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The Collapse of the Third Republic: An Inquiry into the Fall of France in 1940
As an international war correspondent and radio commentator, William L. Shirer didn’t just research the fall of France. He was there. In just six weeks, he watched the Third Reich topple one of the world’s oldest military powers—and institute a rule of terror and paranoia. Based on in-person conversation with the leaders, diplomats, generals, and ordinary citizens who both shaped the events of this time and lived through them on a daily basis, Shirer shapes a compelling account of historical events—without losing sight of the personal experience.
From the heroic efforts of the Freedom Fighters to the tactical military misjudgments that caused the fall and the daily realities of life for French citizens under Nazi rule, this fascinating and exhaustively documented account from one of the 20th Century’s most important historians makes the events of the fall accessible to a younger audience in vivid and memorable style.
About the Author
William Lawrence Shirer (1904-1993) was an American war correspondent, historian, and author of The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich—a definitive account of Nazi Germany that has stood the test of time as a scholarly resource for over five decades. Shirer was the first journalist hired for Edward R. Murrow’s CBS radio team of journalists covering World War II events worldwide, and later became famous for his radio broadcasts from Berlin.
Shirer’s work is gripping for its first-hand immediacy, informed by personal observation, storytelling, and interviews with prominent leaders including Hitler himself. As a member of CBS’s news team, he produced a 30-minute broadcast of live reporting from Vienna, Paris, Berlin, London, and Rome. This was later adopted as the CBS World News Roundup, one of the longest-running programs in news broadcasting today.
From the heroic efforts of the Freedom Fighters to the tactical military misjudgments that caused the fall and the daily realities of life for French citizens under Nazi rule, this fascinating and exhaustively documented account from one of the 20th Century’s most important historians makes the events of the fall accessible to a younger audience in vivid and memorable style.
About the Author
William Lawrence Shirer (1904-1993) was an American war correspondent, historian, and author of The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich—a definitive account of Nazi Germany that has stood the test of time as a scholarly resource for over five decades. Shirer was the first journalist hired for Edward R. Murrow’s CBS radio team of journalists covering World War II events worldwide, and later became famous for his radio broadcasts from Berlin.
Shirer’s work is gripping for its first-hand immediacy, informed by personal observation, storytelling, and interviews with prominent leaders including Hitler himself. As a member of CBS’s news team, he produced a 30-minute broadcast of live reporting from Vienna, Paris, Berlin, London, and Rome. This was later adopted as the CBS World News Roundup, one of the longest-running programs in news broadcasting today.
1084 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 1969
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About the author
William L. Shirer
92 books1,254 followersWilliam Lawrence Shirer was an American journalist and historian. He became known for his broadcasts on CBS from the German capital of Berlin through the first year of World War II.
Shirer first became famous through his account of those years in his Berlin Diary (published in 1941), but his greatest achievement was his 1960 book, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, originally published by Simon & Schuster. This book of well over 1000 pages is still in print, and is a detailed examination of the Third Reich filled with historical information from German archives captured at the end of the war, along with impressions Shirer gained during his days as a correspondent in Berlin. Later, in 1969, his work The Collapse of the Third Republic drew on his experience spent living and working in France from 1925 to 1933. This work is filled with historical information about the Battle of France from the secret orders and reports of the French High Command and of the commanding generals of the field. Shirer also used the memoirs, journals, and diaries of the prominent British, Italian, Spanish, and French figures in government, Parliament, the Army, and diplomacy.
Shirer first became famous through his account of those years in his Berlin Diary (published in 1941), but his greatest achievement was his 1960 book, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, originally published by Simon & Schuster. This book of well over 1000 pages is still in print, and is a detailed examination of the Third Reich filled with historical information from German archives captured at the end of the war, along with impressions Shirer gained during his days as a correspondent in Berlin. Later, in 1969, his work The Collapse of the Third Republic drew on his experience spent living and working in France from 1925 to 1933. This work is filled with historical information about the Battle of France from the secret orders and reports of the French High Command and of the commanding generals of the field. Shirer also used the memoirs, journals, and diaries of the prominent British, Italian, Spanish, and French figures in government, Parliament, the Army, and diplomacy.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 138 reviews
November 19, 2020
This is the second time I have read this book and wondered if I would find it as excellent as I did several years ago. I shouldn't have worried since I was as fascinated as I was before. Shirer's writing style makes it easy to move quickly through this 1,000 page tome, so don't be hesitant to read it because of it's length. It is well worth it and I stand by my original reviews which is found below.
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This is a must read for the history buff and what better author to read than William Shirer who was an eye witness to the unfolding of WWII both in France and Germany.
The government of France was in shambles prior to WWII as various factions vied for power and when war raised its ugly head things went from bad to worse. Shirer, as usual, has done excellent research and this is an in-depth view of what was happening while the world was about to go up in flames.
Classic histories don't need long reviews so I will be brief and succinct............read it if you have any interest in France, Europe, WWII, or the frailties of governments.
________________________________
This is a must read for the history buff and what better author to read than William Shirer who was an eye witness to the unfolding of WWII both in France and Germany.
