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False Economy: A Surprising Economic History of the World
An important book for turbulent times-an accessible and engaging economic history of the world, by a leading economic writer.
Alan Beattie has long been intrigued by the fates of different countries, economies, and societies-why some fail and some succeed. Here, he weaves together elements of economics, history, politics, and human stories, revealing that societies, economies, and countries usually make concrete choices that determine their destinies. He opens up larger questions about these choices, and why countries make them or are driven to make them, and what those decisions can mean for the future of our global economy.
Economic history involves forcing together disciplines that fall naturally in different directions. But Beattie has written a lively and lucid book that successfully marries the two subjects and illustrates their interdependence. In doing so, he addresses such illuminating queries Why are oil and diamonds more trouble than they are worth? Why did Argentina fail and the United States succeed? Why doesn't Africa grow cocaine?
False Economy explains how human beings have shaped their own fates, however unknowingly, and the conditions of the countries they call home. And though it is history, it does not end with the present day. Beattie shows how decisions that are being made now-which have either absorbed or failed to absorb the lessons from economic history-will determine what happens in the future. What does economic history teach us about the present economic unrest? Who will succeed and why? And who will fail? These are questions that we cannot afford to leave unasked . . . or unanswered.
Alan Beattie has long been intrigued by the fates of different countries, economies, and societies-why some fail and some succeed. Here, he weaves together elements of economics, history, politics, and human stories, revealing that societies, economies, and countries usually make concrete choices that determine their destinies. He opens up larger questions about these choices, and why countries make them or are driven to make them, and what those decisions can mean for the future of our global economy.
Economic history involves forcing together disciplines that fall naturally in different directions. But Beattie has written a lively and lucid book that successfully marries the two subjects and illustrates their interdependence. In doing so, he addresses such illuminating queries Why are oil and diamonds more trouble than they are worth? Why did Argentina fail and the United States succeed? Why doesn't Africa grow cocaine?
False Economy explains how human beings have shaped their own fates, however unknowingly, and the conditions of the countries they call home. And though it is history, it does not end with the present day. Beattie shows how decisions that are being made now-which have either absorbed or failed to absorb the lessons from economic history-will determine what happens in the future. What does economic history teach us about the present economic unrest? Who will succeed and why? And who will fail? These are questions that we cannot afford to leave unasked . . . or unanswered.
336 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2009
173 people are currently reading
1738 people want to read
About the author
Alan Beattie
21 books10 followersAlan Beattie is the World Trade Editor of the Financial Times, leading the paper’s coverage of trade policy and economic globalisation.
Previous positions with the paper include economics leader writer, commenting on a wide variety of international and domestic economic issues in the editorial column, and two years in Washington DC as chief US economics correspondent, covering the US economy, the Federal Reserve and international economics and development, including the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.
Alan Beattie Joined the Financial Times in 1998 after working as an economist at the Bank of England.
He holds a Master's degree in Economics from Cambridge and a BA from Oxford in Modern History.
- EOCD Forum 2007
Previous positions with the paper include economics leader writer, commenting on a wide variety of international and domestic economic issues in the editorial column, and two years in Washington DC as chief US economics correspondent, covering the US economy, the Federal Reserve and international economics and development, including the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.
Alan Beattie Joined the Financial Times in 1998 after working as an economist at the Bank of England.
He holds a Master's degree in Economics from Cambridge and a BA from Oxford in Modern History.
- EOCD Forum 2007
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 111 reviews
August 9, 2021
Not knowing anything about the book or author besides that I saw it on a friend's shelf and it looked interesting, I spent the first 50 pages or so trying to figure out what Beattie's agenda was -- his arguments were so bland and middle-of-the-road that he was difficult to get a bead on.
Then some hints started to drop: he compliments the IMF; he criticizes protectionism; he defends oil companies and later the WTO. So it actually becomes embarrassingly obvious that he's one of these soft-spoken "moderates" that are really conservative/neoliberals.
He's not a belligerent conservative though, which is probably more annoying and disconcerting. He couches his arguments, much like The Economist magazine, in these matter-of-fact truisms that he wants you to read as if they are common sense and the height of logic, basically accepting them on faith. Actually, however, they're mere opinions based on who-knows-what. We might know the basis if he decided to offer even a modicum of support for his arguments, but he doesn't. He just wafts them out there and breezes onward. Here's an example in his defense of free trade:
So despite being ably written, it's both horrendously and deceptively argued, which ejects most of Beattie's credibility from the proceedings. On top of that, Beattie continually disproves his own thesis throughout the book.
Both the book jacket and Beattie (in his preface and many other times) claim that he is trying to show that economic destinies are a result of choice, not predetermination. Yet there are over a dozen comments in the first chapter alone arguing that Argentina is screwed because of factors outside of its control (most notably its Spanish heritage). I struggle to reconcile the two claims. It's either Argentina's fault, which I feel like is what Beattie really wants us to believe, or it's due to circumstances, which is what I actually believe.
These sorts of self-rebutting arguments occur throughout the book. He acknowledges that the economic travails of Islamic countries have "a lot more to do with accidents of geography and history than with the theology or 'management structure'" (i.e., the choices) of Islam. He recognizes that Africa's terrible market infrastructure "owes something to geography and history." He even cites Guns, Germs, and Steel -- the modern bible of cultural predestination -- to explain African history.
The more I read, the more confused I became. Here you have a book called "False Economy: A Surprising Economic History," and Beattie has his tone that he's going to lift a veil from your eyes. It's supposed to be subversive, or at least counterintuitive, and his thesis kind of is, I guess, except that he concludes with, "Often, taking the right path is more than one country can do on its own," and, ". . . it still takes large amounts of courage, luck and strength to find a better path."
So his thesis is basically, "A country's fate is not predetermined but due to the choices it makes, except for when it can't make any other choices." This means nothing. It's like saying it's sunny except when it's raining, or maybe that aliens control our thoughts except when they don't. There is NOTHING HERE!
Overall, I get the impression that Beattie is trying to pull a Malcolm Gladwell with this book and failing miserably. To be sure, some of his anecdotes are interesting, but only some of them, and none of them seem quite as clever as he thinks they are.
But there's something else that I alluded to above. Beyond this lack of any real substance or meaningful arguments, there's a very dangerous mindset. Beattie's presentation is misleading and thus dangerous, that aw-shucks, vanilla way in which he states his (many times groundless) opinions as fact. But his mindset as a whole is dangerous and actually extremist in that he only sees things through a lens of economics. Things are only good and bad insofar as they positively or negatively affect national and global economies. There is a marked lack of consideration for the welfare of living things.
For example, Beattie (poorly) argues that: people should be charged more for water; food security is bad; poor countries need rich multinationals to exploit their natural resources; corruption can be better than honesty; and pandas are worthless. I'm serious about that last one -- he really thinks that an entire species is "useless." I'll be honest, I couldn't care much less about pandas, but the paradigm that encourages you to consider them or any other living thing as "useless" is sad, twisted and scary. Living things are ends in themsleves, people! There are more important things than money! The fact that the above positions don't automatically convert him into an extremist in everyone's eyes is a glaring condemnation of our societal values.
Many people will accuse me of being a dirty tree-hugging hippie for these arguments, and I gladly admit I'm a communist. But I try to be fair in my critique of more conservative economic theory, and really what I dislike most about the book is its deception. For those who disagree with this review, please do two things: read Malcolm Gladwell or Freakonomics and tell me it's not more entertaining than False; and then read Open Veins of Latin America, the famous leftist economic treatise, and tell me it's not better-argued (see my review).
Not Bad Reviews
@pointblaek
Then some hints started to drop: he compliments the IMF; he criticizes protectionism; he defends oil companies and later the WTO. So it actually becomes embarrassingly obvious that he's one of these soft-spoken "moderates" that are really conservative/neoliberals.
He's not a belligerent conservative though, which is probably more annoying and disconcerting. He couches his arguments, much like The Economist magazine, in these matter-of-fact truisms that he wants you to read as if they are common sense and the height of logic, basically accepting them on faith. Actually, however, they're mere opinions based on who-knows-what. We might know the basis if he decided to offer even a modicum of support for his arguments, but he doesn't. He just wafts them out there and breezes onward. Here's an example in his defense of free trade:
There is still relatively little trade between far-flung regions compared with that between close neighbors. There is also surprisingly little trade between rich and poor countries. Most trade today is in fact in fairly similar products and services between fairly similar countries, not between very different economies exploiting big innate advantages over their trading partners. 193This would have been a great time to provide some statistics and explain some of his language. For instance, who is this "surprising" for? Just the author? Opponents of free trade? And what does he mean by "most trade?" 51%? 75%? This is a terrible way to try and make a point. Woe unto the people who are convinced by such tripe! Here's another (my emphasis on all the weasel words):
But India's overall literacy rate remains low. The official rate is around 65 percent, though many of those can probably do little more than write their names. Much of the money supposed to go to education is siphoned off by a huge bureaucracy and a corrupt political class. 283In case you didn't tabulate, there's a stretch in there of 13 words in which 4 are weasel words. Followed by an unsupported assertion that absolutely needs a citation. This is just embarrassing in a supposed work of non-fiction.
So despite being ably written, it's both horrendously and deceptively argued, which ejects most of Beattie's credibility from the proceedings. On top of that, Beattie continually disproves his own thesis throughout the book.
Both the book jacket and Beattie (in his preface and many other times) claim that he is trying to show that economic destinies are a result of choice, not predetermination. Yet there are over a dozen comments in the first chapter alone arguing that Argentina is screwed because of factors outside of its control (most notably its Spanish heritage). I struggle to reconcile the two claims. It's either Argentina's fault, which I feel like is what Beattie really wants us to believe, or it's due to circumstances, which is what I actually believe.
These sorts of self-rebutting arguments occur throughout the book. He acknowledges that the economic travails of Islamic countries have "a lot more to do with accidents of geography and history than with the theology or 'management structure'" (i.e., the choices) of Islam. He recognizes that Africa's terrible market infrastructure "owes something to geography and history." He even cites Guns, Germs, and Steel -- the modern bible of cultural predestination -- to explain African history.
The more I read, the more confused I became. Here you have a book called "False Economy: A Surprising Economic History," and Beattie has his tone that he's going to lift a veil from your eyes. It's supposed to be subversive, or at least counterintuitive, and his thesis kind of is, I guess, except that he concludes with, "Often, taking the right path is more than one country can do on its own," and, ". . . it still takes large amounts of courage, luck and strength to find a better path."
So his thesis is basically, "A country's fate is not predetermined but due to the choices it makes, except for when it can't make any other choices." This means nothing. It's like saying it's sunny except when it's raining, or maybe that aliens control our thoughts except when they don't. There is NOTHING HERE!
