Veteran diplomatic correspondent Paul Richter goes behind the battles and the headlines to show how American ambassadors are the unconventional warriors in the Muslim world—running local government, directing drone strikes, nation-building, and risking their lives on the front lines.
The State Department’s heroes are the front-line diplomats who have been unheralded, but crucial in the line of national defense for two decades of wars in the Middle East. In The Ambassadors, Paul Richter shares the astonishing, true-life stories of four expeditionary diplomats who “do the hardest things in the hardest places.”
We’ll see Ryan Crocker’s effort to organize a new Afghan government after the fall of the Taliban, even threatening the life of a Pashtun warlord, a US ally, to ensure that a column of tanks could join US forces in the biggest battle of the Afghan war. Robert Ford, the sole American official for the province of Najaf in central Iraq, tries to restart the economy and deal with growing militia violence—and was is taken hostage by a Shia militia. In Syria, he is chased by government thugs for defying the country’s ruler. J. Christopher Stevens is smuggled into Libya as U.S. Envoy to the rebels during its bloody civil war, then returns as ambassador only to be killed during a terror attack in Benghazi. War-zone veteran Anne Patterson is sent to Pakistan, considered the world’s most dangerous country, to broker deals that prevent a government collapse and to help guide the secret war on jihadists.
Richter’s account of the role of America’s diplomats in the wars in the Middle East and the Muslim world supplies a crucial and—until now—missing part of how these wars are being fought. An important addition to appreciating the roles of these diplomats, and an in-depth look into the complexity and length of these wars and nation-building, The Ambassadors is a critical piece of modern day history.
The past two weeks the American people witnessed the professionalism and commitment to American national security on the part of diplomatic personnel before the House Intelligence Committee. Career diplomats like acting Ambassador to the Ukraine, William B. Taylor, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent, Fiona Hill, a former official at the U.S. National Security Council specializing in Russian and European affairs, and Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch who was fired as ambassador to the Ukraine by President Trump, along with a number of others displayed their honesty and integrity as they were confronted by conspiracy theories and lies developed to defend administration attempts to coerce and bribe Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to encourage him to launch investigations into former Vice President Joe Biden and his son Hunter. The preciseness of their presentations left no doubt as to their credibility and points to the importance of having experienced professionals advising and carrying out American foreign policy.
In our current political climate it is very difficult to conduct foreign policy in a more traditional manner when you have a president who makes decisions from his “gut,” or spur of the moment as he did when he recently allowed Turkey to expand into Syria and crush the Kurds. It is interesting to compare how “normal” foreign policy should be conducted and how important these diplomats are. The publication of Paul Richter’s new book, THE AMBASSADORS: AMERICAN DIPLOMATS ON THE FRONT LINES is important because it supports the kind of work that was performed by the witnesses before the House Impeachment Inquiry and reflects the antithesis of the Trump administration’s approach to foreign policy.
Richter has chosen to explore the careers of four American ambassadors who since 9/11 contributed to what insiders’ term “expeditionary diplomats” who have served in battle zones in the Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, Pakistan, and Libya. Because of the nature of these conflicts these career professionals have been involved with traditional diplomacy in addition to helping generals and spy chiefs decide how to wage war, as well as try to end them. When Washington found itself with a country on the edge with no real plan it was these diplomats who helped improvise and make policy decisions.
Ryan Crocker emerges as America’s most knowledgeable source on Iraq throughout his career having served there when Saddam Hussein came to power in 1980 and in 1998, yet he was left out of planning sessions dealing with the run up to the invasion of Iraq. Richter reviews Bush administration ignorance and agendas that are all too familiar, but Crocker’s warnings about an invasion all came to fruition; sectarian warfare, violence and looting, and the emergence of Iran as the region’s dominant player. Crocker left Iraq in August 2003 and served as ambassador to Pakistan for almost three years. He would return to Iraq and worked well with General David Petraeus replacing Robert Ford as ambassador as they oversaw the somewhat successful surge between 2007 and 2009. Ford another exceptional diplomat, whose experiences reinforce the arrogance and outright stupidity of Donald Rumsfeld, Douglas Feith and numerous others in the Bush administration. The reduced role of Colin Powell and the State Department is plain to see, and Crocker and Ford did their best to overcome America’s mistakes.
