We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History

by John Lewis Gaddis

Did the Soviet Union want world revolution? Why did the USSR send missiles to Cuba? What made the Cold War last as long as it did? The end of the Cold War makes it possible, for the first time, to begin writing its history from a truly international perspective. Based on the latest findings of Cold War historians and extensive research in American archives as well as the recently opened archives in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China, We Now Know provides a vividly written, eye-opening account of the Cold War during the years from the end of World War II to its most dangerous moment, the Cuban missile crisis.
We Now Know stands as a powerful vindication of US policy throughout the period, and as a thought-provoking reassessment of the Cold War by one of its most distinguished historians.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Politics, American History, Military Fiction, Russia, European History

438 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1997

Reviews

[Kuszma · Rating 5 out of 5]

Menjünk a biztosra, idézzünk két mondatot a wikipédiáról: „A hidegháború sok nemzetközi feszültséggel járó korszak volt 1947 és 1989 között, amelyet a két szuperhatalom, az Amerikai Egyesült Államok és a Szovjetunió közötti folytonos rivalizálás jellemzett. A szó szoros értelmében vett háború nem tört ki a két ország között – a hidegháború a második világháború két nyertes nagyhatalmának ideológiai, kulturális, társadalmi, gazdasági, politikai összecsapásából állt.” Gaddis a Szovjetunió összeomlása után, biztos távolból tekint vissza az eseménysorra, nem köti meg gondolkodását – mint oly sokakét azok közül, akik benne nőttek fel -, hogy a hidegháborút állandósult állapotnak látja, az évszakok egymásutániságához hasonlatosnak. Tisztában van a meccs végeredményével: a kommunizmus majdnem olyan totális vereséget szenvedett (ha nem is a hadszíntéren), mint a náci birodalom, ideológiaként minden hitelét elveszítette, Kuba és Észak-Korea kivételével pár holdkóroson kívül senki sem vehette már komolyan. Az oroszok pedig megabirodalomból másodrangú regionális hatalommá zuhantak vissza, ezt a traumát pedig csak most próbálják meg feldolgozni egy Putyin nevezetű medveszelídítő segítségével. (Mindazonáltal ez a Putyin szerintem inkább drog, mint gyógyszer, de erről aligha tudnám meggyőzni a tovarisokat.) Ezzel együtt a szerző óvatos duhaj, nem a hidegháború egészét kívánja megfejteni, megelégszik azzal, hogy a hatvanas évek közepéig kíséri útjukon a történelmi szereplőket.

A szerző Tocqueville-lel nyit, aki már jó kétszáz éve megjósolta, hogy Amerika és Oroszország lesz a világ két meghatározó hatalma, mert bőségesen rendelkezésükre áll terület, ember és nyersanyag egyaránt. Holott már akkor is gyökeresen elütő politikai ideák uralkodtak a két államban: az Egyesült Államok a maga föderális demokráciájával a szabadpiacban és az individualizmusban hitt, az oroszok pedig a cári abszolutizmusban, ami felettébb kompatibilis azzal, ahogy később Sztálin elképzelte a kormányzást. Sokáig úgy tűnt, egyikük sem kívánja beteljesíteni a Torqueville-i jóslatot, az USA bezárkózott, elfordult a „vén Európától”, Oroszország pedig agyaglábakon álló óriásnak bizonyult, amikor megalázó vereséget szenvedett előbb a krími háborúban, majd a japánoktól is. Aztán jött az első világháború, és a helyzet megváltozott. Oroszországban váratlanul hatalomra jutottak a bolsevikok, Amerika pedig hasonlóan kalandos körülmények között a hadviselő felek között találta magát, aminek következtében a háború utáni rendezésben is szerepet kellett vállalnia. Ez az időszak két eszme születése fölött bábáskodott: az egyik ugye Leniné (ezt nem részletezném), a másik pedig Wilson elnöké, aki a nemzet önrendelkezés szószólójaként akarta felforgatni a világot. A két idea egy igen fontos dologban hasonlított: mindketten az egyetemesség igényével léptek fel, az egész világot akarták megváltani – és hát ha két univerzalitásra törekvő eszme találkozik, ott szem nem marad szárazon. Ám ekkor még a nagy összecsapás elhalasztódott, mert a jellegzetes újvilági izolacionalizmus felülkerekedett Wilson magasztos tervein, így az amerikaiak ismét faképnél hagyták Európát. És végső soron a szovjetek is kudarcot vallottak, hisz le kellett mondaniuk a lenini álomról, miszerint az egész földkerekségen elterjesztik a forradalmat. Az utód - Sztálin - megelégedett azzal, hogy (legalábbis ideiglenesen) kizárólag saját alattvalóit vegzálja.