The government of France was in shambles prior to WWII as various factions vied for power and when war raised its ugly head things went from bad to worse. Shirer, as usual, has done excellent research and this is an in-depth view of what was happening while the world was about to go up in flames.
Classic histories don't need long reviews so I will be brief and succinct............read it if you have any interest in France, Europe, WWII, or the frailties of governments.
April 6, 2013
This is a monumental and very tragic account of the collapse of France. Unfortunately France’s democratic values failed to withstand the Nazi onslaught. Shirer illustrates how a democracy can become so self-absorbed that it fails to recognize the dangers on its very border. For a country in Europe, at that stage after the ending of the Great War – to ignore the latest military developments (airplanes, tanks) was a path to self-destruction.
Its’ unstable governments and prime ministerial rotations made any long term diplomatic planning impossible. Shirer describes well how the entrenched upper classes fought to maintain their wealth and avoid paying taxes. This money would have helped France compete industrially, economically and militarily with Germany. The Left was not much better – favouring pacifism and accommodation with Germany (and even more so after the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939). Shirer points out that both the Right and the Left disdained the Republican democracy, even though they derived much benefit from it.
Like Winston Churchill, Shirer states how this war could have been avoided early on. The French government knew well ahead of time that Hitler was going to militarily occupy the Rhineland in 1936. Both the government and the military did nothing to avoid this intrusion. At Munich in 1938 Daladier (unlike Chamberlain) sensed that Hitler was not interested in the Sudeten Germans, but wanted to annex the Czechoslovak state. Once again nothing was done. Naturally Britain has to share blame for they too were playing into Hitler’s hand, but as Shirer points out, a state, must at times, act on its own to maintain and protect itself. The Rhineland occupation was one such event, for at that time Hitler’s armies were no match for the French. Even at the time of the Polish invasion there were virtually no German defensive positions along the French border.
Shirer shows how the military – and particularly it’s commander-in-chief – General Gamelin were impotent and had no offensive plans to meet the German threat – from the time of the Rhineland occupation to the German blitzkrieg in 1940. The French were warned repeatedly that the main German assault was to come through the Ardennes, but the French military did not alter their plans for moving their main forces into coastal Belgium.
All this led to Petain and Vichy. France became a tragedy on a grand scale. And thank God for DeGaulle for leading France back to nation-hood.
Its’ unstable governments and prime ministerial rotations made any long term diplomatic planning impossible. Shirer describes well how the entrenched upper classes fought to maintain their wealth and avoid paying taxes. This money would have helped France compete industrially, economically and militarily with Germany. The Left was not much better – favouring pacifism and accommodation with Germany (and even more so after the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939). Shirer points out that both the Right and the Left disdained the Republican democracy, even though they derived much benefit from it.
Like Winston Churchill, Shirer states how this war could have been avoided early on. The French government knew well ahead of time that Hitler was going to militarily occupy the Rhineland in 1936. Both the government and the military did nothing to avoid this intrusion. At Munich in 1938 Daladier (unlike Chamberlain) sensed that Hitler was not interested in the Sudeten Germans, but wanted to annex the Czechoslovak state. Once again nothing was done. Naturally Britain has to share blame for they too were playing into Hitler’s hand, but as Shirer points out, a state, must at times, act on its own to maintain and protect itself. The Rhineland occupation was one such event, for at that time Hitler’s armies were no match for the French. Even at the time of the Polish invasion there were virtually no German defensive positions along the French border.
Shirer shows how the military – and particularly it’s commander-in-chief – General Gamelin were impotent and had no offensive plans to meet the German threat – from the time of the Rhineland occupation to the German blitzkrieg in 1940. The French were warned repeatedly that the main German assault was to come through the Ardennes, but the French military did not alter their plans for moving their main forces into coastal Belgium.
All this led to Petain and Vichy. France became a tragedy on a grand scale. And thank God for DeGaulle for leading France back to nation-hood.
May 20, 2022
One of the longstanding questions I felt was unanswered by the military history I studied in college was, why did France fall so abruptly in 1940? At West Point this, to my mind, fundamental question was passed over with little discussion other than generalizations about the French Army not being modern in tactics and equipment, with no proof given or illustrations shared. Shirer's book does not shed a great deal of light on the practical or concrete side of why France's Army was so quickly defeated, but there is a wealth of information about the political collapse that led to Petain's Vichy. The sad truth is that all the major politicians knew in their hearts that appeasing Hitler would not end well, but no one had the strength of character to stand up to Hitler's demands. The critical failure was that of Chamberlain, but Daladier and Reynaud followed him without any significant complaint until it was too late.
As to the question of why the French Army fell in weeks in 1940, when it held on for years in WW1, the answer is straightforward: the Germans had 5,000 modern fighter-bomber aircraft, the French had 100; the Germans had light tanks with large fuel capacity and radios, the French had heavily armored tanks with small fuel capacity and no radios. The Germans had adopted the tactics of maneuver of large tank divisions concentrated for breakthrough and then running riot behind the enemies lines; the French (and the British, and the Americans) were still following WW1 tactics of tanks integrated with infantry and moving no faster than a man could walk. France fell in exactly the same way Britain would have fallen if not for the English Channel.