Richter successfully highlights the importance of the diplomats as they tried to keep a lid on the violence in Iraq and nudge the government toward democracy. Their contact within the Iraqi government, outside militias, and other groups is evident, and their role was extremely important when compared to personnel in Washington who at times seemed to have no clue. Crocker’s success rested on the respect that the Iraqis including President Maliki had for him. He thought nothing of traveling to meet all elements in the Iraqi ethnic puzzle as a means of trying to keep the fractured country together. According to Emma Sky, a British Middle East expert, Crocker “had provided the strategic direction and guidance the military so craved from civilian leaders, and so rarely received.” It is not surprising that once Crocker left Iraq in February 2009 the situation deteriorated according to Richter because of the changes in approach implemented by his replacement, Christopher Hill, and the overall policy pursued by the Obama administration.
By 2011, Crocker shifted his focus to Afghanistan and returned to government service after being chosen by President Obama to try and work out agreements for a strategic partnership. Obama’s goal was to reduce US troop levels from 150,000 to 15,000 and turn the fighting over to Afghan troops as much as possible. Crocker’s relationship with Karzai was tested as the Afghanistan president reaffirmed old grudges against Washington as he tried to maneuver among militias, the Taliban and his administration’s corruption. Once again Crocker did give it his best under extremely trying conditions.
Perhaps America’s most important ally in the war on terror was Pakistan, a country that could never be relied upon with its own agenda visa vie the Taliban, al-Qaeda, India, and numerous militias. Richter is correct when he describes the Pakistani-American relationship as a bad marriage with both partners cheating but had no choice but to stay together. Anne Patterson entered this quagmire in 2007 and served as ambassador to Pakistan for three years. Her main goal was preventative. She needed to help keep the country’s politics from becoming so chaotic or dangerous that the army, Pakistan’s most powerful institution, would feel the need to install new leaders to restore order. During her term as ambassador she successfully played the role of political counselor, military advisor, banker, and sometimes psychotherapist. Richter takes the reader through all the crisis attendant to the United States-Pakistani relationship dealing with the duplicitous Parvez Musharraf, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and her husband’s attempts to succeed her as President, the Mumbai attacks and numerous others. She did her best to keep the lid on and for the most part did an admirable job. For the latest work that deals with the topic in full see Steven Coll’s THE DIRECTORATE: THE CIA AND AMERICA’S SECRET WARS IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN.
Patterson would be sent to Egypt with the onset of the Arab Spring. Once the country politically imploded and Hosni Mubarak was overthrown, she moved from the conflagration in Islamabad and found herself amidst another crisis situation. Egypt was the cornerstone of US security strategy for the Middle East by maintaining peace with Israel, fighting counterterrorism, and keeping sea lanes open for the transport of oil. The fall of Mubarak caught the Obama administration by surprise. After the revolution, Washington continued to be blindsided by developments in Egypt. Patterson would arrive when the Egyptian military and civilians were furious at the Obama administration whom they felt had abandoned their country. She was plain speaking and knowledgeable and with a reputation in the State Department that one colleague described as “bad ass” and she was eventually able to earn respect from Egyptian military and intelligence leaders. Further she had to diffuse the Egyptian belief that the US was involved in a conspiracy to push democratic reform. Further she was confronted with the harassment and intimidation by Egyptian authorities against American backed reform NGOs and Embassy staff which she worked to deflate so she could try and influence Egyptian government actions even as Washington seemed to dither.