Overall, I get the impression that Beattie is trying to pull a Malcolm Gladwell with this book and failing miserably. To be sure, some of his anecdotes are interesting, but only some of them, and none of them seem quite as clever as he thinks they are.
But there's something else that I alluded to above. Beyond this lack of any real substance or meaningful arguments, there's a very dangerous mindset. Beattie's presentation is misleading and thus dangerous, that aw-shucks, vanilla way in which he states his (many times groundless) opinions as fact. But his mindset as a whole is dangerous and actually extremist in that he only sees things through a lens of economics. Things are only good and bad insofar as they positively or negatively affect national and global economies. There is a marked lack of consideration for the welfare of living things.
For example, Beattie (poorly) argues that: people should be charged more for water; food security is bad; poor countries need rich multinationals to exploit their natural resources; corruption can be better than honesty; and pandas are worthless. I'm serious about that last one -- he really thinks that an entire species is "useless." I'll be honest, I couldn't care much less about pandas, but the paradigm that encourages you to consider them or any other living thing as "useless" is sad, twisted and scary. Living things are ends in themsleves, people! There are more important things than money! The fact that the above positions don't automatically convert him into an extremist in everyone's eyes is a glaring condemnation of our societal values.
Many people will accuse me of being a dirty tree-hugging hippie for these arguments, and I gladly admit I'm a communist. But I try to be fair in my critique of more conservative economic theory, and really what I dislike most about the book is its deception. For those who disagree with this review, please do two things: read Malcolm Gladwell or Freakonomics and tell me it's not more entertaining than False; and then read Open Veins of Latin America, the famous leftist economic treatise, and tell me it's not better-argued (see my review).
Not Bad Reviews
@pointblaek
March 9, 2018
Another pre-Goodreads read. A really enjoyable collection of vignettes. Mix of history and economics. Fans of Freakonomics series I am sure will like this as well
April 27, 2011
LOVED. IT.
To explain what I mean, let me tell you a story: about a year ago, I e-mailed the librarians at the Goizueta business school -- the librarians who have given about eight presentations on conducting business research that I have sat in on, willingly and unwillingly, of which I have only utilized two (an exposure-to-use ratio surpassed only by my cumulative lifetime watching of cooking shows) -- and asked them to recommend a book about business history.
Business history? Yes, I am secretly fascinated with learning business history. Here I was in business school, learning the cutting edge conventional wisdom about marketing, strategy, and how to tell someone they're fired in a non-Trump sort of way, and I had no idea where any of this was coming from. I am the son of a professional historian, and throughout my life I have sought -- again, willingly and unwillingly -- for the historical context behind a thing. It just seems so natural to try to understand how things got the way they are, you know? My girlfriend teases me that I am he secret history buff, and before I can agree with her, I have to think through how I got to be that way. She would say that that sort of proves her point.
The recommendations from the business librarians, though well-intentioned, were lacking. I can't remember exactly what they suggested I look up, but it seemed so darn "academic." After all, the kind of history I like to read, in this Malcolm Gladwellian world, is pithy, witty, and vivid -- not like the nameless recommended book.
In contrast, False Economy is the "business history I did not know I was looking for," which is the blurb that would go on the book jacket if I were famous. It was assigned to me for my Global Macroeconomics class, and it was always the first thing I read among my semiweekly reading assignments.
So yeah, good job Alan Beattie. You have satisfied a history buff who doesn't know he is a history buff.
To explain what I mean, let me tell you a story: about a year ago, I e-mailed the librarians at the Goizueta business school -- the librarians who have given about eight presentations on conducting business research that I have sat in on, willingly and unwillingly, of which I have only utilized two (an exposure-to-use ratio surpassed only by my cumulative lifetime watching of cooking shows) -- and asked them to recommend a book about business history.
Business history? Yes, I am secretly fascinated with learning business history. Here I was in business school, learning the cutting edge conventional wisdom about marketing, strategy, and how to tell someone they're fired in a non-Trump sort of way, and I had no idea where any of this was coming from. I am the son of a professional historian, and throughout my life I have sought -- again, willingly and unwillingly -- for the historical context behind a thing. It just seems so natural to try to understand how things got the way they are, you know? My girlfriend teases me that I am he secret history buff, and before I can agree with her, I have to think through how I got to be that way. She would say that that sort of proves her point.
The recommendations from the business librarians, though well-intentioned, were lacking. I can't remember exactly what they suggested I look up, but it seemed so darn "academic." After all, the kind of history I like to read, in this Malcolm Gladwellian world, is pithy, witty, and vivid -- not like the nameless recommended book.
In contrast, False Economy is the "business history I did not know I was looking for," which is the blurb that would go on the book jacket if I were famous. It was assigned to me for my Global Macroeconomics class, and it was always the first thing I read among my semiweekly reading assignments.
So yeah, good job Alan Beattie. You have satisfied a history buff who doesn't know he is a history buff.
September 25, 2023
Economics is not exactly a science, although is pretty clear that after several centuries of economic development we know what works and what doesn't. But then, why some countries are still very poor, carry on with unwise policies or do stupid economic decisions, ? Alan Beattie, a former economics reporter at Financial Times, and expert in international trade, tries to develop this idea. In that sense this book is an intersection between classical economic theory and history, and how both have shaped our world.
I liked this book because it tries to provide a different view of actual economics. I have summarized below its content.
Why Argentina is almost a failed state while the US is the first world's economy? Chapter 1 analyzes the history of two new-born countries with enormous resources, vast lands and a healthy immigration. Many differences: the owners of lands (Argentina opted for big landowners, while the US went for squatters). Argentina attracted low-skilled workers while the US embraced more highly skilled farmers. The aristocratic landowners in Argentina had no incentive to invest in education, infrastructure or productivity; rather they played Polo. It is interesting to compare the South in the US with a rural Argentina, but the North won the war and the country was industrialized. Argentina preferred to borrow money from foreign sources for their needs and do not build a strong industrial base that would create the capital. Argentina did not have a Teddy Roosevelt breaking up monopolies and correcting capitalism. And when depression came, as all the countries that owed money, Argentina fell into economic isolationism and political authoritarism (like Germany). The US had FDR and the New Deal; Argentina tried a liberal democracy but it failed into Perón, an assertive nationalistic fascist that went into self-sufficiency by raising tariffs and defying open trade. Meanwhile Japan demonstrated that an economy could be build through exports. And the worst of Peronism is this sense that blame is always outside. In the 50s Argentina income per head doubled the one from Spain. But the isolation made companies bad competitors in the world. Also the frequent overspending meant huge government deficits. That is why when the country dollarized, the lack of export ability meant it was really hard for them to get dollars, and with the international crisis that occurred the system collapsed. Still the FMI is lending money to the country, falling through frequent defaults.
Chapter 2 tackles the issues of urbanization and cities, asking why voters in Washington DC do not have a say (taxation without representation). The urbanization means more economic opportunities but more urban problems, lack of services and bad quality of life. It used to mean that the size of cities was an indication of prosperity, but today countries' proportion of urban population is correlated with economies inefficiencies.
Chapter 3 explains the idea of importing water, as Egypt does by importing grain. With trade countries have the possibility of focusing in their best industries and reduce their water consumption, which is scarce.
Chapter 4 moves to the Dutch disease: the idea that the dependency of an economy to an abundant natural resources kills the rest of the economy and makes the country worse off.
Chapter 5 tries to respond to the fact that maybe religion has something to do with the prosperity of nations. Calvinism and protestantism are better than islamism? The evidence does not suggest a strong correlation, according to Beattie. I would argue that economies that discard 50% of their working population are by definition much less efficient.
Chapter 6 explains why most asparagus come from Peru: is all about the interest group politics in reference to Marcus Olson. Small groups with concentrated interests impose their views to an heterogeneus, unfocused majority. Cotton or corn in America is a good example. Peru exports asparagus as part of trade pacts with the world so that they do not to grow coca.
Chapter 7 asks why Africa does not grow cocaine? Is all about transaction costs: the need of an infrastructure to trade: physical, financial and political. Africa still has not build an economical infrastructure to operate in the world, even with coca. The next chapter asks about corruption and the cost of it in business: the bottom line: better to have an organized corrupt system like China (only one party to bribe) than a predatory corrupt state like the ones in Africa.
Chapter 9 then asks why countries that are so bad managed do not change. It compares them to pandas: animals whose evolution has put them in a difficult position which makes them hopeless without human protection: countries as pandas, have a history that is very hard to change. Beattie explores the economic history of three key countries: China, India and Russia.
In essence, the final solution is, as Beattie states, very hard. Some clues: "But certain basic ideas command wide acceptance. Don't cut yourself off from the rest of the world. Plan ahead for cities but don't force them and don't give them more power than they warrant. Try to let your economy do what it is best at and support it where possible without trying to force it down a predetermined path. Don't obsess about religious belief but watch for elites using it to further their own temporal ends. Stop overweening governments from ignoring property rights and the rule of law. Learn from the examples of those who managed to keep oil and diamond money from poisoning their economy and their politics. Call the bluff of small interest groups who say they have the welfare of the whole country at heart. For very poor nations, worry less about trade policy and more about customs procedures. Concentrate on rooting out the forms of bribery that will do the most damage and worry less about corruption that is moderate and predictable. Be aware when your country is getting stuck on the wrong path and be alert to opportunities to shift it”
I liked this book because it tries to provide a different view of actual economics. I have summarized below its content.
Why Argentina is almost a failed state while the US is the first world's economy? Chapter 1 analyzes the history of two new-born countries with enormous resources, vast lands and a healthy immigration. Many differences: the owners of lands (Argentina opted for big landowners, while the US went for squatters). Argentina attracted low-skilled workers while the US embraced more highly skilled farmers. The aristocratic landowners in Argentina had no incentive to invest in education, infrastructure or productivity; rather they played Polo. It is interesting to compare the South in the US with a rural Argentina, but the North won the war and the country was industrialized. Argentina preferred to borrow money from foreign sources for their needs and do not build a strong industrial base that would create the capital. Argentina did not have a Teddy Roosevelt breaking up monopolies and correcting capitalism. And when depression came, as all the countries that owed money, Argentina fell into economic isolationism and political authoritarism (like Germany). The US had FDR and the New Deal; Argentina tried a liberal democracy but it failed into Perón, an assertive nationalistic fascist that went into self-sufficiency by raising tariffs and defying open trade. Meanwhile Japan demonstrated that an economy could be build through exports. And the worst of Peronism is this sense that blame is always outside. In the 50s Argentina income per head doubled the one from Spain. But the isolation made companies bad competitors in the world. Also the frequent overspending meant huge government deficits. That is why when the country dollarized, the lack of export ability meant it was really hard for them to get dollars, and with the international crisis that occurred the system collapsed. Still the FMI is lending money to the country, falling through frequent defaults.
