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The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1971 #1
The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism
In 1945 the Labour government inherited 'the real British "Empire"', which could be described, in Lord Milner's words, as 'that great British influence, extending from the centre of East Africa, through the Sudan, Egypt, Arabia and the Persian Gulf to India'> This book is about the attempt made after the Second World War to sustain that vision. Labour's 'grand strategy' was to refrain from direct intervention and to conciliate the moderate nationalists. The purpose was to preserve British power by preventing the initiative from passing to anti-British extremists or American anti-colonialists. Throughout most of the period Ernest Bevin was the moving force. He believed that British influence could be maintained by economic and social reform, and by the dismantling of the old system of alliances and formal rule. The history of the period may be summarized as the unsuccessful effort to create a new relationship of equal partners. The goal was to maintain Britain's position as a 'world power' with a predominant place in the Middle East. 'Non-intervention' thus may be regarded as an alternative means of preserving British influence. The postwar period of the Labour government is usually considered to be one of disengagement throughout the world; but in the Middle East the actual withdrawal was mainly limited to Palestine, where the British had to cut losses in 1948. Arab nationalism, frustrated in Palestine, could not be appeased. Nevertheless the hope endured that the peoples of the Middle East could be treated as partners. The Labour government, committed to the liquidation of the old British empire, became dedicated to the development of the Middle East as a replacement for India. This aim could be achieved in the long run only by dealing with the Arabs and Iranians as equals, not by prodding them with bayonets. Whether the goal was an illusion is a matter of historical controversy, but the story itself can by summed up as the hope of halting the decline of the British Empire by putting it on a new basis.
820 pages, Hardcover
First published July 1, 1984
About the author
William Roger Louis
56 books6 followersWilliam Roger Louis CBE FBA, also known as Wm. Roger Louis, or Roger Louis, informally, is an American historian, currently distinguished historian at the University of Texas at Austin. Louis is the Editor-in-Chief of The Oxford History of the British Empire, the former President of the American Historical Association, the former Chairman of the Department of State Historical Advisory Committee, and the Founding Director of the American Historical Association's National History Center in Washington, D.C.
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April 20, 2025
On 21 February 1947, the British government made a momentous announcement to the United States. Facing irreconcilable demands upon their straitened economic resources, the British had decided to reduce their overseas commitments, starting with the termination of further economic aid to Greece and Turkey. While this was not unexpected by Americans who were familiar with events, the suddenness of their withdrawal nonetheless came as a surprise to the Secretary of State, George Marshall. Frustrated by what he saw as yet another abandonment of their longstanding commitments at a time of growing challenges from the Soviet Union, Marshall regarded their decision as “tantamount to British abdication from the Middle East.”
Marshall’s conclusion was erroneous, as the exact opposite was true. As William Roger Louis demonstrates in this excellent book, the decision reflected not an abandonment of the region by the British but a policy of retrenchment intended to maintain their preeminence within it. This he does through a detailed examination of British imperial and foreign policy in the Near East in the years immediately following the Second World War, one that explains methodically both the intentions behind it and how the efforts by British politicians and senior civil servants to maintain the Britain’s imperial presence were ultimately frustrated by a fatal mixture of excessive and conflicting obligations, frustrated nationalism, and the consequences of the war.
The central figure in Louis’s narrative is Ernest Bevin. As Foreign Secretary throughout most of the period covered in the book, the former trade union leader dominated the Labour government’s cabinet discussions and played a decisive role in shaping its grand strategy not just in foreign policy but imperial affairs as well. While committed to maintaining Britain’s empire, Bevin believed its survival required the adoption of new tactics. The days of subjugating countries through overt political and military interventions were over. Acknowledging the unsustainability of such an approach, Bevin sought to establish a more informal presence in the Middle East based on equal partnerships and support for social and economic development programs, a combination he believed would transform the British-dominated empire into a more cooperative multiracial association.
Key to Britain’s postwar plans for the region was Egypt. There the British maintained a vast military enclave occupied by hundreds of thousands of British soldiers and airmen. Even after India gained its independence in 1947 the Suez Canal was seen as a waterway vital to Britain’s global economic position, while the bases guarding it were ideally situated to protect their interests throughout the region. Though the Egyptians resented the British occupation and pressed for a revision of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty that authorized it, the Labour government was nonetheless hopeful that relations could be placed on a more equal footing that, along with support for moderate nationalists and security agreements with Transjordan and Iraq, could serve as the basis for a sustainable presence in the area.