As to the question of why the French Army fell in weeks in 1940, when it held on for years in WW1, the answer is straightforward: the Germans had 5,000 modern fighter-bomber aircraft, the French had 100; the Germans had light tanks with large fuel capacity and radios, the French had heavily armored tanks with small fuel capacity and no radios. The Germans had adopted the tactics of maneuver of large tank divisions concentrated for breakthrough and then running riot behind the enemies lines; the French (and the British, and the Americans) were still following WW1 tactics of tanks integrated with infantry and moving no faster than a man could walk. France fell in exactly the same way Britain would have fallen if not for the English Channel.
September 25, 2022
William Shirer's The Collapse of the Third Republic is intended as a Gallic counterpart to his Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, chronicling the political, cultural and military factors that triggered France's shocking defeat to Germany in 1940. Shirer at least corrects some of the issues which make Reich such a problematic read: more time spent on political and cultural background, less knee-jerk judgments and generalizations about "national character." The book's best exploring the chaotic politics of interwar France, with its extreme polarization, class warfare and political instability; lingering divisions and civil-military distrust from the Boulanger and Dreyfus Affairs, antisemitism and anti-republic sentiment which viewed Communism more dangerous than fascism, trauma and resentment over the appalling losses of WWI, governments which changed every few months through the '20s and '30s, ongoing strikes, riots and street battles, an inflammatory, biased press, etc. Shirer eventually returns to his old preoccupation, attacking the appeasement of fascism with only slightly more nuance than elsewhere. He does show Leon Blum, Eduoard Daladier and others as willing to confront Hitler and Mussolini, but hamstrung both by internal dissension and British reluctance to back them up; still, much of the book's middle passage reads like a recapitulation of Reich with the same harsh (if understandable) judgments about a general failure of will. All of this culminates in a detailed account of France's defeat, which puts it down less to tactical mistakes (though General Gamelin and his cohorts made plenty) than, again, the unwillingness of French military and political leaders to stand and fight more firmly than they did. One can certainly quibble with this - Shirer does seem to arrange facts around his thesis, rather than vice versa - but it's still a passionately argued, well-researched book that's made its stamp on historiography of the Second World War.
August 6, 2007
I first read this in '97 in Japan, and I've just re-read it. It's great writing and even though it's 958 pages it's a page turner (for history dorks like me, anyways). There are a lot of parallels between the bitter rancour that was present in France in the Third Republic and our own time, but of course that's a common temptation for historians, to find evidence in others' catastrophes clues for one's own circumstance. In any case, Shirer's writing is accessible and his sources are impressive. It helps to have a map of NE France, the Benelux and western Germany handy, and I found myself digging out my French-English dictionary at a couple of points as well. Shirer is a humanist, and yet he is unflinching as he looks at the barbarism and cowardice of that time and place.
April 5, 2013
This is a very impressive history of the French Third Republic by the journalist-historian William L. Shirer, author of The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. Not having been alive during the period he discusses and not being as inculcated with information about France as I was about Germany in the years leading up to WWII, I found the detail almost overwhelming. The general impression, however, is of a polity still riven by the conflicts which came to eruption during the French revolution: Catholics versus secularists, bourgeois versus proles, cities versus countryside.
I picked this up while visiting Springfield, Vermont, finishing it only upon returning to Chicago.
I picked this up while visiting Springfield, Vermont, finishing it only upon returning to Chicago.
June 28, 2023
Saw great footage relating to this collapse and other early war stuff that was not corny or retread stuff. Smithsonian Channel.
Unique stuff.
This one on my shelf.
Unique stuff.
This one on my shelf.
May 26, 2015
Imagine for a moment the birth of a dragon. It emerges from its egg full of vim and hate, but still small and vulnerable. Nearby a knight in full kit watches, tired from having spent days in battle with the mother of this beast but still fully capable of stamping it out. Indeed, he need do little but walk upon it to end the future bane of his existence. But rather than do this, the knight calls on the aid of the other knights who helped slay the earlier creature. Their castles are farther away and less threatened. Rather than risk another battle, even with this small demon, they demand the knight start throwing away his weapons. This beast is no threat, and should it ever become one, the other knights promise to come to their former comrade's aid.
The dragon grows and soon strikes at nearby farms. Still, it remains too weak to challenge a knight, much less all of the knights combined. But again, they do nothing. They watch this new dragon develop new methods of battle far different from its ancestor, but convince themselves that their armor was sufficient in the last fight and will be sufficient in any future one, too. The knights begin to squabble among themselves; the smallest among them spends more time defending his frontier with the powerful knight than against the dragon whose nest lies just across a river.
Finally, the dragon, now mature and fully formed, attacks yet another neighbor, one the other knights promised to support and cannot in good conscience abandon (though the thought crosses their minds). This neighbor lives far away, unlike the previous neighbors, and the knights cannot be there to stand by his side. The only option available to them is to attack the dragon from behind, where it is most vulnerable, but to do so they must leave their armor behind. They stay put.
