great Britain to be raised in a Russophobia that has never fully departed from the Western zeitgeist. 

Noticing that Emperor Napoleon, much like his uncle, was desperately trying to link his Empire to Russia's (almost as though it was a divinely provided rope in troubled waters, but one that was wilfully denied), Queen Victoria, despite personally liking the Czar (she found him charming, witty,  and intensely handsome), agreed that it was now in Britain's best interest to steer Napoleon and the French towards a detente with London. 

On the surface this seemed an impossibility. Emperor Napoleon III was forever disturbed that he was rebuffed by the Czar, and like his uncle, never trusted Perfidious Albion. However, for the safety of his own throne, as well as to destroy the possibility of another pan-European Coalition aimed against France, he reluctantly went along with the idea of a working relationship with the traditional foes of France. (This despite repeated attempts to plead the Czar into a rapprochement). And then the Concert of Europe was utterly torn asunder. 

It would be revolts of Christians against Ottoman rule in the Balkans that would be the catalyst for the events that would lead to The Crimean War. Mr. Figes' analysis of the causes of the war, complex and multilayered as they are, come all back together to this culmination point, and one cannot help but to feel vexed on behalf of the Czar. 

Turning down the offers of French alliance on the slim pretext of the legitimacy of the Bonaparte dynasty, the unwillingness to pay attention to military advancements in the West, and the inability to comprehend British politics all now turn around to haunt the Czar and every decision he makes. 

Tensions between St. Petersburg and Constantinople explode, and both sides begin beating the war drums. In fact, as Figes points out, it is not WW1, but here that the Ottoman Sultan first issues a call for Jihad against the Infidels. The coming war will indeed be a Holy one, for more than one of the participants involved.

Thinking that Vienna will abide by the terms of The Holy League, assuming France will do nothing because of Napoleon’s prior overtures, and not expecting London to react so violently, the Czar determines upon war, and launches his Army and Navy into military operations against the Ottomans. Heavy fighting breaks out in the Balkans, and the Russians almost immediately find their going very rough indeed. 

Although the Ottomans are a dying Empire, they're far from dead yet, and they put up a good fight, holding the Russians to a stalemate fairly early on. 

My only real gripe with this book was Mr. Figes lack of coverage of the military events. This book isn't a military history, so I expected only a bare bones discussion of the War itself, however, it is complex enough of a conflict that I really hoped he had added maybe just fifty more pages to flesh out the military operations to make them more comprehensible. 

Essentially, the Russians found themselves bogged down fairly quickly in the Balkans, and very early on the War got ugly, with both sides rather forgetting conventions of international law and traditional custom regarding the treatment of prisoners (fancy way of saying both sides simply shot prisoners whenever the whim took them, because Holy War, of course). And although the Russian Navy won a spectacular triumph at Sinope, British intervention fairly rapidly erased Russian Naval supremacy in the Black Sea. 

To say that Russia was caught by surprise by the Western intervention would be an understatement. 

France’s decision to join truly surprised the Russians, as the thought of the two former traditional foes standing side by side was heretofore unthinkable, and the Czar was truly wounded by Queen Victoria's decision for war as the two had been personally close friends.

Furthermore, the Czar never forgave Vienna for what he saw as the betrayal of The Holy League by doing nothing, and even mobilizing against Russia the deeper they moved into the Balkans, a betrayal that was remembered in St. Petersburg even during the July Crisis of 1914. 

And yet it was French intervention which seemed to truly baffle St. Petersburg. Perhaps they should have accepted Napoleon’s hand after all? 

However, French martial support for what was an enthusiastic call for war in Great Britain should not have been surprising. 

Emperor Napoleon had been playing with fire with his attempts to unite with Russia and make the Czar a personal friend and ally. The French military in particular, whose Officer Corps were young recruits during the closing days of the Napoleonic Wars, were especially vehemently anti-Russian (if likewise very unenthusiastic about alliance with Britain, for obvious reasons) due to the memory of 1812 and the Russian occupation of Paris in 1814 (gentle though it was). 

The French people, too, wanted revenge against those who had destroyed their first attempts at an ordered Europe where it was France, not Great Britain, who was the hegemon of global affairs, and so Napoleon III reluctantly felt he had no choice but to go along. The British determined on an invasion of the Crimea, to strategically move the center of operations away from Constantinople (the British Admiralty was somewhat fearful of the possibility of the Russians breaking the Balkan stalemate and marching south to seize Constantinople, as doing so would mean Russia would likewise control the Dardanelles), and to force Russia onto the defensive. 

All well and good except as events would show, the British were woefully unprepared logistically for war, lead by utter dolts using truly outdated tactics, and who had to watch dumbfounded as they were routinely outperformed by the French (which had to really gall them to no end). 

Which in and of itself wasn't saying much, although as Figes makes clear it was the French who were militarily the most capable in this War, no one really shines in the Crimean War. 

In terms of finding examples of inspiring courage and battlefield heroism, this conflict is full of it from all sides. 

