When Liddell Hart's Sherman was first published in 1929, it received encomiums such as these:
"A masterly performance . . . one of the most thorougly dignified, one of the most distinguished biographies of the year." -- Henry Steele Commager, New York Herald Tribune
"It is not often that one comes upon a biography that is so well done as this book. Nearly every page bears evidence of the fact that it is the product of painstaking and exhaustive research, mature thought, and an expert understanding of the subject in hand . . ." -- Saturday Review of Literature
This classic biography is important in three ways. First, it is simply an excellent portrayal of a great man's life. Second, it is a powerful corrective to the unfair popular perspectives on Sherman that are often taught at the high-school level. And third, it marks the beginning of BH Liddell's developing ideas on strategic concepts like proceeding along the line of least expectation and maintaining flexibility of options. Terrific biography, one of the best I've read.
Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American by B. H. Liddell Hart ⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️✨ (4.5 stars)
This monumental biography of General William Tecumseh Sherman, written in 1929 by the great English military historian Sir B. H. Liddell Hart, has aged remarkably well. Even though it’s nearly a century old, it still feels fresh and modern in many ways. Liddell Hart brings his trademark rigor and clarity, and while some passages show the limitations of the time—particularly in his outdated views on race and Lincoln—the book remains a groundbreaking and essential work.
This was my second Sherman biography, and I came away even more convinced that Sherman was one of the great tacticians of the Civil War. If Lincoln and Stanton had taken the “training wheels” off sooner, the war might have ended earlier. Sherman’s “total war” approach remains controversial—his devastating campaigns against the Confederacy and later against Native Americans are still debated with both admiration and revulsion—but one thing is certain: he always got the job done.
What fascinated me most was the extensive use of primary sources, especially letters between Sherman and Grant. They lend immediacy and authenticity to Liddell Hart’s portrait. I also hadn’t realized the degree to which Sherman was involved in the planning of the transcontinental railroad—an extraordinary detail that broadened my understanding of his impact beyond the battlefield.
That said, the book is long-winded at times, and as a product of its era, some of the author’s interpretations feel dated. But reading through this “monster” of a biography was worth every minute—I came away with new insights and deeper respect for both Sherman and the historian tackling his life.
As someone who already admires Liddell Hart’s Scipio Africanus: Greater Than Napoleon—still one of my favorite Roman history books—I wasn’t surprised by the depth and energy he brought here. This book solidifies his reputation as a historian who could take on giants, whether Roman or American, and make them live on the page. On a side note- I scored a first America edition of the book from Abraham Lincoln Bookstore in Chicago. If you are a history buff, it’s a great place to visit!
"Sherman" was really a pleasure to read; Liddell Hart highlights a controversial and fascinating general with perspicacity and brevity. He paints Sherman as one often considered belligerent, pugnacious and wild; yet in reality he was logical, measured, and when needed, forceful.
Perhaps the most prescient general of the war, Sherman and his titular march are rightly legendary. Liddell Hart charts Sherman's evolution of thought leading to that fateful course, while inserting some of his own strategic theories. That military background however allows Liddell Hart to do an excellent job of explaining not just what happened but why the respective parties made the decisions they did, none more clearly than Sherman.
A cynic of politicians and journalists alike, loyal to an absolute point, Sherman is truly a fascinating character and this is a worthy portrayal.
Not nearly as good as his later works, though I guess the "indirect" approach repeated over and over in Strategy was maybe first hinted at here.
Surprisingly positive view of Hood, everything else I've ever read has him as a grade A scumbag for the smear campaign he ran to get Johnston's job, followed up with the idiocy of attacking an entrenched Thomas. This is not BLH's view: He seemed to think part of the reason Sherman cut loose and lived off the land because Sherman felt Hood was too unpredictable to catch.
Also a surprisingly harsh view of Southern cavalry, particularly that under the command of Wheeler. They were apparently just about indistinguishable in the destruction they left behind them from their Yankee counterparts, and this all in the deep South. So much for that "Southron Honor" garbage, assuming BLH is correct.
Lee was a complete nonentity in this work, which actually makes a great deal of sense given that Lee was a master tactician and a moronic grand strategist, who seemingly couldn't see beyond the borders of Virginia. At least that's the view I've formed of him.
