Seapower States: Maritime Culture, Continental Empires and the Conflict That Made the Modern World

by Andrew D. Lambert

Andrew Lambert, author of The Challenge: Britain Against America in the Naval War of 1812—winner of the prestigious Anderson Medal—turns his attention to Athens, Carthage, Venice, the Dutch Republic, and Britain, examining how their identities as “seapowers” informed their actions and enabled them to achieve success disproportionate to their size.
 
Lambert demonstrates how creating maritime identities made these states more dynamic, open, and inclusive than their lumbering continental rivals. Only when they forgot this aspect of their identity did these nations begin to decline. Recognizing that the United States and China are modern naval powers—rather than seapowers—is essential to understanding the current affairs, as well as long-term trends in world history. This volume is a highly original “big think” analysis of five states whose success—and eventual failure—is a subject of enduring interest, by a scholar at the top of his game.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Politics, Audiobook, War, Military Fiction, Military History

400 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2018

About the author

Andrew Lambert, FRHistS, is a British naval historian, who since 2001 has been the Laughton Professor of Naval History in the Department of War Studies, King's College London

Reviews

[Adriano · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesting topic, however the author struggled to convincingly make his arguments.

The main premise of the book is that there is a difference between "sea power" and "seapower". The former being a state which has a powerful navy (e.g. USA, Ancient Rome), and the latter being a state which has consciously looked to the sea to build its fortune, power and cultural identity.

The author states that there have been 5 seapowers: Classical Athens, Carthage, Venice, the Dutch Republic and England/Great Britain. He rules out other candidates such as Spain/Portugal on the basis that they did not build an identity around their relationship with the sea, but rather were terrestrial, insular, land minded states who only took to the sea as a means to continue their terrestrial struggles. Like most of the arguments made in this book, the concept was interesting but the reasoning was flimsy and I am certain that many Iberians would contest the assertion that they did not have a strong maritime culture or identity.

One other interesting assertion was that seapowers needed to have more open political governance to be a seapower. Autocratic, authoritarian land powers were not compatible with being a seapower. Seapowers were built on sea trade, and the costs of maintaining a huge navy could only be paid by giving enough power to the upstart merchant classes. According to the author, the landed powers detested the sea as a corrupting force, and were thus a natural enemy of seapowers - here Persia, Rome, Bourbon France, Russia and USA are framed as the great enemies of the seapower states.

These land states built their strength and power around the military rather than the navy and engaged in large scale wars of imperialism to add more land to their empires, while seapowers kept small standing armies and avoided large scale conflict, instead relying on diplomacy, alliances and economic warfare. Seapowers focused on creating a web of coastal colonies that allowed them to maintain extensive trade networks.

A counterpoint to this would of course be that Carthage extended its territories into much of the Iberian peninsula, and Britain of course conquered nearby Ireland, swathes of North America, Africa and most of the Indian subcontinent.

All good things come to an end, and of course all 5 seapowers went on to lose their place as great powers, some faster and more catastrophically than others. Here the author argues that:

1 - Land based, authoritarian states have an inherent conflict against politically "open", liberal, more democratic seapower states. When the spread of these liberal, democratic ideas threatens their landed power base, it is only a matter of time before they will move to crush it.

2 - seapowers are only safe while a balance of power exists between rival superpowers - giving seapowers the room to manouvre politically in between. When that balance is gone, the smaller seapower is at risk of being targetted on land by a far more powerful state.

3 - the seeds of defeat are sown by the seapowers themselves - the moment they forget their place and begin acting like a land power they put themselves on a course for their own destruction - e.g. The dutch committing to large continental land battles against far stronger states.

While there might be some merit in these arguments, the author never truly convinces and I am left to question whether he was truly convinced himself. He also didn't help himself with the poor structuring of the book and the writing itself.

Assigning a chapter to each seapower state might strike you as an obvious way to structure the book, but it left the reader with excruciatingly long chapters, which were then further compounded by a confusing writing style and the author's insistence on flitting backwards and forwards chronologically. He also had a habit of making various assumptions as to the reader's prior knowledge of certain historical events and their significance.

