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Grand Improvisation: America Confronts the British Superpower, 1945–1957
A new understanding of the post World War II era, showing what occurred when the British Empire wouldn’t step aside for the rising American superpower—with global insights for today.An enduring myth of the twentieth century is that the United States rapidly became a superpower in the years after World War II, when the British Empire—the greatest in history—was too wounded to maintain a global presence. In fact, Derek Leebaert argues in Grand Improvisation, the idea that a traditionally insular United States suddenly transformed itself into the leader of the free world is illusory, as is the notion that the British colossus was compelled to retreat. The United States and the U.K. had a dozen abrasive years until Washington issued a “declaration of independence” from British influence. Only then did America explicitly assume leadership of the world order just taking shape. Leebaert’s character-driven narrative shows such figures as Churchill, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennan in an entirely new light, while unveiling players of at least equal weight on pivotal events. Little unfolded as historians the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan; the Korean War; America’s descent into Vietnam. Instead, we see nonstop U.S. improvisation until America finally lost all caution and embraced obligations worldwide, a burden we bear today.Understanding all of this properly is vital to understanding the rise and fall of superpowers, why we’re now skeptical of commitments overseas, how the Middle East plunged into disorder, why Europe is fracturing, what China intends—and the ongoing perils to the U.S. world role.
601 pages, Kindle Edition
First published October 16, 2018
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January 6, 2019
“Americans don’t do grand strategy.”
(Oliver Franks, British Ambassador to the United States, 1953)
From the outset of his new work, GRAND IMPROVISATION: AMERICA CONFRONTS THE BRITISH SUPER POWER, 1945-1957 Derek Leebaert puts forth the premise that the idea that the British were about to liquidate their empire because of financial and military weakness after World War II was fallacious. Further, that the United States was fully prepared to assume the leadership of the west and would do so while creating an American led international order that we’ve lived with ever since was equally false. Leebaert’s conclusions are boldly stated as he reevaluates the historical community that for the most part has disagreed with his assumptions over the years. The author rests his case on assiduous research (just check the endnotes) and uncovering documents that have not been available or used previously. Leebaert argues his case very carefully that American foreign policy in the post war era was very improvisational as it tried to develop a consistent policy to confront what it perceived be a world-wide communist surge. Leebaert argues that it took at least until 1957 at the conclusion of the Suez Crisis for London to finally let go of their position as a first-rate power with a dominant empire, allowing the United States to fill the vacuum that it created. No matter how strong Leebaert believes his argument to be I would point out that events in India, Pakistan, Palestine, the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, the creation of NATO, and the American loan of $3.75 billion all of which occurred before 1948 should raise a few questions concerning his conclusions.
Despite the assuredness with which Leebaert presents his case there are merits to his argument and the standard interpretation that has long been gospel deserves a rethinking. His thesis rests on a series of documents that he has uncovered. The most important of which is National Security Document 75 that was presented to President Truman on July 15, 1950. Leebaert contends that this 40-page analysis has never been seen by historians and its conclusions are extremely important. NSC 75’s purpose was to conduct an audit of the far-flung British Empire concentrating on its ability to meet its military commitments and determine how strong the United Kingdom really was, as men including John J. McCloy, Paul Nitze, David K. Bruce, and Lewis Douglas feared what would happen if the British Empire collapsed. All important agencies in the American government took part in this analysis; the CIA, the Pentagon, the Treasury and State Departments and reached some very interesting judgments. The document concluded that “the British Empire and Commonwealth” still had the capacity to meet its military obligations with an army of close to a million men. Leebaert argues that “there had been no retreat that anyone could categorize, in contrast to adjustment, and no need was expected for replacement. Nor could American energy and goodwill substitute for the British Empire’s experienced global presence. As for the need to vastly expand US forces overseas, that wasn’t necessary. Instead the United States should support its formidable ally, which included backing its reserve currency.” (234) For Leebaert this document alone changes years of Cold War historiography.
Harold Evans points out in his October 18, New York Times review that Leebaert offers other persuasive points that mitigate any American take over from the British due to their perceived weakness. First, British military and related industries produced higher proportions of wartime output than the United States well into the 1950s. Second, Britain was ahead in life sciences, civil nuclear energy, and jet aviation than America. Third, England maintained the largest military presence on the Rhine once the United States withdrew its forces at the end of the war. Fourth, British intelligence outshone “American amateurs.” This being the case Leebaert’s thesis has considerable merit, but there are areas that his thesis does not hold water, particularly that of the condition of the English economy, dollar reserves, and how British trade was affected by the weakness of the pound sterling.
Leebaert’s revisionist approach centers on a few historical figures; some he tries to resurrect their reputations, others to bring them to the fore having been seemingly ignored previously. The author’s portrayal of British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin is a key to his presentation. As the leader of the Labour Party, Bevin held leftist anti-colonial beliefs, but once in power the realities of empire, economics, and politics brought about a marked change particularly as it involved the Middle East, London’s role in any attempt at a European federation, the devaluation of the pound sterling, the need to create an Anglo-American bond, and numerous other areas. Leebaert goes out of his way to defend Bevin in several areas, especially charges that he was anti-Semitic in dealing with the situation in Palestine. Other individuals discussed include John Wesley Snyder who had strong relationships with President Truman and Secretary of State Marshall, who as Secretary of the Treasury oversaw the transition of the US economy to peacetime and was the driving force behind the Marshall Plan. The American Ambassador to Great Britain, Lewis Douglas also fits this category as does Commissioner General Malcom MacDonald, who oversaw British policy in the Pacific from his position in Singapore, the hub of British Pacific power.
