Enormously illuminating but disheartening set of case studies for how government policies fail. Stokes provides some theory in early chapters, but then dives into recent environmental policy failures in Texas, Kansas, Ohio, and Arizona.
The lifecycle of any policy passes through several stages, from initial drafts, to negotiations in the legislature, to implementation, to subsequent revisions. Every step of the process provides opportunities for stakeholders to modify policy, and upwards of 40% of Federal policies change in their first decade. But while Stokes’s focus is on the many ways those policy changes erode the efficacy of environmental protection, there are surely course changes that improve policies? My laymen’s understanding of the Affordable Care Act is that there were lots of modifications we could be making to fix some real issues with the law, but in the past decade the political climate hasn’t allowed for these improvements, since they risk totally scuttering the law if it was re-opened.
Some valuable lessons I took from this book:
Ambiguous language in a law is oftentimes intentional, because legislators appreciate that they don’t have enough information to be comprehensive. And, of course, those with a small government bent would argue that we should not be too prescriptive anyway. Therefore, legislators expect some policies to be decided by the executive branch (the regulators empowered by the legislation).
Several states, including Arizona, thought that the public election of regulators would lead to more independent oversight. In practice in Arizona, the opposite has happened, where the Public Utility Commission (PUC) has been captured by the utility companies it was meant to regulate. This was due to the outsized influence the utilities created through campaign finance. In recent elections, campaign spending by the utility companies on their preferred candidate was over 20x greater than the opponents who favored solar net metering.
Perhaps even more depressing about the Arizona story was the second part of the story. After being reconstituted as a group favorable to energy utility companies, the PUC faced protests from Arizonans during their public sessions reviewing a solar net metering retrenchment they were about to push through. The protests grabbed headlines and applied more public scrutiny, but the PUC was able to still eviscerate Arizona’s solar market thanks to the complexity of the policy they ended up passing. As Stokes remarked, “It is difficult to hold a regulatory body accountable when its elected members do not even believe that the public can understand its decisions”.
Other states provide similar hijinks. For example, Ohio neutered its burgeoning wind energy market by passing a budget bill rider that increased the necessary distance between wind energy projects and property lines. The right parties who would defend the wind energy interests even noticed the rider, but the resulting tripling of the distance required resulted in almost no planned wind farms being legal, and the largest project went from 152 turbines to 12.
Stokes has some ideas for how to solve these issues. For drafting, she advocates for policies that can reinforce themselves through path dependence. For maintenance and preventing retrenchment, she advocates for intervener compensation programs. California pioneered these in the early 1980’s, and have seen a lot of success. The way this would work is utility customers would pay a small premium (effectively, a tax) that falls into a fund that awards groups who successfully intervene on bad policies. I take this to basically mean utility customers are paying a small tax for someone to lobby in their interest.