Chapter 2 tackles the issues of urbanization and cities, asking why voters in Washington DC do not have a say (taxation without representation). The urbanization means more economic opportunities but more urban problems, lack of services and bad quality of life. It used to mean that the size of cities was an indication of prosperity, but today countries' proportion of urban population is correlated with economies inefficiencies.
Chapter 3 explains the idea of importing water, as Egypt does by importing grain. With trade countries have the possibility of focusing in their best industries and reduce their water consumption, which is scarce.
Chapter 4 moves to the Dutch disease: the idea that the dependency of an economy to an abundant natural resources kills the rest of the economy and makes the country worse off.
Chapter 5 tries to respond to the fact that maybe religion has something to do with the prosperity of nations. Calvinism and protestantism are better than islamism? The evidence does not suggest a strong correlation, according to Beattie. I would argue that economies that discard 50% of their working population are by definition much less efficient.
Chapter 6 explains why most asparagus come from Peru: is all about the interest group politics in reference to Marcus Olson. Small groups with concentrated interests impose their views to an heterogeneus, unfocused majority. Cotton or corn in America is a good example. Peru exports asparagus as part of trade pacts with the world so that they do not to grow coca.
Chapter 7 asks why Africa does not grow cocaine? Is all about transaction costs: the need of an infrastructure to trade: physical, financial and political. Africa still has not build an economical infrastructure to operate in the world, even with coca. The next chapter asks about corruption and the cost of it in business: the bottom line: better to have an organized corrupt system like China (only one party to bribe) than a predatory corrupt state like the ones in Africa.
Chapter 9 then asks why countries that are so bad managed do not change. It compares them to pandas: animals whose evolution has put them in a difficult position which makes them hopeless without human protection: countries as pandas, have a history that is very hard to change. Beattie explores the economic history of three key countries: China, India and Russia.
In essence, the final solution is, as Beattie states, very hard. Some clues: "But certain basic ideas command wide acceptance. Don't cut yourself off from the rest of the world. Plan ahead for cities but don't force them and don't give them more power than they warrant. Try to let your economy do what it is best at and support it where possible without trying to force it down a predetermined path. Don't obsess about religious belief but watch for elites using it to further their own temporal ends. Stop overweening governments from ignoring property rights and the rule of law. Learn from the examples of those who managed to keep oil and diamond money from poisoning their economy and their politics. Call the bluff of small interest groups who say they have the welfare of the whole country at heart. For very poor nations, worry less about trade policy and more about customs procedures. Concentrate on rooting out the forms of bribery that will do the most damage and worry less about corruption that is moderate and predictable. Be aware when your country is getting stuck on the wrong path and be alert to opportunities to shift it”
March 26, 2018
The trite (and vaguely racist) explanations for Third World poverty presented in this vapid little volume are far less convincing than just looking at the near 1:1 relationship between poverty and a colonial past.
Western Literature may have reached peak neoliberalism with this book, which means we could quit that bullshit now. So there's that.
Western Literature may have reached peak neoliberalism with this book, which means we could quit that bullshit now. So there's that.
June 21, 2020
Wow. So many over-generalizations and blind spots (especially on the legacy of colonialism).
August 26, 2010
Very detailed, really goes in depth into the history and minutiae, but is also fairly dry.
The author presents nine (well, ten) different comparative scenarios to show how different facets of the economy (or ecology and climate, sociology, history, or culture) can lead to very different outcomes: the economics of Argentina versus the United States, the cocaine trade logistics of South America versus Africa, the economic drivers of Christendom versus Islam, and (the one part where I laughed out loud) why panda bears are "incompetent, inefficient piebald buffoons" as compared to the wildly successful house cat. Which, truly, the author makes an excellent case for.
The economies here are less "false" and more "comparative," in the end. The corruption that the British used worked while the Portugese drove themselves to ruin; those corrupt policies weren't false, they were just different.
For any econo-historical person, this book is perfect. But if you're looking for an extension of The World Is Flat or Freakonomics, you probably want to keep searching.
"Unregulated finance capitalism appeared to be enriching a powerful minority while subjecting everyone else to the vagaries of a volatile economy."
The author presents nine (well, ten) different comparative scenarios to show how different facets of the economy (or ecology and climate, sociology, history, or culture) can lead to very different outcomes: the economics of Argentina versus the United States, the cocaine trade logistics of South America versus Africa, the economic drivers of Christendom versus Islam, and (the one part where I laughed out loud) why panda bears are "incompetent, inefficient piebald buffoons" as compared to the wildly successful house cat. Which, truly, the author makes an excellent case for.
The economies here are less "false" and more "comparative," in the end. The corruption that the British used worked while the Portugese drove themselves to ruin; those corrupt policies weren't false, they were just different.
For any econo-historical person, this book is perfect. But if you're looking for an extension of The World Is Flat or Freakonomics, you probably want to keep searching.
"Unregulated finance capitalism appeared to be enriching a powerful minority while subjecting everyone else to the vagaries of a volatile economy."
April 26, 2012
Beattie has written a formidable book about the intersection of policies/politics and economy/trade. I love this book because unlike most business books, it has more than just one good idea or revelation. Just the first two chapters alone are worth every dollar of the purchase price - his historical comparison of Argentina with the US and subsequent divergent economic success, and his description on Washington vs. ancient Rome have huge relevance today. For example, the city of Berlin (Germany's capital) is basically bankrupt but is subsidized by other cities/federal states because it has voting cloud and is the seat of parliament; Beattie, by explaining the downsides of capitals too large and powerful for the good of their country, helps you analyze your own country or city. Whether you agree with his analyses in each and every of his chapters is not important. Beattie makes you think and helps you challenge common assumptions. In other words, the author has written a very educational and thought provoking book for everybody with an economic interest in our globalized world.
July 11, 2018
I thoroughly enjoyed the book. I recommend it strongly for those who would like a marvelously meshed view of history and economics and how they have shaped each other.
It explains economic principles like supply chains, comparative advantage, how technology affects prices and geographical importance, incentives, disincentives, effects of taxes, political compulsions behind taxes(taxes on cotton clothes), intentions versus results, useful corruption (example Indonesia) versus harmful honesty(Tanzania), and such things.
Amazing information - Argentina and USA were roughly equal in GDP and industrialization around the 1890s, Botswana was the fastest growing economy for a couple of decades, England heeded Adam Smith's suggestions on economics several decades after his death, etc.
This is the audio recording of my review in English
https://bit.ly/2uaVVz4
This is the video recording of my review in Tamil
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yFex-...
It explains economic principles like supply chains, comparative advantage, how technology affects prices and geographical importance, incentives, disincentives, effects of taxes, political compulsions behind taxes(taxes on cotton clothes), intentions versus results, useful corruption (example Indonesia) versus harmful honesty(Tanzania), and such things.
Amazing information - Argentina and USA were roughly equal in GDP and industrialization around the 1890s, Botswana was the fastest growing economy for a couple of decades, England heeded Adam Smith's suggestions on economics several decades after his death, etc.
This is the audio recording of my review in English
https://bit.ly/2uaVVz4
This is the video recording of my review in Tamil
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yFex-...
January 8, 2025
Had a difficult time in understanding what the author was driving at. Was hoping that columnist books would be crisp and effective, but definitely not think. Had to drop after few pages itself. Wouldn’t even allow me to say dropped midway.
November 12, 2023
Quite chaotic.
March 7, 2025
Very very good read on the many failures of trade policies throughout history. Nice timing since tariffs are wrecking the economy
January 25, 2015
The book takes a road less-travelled in economic theory. Rather than accepting -as it has been the trend- that destiny, geography, history,etc.. determine the wealth of nations, the author explores the idea that it is actually human agency through policies, governments and individuals that ultimately has the last word in regards to the wealth of a community. In that sense, the book advocates for policies rather than the acceptance of fate. The author, an economist, seems very impressed, for example, with Botswana and Norway, two very different countries for sure but one thing in common, a very abundant natural resource. Botswana in particular was handed probably all of the wrong ends of the stick including diamond mines. Through good policies these two countries seem to have avoided the terrible pitfalls of neighbors like Russia or Zimbawe. Of course other factors besides destiny's intervention are considered and given ample space, especially the long-standing traditions that have aided progress or kept countries away from genuine growth like the custom of distributing political favors in India, the absent land ownership of Spanish aristocrats, the autocratic tendencies of Russian leaders or the predictable burocracies and corruptions of China among others.
I agree with the author that to take a country like the U.S. and say that it naturally had to become a wealthy nation Isabel exercise of historical backengineering. The fact is that the U.S. could have followed the path of Argentina if things had gone just a bit differently (the South could have won the Civil War or the country might have called it splits). The fact is that only good, even when very flawed, policy allows US and other nations to continue to thrive. There is nothing guaranteed or inherent in a country that would deliver growth no matter what. On the contrary, the state of affairs is always fragile. Farming subsidies for cotton or Peruvian asparagus and catfish tariffs are some examples of very damaging policies in the US today.
Other questions the book tries to answer: Does Max Weber's idea that countries with a Protestan ethic tend to do better economically hold any water? -Never mind Calvinist predetermination basically makes all attempt at salvation through work pretty useless- Is there a particular religion that is better suited for creating wealth or is it the use of religion by interest groups with very secular interests the cause of much damage? What happened to China that stopped it on its track to remaining a superpower during the Min Dinasty? How does its future look when compared to India? You'd think oil, diamonds and natural resources would propel any country out of poverty and yet, again and again, those resources seem to be the kiss cof death, mismanaged and corrupting. Why did Argentina and the U.S. follow such divergent paths when they both started as equals in potential and wealth? What are the crazy paradoxes about lobbying for ethanol and catfish? Why has London managed to remain a hub of world commerce but Moscow has floundered? Why doesn't Africa grow cocaine? Has globalization truly made distance a non-issue? The author writes about these and other questions with a very clear and entertaining style that left me enlightened and worried at the same time.
I agree with the author that to take a country like the U.S. and say that it naturally had to become a wealthy nation Isabel exercise of historical backengineering. The fact is that the U.S. could have followed the path of Argentina if things had gone just a bit differently (the South could have won the Civil War or the country might have called it splits). The fact is that only good, even when very flawed, policy allows US and other nations to continue to thrive. There is nothing guaranteed or inherent in a country that would deliver growth no matter what. On the contrary, the state of affairs is always fragile. Farming subsidies for cotton or Peruvian asparagus and catfish tariffs are some examples of very damaging policies in the US today.