A missed opportunity for what could have been a fascinating cultural history.

[Shrike58 · Rating 2 out of 5]

When I started this book I really didn't know what angle Lambert was going to adopt. To be honest, I mostly expected a boiler-plate examination of the sinews of naval power for the current age, with a particular eye on Beijing's maritime aspirations. I then get exposed to this somewhat labored dichotomy between nations with a "seapower" culture, versus countries that simply have navies capable of offensive naval action; my reaction being okay, let's see what the author does with this.

One then goes through this looping examination of those disparate polities that Lambert holds had a "seapower" culture: Athens, Carthage, Venice, the Netherlands, and Britain. The argument being that only such states were the true creators of open societies (or at least the best opponents of overbearing hegemonic states), upon which we eventually wind up arriving at author's true concern; Great Britain's absorption into a European Union that, to Lambert, is just a new form of German hegemony. Yes, this is mostly a pro-Brexit polemic. Keep in mind that I'm not convinced that the EU as it's been run has been all it's cracked up to be, and that since this book was probably finished about 2017, you could argue that I should give Lambert more benefit of the doubt. However, since it turns out that the Brexit skeptics were dead right about this being a disastrous move, mostly implemented on dishonest arguments, that result makes this book look like wishful thinking. Professional historians might have reason to read this book as a case study of when a smart person fails to rise above their own prejudices, but the general reader should give this work a wide berth.

[Boudewijn]

For someone without a thorough knowledge of maritime history, this book is difficult to read and it couldn't hold my attention. A messy structure and most of times hard to follow.

[Ryan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Fluid and provocative. Build on a core of strong ideas, but frequently overreaches with insufficiently supported assertions and is frustratingly disorganized.

[John DeRosa · Rating 3 out of 5]

A dense read but worth the time...especially as a landlubber. Important insights about the future of seapower with the US and China.

[Dan O'Meara · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is one of those "big history" books in which the author develops an overriding hypothesis that is claimed to explain much history, and then spends several hundred pages illustrating this central idea (Paul Kennedy's "The Rise and Fall of Great Powers" springs to mind).

Lambert distinguished between sea power (two words) and seapower states. He sees the latter as those which develop a strategic dependence on naval power and maritime commerce, and which sustained both with a sea-focussed cultural ethos and national identity, themselves hinged on political and economic systems more open than their rival continental powers.

The books presents five case studies of the rise and decline of such "seapower states" together with chapters dealing with countries that, at one moment or another, developed significant naval power but did not ultimately become "seapower states" (Portugal, Spain, Russia, the US). The result is interesting and occasionally highly illuminating (particularly the Chapters dealing with the Dutch Republic and England). Yet the book also suffers from two major and related flaws that left this reader more skeptical than convinced.

The first is that he repeats his central arguments ad naseam, often on the same page. The second is that it soon becomes clear that this irritating repetition functions as Lambert's principal mode of proof. He ends up with narrative form that is almost exclusively geared around merely illustrating the grand hypothesis via a deeply circular mode of demonstration. This makes for extravagant claims about the book's achievement, and, in my view, actually obfuscates often far more complex and contingent historical processes than the author's somewhat mechanistic hypothesis can cope with.

[Mathijs Loo · Rating 3 out of 5]

Het boek is redelijk Anglocentrisch en daarnaast vrees ik dat de schrijver her en der wat aan cherry picking heeft gedaan om zijn narratief of analyse kloppend te maken.

[Annie Morphew · Rating 2 out of 5]

⭐️⭐️1/2

Andrew Lambert’s “Seapower States” contains plenty of good information, however I found his analytical framework to be poor. His thesis (that seapower states are inherently democratic polities that orient themselves seaward and develop naval power in order to protect free market trade and furthermore that the British Empire was the apotheosis of the Western seapower state tradition) to be Whiggish and unsatisfying.