The last battle begin as the dragon attacks the knight. Even now, the knights still have more weapons and power than the dragon, but they don't know how to use them properly. Worse still, the knights argue among themselves about who should shoulder the tasks of using the weapons. In a final humiliation, they learn that their much vaunted armor has been put on wrong and is actually incumbering their effort to fight back. The dragon wins in spectacular fashion, leaving but one knight capable of further resistance, who has fled to his castle protected by a large moat the dragon cannot immediately cross. The other knights opt to blame him for their debacle and take bitter joy in knowing that castle will not long resist, either.
It sounds ridiculous, but that about sums up Europe between the World Wars. There are two main focuses of this work that explain the defeat of France, up to then a great power, in such rapid fashion by the Germans, who were by no means the dominant military force. The first is political, and it is a miracle that the Third Republic lasted as long as it did. Governments were replaced more frequently than I replace the oil in my car, and I'm actually fairly good at keeping up with that. After the First World War, the average government in France lasted six months, hardly enough time to achieve any long term goals. Their economy, foreign policy, and military all paid a price for this lack of ability to function.
But that was not the fatal flaw. This same system of government had survived the incredible ordeal of 1914. But it did so at an enormous price in lives lost, a price Frenchmen were not willing to pay again. Their minds turned to the defensive at exactly the moment when technology opened the doors to effective offensive weapons, namely the tank and the airplane. Partially out of ignorance and partially out of willful ignorance, the French High Command did not develop these new tools of war effectively. Many of the men who made these poor decisions would come to look for a scapegoat after the debacle of 1940.
The tragedy of the 1930's is recounted once again here, but I will not focus on it. Suffice it to say that France, Britain, and the United States all bear responsibility here, the latter for dissuading France from action and the former for being so willingly dissuaded. I will note that France did waste valuable time 1939 considering an attack against the Soviet Union of all places, giving one an idea of how out of touch France's leaders really were with reality. I will also note that your government should not take orders from your mistress.
The great trial of 1940 ended up in such a ridiculously one sided conflict that it has spawned many myths to try to explain it. One might believe that Germany had an incomparable advantage in terms of technology and manpower. While it certainly used these tools more effectively, integrating the air force with the ground forces and using the panzers as united strike groups, in terms of technological advances and material the Allies had at least equality if not outright superiority. The Germans utilized common technology like radios and phones to coordinate, while the French sent messages via motorcycles.
Yet even with this, the Allies might have triumphed (or at least fought to a standstill) had their brass any sense at all. The French Air Force was hardly involved, with most of their aircraft unused during the conflict, a point that severely undermines many Frenchman's complaint about Britain's unwillingness to commit all of their air power to the Battle of France. The Belgians, bless their hearts, screwed themselves in epic fashion, refusing to coordinate with the Allied powers and even putting up road blocks against the French right up until they needed French and British help to stop the Germans already in Belgium.
And Gamelin...this poor fool would have made an outstanding history professor, but as a general he was an abject failure. There was a complete lack of coordination, both between the Allied powers and within the French army itself. Contradictory orders, delivered at a snails pace, helped ensure that good units were crushed by effective and timely attacks of the Germans. The latter exposed themselves to great risks of a flanking counterattack and were quite nervous about it. It didn't much matter, though, for the French lacked the logistical support necessary to counter-attack. Their philosophy, developed through the lenses of slaughter in World War I, was to be on the defensive, which did not require trucks or heavy equipment movers, which many French units lacked.
And this created the least forgivable sin of all: the lack of a strategic reserve. Even high school sports teach this. One never sees a football or soccer team place all of their defenses right on the line of scrimmage. They place people in reserve to block a breakthrough. Once through the weak defenses of the Ardennes, the Germans faced no effective opposition all the way to the English Channel, trapping the bulk of the Allied fighting forces against the sea. Gamelin had a severe case of tunnel vision and became utterly convinced that the Germans would repeat the Schlieffen Plan of 1914, despite more than amble evidence to the contrary. While he might use the lesson of history as an excuse, it does not defend him in light of the German victory through Sedan in 1870.
After Dunkirk, the balance of the book deals with the French "government" attempting to salvage anything from their defeat. It reads like a patzer chess player struggling to continue a game in which he is a rook down. The story is, in short, pathetic. Shirer tells it well.
This is a horrifically sad, infuriating book. Rarely though was my rage turned on the Germans, who are treated more as a force of nature than anything else in this work. That's not a criticism; the focus deserves to be on the French, who bear responsibility for their actions that led to such a sad pass. It is an extraordinarily readable and enlightening book about how not to conduct a war. At a thousand pages, it is an investment of time, but one worth considering. It is Clausewitz's warnings in action.
The dragon grows and soon strikes at nearby farms. Still, it remains too weak to challenge a knight, much less all of the knights combined. But again, they do nothing. They watch this new dragon develop new methods of battle far different from its ancestor, but convince themselves that their armor was sufficient in the last fight and will be sufficient in any future one, too. The knights begin to squabble among themselves; the smallest among them spends more time defending his frontier with the powerful knight than against the dragon whose nest lies just across a river.