Quite a bit of the book veered toward Hagiography, BLH was very quick to excuse Sherman for "making Georgia howl," and the pages and pages of Sherman's humility re: taking a rank equal to Grant? Maybe it was that way, maybe it wasn't. I don't think BLH proved his case there, but for the personality of the Sherman he drew this wouldn't have been completely out of character.
It's not easy to find a hero. Most are flawed. But Sherman is the man.
The book was a real page-turner for me and has become a favourite. I had the book for a while now, but was wary of reading it ... worried that I might start a book and not finish it because I might be bored and get lost in the details. I read it with some Civil War maps from Wikipedia. I usually read a few books at the same time, but this book totally consumed me.
In finishing the book, I have found for myself someone that I can really learn from when it comes to humility, moderation and strategy. If you read about him from the Wikipedia pages, you are going to misunderstand him as his contemporaries did. Read the book and understand his motivation. As Liddell Hart pointed out, the significance of his leadership is more obvious after World War 1 where the war did not produce a second Sherman.
Liddell Hart is an incredible military theorist and historian, however his work on Sherman, “the master grand strategist of our Civil War,” was a tough one to get through. It felt slightly biased and overly grandiose while bogged down in the tactical minutia. Yet, this was certainly a classic nonetheless. While his theory on maneuver warfare was grounded in historic data, it was suspect of true objectivity and applicability since Hart’s experience with the Great War shaded much of this synthesis.
Overall, I finished the book more in love with Sherman although I felt this was one that I’ll find more enjoyment in saying I’ve read vs the actual experience of reading it.
Some of my favorite quotes:
“Because of this realism, he saw war as an instrument of policy rather than as an impassioned drama or glorious adventure.”
“Reason has very little influence in this world: prejudice governs” - Sherman
“I have seen enough of war not to be caught by its first glittering bait, and when I engage in this it must be with a full consciousness of its real character.” - Sherman
“The whole secret of the art of war lies in being master of the communications” - Napoleon
“The longest way around is often the shortest way there … ‘lines of expectation’ … to move along the natural line of expectation is to consolidate the opponent’s equilibrium, and by stiffening it to augment his resisting power … for even if at the outset successful, it rolls the enemy back in snowball fashion, towards his reserves, supplies and reinforcement.” (Huge implication for Taiwan 🇹🇼 🇨🇳 fight!)
“He was more and more developing a logical ruthlessness, which was fostered by his increasingly acute sense that the issue of the struggle rested in the wills of the Southern people and not in the bodies of their troops … the land must be purified by fire.”
“I would make this war as severe as possible, and show no symptoms of tiring till the South begs for mercy … they have sowed the wind and must reap the whirlwind.” - Sherman
“I propose to remove all the inhabitants of Atlanta… if the people raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty I will answer that war is war, and not popularity seeking. If they want us to leave they and their relatives must stop war.” - Sherman
“The Atlanta Campaign had brought Sherman’s strategical mind to maturity, deepening his grasp of the truths of the way to success is strategically along the line of least expectation, and tactically along the line of least resistance, and that the general can best achieve the coincidence of the two by taking a line which provides a duality of objective- so that he has the baffling and unnerving power of being able to ‘sell the dummy’ to his opponent, or, as Sherman put it, has his opponent on the horns of a dilemma.”
“Instead of being on the defensive, I would be on the offensive, instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would have to guess at my plans.” - Sherman (best summary of Sherman’s theory of warfare)
“I have been with General Grant in the midst of death and slaughter … and yet I never saw him more troubled than since he has been in Washington.” - Sherman
“I have destroyed the enemy merely by marching.” - Sherman … “The greatest strategic circle in military history … the granary of the south had been ransacked, the Confederacy deprived of its essential resources- not only corn, but cotton, cattle, horses and mules; and 265 miles of railroad had been destroyed. Sherman calculated the damage in dollar values at $100,000,000 but more the moral damage of having pierced the heart of the South.”
“The purpose of strategy is to minimize fighting and that it fulfills this purpose by playing on the mind of the opponent so as to disturb and then to upset his balance of mind … unexpectedness and mobility are the master-keys of generalship.”
“Sherman perceived that the resisting power of a modern democracy depends more on the strength of the popular will than on the strength of its armies, and that this will in turn depends largely upon economic and social security.”