These hopes foundered on the rock of Palestine. Louis sees the British withdrawal from its mandate there as the turning point for its ambitions in the region, one that overwhelmed many of Bevin’s initiatives. Regarding the postwar Jewish refugee problem as one that needed to be solved by Europe rather than the Arabs, Bevin hoped to create a binational state in which both groups could live harmoniously. Jewish immigration to Palestine frustrated these hopes, exacerbating the insurgency in the region and fueling tensions between Britain and the United States. Caught between President Harry Truman’s support for an independent Jewish state and the objections to one from Arab leaders, Britain’s position was hopelessly compromised. In the wake of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, British policymakers found themselves coping vainly with a more strident Arab nationalism, one that accelerated the erosion of their position in the Middle East.
Much of this was not evident at the time to the casual observer. In 1951, Britain still possessed an extensive strategic presence throughout the area. With the crisis that year over Britain’s control of the Iranian oilfields and Egypt’s repeal of the 1936 treaty, however, that presence was an increasingly beleaguered one. After reading Louis’s book, it is difficult to envision what they could have done to avoid any outcome other than the loss of their empire in the region. Though his use of the enormous collection of British and American documentation is not complimented by a similarly comprehensive examination of regional perspectives or developments at the local level, this does not diminish the considerable value of his book as a study of the workings of the “official mind” in formulating their efforts to prevent this from happening. For its insights it offers into the perspectives that shaped their efforts and the realities that thwarted them, it remains as important a study of its subject as it was when it was originally published.
Marshall’s conclusion was erroneous, as the exact opposite was true. As William Roger Louis demonstrates in this excellent book, the decision reflected not an abandonment of the region by the British but a policy of retrenchment intended to maintain their preeminence within it. This he does through a detailed examination of British imperial and foreign policy in the Near East in the years immediately following the Second World War, one that explains methodically both the intentions behind it and how the efforts by British politicians and senior civil servants to maintain the Britain’s imperial presence were ultimately frustrated by a fatal mixture of excessive and conflicting obligations, frustrated nationalism, and the consequences of the war.
The central figure in Louis’s narrative is Ernest Bevin. As Foreign Secretary throughout most of the period covered in the book, the former trade union leader dominated the Labour government’s cabinet discussions and played a decisive role in shaping its grand strategy not just in foreign policy but imperial affairs as well. While committed to maintaining Britain’s empire, Bevin believed its survival required the adoption of new tactics. The days of subjugating countries through overt political and military interventions were over. Acknowledging the unsustainability of such an approach, Bevin sought to establish a more informal presence in the Middle East based on equal partnerships and support for social and economic development programs, a combination he believed would transform the British-dominated empire into a more cooperative multiracial association.
Key to Britain’s postwar plans for the region was Egypt. There the British maintained a vast military enclave occupied by hundreds of thousands of British soldiers and airmen. Even after India gained its independence in 1947 the Suez Canal was seen as a waterway vital to Britain’s global economic position, while the bases guarding it were ideally situated to protect their interests throughout the region. Though the Egyptians resented the British occupation and pressed for a revision of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty that authorized it, the Labour government was nonetheless hopeful that relations could be placed on a more equal footing that, along with support for moderate nationalists and security agreements with Transjordan and Iraq, could serve as the basis for a sustainable presence in the area.
These hopes foundered on the rock of Palestine. Louis sees the British withdrawal from its mandate there as the turning point for its ambitions in the region, one that overwhelmed many of Bevin’s initiatives. Regarding the postwar Jewish refugee problem as one that needed to be solved by Europe rather than the Arabs, Bevin hoped to create a binational state in which both groups could live harmoniously. Jewish immigration to Palestine frustrated these hopes, exacerbating the insurgency in the region and fueling tensions between Britain and the United States. Caught between President Harry Truman’s support for an independent Jewish state and the objections to one from Arab leaders, Britain’s position was hopelessly compromised. In the wake of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, British policymakers found themselves coping vainly with a more strident Arab nationalism, one that accelerated the erosion of their position in the Middle East.
Much of this was not evident at the time to the casual observer. In 1951, Britain still possessed an extensive strategic presence throughout the area. With the crisis that year over Britain’s control of the Iranian oilfields and Egypt’s repeal of the 1936 treaty, however, that presence was an increasingly beleaguered one. After reading Louis’s book, it is difficult to envision what they could have done to avoid any outcome other than the loss of their empire in the region. Though his use of the enormous collection of British and American documentation is not complimented by a similarly comprehensive examination of regional perspectives or developments at the local level, this does not diminish the considerable value of his book as a study of the workings of the “official mind” in formulating their efforts to prevent this from happening. For its insights it offers into the perspectives that shaped their efforts and the realities that thwarted them, it remains as important a study of its subject as it was when it was originally published.
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