Az, hogy az epic összezördülés végül mégis megtörtént, Hitlernek köszönhető. Az elfuserált kis osztrák ugyanis fogta magát, és lerohanta a Szovjetuniót, ezzel pedig egy addig felettébb simulékony gazdasági partnert kényszerített arra, hogy – akarata ellenére - a jó oldalra álljon. Az óceán túloldalán pedig Roosevelt pontosan átlátta, hogy Hitler a globális rendet – vagyis közvetve az USA elemi biztonsági és gazdasági érdekeit - veszélyezteti, így nem is nagyon tehetett mást, mint hogy Sztálin csapatában játssza le a meccset. A németek végül totális vereséget szenvedtek, az oroszok pedig azon kapták magukat, hogy Európa fele az övék, és hát nagyon nem akaródzott nekik kimenni onnan. Hitler hiányában pedig a nyugatiaknak is rá kellett jönniük, hogy a nácik helyett kaptak egy másik borzalmas szomszédot, aki folyton a mi kukánkba tömködi a szemetét, és az éjszaka közepén nekiáll szaxofonozni, mégpedig szarul. És lőn, máris ott húzódott kontinensünk kellős közepén a Vasfüggöny.

Persze a hidegháború nem csak a mi földrészünkön zajlott. A két domináns hatalom összeakasztotta a bajuszt Ázsiától Latin-Amerikáig mindenhol, és folyamatosan tesztelték a másik elszántságát. Nem csak anyagi vagy katonai támogatást kínáltak fel reménybeli csatlósaiknak, hanem ideológiával is házaltak: az USA a liberális demokráciával, a szovjetek pedig a szocializmussal, ami – antikolonialista mellékzöngéinek köszönhetően – úgy tűnt, kelendő a volt gyarmati országok között*. Volt is hacacáré rendesen, mindkét birodalom felfújta magát, mint a békagyík, és igyekezett rettenthetetlennek mutatkozni, lehetőleg olyan módon, hogy 1.) úgy tűnjön, a másik kezdte a fenyegetőzést 2.) közben ne kelljen tettekkel bizonyítani saját rettenthetetlenségüket.

De miért tudott a hidegháború hideg maradni, hogyan tudták csatározásaikat a perifériákra korlátozni? A válasz egyszerű: az atombomba miatt. Gaddis az egész hidegháború egyik kulcsának a nukleáris fegyverkezést tekinti, ami – nézete szerint – elejét vette az igazi totális háborúnak. Mert ha a két hatalom a hagyományos fegyverzetet fejlesztette volna, akkor óhatatlanul kedvük szottyant volna kipróbálni az erejüket. Ám ők az – olcsóbb – nukleáris arzenál növelésére szavaztak, miközben pontosan tudták (bármit is nyilatkoztak a köznek), hogy még ha meg is nyernének egy globális háborút, közben ők is elképzelhetetlen pusztítást fognak elszenvedni. Ez az atomparadoxon: amikor a felek kölcsönösen olyan erős csapásmérő eszközökkel rendelkeznek, hogy az már eleve kizárja azok használatát. Ennek köszönhető ez a történelmi patthelyzet, amiben a felek ugyan kakaskodnak egymással hol Koreában, hol Kubában, de ha úgy érzik, melegszik a helyzet, inkább meghátrálnak. Ennek viszont az volt az ára, hogy a konfliktus időben elnyúlt, mondhatjuk, a bénító véráldozatot tartósságra cserélték. Elképzelhető, hogy jó csere volt.