“As that war (American Civil War) was the first modern war, so was Sherman the first modern general. That war (WW1) did not produce a second Sherman. Nor did the armistice.”
Because the author is British his focus is more on the person, Sherman, than the war. Plus I can tell the author likes his subject, it makes for more pleasant reading. I'm listening to the audiobook, but I also ordered a used copy in hardcover from 1929 because there is so much in it I want to be able to refer to it for years to come.
Very often I am plagued by the question of whether I have enjoyed a work of biography because I liked the subject or because the quality of the writing was excellent leading me to like the subject. In this case, I have no doubt: I loved both. BH Liddell Hart was a professional soldier and also an extraordinary writer. William Tecumseh Sherman was the best grand strategist either side of the Civil War produced and the second most able tactical commander after Lee. It's no exaggeration to say that his decisions, more than those of any other Union commander, won the war unless one counts Grant's support of those decisions and his judgement of character to trust Sherman.
Sherman was orphaned at an early age and was adopted into a political family in Ohio who were friends of his parents. His adoptive father was a Senator as was his adoptive brother and he eventually married his adoptive sister. So Sherman got an early view into the political milieu of the Republic and this gave him a very realistic understanding of the country. His early military career saw him posted to several points in the South and wherever he was posted he took an interest in the local country and the views of the local citizens. He was a very spartan and practical man but he also had both a deep empathy for the feelings of his fellow man and a keen eye for the realities that underlay many delusions.
He also understood both the utility and the economy of Force. When he was posted to California after the Mexican War when a group suggested he join an unarmed attack on a group of determined, and armed, vigilantes he declined knowing that good will backed by insufficient force is worse than useless because it undermines the principle on which the good will was based in the first place. He had a mediocre career as a banker and in 1859, found himself as the dean of a military school in Louisiana training the officers who would some day oppose him. In a bizarre twist of fate, he was offered a position by a New York bank during this period to set up their operations in London. Future confederate commanders Bragg and Beauregard convinced him to stay and finish out his task which had the effect of destroying the Confederacy because the deal was for a multi-year contract which Sherman would have completed.
His residence in Louisiana during the 1860 election and the rush to secession put him in a unique position. With family members in Congress he tried, unsuccessfully, to explain to secessionists employing him that the North would never accept the dissolution of the union nor the continuation of slavery. When secession made his role untenable he came North and tried to re-enlist in the Army but was offered a desk job rather than a combat command and so declined. All the while, he tried to use his experience in the South to explain to the North just what they were getting into, that the war would not be quick and that the commitment of the Confederacy to the cause was total. As in the South, in the North his knowledge was discounted and his advice ignored.
His combat career began as a commander at Bull Run at which his personal conduct was exemplary though neither his unit nor the Union Army covered itself in glory. He was then transferred to the Western theater and assigned to help build up the state militias that were being federalized and would wage the war in the west. As Grant began to increase in aggression, Sherman got more opportunity for action and rose in stature. At Shiloh, Sherman was significantly more adept at handling his tasks than Grant but appreciated having an honest in introspective commander and the two men worked well together to the end of the War.
Sherman commanded detachments in a number of abortive assaults on Vicksburg and also contributed to the tactical and strategic decisions that led to the successful siege. In the wake of that battle, rather than take leave, he brought his family down from Ohio to Mississippi and while there his 9 year old son caught yellow fever and died. Liddell-Hart makes much of this and its effect of driving Sherman deeper into himself and making him more coldly rational but I wonder whether a more psychological interpretation of this might not be helpful because it was immediately after this that Sherman embarked on the campaign that made him famous and more or less destroyed the Confederacy.
"Sherman's march to the Sea" was really three phases. The first was a stunning series of turning motions against the larger and better supplied army of Johnston standing between him and Atlanta. Throughout the campaign the only frontal battle that occurred was Kennesaw Mountain, a setback for Sherman, and the rest of it was a series of armed probes that made each of Johnstons strong lines untenable while at the same time preventing Johnston from being able to mass for an attack on him. Eventually Johnston was replaced by Hood who was no match for Sherman at all and whose errors led to the fall and ultimately the destruction of Atlanta.
