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Valley Of Death: The Tragedy At Dien Bien Phu That Led America Into The Vietnam War
Pulitzer Prize–winning author Ted Morgan has now written a rich and definitive account of the fateful battle that ended French rule in Indochina—and led inexorably to America’s Vietnam War. Dien Bien Phu was a remote valley on the border of Laos along a simple rural trade route. But it would also be where a great European power fell to an underestimated insurgent army and lost control of a crucial colony. Valley of Death is the untold story of the 1954 battle that, in six weeks, changed the course of history.
A veteran of the French Army, Ted Morgan has made use of exclusive firsthand reports to create the most complete and dramatic telling of the conflict ever written. Here is the history of the Vietminh liberation movement’s rebellion against French occupation after World War II and its growth as an adversary, eventually backed by Communist China. Here too is the ill-fated French plan to build a base in Dien Bien Phu and draw the Vietminh into a debilitating defeat—which instead led to the Europeans being encircled in the surrounding hills, besieged by heavy artillery, overrun, and defeated.
Making expert use of recently unearthed or released information, Morgan reveals the inner workings of the American effort to aid France, with Eisenhower secretly disdainful of the French effort and prophetically worried that “no military victory was possible in that type of theater.” Morgan paints indelible portraits of all the major players, from Henri Navarre, head of the French Union forces, a rigid professional unprepared for an enemy fortified by rice carried on bicycles, to his commander, General Christian de Castries, a privileged, miscast cavalry officer, and General Vo Nguyen Giap, a master of guerrilla warfare working out of a one-room hut on the side of a hill. Most devastatingly, Morgan sets the stage for the Vietnam quagmire that was to come.
Superbly researched and powerfully written, Valley of Death is the crowning achievement of an author whose work has always been as compulsively readable as it is important.
A veteran of the French Army, Ted Morgan has made use of exclusive firsthand reports to create the most complete and dramatic telling of the conflict ever written. Here is the history of the Vietminh liberation movement’s rebellion against French occupation after World War II and its growth as an adversary, eventually backed by Communist China. Here too is the ill-fated French plan to build a base in Dien Bien Phu and draw the Vietminh into a debilitating defeat—which instead led to the Europeans being encircled in the surrounding hills, besieged by heavy artillery, overrun, and defeated.
Making expert use of recently unearthed or released information, Morgan reveals the inner workings of the American effort to aid France, with Eisenhower secretly disdainful of the French effort and prophetically worried that “no military victory was possible in that type of theater.” Morgan paints indelible portraits of all the major players, from Henri Navarre, head of the French Union forces, a rigid professional unprepared for an enemy fortified by rice carried on bicycles, to his commander, General Christian de Castries, a privileged, miscast cavalry officer, and General Vo Nguyen Giap, a master of guerrilla warfare working out of a one-room hut on the side of a hill. Most devastatingly, Morgan sets the stage for the Vietnam quagmire that was to come.
Superbly researched and powerfully written, Valley of Death is the crowning achievement of an author whose work has always been as compulsively readable as it is important.
752 pages, Hardcover
First published February 1, 2010
48 people are currently reading
604 people want to read
About the author
Ted Morgan
49 books27 followersBorn Saint-Charles Armand Gabriel de Gramont*, he used the name Sanche de Gramont as his byline (and also on his books) during the early part of his career. He worked as a journalist for many years, and was awarded the Pulitzer Prize in 1961 for local reporting written under pressure of a deadline. He first came to the United States in 1937, and became a naturalized citizen in February 1977, at which time he had his name legally changed to Ted Morgan. He was a National Book Award finalist in 1982 for Maugham: A Biography.
*His father was a military pilot who died in an accident in 1943, at which point he inherited the title "Comte de Gramont". He was properly styled "Saint-Charles Armand Gabriel, Comte de Gramont" until he renounced his title upon becoming a U.S. citizen in 1977.
*His father was a military pilot who died in an accident in 1943, at which point he inherited the title "Comte de Gramont". He was properly styled "Saint-Charles Armand Gabriel, Comte de Gramont" until he renounced his title upon becoming a U.S. citizen in 1977.
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April 27, 2016
Some weeks after reading Ted Morgan’s Valley of Death, I was whiling away a lazy Saturday channel surfing and watching the baby lay on her play mat while speaking in her magical nothing-language to a stuffed lion. I was also desperately hung over and looking for something, anything, to take my mind off my stomach.
Finally, I settled on the History Channel’s all-day marathon of Vietnam in HD, which is a handsomely constructed documentary, incongruous only for the fact that four of the leads of Entourage provided voice work. (At this point, the baby was taken to another room). I watched nearly all six hours of the program (excluding bathroom breaks for myself, and diaper breaks for the baby), and at the end, hadn’t learned much at all.
This is not to blame the History Channel. To the contrary, I applaud them every time they introduce programming that doesn’t involve pawn shop owners. It’s just that Vietnam in HD didn't set out with a pedagogical aim. Instead, it was experiential and anecdotal, focusing on individual participants rather than overall strategy and policy.
That’s really where we’re at with Vietnam.
As a nation, we’re still processing its impact. It is still too soon for sound and measured judgments. Often, reading about Vietnam is like poking at an unhealed wound. The war is too recent and too complicated to draw bold historical conclusions.
Except for the battle of Dien Bien Phu, the subject of Valley of Death.
Compared to the irregular, asymmetrical jungle warfare between the United States Armed Forces and the North Vietnamese, Dien Bien Phu is a marvel of understandability.
The battle was fought in March-May 1954, and pitted a French Expeditionary Force (French paratroopers, Foreign Legionnaires, Colonial forces, and friendly Vietnamese) against the Viet Minh troops under Vo Nguyen Giap. The French established a base aero-terrestre (essentially a fortified landing strip) deep in northern Vietnam, essentially daring the Viet Minh to attack. Despite daunting logistical difficulties, Giap did just that, laying siege to the French airbase.
The battle developed along static lines that would’ve been familiar to a World War I infantryman (indeed, in the famous conception of French commander Christian de Castries, Dien Bien Phu was like “Verdun, without the Sacred Way”). The French were cut off and surrounded and relied on airdrops for supplies. However, despite some grudging assistance from the United States, the French did not have enough planes and pilots to land sufficient materiel. Moreover, as the Viet Minh closed the noose, it became increasingly dangerous for planes to land.
The French begged the United States to intervene militarily; the United States refused. Dien Bien Phu fell to Giap. This led to the inevitable French retreat from Vietnam. The irony, of course, is that the United States took France’s place within a decade, fighting the same war that it could have helped France execute at Dien Bien Phu.
Dien Bien Phu is a clear turning point in the tangled history of Southeast Asia. It is also a historical moment of high drama. For easterners, it is a story of a long-colonized people throwing off their arrogant oppressors. For westerners, it is another in a long line of “epics of defeat,” in which some moral succor is taken from a doomed battle against long odds. In either case, it is a story that isimpossible almost impossible to screw up.
Well, I’m here to state my opinion that Ted Morgan screwed it up.
The problems with this book – and there are many – can be boiled down to a lack of focus. Despite its lazy and generic title, Valley of Death is really about almost everything except the actual battle of Dien Bien Phu. All the secondary aspects of this event are brought to the forefront; meanwhile, the central event, with all its drama and high stakes, recedes into the background.
This central problem is noticeable right away. Interestingly, it manifests itself as a problem of context. In this case, way too much context. I understand this is an odd thing to say. After all, everybody loves context (“context is everything” etc., etc.). In this case, though, the context overwhelms and confuses the story with needless factoids, secondary personages, and myriad unnecessary complications.
The first 86 pages or so is devoted to an overly-detailed discussion of French colonialism, World War II, and the French reoccupation. Here, 86 pages is both too long and too short. It’s too long for a book about a single battle; it’s too short for a full explanation. The resulting reading experience feels crammed-in. And it doesn’t really have to be this way. The focus of the book should be the battle of Dien Bien Phu. The context should be told, not shown. Morgan, though, goes the other way. As a consequence, I immediately bogged down in minor matters. For instance, in a book about Dien Bien Phu, there certainly doesn’t need to be an entire paragraph devoted to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, which names each of the battleships sunk during the battle.
Perhaps the best example of this troubling lack of focus can be found in the photographic insert. There are sixteen pages of black and white pictures (of stunningly poor quality), with a total of 29 photos. Of these 29 photos, there are two of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the American president who died nearly a decade before Dien Bien Phu, one photograph of Castries, the French commander, and zero pictures of the Viet Minh commander Giap, or of other French leaders such as Langlais and Navarre.
As the narrative lurched forward, Morgan continues to catalogue minutiae, while failing to develop a clear picture of French strategy. In Morgan’s hands, the decision to build a base aero-terrestre close to the Laotian border, supplied only by airdrops, is never fully explained. Morgan does the bare minimum in explaining the French hérisson (“hedgehog”) approach, or how that tactic came about during the successful defense of Na San by French Group Mobile 7.
I’m not saying this aspect is completely ignored. I’m saying that Na San, a battle that tragically gave the French false hope for future operations, is given a whopping four pages.
Where is Morgan’s attention, then? It’s on the palace intrigue.
Despite the title, and the subtitle, and the picture of soldiers on the front cover, Valley of Death is a diplomatic history. With some sort of balance, with careful segues from jungle-to-conference room, this would’ve been just fine. Simply telling the story of a battle, after all, without any of its wider meaning, would be a waste. But Morgan doesn’t try to find a balance, and his shifting perspectives have all the subtlety of a sledgehammer to the cheek. One paragraph is in Washington; the next in Dien Bien Phu; and then suddenly we’re in Geneva.
The main irritant (leaving aside the clumsy edititing), as before, is misplaced detail. I totally lost count of the number of inanities that Morgan stuffs into the narrative. In one instance, he takes the time to give the reader General Paul Ely’s flight number! (“Ely landed at New York’s Idlewild Airport at 6:30 p.m. on Saturday, March 20, aboard TWA flight 931. The transatlantic voyage in those propeller-driven days took fourteen hours…”). In the meantime, back in Vietnam, men are fighting and dying, but the author barely seems to care. He’s more interested in the grade-D Machiavellian machinations of the French diplomatic delegations.
With regards to the diplomatic negotiations, a little would’ve gone a long way. Morgan feels differently, and these backdoor conversations (will America intervene to help the French or not? Pretend you don’t know the answer and keep reading!) really form the spine of the book. Morgan presents a lot of this stuff as revelatory; the problem, though, is that this is a poorly sourced book. The notes are threadbare and next to worthless, mostly containing naked citations to secondary sources. I need to know about where these verbatim conversations are coming from.
When Morgan actually takes the time to discuss the battle, the product is a shambles. His narrative on the battle is nearly impossible to follow. He does a poor job explaining the layout of the battle-site, the makeup of the troops, and the personalities of the commanders. All this is made worse by his tendency to cut away from the battle for long periods of time, to linger on the diplomats. By the time Morgan returns the story to the battle, you’ve forgotten who is who.