Leebaert’s narrative includes the history of the major Cold War events of the 1945-1950. His discussion of the situation in Greece and Turkey including Bevin and US Admiral Leahy’s bluffs in negotiations that resulted in the Truman Doctrine and $400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey. The Berlin Crisis, the Soviet murder of Jan Masaryk, Mao’s victory in China and what it meant for Hong Kong and Taiwan, and the Korean War are all presented in detail.
Perhaps Leebaert’s favorite character in supporting his thesis is Walter Lippmann, the American journalist who had difficulty deciding whether the British were using the United States as a foil against the Soviet Union, or as a vehicle to fill any vacuums that might avail themselves should England retrench. But eventually Lippmann concluded that Washington believed that the British Empire would contain the Soviet Union all by itself, not the actions of an empire that was about to fold and pass the torch to the United States.
Leebaert is not shy about putting certain historical figures on the carpet and shattering their reputations. Chief among these people is George F. Kennan, who was Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Head of the State Department Policy Planning staff among his many diplomatic positions. For Leebaert the idea that Kennan was a “giant of diplomacy” as he was described by Henry Kissinger is a misnomer to say the least. He finds Kennan to be emotional, careless, impulsive, and “frequently amateurish.” Further, he believes Kennan was often ignorant about certain areas, particularly the Middle East and Japan, and lacked a rudimentary knowledge of economics. But for Leebaert this did not stop Kennan from offering his opinions and interfering in areas that he lacked any type of expertise.
The situation in Southeast Asia was crucial for the British as seen through the eyes of Malcom MacDonald. He firmly believed that if Indochina fell Thailand would follow as would the British stronghold of Malaya. British trade and investment would be cut and wouldn’t be able to strengthen their recovering European allies, thus ending any American hope of a self-reliant North-Atlantic partnership. According to Leebaert, it was imperative to get Washington to support Bao Dai as leader of Vietnam and MacDonald made the case to the Americans better than the French. If nothing was done the entire area would be lost to the communists. Leebaert interestingly points out that in the 1930s when it appeared, he might become Prime Minister some day he backed Neville Chamberlain at Munich, now in the early 1950s he did not want to be seen as an appeaser once again.
At the same time disaster was unfolding on the Korean peninsula and Washington kept calling for British troops to assist MacArthur’s forces at Pusan. The Atlee government did not respond quickly, and with British recognition of Mao’s regime and continued trade with Beijing, along with its attitude toward Taiwan, resulting in fissures between the British and the United States. With Bevin ill, Kenneth Younger, the Minister of State argued that London could not be spread too thin because they could not leave Iran, Suez, Malaya, or Hong Kong unguarded. Interestingly, Leebaert points out at the time the only real Soviet military plan was geared against Tito’s Yugoslavia. The difference between Washington and London was clear – the British had global concerns, the Americans were obsessed with Korea. Finally, by the end of August 1950 London dispatched 1500 soldiers, a year later 20,000 Commonwealth soldiers would be involved in combat operations.
Leebaert’s premise that the British would not forgo empire until the results of the Suez Crisis was a few years off. By 1951 strong signals emerged that the empire was about to experience further decline with events in Iran and Egypt taking precedence. If Islamists focused on anti-communism in these areas the British were safe, but when they began to turn their focus to nationalism London would be in trouble. Domestically, Britain was also in difficulty as financial news was very dispiriting. Due to the Korean War and the US demand for industrial goods the total cost for imports shot up markedly. This caused a balance of payments problem and the pound sterling plummeted once again. The cold winter exacerbated the economy even further as another coal shortage took place. It seemed that the British people had to deal with the rationing of certain items, but the defeated Germany did not. Further, by 1952 Mau Mau uprisings in Kenya began to take their toll causing London to face another external challenge.
The British strategy toward the United States was to stress the anti-communism fear in dealing with Egypt and Iran. In Egypt, King Farouk was a disaster and the British feared for the Suez Canal. In Iran, the English fear centered around the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company which had been ripping off Teheran for decades. An attempt to ameliorate the situation came to naught as the company was nationalized and eventually in 1953 the British and American staged a coup that overthrew the elected Prime Minister, Mohamed Mossadegh. In Egypt nationalism would also become a major force that London could not contain resulting in the 1952 Free Officers Movement that brought to power Gamel Abdul Nasser. In each instance Washington took on an even more important role, and some have argued that the CIA was complicit in fostering a change in the Egyptian government. In addition, Dwight Eisenhower became president and John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State. Despite newly elected Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s hope that the World War II relationship could be rekindled, Eisenhower saw the British as colonialists who were hindering US foreign policy, in addition the relationship between Dulles and British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden was at rock bottom. It became increasingly clear that the Eisenhower administration wanted to avoid being perceived as acting in concert with Britain in dealing with colonial issues, except in the case of Iran which the United States is still paying for because of its actions.
Regarding Indochina, the United States and England could not reach any demarche as regards the plight of the French visa vie the Vietminh, particularly as the battle of Dienbienphu played out. Leebaert does an excellent job recounting the play by play between Dulles and Eden, Eisenhower and Churchill as the US and England saw their relations splintering as negotiations and the resulting recriminations proved fruitless. This inability to come together over Southeast Asia would have grave implications in other areas.
