The Maryland campaign of September 1862 ranks among the most important military operations of the American Civil War. Crucial political, diplomatic, and military issues were at stake as Robert E. Lee and George B. McClellan maneuvered and fought in the western part of the state. The climactic clash came on September 17 at the battle of Antietam, where more than 23,000 men fell in the single bloodiest day of the war.
Approaching topics related to Lee's and McClellan's operations from a variety of perspectives, contributors to this volume explore questions regarding military leadership, strategy, and tactics, the impact of the fighting on officers and soldiers in both armies, and the ways in which participants and people behind the lines interpreted and remembered the campaign. They also discuss the performance of untried military units and offer a look at how the United States Army used the Antietam battlefield as an outdoor classroom for its officers in the early twentieth century.
The contributors are William A. Blair, Keith S. Bohannon, Peter S. Carmichael, Gary W. Gallagher, Lesley J. Gordon, D. Scott Hartwig, Robert E. L. Krick, Robert K. Krick, Carol Reardon, and Brooks D. Simpson.
<!-- [for catalog, in place of 3rd paragraph]] The William A. Blair Keith S. Bohannon Peter S. Carmichael Gary W. Gallagher Lesley J. Gordon D. Scott Hartwig Robert E. L. Krick Robert K. Krick Carol Reardon Brooks D. Simpson -->
<!--copy for pb The Maryland campaign of September 1862 ranks among the most important military operations of the American Civil War. The climactic clash came on September 17 at the battle of Antietam, where more than 23,000 men fell in the single bloodiest day of the war. Exploring topics related to Lee's and McClellan's operations from a variety of perspectives, contributors to this volume examine questions of military leadership, strategy, and tactics; the performance of untried military units; and the ways in which the battle has been remembered. The contributors are William A. Blair, Keith S. Bohannon, Peter S. Carmichael, Gary W. Gallagher, Lesley J. Gordon, D. Scott Hartwig, Robert E. L. Krick, Robert K. Krick, Carol Reardon, and Brooks D. Simpson. The editor is Gary W. Gallagher.-->
Gary W. Gallagher, the John L. Nau III Professor of History at the University of Virginia, is the author or editor of many books in the field of Civil War history, including The Confederate War; Causes Won, Lost, and Forgotten: How Hollywood and Popular Art Shape What We Know about the Civil War; and The Union War.
Early in September, 1862, Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac River into Maryland in what became the Confederacy's first invasion of the North. General McClellan received command of the Union troops following the disaster of Second Manassas. In a daring move, Lee divided his army in an attempt to capture Harpers Ferry, and McClellan had the good fortune to recover Special Order No 191 detailing the movements of the Confederate units. McClellan pressed forward, albeit cautiously, and the result was the Battle of Antietam (or Sharpsburg) on September 17, 1862, the bloodiest single day in American history. Following the battle, President Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation. Antietam, rather than the more famous Battle of Gettysburg, is increasingly regarded as the pivotal moment of the Civil War.
The Maryland Campaign and the Battle of Antietam have provoked no end of controversy. This excellent collection, "The Antietam Campaign", edited by Gary Gallagher, consists of ten essays by as many different students of the Civil War examining in detail various aspects of the Antietam campaign. The essays are thoughtful and provocative and will cause the reader to rethink commonly held assumptions about Lee's first invasion. The book is part of a series edited by Gallagher titled "Military Campaigns of the Civil War".
Various aspects of the Battle itself are examined in three essays in the volume. Robert E.L. Krick's article, "Defending Lee's Flank" explores the role of Confederate artillery in holding off the initial Union attacks early in the morning on the Confederate left in the vicinity of Dunkers' Church and the infamous Cornfield. Robert K. Krick's essay takes a close look at the Union's attack on the center of the Confederate line on what has become known as the Bloody Lane. Lesley Gordon's "All Who Went into that Battle were Heroes" is an essay in history and memory. It examines the fate of the 16th Connecticut, a unit of green volunteers, which had the unenviable task late in the battle of meeting a counter-attack by A.P. Hill's troops, after Union General Burnside had finally crossed "Burnside's Bridge" and was pressing the Confederate Army to cut-off its line of retreat.