Gaddis (többek között) két kérdést tesz fel és válaszol meg:
1.) El lehetett volna kerülni a hidegháborút?
Gaddis szerint nem. Két univerzális eszme ilyen hadi potenciállal egyszerűen nem kerülheti el az összeütközést. Ennek felelőssége megoszlik a felek között, de azért Gaddis Sztálint tekinti inkább hibásnak, egyszerűen mert a bősz zsarnok valami elképesztően paranoiás volt**. Személyes biztonságát összemosta az állam biztonságával, ami végtelenül feszült helyzetet teremtett. Sztálin minden békülékeny gesztust a gyengeség jelének tekintett, egyszerűen képtelen volt felfogni, hogy Roosevelt vagy Eisenhower elnök a saját közvéleményének is felelősséggel tartozik, és engedményeket kell tennie szavazóinak. Amíg élt, lehetetlen volt a tartós megegyezés***.
2.) Megnyerhette volna a Szovjetunió a hidegháborút?
Gaddis szerint megint: nem. Bár a nukleáris patthelyzet egy ideig elfedte, de a kelet-európai forradalmak hamar nyilvánvalóvá tették, hogy a szovjet politikai modell önmagában, erős autoriter nyomás nélkül nem veheti fel a versenyt a fogyasztás vágyára épülő nyugati berendezkedésekkel. Ráadásul Sztálin, de Hruscsov Oroszországa is gazdasági értelemben riasztóan merev volt a nyugathoz képest, ami előrevetítette csúfos bukásukat. Amíg a nyugati demokráciák rugalmasan tudtak reagálni az egymást követő válságokra, addig a szocialisták nem voltak képesek elszakadni a merev tervutasításos gondolkodástól, még akkor sem, amikor nyilvánvalóvá vált, hogy ezzel csak állandósítják a rossz hatásfokú termelést és az ezzel járó permanens hiányt. Igazából nem az a csoda, hogy ’89-ben összeomlott a szovjet blokk, hanem hogy kihúzta odáig.

Remekbeszabott tanulmány, amilyen vaskos, olyan lendületes és összeszedett. Nem csak okosodtam tőle, még élveztem is. Hálás vagyok annak, aki eladta nekem. Nem adom vissza, duplaannyiért se.

* Gaddis mindazonáltal elég meggyőzően bizonyítja, hogy a szocializmus hatása a harmadik világra korlátozott maradt. Az olyan államok, mint Egyiptom, éppúgy kihasználták az oroszokat, mint azok őket, hitegették a Szovjetuniót, de közben csak a fegyvereikre és a pénzükre ácsingóztak. Másfelől az olyan kommunista sikertörténet is, mint amilyen a maoista Kína megszületése volt, a későbbiekben kontraproduktívnak bizonyult, mert „másfajta” kommunista alternatívákat honosított meg, ezzel pedig a Szovjetunió ideológiai riválisává nőtte ki magát.
** Mindent elárul Koba gondolkodásáról, hogy amikor a negyvenes évek elején kémei jelentették, az amerikaiak elkezdték fejleszteni az atombombát, lesöpörte az információt az asztalról, arra hivatkozva, hogy imperialista provokáció. Viszont ahogy jelezték neki, hogy az amerikai tudományos szaklapok egy idő óta nem közölnek az atomkutatással kapcsolatos cikkeket, rögtön ugrott a témára. Jó paranoiásként csak az az információ izgatta, amit nézete szerint el akartak titkolni előle, a nyilvánvalóan logikust, ha nem illett a világképébe, előszeretettel figyelmen kívül hagyta.
*** Hruscsov se volt sokkal jobb. A desztalinizációval reményteljes folyamatot indított el, és alighanem alatta pöttyet könnyebb volt szovjet állampolgárnak lenni, mint Sztálin alatt. De amíg Koba legalább kiszámítható volt, addig Hruscsov jóval labilisabb, érzelemvezéreltebb figurának bizonyult.

[Mickey Schulz · Rating 1 out of 5]

Ugh. Seriously full of cold warrior rhetoric and Reagan idolatry. Bleah.

Some of my favorite parts talk about how those dastardly Russkies had SPIES in America, SPIES I TELL YOU. Completely ignoring the fact that we had spies over there too. Too ridiculous for words, or to be taken seriously as anything other than a portrait of the kind of thinking that kept the Cold War going as long as it did.