In terms of military genius, well, there isn't any, though yes, the French do win on mere points, but it was a low scoring contest overall. The majority of the fighting saw the Russians utterly shot to pieces by Allied rifled muskets, which could outrange Russian smoothbore muskets 300 yards to barely 100. (And those rifled muskets, perfected in the War Between the States in America a few years later, were also insanely accurate at those ranges too, as many Russian officers found out in the last moments of their mortal existence). French and British artillery was likewise longer ranged, far more accurate, and due to new chemical sciences, far more powerful in terms of blasting and propellant charges and explosive force. 

Both sides had to deal with the catastrophe of disease and illness, as the static lines around Sevastopol (the majority of the war was an unnecessary Siege of a city that could have been taken after the initial Battle of the Alma River, and the French had even urged the British to do just that…but the British wavered in resolve, and thus the horrors of the waste of Sevastopol) ensured rampaging illness. 

The French were quietly rather smug that they had to carry the British logistically for the first part of the conflict, though the British did eventually recover and gain their footing (though not their wits, as it were, as this conflict has to be the absolute nadir of British military leadership), though the French fairly botched the first attempt to end the siege by storm after nearly a year (a botch which cost around 2,000 French lives…), and truly no one on the Allied side has their reputation enhanced by the war. 

Though the Allies do win it, when the French, British, and Piedmontese (who joined late to earn points with Emperor Napoleon in order to woo him for their hopes of aid against Austria to unite Italy by force) finally breakthrough in a final, costly, offensive which does break the Russian defensive lines. By this point Czar Nicholas I has died a broken, defeated, heartbroken man, and Alexander II is now Czar, and he is forced to negotiate terms of peace. 

Despite the harsh peace terms, within a decade and a half, Russia completely overturned the Wars decisions…making this conflict truly one of the most tragically unnecessary in all of European history. 

And with the current events in the Ukraine, now. Perhaps we all should be paying a little more attention to Russia, her interests, her red lines, her values, and her history. 

While this book didn't fill my need to study the military dimensions of the conflict, it is an excellent overview, and brings to light a perspective often ignored in the West. Faith, values, culture, these things were more important then in this conflict. Maybe the West should learn they're still important, or else we may find ourselves in another blood soaked quagmire, led by fools, not fully grasping what we have gotten ourselves into. 

Highly recommended. 

[Mircea Poeana · Rating 4 out of 5]

Judecat din perspectiva veacului al XIX-lea Razboiul Crimeei a insemnat o adevarata conflagratie mondiala, comparabila cu tragicele evenimentele istorice din 1914-1918 si 1939-1945.
Imperiul Britanic, Franta si Regatul Sardiniei aliate "impotriva naturii" cu Imperiul Otoman impotriva Imperiului Rus.
O imagine demna de tablourile coplesitoare zugravite in Povestirile din Sevastopol ale lui Lev Tolstoi, el insusi participant la luptele pentru apararea patriei.
O armata a Tarului, in care doar 2% dintre osteni stiau sa citeasca, a infruntat timp de trei ani o masina internationala de lupta.
A fost, de asemenea, un razboi paradoxal pentru ca a balansat geografic intre Principatele Romane si Caucaz.
Paradoxala este si interpretarea peste timp, deoarece istoriografia rusa il considera ceea ce in zilele noastre s-ar numi "a successful failure".
Cu ochii atintiti pe Crimeea secolului nostru, intelegem mai bine analiza detaliata si riguros argumentata a lui Orlando Figes.

[James Murphy · Rating 5 out of 5]

Reading this interesting history I discovered that some of my preconceived notions about the war were wrong. Besides knowing very little about the war itself, I realized what familiarity I have with it is through British perceptions. The histories most available to us are British histories, and so such innovative work such as that of Florence Nightingale is filtered through British sensibilities, and the attention given to something like Tennyson's "Charge of the Light Brigade" has made that action during the Battle of Balaklava as iconic as Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg. The fact is the British had only about half the force in the field as the French, and British lack of success, both on the battlefield and in caring for their army, meant they generally had to follow the French lead in the conduct of the campaign.

That's only one of the new perceptions of the war Figes's big sweeping history gives us. It's comprehensive, and it covers not only the military operations during the conflict but the political and diplomatic activity in the couple of decades prior to the war and after. Figes explains clearly the Russian ambitions in the Balkans and the religious tensions between Ottoman Islam and Russian Orthodoxy which provided the backdrop to Russian territorial incursions igniting the war, ultimately involving Britain and France because they feared Russian expansion in the Black Sea and their potential occupation of the Bosporus and Dardanelles. He asks the reader in his "Introduction" to be patient because his detailed consideration of the historical contexts of the war means the descriptions of military operations don't begin for about 150 pages.

Figes's work is important for opening up to us the Russian side of the war. In addition to the discussion of Russian military operations and political actions is another new perception, this covered in the war's meanings in myth and memory, of the significance the defense of the Crimea during the mid-1800s has always meant to Russian identity. He writes that the loss of the Crimea during the collapse of the Soviet Union was a severe blow to Russians, and adding this fact to Crimea's obvious strategic importance in the Black Sea the reader can also understand that Putin's recent restoration of the peninsula to Russian sovereignty served to restore reputation, too.

