Battle Tactics of Napoleon and His Enemies

by Brent Nosworthy

The French Revolutionary wars of the eighteenth century resulted in the overturning of the tradition of 'linear' warfare on the European battlefield by a new system of 'impulse' warfare primarily employed by the French Army and later adopted by their adversaries. Historians have placed great emphasis on Napoleon's leadership in defining the outcome of decisive battles of the period, but Brent Nosworthy argues this fails to appreciate the wealth of opportunities the new impulse system afforded to his subordinate commanders at the expense of their opponents. This book argues that successful minor tactics were the building blocks which enabled Napoleon to implement his grand tactical designs, best illustrated by the triumph of Austerlitz. Brent Nosworthy provides a wealth of detailed analysis of the various tactical doctrines employed by the main armies of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period, giving fresh consideration to the theoretical versus practical handling of the three principal arms of infantry, cavalry and artillery. His approach yields many fascinating new insights into the tactical operations of the armies of the period based on close examination of primary sources.S.

Genres: Military History, History, Military Fiction, War, Nonfiction, 19th Century

516 pages, Hardcover

First published December 1, 1995

About the author

Brent Nosworthy is a game designer, author, and military historian from Providence, Rhode Island.

Reviews

[Mark · Rating 3 out of 5]

Military histories of the Napoleonic era typically focus on the plans and decisions of the men commanding the armies. Innumerable chapters are written detailing their decisions, the reasons for them, and how they played out on the battlefield. Left out from such accounts are the factors that shaped battles at the tactical level. While operations were formulated with tactics in mind, what these considerations were and how they played out on the battlefields themselves is often presented so broadly that the tactical actions are blurred to the point of vagueness.

Brent Nosworthy’s book offers a corrective to this approach. In it, he offers a survey of the tactics of the era and how they played out on the battlefields. This he does by offering an analysis divided into four parts. In the first of these, he recounts the tactics employed in three Napoleonic-era battles – Lodi, Marengo, and Sedyman – to underscore the role tactics played in determining the outcome of battles in that era. He then uses this as a springboard to describe the development of tactics during the era more generally, and the considerations that shaped them. As he details, the era was one in which the “line” tactics that predominated throughout most of the 18th century were increasingly superseded by the “impulse” method in which columns were deployed, granting a degree of flexibility and depth previously lacking.

How this played out on the battlefields of the era is the focus of the second part of Nosworthy’s book. Here he describes the employment of tactics in the various wars, stretching from the early battles of the Revolutionary period to the clashes at the end of the era. The process he describes is one more of evolution than revolution, as many of the elements of the impulse method emerged in the wars leading up to the period on which Nosworthy focuses. The advantage that the French enjoyed in this respect was one of early adoption, which gave the revolutionary and Napoleonic armies an advantage they enjoyed into the battles of the 1805-7 era. Yet while Nosworthy notes that armies during this period rarely gathered intelligence on their opponents’ tactical practices, the exposure of Napoleon’s opponents to them in so many losing campaigns created an incentive to adopt them, which along with the decline of French tactical capabilities with the debilitation of French forces in the later Napoleonic era contributed to his eventual defeat.

In the second half of Nosworthy’s book, the author examines more closely the tactics employed by the various branches of the army. Though his focus is on the infantry, he includes here an extended description of the tactics employed with the cavalry and artillery branches as well. This involves not just describing their employment on the battlefield, but the tactics each branch devised to deal with the others. Yet Nosworthy makes clear that theory often did not measure up to the experiences on the battlefield, where such immutable conditions as geography and environmental conditions often complicated the successful implementation of the tactics drilled into the soldiers prior to combat.

In his conclusion, Nosworthy argues for greater incorporation of tactical operations into military history more generally. His book provides an excellent example of the value of doing so, as he demonstrates convincingly the important role tactics can play in determining the outcome of battles. For many readers, though, Nosworthy will likely be pushing against an open door. Much of what he writes has been covered by scholars before him, with the greatest value of his text being in concentrating the various aspects of Napoleonic-era tactics into the pages of a single volume. His organization of the material is a little idiosyncratic, and makes his book more valuable as a reference work than as a narrative history of tactical developments and their employment. While this might mitigate the enjoyment to be derived from Nosworthy’s book, however, it still makes it one that everyone with a burgeoning interest in Napoleonic warfare will want to consult both for the clarity of his explanations and for his focus on what is sometimes an overlooked factor in determining the outcome of the battles of the period.

[Sean Chick · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a wonderful examination of the tactics used in the French Revolution and Napoleon, its emphasis mostly being on the French. Nosworthy also aptly explains the success of the British as coming from one big volley followed by a charge, and its psychological origins. On the other end, the French practice of drawing sabre just before contact in a cavalry charge were effective for the same reasons.