Other questions the book tries to answer: Does Max Weber's idea that countries with a Protestan ethic tend to do better economically hold any water? -Never mind Calvinist predetermination basically makes all attempt at salvation through work pretty useless- Is there a particular religion that is better suited for creating wealth or is it the use of religion by interest groups with very secular interests the cause of much damage? What happened to China that stopped it on its track to remaining a superpower during the Min Dinasty? How does its future look when compared to India? You'd think oil, diamonds and natural resources would propel any country out of poverty and yet, again and again, those resources seem to be the kiss cof death, mismanaged and corrupting. Why did Argentina and the U.S. follow such divergent paths when they both started as equals in potential and wealth? What are the crazy paradoxes about lobbying for ethanol and catfish? Why has London managed to remain a hub of world commerce but Moscow has floundered? Why doesn't Africa grow cocaine? Has globalization truly made distance a non-issue? The author writes about these and other questions with a very clear and entertaining style that left me enlightened and worried at the same time.
August 8, 2023
Why do some countries succeed economically while others stagnate or fail? Alan Beattie, an economics reporter with the Financial Times, has an answer: “Countries have choices and those choices have substantially determined whether they succeeded or failed” (p. 2). This book is about the choices countries make; each of the nine chapters (prior to the conclusion) is based on an economic theory – for example, Chapter 3 on trade is informed by Hotelling’s transportation model, and by Tony Allen’s concept of trade in “embedded water,” while Chapter 6 is based on Mancur Olson’s interest group theory – with well-chosen examples illustrating the theory in action. Each chapter is titled with an interesting question: for example, Chapter 5 asks “Why don’t Islamic countries grow rich? (I have more to comment on this later.) The treatment is accessible and entertaining, while the lessons are well drawn. But there is a bit of bias. Since Beattie focuses on the choices countries can make, there is a certain tendency to ignore how those choices are often conditioned within the international economic system, designed to fit the self-interest of powerful nations. But the fundamental point is well-taken – irrespective of the circumstances in which any country finds itself, its choices do have an impact.
Now for a detailed summary: Chapter 1 compares Argentina and United States as a illustration of this central premise of the book. The two countries were almost identically placed in the late 18th century. Indeed some would have said Argentina was better positioned economically, since there were fewer rival powers blocking its expansion (no French, no Spanish, and no strong native presence). But Argentina opted for large scale ranching, giving a few landowners access to huge tracts of land. Most immigrants were confined to low-skill, low-wage employment as farmhands and craftspeople. The aristocratic landowners in turn had no incentive to invest in education or civic infrastructure, preferring to spend their profits on ostentations consumption of imported luxuries. The US on the other hand had a large number of small freeholders. Eventually, when industrialization arrived, it was driven in Argentina mostly along the same model as the farm economy – as large, protected monopolies handed out to favorites. Also, most of the capital – with agriculture stuck in low productivity – came from foreign sources. In the US, manufacturing was initiated by many highly competitive firms, financed mostly by domestic capital. The choices made in the 18th century to allocate land one way or the other proved fateful.
Chapter 2 asks why “Washington DC does not have the vote?” Really, it is a hook to present a theory of development and economic geography. Beattie summarizes a theory of industrialization, in which nations start with a base of agriculture. As agriculture becomes more productive, the surpluses are invested in manufacturing firms attracting some labor to the cities. But since agriculture is productive, farm wages too are high, and the flow of labor to the cities is manageable. Cities grow organically. But in countries where farm productivity is not high, industrialization comes from diverting investment from other areas of the economy or from foreign sources. Both lead to an enormous rush to the cities, as people with no rural prospects migrate to the urban areas. In addition to the usual problems of providing urban services, this has a political cost too. An aggrieved urban population is a threat to the political order – as evidenced by the sans culottes in the French revolution. The government is forced to coddle the urbanites, often at the cost of further marginalizing the rural areas. These benefits for cities act as a further incentive for rural migration. Beattie thus raises an interesting hypothesis – the size of cities relative to the national population is an indicator of how inefficient the economy is! With notable exceptions (Seoul?) large cities indicate a dysfunctional economy.
Chapter 3 raises a paradox. After being the breadbasket of the Roman empire, Egypt today is a net food importer. Why? This is answered in two ways. First is how transportation costs help define the limits of markets. The commodities most often traded when transportation costs are high are high-value, non-perishable, low-volume items. Think diamonds or silks. But as transportation costs decline, it becomes possible to transport lower value, bulk commodities. In the case of Egypt, the extant means of transportation (rivers and oceans) meant that Egypt (relative to other parts of Europe) had an advantage as a food producer. But as better means of transport were invented, Egypt became part of a much larger, global market, in which it ceased to enjoy an advantage in agriculture. That is the first explanation. The second one is based on the idea of trade in “embedded water” or “virtual water” in which water-scarce regions import foodstuffs that require copious inputs of water. Egypt is a net importer of embedded water, since it is a water-scarce region. Beattie also uses the chapter to critique national policies such as “food self-sufficiency” that sacrifice economic efficiency for other, often political goals. Note: water scarce regions can still be efficient food exporters, if the products produced with embedded water are high-value items – for example, flowers, vegetables, etc.
Chapter 4 is on the “Dutch disease” and more generally the “resource curse.” It is generally considered “good” for an economy to have natural resource endowments. But paradoxically, natural resources can also be a curse. Beattie explains why. The “Dutch disease” refers to the economic outcome in the Netherlands consequent to the discovery of oil there. Such discoveries tend to attract large amounts of local or foreign capital to that industry. If it is domestic capital, it ends up starving other sectors of the economy of investments. But the effects of foreign investments are more subtle – the influx causes the national currency to appreciate, making exports from other sectors less competitive. In the Dutch case, the flourishing tulip industry was devastated after the discovery of oil. The “resource curse” is a more general phenomenon including both the economic effects as well as the political consequences. Since natural resources are naturally monopolistic, competition does not develop; instead, firms compete politically to gain monopoly access to the resource. This leads to corruption and civil/political conflict as businesses and their political agents compete by all means necessary to gain access to the resource. With a ready source of cash available for support, politicians tend to ignore investing in other productive activities such as education and innovation. Thus paradoxically, resource rich nations tend to be mismanaged and politically and economically dysfunctional. Beattie does hold out hope that nations can avoid the resource curse – Botswana is cited as an example. But it calls for considerable political forbearance and wisdom.
Chapter 5 is perhaps the shakiest chapter in the book. It asks why “Islamic nations do not become rich.” To explain why, Beattie starts with Weber’s “Protestant work ethic” but quickly rejects it on both logical and evidentiary grounds. Logically, all we know is that modern capitalism emerged in some places in Western Europe (England, Netherlands) which were Protestant. But that does not mean that Protestantism “caused” capitalism to emerge. The causation could be the other way around too – nascent capitalism required motivation and exhortation that could be most effectively addressed by changing the tenets of religion. In terms of evidence, Confucianist, Buddhist and Catholic countries too have achieved significant rates of growth in subsequent centuries. Some Islamic countries have languished, while others (Indonesia, Malaysia) have done impressively well. Beattie concludes that perhaps it is not religion per se, but the use of religion by elites to protect their own privileges that is responsible for the differential economic performance of nations. But that still leaves the question unanswered why some religions are more amenable to manipulation by elites and some less.
Chapter 6 asks why “asparagus comes from Peru” and allows Beattie to explore the fascinating field of interest group politics with references to Mancur Olson. Small groups with concentrated interests (high gains per individual) tend to dominate over large groups with diffuse interests. Beattie discusses the insidious role of farm lobbies in modern trade negotiations – it helps if the growers are concentrated in one area, since their local politicians will have no choice but to back their demands (chief example, cotton growers in the American south). There is a fascinating section on the East India Company’s imports of fine cotton cloth into England and the opposition it evoked from local wool manufacturers unable to compete. Another section on the political dynamics leading up to the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, and another on the fight against the sugar lobby (the abolishment of slavery was one episode in this fight). And by the way – asparagus comes from Peru because it was part of the deal that Western nations cut to wean Peruvian farmers off growing coca.
Chapter 7 asks an interesting question: “why does Africa not grow cocaine?” The answer, according to Beattie, is all about transaction costs. Efficient production needs an infrastructure – not only physical (uninterrupted power, reliable transportation), but also financial (credit, payment systems, pricing information) and political (a modicum of rule of law). Beattie says Africa is unable to compete not because of systemic discrimination, but because African nations have not invested in an economic infrastructure. There is a great case study of how G. F. Swift created a continent-wide market for processed beef in the U.S., utilizing a telegraph-based system of ordering and a network of refrigerated railcars. Entrepreneurs can piece together such systems once the basic infrastructure (railways, telegraph) is in place. And why are the Taliban able to grow cocaine while Africa cannot? The Taliban can protect the growers through the entire growing season, from planting to harvesting, which African nations cannot without a rival faction misappropriating the harvest.
Chapter 8: why did corrupt Indonesia grow, while honest Tanzania under Nyerere stagnate. The answer – some corruption guarantees results, and such corruption would be seen as the cost of doing business. The other type of corruption is predatory – officials making money while they can, with no assurance that they will be there tomorrow.
Chapter 9, on why pandas are so endangered, is on path dependence and evolutionary dead ends. Pandas are endangered because they chose a narrow specialization (bamboo) with low nutritional value. The housecat meanwhile, chose to be omnivorous and allied itself with the dominant species, giving it a huge survival advantage. This chapter seems to argue against Beattie’s major premise that nations have choices, by stating that they are also bound by path dependence. Past choices have narrowed the choices available to them. Beattie uses three examples: Russia, China and India, to illustrate path dependence. Russia has no property rights and tenuous rule of law, since from Mongol times, Russia has had a strong, autocratic center to which all property belonged. China’s mandate of heaven transferred easily from the emperors to the Communist Party, based on an exchange of loyalty and obedience in return for material prosperity. India’s democracy is “clientist” because it is based on a history of caste autonomy.
So what do we learn from all this? In Chapter 10, Beattie summarizes his conclusions: Beattie admits candidly that he does not have all the answers, and those who claim to are lying. “But certain basic ideas command wide acceptance. Don't cut yourself off from the rest of the world. Plan ahead for cities but don't force them and don't give them more power than they warrant. Try to let your economy do what it is best at and support it where possible without trying to force it down a predetermined path. Don't obsess about religious belief but watch for elites using it to further their own temporal ends. Stop overweening governments from ignoring property rights and the rule of law. Learn from the examples of those who managed to keep oil and diamond money from poisoning their economy and their politics. Call the bluff of small interest groups who say they have the welfare of the whole country at heart. For very poor nations, worry less about trade policy and more about customs procedures. Concentrate on rooting out the forms of bribery that will do the most damage and worry less about corruption that is moderate and predictable. Be aware when your country is getting stuck on the wrong path and be alert to opportunities to shift it” (p. 298).
He concludes with a nice quote from Shakespeare:
Our remedies oft in ourselves do lie,
Which we ascribe to heaven: the fated sky
Gives us free scope, only doth backward pull
Our slow designs when we ourselves are dull.
