A funny thing happened when by happy accident I started reading Unlikely Allies: How a Merchant, a Playwright, and a Spy Saved the American Revolution and also Robert Morris: Financier of the American Revolution at the same time as both books are set in the same time period.
The first book is about how the efforts of Beaumarchais and Silas Deane to send munitions, uniforms and other supplies to support the American revolution. The second book is how Robert Morris tried to send tobacco ships to France in order to pay for them. Both books thus focus on different sides of the Atlantic and spend a lot of time with their subjects wondering why they haven't heard anything from the other and just what was going on. After a while I felt that if I could just get the two books to talk to one another all would be well!
This author likes, I think, his subject a little bit too much. Although he mentions the critiques of his contemporaries, Morris almost always has the last word.
He also suggests credit for things that he did not actually. For example, it was during the Revolution that the idea of creating a new currency based on the decimal system was invented. (Thank goodness or we might still be worried about pounds, shillings and pence, or even worse Spanish pieces of eight!) Most historians believe it was Gouverneur Morris (no relation) who first made this proposal, but this author does not ascribe an originator, leaving one to think that Robert Morris started the idea.
Sometimes he misses nuances. Discussing the pair of Madison and Hamilton, he says that while Madison was with Morris/Hamilton financial program in 1783, he moved against it in 1790. That's not entirely accurate. Madison was for some of the Morris measures, but always against the national bank. It's a long book, it wasn't necessary to gloss over a point this large. (For more on this topic, see The Power of the Purse by Ferguson, which the author admits to having read.)
On the Compromise of 1790, many popular histories (and the musical) only tell Jefferson's version of the story and omit all the complex negotiations that preceded his involvement. As Morris was a a big part of the negotiation, this book does a good job covering all of that.
Regarding his disasters in land speculation, the book only shows us cases of people who failed at it, subtly hinting that it was not so much their fault. But people like James Duane who succeeded at it are not mentioned.
That Morris owned slaves is barely touched upon.
An epilog kindly recounts the significant previous biographies in some detail. The author is at odds with Ferguson's history of revolutionary finance, in particular the suggestion that Morris may have taken advantage of his position as financier for personal gain. To counter that argument, he states that in the thousands of Morris papers published, there is no evidence of it. On the other hand, that's not the kind of thing one would find in a person's papers. That's the kind of document that's destroyed after reading. On the other hand, an independent auditor found that Morris had taken $80K of the government's money during the war. The author barely mentions this, pointing out that Morris always disputed it. However, Morris did pay the government back $93K after this was revealed, and this at a time when he badly needed money and was likely to go to debtor's prison, which eventually occurred.
Overall, what can we say about Morris? In his time, the smartest and most capable American in matters of finance and probably indispensable for managing the war, but also he did not stop his personal commercial activities while acting in government roles. This was explicitly approved by Congress because it enabled him to ship army supplies from France legally, for example, without explicitly violating France's treaty with Britain. He also helped Washington greatly in 1781 when he guaranteed various payments on his personal account. But when government and personal cargoes are on the same ship, and that ship goes down or has its contents captured, it gets tricky. It can be so easy to assign the losses to the government rather than to oneself. There's also a question of how he should have been rewarded for doing so much more than the office required, though officially there was no extra compensation for this. Did he justify hiding some profits to fix what he may have considered wrong? Further, he had considerable financial benefit because as the director of national finance, other merchants were much more willing to make deals with him.
In his later years he pushed his luck far too hard in buying millions of acres of land on credit. He was right that eventually the lands would be worth huge amounts, but dead wrong on the rate at which that would occur. He lost it all and wound up in prison. This also hurt not just his family, but many of his business partners.
Finally, a great deal of the program Hamilton put into place was invented by him, and likeminded Congressional delegates, in particular the ideas of a national bank, keeping the debts national, assuming those of the states, and paying them off via the tariff and sales of western lands. Indeed, when Washington formed the first government, it was his great friend Morris he turned to to become the first Treasury secretary. Morris was too embroiled in financial ventures at the time, and his first round doing this had not gone so well, so he recommended Hamilton. Washington was stunned as he had no idea that his young former aide knew anything about finance whatever.
So, like most founders, Morris was capable, sometimes brilliant, but not free of errors.