The larger argument being made is that success was dependent upon training and experience more than leadership. To be fair Nosworthy does not quite go that far, but I feel his book does not fully account for the importance of the commanders. For instance, even though Wellington was never defeated in a major battle, and much of that was due to his infantry, why then were other British commanders far less successful? Wellington himself might hold the key in a letter he wrote in 1808.

"They have...a new system of strategy which has out-manoeuvred and overwhelmed all the armies of Europe...they may overwhelm me, but I don't think they will out-manoevre me. First, because I am not afraid of them, as everybody else seems to be; and secondly, because if what I hear of their system of manoevre, is true, I think it a false one as against steady troops. I suspect all the continental armies were more than half beaten before the battle was begun - I, at least, will not be frightened beforehand."

Wellington's passage is a synthesis of both a tactical and personal explanation for his success. Nosworthy offers us the tactical. Will anyone combine the two to explain warfare in this era?

Lastly, Nosworthy points out the parochial limitations of British military histornians aptly. Too bad few men have followed his lead.

[Windsor · Rating 3 out of 5]

Reads like a dictionary

[Natalie W · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book offers a very detailed description of the mechanics of battles (especially in the Napoleonic Wars) on both a level of "grand tactics" and "minor" ones, including various ways of firing volleys (e.g. "platoon fire"), the influence different events on a battlefield have on a soldier's psyche, and many more. The frame of all this is the author's argumentation of why the quite new system of "impulse warfare" in contrast to the more traditional "linear warfare" helped the French to gain the upper hand, which is elaborately illustrated by several example battles, obviously the most important of them being the Battle of Austerlitz. I personally would have wished for a bit more organisation in the writing (some points Nosworthy makes aren't followed by a conclusion or some explanation of how this particular matter refers to his overall argument, for instance), but apart from that it was an informative and absolutely worthwhile read!

[Panu-Petteri Väänänen · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great, definitive book about the subject. Like an advanced course. Must read if you're interested in the tactical aspects of infantry, cavalry and artillery warfare of the Napoleonic system. It also sheds light on the foundations of said period by examining the decades before it, like linear tactics of the 18th century and Frederick the great's reforms. I especially liked the idea that the linear warfare system was basically a manifestation of governmental absolutism on the field of battle and how that compared to the impulse warfare, which allowed more freedoms to the individual divisional and corps commanders, used by the revolutionary and later imperial France. Dispels many myths about the era too.

[Sue Law · Rating 5 out of 5]

An eye opening book that bridges the gap between strategic and grand tactical theories and plans and what actually happened on the battle fields. On the way Nosworthy explodes a myth or two. In my future explorations of the Revolutionary & Napoleonic wars I will be seeing the material in a totally different way.
Nosworthy explores how battlefield tactics developed during the wars of the 18th century and how most infantry and cavalry formations used during the R&N wars had already been experimented with in earlier times. He explores the novel ways in which the French army combined these formations ("mixed order") and the conditions under which such combinations worked.
Well worth reading.

[Peter Harrison · Rating 3 out of 5]

The first part of this book which focuses on the development of an 'impulse' system of tactics as the evolution from earlier 'linear' forms of warfare is very interesting indeed, along with the brief descriptions of actions which emphasise the importance of tactics to the outcome of an engagement. The later part which assesses the drill used by each arm is less useful and marred by a number of basic factual errors.

[Joshua Horn · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a very thorough examination of the battle tactics of the Napoleonic Wars. It contains a lot of helpful information. I especially appreciated the emphasis on the psychology of battle - how different elements of tactics influenced the men's morale and their will to fight. Also very interesting were the first person accounts. This book was a little too academic for me in some places, and it was also a little difficult to jump in without being very familiar with the Napoleonic Wars. He refers to a lot of battles, generals and campaigns without giving much background, which is troublesome for someone like me who is not very familiar with the period. From what I remember, Bloody Crucible of Courage, Nosworthy's book on the American Civil War, was better.

Overall, it was a thought-provoking read.

[Crunknor · Rating 3 out of 5]

Covers a lot of interesting ground. Nosworthy suffers from a tendency towards needlessly complex academic prose, but if you can get past that there's a lot of good information here. In particular, he focuses much more on actual battlefield results than on drillbook practices, unlike in The Anatomy of Victory: Battle Tactics 1689-1763.

[John · Rating 4 out of 5]

An in depth look at the tactics of warfare during the Napoleonic Wars. Like the author's other books on battle tactics, you have to have a serious interest in the subject matter to appreciate this book, but if you do then it's a must read.