Finally, the dragon, now mature and fully formed, attacks yet another neighbor, one the other knights promised to support and cannot in good conscience abandon (though the thought crosses their minds). This neighbor lives far away, unlike the previous neighbors, and the knights cannot be there to stand by his side. The only option available to them is to attack the dragon from behind, where it is most vulnerable, but to do so they must leave their armor behind. They stay put.
The last battle begin as the dragon attacks the knight. Even now, the knights still have more weapons and power than the dragon, but they don't know how to use them properly. Worse still, the knights argue among themselves about who should shoulder the tasks of using the weapons. In a final humiliation, they learn that their much vaunted armor has been put on wrong and is actually incumbering their effort to fight back. The dragon wins in spectacular fashion, leaving but one knight capable of further resistance, who has fled to his castle protected by a large moat the dragon cannot immediately cross. The other knights opt to blame him for their debacle and take bitter joy in knowing that castle will not long resist, either.
It sounds ridiculous, but that about sums up Europe between the World Wars. There are two main focuses of this work that explain the defeat of France, up to then a great power, in such rapid fashion by the Germans, who were by no means the dominant military force. The first is political, and it is a miracle that the Third Republic lasted as long as it did. Governments were replaced more frequently than I replace the oil in my car, and I'm actually fairly good at keeping up with that. After the First World War, the average government in France lasted six months, hardly enough time to achieve any long term goals. Their economy, foreign policy, and military all paid a price for this lack of ability to function.
But that was not the fatal flaw. This same system of government had survived the incredible ordeal of 1914. But it did so at an enormous price in lives lost, a price Frenchmen were not willing to pay again. Their minds turned to the defensive at exactly the moment when technology opened the doors to effective offensive weapons, namely the tank and the airplane. Partially out of ignorance and partially out of willful ignorance, the French High Command did not develop these new tools of war effectively. Many of the men who made these poor decisions would come to look for a scapegoat after the debacle of 1940.
The tragedy of the 1930's is recounted once again here, but I will not focus on it. Suffice it to say that France, Britain, and the United States all bear responsibility here, the latter for dissuading France from action and the former for being so willingly dissuaded. I will note that France did waste valuable time 1939 considering an attack against the Soviet Union of all places, giving one an idea of how out of touch France's leaders really were with reality. I will also note that your government should not take orders from your mistress.
The great trial of 1940 ended up in such a ridiculously one sided conflict that it has spawned many myths to try to explain it. One might believe that Germany had an incomparable advantage in terms of technology and manpower. While it certainly used these tools more effectively, integrating the air force with the ground forces and using the panzers as united strike groups, in terms of technological advances and material the Allies had at least equality if not outright superiority. The Germans utilized common technology like radios and phones to coordinate, while the French sent messages via motorcycles.
Yet even with this, the Allies might have triumphed (or at least fought to a standstill) had their brass any sense at all. The French Air Force was hardly involved, with most of their aircraft unused during the conflict, a point that severely undermines many Frenchman's complaint about Britain's unwillingness to commit all of their air power to the Battle of France. The Belgians, bless their hearts, screwed themselves in epic fashion, refusing to coordinate with the Allied powers and even putting up road blocks against the French right up until they needed French and British help to stop the Germans already in Belgium.
And Gamelin...this poor fool would have made an outstanding history professor, but as a general he was an abject failure. There was a complete lack of coordination, both between the Allied powers and within the French army itself. Contradictory orders, delivered at a snails pace, helped ensure that good units were crushed by effective and timely attacks of the Germans. The latter exposed themselves to great risks of a flanking counterattack and were quite nervous about it. It didn't much matter, though, for the French lacked the logistical support necessary to counter-attack. Their philosophy, developed through the lenses of slaughter in World War I, was to be on the defensive, which did not require trucks or heavy equipment movers, which many French units lacked.
And this created the least forgivable sin of all: the lack of a strategic reserve. Even high school sports teach this. One never sees a football or soccer team place all of their defenses right on the line of scrimmage. They place people in reserve to block a breakthrough. Once through the weak defenses of the Ardennes, the Germans faced no effective opposition all the way to the English Channel, trapping the bulk of the Allied fighting forces against the sea. Gamelin had a severe case of tunnel vision and became utterly convinced that the Germans would repeat the Schlieffen Plan of 1914, despite more than amble evidence to the contrary. While he might use the lesson of history as an excuse, it does not defend him in light of the German victory through Sedan in 1870.
After Dunkirk, the balance of the book deals with the French "government" attempting to salvage anything from their defeat. It reads like a patzer chess player struggling to continue a game in which he is a rook down. The story is, in short, pathetic. Shirer tells it well.
This is a horrifically sad, infuriating book. Rarely though was my rage turned on the Germans, who are treated more as a force of nature than anything else in this work. That's not a criticism; the focus deserves to be on the French, who bear responsibility for their actions that led to such a sad pass. It is an extraordinarily readable and enlightening book about how not to conduct a war. At a thousand pages, it is an investment of time, but one worth considering. It is Clausewitz's warnings in action.