Throughout this book, Lambert examines a number of seapower states and analyzes them in terms of their political institutions, economics, and a public cultural “maritime identity.” While I found the cultural element compelling, I think Lambert’s focus on the military and naval elements of cultural identity far too limiting. In Lambert’s formulation, a country without a navy has no maritime identity. However, cultural maritime identities are also based in labor, trade, recreation, regional defense, etc. Furthermore, I found the global dimension of this study to be too underdeveloped - particularly in the analysis of early modern seapower states and in terms of the global imperial dimension of British seapower.

[Jamie Redfern · Rating 1 out of 5]

Dreadful. Overflowing with omissions and mistakes to the point it feels deliberate.

[Dwain · Rating 3 out of 5]

Lambert's maritime history stimulated my thinking more than any other book I've read in a long time. It was fascinating. He claims that there are two types of great powers: continental powers and seapower states. He also says that there is a difference between sea-power states, which are continental powers that also have naval military power; and seapower states, which are states in which the state's identity, economy, and culture is based on the sea. (Incidentally, if you are listening to the audiobook version the difference between sea power and seapower sounds the same, resulting in a great deal of confusion.)

The prose was engaging and informative, and it made historical connections that I had never made myself. It was thoroughly enjoyable from start to finish. Those are the pros.

Unfortunately, the list of cons is just as compelling, or even more so. First, the book is full, and I mean FULL, of sweeping, unsubstantiated generalizations. Second, his basic thesis seems selectively applied, and finally, his treatment of British history is so whitewashed as to be unrecognizable.

One example of Lambert's sweeping generalizations is he says multiple times that continental powers don't care about piracy, but seapower states are greatly concerned with counter-piracy operations because the safety of commerce is top priority. This may be true, but like most of his sweeping generalizations, he doesn't bother to provide any real evidence to back up this assertion. Like his other claims, the reader is just expected to trust and continue.

A good example of Lambert's selective application of his thesis is his treatment of the Punic Wars. Throughout the book, Lambert makes many claims about seapower states. For example, seapower states have "inclusive" governments, and continental powers have monarchical, militaristic governments. When discussing the Punic Wars he labels Rome as the continental power, and Carthage as the seapower state. He repeatedly talks about Rome's authoritarian government and contrasts it to Carthage's "inclusive," seapower government. This comparison is pure fancy, as Rome had a government that was just as inclusive as Carthage. Both were oligarchies where officials were drawn from an aristocratic governing class. Furthermore, Carthage was hardly an example of liberal democracy, or freedom and human rights. Carthage engaged in human sacrifice, was periodically subject to domination by a single ruler (including during the second Punic War, undermining Lambert's example), and often treated subject peoples harshly. Given these realities, Lambert's version of history seems largely imagined.

Additionally, when talking about the British Empire, Lambert seem to forget most of his earlier criteria for seapower states. For example, he repeatedly says that when seapower states begin to obtain large tracts of land in the form of an empire they inevitably lose their character as seapower states. For some reason he continues to regard the British Empire as a seapower state, despite having an empire that covered 1/4 of the Earth's surface.

And speaking of British history, the author's British Empire is not the British Empire that actually existed. His entire treatment of the American Revolution consists of saying that the American colonies made it clear that they didn't want to be a part of the British Empire, so the Empire let them go. That's not quite the way it went. I seem to remember the US had to fight the Empire for years before gaining its independence. Lambert also says that the United States is responsible for the eventual collapse of the British Empire because of its predatory financial policies during the world wars. In essence, he claims that Washington provided just enough financial support to keep Britain afloat, but not enough to actually help it win those wars. Essentially, the US was playing the two sides off against each other, laughing all the way to the bank. Again, that's not quite the way it happened. I seem to remember the United States suffering nearly half a million dead fighting for the freedom of Europeans and Asians. Lambert fails to attribute the fall of the British empire to imperial overreach and financial exhaustion from getting involved in two continental wars of attrition, which oddly enough, actually fits his thesis better!