Now for a detailed summary: Chapter 1 compares Argentina and United States as a illustration of this central premise of the book. The two countries were almost identically placed in the late 18th century. Indeed some would have said Argentina was better positioned economically, since there were fewer rival powers blocking its expansion (no French, no Spanish, and no strong native presence). But Argentina opted for large scale ranching, giving a few landowners access to huge tracts of land. Most immigrants were confined to low-skill, low-wage employment as farmhands and craftspeople. The aristocratic landowners in turn had no incentive to invest in education or civic infrastructure, preferring to spend their profits on ostentations consumption of imported luxuries. The US on the other hand had a large number of small freeholders. Eventually, when industrialization arrived, it was driven in Argentina mostly along the same model as the farm economy – as large, protected monopolies handed out to favorites. Also, most of the capital – with agriculture stuck in low productivity – came from foreign sources. In the US, manufacturing was initiated by many highly competitive firms, financed mostly by domestic capital. The choices made in the 18th century to allocate land one way or the other proved fateful.
Chapter 2 asks why “Washington DC does not have the vote?” Really, it is a hook to present a theory of development and economic geography. Beattie summarizes a theory of industrialization, in which nations start with a base of agriculture. As agriculture becomes more productive, the surpluses are invested in manufacturing firms attracting some labor to the cities. But since agriculture is productive, farm wages too are high, and the flow of labor to the cities is manageable. Cities grow organically. But in countries where farm productivity is not high, industrialization comes from diverting investment from other areas of the economy or from foreign sources. Both lead to an enormous rush to the cities, as people with no rural prospects migrate to the urban areas. In addition to the usual problems of providing urban services, this has a political cost too. An aggrieved urban population is a threat to the political order – as evidenced by the sans culottes in the French revolution. The government is forced to coddle the urbanites, often at the cost of further marginalizing the rural areas. These benefits for cities act as a further incentive for rural migration. Beattie thus raises an interesting hypothesis – the size of cities relative to the national population is an indicator of how inefficient the economy is! With notable exceptions (Seoul?) large cities indicate a dysfunctional economy.
Chapter 3 raises a paradox. After being the breadbasket of the Roman empire, Egypt today is a net food importer. Why? This is answered in two ways. First is how transportation costs help define the limits of markets. The commodities most often traded when transportation costs are high are high-value, non-perishable, low-volume items. Think diamonds or silks. But as transportation costs decline, it becomes possible to transport lower value, bulk commodities. In the case of Egypt, the extant means of transportation (rivers and oceans) meant that Egypt (relative to other parts of Europe) had an advantage as a food producer. But as better means of transport were invented, Egypt became part of a much larger, global market, in which it ceased to enjoy an advantage in agriculture. That is the first explanation. The second one is based on the idea of trade in “embedded water” or “virtual water” in which water-scarce regions import foodstuffs that require copious inputs of water. Egypt is a net importer of embedded water, since it is a water-scarce region. Beattie also uses the chapter to critique national policies such as “food self-sufficiency” that sacrifice economic efficiency for other, often political goals. Note: water scarce regions can still be efficient food exporters, if the products produced with embedded water are high-value items – for example, flowers, vegetables, etc.
Chapter 4 is on the “Dutch disease” and more generally the “resource curse.” It is generally considered “good” for an economy to have natural resource endowments. But paradoxically, natural resources can also be a curse. Beattie explains why. The “Dutch disease” refers to the economic outcome in the Netherlands consequent to the discovery of oil there. Such discoveries tend to attract large amounts of local or foreign capital to that industry. If it is domestic capital, it ends up starving other sectors of the economy of investments. But the effects of foreign investments are more subtle – the influx causes the national currency to appreciate, making exports from other sectors less competitive. In the Dutch case, the flourishing tulip industry was devastated after the discovery of oil. The “resource curse” is a more general phenomenon including both the economic effects as well as the political consequences. Since natural resources are naturally monopolistic, competition does not develop; instead, firms compete politically to gain monopoly access to the resource. This leads to corruption and civil/political conflict as businesses and their political agents compete by all means necessary to gain access to the resource. With a ready source of cash available for support, politicians tend to ignore investing in other productive activities such as education and innovation. Thus paradoxically, resource rich nations tend to be mismanaged and politically and economically dysfunctional. Beattie does hold out hope that nations can avoid the resource curse – Botswana is cited as an example. But it calls for considerable political forbearance and wisdom.
Chapter 5 is perhaps the shakiest chapter in the book. It asks why “Islamic nations do not become rich.” To explain why, Beattie starts with Weber’s “Protestant work ethic” but quickly rejects it on both logical and evidentiary grounds. Logically, all we know is that modern capitalism emerged in some places in Western Europe (England, Netherlands) which were Protestant. But that does not mean that Protestantism “caused” capitalism to emerge. The causation could be the other way around too – nascent capitalism required motivation and exhortation that could be most effectively addressed by changing the tenets of religion. In terms of evidence, Confucianist, Buddhist and Catholic countries too have achieved significant rates of growth in subsequent centuries. Some Islamic countries have languished, while others (Indonesia, Malaysia) have done impressively well. Beattie concludes that perhaps it is not religion per se, but the use of religion by elites to protect their own privileges that is responsible for the differential economic performance of nations. But that still leaves the question unanswered why some religions are more amenable to manipulation by elites and some less.
Chapter 6 asks why “asparagus comes from Peru” and allows Beattie to explore the fascinating field of interest group politics with references to Mancur Olson. Small groups with concentrated interests (high gains per individual) tend to dominate over large groups with diffuse interests. Beattie discusses the insidious role of farm lobbies in modern trade negotiations – it helps if the growers are concentrated in one area, since their local politicians will have no choice but to back their demands (chief example, cotton growers in the American south). There is a fascinating section on the East India Company’s imports of fine cotton cloth into England and the opposition it evoked from local wool manufacturers unable to compete. Another section on the political dynamics leading up to the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, and another on the fight against the sugar lobby (the abolishment of slavery was one episode in this fight). And by the way – asparagus comes from Peru because it was part of the deal that Western nations cut to wean Peruvian farmers off growing coca.
Chapter 7 asks an interesting question: “why does Africa not grow cocaine?” The answer, according to Beattie, is all about transaction costs. Efficient production needs an infrastructure – not only physical (uninterrupted power, reliable transportation), but also financial (credit, payment systems, pricing information) and political (a modicum of rule of law). Beattie says Africa is unable to compete not because of systemic discrimination, but because African nations have not invested in an economic infrastructure. There is a great case study of how G. F. Swift created a continent-wide market for processed beef in the U.S., utilizing a telegraph-based system of ordering and a network of refrigerated railcars. Entrepreneurs can piece together such systems once the basic infrastructure (railways, telegraph) is in place. And why are the Taliban able to grow cocaine while Africa cannot? The Taliban can protect the growers through the entire growing season, from planting to harvesting, which African nations cannot without a rival faction misappropriating the harvest.
Chapter 8: why did corrupt Indonesia grow, while honest Tanzania under Nyerere stagnate. The answer – some corruption guarantees results, and such corruption would be seen as the cost of doing business. The other type of corruption is predatory – officials making money while they can, with no assurance that they will be there tomorrow.
Chapter 9, on why pandas are so endangered, is on path dependence and evolutionary dead ends. Pandas are endangered because they chose a narrow specialization (bamboo) with low nutritional value. The housecat meanwhile, chose to be omnivorous and allied itself with the dominant species, giving it a huge survival advantage. This chapter seems to argue against Beattie’s major premise that nations have choices, by stating that they are also bound by path dependence. Past choices have narrowed the choices available to them. Beattie uses three examples: Russia, China and India, to illustrate path dependence. Russia has no property rights and tenuous rule of law, since from Mongol times, Russia has had a strong, autocratic center to which all property belonged. China’s mandate of heaven transferred easily from the emperors to the Communist Party, based on an exchange of loyalty and obedience in return for material prosperity. India’s democracy is “clientist” because it is based on a history of caste autonomy.
So what do we learn from all this? In Chapter 10, Beattie summarizes his conclusions: Beattie admits candidly that he does not have all the answers, and those who claim to are lying. “But certain basic ideas command wide acceptance. Don't cut yourself off from the rest of the world. Plan ahead for cities but don't force them and don't give them more power than they warrant. Try to let your economy do what it is best at and support it where possible without trying to force it down a predetermined path. Don't obsess about religious belief but watch for elites using it to further their own temporal ends. Stop overweening governments from ignoring property rights and the rule of law. Learn from the examples of those who managed to keep oil and diamond money from poisoning their economy and their politics. Call the bluff of small interest groups who say they have the welfare of the whole country at heart. For very poor nations, worry less about trade policy and more about customs procedures. Concentrate on rooting out the forms of bribery that will do the most damage and worry less about corruption that is moderate and predictable. Be aware when your country is getting stuck on the wrong path and be alert to opportunities to shift it” (p. 298).
He concludes with a nice quote from Shakespeare:
Our remedies oft in ourselves do lie,
Which we ascribe to heaven: the fated sky
Gives us free scope, only doth backward pull
Our slow designs when we ourselves are dull.
April 2, 2012
An enjoyable, thoughtful collection of essays. Certainly not a systematic theory or prescriptive beyond the basics, but a nice treatment of some fundamental principles of economic development. I enjoyed the opening chapter comparing the trajectories of Argentina and the US and the brief history of the textile trade in Britain, particularly the extraordinary measures taken by the British wool industry in the face of imported Indian calico. I was surprised and somewhat disappointed at the lack of consideration given to environmental matters, but then again, that is symptomatic of the Financial Times/Economist approach, which seems slow to recognize the tight, indissoluble bonds between the Earth's ecology and our economy. I would have particularly appreciated taking that aspect into account in the discussion of virtual water. Worth a read.
September 15, 2012
Just started reading this book and am quite enjoying it so far, not at all dry. Interesting comparison of USA to Argentina, making an argument with a bit of tongue in cheek that Argentina today resembles what the USA might have looked like if the South had won the Civil War. Argentina stayed agrarian-based with manufacturing only as an adjunct supporting agriculture. Also countries that entered the Depression as creditor nations, like USA and France, remained democratic, whereas debtor nations like Germany and Argentina turned authoritarian. Lots of other details about cultural and national choices leading to different paths. Full disclosure: my judgement on what is dry vs colorful could be tainted by having a degree in Economics.
December 26, 2011
A good read overall. Due to working hours it took me over a month to finish. The book bases itself on histories of nations and how these countries end up to where they are not by accident but rather by a series of choice or policies taken up by their so-called leader.
It has strengthened my belief that it is not the religion itself that curses the country into an undeveloped state but rather the manipulation of those that have vested interest in keeping the status quo. Thus in a way it solidifies my stand that religion should be kept out of politics/government lest it be mis-used by the powers that be.
It has strengthened my belief that it is not the religion itself that curses the country into an undeveloped state but rather the manipulation of those that have vested interest in keeping the status quo. Thus in a way it solidifies my stand that religion should be kept out of politics/government lest it be mis-used by the powers that be.