December 19, 2023
I bought and read this book when I was 14/15 - it was an revelation - how else can I explain the way I galloped through its 800 or what ever pages. I adored it and it gave me an insight and love of real history. I would happily reread it today.
Is it flawed - well any 70 odd years old history book is going to be flawed - Shirer's views on Germany - that whole special path and missed liberal opportunities and the unique evil nature of Germany ,- seem not simply silly but laughably naive. There was a time we could think that 'the Germans' were distinct monsters and that 'we' in other countries had nothing in common with their crimes and horrors but history has taught us that neither then nor now were any no us innocent of complicity at the very least.
To be honest I can't remember enough detail to say what Shirer gets right or wrong - I imagine his portrait of the Third Republic is very deterministic seeing in its demise the weaknesses of its past. But it was tremendously readable narrative history. If it is flawed it is still splendid stuff and a wonderful introduction to a history far to little known to English language readers.
Is it flawed - well any 70 odd years old history book is going to be flawed - Shirer's views on Germany - that whole special path and missed liberal opportunities and the unique evil nature of Germany ,- seem not simply silly but laughably naive. There was a time we could think that 'the Germans' were distinct monsters and that 'we' in other countries had nothing in common with their crimes and horrors but history has taught us that neither then nor now were any no us innocent of complicity at the very least.
To be honest I can't remember enough detail to say what Shirer gets right or wrong - I imagine his portrait of the Third Republic is very deterministic seeing in its demise the weaknesses of its past. But it was tremendously readable narrative history. If it is flawed it is still splendid stuff and a wonderful introduction to a history far to little known to English language readers.
October 10, 2016
I read this book on and off in a 2 month period so my review will be largely based on the last chapters of the book.
It's an extensive read about the start and goings of the Third Republic, and especially the last chapters during the take over by Petain and Laval, who put the nail to the coffin of the Third Republic.
It's an extensive read about the start and goings of the Third Republic, and especially the last chapters during the take over by Petain and Laval, who put the nail to the coffin of the Third Republic.
March 25, 2015
Chapters 1-15
It’s tempting to read Shirer’s book and see the dysfunctions of the Third Republic in the contemporary United States. Or any democratic nation really. I think it’s best to resist this temptation.
Yes, like today’s democracies (pick one), France was riven by factions and seemingly incapable of responding to the most basic challenges. The citizens were jaded and felt alienated from the government and politicians. The elite made sure their positions were unchallenged and felt no responsibility to help pay for the needs of the nation and its people.
But France was different. A fatal cynicism about democracy had taken hold of France prior to World War II, but that’s not a surprise. France’s hold on democracy was always tenuous. Following France’s ignominious defeat to the Germans in 1870, the republic was ill-formed, almost by accident, when the assembled monarchists couldn’t agree on a king. No one really wanted a republic, they just couldn’t come up with anything else.
In making the government, though, they ensured that it would be a conservative organ: unwieldy to navigate, unresponsive to public opinion, difficult to steer or change, and beholden to the upper classes. Governing coalitions rose and fell with an amazing rapidity. It was the epitome of the government that governs least, governs best.
The poorly functioning government, in conjunction with the increasing and outspoken desire for a monarchy or a fascist government, were ultimately what undermined France. When taxing the rich became a topic of discussion, the nation’s rich elite had no qualms arguing about the benefits of a fascist government. They even fomented for it.
So the United States has a way to go to reach that point. Although one party actively tries to suppress voting, and by function the US Constitution the nation is not very democratic (see the Senate), no one is yet proposing a fascist regime. (Though the love for Putin is a bit creepy.)
Oh yeah, the book. It’s a fascinating read. Although I’ve read 250 pages, I’ve hardly made a dent in it. It covers the formation of the Third Republic, and I stopped at March 1936. Shirer presents an image of an ossified society stunted with an ineffective government and rife with anti-Semitism.
A very good reading so far. I just picked it up to read about pre-war France, but at some point I’ll read the rest.
It’s tempting to read Shirer’s book and see the dysfunctions of the Third Republic in the contemporary United States. Or any democratic nation really. I think it’s best to resist this temptation.
Yes, like today’s democracies (pick one), France was riven by factions and seemingly incapable of responding to the most basic challenges. The citizens were jaded and felt alienated from the government and politicians. The elite made sure their positions were unchallenged and felt no responsibility to help pay for the needs of the nation and its people.
But France was different. A fatal cynicism about democracy had taken hold of France prior to World War II, but that’s not a surprise. France’s hold on democracy was always tenuous. Following France’s ignominious defeat to the Germans in 1870, the republic was ill-formed, almost by accident, when the assembled monarchists couldn’t agree on a king. No one really wanted a republic, they just couldn’t come up with anything else.
In making the government, though, they ensured that it would be a conservative organ: unwieldy to navigate, unresponsive to public opinion, difficult to steer or change, and beholden to the upper classes. Governing coalitions rose and fell with an amazing rapidity. It was the epitome of the government that governs least, governs best.
