This is a lively and sometimes amusing history, examining the work of the Frankfurt School in each decade from 1900 to the late 1960s and beyond that to recent times, the internet, Facebook and Twitter. It is quietly critical, sometimes reprimanding, sometimes mocking, but often also supporting the school against its rivals and mockers. It has a lot that is perfectly relevant today.
The Frankfurt School is not just a body of ideas or writers, as I expected, but an autonomous academic institution which was given the resources to survive even transposition to the USA during the Nazi era by a bequest from a wealthy capitalist for the sake of his Marxist son. Its initial mission was to account for the failure of the German working class to emulate the Russians by overthrowing capitalism in a successful revolution, particularly in 1919. Using social research in the Thirties it identified an authoritarian strand to popular culture which made the German people vulnerable to the Nazi ideology, while in the USA in the Forties and Fifties it extended this work to demonstrate the role of authoritarian attitudes in a liberal democracy. Returning as an institution to post-war Germany, the mission was redefined to call for solutions that might prevent the barbarism of Nazism and in particular of the Holocaust from ever happening again. In the event, both in Europe and in the USA, its theorists encountered forms of totalitarian control over the mass of people that were no less terrifying yet were achieved by subtle and seemingly non-violent means. From discussions of the coffee house societies of Eighteenth Century Europe to the internet and Facebook, the recurring theme seems to have been very much the one concern: the seeming impossibility of ever thinking differently.
In particular, they reflected on how everyday life could become the theatre of revolution and yet in fact was mostly the opposite, involving a conformism that thwarted any desire to overcome an oppressive system. p.18
IF CRITICAL THEORY means anything, it means the kind of radical re-thinking that challenges what it considers to be the official versions of history and intellectual endeavour. Benjamin initiated it, perhaps, but it was Max Horkheimer who gave it a name when he became the director of the Frankfurt School in 1930: critical theory stood in opposition to all those ostensibly craven intellectual tendencies that thrived in the twentieth century and served as tools to keep an irksome social order in place – logical positivism, value-free science, positivist sociology, among others. Critical theory stood in opposition, too, to what capitalism in particular does to those it exploits – buying us off cheaply with consumer goods, making us forget that other ways of life are possible, enabling us to ignore the truth that we are ensnared in the system by our fetishistic attention and growing addiction to the purportedly must-have new consumer good. p28
In his last essay, Benjamin wrote: ‘There is no document of civilisation that is not at the same time a document of barbarism.’ That sense of the repression of the unacceptable, the embarrassing, the awkward, of the ideological disappearing of that which doesn’t fit the master narrative, had come early to him and remained with him lifelong: barbarism, for Walter Benjamin, began at home. p30
Men do not live their own lives but perform pre-established functions’, he [Horkheimer] wrote. ‘While they work, they do not fulfill their own needs and faculties but work in alienation.’ p74.
Even though the Institute was nicknamed ‘Cafe Marx’, that scarcely captures its austere mood, which was better reflected in its architecture: the neo-Marxists of the Frankfurt School were modern-day monks working in retreat from a world they could not change and a politics they had no hope of influencing p91
Revolutions, thus conceived, required the proletariat to have the patience of the bus queue. They must wait for what would, inevitably, come, and then jump on board. p93
an era when it seemed to be, increasingly, a brain-numbing, spirit-crushing, soul-destroying nightmare, and the only alternative to the Marxist cogito (I work therefore I am) was the consumerist one (I shop therefore I am).
Under Horkheimer, the Frankfurt School rebelled against this orthodox German view of the value of work and in particular against the Marxist credo that we fulfil ourselves through labour. For the likes of Horkheimer and Adorno, if not for Fromm who remained more faithful to Marx than his colleagues, labour is not the basic category of human realisation p136
In 1931, capitalism seemed able to defer its abolition, perhaps even indefinitely. In such circumstances, Horkheimer argued, the Institute must consider not only the economic basis of society but its superstructure. It must develop a critique of the ideological control mechanisms that held capitalism in place. p157
The insistence that the past can be transformed remains, for Marxists and others, one of Benjamin’s most appealing ideas. The critic Terry Eagleton, for instance, wrote: ‘In one of his shrewdest sayings, Benjamin remarked that what drives men and women to revolt against injustice is not dreams of liberated grandchildren, but memories of enslaved ancestors. It is by turning our gaze to the horrors of the past, in the hope that we will not thereby be turned to stone, that we are impelled to move forward.’ p197
In 1492, the Abbot of Sponheim wrote a tract called In Defence of Scribes urging that the scribal tradition be maintained because the very act of handcopying sacred texts brought spiritual enlightenment. One problem: the abbot had his book set in movable type so his argument could be spread quickly and cheaply.