If you read this book with your expectations appropriately managed, it is a wonderful way to get you to think about history in a different way. His thesis is intriguing, and flies in the face of the typical ways of relating history. I also learned about parts of history that were relatively new to me, which was exciting. Just don't read this book for historical accuracy or unbiased, well researched scholarship, and it will be well worth your time.

[Vintagebooklvr · Rating 3 out of 5]

Lambert writes well and knows his stuff. There is no lack of footnotes for references. There was a lot of history that I did not know.

However, I didn't think he always proved his points. Sometimes he seemed to contradict a statement he made earlier or did not provide enough evidence. Particularly, I did not think he showed that absolutist countries feared the "democratic" forms of government in Venice, Holland and England. They did sometimes hate the country and wanted the land but it wasn't proven with lots of evidence that specifically the kings feared the form of government. Nor did he prove to my satisfaction that the mixing of different cultures, societies, and ideas from sailors from different areas mixing in port or from actual trade brought in dangerous ideas.

I have always been interested in how culture may be used as a deliberate political action just like raising taxes or passing new laws. One of Lambert's strength in this monograph is showing how sea states used architecture, paintings, tapestries, monuments, statues and even language to impress and cow other countries. Culture was also used create and maintain a seastate identity for its own population.

It was also interesting to read Lambert's take on the British view of some of America's action. His statement that the war of 1812 was a disaster for the U.S. was not something I read in history books growing up. My school books made it out to be more of a draw. It was definitely interesting to read how Wilson made deliberate moves to destroy England's naval power. (I'm not saying he's wrong but it is definitely not how the Americans usually present it. That's why it is good to read histories by people of other nationalities.)

Lambert made some interesting conclusions about the importance of seapower and its legacy. I would like to read more about that.

[Peter Macksen · Rating 3 out of 5]

Lambert's Seapower States is, at its core, a series of commentaries regarding what he calls a Seapower State, that is, a state that has maritime traditions and seapower as the core of its culture, contrasted with a state that has sea power, in other words a continental, or land-based power, that has a large navy or an ability to project naval power.

Content-wise the book is quite good, Lambert puts forward a convincing case for the distinction, and fundamental differences between, seapower states and states with sea power. While a critique of this book, and not just on this website, has been that it is "Western-centric", I personally feel that his focus on Western countries is a relatively fair one. Seapower States, as Lambert defines and recognises it, did not really exist in East Asia during the scope of this book, though a case could be argued for giving at least some mention to Polynesia's seafarers, which I do feel is a bit of an oversight. In addition, some of his assertions, such as that continental powers were fundamentally fearful of seapower culture, hence national antipathies, seem to be a leap in some cases, and the author seems to struggle to prove his case in this regard.

Content concerns however, is not the main problem with the book; the main issue is a structural one. Seapower States feels held back because of the writing style of Lambert, which, due to the choice to dedicate 1 chapter and 1 chapter only to each case study, can at times drag on, or become unnecessarily difficult to follow, especially when the timeline jumps around in some areas. That said, persistence from the reader should be able to overcome the narrative issues and enjoy a thought-provoking book, even if they may not always be in agreement with the conclusions.

[Wieland Wyntin · Rating 2 out of 5]

Lambert is een goede schrijver die erin slaagt een complex onderwerp (een cultuurgeschiedenis van landen die zich sterk met de zee verbonden voelden) eenvoudig uit te leggen. Echter zit zijn historische thesis vol met gaten. Lambert komt eerder over als een whig-historicus die gelooft in de teleologische vooruitgang van de mensheid. Alleen landen die een semidemocratisch bestal hadden (Engeland-Nederlandse Republiek - Venetië) passen in zijn kraam. Portugal, de zeevaardersnatie bij uitstek, het land van Diaz en Vasco da Gama, die één van grootste maritieme rijken ooit had werd volledig weggelaten in dit boek. Whig-histories horen thuis in de 19de eeuw en zijn een 21ste-eeuws academicus onwaardig. Wie graag boeken leest van een Angelsaksisch historicus die eerst zijn argumenten uitschrijft vooraleer hij zich aan historisch onderzoek waagt zal dit boek wellicht leuk vinden.