Furthermore, the two battle maps included in the book are near to worthless. Dien Bien Phu is an inherently difficult battle to follow. It wasn’t comprised of a single fortress, like the Alamo, which was overwhelmed by a horde of Viet Minh in one great charge. Rather, it was a series of strong-points, named after women (Eliane, Claudine, Gabrielle, etc.), ringing the airfield. These outposts fell, were retaken, and fell again at different times during the course of the fighting. It is a complicated chronology, one that requires a lot of discipline to explain. As noted before, that discipline is lacking.
I was further frustrated, throughout Valley of Death, by Morgan’s style of writing. He breaks every chapter up into dozens of subheadings (an average of one subheading per page). I don’t know why he did this, or what positive outcome he hoped to obtain. For me, it caused an already unfocused and stuttering narrative to become even more disjointed. Of course, I might just be getting crotchety. Perhaps this is the future of writing, in which even serious history books have to be broken down into easily-digestible soundbites for an audience weaned on Twitter and blog posts.
Normally, I try to avoid name-dropping other books when I write a review. This will be an exception.
Dien Bien Phu is a fascinating world-historical event. The battle’s outcome meant the end of French colonial rule, the beginning of American intervention, and ultimately the most divisive war in U.S. history, one that killed thousands of men, wounded many thousands more, alienated a generation, and caused a socio-political rift that exists to this day.
So if you’re interested in Dien Bien Phu, read Bernard Fall’s Hell in a Very Small Place or Martin Windrow’s The Last Valley. Neither are perfect, but both do a far better job in telling the story of this singularly important battle.
Finally, I settled on the History Channel’s all-day marathon of Vietnam in HD, which is a handsomely constructed documentary, incongruous only for the fact that four of the leads of Entourage provided voice work. (At this point, the baby was taken to another room). I watched nearly all six hours of the program (excluding bathroom breaks for myself, and diaper breaks for the baby), and at the end, hadn’t learned much at all.
This is not to blame the History Channel. To the contrary, I applaud them every time they introduce programming that doesn’t involve pawn shop owners. It’s just that Vietnam in HD didn't set out with a pedagogical aim. Instead, it was experiential and anecdotal, focusing on individual participants rather than overall strategy and policy.
That’s really where we’re at with Vietnam.
As a nation, we’re still processing its impact. It is still too soon for sound and measured judgments. Often, reading about Vietnam is like poking at an unhealed wound. The war is too recent and too complicated to draw bold historical conclusions.
Except for the battle of Dien Bien Phu, the subject of Valley of Death.
Compared to the irregular, asymmetrical jungle warfare between the United States Armed Forces and the North Vietnamese, Dien Bien Phu is a marvel of understandability.
The battle was fought in March-May 1954, and pitted a French Expeditionary Force (French paratroopers, Foreign Legionnaires, Colonial forces, and friendly Vietnamese) against the Viet Minh troops under Vo Nguyen Giap. The French established a base aero-terrestre (essentially a fortified landing strip) deep in northern Vietnam, essentially daring the Viet Minh to attack. Despite daunting logistical difficulties, Giap did just that, laying siege to the French airbase.
The battle developed along static lines that would’ve been familiar to a World War I infantryman (indeed, in the famous conception of French commander Christian de Castries, Dien Bien Phu was like “Verdun, without the Sacred Way”). The French were cut off and surrounded and relied on airdrops for supplies. However, despite some grudging assistance from the United States, the French did not have enough planes and pilots to land sufficient materiel. Moreover, as the Viet Minh closed the noose, it became increasingly dangerous for planes to land.
The French begged the United States to intervene militarily; the United States refused. Dien Bien Phu fell to Giap. This led to the inevitable French retreat from Vietnam. The irony, of course, is that the United States took France’s place within a decade, fighting the same war that it could have helped France execute at Dien Bien Phu.
Dien Bien Phu is a clear turning point in the tangled history of Southeast Asia. It is also a historical moment of high drama. For easterners, it is a story of a long-colonized people throwing off their arrogant oppressors. For westerners, it is another in a long line of “epics of defeat,” in which some moral succor is taken from a doomed battle against long odds. In either case, it is a story that is
Well, I’m here to state my opinion that Ted Morgan screwed it up.
The problems with this book – and there are many – can be boiled down to a lack of focus. Despite its lazy and generic title, Valley of Death is really about almost everything except the actual battle of Dien Bien Phu. All the secondary aspects of this event are brought to the forefront; meanwhile, the central event, with all its drama and high stakes, recedes into the background.
This central problem is noticeable right away. Interestingly, it manifests itself as a problem of context. In this case, way too much context. I understand this is an odd thing to say. After all, everybody loves context (“context is everything” etc., etc.). In this case, though, the context overwhelms and confuses the story with needless factoids, secondary personages, and myriad unnecessary complications.
The first 86 pages or so is devoted to an overly-detailed discussion of French colonialism, World War II, and the French reoccupation. Here, 86 pages is both too long and too short. It’s too long for a book about a single battle; it’s too short for a full explanation. The resulting reading experience feels crammed-in. And it doesn’t really have to be this way. The focus of the book should be the battle of Dien Bien Phu. The context should be told, not shown. Morgan, though, goes the other way. As a consequence, I immediately bogged down in minor matters. For instance, in a book about Dien Bien Phu, there certainly doesn’t need to be an entire paragraph devoted to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, which names each of the battleships sunk during the battle.
Perhaps the best example of this troubling lack of focus can be found in the photographic insert. There are sixteen pages of black and white pictures (of stunningly poor quality), with a total of 29 photos. Of these 29 photos, there are two of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the American president who died nearly a decade before Dien Bien Phu, one photograph of Castries, the French commander, and zero pictures of the Viet Minh commander Giap, or of other French leaders such as Langlais and Navarre.
As the narrative lurched forward, Morgan continues to catalogue minutiae, while failing to develop a clear picture of French strategy. In Morgan’s hands, the decision to build a base aero-terrestre close to the Laotian border, supplied only by airdrops, is never fully explained. Morgan does the bare minimum in explaining the French hérisson (“hedgehog”) approach, or how that tactic came about during the successful defense of Na San by French Group Mobile 7.
I’m not saying this aspect is completely ignored. I’m saying that Na San, a battle that tragically gave the French false hope for future operations, is given a whopping four pages.
Where is Morgan’s attention, then? It’s on the palace intrigue.
Despite the title, and the subtitle, and the picture of soldiers on the front cover, Valley of Death is a diplomatic history. With some sort of balance, with careful segues from jungle-to-conference room, this would’ve been just fine. Simply telling the story of a battle, after all, without any of its wider meaning, would be a waste. But Morgan doesn’t try to find a balance, and his shifting perspectives have all the subtlety of a sledgehammer to the cheek. One paragraph is in Washington; the next in Dien Bien Phu; and then suddenly we’re in Geneva.
The main irritant (leaving aside the clumsy edititing), as before, is misplaced detail. I totally lost count of the number of inanities that Morgan stuffs into the narrative. In one instance, he takes the time to give the reader General Paul Ely’s flight number! (“Ely landed at New York’s Idlewild Airport at 6:30 p.m. on Saturday, March 20, aboard TWA flight 931. The transatlantic voyage in those propeller-driven days took fourteen hours…”). In the meantime, back in Vietnam, men are fighting and dying, but the author barely seems to care. He’s more interested in the grade-D Machiavellian machinations of the French diplomatic delegations.
With regards to the diplomatic negotiations, a little would’ve gone a long way. Morgan feels differently, and these backdoor conversations (will America intervene to help the French or not? Pretend you don’t know the answer and keep reading!) really form the spine of the book. Morgan presents a lot of this stuff as revelatory; the problem, though, is that this is a poorly sourced book. The notes are threadbare and next to worthless, mostly containing naked citations to secondary sources. I need to know about where these verbatim conversations are coming from.
When Morgan actually takes the time to discuss the battle, the product is a shambles. His narrative on the battle is nearly impossible to follow. He does a poor job explaining the layout of the battle-site, the makeup of the troops, and the personalities of the commanders. All this is made worse by his tendency to cut away from the battle for long periods of time, to linger on the diplomats. By the time Morgan returns the story to the battle, you’ve forgotten who is who.
Furthermore, the two battle maps included in the book are near to worthless. Dien Bien Phu is an inherently difficult battle to follow. It wasn’t comprised of a single fortress, like the Alamo, which was overwhelmed by a horde of Viet Minh in one great charge. Rather, it was a series of strong-points, named after women (Eliane, Claudine, Gabrielle, etc.), ringing the airfield. These outposts fell, were retaken, and fell again at different times during the course of the fighting. It is a complicated chronology, one that requires a lot of discipline to explain. As noted before, that discipline is lacking.
I was further frustrated, throughout Valley of Death, by Morgan’s style of writing. He breaks every chapter up into dozens of subheadings (an average of one subheading per page). I don’t know why he did this, or what positive outcome he hoped to obtain. For me, it caused an already unfocused and stuttering narrative to become even more disjointed. Of course, I might just be getting crotchety. Perhaps this is the future of writing, in which even serious history books have to be broken down into easily-digestible soundbites for an audience weaned on Twitter and blog posts.
Normally, I try to avoid name-dropping other books when I write a review. This will be an exception.
Dien Bien Phu is a fascinating world-historical event. The battle’s outcome meant the end of French colonial rule, the beginning of American intervention, and ultimately the most divisive war in U.S. history, one that killed thousands of men, wounded many thousands more, alienated a generation, and caused a socio-political rift that exists to this day.
So if you’re interested in Dien Bien Phu, read Bernard Fall’s Hell in a Very Small Place or Martin Windrow’s The Last Valley. Neither are perfect, but both do a far better job in telling the story of this singularly important battle.
January 13, 2022
Not long ago I used to enjoy books like Ted Morgan's VALLEY OF DEATH. While First Indochina War buffs may not be very familiar with such works, as a former WWII buff, I can name a few: Rick Atkinson's Liberation Trilogy, James Holland's Normandy '44, Antony Beevor's Ardennes 1944 etc. etc. They are brilliantly written and impressively detailed popular historical works. They are so compelling that it is often almost impossible to put them down. They are widely praised as "raw," "no-holds-barred" accounts of epic battles, and they are really this good. However, after the wild ride of tackling such a book, I usually felt confused, but could not understand why. Now, because I read VALLEY OF DEATH after reading a number of academic Vietnam histories, I finally pinpointed this type of books' flaw – no explanations, too much detail, no perspective, and no conclusions.
Recently, a Goodreads friend of mine recommended me a great and highly useful book called Historians' Fallacies. As its name suggests, one of its purposes is to help historians avoid common pitfalls, such as the fallacies of narration. Storytelling, in is complex form, does not focus only on whens and hows – it focuses on whys. However, Ted Morgan, as well as the other authors I mentioned, exclude explanations from their narrative in order not to spoil the thrill, I suspect. Chronicling events without interpreting them keeps the reader on the edge, and he or she feels as if he or she has picked up a good thriller. However, non-fiction writers' attempts to imitate fiction often jeopardize the academic merit of their works. While the purpose of a thriller is to mystify and entertain, the goal of a historical work is to make the murky past as clear and understandable as possible.