Certainly, the angel of history whom Benjamin invokes in thesis IX is a figure who inverts such crude historical materialism: for the angel, the past is not a chain of events but a single catastrophe and the task of any justifiable historical materialism is not to predict revolutionary future or communist utopia, but to attend to and thereby redeem the sufferings of the past.p246
Every morning, to earn my bread, I go to the market where lies are bought. Hopefully I take my place among the sellers. [Brecht] p248
Fromm distinguished between negative and positive freedom – freedom from and freedom to. The responsibility conferred on humans by having freedom from authority can be unbearable unless we are able to exercise our positive freedom creatively.p281
Fromm argued that this fear of freedom was not a peculiarly fascist one, but threatened the basis of democracy in every modern state. Indeed, at the outset of Escape from Freedom, he quoted with approval the words of the American pragmatist philosopher John Dewey. ‘The serious threat to our democracy is not the existence of foreign totalitarian states. It is the existence within our own personal attitudes and within our own institutions of conditions which have given a victory to external authority, discipline, uniformity and dependence upon The Leader in foreign countries. The battlefield is also accordingly here – within ourselves and our institutions.’ p281
In Negative Dialectics, too, Adorno expressed better what human duty was in the wake of Auschwitz than he had a decade earlier. ‘A new categorical imperative has been imposed by Hitler upon unfree mankind: to arrange their thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so that nothing similar will happen.’p307
Marcuse maintained close links with his former colleagues Adorno and Horkheimer in Frankfurt, and in key respects, their critique of America is similar. For all three, the rugged individualism of US society that was pitted rhetorically against the collectivism of the Soviet bloc during the Cold War was a myth: Americans were infantilised, repressed pseudo-individuals p319
During 1952 and 1953, for instance, Adorno spent ten months in California analysing newspaper astrology columns, radio soap operas and the new medium of television, and what he had to say about them bore closely on what Marcuse wrote in Eros and Civilisation. Adorno found in all these forms of mass culture a symmetry with fascist propaganda: both mass culture and fascist propaganda, he argued, meet and manipulate the dependency needs of the pseudo-individual character, ‘promoting conventional, conformist and contented attitudes’.p319
The American society, or any other civilised society for that matter, that postured in the 1950s as free and affluent was, so Marcuse argued, straitjacketed by conformity.p321
This part of Marcuse’s analysis clearly connected with Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique of the despoilation of nature in Dialectic of Enlightenment. For all three, any desirable transformation involved reuniting humans with nature rather than treating it, as it had been since Francis Bacon, as fit for nothing but domination.p325
In particular, psychoanalysis claimed that the autonomous individual is a chimera. We are not free either of our biological instincts, nor can we escape determination and domination by the social order. ‘Decisions for men as active workers are taken by the hierarchy ranging from the trade associations to the national administration’, wrote Adorno and Horkheimer, ‘and in the private sphere by the system of mass culture which takes over the last inward impulses of individuals who are forced to consume what is offered to them’. The autonomous individual, the figure that Fromm needed to construct his road to sanity, was programatically denied by critical theory.p329
This attitude – that there is nothing easier than to love – has continued to be the prevalent idea about love in spite of the overwhelming evidence to the contrary.’ In Marxist terms, society treated love as a commodity rather than realising it was an art that took time, skill and dedication to master. The beloved too became reified, an object serving instrumental purposes rather than a person. All the five types of love Fromm identified in The Art of Loving were becoming similarly debased – brotherly love by the commodification of humans; motherly love by narcissism; self-love by selfishness; love of God by idolatry; and erotic love by the absence of tenderness. The death of the tenderness in erotic love, he charged, came from the refusal of personal responsibility, the insistence on entitlement and the tendency to look outward in demand rather than inward in obligation. p332
For Habermas, the Federal Republic had accorded many fundamental rights to the West German people under its so-called Basic Law and had given them access to politics at the federal level by means of elections to the Bundestag. But, as Rolf Wiggershaus notes, the Bundestag had lost power to the executive, the bureaucracy and lobbying groups. Elections, then, seemed to confer democratic political power, but in fact made a mockery of it. p336
Adorno despaired in Europe. ‘No universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one that leads from the slingshot to the megaton bomb’, he wrote in Negative Dialectics, the book he published in 1966p365
In order to enter into a conversation in which you might lose your prejudices, Fish argued, you would have to begin by putting aside your prejudicesp403
While Horkheimer and Adorno linked emancipation to refusing to adapt to current social reality, Habermas’s extraordinary hope is that social reality can be changed by means of creating truly democratic institutions that are capable of withstanding the corrosive effects of capitalism. p423
freedom of choice, as Habermas understood from the first generation of Frankfurt scholars, and from Marcuse in particular, was no freedom at all. p423
If there is any small remnant of utopia that I’ve preserved, then it is surely the idea that democracy – and its public struggle for its best form – is capable of hacking through the Gordian knot of otherwise insoluble problems. I’m not saying we’re going to succeed in this; we don’t even know whether success is possible. But because we don’t know, we still have to try.’ Habermas. p424
Among capitalism’s losers are millions of overworked, underpaid workers ostensibly liberated by the largest socialist revolution in history (China’s) who have been driven to the brink of suicide to keep those in the west playing with their iPads. The proletariat, far from burying capitalism, are keeping it on life support. p439
the best writings of the Frankfurt School still have much to teach us – not least about the impossibility and the necessity of thinking differently.p441