The Pulitzer Prize–winning author reveals how Lincoln won the Civil War and invented the role of commander in chief as we know it
As we celebrate the bicentennial of Lincoln's birth, this study by preeminent, bestselling Civil War historian James M. McPherson provides a rare, fresh take on one of the most enigmatic figures in American history. Tried by War offers a revelatory (and timely) portrait of leadership during the greatest crisis our nation has ever endured. Suspenseful and inspiring, this is the story of how Lincoln, with almost no previous military experience before entering the White House, assumed the powers associated with the role of commander in chief, and through his strategic insight and will to fight changed the course of the war and saved the Union.
James M. McPherson, Ph.D. (Johns Hopkins University, 1963; B.A., Gustavus Adolphus College (St. Peter, Minnesota), 1958) is an American Civil War historian, and the George Henry Davis '86 Professor Emeritus of United States History at Princeton University. He received the Pulitzer Prize for Battle Cry of Freedom, his most famous book. He was the president of the American Historical Association in 2003, and is a member of the editorial board of Encyclopædia Britannica.
This is a concise, well-written primer on Abraham Lincoln and his conduct in waging the Civil War, that hits upon all the important points with clear explanations and analysis. There’s nothing bad about it, per se, but I found it rather too concise and elementary, and didn’t think it really lived up to the promise of its premise.
In the book’s preface, McPherson gently knocks other Lincoln historians for focusing their attention on specific, sometimes esoteric subjects like “Lincoln and the South, religion, politics, Reconstruction, civil rights… his economic ideas, humor, Indian policy and slavery,” suggesting that too few have focused on Lincoln’s role as commander in chief during the war. What he seemingly fails to consider is that the very reason so many modern historians have focused on such specific topics is that the obvious topics like Lincoln as commander in chief have been somewhat well-picked over by now.
Nevertheless, McPherson sets out to explore Lincoln’s "five functions as commander in chief - policy, national strategy, military strategy, operations, and tactics." In establishing this as the book’s framework in the introduction, and reiterating it in the epilogue, it’s a promising premise.
But it gets a little lost in the narrative itself, which reads more like a condensed, sometimes superficial summary of the war. With few exceptions, most of what we're told about Lincoln as commander in chief are the familiar stories of him fretting about his generals, pacing back and forth while awaiting news from the front, and lamenting the many battlefield setbacks until Grant emerges on the scene and saves the day.
McPherson does touch on the contrasts between how Lincoln’s generals saw the war and how he had to see it. Not only did the self-taught commander in chief have to oversee military strategy and tactics, but he had to balance military and political considerations in a way his generals didn’t, in trying to maintain public support for the war. McPherson offers a mild critique of Lincoln as an "armchair commander in chief," who didn’t always see things as his generals did, perhaps “fail(ing) to appreciate that logistical problems and frequent rains slowed their movements". But managing the war from a distance also allowed Lincoln to understand things that his generals didn’t, or wouldn’t, such as the fact that "Union armies were bogged down by the very abundance of their supplies."
Overall, though, while it may be true that few books have zeroed in on Lincoln’s role in managing the war, there are few facts and few insights in here that aren’t well-covered in other, longer Lincoln biographies or Civil War histories. I can’t really call this book a synthesis, because McPherson does cite plenty of primary sources. But they’re familiar sources, recounting familiar tales, so the book does nonetheless end up reading like a synthesis.
Perhaps this book was meant for readers who are less familiar with Lincoln and the Civil War. So if those readers come away with a better understanding of both by engaging with this rather quick read, then great. But that’s not really how the book seemed to be pitched. While it’s a good enough read, it seems to me unlikely that anyone who does have more familiarity with Lincoln and the Civil War will come away from this book with new or deeper insights into either.
From the author of Battle Cry of Freedom (my personal favourite Civil War book), Tried by War focuses on Abraham Lincoln's role as Commander in Chief, an aspect of Lincoln's life that James McPherson unconvincingly claims has been neglected by other historians. While the book is very good as an introduction to Lincoln and the U.S. Civil War, being written by one of the great Civil War historians, there isn't anything that -- so far as I can tell -- will be news to readers who've dipped into the work that authors like David Herbert Donald (Lincoln) and Doris Kearns Goodwin (Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln) have previously put out. Of course, McPherson's work here is much more concise, and if you're not in the mood for a heavy Lincoln tome, this does a great job of addressing the challenges Lincoln faced and conquered during his tumultuous time.