Following the Moslem Brotherhood victory with the election of Mohamed Morsi as President, Patterson met with the new Egyptian leader and tried to pin him down as to his views on Israel, human rights, etc. She did her best to work with Morsi and even gave him a certain leeway, all for naught as Morsi had an overstated view of his own importance. His major error was to appoint the ruthless General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi as Defense Minister. As Morsi became more authoritarian, she tried to curb his lack of political skill and quest for more and more power to no vail. With the Arab Emirates and Saudis working with the Egyptian military Morsi was arrested and a coup brought Sisi to power. The entire episode was not the Obama administrations finest hour. Granted they had little leeway with Morsi, but they did not do enough to try and steer him toward a more democratic approach. The problem as Patterson pointed out was not that Morsi was an Islamist extremist, “but that he simply didn’t know what he was doing.” Patterson was vilified by reform groups, foreign leaders and certain members of Congress as having assisted in bringing Morsi to power, criticism that is unwarranted but reflected that Patterson was damned no matter what course she chose.
Perhaps the most unsolvable problem facing American diplomats discussed in Richter’s narrative is Syria. Robert Ford was placed in the breach as the Arab Spring left its mark on the country and civil war ensued due to the forty-year repressive and murderous reign of the Assad family. Obama came to the presidency naively hoping to engage the Syrian and Iranian regimes. Ford was the first American ambassador to Damascus since 2006. Ford had a working relationship with the Syrian opposition, and he advised them to focus on reform not regime change. In his heart of hearts, Ford realized that Assad would never give up power. Ford’s secondary role was to educate Washington concerning events in Syria, but the Obama administration policy was faulty as it called for Assad to resign, publicized a “red line” as a response to the use of chemical weapons, and opening the door for Russia. Ford did his best, risking his life repeatedly confronting Assad and developing relationships with the opposition, but by December 2011 he would return to Washington where he worked to try and merge the different opposition groups. This task was impossible because at the same time jihadist opposition began to infiltrate into eastern Syria enabling them to seize control of the uprising from more moderate Syrians. Ford argued to no avail that Obama administration needed to arm more moderate elements or Jihadists in eastern Syria would join those in western Iraq. Obama refused to supply weapons for more moderate elements and with Iranian and Russian aid the moderates had nowhere to turn to but Islamists for help. For Ford, the lack of weapons aid made a radical take over a self-fulfilling prophecy. When Obama did little about Assad chemical attacks it further fueled opposition by moderates and members of Congress. Richter describes Ford as a pinata as he was bashed by everyone for the lack of US aid including Senate Foreign Relations Committee members. Finally, in total frustration he left the Foreign Service in 2014.
The diplomat most familiar to the American people was J. Christopher Stevens who was killed in a jihadist raid in Benghazi in 2012 fostering a partisan uproar in Washington as Republicans used his death as a political vehicle against Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. According to Richter the details of how Stevens died and who is responsible remains open to conjecture, but one thing is certain, there is plenty of blame to go around. When Stevens accepted the assignment, he knew what he was getting into, but his career long love of the Libyan people clouded his vision. Stevens had to start from scratch to carve out his own rules for working with the Libyan opposition who he met with frequently earning their trust even though they did not always follow his advice. The problem was the inability of the opposition to control the varied militias who had access to weaponry left over from the Qaddafi regime. At the time, according to Jake Sullivan, a Clinton foreign policy advisor; “post-conflict stabilization in Libya, while clearly a worthy undertaking at the right level of investment, cannot be counted on as one of our highest priorities.” Stevens concern that the administration wasn’t paying enough attention to what was going on in Benghazi in the eastern region around it would result in his death. In discussing Stevens, as with Crocker, Ford, and Patterson, Richter provides a nice balance of historical detail, Washington policy and his own insights and analysis which are dead on.