It's history enlivened by some of its actors. Tolstoy's role as soldier in the Crimea is detailed. And so is the role of Nightingale and others in providing medical help for the wounded. Political and military leadership is analyzed thoroughly enough that their strengths and weaknesses give them the qualities of characters in a drama.

One quibble is that Figes's claims for the technological innovations developed during the Crimean War or some of the harsher realities of the nature of the war ignore the American Civil War. His claim on p275 that not until World War I would armies again be subjected to the horrendous scale and nature of injuries caused by industrial war is an example of this overreach.

But there's much more to admire in this history than there is to quibble about.

[Steven Peterson · Rating 4 out of 5]

A fine history of the nasty Crimean War. This was one of those wars that should never have happened. Neither the French nor British could quite figure out why to go to war. Russia had the deteriorating Czar Nicholas seeing possible war in religious terms. The Ottoman Empire was in decline. The dynamics, thus, were not auspicious.

Once war began, the allies (Britain, France, the Ottoman Empire, plus others as well) bruised the Russian forces at the outset. Then, a surprisingly strong stand by the Russians at Balaklava. This is the battle, of course, where history witnessed The Charge of the Light Brigade (which was actually rather successful despite the heavy losses suffered by the troops involved). The invasion force of the British eventually won and moved--with the French--toward the key city of Sevastopol. The allies moved slowly, not seeing need for dispatch. A major mistake. Time played into the Russians' hands as they fortified the city and received reinforcements. Another factor in Russia's favor was the inept British commander, Lord Raglan. He made mistake after mistake, thereby aiding the Russian cause. On the other hand, the Russian forces were afflicted with a set of poor commanders as well.

By the time the allies began their move to Sevastopol, a siege was inevitable. The Russian winter and disease devastated the besiegers--especially the British, who had frighteningly poor logistics.

Media were players in this war, one of the earlier occasions when media played a key role. Media helped fan the flames in the West in favor of war; stories about the appalling conditions facing the soldiers during the war also had an effect on the people back home. In addition, the technology of war had changed. The adoption of the minie ball made the firepower of the English and French far beyond that of the muskets of the Russians.

The war limped to its conclusion, as noted in this volume. The final chapter pulls matters together, exploring the myth and memory of the bloody Crimean War.

[Bob H · Rating 5 out of 5]

A majestic and magisterial history of the bloody 1853-1856 conflict; the author has done considerable research, including first-person accounts (and not just those of a young Leo Tolstoy). He does show the other fronts in the war -- the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Baltic -- and not just the Crimean peninsula, though the narrative mostly focuses on the latter, and the siege of Sevastopol. We also learn of the diplomatic and religious intrigue before and after the conflict.

This book is not just a maneuver-by-maneuver military history but the story of the human striving, and costs, of the war, and there the reader will find many revelations. We learn not just of British military blunders but British inadequacies, criminally so, in logistics: supply, sanitation, medical services that would cost so many lives. These inadequacies were needless, even given the times, since we find that the French and even the Russians were better -- far better, in the case of the French. We learn more about Florence Nightingale, her personal qualities and her cultural importance in Britain, but we find out just how appalling conditions were in her hospital in Scutari. We learn of a Russian medical reformer, the surgeon Nikolai Pirogov, whose work was groundbreaking and far more important in some ways.

We also learn of the cultural and historical importance of the Crimean War in later years, especially in Russia. This book came out in 2010, before the 2014 re-conquest of Crimea, but we get a good sense of its importance to present-day Russia.

[Mark]

Thanks Santa!!

[Bruce Graham · Rating 5 out of 5]

In The Crimean War, Orlando Figes reminds us that 'story' is an inextricable part of history. What stories there are to tell.
The First and Second World Wars have relegated the Crimean to a dusty backroom in collective memory. Balaclavas have become clothing rather than a Crimean district. Thousands have climbed New Zealand's Mount Sebastopol without realizing it derives from a Crimean city.
Figes makes the case that the Crimean war was at least partially a religious war. As Nietzsche reminds us, "...only a horizon surrounded by myths can unify an entire cultural movement." Crimea was where Orthodox Christianity was brought to the Rus. Thus there is a religious line from Moscow to Kiev, to Crimea, Constantinople to Jerusalem. It is a Russian believer's mission to connect those dots and maintain them. Westerners remain largely unaware of this.
Each nation participating had their reasons for being there, but as Figes points out, this was the world's first media generated war. In fact, there were multiple 'firsts':

It was also the earliest example of a truly modern war – fought with new industrial technologies, modern rifles, steamships and railways, novel forms of logistics and communication like the telegraph, important innovations in military medicine, and war reporters and photographers directly on the scene. Yet at the same time it was the last war to be conducted by the old codes of chivalry, with ‘parliamentaries’ and truces in the fighting to clear the dead and wounded from the killing fields.

With the introduction of trench warfare, it was a prelude to WWI tactics.
Just as exposure to WWI was a major impetus in the writing career of Ernest Hemingway, Crimea was a major impact of the writing of a gambling and womanizing layabout called Tolstoy, leading ultimately to War and Peace.