In another region, the Eisenhower administration would embark on a strategy to create some sort of Middle East Defense Organization to hinder Soviet penetration. This strategy, whether called a “Northern Tier” or the “Baghdad Pact” of Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran or other nomenclatures created difficulties with Britain who sought to use such an alliance as a vehicle to maintain their influence in the region, particularly in Jordan and Iraq. British machinations would irritate Washington as Eden and company resented American pressure to withdraw from the Suez Canal Base and other issues. The result would be an alliance between England, France, and Israel to topple Nasser in Egypt. The alliance was misconceived and would evolve into a break between the United States and its Atlantic allies even to the effect of the Eisenhower administration working behind the scenes to topple the Eden government and bring about the Eisenhower Doctrine signaling that the British had lost its leadership position and was no longer considered a “major power.”
I must point out that I have written my own monograph that deals with major aspects of Leebaert’s thesis, DAWN OVER SUEZ: THE RISE OF AMERICAN POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1953-1957. My own research concludes that the United States actively worked to replace Britain as the dominant force in the Middle East as early as May 1953 when John F. Dulles visited the region and came back appalled by British colonialism. Leebaert leaves out a great deal in discussing the period; the role of the US in forcing Churchill into agreeing to the Heads of Agreement to withdraw from the Suez Canal Base; the failure of secret project Alpha and the Anderson Mission to bring about a rapprochement between Israel and Egypt and its implications for US policy; the disdain that the Americans viewed Eden, the extent of American ire at the British for undercutting their attempts at a Middle East Defense Organization by their actions in Iraq and Jordan; the role of US anger over the Suez invasion because it ruined a coup set to take place in Syria; and the Eisenhower administrations machinations behind the scenes to remove Eden as Prime Minister to be replaced by Harold Macmillan. In addition, the author makes a series of statements that are not supported by any citations; i.e.; Eisenhower’s support for finding a way to fund the Aswan Dam after Nasser had nationalized the Suez Canal; attempts to poison Nasser etc.
Overall however, Leebaert has written a monograph that should raise many eyebrows for those who have accepted the Cold War narrative of the last six decades. There are many instances where he raises questions, provides answers that force the reader to conclude that these issues should be reexamined considering his work. At a time when the United States is struggling to implement a consistent worldview in the realm of foreign policy it is important for policy makers to consider the plight of the British Empire following World War II and how Washington’s inability to confront world issues in a reasoned and measured way and develop a long term strategy fostered a pattern that has created many difficulties that continue to dog us today.
(Oliver Franks, British Ambassador to the United States, 1953)
From the outset of his new work, GRAND IMPROVISATION: AMERICA CONFRONTS THE BRITISH SUPER POWER, 1945-1957 Derek Leebaert puts forth the premise that the idea that the British were about to liquidate their empire because of financial and military weakness after World War II was fallacious. Further, that the United States was fully prepared to assume the leadership of the west and would do so while creating an American led international order that we’ve lived with ever since was equally false. Leebaert’s conclusions are boldly stated as he reevaluates the historical community that for the most part has disagreed with his assumptions over the years. The author rests his case on assiduous research (just check the endnotes) and uncovering documents that have not been available or used previously. Leebaert argues his case very carefully that American foreign policy in the post war era was very improvisational as it tried to develop a consistent policy to confront what it perceived be a world-wide communist surge. Leebaert argues that it took at least until 1957 at the conclusion of the Suez Crisis for London to finally let go of their position as a first-rate power with a dominant empire, allowing the United States to fill the vacuum that it created. No matter how strong Leebaert believes his argument to be I would point out that events in India, Pakistan, Palestine, the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, the creation of NATO, and the American loan of $3.75 billion all of which occurred before 1948 should raise a few questions concerning his conclusions.
Despite the assuredness with which Leebaert presents his case there are merits to his argument and the standard interpretation that has long been gospel deserves a rethinking. His thesis rests on a series of documents that he has uncovered. The most important of which is National Security Document 75 that was presented to President Truman on July 15, 1950. Leebaert contends that this 40-page analysis has never been seen by historians and its conclusions are extremely important. NSC 75’s purpose was to conduct an audit of the far-flung British Empire concentrating on its ability to meet its military commitments and determine how strong the United Kingdom really was, as men including John J. McCloy, Paul Nitze, David K. Bruce, and Lewis Douglas feared what would happen if the British Empire collapsed. All important agencies in the American government took part in this analysis; the CIA, the Pentagon, the Treasury and State Departments and reached some very interesting judgments. The document concluded that “the British Empire and Commonwealth” still had the capacity to meet its military obligations with an army of close to a million men. Leebaert argues that “there had been no retreat that anyone could categorize, in contrast to adjustment, and no need was expected for replacement. Nor could American energy and goodwill substitute for the British Empire’s experienced global presence. As for the need to vastly expand US forces overseas, that wasn’t necessary. Instead the United States should support its formidable ally, which included backing its reserve currency.” (234) For Leebaert this document alone changes years of Cold War historiography.
Harold Evans points out in his October 18, New York Times review that Leebaert offers other persuasive points that mitigate any American take over from the British due to their perceived weakness. First, British military and related industries produced higher proportions of wartime output than the United States well into the 1950s. Second, Britain was ahead in life sciences, civil nuclear energy, and jet aviation than America. Third, England maintained the largest military presence on the Rhine once the United States withdrew its forces at the end of the war. Fourth, British intelligence outshone “American amateurs.” This being the case Leebaert’s thesis has considerable merit, but there are areas that his thesis does not hold water, particularly that of the condition of the English economy, dollar reserves, and how British trade was affected by the weakness of the pound sterling.
