What do you think?
Rate this book


307 pages, Hardcover
First published July 11, 2008
“When strong emotions are involved, people tend to focus on the badness of the outcome rather than on the probability that the outcome will occur.”
“If we are to act as rational risk minimizers, the current preoccupation with terrorism should not blind us to what are historically two much more likely threats: another mega - war and another pandemic (possibly two) during the next 50 years. Early interventions to defuse emerging causes of potentially massive armed confrontations, and better preparedness for a major pandemic, would be the most rewarding risk-reducing steps. We can forget (relatively speaking) about near-Earth asteroids, supervolcanoes, and monster tsunamis, but we must not underestimate the chances of another mega-war, and we must remember that unpredictably mutating viruses will be always with us. That is why we should be constantly upgrading preparedness to deal with a new pandemic.”
“But the greatest reward of the new quantitative models is the heuristic benefit their construction brings to the modelers, not their ability to capture anything approaching future complex realities. As for the standard applied forecasting models, they are nothing but series of ephemeral failures: thousands of forecasts are constantly issued by numerous chief economists and think tanks, only to be superseded by equally pointless exercises days or weeks later.”
“This perspective illuminates the irreplaceable importance of ecosystemic services for human survival and hence, obviously, for any economic activity. The global economy is merely a subsystem of the biosphere, and it is easy to enumerate the natural services without which it would be impossible, but it is meaningless to rank their importance because they are interconnected with a multitude of feedbacks.”
"does not have to watch inane TV shows or read supermarket tabloids in order to feel that public mores and tastes are driven toward the lowest common denominator."
“Trends may thus seem obvious, but because they have a multitude of drivers whose importance shifts constantly, the resulting mix is beyond anyone’s grasp. So, when contemplating the great U.S. retreat, it is useful to recall that historians have identified scores of causes for the decline of the Roman Empire (Rollins 1983; Tainter 1989), and only a naive mind would rank German tribes ahead of debased currency, or imperial overstretch ahead of ostentatious, consumption, in that typology of the causes of Rome’s fall. This is also the reason that even when large corporations and large nations are fully aware of unfolding trends, they are rarely able to shape them to their long-term advantage.”