Then began the "March to the Sea" whose main objective and accomplishment was to destroy the morale of the South by proving to one and all that the press was lying to the people of the Confederacy about the success of their armies and demonstrating its incapacity to secure them. The third and final phase was the march through the Carolinas which has the effect of destroying the capacity of the South to supply Lee's army facing Grant and so led to the collapse of the Virginia front, the capture of Richmond and the end of the Confederacy.
Sherman then negotiated a controversial end to hostilities more generally which generated some controversy. Andrew Johnson and Stanton rejected his terms and ordered him to renew hostilities against Johnston, which he did, at which point Johnston surrendered again and when Johnson and Stanton permitted another commander to attempt to destroy the remnants of the army Sherman darkly hinted that he would use his own forces against those that sought to break the surrender he had accepted. Sherman knew from his experience in the South, on account of his systematically destroying it, that the will of the South had been broken and that a lenient piece with the whole of the Confederate Army was the surest way to prevent resistance to reconstruction but that a forceful peace and an attempt to run down and destroy the remaining Confederate units would simply create an insurgency which would take forever to put down. In the end a middle course was taken and the birth of the Klan and Jim Crow was the result.
After the war Sherman spent the rest of his life in a senior post in the Army but with little actual power within it. He resisted all efforts to politicize him or to use his name for one cause or another. His efforts to make Reconstruction more productive and the fruits of the victory more lasting were rejected as were his attempts to treat the Indians fairly in the west and he quickly realized that his involvement was simply lending his prestige to bad actors and to overpower them he would have to engage in a form of political combat to which he knew his honest bearing was unsuited. At his death Johnston, the man that Sherman had broken more than once and whose honor he had nearly mutinied to defend, was one of his pallbearers.
Liddell-Hart's book is outstanding. The character of Sherman is made manifest on every page, and his tactical and strategic genius are illuminated clearly and efficiently by a man who studied both his whole life and from his own experience knew the hazards of combat and command. I read this as an e-book and I would suggest doing so with campaign maps of both the siege of Vicksburg and the Nashville-Atlanta campaign near to hand as the authors command of geography and maneuver can be difficult to follow without a map. But the main thrust of the book and the real joy of it, is the portrait of a realist idealist, kind of a unique American type, and one I hope to emulate.
When you think about the men behind the Civil War, who comes to mind? The average American would probably say Lincoln, Grant, and General Lee. Two were presidents, and one is posthumously famous for leading the Confederacy and for the orange car from the television show. What about William Sherman? Who is he and why has his name been obscured by the passage of time? William Tecumseh Sherman was the General directly subordinate to General Grant and is the orchestrator behind some of the most impressive victories from the war including the campaign against Atlanta, the march through Georgia, and the final sweep through the Carolinas which effectively won the war for the North.
It is curious that those great figures of history most worth remembering are often forgotten, while those we do remember are frequently less deserving of our posthumous praise and attention. For William Sherman, this was as much to his own personal desires as it was to history’s course of remembrance. In his book, Hart records Sherman’s preference to remain anonymous: “I deeply regret that I am threatened with that curse to all peace and comfort—popularity.” This sentiment remained, despite his continuous rise in the military, culminating with the prestigious rank of Major General—with a 14-year post-war stint as Commander General of the entire U.S. Army. Despite these lofty laurels, Sherman is one of the few historical figures that can be found to have actively abstained from letting his ego carry him into unwanted territories. After the conclusion of the war, he was pressured for years to enter the world of politics, and maybe even run for the office of president, but he steadfastly refused. “Why should I at sixty-five years of age, with a reasonable provision of life, not a dollar of debt, and with the universal respect of my neighbors and countrymen, embark in the questionable game of politics?” He was recorded as saying.
Why is he worth remembering? Because he was unrivaled at mobile warfare. He perfected the ‘indirect approach’ on the battlefield and would often confuse his enemies by approaching multiple objectives simultaneously. Sherman is most famous for his march through Georgia—a campaign in which he decidedly abandoned his lines of supply and communication and stormed through the heartland of the Confederacy on foot and horseback, effectively living off the land. He did the same in the Carolinas, leading over sixty thousand men across open land and into hostile territory. He struck directly at the hearts and minds of the southern people along the way and smashed their hopes (and a few of their barns) to bits. General George Patton himself spent time in Georgia prior to the Second World War studying Sherman’s tactics, including how he ‘stripped’ his soldiers of all essentials in order to increase mobility. He had an excellent mind for war and tactics and his resume proves it outright.