Leebaert’s revisionist approach centers on a few historical figures; some he tries to resurrect their reputations, others to bring them to the fore having been seemingly ignored previously. The author’s portrayal of British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin is a key to his presentation. As the leader of the Labour Party, Bevin held leftist anti-colonial beliefs, but once in power the realities of empire, economics, and politics brought about a marked change particularly as it involved the Middle East, London’s role in any attempt at a European federation, the devaluation of the pound sterling, the need to create an Anglo-American bond, and numerous other areas. Leebaert goes out of his way to defend Bevin in several areas, especially charges that he was anti-Semitic in dealing with the situation in Palestine. Other individuals discussed include John Wesley Snyder who had strong relationships with President Truman and Secretary of State Marshall, who as Secretary of the Treasury oversaw the transition of the US economy to peacetime and was the driving force behind the Marshall Plan. The American Ambassador to Great Britain, Lewis Douglas also fits this category as does Commissioner General Malcom MacDonald, who oversaw British policy in the Pacific from his position in Singapore, the hub of British Pacific power.
Leebaert’s narrative includes the history of the major Cold War events of the 1945-1950. His discussion of the situation in Greece and Turkey including Bevin and US Admiral Leahy’s bluffs in negotiations that resulted in the Truman Doctrine and $400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey. The Berlin Crisis, the Soviet murder of Jan Masaryk, Mao’s victory in China and what it meant for Hong Kong and Taiwan, and the Korean War are all presented in detail.
Perhaps Leebaert’s favorite character in supporting his thesis is Walter Lippmann, the American journalist who had difficulty deciding whether the British were using the United States as a foil against the Soviet Union, or as a vehicle to fill any vacuums that might avail themselves should England retrench. But eventually Lippmann concluded that Washington believed that the British Empire would contain the Soviet Union all by itself, not the actions of an empire that was about to fold and pass the torch to the United States.
Leebaert is not shy about putting certain historical figures on the carpet and shattering their reputations. Chief among these people is George F. Kennan, who was Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Head of the State Department Policy Planning staff among his many diplomatic positions. For Leebaert the idea that Kennan was a “giant of diplomacy” as he was described by Henry Kissinger is a misnomer to say the least. He finds Kennan to be emotional, careless, impulsive, and “frequently amateurish.” Further, he believes Kennan was often ignorant about certain areas, particularly the Middle East and Japan, and lacked a rudimentary knowledge of economics. But for Leebaert this did not stop Kennan from offering his opinions and interfering in areas that he lacked any type of expertise.
The situation in Southeast Asia was crucial for the British as seen through the eyes of Malcom MacDonald. He firmly believed that if Indochina fell Thailand would follow as would the British stronghold of Malaya. British trade and investment would be cut and wouldn’t be able to strengthen their recovering European allies, thus ending any American hope of a self-reliant North-Atlantic partnership. According to Leebaert, it was imperative to get Washington to support Bao Dai as leader of Vietnam and MacDonald made the case to the Americans better than the French. If nothing was done the entire area would be lost to the communists. Leebaert interestingly points out that in the 1930s when it appeared, he might become Prime Minister some day he backed Neville Chamberlain at Munich, now in the early 1950s he did not want to be seen as an appeaser once again.
At the same time disaster was unfolding on the Korean peninsula and Washington kept calling for British troops to assist MacArthur’s forces at Pusan. The Atlee government did not respond quickly, and with British recognition of Mao’s regime and continued trade with Beijing, along with its attitude toward Taiwan, resulting in fissures between the British and the United States. With Bevin ill, Kenneth Younger, the Minister of State argued that London could not be spread too thin because they could not leave Iran, Suez, Malaya, or Hong Kong unguarded. Interestingly, Leebaert points out at the time the only real Soviet military plan was geared against Tito’s Yugoslavia. The difference between Washington and London was clear – the British had global concerns, the Americans were obsessed with Korea. Finally, by the end of August 1950 London dispatched 1500 soldiers, a year later 20,000 Commonwealth soldiers would be involved in combat operations.
Leebaert’s premise that the British would not forgo empire until the results of the Suez Crisis was a few years off. By 1951 strong signals emerged that the empire was about to experience further decline with events in Iran and Egypt taking precedence. If Islamists focused on anti-communism in these areas the British were safe, but when they began to turn their focus to nationalism London would be in trouble. Domestically, Britain was also in difficulty as financial news was very dispiriting. Due to the Korean War and the US demand for industrial goods the total cost for imports shot up markedly. This caused a balance of payments problem and the pound sterling plummeted once again. The cold winter exacerbated the economy even further as another coal shortage took place. It seemed that the British people had to deal with the rationing of certain items, but the defeated Germany did not. Further, by 1952 Mau Mau uprisings in Kenya began to take their toll causing London to face another external challenge.