Another significant flaw of Morgan and similar authors is their obsession with realism. And by realism I do not mean authenticity; I mean the desire to fully immerse the reader in the events discussed in the book by paying excessive attention to the smallest detail – dialogues, habits of historical figures, clothing, surroundings. The descriptive ability rivals that of fiction writers! On one hand, this is undoubtedly amazing. While reading, the reader feels as if he is looking over General Navarre's shoulder himself. The spirit of the battle; the frustration, the pain, the nervousness are conveyed to him perfectly. But because one is constantly looking through the eyes of one character or another, the view is limited and often confusing as thoughts and events shift back and forth all the time. The narrative splits into many different ones, and it becomes increasingly difficult to stay focused and follow at least some of the strings of events. For example, Morgan mentions General Ély's visit to Washington and the birth of Operation VULTURE. But then he completely drops the matter and goes back to Navarre. Operation VULTURE is not mentioned for another fifty or so pages, and it ultimately does not become clear what happened to this plan. The reader is left as confused as the historical figures from the narrative were at the time. Yes, this is realism, but is it useful realism? No.
From the aforementioned problem stems an even bigger one: lack of perspective. One of the main reasons why current historians concern themselves with the same topics those before them had elaborated on is that time has allowed them to acquire historical perspective historians of previous generations did not have. Just compare Vietnam War historians who wrote in the 1960s-70s with our contemporaries. Newer works are usually much more comprehensive, insightful, and complete. That's why Morgan's abandoning of the benefit of historical perspective on purpose affects his work negatively. His narrative leaves the reader down there, in the pits of obscurity, instead of elevating him so that he could see the complete picture, which is an essential condition for understanding a historical event, its causes and consequences, well.
And from this problem stems the final one – lack of conclusions. History has to be analytical. It has to be interpreted. We never learn from history exactly because most of us perceive it as a collection of curious – or horrible, scary, unbelievable etc. etc. – stories, which are to be told for entertainment. But this is chronicling, recording, not history. History is not the past. It is a way to organize, interpret, and make sense of the past in order to understand the present and maybe even the future. Morgan chronicles the battle of Dien Bien Phu without either drawing conclusions or giving the readers the insight needed to make conclusions themselves. The battle ends, and the book ends too. The thrill subsides. Only a question remains: "So what?"
Of course, Morgan's narrative style has its positive aspects. For instance, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's tense negotiations about US intervention and united action with congressmen are presented with the smallest attention to dialogue, which in the case is highly important.
However, generally I consider Ted Morgan's VALLEY OF DEATH and similar books more of an indulgence than a serious read. They are addictive because of how fast-paced, richly descriptive, and exciting they are. Just like a true student of English literature should read much more classics than rom-com novels, though, a true student of history should not include too many popular historical works in his reading list. Unlike academic works, they are not particularly thought-provoking and, if read in excessive quantities, might even blunt his or her analytical capacities.
Otherwise, if you would like a thrilling, raw account of the battle of Dien Bien Phu – with the gore, and the intrigue, and the pain – to beguile the time; if you would like to feel as if you were in the damned valley yourself, Morgan's book is undoubtedly a great read to curl on the coach with.
Recently, a Goodreads friend of mine recommended me a great and highly useful book called Historians' Fallacies. As its name suggests, one of its purposes is to help historians avoid common pitfalls, such as the fallacies of narration. Storytelling, in is complex form, does not focus only on whens and hows – it focuses on whys. However, Ted Morgan, as well as the other authors I mentioned, exclude explanations from their narrative in order not to spoil the thrill, I suspect. Chronicling events without interpreting them keeps the reader on the edge, and he or she feels as if he or she has picked up a good thriller. However, non-fiction writers' attempts to imitate fiction often jeopardize the academic merit of their works. While the purpose of a thriller is to mystify and entertain, the goal of a historical work is to make the murky past as clear and understandable as possible.
Another significant flaw of Morgan and similar authors is their obsession with realism. And by realism I do not mean authenticity; I mean the desire to fully immerse the reader in the events discussed in the book by paying excessive attention to the smallest detail – dialogues, habits of historical figures, clothing, surroundings. The descriptive ability rivals that of fiction writers! On one hand, this is undoubtedly amazing. While reading, the reader feels as if he is looking over General Navarre's shoulder himself. The spirit of the battle; the frustration, the pain, the nervousness are conveyed to him perfectly. But because one is constantly looking through the eyes of one character or another, the view is limited and often confusing as thoughts and events shift back and forth all the time. The narrative splits into many different ones, and it becomes increasingly difficult to stay focused and follow at least some of the strings of events. For example, Morgan mentions General Ély's visit to Washington and the birth of Operation VULTURE. But then he completely drops the matter and goes back to Navarre. Operation VULTURE is not mentioned for another fifty or so pages, and it ultimately does not become clear what happened to this plan. The reader is left as confused as the historical figures from the narrative were at the time. Yes, this is realism, but is it useful realism? No.
From the aforementioned problem stems an even bigger one: lack of perspective. One of the main reasons why current historians concern themselves with the same topics those before them had elaborated on is that time has allowed them to acquire historical perspective historians of previous generations did not have. Just compare Vietnam War historians who wrote in the 1960s-70s with our contemporaries. Newer works are usually much more comprehensive, insightful, and complete. That's why Morgan's abandoning of the benefit of historical perspective on purpose affects his work negatively. His narrative leaves the reader down there, in the pits of obscurity, instead of elevating him so that he could see the complete picture, which is an essential condition for understanding a historical event, its causes and consequences, well.
And from this problem stems the final one – lack of conclusions. History has to be analytical. It has to be interpreted. We never learn from history exactly because most of us perceive it as a collection of curious – or horrible, scary, unbelievable etc. etc. – stories, which are to be told for entertainment. But this is chronicling, recording, not history. History is not the past. It is a way to organize, interpret, and make sense of the past in order to understand the present and maybe even the future. Morgan chronicles the battle of Dien Bien Phu without either drawing conclusions or giving the readers the insight needed to make conclusions themselves. The battle ends, and the book ends too. The thrill subsides. Only a question remains: "So what?"
Of course, Morgan's narrative style has its positive aspects. For instance, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's tense negotiations about US intervention and united action with congressmen are presented with the smallest attention to dialogue, which in the case is highly important.
However, generally I consider Ted Morgan's VALLEY OF DEATH and similar books more of an indulgence than a serious read. They are addictive because of how fast-paced, richly descriptive, and exciting they are. Just like a true student of English literature should read much more classics than rom-com novels, though, a true student of history should not include too many popular historical works in his reading list. Unlike academic works, they are not particularly thought-provoking and, if read in excessive quantities, might even blunt his or her analytical capacities.
Otherwise, if you would like a thrilling, raw account of the battle of Dien Bien Phu – with the gore, and the intrigue, and the pain – to beguile the time; if you would like to feel as if you were in the damned valley yourself, Morgan's book is undoubtedly a great read to curl on the coach with.
February 25, 2014
I finished the book – 637 pages - in record time. It was really hard to put down. If this had been a work of fiction I would have criticized the Valley of Death as being too improbable. However, you can’t make this stuff up. How did this French disaster happen? Is this just another French military disaster due to French arrogance? From Waterloo to Jean van de Velde’s loss at the 1999 British Open, history is full of French disasters like this one.
The story begins in the early 1940’s during WWII. According to the author, the French not only collaborated with the Germans in Europe, they also collaborated with the Japanese in Indochina. In fact, the Vichy French annually paid the Japanese for their forces of occupation! The Japanese used Indochina as a base to launch other campaigns without having to worry about the supply lines in their rear thanks to the complicit French. During the war, acreage used to grow rice was diverted to other crops necessary for the Japanese war machine. The rice that was grown in Indochina was hoarded for the Japanese and French leading to the starvation of 2 million Vietnamese. Meanwhile, Ho Chi Min was recruited by the OSS to retrieve downed American pilots and spy on the Japanese. His life was saved by an American medic when he was dying from Malaria. The OSS operatives spoke very highly of him and his friendship could have been further cultivated. Furthermore, FDR proclaimed that colonialism was dead and the French had no right to keep Indochina after the war. This was a sentiment shared by the majority of Americans. It drew jeers from the likes of Winston Churchill who was worried about the UK having to turn over many of their own colonies!
So what happened in a span of a couple years to make things change 180˚? China fell to Mao’s Red Army and North Korea attacked South Korea. The term the Domino Principle became part of the North American vernacular. The Domino Principle transformed France’s imperialism into a crusade against communism. Meanwhile our staunch ally, the United Kingdom, had to give up India and could care less about some French Colony in the middle of nowhere.
The Indochina war quickly became a war of China vs. The USA fighting through surrogates. The Chinese trained and outfitted the Vietminh. This included 105 and 155 howitzers. Meanwhile, the USA was paying for 80% of the Indochina war. Only 8% of the French population supported the war. Also, It was illegal to send conscripts to Indochina and only 25% of the troops fighting in Indochina were from France.
The French plan to defeat the Vietminh was to man outposts referred to by the author as “Beau Geste” forts. The French strategy was to fight protracted defensive battles from static, defensive positions. When it was apparent that this was not a winning strategy the French high command decided upon a new strategy. They would build an even bigger fort in a valley near the Laotian border and call it Dien Bien Phu. This outpost was really the connection of several intertwined strong points that spanned 6 miles in two directions and covered the low ground. Offensive patrols could be mounted from Dien Bien Phu. It would draw the Vietminh from the Delta and it would protect Laos. The hope was that the lightly armed Vietminh forces would make human wave attacks against the highly fortified French position and wreck themselves. The French built an airstrip and there was no way to reinforce the camp or retreat overland. When Eisenhower heard of this plan he said something like “Good God, they’ll be cut to pieces.”
The French folly was apparent almost immediately. It was demonstrated that the French could not mount offensive patrols with any intended purpose without being ambushed. 3 divisions of Vietminh led by Giap were able to surround the encampment. They pushed artillery from China using 100’s of coolies per gun and winches and hid them from the French air force in caves in the heights surrounding DBP. The French never thought they would be able to do this. The Viets infiltrated various strongholds and cut the French off one by one. The French paratroops and the Legionnaires (most were ex-Wehrmacht) fought well and so did some of the Vietnamese paratroops but there just weren’t enough of them. The Moroccans, Algerians, Thais, and other colonial troops did not fight with the same élan. Their commanding officer De Castries never came out of his bunker once the battle started. The French high command outside of DBP bickered. One of the officers would not drop in replacements until they had made 6 jumps in Hanoi and earned a certificate. The Americans could not decide how to help the French. They couldn’t use strategic bombing because the forces were on top of each other and there were few targets when fighting a guerilla army in the jungle. The majority of US Joint Chiefs and Eisenhower did not want to commit troops. Tactical nukes were offered but there was no way to really employee these either. The French were given an aircraft carrier and used it to transport recently sold French planes to Canada. The book is full of ludicrous stories such as this.