I loved how this focused on Lincoln as Commander in Chief. I don't always feel like reading an entire 1,000+ page biography. This was 270 pages short and focused in on Lincoln's relationship with his Generals and the tightrope he had to walk in order to get the public to accept the Emancipation Proclamation.
This book, well written, is authored by the eminent historian James McPherson. The focus is plainly stated at the outset (Page xiv): "In the vast literature on our sixteenth president, however, the amount of attention devoted to his role as commander in chief is disproportionately smaller than the actual percentage of time he spent on that task."
Lincoln's own military experience was slender, his 1832 service in the militia. However, as McPherson puts it (Page 5), he was ". . .a more hands-on commander in chief than any other president." He assumed or presided over five war-making functions (in declining order of importance, as the author judges matters): policy, national strategy, military strategy, operations, and tactics.
McPherson observes that Lincoln read a great deal about military issues, to become more informed and to develop grounding in strategy and tactics. Indeed, as the book argues, he needed to, since so many of his military leaders were passive and did not "take charge." Thus, the thesis of this book makes sense, given the context of the times while Lincoln served as president.
The book covers the war, year by year, Lincoln's frustrations with his military commanders, his desire to find someone who had "it," the will and ability to triumph, to share Lincoln's vision of what had to be done. Of course, in the end, U. S. Grant and his subordinates, such as Sherman, Sheridan, and Thomas played that role, after the years of failure with the likes of Buell, Halleck, Rosecrans, Sigel, Banks, Butler, and so on.
For those not so familiar with the Civil War, this book will be most useful. For those steeped in the study of the Civil War, there is not a great deal that is new. However, what such readers know is put into useful context, as per the book's focus. So, in the end, this is a handy volume, especially for those who are not deeply read in the relevant works. For those well read on the subject, of less interest. . .
From an acclaimed Civil War historian comes this nuanced look at Lincoln as commander-in-chief of the nation's military. The book focuses on some of the struggles the president faced during the war and the tough decisions he had to make regarding military affairs as well as civil liberties and Constitutional rights. If you haven't read any of McPherson's other works, that's ok; this book works as a stand alone. But if you want a great overview of the war, go back and read Battle Cry of Freedom. These two works complement each other extremely well.
Mr McPherson has presented a very different view of the genius that was Lincoln. Now known for his emancipation proclaimation, Lincoln did not advance freeing the slaves as his first priority during his administration. Instead, his driving ambition was union, and he was willing to fight to save the Union.
As the civil war progressed, the President and the Union Army suffered several discouraging losses and in fact were near defeat in 1862-3. As a military tactic, Lincoln first declared slaves as spoils of war, along with other southern property. This allowed new army recruites as well as northern industry labor for the war effort. Lincoln, always symphathetic to emancipation but realizing it was politically out of reach, now saw an opportunity to accomplish both victory and freedom. By interpreting new constitutional powers for the Presidency never before exercised by prior Presidents, he skillfully led our nation through the devastating civil war years, preserving both the union and freeing the slaves.
These accomplishments place Lincoln at the very top of the list of US Presidents. His attributes of intelligence, communication ability, sensitivity, and political shrewdness were highly complimented with his skill as Commander in Chief. No other President has demonstrated this set of skills and Lincoln's success as our nations leader. Reading McPherson's book will give anyone a new perspective of this great man. This book receives my highest recommendation for your reading time.
Disappointing; the book offers far too much linear, chronological narrative, and far too little thematic analysis of Lincoln's performance, his decisionmaking, and his evolution as a wartime commander-in-chief. This is an adequate work of introductory popular history, but there is little here of any value to anyone who is even glancingly familiar with Lincoln's presidency or the conduct of the Union war effort.
On the plus side, the book does offer a surprisingly sympathetic, though still devastating, portrait of Gen. McClellan, a figure who has too often been portrayed in Civil War scholarship as a simplistic caricature of abused hero or villainous scoundrel to score points one way or another on matters of strategy and policy. But as soon as McClellan's military service ends, so too does the author's interest in him, and we are offered very little analysis, or even description, of McClellan as presidential candidate, or of how facing McClellan affected Lincoln's political and command decisionmaking.
I’ve read a few books about Lincoln and probably 40 books on the Civil War but still felt like I would enjoy a book specific to Lincoln as Commander in Chief.