The British strategy toward the United States was to stress the anti-communism fear in dealing with Egypt and Iran. In Egypt, King Farouk was a disaster and the British feared for the Suez Canal. In Iran, the English fear centered around the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company which had been ripping off Teheran for decades. An attempt to ameliorate the situation came to naught as the company was nationalized and eventually in 1953 the British and American staged a coup that overthrew the elected Prime Minister, Mohamed Mossadegh. In Egypt nationalism would also become a major force that London could not contain resulting in the 1952 Free Officers Movement that brought to power Gamel Abdul Nasser. In each instance Washington took on an even more important role, and some have argued that the CIA was complicit in fostering a change in the Egyptian government. In addition, Dwight Eisenhower became president and John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State. Despite newly elected Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s hope that the World War II relationship could be rekindled, Eisenhower saw the British as colonialists who were hindering US foreign policy, in addition the relationship between Dulles and British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden was at rock bottom. It became increasingly clear that the Eisenhower administration wanted to avoid being perceived as acting in concert with Britain in dealing with colonial issues, except in the case of Iran which the United States is still paying for because of its actions.
Regarding Indochina, the United States and England could not reach any demarche as regards the plight of the French visa vie the Vietminh, particularly as the battle of Dienbienphu played out. Leebaert does an excellent job recounting the play by play between Dulles and Eden, Eisenhower and Churchill as the US and England saw their relations splintering as negotiations and the resulting recriminations proved fruitless. This inability to come together over Southeast Asia would have grave implications in other areas.
In another region, the Eisenhower administration would embark on a strategy to create some sort of Middle East Defense Organization to hinder Soviet penetration. This strategy, whether called a “Northern Tier” or the “Baghdad Pact” of Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran or other nomenclatures created difficulties with Britain who sought to use such an alliance as a vehicle to maintain their influence in the region, particularly in Jordan and Iraq. British machinations would irritate Washington as Eden and company resented American pressure to withdraw from the Suez Canal Base and other issues. The result would be an alliance between England, France, and Israel to topple Nasser in Egypt. The alliance was misconceived and would evolve into a break between the United States and its Atlantic allies even to the effect of the Eisenhower administration working behind the scenes to topple the Eden government and bring about the Eisenhower Doctrine signaling that the British had lost its leadership position and was no longer considered a “major power.”
I must point out that I have written my own monograph that deals with major aspects of Leebaert’s thesis, DAWN OVER SUEZ: THE RISE OF AMERICAN POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1953-1957. My own research concludes that the United States actively worked to replace Britain as the dominant force in the Middle East as early as May 1953 when John F. Dulles visited the region and came back appalled by British colonialism. Leebaert leaves out a great deal in discussing the period; the role of the US in forcing Churchill into agreeing to the Heads of Agreement to withdraw from the Suez Canal Base; the failure of secret project Alpha and the Anderson Mission to bring about a rapprochement between Israel and Egypt and its implications for US policy; the disdain that the Americans viewed Eden, the extent of American ire at the British for undercutting their attempts at a Middle East Defense Organization by their actions in Iraq and Jordan; the role of US anger over the Suez invasion because it ruined a coup set to take place in Syria; and the Eisenhower administrations machinations behind the scenes to remove Eden as Prime Minister to be replaced by Harold Macmillan. In addition, the author makes a series of statements that are not supported by any citations; i.e.; Eisenhower’s support for finding a way to fund the Aswan Dam after Nasser had nationalized the Suez Canal; attempts to poison Nasser etc.
Overall however, Leebaert has written a monograph that should raise many eyebrows for those who have accepted the Cold War narrative of the last six decades. There are many instances where he raises questions, provides answers that force the reader to conclude that these issues should be reexamined considering his work. At a time when the United States is struggling to implement a consistent worldview in the realm of foreign policy it is important for policy makers to consider the plight of the British Empire following World War II and how Washington’s inability to confront world issues in a reasoned and measured way and develop a long term strategy fostered a pattern that has created many difficulties that continue to dog us today.
December 9, 2025
I can't help but give this book five stars - it probably should get more because it is a wonderful example of what good history writing is - fluent, readable and with fascinating things to say based on first rate research in the archives. Anything you think you know about the cold war and in particularly the about how the USA 'took on' the role of worldwide military and police commitments as a result of the UK's 'abandonment' of it's great power status has to be forgotten as wrong - it is a myth - and the failure to understand what actually happened between the end of WWII and Suez helps explain an awful lot of what has been done so badly by recent by US government's and their toadies like Tony Blair in the UK.
It also destroys the much propagated idea that America was actively seeking ways to undermine and destroy the British empire. America didn't want the empire undermined but they also couldn't understand why Britain made such a mess of their imperial project.
An important fascinating book and one that supersedes almost all previous histories of that period.
It also destroys the much propagated idea that America was actively seeking ways to undermine and destroy the British empire. America didn't want the empire undermined but they also couldn't understand why Britain made such a mess of their imperial project.
An important fascinating book and one that supersedes almost all previous histories of that period.
Read
January 4, 2023In the 1950s, the British ambassador to the US remarked that ‘Americans don’t do grand strategy.’ This book convincingly makes that case, zooming in on the post war years until 1957.
Most interestingly, this book clearly demonstrates that the UK did not simply abandon its empire, but instead worked hard to rehabilitate it after WW2. It did not hand the reigns of global leadership to the Americans, but instead thought of the US as the junior partner until roughly the Suez crisis. And treated them accordingly. It is a deeply interesting historical revisionism.
The writing loses its focus at several times, particularly at the end and on certain Middle Eastern themes. But overall, a sharply argued case that has made me think differently about the post war period.