The French realized that there was no chance of a military victory without a political solution. The Geneva conference was held while the French were fighting in Dien Bien Phu. The Allies had a tough time presenting a united front. The French were very stubborn and fought amongst themselves. The Americans and French could agree on little. The British could care less about Indochina after having to give up India a few years earlier. Their British minister Eden actually worked to undercut the allied position. Meanwhile the communists seemed to be in locked step.
After a valiant effort the French finally surrendered. This was OK with French high command as long as they did not wave a white flag. Over 10,000 men were marched into captivity and only about 3,000 survived. The French got out of Vietnam and you know the rest of the story.
Read the Valley of Death and then hit me up on Face Book and we can all try to make sense of the French and allied position. I’m still scratching my head.
The story begins in the early 1940’s during WWII. According to the author, the French not only collaborated with the Germans in Europe, they also collaborated with the Japanese in Indochina. In fact, the Vichy French annually paid the Japanese for their forces of occupation! The Japanese used Indochina as a base to launch other campaigns without having to worry about the supply lines in their rear thanks to the complicit French. During the war, acreage used to grow rice was diverted to other crops necessary for the Japanese war machine. The rice that was grown in Indochina was hoarded for the Japanese and French leading to the starvation of 2 million Vietnamese. Meanwhile, Ho Chi Min was recruited by the OSS to retrieve downed American pilots and spy on the Japanese. His life was saved by an American medic when he was dying from Malaria. The OSS operatives spoke very highly of him and his friendship could have been further cultivated. Furthermore, FDR proclaimed that colonialism was dead and the French had no right to keep Indochina after the war. This was a sentiment shared by the majority of Americans. It drew jeers from the likes of Winston Churchill who was worried about the UK having to turn over many of their own colonies!
So what happened in a span of a couple years to make things change 180˚? China fell to Mao’s Red Army and North Korea attacked South Korea. The term the Domino Principle became part of the North American vernacular. The Domino Principle transformed France’s imperialism into a crusade against communism. Meanwhile our staunch ally, the United Kingdom, had to give up India and could care less about some French Colony in the middle of nowhere.
The Indochina war quickly became a war of China vs. The USA fighting through surrogates. The Chinese trained and outfitted the Vietminh. This included 105 and 155 howitzers. Meanwhile, the USA was paying for 80% of the Indochina war. Only 8% of the French population supported the war. Also, It was illegal to send conscripts to Indochina and only 25% of the troops fighting in Indochina were from France.
The French plan to defeat the Vietminh was to man outposts referred to by the author as “Beau Geste” forts. The French strategy was to fight protracted defensive battles from static, defensive positions. When it was apparent that this was not a winning strategy the French high command decided upon a new strategy. They would build an even bigger fort in a valley near the Laotian border and call it Dien Bien Phu. This outpost was really the connection of several intertwined strong points that spanned 6 miles in two directions and covered the low ground. Offensive patrols could be mounted from Dien Bien Phu. It would draw the Vietminh from the Delta and it would protect Laos. The hope was that the lightly armed Vietminh forces would make human wave attacks against the highly fortified French position and wreck themselves. The French built an airstrip and there was no way to reinforce the camp or retreat overland. When Eisenhower heard of this plan he said something like “Good God, they’ll be cut to pieces.”
The French folly was apparent almost immediately. It was demonstrated that the French could not mount offensive patrols with any intended purpose without being ambushed. 3 divisions of Vietminh led by Giap were able to surround the encampment. They pushed artillery from China using 100’s of coolies per gun and winches and hid them from the French air force in caves in the heights surrounding DBP. The French never thought they would be able to do this. The Viets infiltrated various strongholds and cut the French off one by one. The French paratroops and the Legionnaires (most were ex-Wehrmacht) fought well and so did some of the Vietnamese paratroops but there just weren’t enough of them. The Moroccans, Algerians, Thais, and other colonial troops did not fight with the same élan. Their commanding officer De Castries never came out of his bunker once the battle started. The French high command outside of DBP bickered. One of the officers would not drop in replacements until they had made 6 jumps in Hanoi and earned a certificate. The Americans could not decide how to help the French. They couldn’t use strategic bombing because the forces were on top of each other and there were few targets when fighting a guerilla army in the jungle. The majority of US Joint Chiefs and Eisenhower did not want to commit troops. Tactical nukes were offered but there was no way to really employee these either. The French were given an aircraft carrier and used it to transport recently sold French planes to Canada. The book is full of ludicrous stories such as this.
The French realized that there was no chance of a military victory without a political solution. The Geneva conference was held while the French were fighting in Dien Bien Phu. The Allies had a tough time presenting a united front. The French were very stubborn and fought amongst themselves. The Americans and French could agree on little. The British could care less about Indochina after having to give up India a few years earlier. Their British minister Eden actually worked to undercut the allied position. Meanwhile the communists seemed to be in locked step.
After a valiant effort the French finally surrendered. This was OK with French high command as long as they did not wave a white flag. Over 10,000 men were marched into captivity and only about 3,000 survived. The French got out of Vietnam and you know the rest of the story.
Read the Valley of Death and then hit me up on Face Book and we can all try to make sense of the French and allied position. I’m still scratching my head.
October 19, 2010
How could the France which gave us the brilliant Charles Martel, Charlemagne, Turene, de Saxe and, of course, the incomparable Napoleon, have given us the nincompoops responsible for the idiocy which was Dien Bien Phu? It is hard to read as elite French Paratroopers and Foreign Legionnaires (largely comprised of ex-Waffen SS survivors of Stalingrad) are knowingly placed into a death-trap and bravely die in the face of overwhelming odds, incompetent senior staff officers and cowardly politicians. And all for maintaining a colonial system whose time had clearly long past. It all seems so impossibly delusional, until you remember that the United States would soon choose the same path, ignore the lessons of Dien Bien Phu and needlessly send almost 60,000 Americans to their death. Truman, Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles all have blood on their hands for this folly.
Indeed, almost no one comes off well in this sorry tale which is brilliantly told, except perhaps the intrepid, but merciless (particularly to their unlucky captives), Vietminh who seem to have been fighting for independence more than Communism. The Chinese and Russians betray Ho Chi Minh, the British betray their alleged allies in a pathetic attempt to remain relevant and retain Burma, while the Americans betray their own ideals, as well as any notions of common sense, in deference to the ridiculous “domino” theory.
This is a must read for anyone who wants to understand the American experience in Vietnam or why the modern Neo-Cons are such idiots.
Indeed, almost no one comes off well in this sorry tale which is brilliantly told, except perhaps the intrepid, but merciless (particularly to their unlucky captives), Vietminh who seem to have been fighting for independence more than Communism. The Chinese and Russians betray Ho Chi Minh, the British betray their alleged allies in a pathetic attempt to remain relevant and retain Burma, while the Americans betray their own ideals, as well as any notions of common sense, in deference to the ridiculous “domino” theory.
This is a must read for anyone who wants to understand the American experience in Vietnam or why the modern Neo-Cons are such idiots.
July 26, 2010
In summation after a 500 pages the book could read:
French Generals: " France will never Leave Indochina"
French Soldiers: "Duck"
I love a history that pulls no punches, with sub-chapter headings like "What the fuck are we doing here?!" Morgan leaves no doubt about where his sympathies lie, that's not a complaint, it is a virtue. Working from a great set of unearthed primary sources, both French & Vietnamese & American he reconstructs the folly of this battle.
It is a painful and madding read.
Highly recommended, now if I could only find my Eric Burdon 8-Track.
French Generals: " France will never Leave Indochina"
French Soldiers: "Duck"
I love a history that pulls no punches, with sub-chapter headings like "What the fuck are we doing here?!" Morgan leaves no doubt about where his sympathies lie, that's not a complaint, it is a virtue. Working from a great set of unearthed primary sources, both French & Vietnamese & American he reconstructs the folly of this battle.
It is a painful and madding read.
Highly recommended, now if I could only find my Eric Burdon 8-Track.
March 30, 2020
An informative and riveting if uneven history of Dien Bien Phu, with a focus on the battle’s strategic context.
Morgan does a fine job putting the battle into the context of World War Two’s aftermath and providing the right amount of political background, although he doesn’t really provide anything new. Morgan’s book is mainly about the battle itself, but he does move back and forth to the actions of decision makers in Hanoi, Washington, and Paris, and finally to the peace talks in Geneva.
The way Morgan puts it all together is a little disjointed, however. He also gets a few small facts wrong like the date of the Hantz airdrop, referring to an “Eliane 13” (he probably means 12) and calling Jean Bréchignac a member of the Legion (he was a paratrooper with 1st RCP) At one point Morgan mentions Colonel Louis Guth being killed both by a “sniper” and by “automatic fire.” The US ambassador to Indochina, Donald Heath, is called “David Heath” more than once. Matt Ridgway is referred to as a “tough guy.” More maps and a greater focus on the Vietminh side would have helped.
A well-written, vivid, and engaging history of the battle overall.
Morgan does a fine job putting the battle into the context of World War Two’s aftermath and providing the right amount of political background, although he doesn’t really provide anything new. Morgan’s book is mainly about the battle itself, but he does move back and forth to the actions of decision makers in Hanoi, Washington, and Paris, and finally to the peace talks in Geneva.
The way Morgan puts it all together is a little disjointed, however. He also gets a few small facts wrong like the date of the Hantz airdrop, referring to an “Eliane 13” (he probably means 12) and calling Jean Bréchignac a member of the Legion (he was a paratrooper with 1st RCP) At one point Morgan mentions Colonel Louis Guth being killed both by a “sniper” and by “automatic fire.” The US ambassador to Indochina, Donald Heath, is called “David Heath” more than once. Matt Ridgway is referred to as a “tough guy.” More maps and a greater focus on the Vietminh side would have helped.
A well-written, vivid, and engaging history of the battle overall.
July 9, 2021
The story starts with the death of FDR and the new US President Truman attending the conference at Potsdam. The amazing part of this first chapter is that most people do not associate the European war (WWII) with the conflicts in Indonesia and Korea. Morgan confirms that Potsdam is where the American march to the Vietnam war began. This book is a perfect illustration of the principal: The fighting of wars is about actual fighting and the politics that permeates the fighting. Morgan describes the politics in detail; he puts you in the room when the Big 5 (US, Britain, France, Russia, and China) meet.
Among the things I learned from Morgan’s book was that the Vietnamese fought the Vichy French and the Japanese during World War II, and the US helped and supported their fight. After the war as the Vietnamese fought for independence from France, we supported the French.