One aspect of this book that really hit me in the gut was Sherman’s diagnosis of the press and media of the times. They distorted events to devastating degree and seemed to create more anxiety and anger in the populace than was ever necessary. Sherman’s words, written in 1862, still ring with the hollow tones of truth. He describes members of the media as “the chief cause of this unhappy war. They fan the flame of local hatred and keep alive the prejudices which have forced friends into opposing hostile ranks.” Despite being on one side of the war, he was objective enough to clearly see how both the “North and South [keep] each radical class [of] its votaries filled with the most outrageous lies of the other.” I found this sentiment alarmingly true, as it could very easily have been written about the disconnect I see in my own country (the United States) today. Sherman was supremely aware of the media and politician’s ability to divide people’s hearts and minds. Hart echos Sherman when he writes that “prejudice governs. You and all who derive power from the people do not look for pure, unalloyed truth, but to that kind of truth which jumps with the prejudice of the day.” His prophetical words struck a major chord in my mind and it really made me ‘zoom out’ and try to view current events through the larger scope of one that examines history as a fluid whole. Past events have all the lessons to teach us about how to solve our current quandaries, if only we were more desirous to learn.
What I grew to admire most about Sherman was his astuteness of mind. He never bit off more than he could chew. He always keep his objectives in clear view and routed all available resources to its achievement. He was supremely accurate in his diagnosis of battle tactics including the physical movement of his troops and the psychology of his army as a whole. He had an incredible ability to think inside the mind of his opposition and discern his movements. He was always the first to reject a promotion if he felt himself unworthy, and was conscious of the ever-present need to sideline his ego in support of whatever he deemed best for the Union forces overall. Even after the world acclaimed him for his success, his humility still shined brightly, exemplified by quoted lines from his personal letters such as: “Like one who has walked a narrow plank, I look back and wonder if I really did it.” Although he was describing his march through the South, I think it more accurately describes his life overall, and I think it noble that he had the courage to walk.
This classic biography is important in three ways. First, it is simply an excellent portrayal of a great man's life. Second, it is a powerful corrective to the unfair popular perspectives on Sherman that are often taught at the high-school level. And third, it marks the beginning of BH Liddell's developing ideas on strategic concepts like proceeding along the line of least expectation and maintaining flexibility of options. Terrific biography, one of the best I've read. Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart (1895-1970) was an English soldier, military historian and leading inter-war theorist. This book was released in 1929 and I'm fortunate enough to have found a really good original edition.
There were two important features of this book that really stood out for me. First, the author was a British historian. I've found that nearly all American historians who write about the American Civil War have some degree of bias, whether it be for or against the North or the South. And, try as they might, that bias leaks through. The Civil War is perhaps the darkest moment in American history and although I like to read about how it affected the daily lives of all Americans and learn what they were thinking and doing, I want isolated components of the war to be presented without any filter. Secondly, the level of detail in this extraordinary biography is what makes history come alive for me.
This book is not for everyone, but with the domestic events of the past few years being what they were I became curious enough to want to learn how the heck did we get to this? Since General Sherman was a major figure in this war, it only made sense to find out more about him. Sherman" was really a pleasure to read; Liddell Hart highlights a controversial and fascinating general with perspicacity and brevity. He paints Sherman as one often considered belligerent, pugnacious and wild; yet in reality he was logical, measured, and when needed, forceful.
Perhaps the most prescient general of the war, Sherman and his titular march are rightly legendary. Liddell Hart charts Sherman's evolution of thought leading to that fateful course, while inserting some of his own strategic theories. That military background however allows Liddell Hart to do an excellent job of explaining not just what happened but why the respective parties made the decisions they did, none more clearly than Sherman.
A cynic of politicians and journalists alike, loyal to an absolute point, Sherman is truly a fascinating character and this is a worthy portrayal.