[Marie · Rating 2 out of 5]

I read this book for a history class on the Cold War, and I found Gaddis' analysis quite often one-sided. His United States is always right and wins all interpretation of the Cold War became very tiring, when we are constantly faced with evidence to the contrary.

[Baris · Rating 1 out of 5]

This is a book on Cold-War with lots of pro-American Cold War clichés. Reads like a Reaganite fairy tale than a serious academic book.

[Mscout · Rating 2 out of 5]

The Cold War has hung like a spectre over the latter half of the twentieth century. John Lewis Gaddis is one of the foremost historians of the Cold War and has written extensively on the subject. Prior works specific to the Cold War include The United States and the Origins of the Cold War (1972), The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (1987) and 2005’s The Cold War: A New History. Though all of his works were very well-received, We Now Know is and important work in its own right for a variety of reasons. This work from 1997 was the first of his Cold War histories to be written after the end of the Cold War. Most importantly, the closing of the Cold War led to the opening of previously unassailable archives behind the Iron Curtain. Gaddis utilized those archives and the sources within give a depth to his analysis that was not available when he wrote his earlier works.

One of the examples of this depth and benefits of the greater access is that it afforded Lewis the opportunity to tell the story of the conflict through the thoughts and actions of individual leaders of the time. He paid particular attention to Stalin in this regard. Indeed, Gaddis’ conclusion was that if blame for the outbreak of the Cold War were to be laid at anyone’s feet, that blame would have to go to Josef Stalin, “as long as Stalin was running the Soviet Union a cold war was unavoidable.” Gaddis argued that it was Stalin’s own personality and paranoia that made it so.

Additionally, Gaddis used the personalities not only of the leaders, but of the lands they governed to show that the conflict was as much, if not more, about ideology as it was about global power and territory. He contrasted the bombastic demands of Stalin with the quiet behind-the-scenes pressure that United States President Harry S. Truman was exerting on Western Allies to quit their empires and grant independence to India and Indonesia, as the United States was doing in the Philippines. He characterized this as the “authoritarian romanticism” of the Communist Bloc as opposed to the “democratic realism” of the West. For Gaddis, Stalin spoke, while Truman listened.

This is not to say that Gaddis finds no fault with the United States’ actions during the period. Indeed, he criticizes the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its involvement in Latin American regime change. Likewise, he levels criticism at American policy designed to prevent Communist influence in the modernizing economies of third world countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

While very well researched and argued, there are a few issues one could take with Gaddis’ work. Chief among these is insisting on choosing where to lay blame. While he certainly made a compelling case for Stalin’s culpability in the conflict, it is also possible that in so doing, he perhaps missed some other angles. By doing so, Gaddis chose to forego the opportunity to step completely outside of the event, and instead continued the same path he had laid down in other books. If he were to truly “rethinking” the era, one might think that this work would have been less about blame for the inception and more about analysis of the outcome. This, in turn leads to a second, minor fault, that being that the book only covers through the early 1960s, or roughly, through the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, by CIA-paid defectors and operatives. It would certainly have benefitted the scholarship had he looked at the Cold War in its entirety, which one could reasonably expect from the subtitle.

[David · Rating 1 out of 5]

More accurately titled Despite What We Know, I Still Believe: The Same Old Cold War History. Gaddis wants you to see him as a post-revisionist. He is nothing of the sort.

[Ian · Rating 4 out of 5]