The poorly functioning government, in conjunction with the increasing and outspoken desire for a monarchy or a fascist government, were ultimately what undermined France. When taxing the rich became a topic of discussion, the nation’s rich elite had no qualms arguing about the benefits of a fascist government. They even fomented for it.
So the United States has a way to go to reach that point. Although one party actively tries to suppress voting, and by function the US Constitution the nation is not very democratic (see the Senate), no one is yet proposing a fascist regime. (Though the love for Putin is a bit creepy.)
Oh yeah, the book. It’s a fascinating read. Although I’ve read 250 pages, I’ve hardly made a dent in it. It covers the formation of the Third Republic, and I stopped at March 1936. Shirer presents an image of an ossified society stunted with an ineffective government and rife with anti-Semitism.
A very good reading so far. I just picked it up to read about pre-war France, but at some point I’ll read the rest.
December 26, 2012
Some amazing things in this history! I had no idea Shirer was a radio correspondent basically embedded with the Nazi army and thus present at many key events, such as outside Foch's rail car for the defeat signing and strolling into an abandoned Paris. (At that point cows gazed in the shadow of the Eiffel Tower.) Peeling away the onion of sociological and political France pre-WWII the sudden defeat makes sense with the seeds planted there. Riddled with fascist support, even the far left was against fighting Hitler. "Die for Danzig?", they asked. Heck, it seems like the could have joined The Axis with a bit more of that. This basically briefly in the attacks on the (much hated) British as they tried to sink the French Fleet and prevent it from falling into German hands. The book concludes, before an Epilogue, with the signing away of the Republic to estable Petain's collaborationist, anti-Semite Vichy regime.
March 21, 2024
A large global empire that dominated its continent for over a century is in crisis. A powerful historic enemy is stepping up hostilities as it recovers from a recent historic defeat. Internally, the nation is divided. Large sections of the populace regard the state and its authorities as illegitimate and seek a return to former, oppressive institutions. Even though it has the most powerful army, the empire collapses like a rotten fruit, not defeated from without but from within. As the historic enemy moves in for the kill, the most powerful politicians stand paralyzed, unable to defend the institutions they have served for decades, or they move gleefully for the kill, ready to strike down the state. In this hour of crisis the leadership is dominated by an aged figure who is just a front for reactionary, malignant forces ready to unleash the powers of a police state on their enemies. Does this sound like a particularly pessimistic view of the US in 2020? It’s the story of the collapse of France in June 1940. Many critics liken the US to Rome a great empire overstretched, surrounded by hungry barbarians, where the populace prefer to drown their dread in strange religions or decadent lifestyles, but this is not a good comparison. France is a much better fit.
Shirer’s monumental work, although not as famous as his book on the Third Reich (which is a masterwork of contemporary history by an eyewitness) is magnificent. It starts with the long term view, from the origins of the Third Republic. After Napoleon III is tricked into war by the wily Bismarck on behalf of an ascendant Prussia, he is defeated in the Battle of Sedan in 1870 and then captured. As the troops fall back Paris is captured by the Commune, left wing insurrection that attempts to relive 1789 but fails. The French army surrounds Paris and starves its inhabitants and then it enters the City of Light and drowns the failed revolution in a bloodbath. Over 20.000 people were killed. Thus began France’s so far longest living republican experiment. It lasted two months shy of 70 years. The current fifth republic has existed for 62 years.
The beginnings of the third republic were thus inauspicious. It began with a dictatorship (that of general Macmahon), without the support of the upper class (most were monarchists), of the Catholic Church (thus removing a large part of a cross section of society) or the working class (which was dominated by anarchists and socialists). So it had very narrow support, basically that of the laicized middle and lower middle classes. Crucially, it did not have the support of the army, whose officers were mostly Catholic aristocrats. However, it managed to survive multiple crises, including several coup attempts by potential strongmen, the rivalries arising from the colonization of Africa and the battles with the Catholic Church after ir rescinded Napoleon’s concordat with the Holy See. An ugly incident showed the deep fissures within this society: the Dreyfus affair showed a deep antisemitism and a right wing movement with strong popular backing and total amorality in reaching its goals. This society, that seemed right for the taking, became unified when the Germans attacked it in 1914, under the inspiring leadership of Clemenceau and a generation of brilliant military commanders, such as Foch and Joffre, they turned a rout into a successful counterattack and stopped the boches near the Marne. Eventually, with British and American support, they won the war. Contrary to popular perception at the time and afterwards, the peace conditions were not unduly harsh against the Germans (in fact much lighter than the Germans imposed and would again impose when they would have the upper hand). However, France was scarred by the terrible conflict and its vital force was sapped. It was cursed with a scurrilous press, and able politicians that prized mediocrity in the leadership so as to retain permanent power through the continuous cabinet reshuffles. There were plenty of scandals that delegitimized the state institutions. There were also plenty of homegrown fascists following the example of Italy and Germany. They nearly took over parliament in several terrible days in 1934. Top army leaders often sympathized with the fascists, seeing them as an alternative to the parliamentary system which they saw as weak and corrupt.