An inspiring biography of a brilliant general who devised new military strategy. Unlike Robert O’Connell’s biography, Liddell Hart concentrates on the details of battles, particularly the invasion from Chattanooga to Atlanta, through Georgia, to Savannah, up through Charleston into North Carolina. I was born in Atlanta, raised in Marietta and the battlefields round Kennesaw Mountain. I was soaked in the myth of Sherman’s March to the Sea. But in Hart’s book, I gained new and better knowledge concerning the Union Army’s expedition. I became a great fan of Sherman in O’Connell’s book which devotes a balanced amount to Sherman’s personal and professional life away from meticulous battle movements. Sherman is one of the most intriguing individuals I think our nation has ever produced. He certainly was one of the most influential of the U.S. Civil War. Hart sums him up in the last third of the Epilogue, which I would read first. He was a man in full, yet a man who could be paralyzed by doubts from bouts of depression. He reached the highest level in the Army and many urged him on election cycles to run for President. He forsook any political office. His closest ally was Ulysses S. Grant. He never got over the death of his son, nine-year-old son after a visit to him in the field. He was the favorite of the women at the balls and loved the theatre and opera. Yet he was disheveled and smoked cigars frequently in the field where he slept little, read newspapers, and wrote incessantly, often to his brother, John, a U.S. Senator, and Grant. I also now understand, I think, why people in the south clamor about the fifty mile wide swath of Sherman’s march to Savannah. It came from the strategy of diversion of using his flanks as diversions—keeping the Confederate Army unable to know wear his Army was aiming: East to Augusta, south to Pensacola, or to Savannah. I think I am right here. Nevertheless, Sherman, as Hart points out in the Epilogue, this strategy of movement rather than confronting, was the strategy Sherman adopted to win his march.
From Hart and O’Connell I have to appreciate this Devil of the South. Sherman is the quintessential American who rose to the occasion at the most dramatic time in our history. Myths are just what they are.
William Tecumseh Sherman and his men may have physically torn asunder the heart of the Confederacy by marching through Georgia and the Carolinas, but the general's mind and grand strategy has, perhaps more significantly, cut through military thought as the first instance of total war.
Liddell Hart, a renowned military historian and commentator, delivers a fine biography of Sherman. Though the language is stilted, and perhaps now a bit dated, and the battles are told in less-than-clear prose, Hart captures the man and what makes him so unique to military history, and why he was a godsend to the Union Army of the Civil War.
On from Chattanooga, Sherman devised a strategy of maneuvers and parries with his army that managed both to capture Atlanta and spare his army from the waterfalls of blood that poured forth from Grant's Overland campaign. After capturing Atlanta, though, Sherman devises something even more spectacular: a march to the sea that will physically despoil the South and psychologically impale it. Cutting off from communications, Sherman and his bummers bore into the heart of Georgia, making it howl quite loudly, though many times in fair and regulated fashion. Upon reaching the sea, Sherman carries forth the torch through South Carolina, laying waste to the farms and cities of those bold enough to declare independence in 1861.
Hart gets it exactly right in labeling Sherman one of the geniuses of the Civil War era. Unlike many, this man understood that the war would be long, brutal, make many men's lives short, and also that it was a war of peoples, not merely of armies. In understanding this, Sherman devised a way to strip the South of its political legitimacy and cripples its armies from a tactical standpoint.
Washington, Grant, Eisenhower, MacArthur - these names ring in our time as the leaders of great war efforts. Sherman, however, perhaps stands alone in not just participating in a victorious war effort, but in understanding and implementing a grand strategy that would define the modern age of warfare.
I'd been interested in Sherman since we visited St. Louis last summer and stopped by Sherman's grave. It was not very impressive, given his notoriety. Neither was William Clark's grave /monument (which was more elaborate) - St. Louis doesn't seem to have the funds to keep-up the cemeteries. The book is almost completely focused on Sherman's Civil War exploits. For example, everything later than the end of the war is found in the 'Epilogue' chapter (the last in the book). I'd like to take off a half a star because the maps in the book are pretty blurry and ought to be in color. Better maps would add to the book's 'readability', if you're trying to understand all the force movements described. The book appears to be a photocopy of the 1929 original; maybe folks back then knew their U. S. geography better. The author is interested in military strategy and tactics, and does his best to explain things, though his language is somewhat convoluted at times.
Hart's Sherman achieves both high highs and low lows. The best sections of the book come from Liddell Hart's analysis of big-picture military strategy, where he presents Sherman as a visionary of undermining the political will of the populace as a way to achieve military victory. Hart also analyzes people well—his psychological insights are compelling without becoming far-fetched. The lows arise in the parts where Hart delves into military minutiae. He assumes a sophisticated knowledge of southern geography (town names, rivers, etc.) and Civil War commanders (he neglects to introduce numerous generals and officers when they are mentioned). Despite some sections being a slog, it is definitely still worth reading.