[Steve Birchmore · Rating 5 out of 5]

I think this might be one of the best books I've come across in explaining the rise and downfall of the British Empire.

It covers much more than the British Empire and covers Seapower states such as Athens, Carthage, Venice, the Dutch Republic and finally, England, Britain and the British Empire. It also covers continental empires which made use of sea power such as Russia under Peter The Great and makes a distinction between these and seapower states. It continues into the current period with insights on the US and Chinese navies, with also, I think, a warning to those nations, like the UK, and maybe Australia, NZ and Canada, who perhaps think US Navy will continue to dominate and provide security to its friends and allies forevermore.

I think I remember reading in Carrol Quigley's book Tragedy and Hope the simple observation that Britain became a great power and empire because it is an island and therefore could spend most of its defense budget on a powerful navy which not only provided the essential defense for an island, but gave Britain the opportunity during times of war with its European rivals of being able to seize their colonies and outposts of empire. This may seem obvious - or perhaps not.

The only history I was taught in school was British social history covering the industrial revolution and enclosure acts. Fortunately for me, my dad was very keen on history and so holidays, when we weren't at the beach, would include visits to castles, cathedrals and various museums. He was very knowledgeable and could make a day out on top of an iron-age hill fort fascinating and exciting and inspire the imagination of the boy that I was. So, thanks to my dad, I picked up quite a bit more history. Britain, like everywhere else in Europe, has got an awful lot of history - that is known. So I ended up knowing various bits and pieces of British history going back before the Roman invasion. But there wasn't a simple explanation, that tied it all together of how we came to be who we were and are, of how we acquired the biggest empire the world has ever known.

Until I read Carrol Quigley's book I had never come across such a succinct explanation for how Britain acquired such a massive empire. I suppose Quigley got this from Alfred Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783 I imagine back when the British Empire was near its greatest extent, before the confidence sapping Boer War, there was probably a tendency to believe that Britain acquired such a huge empire because, as a famous book set in this period's title states: God is an Englishman - our very own version of manifest destiny, that we came to be the top dogs simply because we are better than everybody else.

Of course geography doesn't explain everything, the world is full of islands, many of them much larger and with bigger populations than Britain, that did not acquire an empire or great power status, most of them ended up being part of someone else's empire. I read a book some years ago, I can't remember the title, a story of Jacobite Highlander who becomes a mercenary fighting for Frederick The Great of Prussia. What I learned from that is that the famous, or infamous, 'Prussian Militarism' has its roots in being small easily invaded state surrounded by powerful enemies. Geography doesn't explain everything, but it explains a lot.

Britain was not just an island, on the edge of a continually warring and technically advanced continent, it had a nearby rival in the form of the Dutch Republic, whose methods and resulting success could be studied and copied. Venice's day as a great seapower had only recently come to an end, and the great wealth and power of that city inspired much awe, envy and inspiration. Britain also had many wise and learned men who knew of Athens and Carthage. But just copying bits and pieces would not be enough, to become a great seapower required a suitable political environment and changes in culture, in the development of maritime art and stories of the sea, to make the sea, the realm of all possibilities.

Andrew Lambert's book Seapower States: Maritime Culture, Continental Empires and the Conflict That Made the Modern World is almost as though he has taken Carrol Quigley's succinct explanation for Britain's rise and decline and built upon it it and added to it to make it possibly the best book I have come across that explains the rise and fall of the British Empire - even though its not particularly about that, the British Empire just being the most recent example of a seapower state.

[Dave · Rating 4 out of 5]

Seapower States is a sweeping journey through history that looks at the relationship between politics, culture and maritime power with a focus on “seapower states” and, primarily “seapower great powers”. Beginning with Athens, and then moving through Carthage, Venice, the Netherlands and England/Britain, with chapters also covering Russia and (combined) Rhodes, Genoa and Portugal. The book finishes with a discussion of the contemporary situation, highlighting the challenges ahead.

