Carroll writes this book as an interested journalist but also as the son of General Joseph Carroll, the founding father of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Gen. Carroll had a birds-eye view of the Vietnam War and saw the lies up close, himself being charge of overseeing the intelligence that Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara saw. He may have provided some source material for his son in chronicling the internally contradictory McNamara, who ramped up the war and was replaced by Johnson when he began to publicly renounce his own strategy of mass-bombing. The author writes that Gen. Carroll was demoted and fired in 1969 because he had refused to sign off on the inflated Soviet missile counts, the "missile gap," that Congress and President Nixon were using to justify an anti-ballistic missile program. Gen. Carroll had an up-close look at Richard Nixon's "Madman" strategy of bringing US nuclear forces to alert three times to attempt to frighten the Soviets into thinking he might actually start a war (the Soviets, writes Carroll, never brought their forces to alert). All this was enough to sour the General and Carroll uses such examples to show the impending danger to the world of a superpower's unchecked military might. (I listened to this book about the same time Ken Burns' Vietnam documentary aired, which focused heavily on the lies the government told or information it withheld from the public; I found the works complementary.)
This book is also partly about the younger and elder Carroll's relationship. The military man could not understand his son's foray into the Catholic Priesthood. The General's son is a self-proclaimed 'peacenik' who gives the benefit of the doubt to the Soviets on several occassions (like the Nixon example above). So, an unrequited relationship between father and son exist in the background of this book and in the emotion of the author. Carroll is trying to be a voice of morality, pushing back on what he sees are false narratives and choices about military action. It's not clear that Carroll would ever subscribe to a theory of a "just war." Michael Tomasky penned a mostly favorable review of this book and wrote "one can't help wishing at the same time that Carroll were a little less sure of the righteousness of his (belief system)." I agree.
The Pentagon was commissioned on September 11, 1945, a day and month that have obviously ominous connections to future Pentagon history. The current State Department building was originally intended for what the Pentagon eventually became, but once Pearl Harbor happened it became clear that something bigger was needed-- and Leslie R. Groves, who built the place, made it even larger than FDR had wanted. Leslie Groves went from building to the Pentagon to being a driving force behind the Manhattan Project and building the atomic bomb. The author walked the halls of the "nation's sacred temple" as a toddler while his dad worked there. He credits Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower, for seeing and warning other of the rise of the Pentagon. But those who were involved in shaping WWII and post-war policy both saw its dangers while they contributed to its rise. Some, like James Forrestal (and perhaps McNamara to a lesser extent), went insane.
The push by Churchill and FDR for unconditional surrender of the Axis powers likely led to a worsening of the war and a dramatic increase in casualties, argues Carroll. Malcolm Gladwell (podcast) and various military analysts and historians have pointed out some of the faulty logic of Churchill and others who wanted to bomb civilian centers to scare the public into hastening and end to the war. These were emotional decisions, not rational ones. Studies have since found that it would have been much more effective at hastening the end of the war to solely focus on munitions factories and other key military targets. But perhaps the memory of WWI trench warfare had instilled a fear in the Allies of unbreakable stalemates. Carroll notes that the fire bombings and Hamburg and Dresden would have been war crimes if they were done by ground troops instead of from the air. Similarly, Curtis LeMay ran incindiary raids in China and Japan. Carroll writes that Robert McNamara, who worked for LeMay at the time, now admits that the Tokyo bombing was a "war crime." Furthermore, Truman and others likely wanted to drop an atomic bomb to send a message to Moscow as much as the Japanese. Leslie Groves reportedly wanted Kyoto on the target list to maximize civilian casualties, and Truman helped quell the thirst for blood and revenge.
After the war, Congress passed the National Security Act and the joint forces would now be housed at the Pentagon and under one authority. Policy preferences across government, however, were divided. Stimson forsaw that the Russians would eventually get the atomic bomb and believed we needed a pre-emptive treaty to share information and build trust. He allegedly wanted to save society from a nuclear holocaust; maybe he regretted what he had earlier set in motion. Forrestal and others, however, wanted war with the Soviets. Stimson resigned, and policy eventually settled into harder facets of the Cold War. While Carroll acknowledges that 20 million would die under Stalin's purges as the USSR's conditioned worsened, he does little to acknowledge the Soviet's systems crimes, as well as the treachery felt by formerly free people like the Poles who were now under brutal Soviet occupation thanks to the agreement with FDR. He notes George Kennan's long telegram, which basically said negotiating with the USSR was pointless. Carroll takes a contrary position and finds that Kennan's view was flawed. Militarism would win the day, however. Forrestal (and his wife) became increasingly dangerously paranoid (schizophrenic?) and eventually committed suicide.
One major turning point in US history was the infamous NSC-68 in 1950, which made "us versus them" America's official national security policy. The Truman Doctrine basically adopted George Kennan's viewpoint and looked to halt any further Soviet expansion and to roll it back where possible. Korea was the first test as Truman decided it waas ultimately a war against the USSR. Early on, he stated that atomic bomb use was on the table. From declassified Soviet archives we now know that Stalin was willing to accept US dominance on the Korean peninsula, fearing that a US military setback there meant the US would start dropping A-bombs to achieve victory. Had Truman actually authorized use of atomic weaponry, it certainly would have loosened the taboo against such usage. One moral of Carrol's story is that normalization of military actions, armament buildups, leads to bad consequences. I have not read anything Carrol has read recently, but I imagine 2016-2017 has been a horrifying period for him given that the Pentagon is now overtly less transparent about troop totals in various countries and Republican presidential candidates stated they were opened to using nuclear weapons in the Middle East. In the end, it would be Eisenhower and Sec. of State John Foster Dulles' policy of brinkmanship that would enforce the Korean armistice.