After reading the first chapter, I hypothesized, and I think Morgan agrees that if FDR had lived the US may have avoided the wars in Korea and Vietnam. FDR did not like the colonial Empires of the French and the British, so I can only believe that he would have been against the French attempted recolonization of Indonesia post World War II.
Morgan makes many interesting observations, pointing to the vacuum that existed after the War in France, political leadership was practically nonexistent. England wanted and needed a buffer between its little island and the Communist in Europe. A strong democratic France was the only possible buffer, yet France was weak after the war, and it was feared that Communist could come to power in post war France. Britain insisted on the renewal of the French Republic on Democratic principles, yet the French leadership wanted to keep its colonial empire in Indonesia. Without the strong leadership of FDR, his successors acquiesced to the French recolonization in Vietnam. Politics required the US and the British to support the French colonialization efforts and ignored the Vietnamese hopes and prayers for independence.
The US support was first shipments of supplies, then weapons, then planes, and tanks, then advisors and then we owned the war. The reader has the benefit of hindsight, yet while reading this history, we keep saying no! do not get involved!
Initially the US government saw parallels between the Vietnamese desire for independence and our own struggle for independence. We supplied and supported the Vietnamese fight against the Japanese, the French, and China during the World War than politics made Vietnam the loser in the global chess game in the post-war world.
Our leaders rationalized support for the French and our subsequent war with the Vietnamize, as a war against communism, today we know that was short sighted, yet even the great Dwight Eisenhower feel prey to the Communist hysteria. In the fifties, Senator Joseph McCarthy’s search for communist under every rock in government, the rise of Chairman Mao and the entrance of communist China onto the world stage, was a scary reasonable fear.
These first hundred pages provided for this reader a clear picture of why and how the US got entangled in two Asian wars. Morgan is very readable, the clear and concise writing style and his narrative compels the reader forward in the hope that the US will not fall into the trap, while knowing that we will.
Morgan’s recital of the history of this conflict caused me to lose faith in Truman. When Eisenhower entered the arena as President, I searched for his wisdom and leadership to be applied to the crisis in Vietnam, yet he moved with trepidation and caution; but he did not send troops to Vietnam. All the government thinking was towards containment of communism in Indonesia and the world.
Morgan spoke of the atomic bomb and how Truman naively tried to impress Stalin at Potsdam by stating that the US was developing important new weapons, when told of this secret weapon, Stalin replied, “I know”. I was disappointed that Morgan did not develop this topic further. It is acknowledged today that Truman did not have to drop those bombs to stop the loss of life and win the war. He dropped those bombs to impress the Russians. Japan was defeated and was negotiating peace, we were at their door and the Russians were advancing at them through Manchuria, a cease fire and surrender was being negotiated, but Truman dropped the bombs anyhow, and if this is true… it is outrageous.
Morgan’s narratives took the reader through the two years of effort by the Vietnamize to avoid war with France, all the while the French were tightening their control and ignoring the Vietnamize offer of peace and finally on December 23, 1947, Ho Chi Minh announced war was on.
The US fixation and fear of the expansion of Communism cost the Vietnamize US support and we sanctioned the French colonizers, but Vietnam had support from China, and they fought hard for independence. I could have stopped after these first chapters and would have been perfectly satisfied with Morgan’s excellent presentation of post-World War history in Indonesia, but Morgan had much more to say.
Morgan in chronological order presents Chapter 3 Navarre Takes Command; and Chapter 4 The Battle.
These chapters illustrate the political and military frustrations of the French. After several Generals tried and failed, they put in command Henri Navarre, whose experience was staff work and not combat. When he mentioned his lack of experience to his superiors in France, he was told, “someone has to do it”, and this remark explains the state of disorder in the French government. They wanted to retain this colony yet did not have the ways and means to do it.
Navarre was an intelligent man and did work hard at an impossible task. He concluded that by establishing a base in the north close to the Chinese border he could gain access to Laos and divert Viet troops from the south with its important cities like Saigon and Haiphong. His plan was to build a large airbase in a large and beautiful valley called Diem Bien Phu. Navarre felt he could protect this air base because it was surrounded by jungle and mountainous terrain, Navarre was wrong!
Our author presents a compelling day by day narrative of the buildup for the battle for Diem Bien Phu and the brilliant leadership of Viet General Giap and his Chinese advisors. It appears that Morgan, read every letter written home and all communications from the military and Political powers. He is detailed to a fault because he causes some duplication and rehash, but no one can fault his incredible research.
The Viet performed amazing tactical achievements. They dismantled large artillery pieces weighing many tons and pushed and carried the weapons onto the mountain tops in small pieces and then reassembled them. This allowed the Viet’s to surround and strike at the airbase and its planes. They supplied their army by using peasants to transport food and other supplies for hundreds of miles through swamp and mountains. Morgan painted a fantastic picture of peasants using bikes to push hundreds of pounds of supplies over hundreds of miles through swamps, crossing rivers and over mountains to supply the troops.
In these narrations the reader clearly see’s that Morgan is sympathetic to the Viet cause. He also is quick to point out the incompetency of the French and the other western allied nations. When Morgan puts you in a room with the British, French and the US, the reader quickly realizes that there is a dearth of Statesmen in the room. Each Country is pursuing a separate narrow agenda and very few have a world view. Negotiation takes place on a secondary level with old warriors like Eisenhower and Churchill on the sidelines. Yet, these negotiations followed the template that was successful in the World War and could not be successful in Indonesia. The allies from WWII could not see that the map had changed, and that other Countries had to be at the table on an equal basis. Places like China, India, Vietnam needed to be recognized and be heard, yet their appearance at the table was fought by those rooted in the past.
The reader knows that the French will leave Vietnam, yet Morgan keeps you spell bound by the detailed and intimate conversations of politician’s and generals, while soldiers are laying down their lives for nothing. Morgan has little faith in the French political and military leadership, yet it is easy to have empathy for the French and even Viet soldier who is brave and follows orders no matter how irrational.
To sum up this book I must first praise the incredible research performed by Morgan. He is French by birth and spent three years researching French sources and cold war politics. He had access to French correspondence and recollections of survivors of the battle and the overall French disaster in Indonesia. He had the good luck to have direct access to the report of the Committee investigation of this battle that provided direct eyewitness testimony to the incompetence of the upper tier of the French officer corp. and their political counterparts. He even went to Vietnam and viewed the battlefield to get a clear picture.
He presents his case with hour by hour, day by day commentary naming who said what and when. He used a compelling technique of moved back and forth between the politicians cloistered in Paris, London, DC, and Geneva contemplating the problem of Indonesia while enjoying the finest wines and champagne. Dining on the creations of world-renowned chefs; with the soldiers at Dien Bien Phu surrounded by the Vietminh and living and dying in inhuman conditions. The orders were to hang on and not to surrender while politicians in Saigon dictated what and when they would be supported and supplied.
Morgan presents the politics of 1953 so well that the reader wonders how the US got into this war. Eisenhower, who was probably the most cynical of our presidents about war. He was against US soldiers fighting in Vietnam, he felt that this colonial war was a trap to be avoided at all costs. In his epilogue Morgan says, “Eisenhower is the wisest post WWII President because he understood that there were limits to the deployment of US power”. The British also saw it as a war to be avoid. The French desperately wanted an end to the conflict. Every nation including the Russians and the Chinese feared it could escalate into a third World War and wanted an end to this conflict.
Morgan concludes his narrative by describing the march of the French prisoners into captivity and the horrible conditions that they had to endure. His description of their post confinement was so like the experience of US Vietnam soldiers, it could have been describing 1964 instead of 1954. “Many were crippled for life by physical and psychic wounds. They had recurring attacks of malaria, intestinal infections, and rheumatism, and had to be repeatedly hospitalized. Their mental traumas never healed; PTSD disorder had not yet been identified but men did suffer its symptoms like combat flashbacks, insomnia, hallucinations and fits of rage. Some began to drink heavily and kept weapons at home, and some used these weapons on themselves”.
The final political discussions were efforts to broker a peace and many politicians stood out, yet none were American. I have to ask…..After all the human suffering, after the Geneva conference where concessions were made by all sides to end the war, after Eisenhower’s warning about avoiding the trap, how did America ignore all evidence and succumb to its own Vietnam?
Among the things I learned from Morgan’s book was that the Vietnamese fought the Vichy French and the Japanese during World War II, and the US helped and supported their fight. After the war as the Vietnamese fought for independence from France, we supported the French.
After reading the first chapter, I hypothesized, and I think Morgan agrees that if FDR had lived the US may have avoided the wars in Korea and Vietnam. FDR did not like the colonial Empires of the French and the British, so I can only believe that he would have been against the French attempted recolonization of Indonesia post World War II.
Morgan makes many interesting observations, pointing to the vacuum that existed after the War in France, political leadership was practically nonexistent. England wanted and needed a buffer between its little island and the Communist in Europe. A strong democratic France was the only possible buffer, yet France was weak after the war, and it was feared that Communist could come to power in post war France. Britain insisted on the renewal of the French Republic on Democratic principles, yet the French leadership wanted to keep its colonial empire in Indonesia. Without the strong leadership of FDR, his successors acquiesced to the French recolonization in Vietnam. Politics required the US and the British to support the French colonialization efforts and ignored the Vietnamese hopes and prayers for independence.
The US support was first shipments of supplies, then weapons, then planes, and tanks, then advisors and then we owned the war. The reader has the benefit of hindsight, yet while reading this history, we keep saying no! do not get involved!
Initially the US government saw parallels between the Vietnamese desire for independence and our own struggle for independence. We supplied and supported the Vietnamese fight against the Japanese, the French, and China during the World War than politics made Vietnam the loser in the global chess game in the post-war world.
Our leaders rationalized support for the French and our subsequent war with the Vietnamize, as a war against communism, today we know that was short sighted, yet even the great Dwight Eisenhower feel prey to the Communist hysteria. In the fifties, Senator Joseph McCarthy’s search for communist under every rock in government, the rise of Chairman Mao and the entrance of communist China onto the world stage, was a scary reasonable fear.
These first hundred pages provided for this reader a clear picture of why and how the US got entangled in two Asian wars. Morgan is very readable, the clear and concise writing style and his narrative compels the reader forward in the hope that the US will not fall into the trap, while knowing that we will.
Morgan’s recital of the history of this conflict caused me to lose faith in Truman. When Eisenhower entered the arena as President, I searched for his wisdom and leadership to be applied to the crisis in Vietnam, yet he moved with trepidation and caution; but he did not send troops to Vietnam. All the government thinking was towards containment of communism in Indonesia and the world.
Morgan spoke of the atomic bomb and how Truman naively tried to impress Stalin at Potsdam by stating that the US was developing important new weapons, when told of this secret weapon, Stalin replied, “I know”. I was disappointed that Morgan did not develop this topic further. It is acknowledged today that Truman did not have to drop those bombs to stop the loss of life and win the war. He dropped those bombs to impress the Russians. Japan was defeated and was negotiating peace, we were at their door and the Russians were advancing at them through Manchuria, a cease fire and surrender was being negotiated, but Truman dropped the bombs anyhow, and if this is true… it is outrageous.