To Civil War buffs this book has a lot that is familiar with Lincoln’s frustrations over his generals delays and his perceived lack of urgency from them. Most famous of course was Meade not pursuing the Confederates after the victory of Gettysburg.
I find the strategic debates fascinating even though I think it’s a little unfair to criticize the men in the arena from hindsight. Sure it would have been great to push the advantage in some spots but I do believe sometimes the generals know more than the politicians even when that politician is Lincoln.
Lack of supplies, fear of stretched supply lines and troop exhaustion being just a few considerations after a big battle.
Given that there are at least a good 14,000 books that have been written about Abraham Lincoln, it is nonetheless remarkable that his role as commander and chief has received considerably less attention than other aspects of his life and presidency and behavior, not least because it was his job as commander-in-chief of the Union military forces that was the most decisive aspect of his presidency and that which took the most time. The author does a good job at discussing what it is that made the commander in chief different from the general in chief, although it must be admitted that sometimes Lincoln felt pressured to do both tasks because he lacked generals brave enough to take responsibility for executing the goal of defeating the Confederacy outright. Basically, the author takes the judgment of Lincoln that the president is in charge of setting the national and strategic goals of the war and the generals involved had responsibility for proposing and executing operations and appropriate battle tactics that would serve those goals. This seems straightforward enough, but it most not have been given the problems that generals had in both trying to exceed their role by undertaking political matters as well as failing to take sufficient responsibility in military matters.
This particular audiobook is eight discs long, and the book is by no means an excessively long one. Much of the material focuses on the beginning of the war and not nearly as much as one would expect towards the end, and the author focuses most of his attention, as might be expected, on the Eastern front. If the author has an agenda in pointing out the superiority of Lincoln as a strategist to many of his military officers, that agenda is an open one, and the author, for example, points out that Lincoln believed Confederate invasions or raids to be an opportunity for those armies to be defeated and even destroyed, and that he was pleased with those generals (Grant, Thomas, Sheridan) who were able to bring about these victories, as opposed to those whose delays prevented victories from being followed up in places like Antietam and Gettysburg. The author also makes effective use of Lincoln's t-mails as well as his willingness to back generals who were more aggressive in fighting the Confederacy even if there were a lot of casualties that resulted from it.
It is perhaps most telling that Lincoln's powers of Commander In Chief were utilized to a higher degree than they had been before largely because of the demands that fighting a successful civil war entailed. None of America's previous wars had been fought by someone who saw the sort of power that existed in the oath to preserve and maintain the republic. And yet while the Civil War was certainly a more closely fought and more internally conflicted war than any other in American history so far, it is telling that many future American presidents, from Wilson and FDR onward, pushed for greater restrictions on freedom than was the case even for Lincoln. What is also telling is that Lincoln had sound strategic goals and political goals for the Civil War. He recognized that it was an all or nothing war in which there could be no peace without victory, and was instrumental in shepherding along the change in Union war aims from reunion to reunion and the end of slavery as the war expanded in scope and unionist sentiment in the South was not found to be as high as previously hoped. If it is lamentable that the war was so destructive, it can hardly be blamed in Lincoln that it turned out to be so.
“Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief” is James McPherson’s 2008 biography focused on Lincoln’s role as the nation’s chief military strategist and tactician during the Civil War. McPherson is a historian, Professor Emeritus of History at Princeton University and a prolific author. His most notable work is “Battle Cry of Freedom” (the standard one-volume history of the Civil War) for which he received a Pulitzer Prize in 1989.
In the book’s preface, McPherson asserts that most Lincoln-related literature pays disproportionately less attention to Lincoln’s role as commander in chief than is deserved based on the time he devoted to that task. This, it seems, is his rationale for authoring “Tried by War.” And as promised, rather than writing “yet another” biography of Lincoln’s life, McPherson spends all 270 pages focused on Lincoln’s presidency – with the substantial majority focused on his prosecution of the war.
Notwithstanding his claim, the majority of the almost nine-thousand pages I’ve read on Lincoln the past three months (excluding chapters focused on Lincoln’s youth) was spent reviewing, discussing, and analyzing Lincoln’s role as commander in chief. But while I found McPherson’s justification for writing this book somewhat spurious, I was undeniably interested to experience this renowned Civil War historian’s perspective on a presidency consumed by war.