Meanwhile, Allen Dulles' young CIA was carrying out Eisenhower-sanctioned black ops away from the public scrutiny, unlike the US military. (The author does not mention CIA-led operations, coups, etc. under Eisenhower as chronicled in Stephen Kinzer's book The Brothers.) Ike's policies and statements were sometimes contradictory. The CIA and Pentagon were quite convinced there was a missile gap, that the USSR was achieving a hidden dominance in missiles. Eisenhower pushed the National Defense Education Act of 1958 to help stem the gap. This fear drove the U-2 program. But Eisenhower also wanted a lasting peace. Ike was very close to having a serious peace summit with Kruschev when the Soviets shot down an American U-2 over Central Asia that set relations back (see Bridge of Spies). During this period, General Carroll was in charge of running what would now be known as "red team" operations against US airbases to test their vulnerability. He found they were incredibly vulnerable to penetration. This led to the US decision to have 1/3 of the nuclear bomber fleet in the air at all times, away from the airfield and able to attack if disabled.
According to Carroll, when President Kennedy took office, Robert McNamara discovered that the missle gap was a myth. The CIA had discovered that the USSR only had four ICBMs, located at one base which could easily be targeted, and all of their strategic bombers could easily be destroyed at their bases as well-- the US was far superior. Perversely, that led to Pentagon logic that the USSR would strike first because the USSR knew of its vulnerability, and likely knew that the US knew. This leads only to excuse for more buildup. The post-war housing and Korean war defense spending booms had helped boost the economy and weaponized Keynesianism basically became a practice (the author doesn't use the term, I am). Kennedy lost all trust in the CIA after the Bay of Pigs and saw the danger of the military complex during the Cuban Missle Crisis; Curtis LeMay was basically insubordinate as Kennedy pushed back from the brink. Kennedy is somewhat of a hero of Carroll's and Carroll overlooks plenty of Kennedy's flaws (see Dylan Matthews' argument that he is one of the worst presidents ever) because Kennedy called for peace and disarmament. He is apparently ignorant of the many ways in which Kennedy deceived the American public about American troop levels and actions in Vietnam (again, see Ken Burns' documentary). Kennedy increased arm sales, according to Carroll, because he knew that would appease Congress. The author's dad was head of the Defense Intelligence Agency at this time and perhaps it is a personally happy period of memory for him that clouds his judgment.
Paul Nitze is also a player in the book, operating in the background crafting US defense policy; he was LBJ's Secretary of the Navy, and Deputy Secretary of Defense. Carroll chronicles the Vietnam war buildup and McNamara's push for data, troop increases, and bombing, and then the later public apparent recanting of his policies (see above). In the end, McNamara was put over the World Bank and the author's father was demoted. Perhaps most scary are the Nixon years, when he began secretly bombing Cambodia and further escalating the loss of human life. Nixon's "madman" ploy apparently brought the USSR to the SALT negotiations, but a drunken Nixon would sometimes give orders that Secretary of Defense Schlesinger had to intercept. Another moral of the story is that once the powder keg is built, bad things will happen if you put someone crazy enough to light a match in charge of it.
President Carter, of course, is the nuclear submariner who wanted to reduce nuclear arms and canceled the B-1 bomber program. But Paul Nitze "drove the opposition," according to the author. SALT-II was watered down and never ratified. Carroll is quite critical of Carter's action not living up to his lofty rhetoric and reputation-- Carter expanded the list of nuclear targets, initiated what would eventually be Reagan's SDI, and funded the covert war in Afghanistan. He does not get the same benefit of the doubt of placating Congress that the author gives Kennedy.
President Reagan initially took the mantle of Barry Goldwater and pushed for a defense build-up and madman-style rhetoric before eventually pushing for arms reduction and talks with Gorbechev. But Carroll does not follow the traditional narrative, he does not credit SDI and the USSR's balking at the cost of massive additional defense spending with bankrupting the Soviet Union (that's fine, a lot of other factors were involved). He credits Gorbechev with ending the Cold War and actually writes that Gorbechev rescued Reagan by helping him out in public relations at a time when the arms-for-hostages scandal was coming to public light and damaging Reagan's poll numbers. In the end, it's the Pentagon that missed Gorbechev's signals and maintained its vast overestimation of USSR capability. Brent Scowcroft, Condoleeza Rice, and other supposed experts never forsaw the fall of the Berlin Wall-- in their minds, the USSR was too strong to imagine it.
Unfortunately, the author misses philosophical arguments about what a superpower does when its enemy no longer exists. (ie: read ancient Polybius' take that Roman morals declined after their mortal enemy Carthage was finally destroyed.) The 1991 Gulf War was simply using the tools that the military-industrial complex had made. Carroll claims that, like racial integration before, gay rights are the perpetual enemy of the Pentagon. He notes that we still spend at Cold War levels. We are still pushing anti-ballistic missile defense, and every President promises additional buildups. He holds special ire for Paul Wolfowitz and the neocons, who formulated the doctrine to maintain nuclear arms and global military dominance, and pushed a doctrine of pre-emptive war. Carroll writes that President Clinton was simply complicit, oiling the way for Bush-Cheney in 2000. Of course, all of the trillions spent on defense proved useless on September 11, 2001. And now we spend trillions more as a result, in far-away lands against enemies without countries. (This book was published in 2006, during some of the low points of the Iraq war before "the surge.") The author aims to push back against what he sees are what the majority believes and says (like the "missile gap" that many still believe exists). "My father and his cohort were neither religious nor political fundamentalists. Their successors may be both. Beware the House of War when understood as the House of God." The nation's military is essentially impossible to rein in and we are all endangered. The audio version of the book has a brief interview with the author. Three stars.