The book is a full-scale look at Foucault’s philosophical career. I give the book a high rating, not because of Foucault’s philosophical views, but because of the quality of Miller’s book - the amount of research that went into it and the thoroughness of his effort to probe into all sides of the life and thought of this philosopher.
Throughout the book, Miller pulls out snippets of Foucault's writing to illustrate his points, but these were cryptic and hard to absorb. Foucault’s writing style - and the philosophy it expressed - had a wide appeal according to Miller, which turned Foucault into somewhat of a philosophical celebrity in the 1970s until his death in the 1980s. That being said, it was hard for me to discern what exactly was being said.
Right off, I’d say that Foucault's argument is that culture represses the innermost impulses of people, and then that energy finds other outlets that come out in harmful ways. The finger pointing for blame is toward culture and its power to repress, and not toward the self wanting to express its harmful energies. This seems to be the thrust of Foucault’s writing about criminal systems that
locked up individuals for what is, in essence according to Foucault, culture’s fault.
Unlike Sartre, Foucault did not believe that human nature was benign.* There are troubling aspects to who we are as humans, and unless we find healthy outlets, these repressed energies explode in ways that are harmful to society and ourselves. But like Sartre, and especially, Nietzsche, Foucault argued that we should affirm ourselves, in all of our good and bad impulses, and break free of cultural restraints by embracing healthy vehicles for some of these negative tendencies.
This is where Miller adds apparently new insights into Foucault’s philosophical perspective. In spite of some strong push back from Foucault’s defenders, Miller does this by emphasizing the centrality - maybe even the absolute centrality - of Foucault’s sexuality as a gay man, particularly his attraction to and participation in the sado-machistic lifestyle. The underlying argument Miller makes is that for much of Foucault’s life, he kept his gay lifestyle under wraps except among close friends, suggesting the possibility that this contributed to his notion that society - cultural pressures - engage in guilt-shaming, thus oppressing him at the deepest level. That observation is of course largely true. That Foucault was strongly involved with S-M provides another peak into his philosophical development. Inflicting pain on others within a gay man context, may have led to Foucault’s view of humans in a less, non-Sartrean, savory light. But the S-M pleasure-pain dynamic was also the release of such energies, thereby preventing more dangerous expressions of repressed sexual energy.
This is the focal point of Foucault’s rebellion against oppressive cultural pressures against gay people in general, and against de Sadean sexual practices that many find amoral or disgusting. According to Miller, Foucault put his philosophical spin on the S-M lifestyle, arguing that it was a Nietzschean shoving culture aside in favor of self affirmation. It was a coming out of “Truth,” for oneself and about cultural oppression. What does it matter that pain is involved when both parties consent to the various sexual practices involved? There are lines - implicit rules - in the S-M world, including respecting the pain-victim if S-M practices become too much. (Miller had to push through some of the S-M practices Foucault was drawn to.) But S-M was also more for Foucault. Like an LSD or other drug-induced trip, the S-M pleasure-pain dynamic could reach great heights, so much so that a transcendence of sort was achieved that allowed one to see the world in new ways.
In this account of Foucault, I found it a not-appealing philosophy. I think he reads too much into Nietzsche who, in my view, urged us to escape our cultural chains, thereby allowing our true selves to emerge and flower. Just as the Nazis used Nietzsche to justify violence against others, it could be argued that Foucault used Nietzsche to advance a libertine argument against cultural and government oppression, without giving due attention to the responsibilities of individuals to regulate their own behavior. It’s very likely the case that a good many in the criminal system are there, for example, not because culture didn’t allow for their violent or extreme self-serving impulses to find a suitable outlet. Rather, culture, and government, is needed for at least a modicum of rules and regulations that harm the lives of “law-abiding” citizens.
Early on, Miller states that Foucault was one of the last centuries greatest philosophers based, in part, I suppose, in the wide public attention given to what he was putting forward. In reading Miller’s account of Foucault, though, this seems like an overreach. Foucault touches a real issue - social oppression - but then uses it as a cudgel against any and all responsibility for individuals to regulate their own behavior. I’d also argue, especially, that Foucault (and the way he interprets Nietzsche) is overly sweeping in scope. Foucault takes himself, and his deepest (sexual) energies, and applies such to human nature in general, whereas I’d say that Foucault - “The Passion of Michel Foucault” - is (per Darwinian variation) a (minor) subset of humanity that is not reflective of people in general.
*”[T]he violence of the Dionysian philosopher…is…aimed outward, taking joy in destroying whatever mutilates life, and a malicious delight in translating ‘man back into nature’ - an animal ‘nature’ characterized, among other things, by cruelty: the primordial pleasure to be found in inflicting, and suffering, pain.”