The principal thesis of the work is that “seapower identity” is a conscious construction by a state, that aims to use the sea to boost the capacity of the state relative to larger “continental powers”. It links the use of inclusive politics to being able to raise the resources required to fund a navy, and then the use of maritime power to generate wealth to sustain a more powerful state than would otherwise be the case.

The standard of writing is very high, and while there are some occasional grammatical editing slips, I don’t recall seeing any errors of fact. The style of writing is somewhere between accessible and academic – there were the use of some terms that are certainly not well-known, but most of the text is easy to read. The structure of the writing was sound, although there are always challenges on this front when writing about such a broad range of topics.

The book is well-referenced with numerous notes (mostly reference, but some further information, structured as endnotes) and an extensive bibliography. There is one plates section which has well-chosen images, and a small number of images and maps printed on the standard stock throughout the book, but the focus is very much on the words.

It's a difficult book to review because while there were areas that I thought could do with greater discussion (for example, the rise of inclusive politics more broadly and what that meant for an “inclusive politics” continental power like the USA), at 330 pages it is already a decent length, and too long a work makes it far less accessible. It is perhaps too ambitious a thesis for a single book, and I wasn’t entirely convinced (but was certainly swayed). That said, even if one is not won over (and I mostly was), the value of the discussion is very high, bringing together culture, art, trade, naval power, political structures and more in an incisive view on geopolitical history.

All up, it’s an easy recommend to anyone interested in geopolitical or maritime history, and well worth a read for people interested in the history of democracy as well and, of course, anyone interest in the history of states with a close relationship to the sea and trade.

[Kevin · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is one of those books that was sitting on my shelf for a couple of years that I always intended to 'get around to' after I first heard Andrew Lambert interviewed and was intrigued by his ideas. With the current disruption of global trade arising from the situation in the Near East and security of the oceans becoming a hot topic again, I wanted to explore the idea of 'Seapower States' in greater detail.

A 'Seapower State', as Lambert claims, is one that derives its power and identity from its focus on the sea due to the mercantile nature of their elites, with the exchange of goods and ideas being welcomed by seapowers but disdained by land empires. According to the author, maintaining a navy and all that goes into it requires a cultural and societal shift for it to work effectively, while traditional land powers like France failed to emulate the British 'Seapower State' in naval prowess.

While I found the idea of a 'Seapower State' as a cultural phenomenon and one or two chapters, such as the rise and fall of Venice, interesting, I came away a little disappointed overall. 200-250 pages are used to examine 4 states as the author makes the case for being part of the same seapower heritage (Athens, Carthage, Venice, Netherlands) vs more traditional land focused empires (Rome, Spain, Portugal, Russia, USA). All this is done to lead up to saying that Britain was the ultimate 'Seapower State' (probably worth mentioning that this is the only island nation he examines) and derived its fantastic rise to power resulting from perfecting the idea of a 'Seapower State'.

But at the end it just feels like another piece of post-Brexit propaganda that the British intelligentsia seem intent on hammering out (movies like the Darkest Hour, Dunkirk, 1917 come to mind) to help rehabilitate and restructure the British identity (E.G 'Seapower States' are more worldly vs land empires) as they try to get to grips with an unprecedented amount of rapid change over the last few decades. Leaving that aside, it's an interesting concept but the execution was a little lacking.

[Douglas Berry · Rating 5 out of 5]

Absolutely brilliant. Lambert explores the histories of those states that rejected the usual path of land conquest and empire in favor of building trade empires and strong navies. Athens, Carthage, the Netherlands, and England are all examined in some details, as well as looking at states that became sea powers, but were never true seapower states, notably Portugal and Russia under Peter the Great.

What really made the book sing for me was the in-depth examination of the necessary political environment for a true seapower state to come into being. The requirement for a strong merchant class with true political power to control the building of a navy designed more for trade protection and forcing economic policies that favor free trade means that almost all of the states profiled were, to some extent, republics with varying levels of enfranchisement.