Happily, the book’s pace as well as the author’s insight into Lincoln’s management of the war are terrific. “Tried by War” is easy to read and understand, and proves consistently informative and entertaining. Where some Lincoln-oriented biographies become bogged down in dull explanations of war tactics or troop movements, this book appears calibrated for a younger, less patient audience.
However, little about McPherson’s book is truly unique. Given the author’s background, I expected deeper analysis and a richer, more robust interpretation of Lincoln’s actions during the war. Although McPherson frequently demonstrates his mastery of the subject, broad swaths of the commentary are superficial and breezy. And while the book contains new information concerning some of Lincoln’s military leaders and a few battles, none of it is important enough to alter the complexion of Lincoln I’ve gleaned from other biographies.
Readers seeking special insight into the war’s great battles, or overall military strategy, will also be disappointed. Although “Tried by War” is not intended as a Civil War primer (and makes no attempt to supplant the excellent “Battle Cry of Freedom”) McPherson’s focus is almost exclusively on Lincoln and his management of the war. The Battle of Gettysburg, for example, is dispatched in just two sentences.
Rather than writing a potent, fresh study of Lincoln’s life from an unconventional perspective it almost seems as though McPherson has taken a standard six- or seven-hundred page biography of Lincoln and condensed it dramatically by removing Lincoln’s pre-presidency and a great deal of the interaction with his mercurial cabinet members. Rather than seeing Lincoln from a new perspective, I simply saw Lincoln from only one perspective. Interesting though that perspective was, I find found the book limiting rather than revealing.
Overall, James McPherson’s “Tried by War” is an educational and entertaining book best suited for readers already acquainted with Lincoln who seek incremental insight into his management of the Civil War. For readers looking for a comprehensive cradle-to-grave analysis of Lincoln’s life and presidency, this book is clearly less appropriate. But for its intended purpose, “Tried by War” is usually satisfactory and sometimes extremely satisfying.
This is a book by the inestimable James McPherson, author of what remains the best single-volume history of the Civil War by far – Battle Cry of Freedom. Still a better and more illuminating book than many of the multivolume efforts to do the same thing. This book is not a general overview of the war and all issues related to it. Rather, it’s a look at Abraham Lincoln and his approach to military strategy during the course of the war. Or on a more personal level it’s a look at the relationship between him and his generals – a kind of companion to Doris Kearns Goodwin’s exceptional Team of Rivals.
I enjoyed this book because it looked at Lincoln the strategist and contrasted him with the strategies (if that is even the right term) conducted by his generals, who all seemed to think that war was just keeping the enemy off your soil and capturing their capital. Lincoln, on the other hand, sought from almost the beginning of the war to adopt a more aggressive strategy of destroying the rebel armies and removing their ability to conduct war. It was this strategy that led to his Emancipation Proclamation (to deprive rebels of slave workers and tap black manpower for Northern armies) and the gradual intensification of the war effort. Not that his strategy was the same since day one. McPherson does a very good job of tracing the progress of Lincoln’s ideas on strategy as they matured throughout the war.
McPherson also keeps a firm eye on the political implications of the war. McClellan and many of the top generals seem to have genuinely deluded themselves into thinking that military and civilian concerns were entirely separate. As if the political objectives of the war could be divorced from the military operations needed to achieve them. Little Mac treated political considerations as obstacles not to be overcome but to be ignored. His blindness seems especially unforgivable considering his long service in the business world. Lincoln, of course, needed to keep both considerations in mind and the biggest difficulty he had as commander-in-chief was in finding a general who was willing to recognize the same strategic objectives. Given the broader responsibilities of the president it’s hard to dispute that he should play a key role in determining the country’s strategy. Little Mac disagreed. That led to many of the Union’s problems.
I enjoyed this book, but it should not be read in isolation. This is a very narrow look at the president’s military role during the Civil War. For the military history of the war or a biography of the man you should look elsewhere. I do think that this book might work well with McPherson’s Embattled Rebel, which takes the same approach but from Jeff Davis’ side. Between them you’ll have a good account of what both sides were trying to do, if not perhaps how they set about doing it in battle.