First published in 1997, We Now Know is widely accepted as the first serious post-Cold War treatment of the topic. As such it faces the daunting task of placing the global conflict into a historical context as a discrete event. Gaddis argues that decades of scholarship on the Cold War produced between 1945 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 were published by historians who had the unusually ahistorical task of “working within their chosen period rather than after it” and was therefore “an abnormal way of writing history itself” (282-83). The opening of Eastern European, Russian, and Chinese archives after 1991 provided Cold War historians with access to new materials that Gaddis employed to provide greater context to the origins and escalation of the Cold War conflict, and to update and validate certain perspectives and arguments employed by both orthodox and revisionist scholars of the Cold War.
Gaddis endorses a post-revisionist viewpoint of the origins of the Cold War, arguing that the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States inevitably developed out of the power vacuum that was created by the conclusion of the second world war. The distinct personality of Josef Stalin exacerbating the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States in the immediate aftermath of World War II is another major theme in the origins of the Cold War according to Gaddis. These orthodox arguments are supplemented by a recognition that ideology was a fundamental motivating factor in the behavior of the protagonists in this conflict, and therefore a true history of the Cold War will necessarily be internationalist in scope, employing analysis of documentary archives from Soviet as well as third world actors in the conflict in addition to the traditional analysis of United States diplomatic archives. A fundamental conclusion based on this approach is that ideas matter, and the success of the United States in the conflict was due largely to a loss of legitimacy by the Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the contradicting attractiveness of democratic liberalism.
Gaddis's argument is in many ways a logical evolution in the historiography of the Cold War. Historians emphasizing an orthodox school of thought were themselves experiencing the origins of the conflict. Having witnessed the rise of fascism and the destruction of the second World War firsthand, many concluded that a Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States was inevitable due to the aggressive expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union and the Marxist-Leninist ideology of social reform through violent revolution. There was a natural reactionary tendency to vilify the Soviet Union due to the ideological incompatibility of democratic liberalism and communism. Revisionists in the 1960s and 1970s were just as much a product of their own time as the orthodox historians of the previous generation. Experiencing the social unrest of the Vietnam War and civil rights movement, there was extreme disillusionment with American conservatism which manifested as criticism of American empire. Thus revisionist historians of the Cold War tended to emphasize the negative aspects of American economic and military influence in the geopolitics of the day. When Gaddis is writing We Now Know in the 1990s the Soviet Union has collapsed and the superiority of the American system has in many ways been vindicated. This enables Gaddis to take a more objective stance. In many ways, historians of the orthodox and revisionist schools were writing propaganda as well as history due to the political convictions which they were endorsing. Gaddis has the leisure of reconciling the reactionary orthodox and sometimes shrill revisionist perspectives by incorporating the valid aspects of both viewpoints into a situational awareness that is only available from a post-Cold War perspective.

[Alexander Van Leadam · Rating 4 out of 5]

Objective and balanced account of a conflict between quite different empires, unfortunately elliptical in a few respects. Interesting points: (1) inconsistencies in policy, strategy and control on both sides; (2) the issue of contradictions: how one survives by balancing them rather than resolving them; (3) the narrowing of cold war competition following the Cuban missile crisis: shocked by their vulnerability the US tacitly agree with the USSR to restrict competition to the one area where the Soviets hadn't failed yet, nuclear armaments - a focus that curiously facilitated Soviet decay until the implosion of the USSR thirty years later.

[Pie · Rating 3 out of 5]

I didn't feel like this books adds anything new and I am dissappointed that Gaddis failed to deal with the non-aligned world. As Vincent Bevins describes in The Jarkara Method, there were ambitions and dreams for their post-independence world and when it suited American's Cold War interests they were ruthlessly smashed. Gaddis even mentions Jakarta once, but only to say they weren't going to turn Communist and that Washington realized that during their struggle for independence. 1965 never gets a mention, let alone an exploration. And that is true for related issues throughout the book.

[Chad Manske · Rating 4 out of 5]