Reading this, mostly at Burning Man, made me think about the established setting for the SFRPG Traveller. The Third Imperium is really a seapower state in space, more concerned with free trade and communication than expanding and controlling territory. This inspired me to start writing, in my head, an essay on how to make the Third Imperium a true spacepower state. I love it when a book inspires me to create, and Mr. Lambert did it in spades.

If I have any complaints, it's that the author tends to hammer the same point over and over, almost like a student trying to fill his word count. It's mildly annoying but does not detract from the overall quality of the writing.

[Derek · Rating 4 out of 5]

I agree with Lamberts’s thesis, that there is a difference between seapower as an identity and sea power as a strategy or means. His exploration of historical sea powers is really enlightening,and I greatly enjoyed this book. That said, he spends a lot of time in his last two chapters ignoring Britain’s overseas empire and entanglements - at one point he correctly notes that the UK’s involvement in the USA’s war in Afghanistan is remarkable because the UK lacks any interests in Afghanistan. The point that involvement in a place like Afghanistan is anathema to a seapower like England ignores Britain’s own “involvement” in Afghanistan, an involvement so terrible that Britain’s most famous poet decries it. The chapters also gloss over Britain’s domination of India. At some points the effort to blame the US for the demise of British seapower gets tiresome, and I write that as a reader who agrees with the author that the USA is not a “seapower” as constructed by the author. These critiques aside, this is a masterful work that illuminates thousands of years of history. Recommended for all seapower enthusiasts.

[Dropbear123 · Rating 4 out of 5]

4.25/5

I enjoyed it. The book focuses on 5 historical sea powers - ancient Athens, Carthage, medieval Venice, 17th century Netherlands, and the British Empire. These were chosen because they started geographically small (Britain starting just with a small island) and the leadership consciously chose to foster a sea based identity. The book isn't about large continental powers that also had/have large navies, so today's USA and China aren't really focused on a lot. Although there is a good chapter on 18th century Russia and why Peter the Great's attempts to make a strong Russian navy didn't continue after his death. Each chapter generally covers that power/civilisation/empire's rise to sea power, how the elites fostered a sea based identity (through art, architecture etc), the politics of different interest groups (nobles, merchants etc), the relation between the sea power and the larger continental powers of whatever time period, and the reason why the sea powers declined. Personally I thought the Carthage chapters were the best, but the Venice and Britain chapters were also good.

[Casey · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good book, providing an insightful exploration of seapower states, Thalassocracies, across a spectrum of political, economic, cultural, and military characteristics. The author, British maritime historian Andrew Lambert, offers a detailed historical examination of the differences between “pure” seapower polities and those states that pursue a naval dominated strategy over a specific time or region. Lambert’s narrative categorizes these seapower states, highlighting the various facets that define them. However, I think the author draws too sharp a line of differentiation between seapower states and those states that merely pursue a naval strategy; reality is much more nuanced and dynamic. Additionally, Lambert attributes too much liberal virtue to seapower states compared to their continental-focused contemporaries, especially given the colonialism and imperialism of his examples. Highly recommended for anyone wanting to better understand the role of maritime economics and culture on statecraft.

[Jason · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is one of those books that bothers me a lot because I think the idea is wrong, but I'll think about it a lot. The general premise is that there's Sea Power and seapower - the latter are states that are relatively small, mercantile, cosmopolitan, war-avoidant, and exist by building coalitions. Okay, sounds like Athens, basically. The author then goes on to discuss a bunch more but talks about the ways they weren't seapower states, like how Venice acquired land territories that were more profitable than trade. Hmm. But that Carthage was a seapower country even though it had a bunch of territory, and completely maritime places like Portugal weren't because they were autocratic and very religious.

This is how it feels - it feels like he's fitting data to a theory instead of letting the data suggest the theory wasn't great. But I did appreciate its unique way of talking about this, so even though the book bugged me I'm glad I read it and thought it was a worthwhile read.