McPherson never disappoints and this book is a focus on Lincoln's years in the White House as an engaged student and participant as the head of his own military. Often, Civil War books look at Lincoln as President, far from the battlefields and fretting in the White House as the news came in. McPherson places Lincoln's development as a military tactician at the forefront, as an autodidact of military strategy. The result is a revelation of Lincoln as military strategist, sometimes predicting and second guessing his generals accurately until Grant was placed in charge. In fact, once he starts criticizing McClellan, Lincoln is proved right by Little Mac's miscalculations in 1862. Remarkably, the American public agreed, voting for Lincoln over McClellan in the 1864 election. If you are interested in Lincoln as a military President, even with a fair amount of Civil War reading, this book will be a must read.
Both Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War have seen countless books devoted to them, from general biographies or histories to entire books focused on single speeches by Lincoln or single battles of the war. So, the idea of a book narrowly focused on Abraham Lincoln in his role as Commander in Chief is a good one, with a great deal of potential to take a unique view of Lincoln and the war. Unfortunately, in James M. McPherson's 2008 volume Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief, he doesn't really live up to the potential of the premise, instead delivering what reads more like a general history of the Union war effort.
McPherson opens with setting up five main ideas about what a Commander in Chief has to be responsible for. Unfortunately, I can't recall what the five things are, since McPherson then completely forgets to mention them (not even so much as a "Lincoln's decision with X addressed Goal Y") until the epilogue. It's just sloppy writing. Without calling back to the five main points he went to such lengths to detail in the opening, McPherson seems to drift in his narrative and doesn't really get back to the premise of the book.
What McPherson gives us is a fairly general account of the Civil War from the Union side. He honestly doesn't even seem very focused on Lincoln. He spends a great deal of time in the field with the cavalcade of Union generals and in the thick of various fights. But those don't really have anything directly to do with Lincoln, much less his role as Commander in Chief. Detailing how Lincoln made his decisions about the war would be more what I'm expecting, but that's not what we get. Reading time after time how each Union general before Grant screwed up I can do with pretty much any Civil War history.
Even though it's a general biography of Lincoln, I found David Herbert Donald's Lincoln to be much better at the stated goal of Tried by War than Tried by War is. The approach Donald took was to look only at what Lincoln knew when making his decisions. Donald never goes to any battlefields in his biography, save for when Lincoln himself occasionally visited the Army of the Potomac. After all, the specifics of what happened when the battles started were out of Lincoln's hands. All Lincoln could be responsible for were the commands he gave the generals, not how those generals carried them out. McPherson really could have benefited from taking this same approach. It would have provided much more focus to Tried by War and kept the book to its stated premise, instead of getting bogged down as badly as McClellan leading the Army of the Potomac.
McPherson doesn't really seem to evaluate Lincoln's decisions when he does talk about them, either. Until the epilogue, there's no mention of whether or not Lincoln's suspicion of Habeas Corpus was justified or necessary, or any discussion of if his choices for general in chief could have been better, for example. For a book that is supposed to be evaluating Lincoln as Commander in Chief, those issues need to be the central conversation, not simply confined to the epilogue.
I listened to Penguin Audio's 2009 recording of Tried by War, read by George Guidall. Guidall was adequate, but had issues. The main problem with his reading is that he uses a single voice. Even though Tried by War is a history and not a novel and doesn't have characters per se, you still need to be able to hear the difference when something is being quoted. I could forgive Guidall for not inventing voices for Lincoln, McClellan, et al, but he should have still had a consistently identifiable tone for quotes. He would sometimes have a certain inflection when a quote started, but not always, and it was hard to tell at times when the quote ended and McPherson picked up, because there was no closing inflection. The audio production runs approximately 9.5 hours.
Tried by War is a perfectly solid history of the Union effort in the Civil War. Unfortunately, it aimed to be so much more than that, and made no real effort to reach its own stated goal. McPherson missed a chance for a really great book here.