Most interestingly, this book clearly demonstrates that the UK did not simply abandon its empire, but instead worked hard to rehabilitate it after WW2. It did not hand the reigns of global leadership to the Americans, but instead thought of the US as the junior partner until roughly the Suez crisis. And treated them accordingly. It is a deeply interesting historical revisionism.
The writing loses its focus at several times, particularly at the end and on certain Middle Eastern themes. But overall, a sharply argued case that has made me think differently about the post war period.
March 3, 2026
A long and very in depth look at how America became one of the two greatest superpowers in the world. Common knowledge is that the US took on the role of global leadership immediately after WWII ended, but Mr. Leebaert shows us that one, Britain was still in charge of the world for almost a decade while America learned the ropes of Great Power Diplomacy, and that it was not a foretold conclusion that America would reign supreme. It took a combination of smart leadership by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations to steer the ship in favor of the US, combined with the stubbornness that the British exhibited trying to deny that their time on top, or at least as equal to the United States had come to a close. An insightful book, Mr. Leebaret likes the moves the Truman administration did more in my mind that what the Eisenhower administration did, considering that 80% of the book focuses on his presidency. A few times, the book did ramble a bit, but it was still an insightful book that showed that hubris, prestige, and unwillingness to read the writing on the wall, was the downfall of the British Empire. Excellent book.
October 10, 2022
Overall, I absolutely love this work! Derek Leebaert is well informed and does an excellent job of challenging the traditionally held notion that the United States surged out of WWII in order to become a dominant global force while the British Empire quietly slinked away. Leebaert shows that the actuality of these events is much more messy, with the United States blundering around trying to figure out their place in the world.
I only have three complains
1) Leebaert has a very odd fixation on heights. Almost every time a new figure is introduced, Leebaert gives us their exact height. I don't think it takes away from my enjoyment of the work or anything, but it is noticeable enough to be distracting.
2) there are some slight factual errors. At one point, for instance, Leebaert asserts that the F-86 Sabre was vastly outclassed by Soviet MiGs in Korea as an operational failure of the United States Military as they assumed global power. This is not correct, as the F-86 Sabre preformed favorably, maintaining a positive kill ratio even against well trained Soviet pilots.
3) Leebaert makes multiple assertions that challenge prevailing historical narratives without doing his due diligence to dispel the established history. He claims that Korea was actually a dramatic failure for the United States without actually backing that claim up beyond the failed push into Korea. Additionally, his epilogue is nothing more than saber rattling about the inevitability of China overtaking America as a global power. Such speculation is not really appropriate to attach to a work of serious history.
Other than that though, great work! I learned a lot about the Truman administration and British politics that I hadn't known before!
I only have three complains
1) Leebaert has a very odd fixation on heights. Almost every time a new figure is introduced, Leebaert gives us their exact height. I don't think it takes away from my enjoyment of the work or anything, but it is noticeable enough to be distracting.
2) there are some slight factual errors. At one point, for instance, Leebaert asserts that the F-86 Sabre was vastly outclassed by Soviet MiGs in Korea as an operational failure of the United States Military as they assumed global power. This is not correct, as the F-86 Sabre preformed favorably, maintaining a positive kill ratio even against well trained Soviet pilots.
3) Leebaert makes multiple assertions that challenge prevailing historical narratives without doing his due diligence to dispel the established history. He claims that Korea was actually a dramatic failure for the United States without actually backing that claim up beyond the failed push into Korea. Additionally, his epilogue is nothing more than saber rattling about the inevitability of China overtaking America as a global power. Such speculation is not really appropriate to attach to a work of serious history.
Other than that though, great work! I learned a lot about the Truman administration and British politics that I hadn't known before!
May 3, 2019
Derek Leebaert has written a cogent book on the uneven ascendancy of the US in supplanting the British empire in the post war era. Grand Improvisation chronicles the challenges and real tensions between these two powers between 1945 and 1957. The denouement was the 1956 Suez crisis in which Eisenhower and Dulles forced France, Israel and the U.K. to back down. The British empire never recovered
February 10, 2019
This covers a little understood time of history from the end of WWII to the United States involvement around the world.
January 28, 2026
This book analyzes the interactions and roles of two major Western powers (the United Kingdom and the U.S.) at the end of the Second World War, until 1957.
Contrary to what many believe, the U.S. was not the only dominant power at the end of the war. She had to contend, not only with the Soviet Union, but with the U.K., which had colonies spread across the globe - and a huge network of governments and contacts built up over hundreds of years. The only area the U.S. was able to influence was Latin America.
The U.S. was ignorant concerning the Middle East and Africa. And, of course, the Middle East, with its vast oil reserves, was becoming crucial. Egypt was still a colony of the U.K., and with it, the Suez Canal. The creation of the new state of Israel in 1948 added more complexity to this fraught region.
The author persuasively argues that the U.S. was under the influence of the U.K. and its outspoken Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin. The British still had a very strong naval presence and their aviation industry was in some ways superior to the U.S. up until the mid-1950s. They also produced their own atomic bomb in 1952. In other words – both the British and the Americans were sometimes cooperating and at other times clashing for world power. Both opposed the growing power of the Soviet Union.
The U.S. was also worried that it would go into an economic depression after the war, much like it did after the First World War. Every economic downturn brought predictions of doom and gloom.