An additional essay in the collection, "We didn't know what on Earth to do with him" by Peter Carmichael covers a little-known aspect of the Maryland campaign. A small component of Union troops attacked the rear of the Confederate Army of September 19, 1862 in an attempt to harass the retreat. Confederate artillerist "Parson" Pendelton failed to hold the line, but the small Union force was, even so, rebuffed with great loss. Carmichael, as are most scholars, is highly critical of Pendelton's role at Antietam and in the War.
The remaining six essays in the collection offer broader views of matters related to the Maryland campaign. Three essays focus on the Confederacy. Gallager's own essay, "The Net Result of the Campaign was in our Favor" explores Confederate reactions immediately after the battle. Confederates looked to the capture of Harpers Ferry, the victory at Shepherdstown, and the hard draw at Antietam as evidence of their Army's prowess, and were motivated to continue the long, hard fighting of the Civil War. Keith Bohannon's essay, "Dirty Ragged, and Ill-Provided for is, together with the essay by Carol Reardon, the finest in the collection as it explores the difficulties faced by Lee's Army resulting from lack of supplies of basics, such as shoes, rations, and ammunition, as a result of the South's inadequate logistical system. In "Maryland, Our Maryland", Brooks Simpson examines Confederate hopes that the Maryland campaign would bring the Bay State into the Confederacy. It examines the strong efforts President Lincoln made to hold Maryland for the Union. Simpson concludes that the Confederate failure to rally Maryland to its cause worked as a defining moment for Southern identity in the conflict.
Two essays take a close look at the Union side of the line. Brooks Simpson's "General McClellan's Bodyguard" challenges the view held by many students of the battle that McClellan was at fault for not pressing the attack on September 18. Simpson maintains that McClellan did about as well as could have been expected under the circumstances. Scott Hartwig's essay, "Who would not be a Soldier" compliments Simpson's in that Hartwig looks closely at the composition of the Union Army that McClellan led to meet Lee. Much of this Army consisted of raw recruits who had not had basic training, learned to march, or even to fire a weapon. These troops swelled the size of McClellan's Army but proved a liability in the heat of battle.
The final essay in the volume, "From Antietam to Argonne" by Carol Reardon takes a close look at Antietam from the standpoint of the United States War College and its studies of the battle prior to WW I. Students were given detailed summaries of the actions in the Antietam campaign and, in addition, toured the battlefield. They were asked to comment on the command decisions of Lee and McClellan, as well as subordinate officers, and on the performance of the troops on both sides. The results, as Reardon explains them, were fascinating and provide a searching look at the campaign and its leaders. For me, Reardon's essay was the highlight of an excellent volume.
This collection illuminates greatly the Antietam Campaign and shows how much can be gained by careful scholarship and the willingness to rethink received opinions. Readers coming to this book will benefit by a strong prior background in the Civil War and by a basic familiarity with the Battle of Antietam, as can be gained in works by James McPherson, Steven Sears, or James Murfin.
Gary Gallagher has written/edited a number of books on the Civil War. This book is an edited volume, focusing on several aspects of the sanguinary battle at Antietam, fought in 1962. All told, there are ten essays in this volume, with Gallagher contributing the lead essay. As with all edited volumes, some of the works may not be up to the same standards as others. But, overall, this is a useful volume. It might best be used by reading it alongside one of the better histories of the battler, such as Stephen Sears' "Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam." Let's take a look at some of the essays to illustrate what the book is about. . . .