This was challenging for me, because previously, I had not studied the American Civil War in depth; and this book presupposes a level of familiarity that I did not have. Not that it leaves out things that you need to know, just that people and events are brought into the conversation as if everyone in the room is already aware of them. I don’t think this is a bad thing, it’s just that I wouldn’t consider this an entry-level book. It’s not a general overview of the war and events. So that is what is not, what is it? This book is focused on a specific aspect of the war and Lincoln’s life, and that is the politics and strategy of conducting the war from the Union side, highlighting Lincoln’s role in it. At first I struggled, especially because much of the early war was an exercise in frustration, all about political maneuvering and there wasn’t actually much concrete action. But there came a tipping point where the leaders with differing agendas were filtered out and Lincoln’s vision of an active all-out war to reunite the Union, and by that time also abolish slavery, was carried out by energetic generals. So…. I learned and had my mind opened to a ton of stuff reading this! Not only did I improve on my understanding and knowledge of strategy both political and military, but I also had my mind opened to perspectives that I lacked. First the military perspective - as a borderline pacifist, I have only begun to take into account or mull over this perspective with more nuance and consideration. Also, closer to my natural instincts, I felt like my perspective of different individual and group experiences of the war was expanded. The biggest opening of my perspective was brought on by the section of the book that talked about the reality of being a “colored troop” after they began to exist in the army. The extra level of danger from the southern soldiers and leaders, based on the confederacy not defining them as soldiers was something that was completely a new thought for me. I realize, that it is obvious if one thinks about it, but I hadn’t. I think those individuals were very very brave. Additionally, I had my sympathy for all of the people living in the areas of warfare expanded. Not because this book really goes into the details of the destruction (that is not its focus), but because the destruction is described from an aloof perspective with numbers and percentages, and also celebrated. It is the perspective of military leadership - divorced from the individual suffering, and considered strategically. It felt like a very tragic perspective to me, all that devastation summed up in a few numbers; I could not help but have images of many suffering individuals in my mind. Overall, I think this is well-written and in the style of history-writing that I am interested in: presentation of facts as we can know them with some inclusion of how we know them; when speculation is brought in, it is acknowledged as speculation. It has enough of a focus that it weaves together into a coherent bit of the tapestry of history, with a broad enough perspective that the bit can be linked up with other bits in the tapestry. There is an effort to look at the history without placing an overlay on top of it, laying out what happened and why (as far as we currently know). One critique I have of the book is that it’s title implies that the main figure of study is Lincoln, but I found that the focus was decidedly not personally on Lincoln, in the sense that one does not really get to know him very much from this book. The focus is more on the ensemble of the war leadership on the Union side during the war and their activities. I do feel like this work has a definite perspective, which is in sympathy with Lincoln’s. The author expresses the same impatience with the generals in the beginning (particularly McClellan) as Lincoln, due to their defensive and non-aggressive approaches. It certainly seems that those generals had a different goal and mindset than Lincoln and than our modern thought. I would be interested to learn more about their thinking from closer to their perspective and closer to the perspective within the time. They definitely do not seem to wish the end of slavery, and seem equivocal at best about reuniting the union; but I wonder about that as a reflection of their time and place. Did we have to go through that stage of the war for the minds of the average US citizen to come around to the greater ideas of the war and be willing to support aggressive action? Even Lincoln seemed to need to take some time and development to come to it. I also wonder and have sympathy for the thought that much of their inactivity stemmed from a wish to create as little death and destruction as possible. I found it interesting to take a hard look at myself and wonder about how I would act and feel if I were in the place of different people at that time. A favorite thing for me is to have new interests sparked into other areas of history and knowledge, and there were definitely some sparks from this! New (or expanded) areas of interest to look in to: - nature of war and it’s need or lack of need. Are some worthy goals only achievable through violence? I have my doubts, yet the Civil War, WWII, and the Revolutionary war are examples of a worthy goal being achieved. - Political arrests, military trials, and the suspension of habeas corpus (during the Civil War and elsewhen). - The Mexican-American war (all aspects). - The French invasion of Mexico (all aspects, and particularly the effect on the Civil War). - Mary Todd Lincoln and Lincoln’s relationship with her. - Lincoln (all aspects) - comparative study of the balance of power between governmental bodies during the revolutionary war and the civil war. Though Washington was not Pres yet at the time, how did his power and actions compare to Lincoln’s power and actions — as acting “general in chief” of the war? I listened to this by Penguin Random House Audio read by George Guidall. Production was great as always with Penguin. Reading was good, if a bit dramatic at times. This suffers the same weaknesses as all history-audiobooks: no access to any additional bits that are usually helpful, such as notes, an index, and in this case maps - maps would have been incredibly helpful. Don’t know if the written version has these things. I did have to rewind and relisten fairly frequently, especially when battles or strategy were described.
Billed as one of the few Lincoln studies to focus on the 16th President as Commander in Chief, the book really offers little new information. I had hoped to learn much more about what shaped Lincoln's military thinking. For example, his trips to the Library of Congress to study strategy and tactics are legendary. But what did he study? Who were his confidants and mentors? How did he develop the suggested strategies he gave to his generals, especially early in the war, and how might we evaluate those strategies? None of these questions is addressed in Tried by War. Instead, the author offers simply a restatement of familiar Civil War history, omitting many important details under the stated purpose of focusing on the commander in chief. Not a satisfying read for the experienced Lincoln/Civil War scholar and not a good choice for the novice either.