Hanging over all this was an assumption that World War III could erupt at any time. This only accelerated the buildup of atomic and nuclear weapons. It was also the British with their colonies in the Middle East and Far East (Malaya, Singapore, Hong Kong…) who feared the spread of communism and pushed hard for the U.S. to contribute money, arms, and troops to withstand this so-called spread of communism. The British obsessed on the domino theory of one country after another (namely, their colonial outposts) succumbing to communism. It was as if nationalism hardly existed – and the British Empire was threatened not by the aspirations of a people to overthrow the domination of a foreign power, but by a world-wide communist conspiracy emanating from Moscow.
The book focuses on the struggle of Britain and the U.S., and to a lesser extent the Soviet Union, during the formative years after the war. It was only after the Korean War, with the significant contribution of American arms and troops, that U.S. ascendency began to overtake the British Empire. The disastrous military attempt by Britain to regain control of Egypt in late 1956 announced the end of British predominance in the Middle East.
Beginning in the mid-1950s, West Germany, Japan, and France were well on their way to economic recovery – and starting to compete successfully on the world stage.
As some stated, the Commonwealth was merely a collection of former colonies that exercised their own sovereignty, despite the wishes of London.
Page 481 my edition, Louis St. Laurent Canadian Prime Minister in 1957
The era when the supermen of Europe could govern the whole world is coming pretty much to a close.
The author covers a wide-range of global events (from Vietnam to Guatemala) and illustrates well the dynamic personalities and clashes. One individual who comes under considerable criticism is the American diplomat, George Keenan. The author had little regard for his writings and pronouncements on the Cold War (I was wondering if there was something personal). Eisenhower is treated rather well, but this book is mostly concerned with foreign affairs.
Contrary to what many believe, the U.S. was not the only dominant power at the end of the war. She had to contend, not only with the Soviet Union, but with the U.K., which had colonies spread across the globe - and a huge network of governments and contacts built up over hundreds of years. The only area the U.S. was able to influence was Latin America.
The U.S. was ignorant concerning the Middle East and Africa. And, of course, the Middle East, with its vast oil reserves, was becoming crucial. Egypt was still a colony of the U.K., and with it, the Suez Canal. The creation of the new state of Israel in 1948 added more complexity to this fraught region.
The author persuasively argues that the U.S. was under the influence of the U.K. and its outspoken Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin. The British still had a very strong naval presence and their aviation industry was in some ways superior to the U.S. up until the mid-1950s. They also produced their own atomic bomb in 1952. In other words – both the British and the Americans were sometimes cooperating and at other times clashing for world power. Both opposed the growing power of the Soviet Union.
The U.S. was also worried that it would go into an economic depression after the war, much like it did after the First World War. Every economic downturn brought predictions of doom and gloom.
Hanging over all this was an assumption that World War III could erupt at any time. This only accelerated the buildup of atomic and nuclear weapons. It was also the British with their colonies in the Middle East and Far East (Malaya, Singapore, Hong Kong…) who feared the spread of communism and pushed hard for the U.S. to contribute money, arms, and troops to withstand this so-called spread of communism. The British obsessed on the domino theory of one country after another (namely, their colonial outposts) succumbing to communism. It was as if nationalism hardly existed – and the British Empire was threatened not by the aspirations of a people to overthrow the domination of a foreign power, but by a world-wide communist conspiracy emanating from Moscow.
The book focuses on the struggle of Britain and the U.S., and to a lesser extent the Soviet Union, during the formative years after the war. It was only after the Korean War, with the significant contribution of American arms and troops, that U.S. ascendency began to overtake the British Empire. The disastrous military attempt by Britain to regain control of Egypt in late 1956 announced the end of British predominance in the Middle East.
Beginning in the mid-1950s, West Germany, Japan, and France were well on their way to economic recovery – and starting to compete successfully on the world stage.
As some stated, the Commonwealth was merely a collection of former colonies that exercised their own sovereignty, despite the wishes of London.
Page 481 my edition, Louis St. Laurent Canadian Prime Minister in 1957
The era when the supermen of Europe could govern the whole world is coming pretty much to a close.
The author covers a wide-range of global events (from Vietnam to Guatemala) and illustrates well the dynamic personalities and clashes. One individual who comes under considerable criticism is the American diplomat, George Keenan. The author had little regard for his writings and pronouncements on the Cold War (I was wondering if there was something personal). Eisenhower is treated rather well, but this book is mostly concerned with foreign affairs.
September 5, 2025
A very interesting book. The research is prodigious (although the author cites his own work a bit too often for my taste) and the writing is smooth. Mr. Leebaert sets forth two main premises: (1) that the United States did not truly begin to assume world leadership until the outbreak of the Korean conflict in 1950 and didn't fully embrace the role until the Suez debacle in 1956, and (2) that Britain remained a major world power from the end of WWII until Suez. He convinced me of the first but definitely not of the second. Certainly the British wanted to believe they were still a world power and at times tried to fulfill that role but as Leebaert himself shows, the post-war British economy simply could not support the level of spending that was required to maintain superpower status in the nuclear age. The British did a good job of keeping up appearances, which sometimes was enough to fool Washington, but the substance wasn't there.
The author is admirably even-handed when assessing the personalities of the era. Both Truman and Eisenhower receive fair and largely positive reviews for their leadership in very challenging times. The quiet skills of John Foster Dulles get some overdue appreciation; Dean Acheson's strengths and weaknesses are discussed without rancor. Congressional Republicans are not treated like rubes as per usual. A few people get the needle: Mr. Leebaert has no love for George Kennan (and I agree) and Winston Churchill's post-war performance gets a largely negative assessment. On the other hand, the author clearly enjoys burnishing the reputations of largely forgotten figures like British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and US Treasury Secretary James Snyder.