Gallagher begins the book with an essay on how the south saw the aftermath of the battle. He notes that, in the final analysis, southerners were more likely than not to see Antietam as a plus for the cause. In the aftermath of the Peninsula successes of General Robert E. Lee and the remarkable victory by the Confederate forces at Second Manassas, this was seen as the denouement of a stretch of marvelous fighting by the Army of Northern Virginia.
Brooks Simpson authored a more positive than usual account of Union General George McClellan's leadership at Antietam. McClellan was often accused of "the slows," because of his seeming inability to fight aggressively. Simpson argues that some of McClellan's arguments made sense, such as logistical problems associated with the movement of the Army of the Potomac toward Antietam.
The last chapter is a nice counterpoint, examining how Antietam was used by the Army for training/education before World War I. This battle was one example used at the Army War College to prepare officers for command. They would go over maps and scenarios (e.g., what if McClellan had hurried toward Antietam after finding Lee's orders as opposed to his rather movements). The students and teachers were pretty much unanimous in concluding that McClellan had not generaled his forces very well--up to Antietam and at the battle site itself.
Other chapters speak to addition key issues, such as: how poorly supplied Confederate forces were, the Confederate cavalry's and artillery's role in protecting the Confederate flank, the action at Bloody Lane, and the ineptitude of Confederate artillery chief William Pendleton.
For those interested generally in Civil War history and, specifically, the battle at Antietam, this will be a welcome volume. While there is some unevenness across the chapters, all in all this is a solid volume.
Another good book containing essays on the Antietam Campaign edited by Gary Gallagher. The first essay, by Gallagher, examines the Confederate reaction to the results of the campaign. Brooks Simpson then examines the attitude of the Army of the Potomac after Antietam. William Blair discusses the attitude of Maryland toward and by the Confederacy before and after the campaign. Keith Bohannon discusses Confederate logistical problems. D. Scott Hartwig follows with an examination of how new, poorly trained Union volunteers fared in the battle. In a related story, Lesley Gordon discusses the 16th Regiment Connecticut Volunteers at Antietam. Following this were two of my favorite essays: Robert Krick’s discussions of the Confederate artillery on Nicodemus Heights on the Confederate far left flank, and Krick’s discussion of the Confederate defense of the Sunken Road (Bloody Lane). The book concludes with a view of William Pendleton’s flawed defense of the Shepherdstown Ford by Peter Carmichael and Carol Reardon’s discussion of how American military officers in the early 1900s applied the lessons of Antietam to their craft.
As with Gallagher’s other book of essays on the campaign, you should not read this until you’ve familiarized yourself with the campaign through books by Stephen Sears, Harsh, or Carmen. However, for those desiring more detail, both of Gallagher’s books will provide those details.
It's not obvious until you see the table of contents that this is a sequel to Antietam: Essays on the 1862 Maryland Campaign rather than an expanded edition. This is another entry in the growing "Military Campaigns of the Civil War" series, all of them edited by Gallagher and featuring essays by Gallagher and various other Civil War historians (as usual, Robert Krick contributed an essay).
Topics covered are: -Confederate reaction to the campaign -AotP after Antietam and McClellan's influence on it -how the campaign helped define Confederate self-image -Confederate logistical problems during the campaign -performance of fresh Union volunteer regiments -16th Connecticut Volunteers (of the Corps of Burnside/Cox) -Confederate artillery on Nicodemus Heights & Hauser's Ridge -Bloody Lane -William Pendleton's poor performance at Shepherdstown -Army War College studying the campaign decades after the war
As Gallagher admits in the introduction, this book covers a bit wider range of topics than the previous Antietam book and most other books in this series. I found the essays on Confederate logistics and artillery particularly interesting.
Great collection of essays covering a variety of topics, such as the performance of green Union regiments. However, the essay on the Sunken Road seems out of place, since it's a battle narrative rather than providing any analysis of this segment of the battle or battlefield.
Essays covering various aspects of the battle compiled by Gary Gallagher. Includes discussion of the use of green troops by the north, poor supply for the south, Stuart's artillery, etc