The best parts of this book were the letters and writings by Sherman himself. So, oddly, I found Sherman's life in California and Louisiana before the war most interesting. What an articulate, insight writer! The author, Mr. Liddell Hart, had the elegant style of an English historian but there is only so much one can do with battle descriptions. Mr. Liddell Hart also seemed very negative on General Grant, reflecting old prejudices and also Hart's disagreement with his battle strategies. Liddell Hart wrote this books post World War I and was appalled at the stupidities in that war that caused millions of deaths.
This was well written and researched. However, I would've liked much more detail about Sherman's life after the war. BHLH is clearly interested in the war and Sherman's role, and rightfully so. Also, not surprising given that he was a soldier and military theorist. But, it seemed like lost interest after the war ended. The tail end of Sherman's life and career didn't get nearly the attention it deserved. This is particularly interesting when contrasted with Grant's post-war career so I was hoping for more detail.
I picked it up due to my reading of Ryan Holiday's "Ego is the Enemy", and I was expecting a more comprehensive biography of one of the most underrated figures of the Civil War.
This is a more in-depth look at the Civil War with a little bit of the before and after of Sherman's life. However, overall, it is a surprisingly engaging book that really delves into the mind of W.T. Sherman.
I listened to the audio of this book borrowed from the library. Very interesting and informative look at the military strategist and original thinker that was W.T. Sherman. Also, because this was written by a British writer, it was much more direct without the political considerations of the causes and execution of the Civil War taken into account.
This was actually a pretty good biography/analysis of Sherman's Civil War career, despite it being nearly a hundred years old at this point. The author was obviously influenced by the First World War when examining Sherman's career, tactics and motivations and it makes for an interesting and engaging look at Sherman. Still a relevant biography on an eminently interesting man.
Outstanding in understanding the General and the man behind the brutal campaign against the south , the march through Georgia and the Carolinas , highly recommend to students of history
4.5. Really good. WTS needs more reps for his stoic, pragmatic, essential role in American history. His march through Georgia and South Carolina were strategic masterstrokes, and this book tells why. Well written and interesting narrative by the author.
Useful book. Picks up quite a bit as it enters the better known war campaigns. Fairly light on anecdotes for a biography, however there is a great overarching picture of the controversies Sherman created particularly towards the end of the war.
Solid biography focused almost entirely on the war years. The approach is analytical and conceptual, which is a plus for me, but Hart is a little too insistent on turning Sherman into the modern military thinker sine qua non, which leads to him denigrating or minimizing others (like Grant) with similar strategic insights. There are some parts (like the discussion of reconstruction) that do not hold up well, but his analysis of the hard war policy and how it compared to other wars was ahead of its time
A good military biography, maybe not quite 4 stars. This was the man to meet the moment. I’d like to read something a little more recent (this was written before WWIi, in 1929 I think). This was heavy on the civil war, necessarily, but included some childhood and up to retirement in STL then NYC.
I had some trepidations before starting this book. It was written in 1926. How relevant would it be? Hart's treatise on Sherman stands the test of time. It's a excellent read. Sherman is a kick-ass, righteous dude. This author clearly thinks he's the class of the act of civil war generals. Sherman definitely had the vision of what it would take to vanquish the South (i.e., scorched earth policy). His background in the quartermaster corps gave him the insight to move large bodies of troops with limited supplies so as not to bog them down. In "Team of Rivals", I never picked up on the fact the Lincoln and his administration thought they were going to lose the 1864 election; because the country was losing heart while Grant bludgeoned his army against Lee in Virginia. then, Sherman captured Atlanta and Lincoln's re-election was assured. People generally recognize Lee's surrender to Grant at Appomattox as the end of the civil War, however, the south didn't capitulate until Johnston surrendered to Sherman several weeks later. Sherman's biggest concern was that by following Stanton's orders (in the aftermath of Lincoln's assassination), that Johnston's army would melt away and begin guerrilla actions. Sherman rightly knew that his would seriously mess up the reconstruction. Now, I need a book on Grant.