My most significant criticism of the book would be that the author can sometimes assume an "I'm the smartest guy in the room" persona that becomes grating, and he spends entirely too much time sniping at other historians, particularly in the footnotes. That being said, I would recommend this book unhesitatingly to anyone with a serious interest in the period.
The author is admirably even-handed when assessing the personalities of the era. Both Truman and Eisenhower receive fair and largely positive reviews for their leadership in very challenging times. The quiet skills of John Foster Dulles get some overdue appreciation; Dean Acheson's strengths and weaknesses are discussed without rancor. Congressional Republicans are not treated like rubes as per usual. A few people get the needle: Mr. Leebaert has no love for George Kennan (and I agree) and Winston Churchill's post-war performance gets a largely negative assessment. On the other hand, the author clearly enjoys burnishing the reputations of largely forgotten figures like British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and US Treasury Secretary James Snyder.
My most significant criticism of the book would be that the author can sometimes assume an "I'm the smartest guy in the room" persona that becomes grating, and he spends entirely too much time sniping at other historians, particularly in the footnotes. That being said, I would recommend this book unhesitatingly to anyone with a serious interest in the period.
March 21, 2020
Leebaert argues that the transition of power between the UK and the US in the aftermath of World War II did not occur as smoothly as expected. Britain - even if plagued by economic and financial troubles - was able to maintain its status as superpower well into the 1950s. This status was based on Britain's technological advancements, its military power, and the prestige of its empire. This, Leebaert argues, was well understood in Washington. The US in Leebaert's view behaved until the mid-1950s as an unwilling and timid superpower. The turning point, Leebaert argues, came with the Suez crisis.
The account is very precise and the book is, perhaps, too long. One element of Leebaert's argument is convincing: the UK did not happily cede supremacy to the United States and neither was the US an empire waiting to expand. Less convincing, however, is the suggestion that, even in objective terms, the UK was not in decline from the immediate aftermath of WWII.
The book is a good overview of the history of the 'Special Relationship' between the late 1940s and early 1950s. The book is less strong in its discussion of the covert side of the Special Relationship and of the covert operations undertaken by the two countries.
The account is very precise and the book is, perhaps, too long. One element of Leebaert's argument is convincing: the UK did not happily cede supremacy to the United States and neither was the US an empire waiting to expand. Less convincing, however, is the suggestion that, even in objective terms, the UK was not in decline from the immediate aftermath of WWII.
The book is a good overview of the history of the 'Special Relationship' between the late 1940s and early 1950s. The book is less strong in its discussion of the covert side of the Special Relationship and of the covert operations undertaken by the two countries.
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September 6, 2021Great work of historical revisionism. Leebaert's depiction of the 12 years following the Second World War presents a different story than what we learned in history class: the British did not, in its exhaustion from fighting Hitler, relinquish itself to a second-rate power, nor did the United States eagerly take up the mantle of global leadership. Grand Improvisation: America Confronts the British Superpower, 1945-1957 suggests that the transformation was more subtle: a slowly bankrupting English Commonwealth seeking to pass off some responsibility to the United States and an American foreign policy establishment that saw the British overseas presence as key to their interests--and a fitting substitute to American boots on the ground. Even as far ahead as the Korean War the American public had no interest in over-extending itself, and it desired to let the English maintain strategic supremacy (especially in the Middle East). It's a story of partnership between an empire in decline and a superpower on the rise.
May 2, 2023
Well-researched and comprehensive book about the history of America's involvement in the Middle East. Leebaert's writing style is engaging and accessible, making even complex political concepts easy to understand.
One of the strengths of this book is how it provides context for current events by tracing back decades of American foreign policy decisions. However, at times, I found it to be overly detailed and long-winded, which made it a bit of a slog to get through certain sections.
One of the strengths of this book is how it provides context for current events by tracing back decades of American foreign policy decisions. However, at times, I found it to be overly detailed and long-winded, which made it a bit of a slog to get through certain sections.
March 26, 2021
I love the concept of this book but it's written in a very dad-history way that glosses over a lot of colonial conflict. Decolonization is a central focus of this book but the author is very selective about which pieces to highlight for the story he's telling about the transition from UK to US global supremacy
January 1, 2020
4.5, needed an editor, but excellent
March 25, 2021
A new look at the Cold War......from British vs. American eyes......a very detailed and thorough narrative.....I have read Mr. Leebaert's other books and they have great historical insight....
December 27, 2025
Fascinating perspective on history
November 25, 2020
An interesting book but its very much for people who are interested in politics. I felt the first half of the book was quite hard going but then, maybe as I had kind of got used to all the 'players' involved, the second half was a lot easier to follow. Also the second half of the book is where things actually started to happen, in the first half it is very much agreements on paper and loans and grants etc. Later on its actual events like troops going into Vietnam and Korea, take overs of businesses by governments. As an English person its kind of a depressing story really of how after two world wars Britain was struggling to hold on to its empire and position in the world as a superpower. By the end of the book Britain has fallen from a superpower to at best a special ally of the US (even this is questionable), before the US asked permission from Britain to act, now the US do as they please. Its interesting though as it all leads to the cold war, war in Vietnam, why the British weren't involved in Vietnam and the division of Germany. I feel like I need to keep reading now to learn what happened next!
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