In a series of lectures transferred by Robert Dahl into essays, Dahl posits exactly what the model and implications of the US hybrid constitutional system actually is and shows that it does not, historically, balance democratic and minority rights. Dahl notices what many have noticed since the attempts to expand democracy into the Arab world have noticed, despite US's internal narrative about its democracy, it doesn't even impose its system on others: generally, when a state is made democratic by US intervention, it a given a parliamentary system or a presidential/parliamentary hybrid model.
While this does lay the cause, and makes particularly insightful comparisons to other stable and long-established democratic systems, it is not very deep in its analysis. The extremely disproportionate nature of the Senate and increased US urbanization make votes worth different amounts, the winner take-all nature of most states, and the Presidential conflation of head of government and head of state are well-known to those familiar with political science. Dahl does spell out the consequences of this fairly well with comparisons to other systems, and points out that in several models, the US is unique: it's neither a consensus and majoritarian system, but an awkward hybrid of both. There are flaws here though, while evidence is presented in support of Dahl's thesis, the traditional counter-arguments aren't articulated completely. While some of the Federalist arguments are deemed irrelevant (and in the case of Hamilton even a bit inaccurate), other modern arguments about inefficiently of national popular vote and the centralization of power in major areas with Presidential systems (see Mexico City) leading even more corruption than in our system remain unaddressed.
Dahl's critique of the supreme court is sound in many respects, but he does not deal the indirectly accountable through nomination by the President and approval of Congress. Nor does he deal with the crises of Latin American democracies with Presidential executives and weak-supreme courts because he 22 comparison nations do not readily include them. Dahl then can't deal with directly with the idea that indirect accountability may or may not be effective because it isn't factored into the argument at all.
There are some areas where Dahl is particularly strong, including the idea of the party rules system and unstated governmental norms effectively constituted an unwritten constitution that states and parties could more easily systematically change than our current jammed amendment system. However, Dahl does not seem optimistic that this will happen.
This is definitely worth reading if you unfamiliar with this line of critique, but is highly persuasive, but those who are more knowledgable may be slightly frustrated by what this book doesn't address because the nature of the lectures on which it is based.