John Lewis Gaddis’s “We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History” stands as a landmark in Cold War scholarship, offering a fresh, post-Cold War perspective that fundamentally reshapes our understanding of this pivotal era. Written in the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of Eastern European, Russian, and Chinese archives, Gaddis’s work is among the first to fully exploit these new sources, allowing for unprecedented insight into the motivations and decisions of the major players. Gaddis skillfully navigates the long-standing debate between orthodox and revisionist historians. Earlier scholars, he argues, were inevitably shaped by their times—orthodox historians, influenced by the trauma of World War II and the rise of fascism, often viewed the Cold War as the inevitable result of Soviet expansionism and ideological incompatibility with the West. Revisionists of the 1960s and 70s, reacting to Vietnam and domestic unrest, tended to critique American imperialism and emphasize the U.S.’s role in escalating tensions. Gaddis, benefiting from hindsight and new evidence, transcends both schools, integrating their valid insights while discarding their ideological excesses. The book’s narrative is both sweeping and precise, covering the origins of the Cold War through the Cuban Missile Crisis. Gaddis’s analysis highlights the centrality of leaders’ personalities—especially Stalin’s—and the role of ideology in shaping superpower behavior. He also explores how the superpowers were often constrained by their allies, whose actions could force the hands of Washington and Moscow in unexpected ways. What makes “We Now Know” especially compelling is its demonstration of how the Cold War’s history could only be properly written after its conclusion, when the dust had settled and the archives were opened. Gaddis’s synthesis of new archival material with established scholarship creates a nuanced, balanced account that both specialists and general readers will find enlightening. In sum, “We Now Know” is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand the Cold War’s complexity, the evolution of its historiography, and the profound impact of new evidence on historical interpretation. Gaddis’s clear prose and judicious analysis make this book a masterclass in historical revision and synthesis.

[Felix Sun · Rating 3 out of 5]

I would rate this lower if I don't conaider it thst it was published in the late 90s.

The other reviews were right, this book is very pro-Western. It failed to deliver "we now know.." premise that it promised.

Did I learn something from this book? A little.
Was the book easy to read? Not really, too verbose for what it offers.
The last two chapters of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Conclusion were exceptionally disappointing.

I took the audio book version by Danny Campbell, which I thought narrated rather nicely. I wouldn't finish the book in written form.

I wouldn't recommend it to anyone who are already familiar with Cold War.

[Maria · Rating 3 out of 5]

Gaddis has reviewed and compiled the histories of the Cold War that have been published using the Soviet and Chinese archives. This work is more international and helps break out the intellectual silos of limited sources.

Why I started this book: Put this book on hold because I had enjoyed other books by Gaddis and the topic was appealing.

Why I finished it: History is never final, because there are always new sources to explore. Interesting to see more of the Cold War from the Soviet and Chinese side.

[Jim Pomeroy · Rating 3 out of 5]

It’s hard to judge a book that is this old by modern metrics. It certainly is an impactful work in how it altered Cold War history and the “revisionist” approach to said history. However, this book reads more as a provocation at times. While touching on Korea and China, most of this book deals with Europe. Post-war Japan is mentioned in a fraction compared to Germany. Also completely ignores Latin America outside of Cuba.

[Tommy · Rating 2 out of 5]

Mf said histories of the Cold War shouldn’t be triumphalist but all he can talk about is how democratic and successful the US was. Straw man af. Also if your whole deal is about reevaluating the Cold War in light of its recent end, why are you only assigning primacy to the first twenty years? Plenty of examples of outright meddling bafoonery on the part of the US that was decidedly not democratic. Cough cough Iran-Contra

(Gutted for class)

[Sheri Fresonke Harper · Rating 3 out of 5]

It's a little hard to read if not familiar with post-World War II events since it focuses mostly on the decisionmaking of the leaders at key points in time. The last chapters focus on the Cuban Missile Crisis with updates from sources that show how close the world came to blowing up is a real eye opener. However, the communication problems between states is the real message.

[Grant · Rating 5 out of 5]

A master Cold War historian reevaluates our understanding of that period since "we now know" how the Cold War ended, and we have access to many documents and perspectives that were closed to Western scholars. Much of what Gaddis reveals has begun to pass into accepted wisdom, but the initial take is still well worth reviewing.

[Jeff · Rating 4 out of 5]

Well researched and has some genuinely big new insights into the personalities and mindset of the communist nations. The major issue I take with the work is how lightly it treats the NATO forces actions during the German occupation and in the 3rd world.

[Gazham · Rating 2 out of 5]

I feel like every book I have to read for uni is like decent information written in an entirely unengaging way. Reading cold war articles on wikipedia is like a psychological thriller compared to this.

[Pritish · Rating 5 out of 5]

Gaddis' commentary on the Cold War after the declassification of several documents is refreshing. I loved the emphasis on how the Cold War's origin had been as early as 1918 and how Russia and US were pitted against each other long before what we have come to realize. Enlightening read.