Morgan’s narratives took the reader through the two years of effort by the Vietnamize to avoid war with France, all the while the French were tightening their control and ignoring the Vietnamize offer of peace and finally on December 23, 1947, Ho Chi Minh announced war was on.
The US fixation and fear of the expansion of Communism cost the Vietnamize US support and we sanctioned the French colonizers, but Vietnam had support from China, and they fought hard for independence. I could have stopped after these first chapters and would have been perfectly satisfied with Morgan’s excellent presentation of post-World War history in Indonesia, but Morgan had much more to say.
Morgan in chronological order presents Chapter 3 Navarre Takes Command; and Chapter 4 The Battle.
These chapters illustrate the political and military frustrations of the French. After several Generals tried and failed, they put in command Henri Navarre, whose experience was staff work and not combat. When he mentioned his lack of experience to his superiors in France, he was told, “someone has to do it”, and this remark explains the state of disorder in the French government. They wanted to retain this colony yet did not have the ways and means to do it.
Navarre was an intelligent man and did work hard at an impossible task. He concluded that by establishing a base in the north close to the Chinese border he could gain access to Laos and divert Viet troops from the south with its important cities like Saigon and Haiphong. His plan was to build a large airbase in a large and beautiful valley called Diem Bien Phu. Navarre felt he could protect this air base because it was surrounded by jungle and mountainous terrain, Navarre was wrong!
Our author presents a compelling day by day narrative of the buildup for the battle for Diem Bien Phu and the brilliant leadership of Viet General Giap and his Chinese advisors. It appears that Morgan, read every letter written home and all communications from the military and Political powers. He is detailed to a fault because he causes some duplication and rehash, but no one can fault his incredible research.
The Viet performed amazing tactical achievements. They dismantled large artillery pieces weighing many tons and pushed and carried the weapons onto the mountain tops in small pieces and then reassembled them. This allowed the Viet’s to surround and strike at the airbase and its planes. They supplied their army by using peasants to transport food and other supplies for hundreds of miles through swamp and mountains. Morgan painted a fantastic picture of peasants using bikes to push hundreds of pounds of supplies over hundreds of miles through swamps, crossing rivers and over mountains to supply the troops.
In these narrations the reader clearly see’s that Morgan is sympathetic to the Viet cause. He also is quick to point out the incompetency of the French and the other western allied nations. When Morgan puts you in a room with the British, French and the US, the reader quickly realizes that there is a dearth of Statesmen in the room. Each Country is pursuing a separate narrow agenda and very few have a world view. Negotiation takes place on a secondary level with old warriors like Eisenhower and Churchill on the sidelines. Yet, these negotiations followed the template that was successful in the World War and could not be successful in Indonesia. The allies from WWII could not see that the map had changed, and that other Countries had to be at the table on an equal basis. Places like China, India, Vietnam needed to be recognized and be heard, yet their appearance at the table was fought by those rooted in the past.
The reader knows that the French will leave Vietnam, yet Morgan keeps you spell bound by the detailed and intimate conversations of politician’s and generals, while soldiers are laying down their lives for nothing. Morgan has little faith in the French political and military leadership, yet it is easy to have empathy for the French and even Viet soldier who is brave and follows orders no matter how irrational.
To sum up this book I must first praise the incredible research performed by Morgan. He is French by birth and spent three years researching French sources and cold war politics. He had access to French correspondence and recollections of survivors of the battle and the overall French disaster in Indonesia. He had the good luck to have direct access to the report of the Committee investigation of this battle that provided direct eyewitness testimony to the incompetence of the upper tier of the French officer corp. and their political counterparts. He even went to Vietnam and viewed the battlefield to get a clear picture.
He presents his case with hour by hour, day by day commentary naming who said what and when. He used a compelling technique of moved back and forth between the politicians cloistered in Paris, London, DC, and Geneva contemplating the problem of Indonesia while enjoying the finest wines and champagne. Dining on the creations of world-renowned chefs; with the soldiers at Dien Bien Phu surrounded by the Vietminh and living and dying in inhuman conditions. The orders were to hang on and not to surrender while politicians in Saigon dictated what and when they would be supported and supplied.
Morgan presents the politics of 1953 so well that the reader wonders how the US got into this war. Eisenhower, who was probably the most cynical of our presidents about war. He was against US soldiers fighting in Vietnam, he felt that this colonial war was a trap to be avoided at all costs. In his epilogue Morgan says, “Eisenhower is the wisest post WWII President because he understood that there were limits to the deployment of US power”. The British also saw it as a war to be avoid. The French desperately wanted an end to the conflict. Every nation including the Russians and the Chinese feared it could escalate into a third World War and wanted an end to this conflict.
Morgan concludes his narrative by describing the march of the French prisoners into captivity and the horrible conditions that they had to endure. His description of their post confinement was so like the experience of US Vietnam soldiers, it could have been describing 1964 instead of 1954. “Many were crippled for life by physical and psychic wounds. They had recurring attacks of malaria, intestinal infections, and rheumatism, and had to be repeatedly hospitalized. Their mental traumas never healed; PTSD disorder had not yet been identified but men did suffer its symptoms like combat flashbacks, insomnia, hallucinations and fits of rage. Some began to drink heavily and kept weapons at home, and some used these weapons on themselves”.
The final political discussions were efforts to broker a peace and many politicians stood out, yet none were American. I have to ask…..After all the human suffering, after the Geneva conference where concessions were made by all sides to end the war, after Eisenhower’s warning about avoiding the trap, how did America ignore all evidence and succumb to its own Vietnam?
September 5, 2010
Very detailed, but manages not to get bogged down. Alternates between battles and diplomacy, and goes through a lot of Vietnam history that isn't that well known in this country.
May 1, 2012
Excellent book on the history of the battle of Dien Bien Phu along with the political history taking place while the battle was being fought. He starts with the history of Indochina from the start of WW 2. You get a clear picture in detail of the battle. You feel craziness of the political scene while men were dying and wounded at Dien Bien Phu. It seems at that time in history that the political haggling was as much part of battle as the actual fighting. People used the battle to improve their position at the talks for peace. Men were dying and lying wounded while politicians were more worried about their influence and power.
He is very clear and detailed about what took place from 1940 through 1954. It was a ugly time for France as they tried to hang onto Indochina. Two words come to mine that hung over this time; colonialism and communism. France trying to hang onto their colonial lands and the fear of Communism especially in the United States.
You get a clear idea how what happened in 1954 set up the US to enter Vietnam in the 60's.
He is very clear and detailed about what took place from 1940 through 1954. It was a ugly time for France as they tried to hang onto Indochina. Two words come to mine that hung over this time; colonialism and communism. France trying to hang onto their colonial lands and the fear of Communism especially in the United States.
You get a clear idea how what happened in 1954 set up the US to enter Vietnam in the 60's.
February 15, 2011
Ted Morgan's look at the twisting and changing fortunes leading the United States into the Vietnam War is an insightful examination of the trap placed upon our Strategic thinking by "Washington." Read in conjunction with Washington Rules, you will be very disturbed by the shortsighted views and positions held within the State Departmentand The Department of Defense. This is a book that looks at the quicksands surrounding leadership when decision makers allow their egos, and sense of power, to cloud their judgement, realities of the situation and fail to ask the key question, " What constitutes winning?" The "lessons" in Ted Morgan's book are meaningful and very realvant for us today. This book should be required reading for all individuals whose decisions can put our military into environments where there is no "winning."
September 10, 2023
At the end of 2005, in December, I was on my way to Afghanistan. I read two books along the way; The Last Valley, Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam by Martin Windrow and The Valley of Death, The Tragedy at Dien Bien Phu That Led America into the Vietnam War, Ted Morgan, a Pulitzer Prize winning author. The book contains several pages of pictures. Its one flaw is that there are no battle maps. You will need to Google “French Dispositions in Dien Bien Phu” and find a couple of good maps.
Here is one good link to a Map that the reader may find helpful. https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/art...
In light of recent tensions between the US and China, I thought I would revisit the book by Ted Morgan.
The book is sectioned into Acts, not chapters. The book begins with a little colonial history and the first partition of Vietnam. It progresses into how a colonial war was simultaneously a proxy war, when General Navarre takes command, devotes 250 pages to the actual battle and concludes with 139 pages of the aftermath of diplomacy, defeat and captivity, and then there is a final epilogue. The book has an extensive bibliography and notes section of myriad primary sources, The beauty of this book is that it was written after 2008 and includes numerous declassified and historical documents from the Chinese, the Vietnamese participants. There is a total of 722 pages.
I have 50 3x5 cards with notes that I took. I will not dwell on the battle. I would like to point to the effective use of diplomacy and force by the Vietnamese who were mentored by their Chinese Advisors of whom some were veterans of the Korean War. Chinese general officers and military advisors effectively migrated the military strategy with the political strategy. Although this is still early in the evolution of the Chinese Communist Party one thing has not changed and that is the Party is the State. The Party’s rigid hierarchy of guidance, Party line, guidelines, policy and use of slogans and speeches to reinforce – authoritatively – the tight integration of Diplomacy, policy and military action. In hindsight, strategists are aware that Korea was both a sideshow to gain traction in Indochina and that for the Chinese, Vietnam and Korea were really one war that focused on the political and diplomatic outcome of great Asia / Indochina.
As usual, there were a number of astute offices, envoys and advisors that council caution that the US should not be involved. Over the course of 1946 thru 1954, Intelligence estimates and reports were ignored, and the domino theory flawed Cartesian logic prevailed; Europe and French participation in Europe’s defense became more important than Indochina. The French, British, and US did not clearly understand the type of and character of war that they were involved in – The Chinese and the Vietnamese clearly did.
By late 1953, General Giap had clearly recognized that Dien Bien Phu was totally isolated and that air supply of the base – which required more than 80 tons daily - was the only realistic means available. General Giap took months to move his divisions into place.
An Chinese example of what we can call Multidomain Operations occurred in late November of 1953 when a Swedish newspaper was granted an exclusive interview with Ho Chi Minh. The journalist sent 5 questions three weeks prior to HO and the questions were vetted by the Chinese and Russians. Playing to the prevailing international mood for negotiations, Ho replied that “If the French wish to have an armistice and to resolve the question of Vietnam by negotiation, the people and government of the democratic Republic of Vietnam are ready to examine French proposals” a few days later, Ho sent a letter to General Giap saying: “This campaign is a very important one, not only militarily, but politically, not only for domestic reasons, but international ones as well. So all of our people, all of our armed forces, and the entire Party must be entirely united to get the job done. In any case, as the result of all these peace rumblings, the involved Western powers – United States, France, and Britain- decided to meet in Bermuda in December to make sure they were all on the same page and to emphasize the vital importance of the French War effort to the defense of the free world.”