July 11, 2009
The author claims that the book is "not a whimsical set of disconnected stories" but rather "an explanation of how human beings have shaped their own destiny." However, sometimes the thread is lost. While Beattie is a very good writer, the book begins to lose momentum towards the end.
March 23, 2025
False Economy is a book that examines the history of economics from a counterintuitive position. The author, Alan Beattie, seeks to ask questions about economics and why economic decisions are made irrationally. False Economy has some interesting questions about the economy and the decisions that are made within societies around it.
The decisions made in economics can be contrary to reason. Chapter 3 on Trade, subtitled Why does Egypt import half its staple food is one such chapter. This chapter examines why Egypt imports all of its grain to feed its citizens. This becomes apparent when in history, Egypt was a grain-exporting region in the ancient world. It turns out that Egypt exports less grain because the use of water pushes Egypt to farm more profitable crops for water use. Chapter 1 on Making Choices compares the US to Argentina and claims that the rentier economy of Argentina which is an economy dependent on asset extraction led to its demise.
One prevalent theme was how history has had a direct relationship with the development of different countries. An example was in Chapter 5 on Religion, specifically why Islam was correlated to lower economic development. False Economy claimed that the Mongol invasions led to the destabilisation of Islamic countries and the greater need for military spending led to the Islamic world focusing on military leadership over economic growth. Chapter 7 on Trade routes and supply chains argues that Africa's lack of infrastructure holds back development.
Whilst the book claims to have a look over the less well-known parts of the economy, a lot of what the book says does make it into the economic textbooks. For example, Chapter 4 on Natural Resources is a chapter all on Dutch disease, which is a well-known economics conundrum, that natural resource extraction leads to a highly uncompetitive economy, as your economy becomes dependent on the extraction of raw materials. This name was given after the Dutch found natural gas reserves that consequently led to massive increases in the value of its currency.
I found the book at times making contradictory statements. For example, in Chapter 1, Making Choices, on pp 13-14 there is a claim that had "the (US) South won the Civil War and gone on to dominate the North, America might have looked a lot more like Argentina" which is later contradicted by the later comment "a Southern victory in the Civil War might have slowed or skewed American industrialization but not halted it". I do agree with Alan Beattie that a Southern victory would have turned the American South into an English-speaking version of a Latin American country, I hardly think they would have been able to conquer the Northern American states. This was not likely to begin with as the war goals of the American South were to break away from the union to prolong slavery.
There are also dubious claims made throughout the book. On page 44, there was a claim made those rural economies frequently used barter economies specifically at the time of the Medieval period. Except that wasn't the case, there is no evidence of barter being used at all in economics throughout history as it is cumbersome and pointless for most people to do it. What used to happen was some kind of credit existed allowing people to exchange goods for future goods when they needed it Another claim is made on page 110 in that tanker drivers are paid more because "the degree of skill and danger involved is identical". I cannot think how someone can make such a stupid claim. Tanker drivers are paid more because they carry fuel that is highly flammable and dangerous to human life, property and the environment. Sure, tanker drivers can bring the economy to a halt by striking but that begs the question, why can't the oil companies hire drivers that drive other HGVs?
Then there is the referencing or the lack of it. The book does have a bibliography but there are no citations or references to the bibliography. This becomes apparent throughout the book. For example, in Chapter 3, there is a claim on page 74 which claimed that the cost of shifting a load a mile by ox could be transported 57 miles by sea. Another claim on page 75 was that the entire Roman Empire's production of grain was around 18 million tonnes. Neither of these statistics has citations other than different books and essays listed in the bibliography. This therefore has to be marked down partially because of poor referencing.
Overall, the book makes some interesting claims about the economy but its mistakes mean the book isn't as strong as it could be. 3 stars.
The decisions made in economics can be contrary to reason. Chapter 3 on Trade, subtitled Why does Egypt import half its staple food is one such chapter. This chapter examines why Egypt imports all of its grain to feed its citizens. This becomes apparent when in history, Egypt was a grain-exporting region in the ancient world. It turns out that Egypt exports less grain because the use of water pushes Egypt to farm more profitable crops for water use. Chapter 1 on Making Choices compares the US to Argentina and claims that the rentier economy of Argentina which is an economy dependent on asset extraction led to its demise.
One prevalent theme was how history has had a direct relationship with the development of different countries. An example was in Chapter 5 on Religion, specifically why Islam was correlated to lower economic development. False Economy claimed that the Mongol invasions led to the destabilisation of Islamic countries and the greater need for military spending led to the Islamic world focusing on military leadership over economic growth. Chapter 7 on Trade routes and supply chains argues that Africa's lack of infrastructure holds back development.
Whilst the book claims to have a look over the less well-known parts of the economy, a lot of what the book says does make it into the economic textbooks. For example, Chapter 4 on Natural Resources is a chapter all on Dutch disease, which is a well-known economics conundrum, that natural resource extraction leads to a highly uncompetitive economy, as your economy becomes dependent on the extraction of raw materials. This name was given after the Dutch found natural gas reserves that consequently led to massive increases in the value of its currency.
I found the book at times making contradictory statements. For example, in Chapter 1, Making Choices, on pp 13-14 there is a claim that had "the (US) South won the Civil War and gone on to dominate the North, America might have looked a lot more like Argentina" which is later contradicted by the later comment "a Southern victory in the Civil War might have slowed or skewed American industrialization but not halted it". I do agree with Alan Beattie that a Southern victory would have turned the American South into an English-speaking version of a Latin American country, I hardly think they would have been able to conquer the Northern American states. This was not likely to begin with as the war goals of the American South were to break away from the union to prolong slavery.
There are also dubious claims made throughout the book. On page 44, there was a claim made those rural economies frequently used barter economies specifically at the time of the Medieval period. Except that wasn't the case, there is no evidence of barter being used at all in economics throughout history as it is cumbersome and pointless for most people to do it. What used to happen was some kind of credit existed allowing people to exchange goods for future goods when they needed it Another claim is made on page 110 in that tanker drivers are paid more because "the degree of skill and danger involved is identical". I cannot think how someone can make such a stupid claim. Tanker drivers are paid more because they carry fuel that is highly flammable and dangerous to human life, property and the environment. Sure, tanker drivers can bring the economy to a halt by striking but that begs the question, why can't the oil companies hire drivers that drive other HGVs?
Then there is the referencing or the lack of it. The book does have a bibliography but there are no citations or references to the bibliography. This becomes apparent throughout the book. For example, in Chapter 3, there is a claim on page 74 which claimed that the cost of shifting a load a mile by ox could be transported 57 miles by sea. Another claim on page 75 was that the entire Roman Empire's production of grain was around 18 million tonnes. Neither of these statistics has citations other than different books and essays listed in the bibliography. This therefore has to be marked down partially because of poor referencing.
Overall, the book makes some interesting claims about the economy but its mistakes mean the book isn't as strong as it could be. 3 stars.
November 25, 2025
کتاب درباره چیه؟ درباره اینکه چرا یه اقتصاد موفقه و یه اقتصاد با شکست مواجه میشه و اینکه همهچیزبه انتخابها برمیگرده.
تفاوت اقتصاد آمریکا و آرژانتین: آمریکا الان یه ابرقدرت اقتصادیه ولی آرژانتین دائم با مشکلات مختلف دستوپنجه نرم میکنه. این درحالیه که هر دو در یک زمان شروع به تغییر کردن چون استقلال هر دو در فاصله ۱۵ سال از هم اتفاق افتاد، آمریکا سال ۱۷۸۹ و آرژانتین سال ۱۸۱۶. اما بعد آمریکا سرزمینش رو بین افراد و خانوادههای ماهر با امکان ورود کشاورزان ماهر از اروپا تقسیم کرد ولی آرژانتین بین چند خانواده و مالک ثروتمند و قدرتمند. بنابراین افراد ماهر روی کار نیومدن و انحصار رخ داد. آمریکا دنبال جذب سرمایه خارجیها بود ولی آرژانتین بر خودکفایی اصرار میکرد و واردات رو ممنوع و مالیات سنگینی روی صادرات اعمال کرد که در نهایت باعث ورشکستگی آرژانتین شد.
نقش شهرهای بزرگ در اقتصاد کشورها: بیشتر دولتهای بیثبات پایتختهای متورمی دارن. از طرفی افراد زیادی به شهر و پایتخت مهاجرت میکنن چون فرصتهای رفاهی در اطراف شهرها و روستاها کمتره. وقتی جمعیت شهرها بالا میره، وضعیت معیشت در روستاها یا شهرهای دیگه به جز پایتخت سخت میشه و مالیاتشون سنگینتر میشه چون باید به توسعه بیشتر پایتخت و شهرهای بزرگتر رسیدگی کرد.
درمقابل، یه شهر موفق، شهریه که به اقتصاد کمک کنه و باعث رونق شهرهای دیگه هم بشه. راهکارش هم اینه که یه یه نوع تجارت یا فناوری وابسته نباشن. مثلا شهر دیترویت به شدت به صنعت خودرو وابسته بود و در زمان بحران مالی که شرکتهای خودروسازی به ورشکستگی نزدیک شدن، اقتصاد دیترویت سقوط کرد.
تاثیر انتخابهای کشاورزی و مسیرهای حملونقل: کشوری مثل پرو با قراردادی که با آمریکا امضا کرد توافق کرد سالانه ۱۰ میلیون تن مارچوبه به آمریکا بده. بنابراین کشاورزان خودش رو از تولید کوکائین به کاشت و تولید مارچوبه سوق داد.
از طرفی خیلی کشورهای آفریقایی میتونن بزرگترین تولیدکنندههای قهوه باشن ولی به دلیل جنگهای داخلی و بسته شدن راهها توسط دیکتاتوریها، نمیتونن معاملهای با سایر نقاط جهان داشته باشن و مسیرهای آبی برای دادوستد خطرناک هستن.
منابع طبیعی میتونن دردسر بشن: مثلا عربستان سعودی یه کشور نفتخیزه و درآمد زیادی از نفت داره ولی باعث ایجاد شغل در کشورش نشده. نرخ بیکاری حدود ۲۵ درصده و تاثیر منفی بر جامعه داره. درمقابل نروژ و شیلی که به ترتیب نفت و مس دارن، تونستن به این منابع به عنوان یکی از راههای کسب درآمد برای کشور نگاه کنن، نه به عنوان تنها راه.
نقش دین در اقتصاد: مطالعات روی هنگکنگ و تایوان که به روی همبستگی اجتماعی و رد فردگرایی تاکید داشتن نشون داد برخلاف نظر عموم که فکر میکردن برای سرمایهداری مناسبن، مانند بقیه کشورها آسیبپذیر هستن.