[Kris Miller · Rating 3 out of 5]

Average.
No original research and few primary sources, but a decent review of the Cold War.

[Cameron · Rating 5 out of 5]

Again, fantastic! Great analysis particularly regarding the American and Soviet ‘Empires’ and the origins of the conflict in itself. Highly recommend.

[Allie · Rating 5 out of 5]

A comprehensive look at the various foundations for the Cold War.

[Reko Wenell · Rating 2 out of 5]

Learned some things but I didn’t really end up with an overall understanding.

[Roy McCullough · Rating 5 out of 5]

A now dated but still brilliant study of new developments in Cold War history (as of 1997). By one of the masters of the field.

[Ella Denton · Rating 4 out of 5]

banger

[Kevin · Rating 3 out of 5]

To begin with . . . the book is roughly 290 pages of analysis of what "we now know" (as of 1997) with 130 pages of extensive notes.

Gaddis' work, appearing merely six years after the end of the Cold War, only examines the first twenty years or so of events following the end of World War II, focusing primarily on decisions and actions of the United States and Josef Stalin; Gaddis, for the most part, avoids touching on Vietnam even though that situation clearly begins during the period covered in this volume. The overarching theme of the book appears to be an attempt to answer the question, "could the Cold War have ended much sooner?"

Despite the title of the book, much of what appears in We Now Know is conjecture mostly in the form of questions that Gaddis tries to answer based on information released since the fall of the Soviet Union.

Very much an academic book, Gaddis provides plenty of details to support his many hypotheses, making some of the reading laborious. We Now Know is well organized around the major areas of the world that were affected by the fight between communism and democracy/capitalism.

Gaddis does present some bias in favor of the West but this can be attributed to the fact that he is a Westerner and the United States won the Cold War. The author does balance this bias though by showing many mistakes made by the Americans (Soviets too) when it came to handling worldwide confrontations. The key players in the Cold War are often presented as being pushed around and manipulated by not just the "third world" countries as is well known now, but also by the nations of throughout Europe, especially Germany.

One must really want to read about the Cold War before picking up We Now Know and much of what is presented will be well-known to anyone with a cursory knowledge of the Cold War, though the chapter on Germany does provide some insight as to how country survived as a divided nation and how well the leaders of East and West Germany managed to manipulate the Americans, Soviets, and each of their allies in those first couple of decades after Hitler's demise.

[Mehlka Mustansir · Rating 3 out of 5]

I read this to prepare for my A level History. Gaddis is known as the 'Dean of Cold Historians' and I can see why. This book is exceptionally detailed and is a great insight into the debate of the origins of the Cold War.

The only issue that I had was the overemphasis on Stalin's role. He described Stalin as the most important agent in the beginning of the Cold War (Stalin sought the Cold War as a fish seeks water). Stalin was definitely an important factor but all the blame could not be put on one personality. Certainly Stalin's paranoia contributed a lot to the atmosphere but some of Stalin's actions were cautious (for instance, how he backed out of Iran or didn't support the French and the Greek communists).

Historians always differ in opinions. However, this is still a fantastic read. Gaddis' theory about the different American and Soviet empires was a new insight into analyzing the power struggle. This is one of the best post-revisionist Cold War history books!

[Neil Lovell · Rating 3 out of 5]

I appreciated the investigation of Joseph Stalin and his role in instigating the Cold War. I agree he played a pivotal role in starting the Cold War in the case of Europe, yet Gaddis attempts to make the same conclusion in Asia. That argument undermines nationalistic and other political movements seen throughout Asia. In conversation with William's Tragedy of American Diplomacy, this is a worthy addition to American history.

[Diane · Rating 4 out of 5]

Well-written history of the Cold War. Covers the period from World War II through the Cuban Missile Crisis. Also discusses antecedents to the Cold War, such as de Tocqueville's 19th century prophecy that America and Russia would be rivals in the next century.

[Brandy · Rating 4 out of 5]

Read this for a grad class.
Very good read, very interesting to finally read the book that laid the the groundwork for so many of the other books I've read.

I don't have much else to say that hasn't been said already.
Thanks for getting the field rolling, Gaddis!