At the Bermuda Conference, The French Envoy lied, Washington preferred to accept wishful thinking disguised as good news, General Navarre ignores his intelligence when he selects Dien Bien Phu and does not know that the Vietnamese have already penetrated French Lines, and US General Officer situation assessments are overly optimistic in support of wishful thinking.
The first assaults on Dien Bien Phu began on 13 March 1954, by May 7th, it was over.
My suggested reading list from here is:
1. The Long Game by Rush Doshi,
2. On China, Henry Kissinger
3. The Best and the Brightest, David Halberstam
4. Stilwell and the American Experience in China ( 1911- 1945), Barbara Tuchman
5. Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War, 3rd Ed. Robert J. McMahon
Here is one good link to a Map that the reader may find helpful. https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/art...
In light of recent tensions between the US and China, I thought I would revisit the book by Ted Morgan.
The book is sectioned into Acts, not chapters. The book begins with a little colonial history and the first partition of Vietnam. It progresses into how a colonial war was simultaneously a proxy war, when General Navarre takes command, devotes 250 pages to the actual battle and concludes with 139 pages of the aftermath of diplomacy, defeat and captivity, and then there is a final epilogue. The book has an extensive bibliography and notes section of myriad primary sources, The beauty of this book is that it was written after 2008 and includes numerous declassified and historical documents from the Chinese, the Vietnamese participants. There is a total of 722 pages.
I have 50 3x5 cards with notes that I took. I will not dwell on the battle. I would like to point to the effective use of diplomacy and force by the Vietnamese who were mentored by their Chinese Advisors of whom some were veterans of the Korean War. Chinese general officers and military advisors effectively migrated the military strategy with the political strategy. Although this is still early in the evolution of the Chinese Communist Party one thing has not changed and that is the Party is the State. The Party’s rigid hierarchy of guidance, Party line, guidelines, policy and use of slogans and speeches to reinforce – authoritatively – the tight integration of Diplomacy, policy and military action. In hindsight, strategists are aware that Korea was both a sideshow to gain traction in Indochina and that for the Chinese, Vietnam and Korea were really one war that focused on the political and diplomatic outcome of great Asia / Indochina.
As usual, there were a number of astute offices, envoys and advisors that council caution that the US should not be involved. Over the course of 1946 thru 1954, Intelligence estimates and reports were ignored, and the domino theory flawed Cartesian logic prevailed; Europe and French participation in Europe’s defense became more important than Indochina. The French, British, and US did not clearly understand the type of and character of war that they were involved in – The Chinese and the Vietnamese clearly did.
By late 1953, General Giap had clearly recognized that Dien Bien Phu was totally isolated and that air supply of the base – which required more than 80 tons daily - was the only realistic means available. General Giap took months to move his divisions into place.
An Chinese example of what we can call Multidomain Operations occurred in late November of 1953 when a Swedish newspaper was granted an exclusive interview with Ho Chi Minh. The journalist sent 5 questions three weeks prior to HO and the questions were vetted by the Chinese and Russians. Playing to the prevailing international mood for negotiations, Ho replied that “If the French wish to have an armistice and to resolve the question of Vietnam by negotiation, the people and government of the democratic Republic of Vietnam are ready to examine French proposals” a few days later, Ho sent a letter to General Giap saying: “This campaign is a very important one, not only militarily, but politically, not only for domestic reasons, but international ones as well. So all of our people, all of our armed forces, and the entire Party must be entirely united to get the job done. In any case, as the result of all these peace rumblings, the involved Western powers – United States, France, and Britain- decided to meet in Bermuda in December to make sure they were all on the same page and to emphasize the vital importance of the French War effort to the defense of the free world.”
At the Bermuda Conference, The French Envoy lied, Washington preferred to accept wishful thinking disguised as good news, General Navarre ignores his intelligence when he selects Dien Bien Phu and does not know that the Vietnamese have already penetrated French Lines, and US General Officer situation assessments are overly optimistic in support of wishful thinking.
The first assaults on Dien Bien Phu began on 13 March 1954, by May 7th, it was over.
My suggested reading list from here is:
1. The Long Game by Rush Doshi,
2. On China, Henry Kissinger
3. The Best and the Brightest, David Halberstam
4. Stilwell and the American Experience in China ( 1911- 1945), Barbara Tuchman
5. Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War, 3rd Ed. Robert J. McMahon
August 18, 2023
Ted Morgan's book about the battle of Dien Bien Phu which took place in March and April of 1954.
Ted Morgan (still living, age 91) served as a conscript in the French Army in 1956, in Algeria, two years after the fall of Dien Bien Phu. As a native French speaker, most of the resources used to write this book were written in the French language.
This is a very detailed book and turned out to be one of the largest books I've read in some time. My Kindle reader tells me that I spent 23 hrs 47 min reading this book. That's way too much time to spend on this one topic, and a significant part of the book is devoted to the politics that surrounded this decisive battle, and the 1954 Geneva Conference which led to the French abandonment of its Indochina colony and the creation of the divided Vietnam. It's politics; it's boring.
It's important to remember that, at the time, Indochina was very important to France, as a major source of rubber, coal, tin and tungsten. Control of those natural resources was the leading reason that European colonizers were reluctant to leave.
I wanted to know why (like in Ukraine today), the US involved itself in providing military and financial support for a war that could not be won. Why did the Americans allow themselves to be dragged into what became a horrendous act of genocidal violence, the murders of 1.5 million people in a war waged with psychopathic intensity against a tiny nation that wanted nothing but its right to independence, self-determination.
Why??
The United States was determined that the French must hang on in Indochina, and initially began providing military support to the French so they could negotiate a withdrawal settlement (in Geneva) from a position of strength. In 1954, in the case of Indochina, this was largely because of the "domino theory" ... that if the Chinese-supported Viet Mihn were not stopped, at any cost, other (former European colonies) in the region would fall "like dominos" to the Chinese: Burma, Thailand, Malaya, Singapore and Indonesia would be lost. And after that, Japan, Formosa (Taiwan), the Philippines, and ultimately India.
That false narrative was largely pushed by the Dulles brothers, US Secretary of State John Foster, and Allan, the Deputy Director of the CIA, both of whom believed it. His Vice-President Richard Nixon believed it. President Eisenhower did not believe it, and Eisenhower certainly didn't believe the US should threaten China with the use of nuclear weapons, as a bluff, which it did on three occasions: 1) in Korea, 2) in Formosa, and 3) in Vietnam.
For what it's worth, US President Franklin Roosevelt felt strongly that colonialism should have no place in the post-WWII world. He wanted to estables trusteeships under the proposed new United Nations, which would be the first step toward eventual independence of all European colonies. Winston Churchill, who had fought in India, the Sudan, and South Africa, was a stout defender of empire, and disagreed with FDR.
According to the author of this book, President Eisenhower’s achievement was keeping American ground troops out of Indochina. "The United States never lost a soldier or a foot of ground in my administration," Eisenhower said later in his life. "We kept the peace. People asked how it happened — by God, it didn't just happen, I’ll tell you that." Ted Morgan: Eisenhower remains America’s wisest post–World War II president because he understood that there were limits to the deployment of U.S. power.
But, here we go again, with warmed-over Cold War fear-mongering of 1) a new nuclear arms race Russia, 2) a new round of conspiracy theories aimed at demonizing China, 3) a proxy war in a country that is absolutely not essential to American national security, and 4) a return of the "domino theory", this time in Europe.
Do people never learn from history?
Ted Morgan (still living, age 91) served as a conscript in the French Army in 1956, in Algeria, two years after the fall of Dien Bien Phu. As a native French speaker, most of the resources used to write this book were written in the French language.
This is a very detailed book and turned out to be one of the largest books I've read in some time. My Kindle reader tells me that I spent 23 hrs 47 min reading this book. That's way too much time to spend on this one topic, and a significant part of the book is devoted to the politics that surrounded this decisive battle, and the 1954 Geneva Conference which led to the French abandonment of its Indochina colony and the creation of the divided Vietnam. It's politics; it's boring.
It's important to remember that, at the time, Indochina was very important to France, as a major source of rubber, coal, tin and tungsten. Control of those natural resources was the leading reason that European colonizers were reluctant to leave.
I wanted to know why (like in Ukraine today), the US involved itself in providing military and financial support for a war that could not be won. Why did the Americans allow themselves to be dragged into what became a horrendous act of genocidal violence, the murders of 1.5 million people in a war waged with psychopathic intensity against a tiny nation that wanted nothing but its right to independence, self-determination.
Why??
The United States was determined that the French must hang on in Indochina, and initially began providing military support to the French so they could negotiate a withdrawal settlement (in Geneva) from a position of strength. In 1954, in the case of Indochina, this was largely because of the "domino theory" ... that if the Chinese-supported Viet Mihn were not stopped, at any cost, other (former European colonies) in the region would fall "like dominos" to the Chinese: Burma, Thailand, Malaya, Singapore and Indonesia would be lost. And after that, Japan, Formosa (Taiwan), the Philippines, and ultimately India.
That false narrative was largely pushed by the Dulles brothers, US Secretary of State John Foster, and Allan, the Deputy Director of the CIA, both of whom believed it. His Vice-President Richard Nixon believed it. President Eisenhower did not believe it, and Eisenhower certainly didn't believe the US should threaten China with the use of nuclear weapons, as a bluff, which it did on three occasions: 1) in Korea, 2) in Formosa, and 3) in Vietnam.
For what it's worth, US President Franklin Roosevelt felt strongly that colonialism should have no place in the post-WWII world. He wanted to estables trusteeships under the proposed new United Nations, which would be the first step toward eventual independence of all European colonies. Winston Churchill, who had fought in India, the Sudan, and South Africa, was a stout defender of empire, and disagreed with FDR.
According to the author of this book, President Eisenhower’s achievement was keeping American ground troops out of Indochina. "The United States never lost a soldier or a foot of ground in my administration," Eisenhower said later in his life. "We kept the peace. People asked how it happened — by God, it didn't just happen, I’ll tell you that." Ted Morgan: Eisenhower remains America’s wisest post–World War II president because he understood that there were limits to the deployment of U.S. power.
But, here we go again, with warmed-over Cold War fear-mongering of 1) a new nuclear arms race Russia, 2) a new round of conspiracy theories aimed at demonizing China, 3) a proxy war in a country that is absolutely not essential to American national security, and 4) a return of the "domino theory", this time in Europe.
Do people never learn from history?
February 5, 2023
For those who have read Bernard Fall's "Hell In A Very Small Place," "Valley of Death" doesn't have a lot new on Dien Bien Phu. What Morgan does have in "Valley of Death," however, he tells very well, and for readers like me who read Fall many years ago the battle was fresh. It is a harrowing tale, indeed. The world, thankfully, just doesn't see long, drawn out, set piece battles like Dien Bien Phu anymore, and "Valley of Death" is a reminder that like Stalingrad or Manila, or sieges in centuries past, it is a hideous scene. I'd forgotten that paratroopers continued to drop into Dien Bien Phu almost to the very end - an insane assignment.