نظریههایی هم وجود داره که کشورهای اسلامی مثل افغانستان بیشتر از بقیه با مشکلات اقتصادی دستوپنجه نرم میکنن. و دلیل اون تصیمیم دولتهاست که انتخابهای ضعیفی رو برای کشور به دنبال دارن. نمونه موفق کشورهای اسلامی مالزی و اندونزی هست.
درنهایت باید گفت که اقتصاد کشور دنبالهروی تصمیمات و انتخاب دولتهاست و اگر تصمیمات درستی گرفته بشه، رونق اقتصادی به دنبال داره.
پ.ن: خلاصهی من از خلاصه متنی و صوتی کتاب اقتصاد ورشکسته، تهیه شده توسط برنامه چکیدا ♡
تفاوت اقتصاد آمریکا و آرژانتین: آمریکا الان یه ابرقدرت اقتصادیه ولی آرژانتین دائم با مشکلات مختلف دستوپنجه نرم میکنه. این درحالیه که هر دو در یک زمان شروع به تغییر کردن چون استقلال هر دو در فاصله ۱۵ سال از هم اتفاق افتاد، آمریکا سال ۱۷۸۹ و آرژانتین سال ۱۸۱۶. اما بعد آمریکا سرزمینش رو بین افراد و خانوادههای ماهر با امکان ورود کشاورزان ماهر از اروپا تقسیم کرد ولی آرژانتین بین چند خانواده و مالک ثروتمند و قدرتمند. بنابراین افراد ماهر روی کار نیومدن و انحصار رخ داد. آمریکا دنبال جذب سرمایه خارجیها بود ولی آرژانتین بر خودکفایی اصرار میکرد و واردات رو ممنوع و مالیات سنگینی روی صادرات اعمال کرد که در نهایت باعث ورشکستگی آرژانتین شد.
نقش شهرهای بزرگ در اقتصاد کشورها: بیشتر دولتهای بیثبات پایتختهای متورمی دارن. از طرفی افراد زیادی به شهر و پایتخت مهاجرت میکنن چون فرصتهای رفاهی در اطراف شهرها و روستاها کمتره. وقتی جمعیت شهرها بالا میره، وضعیت معیشت در روستاها یا شهرهای دیگه به جز پایتخت سخت میشه و مالیاتشون سنگینتر میشه چون باید به توسعه بیشتر پایتخت و شهرهای بزرگتر رسیدگی کرد.
درمقابل، یه شهر موفق، شهریه که به اقتصاد کمک کنه و باعث رونق شهرهای دیگه هم بشه. راهکارش هم اینه که یه یه نوع تجارت یا فناوری وابسته نباشن. مثلا شهر دیترویت به شدت به صنعت خودرو وابسته بود و در زمان بحران مالی که شرکتهای خودروسازی به ورشکستگی نزدیک شدن، اقتصاد دیترویت سقوط کرد.
تاثیر انتخابهای کشاورزی و مسیرهای حملونقل: کشوری مثل پرو با قراردادی که با آمریکا امضا کرد توافق کرد سالانه ۱۰ میلیون تن مارچوبه به آمریکا بده. بنابراین کشاورزان خودش رو از تولید کوکائین به کاشت و تولید مارچوبه سوق داد.
از طرفی خیلی کشورهای آفریقایی میتونن بزرگترین تولیدکنندههای قهوه باشن ولی به دلیل جنگهای داخلی و بسته شدن راهها توسط دیکتاتوریها، نمیتونن معاملهای با سایر نقاط جهان داشته باشن و مسیرهای آبی برای دادوستد خطرناک هستن.
منابع طبیعی میتونن دردسر بشن: مثلا عربستان سعودی یه کشور نفتخیزه و درآمد زیادی از نفت داره ولی باعث ایجاد شغل در کشورش نشده. نرخ بیکاری حدود ۲۵ درصده و تاثیر منفی بر جامعه داره. درمقابل نروژ و شیلی که به ترتیب نفت و مس دارن، تونستن به این منابع به عنوان یکی از راههای کسب درآمد برای کشور نگاه کنن، نه به عنوان تنها راه.
نقش دین در اقتصاد: مطالعات روی هنگکنگ و تایوان که به روی همبستگی اجتماعی و رد فردگرایی تاکید داشتن نشون داد برخلاف نظر عموم که فکر میکردن برای سرمایهداری مناسبن، مانند بقیه کشورها آسیبپذیر هستن.
نظریههایی هم وجود داره که کشورهای اسلامی مثل افغانستان بیشتر از بقیه با مشکلات اقتصادی دستوپنجه نرم میکنن. و دلیل اون تصیمیم دولتهاست که انتخابهای ضعیفی رو برای کشور به دنبال دارن. نمونه موفق کشورهای اسلامی مالزی و اندونزی هست.
درنهایت باید گفت که اقتصاد کشور دنبالهروی تصمیمات و انتخاب دولتهاست و اگر تصمیمات درستی گرفته بشه، رونق اقتصادی به دنبال داره.
پ.ن: خلاصهی من از خلاصه متنی و صوتی کتاب اقتصاد ورشکسته، تهیه شده توسط برنامه چکیدا ♡
February 14, 2022
Writing: 2/5
Knowledge Gained: 1/5
Enjoyment: 1/5
Is it non-fiction? I had to double-check. Instead of admonishing this author, let me get into some facts.
-Writing is hard to follow, some irony in there and time to time had to re-read to make sure I got the sarcastic comment or that it was actually what the author wanted to write. (for example, wrote about argentina and the US' economies and I had trouble at first, telling which is which)
-Author is not skilled in economics, or history, very superficial knowledge of both. (all throughout the book)
-Author is pushing a non-barrier/tariff economy, and praises the IMF (flag/warning there)
-Could not give concrete examples why non-barrier/tariff economy, and IMF etc. is helpful for the economy.
-Sparse and scarse data throughout, no support of what he's saying, and all over the place.
A few quotes to show my point:
"The US learnt that this was not sustainable, and because it was a democracy, however imperfect, it reacted."
"Carolos Menum ... he was, arguably, not unlike an argentine version of the us president for most of the 1990s, bill clinton. both were former governors of impoverished backwater states ... Menum chose a cabinet of talented technocrats, many of them educated at the same american universities as their counterparts in the clinton administration and IMF, although he came from a peronish background, Menum edged away from economic isolationism ...for a while, this approach seemed to work ...but once again argentina proved a delinquent, better at borrowing than earning ...in desperation, buenos aires doubled down on its bets, borrowing billions of dollars form the IMF"
(What is the purpose of reading this book?)
"The london of 1910 was 7 times begger than the london of 1800, but dhaka now is 40 times bigger than it was in 1950 ... between 130 and 50 bc, rome's population expanded at a truly astonishing rate, from 375,000 to around a million. no city would again reach one million inhabitants until london during the industrial revolution eighteen centuries later."
( I had to double-check my history knowledge, and grade-school arithmetic for this one)
Maybe, just maybe, this book might be worse than "twilight" or "50 shades of grey"
Knowledge Gained: 1/5
Enjoyment: 1/5
Is it non-fiction? I had to double-check. Instead of admonishing this author, let me get into some facts.
-Writing is hard to follow, some irony in there and time to time had to re-read to make sure I got the sarcastic comment or that it was actually what the author wanted to write. (for example, wrote about argentina and the US' economies and I had trouble at first, telling which is which)
-Author is not skilled in economics, or history, very superficial knowledge of both. (all throughout the book)
-Author is pushing a non-barrier/tariff economy, and praises the IMF (flag/warning there)
-Could not give concrete examples why non-barrier/tariff economy, and IMF etc. is helpful for the economy.
-Sparse and scarse data throughout, no support of what he's saying, and all over the place.
A few quotes to show my point:
"The US learnt that this was not sustainable, and because it was a democracy, however imperfect, it reacted."
"Carolos Menum ... he was, arguably, not unlike an argentine version of the us president for most of the 1990s, bill clinton. both were former governors of impoverished backwater states ... Menum chose a cabinet of talented technocrats, many of them educated at the same american universities as their counterparts in the clinton administration and IMF, although he came from a peronish background, Menum edged away from economic isolationism ...for a while, this approach seemed to work ...but once again argentina proved a delinquent, better at borrowing than earning ...in desperation, buenos aires doubled down on its bets, borrowing billions of dollars form the IMF"
(What is the purpose of reading this book?)
"The london of 1910 was 7 times begger than the london of 1800, but dhaka now is 40 times bigger than it was in 1950 ... between 130 and 50 bc, rome's population expanded at a truly astonishing rate, from 375,000 to around a million. no city would again reach one million inhabitants until london during the industrial revolution eighteen centuries later."
( I had to double-check my history knowledge, and grade-school arithmetic for this one)
Maybe, just maybe, this book might be worse than "twilight" or "50 shades of grey"
June 21, 2022
What happens when you find a few books of nectar in one book.The book is full of facts which altered my perception and answered a lot of questions, which was suppressed inside me because everyone knows the same hypocrisy answer hence it is very difficult to get cleared. Here the author clears everyone queries..
The books answer the followingYou always see two similar countries start at the same time and one becoming rich and another not. You will find the answer here, a beautiful analysis of the United States Vs Argentina was mind blowing. How nations do mistakes without realising they are doing sin to their own country by adopting useless policy.
Why do some countries produce raw material and exports but at the same time import the finished goods of the same material. A real eye opening analysis of an economist, where they found the practical problem of such a nation to set up infrastructure or transportation of the same. It was such an interesting topic.
There is always a notion or myth that the middle east is rich in natural resources but why struggles in economy. This chapter enlightens the heavy deposit of natural resources is only a sin rather than blessed. Superb!
How religions influence the growth or disaster of the nation. An eye opening chapter everyone should read and understand the truth behind.
How lobbying pushes or pulls the nation. This chapter always answers so many hidden doubts and finally you agree, why good citizens are pawns in the hands of politicians.
How transportation and trade agreements influence the growth of a nation.....is more informative, hence you can choose which country is viable to do business.
Corruption is an interesting topic because India plays an important role in this chapter and it says we can't blame the politicians but it is the mind of people and it also vouches that some corrupted countries have shown tremendous growth.
and much more....Don't miss this book even though the information is old but the concept behind the behaviour of every country is the same even today.
The books answer the followingYou always see two similar countries start at the same time and one becoming rich and another not. You will find the answer here, a beautiful analysis of the United States Vs Argentina was mind blowing. How nations do mistakes without realising they are doing sin to their own country by adopting useless policy.
Why do some countries produce raw material and exports but at the same time import the finished goods of the same material. A real eye opening analysis of an economist, where they found the practical problem of such a nation to set up infrastructure or transportation of the same. It was such an interesting topic.
There is always a notion or myth that the middle east is rich in natural resources but why struggles in economy. This chapter enlightens the heavy deposit of natural resources is only a sin rather than blessed. Superb!