If one wants to gain an understanding of the problems the United States faced in the Middle East and Afghanistan after 9/11 in a succinct and compact approach, then Richter’s monograph should be consulted. At a time when American decision makers made what proved to be disastrous decisions that we are still confronting today, it is refreshing to explore the careers and work of four individuals who devoted their lives to unravel and try and rectify these mistakes, and one who gave his life believing in the importance of his work and having the ability to the tell truth to power.
Richter profiles ambassadors Ryan Crocker, Robert Ford, Anne Patterson, and Christopher Stevens (“the best people for the worst places”) These men and women mostly served in war zones and apparent failed states, and Richter ably covers the work they did in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Libya and the risks they faced, the pain-staking work involved, the direct and personal engagement that seemed imperative (the “new diplomacy of the front lines,” as Richter calls it), the terrible conditions they endured, and the almost impossible objectives they were given. He notes that all of them were nearly killed at their posts at one point or another, and, of course, Stevens did eventually die at his. From reading the book it seems that all of them had no regrets about accepting their posts, enjoyed the work they did, and demonstrated a talent for it.
Richter does a good job tying in their stories with the big picture of American engagement in the Middle East. Richter’s coverage of these diplomats is admiring, and he covers how they often had to choose whether to stay at their posts to assist in implementing policies that they often considered misguided or disastrous, and despite their advice often being ignored at higher levels. Needless to say, the book’s tone is often tragic.
The narrative is sharp and well organized and moves along at a quick pace, although some may find that the chapters are too lengthy. It often seems that Richter believes that ambassadors with “on-the-ground-knowledge” have the best insights into the situation, but perhaps this could have been more balanced by the views of other officials (even in Washington) It seems that Richter on one hand wants to make the case for a US role in stabilizing countries in this region, but on the other hand he has to admit that that objective is rendered impossible by corrupt or incompetent governments as well as ethnicities and factions engaged in seemingly impossible civil wars.
As a former Army Officer and OEF veteran, this book helped clarify so much of the convoluted non sense I experienced on the ground and read in the news. I was so proud to read of the accomplishments by Ryan Crocker, Anne Patterson, Rob Ford, and the late Chris Stevens: the diplomatic all-star team who we never seemed to do without. My key take aways from the book a) The Bush administration was far too interventionist, while the Obama administration far too isolationist...the former probably influencing hesitance in the latter. In both administrations, these Ambassadors were consummate sources of on the ground intelligence and wisdom which often went disregarded. b) The US spends more money on defense than the next 10 countries combined...yet we haven't decisively won a war in 75 years. Generals Petreaus and Allen would walk around Iraq and Afghanistan with seemingly 100s of billions of dollars and legions of Soldiers and Marines at their disposal...and yet Ambassador Ryan Crocker with just a few dozen folks, a meager budget, and a budding friendship with Karzai was asked to manage all elements of the "nation building" projects. In Syria, Egypt, and Libya, much of the same story: highly under resourced diplomatic professionals carrying the weight of the free world on their shoulders. And are given an exceptionally strong "left hook" and that's about it. c) This isn't a problem that the military is responsible for causing. Civilian administrators in the executive branch have convoluted incentive structures that prevent a fair deliberation between the diplomatic and military arms of our government. We need to take our presidential candidates' foreign policy frameworks extremely seriously, otherwise we'll continue falling into these traps.
In an election year where foreign policy and national defense are of utmost importance. This is the time to pick up this book. Well done Paul Richter.
"Do you really want to spend your career in Brussels, Paris, or Berlin? Or do you want to be out where the action is?"
I would rather be where the action is!
Very insightful and inspiring look into the careers and politics of four career diplomats who became Ambassadors to countries during tough periods in their bilateral relations with the United States. I learned a lot from the author's profiles of the Ambassadors. I would love to see a similar subsequent book, perhaps with more representation of female and Ambassadors of color in other countries outside of the Middle East in Africa, South America, etc. since there are quite a few who have had just as interesting and fascinating, albeit, less publicized Ambassadorships in these places.