[Joseph · Rating 2 out of 5]

Like a promising club fighter fighting for a world title for the first time, the author seems a bit overwhelmed with the challenge at hand. In this case it is balancing so many different states over such a large stretch of history. We focus on Athens, Carthage, Venice, the Dutch Republic, and Britain. The difference between a "sea power" and "seapower" (spoiler Spain or Portugal don't count and non-Western countries such as Oman are not considered) is the extent to which the culture is focused on the maritime economy. Its an interesting idea and not a very original one. The final bit about contemporary issues and challenges were quite interesting and Lambert's views on these topics would have been welcome. This book might have been better structured as a sort of Parallel economic lives comparing historic examples with contemporary challenges. Somewhere in here is a four star book in need a good editor.

[Maria · Rating 2 out of 5]

It is the conflict as old as time, between freedom and oppression. Seapower states are small compared to the land powers. They must rely on a balance of power to thrive but their sea culture and trade bring new ideas, wealth and freedom.

Why I started this book: Another book about seapower... brushing up on naval history and political theories.

Why I finished: Interesting theory that Seapower states, ones that have their security and power built on sea trade and more open, and republican than land powers. And it was an interesting distinction between naval power (states with a navy) and seapowers (states that based culture on the sea) but Lambert's hazy explanations and unclear divisions felt more like fitting the facts to the theory rather than fitting the theory to the facts.

[Daniel Minister · Rating 4 out of 5]

Andrew Lambert has played a blinder here with a fantastic grand series study on a very special subject in the style of Paul Kennedy. The book is well researched and written in a engaging style which holds on to the interest of the reader. The key arguments of the book are of use and do add value and worth to the discipline of the genre.

Would recommend it to people interested in grand history and specifically naval issues at heart. I have heard a few interviews with the author in podcast and in them he expanded on his written work. Would have been nice to have seen that in the book as it certainly added value.

[Mick Maye · Rating 2 out of 5]

I found the book rambled and constantly repeated the same arguments ad nauseam. The topic of Holland or The Netherlands was minimal and conversed about art more than their moment in the sun. Athens and Carthage were good and introduced his main point about seapowers. Venice was contradictory to what I have read before but that was OK. Britain was OK but the relevance of what art is being made lost me completely. The final discussion about the current and past superpowers and their usage of navies I found the best part of the book, however it was very brief.

[Steven · Rating 3 out of 5]

Conceptually, I liked some of the ideas put forward (inasmuch as they made me think; not because I always agreed). I'm still digesting some of these ideas (like the argument that seapowers are opting for a work-around vs. contintent-based, soldier-focused powers who typically have the ultimate advantage) as I plow through other books. That seems the right compliment for the book.
While reading it, though, I was often worried at the pace: meaning, the author reached for conclusions faster than I thought wise... I was less certain they had been "proved" than was Lambert.

[Chris Csergei · Rating 5 out of 5]

I though Lambert did a good job of defining what a Seapower State is and differentiating it with other nations that have or had large navies. His argument runs consistent through the whole book, and I appreciated both the sections that focused on specific states and others that took a more broad approach. His chapter on Peter the Great and Russian naval power was especially insightful, and brought a fresh perspective to Peter's naval goals.

[Nick Harriss · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very good book. I found the chapters on Venice, Genoa and Britain more interesting (more emphasis on the historical and economic elements) than those on Athens, Carthage and the Dutch (more emphasis on the cultural aspects), but that doesn't deminish my overall positive view. An excellent look at long term geostrategy and geopolitics.

[Evelyn Amaral Garcia · Rating 4 out of 5]

‘One is not born a seapower state, but becomes one’ (my personal adaptation of Simone de Beauvoir ‘s quote after having read this book).

Very interesting and surprising read, even if in many parts the book is a long list of historical facts. It takes a lot of attention and will power to finish it.

[David · Rating 3 out of 5]

Politically charged reading of seapower states that has more to say about the academic reading of contemporary political issues than it does about the strain between terrestrial powers and sea powers.

Of limited value

3 out of 5 Stars