How religions influence the growth or disaster of the nation. An eye opening chapter everyone should read and understand the truth behind.
How lobbying pushes or pulls the nation. This chapter always answers so many hidden doubts and finally you agree, why good citizens are pawns in the hands of politicians.
How transportation and trade agreements influence the growth of a nation.....is more informative, hence you can choose which country is viable to do business.
Corruption is an interesting topic because India plays an important role in this chapter and it says we can't blame the politicians but it is the mind of people and it also vouches that some corrupted countries have shown tremendous growth.
and much more....Don't miss this book even though the information is old but the concept behind the behaviour of every country is the same even today.
November 6, 2017
先抱怨一下本書的中譯書名。原書標題為《錯誤的經濟學︰令人驚訝的經濟世界史（False Economy: A Surprising Economic History of the World）》，代表它是本經濟科普讀物。但財信出版的中譯版弄成了《國家的命運好好玩︰從經濟史徹底看穿世界各國富運勢》，乍看之下似乎是部趣味扯淡的消遣作品——然而本書卻是部正正經經的經濟史作品。
本書在〈序言〉中提到作者亞倫比場的作學問態度︰經濟史很容易陷入宿命論的窠臼，一項研究的目標時程若是以今天為終點，研究者是很容易傾向從結果倒推出歷史歷程。史料浩如煙海，史學家總能找到某些事實，清楚明確地解釋事物的成因。但這種推論往往遭後來的史實所推翻，要不就是完全無法解釋為什麼處境類似的其他國家或經濟體會有不同的結局。
以上這段表述我很欣賞。因為自己也讀過不少史學方面的雜書，常常覺得某些著作講得言之鑿鑿，洋洋灑灑撈了一大堆資料建立自洽的理論。但若以每位作者的「心態健康」而言，卻出現了南轅北轍的風格。比如前幾個月讀的《國家為什麼會失敗》與目前還在手上的《殺戮與文化》，差不多都是「先設定好要褒此貶彼」，然後再找能夠配合的史料搭湊進來罷了。而這本《國家的命運好好玩》的作者，心態便顯得較為健康，對於各種可以用來分析的因素，大多都能平等與開放來看待其正面或反面的支持與駁斥的角度，而非一味地簡化出扁平的「正邪對立」的結果。
坊間最常見到的西方中心論者對國家貧富的比較觀點，通常都是︰
西方有基督教信仰，新教倫理鼓勵奮鬥，人們將民主視為理想。東方是佛教儒教信仰，習慣逆來順受，人民願意接受獨裁腐敗統治。
但本書作者卻認為，根本沒這回事。即使是宗教信仰的刻板印象，作者也認為韋伯的新教倫理在其發表的當年與其後的世界發展來看，根本站不住腳；至於各種東方佛教或伊斯蘭文化之下的人們，為了賺錢與求得更完善生活所付出的努力，完全不亞於歐洲無端自豪的新教倫理。換句話說，拿文化或宗教信仰的比較來判定國家與經濟體的發展好壞，完全是假的命題。至於貪腐的問題，作者不僅拿東印度公司時代英國政治圈的賣官鬻爵來作反例，甚至還以二戰後同一時代的印尼與坦尚尼亞領導人的對比，來論證這項因素對發展所佔的重要性高低。作者甚至以改革開放後的中國作例子，若貪腐是固定且可預期的，其性質也與高稅率的國家收稅差不了多少。
這本書的立論主旨，是建立在「自由貿易」的經濟上的。當然這種理想，在歷史上卻不見得能夠符合當代的��治氣氛。作者舉出英國的棉紡織業，在數百年來由主張閉鎖保護、到暢議全面開放、最後再回到閉鎖保護的奇妙循環，以及越南輸入美國的鮭魚不能叫鮭魚，美國與歐盟對於農業補貼政策的不當，在在都顯示出要與真實世界的政治妥協的各種現象。至於埃及從「小麥輸出國」轉變成為「小麥輸入國」，作者覺得這才是最符合地球資源（水資源）分配的合理作法；所謂的「糧食自給」信仰，作者並不認同。然而，作者在最後也認為，沒有哪一套方法是可以一體適用的，因為每個國家各自繼承了不同的文化歷史，與其硬生生地照搬套用，不如由既有條件加以改變。
很好看的一本書。由經濟史來著手，有許多觀點都值得讓人細細深索。
本書在〈序言〉中提到作者亞倫比場的作學問態度︰經濟史很容易陷入宿命論的窠臼，一項研究的目標時程若是以今天為終點，研究者是很容易傾向從結果倒推出歷史歷程。史料浩如煙海，史學家總能找到某些事實，清楚明確地解釋事物的成因。但這種推論往往遭後來的史實所推翻，要不就是完全無法解釋為什麼處境類似的其他國家或經濟體會有不同的結局。
以上這段表述我很欣賞。因為自己也讀過不少史學方面的雜書，常常覺得某些著作講得言之鑿鑿，洋洋灑灑撈了一大堆資料建立自洽的理論。但若以每位作者的「心態健康」而言，卻出現了南轅北轍的風格。比如前幾個月讀的《國家為什麼會失敗》與目前還在手上的《殺戮與文化》，差不多都是「先設定好要褒此貶彼」，然後再找能夠配合的史料搭湊進來罷了。而這本《國家的命運好好玩》的作者，心態便顯得較為健康，對於各種可以用來分析的因素，大多都能平等與開放來看待其正面或反面的支持與駁斥的角度，而非一味地簡化出扁平的「正邪對立」的結果。
坊間最常見到的西方中心論者對國家貧富的比較觀點，通常都是︰
西方有基督教信仰，新教倫理鼓勵奮鬥，人們將民主視為理想。東方是佛教儒教信仰，習慣逆來順受，人民願意接受獨裁腐敗統治。
但本書作者卻認為，根本沒這回事。即使是宗教信仰的刻板印象，作者也認為韋伯的新教倫理在其發表的當年與其後的世界發展來看，根本站不住腳；至於各種東方佛教或伊斯蘭文化之下的人們，為了賺錢與求得更完善生活所付出的努力，完全不亞於歐洲無端自豪的新教倫理。換句話說，拿文化或宗教信仰的比較來判定國家與經濟體的發展好壞，完全是假的命題。至於貪腐的問題，作者不僅拿東印度公司時代英國政治圈的賣官鬻爵來作反例，甚至還以二戰後同一時代的印尼與坦尚尼亞領導人的對比，來論證這項因素對發展所佔的重要性高低。作者甚至以改革開放後的中國作例子，若貪腐是固定且可預期的，其性質也與高稅率的國家收稅差不了多少。
這本書的立論主旨，是建立在「自由貿易」的經濟上的。當然這種理想，在歷史上卻不見得能夠符合當代的��治氣氛。作者舉出英國的棉紡織業，在數百年來由主張閉鎖保護、到暢議全面開放、最後再回到閉鎖保護的奇妙循環，以及越南輸入美國的鮭魚不能叫鮭魚，美國與歐盟對於農業補貼政策的不當，在在都顯示出要與真實世界的政治妥協的各種現象。至於埃及從「小麥輸出國」轉變成為「小麥輸入國」，作者覺得這才是最符合地球資源（水資源）分配的合理作法；所謂的「糧食自給」信仰，作者並不認同。然而，作者在最後也認為，沒有哪一套方法是可以一體適用的，因為每個國家各自繼承了不同的文化歷史，與其硬生生地照搬套用，不如由既有條件加以改變。
很好看的一本書。由經濟史來著手，有許多觀點都值得讓人細細深索。
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June 26, 2023The book is dense and fast-moving and given my unfamiliarity with economics, it felt an abusive lecturing rather than a transformative learning experience. This may also be the reason why I found it difficult to argue with any of his points. Like I may challenge the logic sometimes but so much is built on evidence and knowledge that I am not familiar with and so feel as though I have to take everything as truth. I would rather see a direct criticism to this man's points right alongside. That would be the more interesting and more importantly the more educational book.
Regardless of my ineptitude, this was thoroughly engaging for how fast-moving and broad sweeping it was. It addressed all the big topics without fear of confrontation and that’s incredibly valuable even if only to understand the so-called neo-liberal position Goodread reviews lead me to believe the author propagates.
Regardless of my ineptitude, this was thoroughly engaging for how fast-moving and broad sweeping it was. It addressed all the big topics without fear of confrontation and that’s incredibly valuable even if only to understand the so-called neo-liberal position Goodread reviews lead me to believe the author propagates.
September 16, 2024
This book offers a captivating exploration of why some countries flourish while others falter, showing that the current world economic landscape is largely shaped by globalization. Beattie argues that success isn't determined by geography or natural resources, but by the policies nations choose. Some countries have embraced globalization and reaped the benefits, while others have closed themselves off and faced economic hardship. Through compelling historical examples, Beattie demonstrates that it’s never too late for nations to adapt and change, and that we should never view economic outcomes as inevitable.
May 31, 2017
An introduction into the study of the intersection between history and economics. How rationality of human beings become very much affected by the path dependence nature of society.
Historical context matters very much in evaluating the rationale for different choices made by governments. Not taking these nuances into account when evaluating the present choices of a county would be oversight on the critic's part.
Historical context matters very much in evaluating the rationale for different choices made by governments. Not taking these nuances into account when evaluating the present choices of a county would be oversight on the critic's part.
April 4, 2018
Not a great book but at the same time not a bad book as well. Basically a book on the evolution of world economy and what did each country do to reach where they are today. Events that could impact the economy and the measures done by each country seems to be very interesting. However, this book only paints an overall picture of all the events and this is not a detailed analysis of any particular concept.
November 8, 2022
I was fooled by the subtitle--good saleswork, Viking. This isn't an economic history of the world at all; it's a few essays on vaguely linked topics that, at worst, want to absolve bad people and bad policies in the rich world for the economic suffering of people the poor world. If only the global south would make wiser policy decisions, everything would be okay! Beattie's heart is in the right place, but I don't think the same can be said for his arguments.
November 6, 2020
A great book! I literally couldn't put this book down. The analysis and historical insights are deep and well-researched. You may not agree with the author's points of view but you'll definitely respect them. Highly recommended for those looking for challenging discussions and fresh insight into the economic and social imperatives of nations and governments.
May 14, 2022
Grundsätzlich ein sehr interessantes Thema mit vielen guten Parts. Mir hat der Schreibstil oft nicht so gut gefallen, weil nicht präszise und deutlich genug. Liegt vielleicht auch daran, dass mein Englisch einfach nicht gut genug ist für das Niveau.
Teilweise fand ich es aber sehr einleuchtend und interessant, aber dafür manchmal auch nicht so überzeugend.
Teilweise fand ich es aber sehr einleuchtend und interessant, aber dafür manchmal auch nicht so überzeugend.
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