There was a lot of what I was hoping to find in this book, but it needed further editing. I read it hoping to learn more about some figures only alluded to in William Burns' Foreign Service memoir, The Back Channel, and Richter does tell some of those behind-the-scenes stories. And there a few of those that I don't know where else I could have come across. But many of the stories were irrelevant and some of them he repeats twice, even verbatim in one instance. It felt like an accumulation of a lot of great reporting that wasn't edited to read like a single book.
Update. The more books I read around this one, the more convinced I become that it's a useless book.
Excellent book about four talented ambassadors and their work in some of the most dangerous countries in the world. Ryan Crocker was sent to Afghanistan after 9/11. He spent a decade in Iraq and Afghanistan working with warring factions. Robert Ford worked in Iraq, Syria, and Pakistan. He was captured by Shia militia in Iraq and chased by secret police in Syria. Anne Patterson fought to keep shaky governments from Collapsing. Chris Stevens tragically lost his life in a terrorist attack in Benghazi. All were career ambassadors who served as an essential line of national defense in the Middle East. They all ended their service to our country at a time when the diplomatic corps was being downsized. The book was released in November of 2019.
This was an interesting read. It's about four ambassadors and their challenges and accomplishments during multiple difficult postings in places like Syria, Pakistan, Egypt, and Libya. Robert Ford, Ryan Crocker, Anne Patterson, and Christopher Stevens are the main focus, though the decisions of presidents and other diplomats is covered as well.
Ultimately it's not a terribly optimistic book. American influence over the events in question seems limited, and that of other powers - Russia, China, Iran - seems ascendant, or at least equal to ours. It might be something of a warning shot that our foreign policy needs to be more engaged but more realistic about what that engagement can bring about.
This book compares the careers of several well-known ambassadors in the Middle East and South Asia in the early 21st century. It profiles Ryan Crocker, Robert Ford (who I met at a conference once), Christopher Stevens (who was killed in a terrorist attack in Libya), and Anne Patterson (who served in Pakistan). The book isn't really a biography, but it covers each ambassador's career during the War on Terror phase. It is written well, but in a journalistic style. The author covers each ambassador's views on US foreign policy, as well as their efforts to promote US interests in difficult circumstances. The author discusses US policy, which makes more sense when the reader is aware of the diplomatic and security background.
The highly readable story of what some of our most talented diplomats do to help mend countries pushed to the brink of collapse by war and civil upheaval. The lead characters are like emergency-room doctors, always most at home when they are rescuing victims of gruesome injuries. They rebuild shattered governments, help run military campaigns, strike deals with America's most feared enemies, while dodging constant threats to their lives. Richter introduces us to four fascinating and very different characters and relates their triumphs and defeats in a volatile and puzzling region.
Posted to a variety of Muslim countries including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Libya, Egypt and Syria, former ambassadors Ryan Crocker, Robert Ford, Anne Patterson and Chris Stevens each faced copious challenges in conflict-ridden regions and warzones and had to tread a fine line as a link between their host countries and frequently questionable US foreign policy decisions. Richter's book provides interesting look at the work of these four career diplomats during the Bush and Obama administrations.
While I loved the anecdotes and stories richter wrote about, I thought the lack of organization severely hampered the book. Richter shifts his timeline, subject, and country chapter by chapter making it difficult to follow through lines and requiring frequent flip-backs.
I did appreciate the collection of stories and information about some of the most difficult foreign policy tasks of the last two decades, and thought that the lessons of the importance of hard, in person, expeditionary diplomacy remain relevant.
Really lovely celebration of the American diplomatic corps and four exemplary diplomats who dedicated their lives to serving in the Middle East. Really interesting look into their lives and international relations with the Middle East in the early 2000s and 2010s. A bit hard to follow at times with all the names but enjoyable nonetheless.
One of the best books I've read on the recent Middle East, describes four talented, strong, intelligent ambassadors who know how to talk with the Arab leaders.