Enjoyed this more than I thought I might. I've always been interested in Lincoln - even before the recent Obama related surge - but never been much of a Civil War buff. The book gave a great chronological sketch of the various leadership styles and strengths not just of Lincoln but other important players. Discussions include McLellan, Grant, Lee and other well know historical generals and other principals. Highly recommended for those intersted in seeing the various sides of Lincoln i.e. not just the principled leader but also the occasioanally sullen, challenged and driven president who presided over one of the toughest parts of American history.
Very interesting book about Lincoln. I love American History, Presidential history, and Lincoln, so this book appealed to me. I have read a lot about Lincoln, but this book was a bit different, in that it focused solely on his actions as Commander in Chief. It was fascinating to read about his relationships with his generals, and his decisions about their appointments, their actions, and their dismissals. The more you read about him, the more you realize what an incredible leader Lincoln was.
Solid book - focusing on Lincoln's military management. It truly is incredible that Lincoln succeeded in winning the Civil War in spite of the gross imcompetence (and sometimes insubordination) of so many of his generals.
Tried by War was a unique perspective which is hard to do since the Civil War and the events leading up to it, during it and after it, have been written about in so many genres, it seems to me to be hard to find a new viewpoint of looking at it. However, McPherson found a way to provide a fresh take on this subject by showing the way that Lincoln took a direct approach to his role as Commander in Chief. Though the book was a bit boggy at times for my personal taste since the author spoke often of casualties at various battles and how long it took for troops to get from here to there, the information presented was nonetheless painstakingly researched. That General McClellan on paper looked like the man for the job of General in Chief, his ineptitude was staggering and it seemed to me to be part of the reason the war lasted longer than it needed to. The author hypothesizes that McClellan's own personal political feelings for the Democrats and that of slavery may have contributed to his inadequate command. But what struck me was that Lincoln let McClellan lead for as long as he did in order to have a better chance to win the White House for a second term. Think of all the lives lost because of that decision. Was it justified in order to continue the course of abolishing slavery for good or was there a more selfish reason? One other aspect of the book that could have improved the reader's knowledge of Lincoln was that while he studied a lot about the strategies of war, the author did little to demonstrate how Lincoln arrived at some of the strategies that he did and while they are by and large completely ignored by his generals in the field, he really was onto something. It wasn't until he got Grant, Sherman, Thomas and Sheridan later in the war, did he see his strategic picture of offensive attacks realized. Up until 1864, his generals chose blatantly to ignore whatever ideas he had, and who knows how much better the war would have gone for the Union had they at least considered his plans. As a Civil War tome, the reader will make some takeaways that have always been presumed, for instance, that the Battle of Gettysburg was the defining moment of the war; in fact, this doesn't appear to be the case. While the 16th president is probably best known for the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln's very active role as Commander in Chief seems to have defined the role for future Presidents' involvement when the US goes to war.
This was an interesting read as McPherson took a different approach to Lincoln than other writers. Lincoln as commander-in-chief entailed finding a way into the decisions that Lincoln made as the nation’s military leader. McPherson doesn’t gloss over Lincoln’s mistakes, but shows the reader how Lincoln learned from those mistakes and was able to advance the Union cause.
While McPherson deals with the personalities that Lincoln had to contend with, he keeps the attention on Lincoln and his decisiveness. As many writers have pointed out, Lincoln was not well served by his military leaders and their inability to follow orders (or their disobedience) actually lengthened the war. McPherson does a masterful job of digging into these contretemps and sharing Lincoln’s frustrations with the incompetence of the Union generals.
I haven’t read a James M. McPherson book in years but remember he was good. Now I see him as a great writer as well as a great historian. I learned so much about Lincoln’s actions as president and how they affected the Civil War. McPherson is such a great writer, he kept me absorbed and on my toes.
Excellent overview of the way Lincoln ran the war and all of the difficulties he faced, especially with his generals. A high level overview and good for folks who do not know much about the Civil War. Engagingly written.
If your own life does not offer frustrations to irritate you beyond reason, you can read this account of what Lincoln had to endure with his generals during the Civil War, most notably George McClellan.