What Morgan has also done here is provide a comprehensive view of the diplomatic maneuvering that went on, mostly in Europe and Washington, in the weeks Dien Bien Phu ground on. This can make for a herky-jerky narrative, but Morgan does capture the personalities of the various key diplomats. The British don't come off well, in my opinion. The various Communist figures are as creepy and awful as they always are, in all decades and all continents. Ho Chi Minh comes across as perhaps the only exception there (I am excluding people like Giap, who was a general and they are all involved in nasty work).
The book could use more maps - virtually all military histories could! And I would have liked more on Isabelle, the French stronghold south of the main positions at Dien Bien Phu that wound up as a small-scale battle of its own, and more on the "Rats of Nam Yum," a growing body of deserters that congregated on the banks of the river, chiefly between Dien Bien Phu and Isabelle (I think).
How anyone survived is a mystery. Relentless shelling and vicious, often hand-to-hand combat on more than a dozen hills surrounding the airstrip. Incredible.
What Morgan has also done here is provide a comprehensive view of the diplomatic maneuvering that went on, mostly in Europe and Washington, in the weeks Dien Bien Phu ground on. This can make for a herky-jerky narrative, but Morgan does capture the personalities of the various key diplomats. The British don't come off well, in my opinion. The various Communist figures are as creepy and awful as they always are, in all decades and all continents. Ho Chi Minh comes across as perhaps the only exception there (I am excluding people like Giap, who was a general and they are all involved in nasty work).
The book could use more maps - virtually all military histories could! And I would have liked more on Isabelle, the French stronghold south of the main positions at Dien Bien Phu that wound up as a small-scale battle of its own, and more on the "Rats of Nam Yum," a growing body of deserters that congregated on the banks of the river, chiefly between Dien Bien Phu and Isabelle (I think).
How anyone survived is a mystery. Relentless shelling and vicious, often hand-to-hand combat on more than a dozen hills surrounding the airstrip. Incredible.
March 30, 2020
I'm finally finished reading this. I am not going to write a full review (I concur with Jerome's review, which you will find here: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...), but I do have a few comments. First of all, Jules Roy, Howard R. Simpson, Martin Windrow, et. al. are a damned hard act to follow. In addition, it should not be forgotten that the author is writing in his second language; I believe he may have unintentionally done himself a minor disservice in that regard when he changed his name from Sanche de Gramont to Ted Morgan. Having said that, it was a decent book, and I'm glad I read it. At a certain point, though, I just don't have any desire to read another graphic description of the conditions in Dr. Grauwin's surgery during the last weeks of the battle...
June 4, 2019
A extremely thorough and in depth account of the events that led up to the French withdrawal from Indochina, culminating in the Viet Minh army overwhelming the French at Dien Bien Phu. A decade later the United States military would become embroiled in conflict in the same theatre of war. Ted Morgan has written what may be the most detailed and accurate work on this subject. There are many answers to the who, when, how and why's of this tragedy. This is by no means a quick read, and not for all tastes. If you're a history buff and wish to be educated about an event that is not nearly as written about as other wars in the twentieth century, I strongly recommend this book.
October 23, 2018
I’ve read a number of books on this part of history regarding the French in Indochina in the 19th and 20th centuries. This is by far the best retelling of this particular battle, it explains the unique political and military significance of what, in the grand scheme of things, was a minor battle. The Machiavellian political backstabbing that went on is of an epic scale and the author manages to encompass the huge transfer of world power that occurred with regard European diminished hegemony post WW2.
June 15, 2018
excellent.
a history book is written in a way of a novel.
Dien Bien Phu from different perspectives.
a history book is written in a way of a novel.
Dien Bien Phu from different perspectives.
June 9, 2019
Exceptionally well written...I only wish he included maps.
January 2, 2017
Ted Morgan may have just written the last word on this epic battle which signalled the end of French colonialism in SE Asia. The Author has examined hitherto classified documents and studied the Battle on a larger canvas. While he has gone into the Battle itself in some detail, he has also examined the backdrop of power politics played out in France, US, UK and China, which ultimately led to the doom of the French forces and the creation of an independent Vietnam. There are fascinating insights. The nadir of French patriotism, where large sections of the population and parliament actively lobbied against the Colonial effort; the character qualities of Ho Chi Minh; the complete ambivalence in America and the determination of the Chinese is aptly brought out. In Vietnam itself, Gen Navarre, the overall commander stepped into the larger shoes of his predecessor and read his strategy wrong. In America, Eisenhower's ambivalence, reflected by the US Congress spelt doom to any active engagement in Vietnam despite the persistence of Dulles, the Secretary of State, who constantly tried for a united coalition. The marked reluctance of Eden, the British Foreign Minister, standing powerful in view of Churchill's failing health put paid to any unity. The Russians actively stonewalled all American effort to find a solution. The Chinese helped the Vietnamese unflinchingly and contributed largely to the successful strategy. Ho faced many humiliations while continuously strived for freedom while Giap emerged out of the shadow of his Chinese mentors and orchestrated a remarkable victory. The French while deciding to fight completely underestimated the logistic ability of the Vietnamese and the effect of their artillery so that Dien Bien Phu got isolated despite heroic efforts by paratroops. The overall commander, a tankman, was out of his depth, while the elite French troops fought and died in bitter battles against overwhelming odds. The treatment of the Prisoners of War will remain a blot on Vietnamese history. 70% seem to have perished.
There are lessons still to be drawn. First the inability of US to read the People's War haunts them still. Second,their belief in the Domino Theory led them into the failure of the Vietnam War. They constantly talked of intervention. All bluster as the present situation in Syria is reflecting. Also UK and US were at daggers drawn then, cozyed up in Iraq and now again face a divergence in their thinking. History inexorably repeats itself if not learnt.
There are lessons still to be drawn. First the inability of US to read the People's War haunts them still. Second,their belief in the Domino Theory led them into the failure of the Vietnam War. They constantly talked of intervention. All bluster as the present situation in Syria is reflecting. Also UK and US were at daggers drawn then, cozyed up in Iraq and now again face a divergence in their thinking. History inexorably repeats itself if not learnt.
April 14, 2014
The author has done a good job devoting a substantial part of the book describing the political storm that is brewing behind the scenes, and not just in the Indochina region, but also thousands of miles away in Europe. Every battle is just the symptom of broader political turmoil and conflict.
The book offers a good description of the post-WWII political landscape in Europe: how the French is severely weakened but struggled to hold on to its colonial crown jewels in Asia, Russia is determined to stop Germany from rearmament and has a stake in the European EDC negotiations - thus does not want to upset the French too much, all the while Russia has vested interest in incubating communists regimes in Asia, and how the British seem to be fence-sitting while not without their own problems in Malaysia. This situation, combined with the rising anti-colonialism in SE Asia, the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek and formation of the People's Republic of China, offered the ingredients of the Vietminh's determination for independence.
The book also revealed how the US (from FDR to Eisenhower later) never did care about "democracy" in Vietnam, and actively tried to undermine the Vietminh (even though they were THE popularist movement among the Vietnamese) just because they were communist-leaning. Cold War politics was all about ideological struggle and sometimes the people's will were trampled. The US only fear that if the French fell, Vietnam will turn communist. Some might argue that the US is covertly undermining the French and tried to take its place. That's for you to judge but it is not entirely invalid.
The fall of Dien Bien Phu is a huge blunder for the French and exposed the lack of political will and careful/calculated decision-making on the part of the French generals. French prestige as a world power evaporated. This chapter in history sets the stage for greater American involvement and the Vietnam War. I look forward to reading about the Vietnam War next.
The book offers a good description of the post-WWII political landscape in Europe: how the French is severely weakened but struggled to hold on to its colonial crown jewels in Asia, Russia is determined to stop Germany from rearmament and has a stake in the European EDC negotiations - thus does not want to upset the French too much, all the while Russia has vested interest in incubating communists regimes in Asia, and how the British seem to be fence-sitting while not without their own problems in Malaysia. This situation, combined with the rising anti-colonialism in SE Asia, the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek and formation of the People's Republic of China, offered the ingredients of the Vietminh's determination for independence.
The book also revealed how the US (from FDR to Eisenhower later) never did care about "democracy" in Vietnam, and actively tried to undermine the Vietminh (even though they were THE popularist movement among the Vietnamese) just because they were communist-leaning. Cold War politics was all about ideological struggle and sometimes the people's will were trampled. The US only fear that if the French fell, Vietnam will turn communist. Some might argue that the US is covertly undermining the French and tried to take its place. That's for you to judge but it is not entirely invalid.
The fall of Dien Bien Phu is a huge blunder for the French and exposed the lack of political will and careful/calculated decision-making on the part of the French generals. French prestige as a world power evaporated. This chapter in history sets the stage for greater American involvement and the Vietnam War. I look forward to reading about the Vietnam War next.
February 12, 2017
Well, I read most of this book. I had to skip some of the accounts of technical military maneuvers, they were beyond me. But, this is an excellent book if you're interested in the topic. It's very well researched and organized. I learned a lot.
June 16, 2014
A very detailed and comprehensive account of the development of the Dien Bien Phu conflict, from the seeds of its beginning at the end of WW2 to the catastrophe it evolved into and how the Americans got increasingly embroiled in the conflict at every step of the way. A reference book for historians, this heavy tome made for difficult reading at times for the casual person, with its huge cast of historical figures, not just soldiers but diplomats and politicans, and coverage of seemingly trivial developments in excruciating detail. It was too longwinded and deviated too much from the actual battle for my taste. Made it through 3/4 of the book.
June 15, 2010
Marvelous detail of the battle, the background, and the diplomatic struggles going on at the same time. It is clear now to me now why the U.S. felt it was necessary to send troops to Indochina.
The stories of the battle are vivid and full of heroism in a futile and politically mismanaged struggle.
The stories of the battle are vivid and full of heroism in a futile and politically mismanaged struggle.
April 11, 2014
a very good book. i read it after Embers of War because i wanted to learn more about the actual battle at DBP. both books cover the diplomatic history but this book did provide more detail on the actual siege.
April 13, 2015
Oh my GOD this is a must read, but requires a box.....maybe a case of Kleenex if you have a soul at all. A very bittersweet narrative of the harsh reality of surviving and dying in a place NO one wanted to be.
Thank you Veterans, Thank you for our FREEDOM.
Thank you Veterans, Thank you for our FREEDOM.
April 13, 2012
An epic chronicle of the events leading to the end of French Indochina and the beginning of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. An exhaustively detailed, insightful account.
January 1, 2013
A thorough study of the event that defined post war France and shaped American History. Well done.
November 3, 2013
A very thorough account of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu and how it shaped and affected global politics.
May 12, 2014
I was reading part of this for work and don't have time to finish the whole thing, the hundred or so pages I did read we're very good.
May 26, 2014
Lots of great information.
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