McClellan didn’t seem too interested in engaging the army of which he had command, but he was so popular with his troops that Lincoln feared mutiny if he dismissed McClellan. McClellan also had overwhelming and enthusiastic support among Democrats. Therefore, Lincoln decided he had better put up with McClellan at least until after the elections in November of 1862.
But there is much more in this book than contemplating how many lives might have not been lost if McClellan (and subsequent balky generals) had just followed Lincoln’s orders.
McPherson organizes the book around five functions performed or overseen by Lincoln in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief: the formulation of policy, national strategy, military strategy, operations, and tactics. In all of these areas, McPherson shows how Lincoln based his decisions on one core concept, i.e., to preserve the nation by winning the war. Lincoln averred that “the right of a State to secede is not an open or debatable question” and that the President “cannot entertain any proposition for dissolution or dismemberment.”
[It should be noted that there is nothing in the Constitution about whether or not a state may leave the Union. The South argued that the Constitution was simply a compact among sovereign states and states could opt out if they no longer found conditions for this compact favorable to them. Lincoln, however, argued that the nation predated the Constitution, having been declared by the people, not the states, in the Declaration of Independence. Therefore no state can dissolve the Union. This is the idea upon which he elaborated in The Gettysburg Address.]
Later in his presidency, Lincoln added two other conditions for peace in addition to the insistence that the Union be restored. One was “abandonment of slavery.” Lincoln made a promise of freedom to black soldiers who fought for the Union, and, he maintained, he could not betray that promise. Nor would he agree to any ceasefire for the purpose of negotiations - he stipulated that there would be “no cessation of hostilities sort of an end of the war, and the disbanding of all forces hostile to the government.”
Much of McPherson’s analysis is made by reporting the content of the telegrams Lincoln sent his generals, and explaining the many excuses the generals made by way of reply for not obeying Lincoln’s directions. Lincoln's suggestions for military operations were remarkably astute, but they mostly were ignored.
Lincoln was incredibly frustrated over his generals’ inaction, excuses, and even insubordination, but he faced three main difficulties: (1) in the beginning, Lincoln was unsure of his own ability as a “commander in chief” and thought the West Point “professionals” perforce must know better than he, so he was apt to defer to their judgment; (2) many of the non-professionals were political appointments Lincoln had made to appease some faction or other, and while these men were very much out of their depth, Lincoln couldn’t take the political risk of cashiering them; (3) until near the end of the war, Lincoln just had no one else qualified to whom he could turn.
By 1864, however, Lincoln finally had a competent team in place, consisting of Grant, Sherman, Sheridan and Thomas, inter alia - men who not only were eager and willing to fight an offensive war, rather than strictly taking a defensive stance, but who understood that the goal of the war was to destroy Lee’s army, not just to capture Richmond (whether the Confederate army was still intact or not!)
McPherson tips his hat to Lincoln’s lucid and convincing explanations to the American people of the actions he took. As McPherson writes, Lincoln was “a master of metaphors” who utilized stories and homilies to make abstruse concepts seem totally clear and logical.
He also defends the measures Lincoln took to extend the wartime powers of the Executive, such as Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus and his authorization of military tribunals to try civilians. As McPherson argues, at no time in American history was the survival of the country in greater danger than in the Civil War. Yet, he reminds us:
"…compared with the draconian enforcement of espionage and sedition laws in World War I, the internment of more than one hundred thousand Japanese Americans in the 1940s, McCarthyism in the 1950s, or the National Security State of our own time, the infringement of civil liberties from 1861 to 1865 seems mild indeed.”
Evaluation: This examination of how Lincoln fulfilled his role as a wartime Commander-in-Chief provides an excellent perspective on Lincoln, the military, and the many challenges facing a wartime president. In addition, you also get a brief history of the Civil War itself: one that summarizes, in a highly interesting format, most of its history.
Very good and well researched book about a fascinating topic. Highly recommend and a pretty quick read. All Americans should know more about this part of history.
Terrific analysis of Lincoln in the scope of his actions as a war leader; truly the best President and one of the most interesting men in history. Not so much “I’m surrounded by idiots” but “I’m really fucking trying here” heroism. Great little tidbit connecting the context and analysis of modern American presidential power, that which began with Lincoln to address the single greatest existential threat to the country, to what we accept the norm now given the lies that are told and propagated to maintain the security state.