Like in real life, in this book time expands over certain events and contracts on others. In many historic junctures (such as January 30, 1933, when Hitler came to power), France had no government. It also lost many opportunities to stop Hitler, who did not have full army support in the first years of his dictatorship. France could very easily have stopped Hitler by itself when it moved into the Rhineland in March 1936 (he had already indicated his intention when he withdrew Germany’s consent to the military provisions of the Versailles treaty in 1935), or when he moved into Austria in 1938. Here France could have agreed with Mussolini to stop Hitler. In both cases Hitler would very likely have been toppled. There were chances as well in 1938 when he took over the Sudetenland in Bohemia, or in March 1939, when he occupied rump Czechoslovakia. Even in September 1939 it still wasn’t too late: when Hitler attacked Poland France and Britain had unwisely given a unilateral guarantee without Poland having agreed to allow Soviet troops to pass through its territory to attack Germany. This showed Russia that France and Britain were not serious about a defensive military alliance and Stalin sought an accommodation with Hitler. The divisions in French society didn’t help. The Socialists had come to power in a popular front of leftists, headed by Leon Blum. That he was a Jew, even though there were few Jews in his administration, helped fuel antisemitic conspiracy theories. Yet Blum was unable to help the legal government of the Spanish Republic during that country’s civil war, which allowed a hostile government on French borders to take power for decades, and showed the fascists and nazis that France was not serious about stopping them. Daladier, who for long was Minister of Defense and Prime Minister, was unable to change the hidebound upper military echelons. These officers dismissed planes as toys, useless in war, and tanks as little more than auxiliaries to the infantry. French tanks and planes were plentiful and well made, but they had no radios, so they couldn’t act as a coordinated force. No one of significance, besides Colonel de Gaulle, paid attention to evolving theories of tank warfare developed by the Germans Guderian and Rommel. They put all their trust in defensive fortresses along the Maginot Line, believing against all evidence that the Germans would attack well-defensed lines rather than moving through Belgium and the Ardennes forest in Luxembourg, like they had done in 1914.
Then, when the Germans gave the French 9 months of fake war (drôle de guerre), the government and the political leadership did nothing to prepare. They did not coordinate their defense with Belgium’s (although in all fairness King Leopold did not make that easy), they did not take advantage of Germany being occupied in Norway, but they waited passively for the attack. When it came, the bovine leadership of useless generals Gamelin and Georges were completely unable to match the tempo of the German attack (the French fought as if they were in a leisurely nineteenth century war). The new leadership of Reynaud, who tried to be a French Churchill, failed, in part because he was surrounded by defeatists (including his lover, the ghastly comtesse Helène des Portes), in part because, even though he was intelligent and able, he lacked Churchill’s bloodymindedness and monumental self confidence. As the catastrophe unfolds the two months between 10 May 1940 when the Germans attack and 10 July widen into long days in which Reynaud tries to keep together his pro-war coalition against those who would accept any peace with the Germans to keep from fighting. Churchill drops in several times to try to stiffen resistance, but defeatist general Weigand stifles all attempts to defend France, in league with catholic monarchists such as Alibert and Baudoin. Unintelligent but stubborn president of the republic Lebrun is unable to help things and eventually power falls into the lap of senile general Petain and his evil genius, resentful politician Laval, the scene is set for a humiliating armistice and the fall of the government under the power of the Germans, and then the end of the 1875 Constitution as the two chambers enable Petain to issue a new Constitution (which he doesn’t) and the power to legislate in any matter (which he does often). In the end all honor is lost. France loses many fewer men in WWII than in WWI but compromises its honor and its spirit as it becomes a willing victim to Hitler and uses its state powers to persecute and murder. Such pollution is never washed away, particularly when there is no reckoning. As the book ends Laval reaches the climax of its power, although we are told he would be judged and executed in 1945, not before he persecuted and murdered many men better than him. The malignant, incompetent Weigand lives to be nearly 100, and even evil Alibert lives for decades more. The postwar wouldn’t be much kinder to France, as it stumbled through colonial crises that further compromised its values (notably the crushing defeat in Diem Viem Phu and the nightmarish exit from Algeria, that nearly caused a coup in France). General de Gaulle managed to make France feel like a world power with nukes and a seat in the security council of the UN, but it wasn’t. It still hasn’t found a role in a Europe with a stronger Germany, a feckless Italy and a quitting Britain.
Even though the specialized subject of this book and its bulk might dissuade readers from taking it up, they should give it a try. Shirer writes in a learned but journalistic style and the people portrayed are archetypes of those one would probably find in any society: smart and dull, crafty or artless, competent or inept, mostly good (like Reynaud) or mostly bad (like Laval), most in between. An excellent read.
Shirer’s monumental work, although not as famous as his book on the Third Reich (which is a masterwork of contemporary history by an eyewitness) is magnificent. It starts with the long term view, from the origins of the Third Republic. After Napoleon III is tricked into war by the wily Bismarck on behalf of an ascendant Prussia, he is defeated in the Battle of Sedan in 1870 and then captured. As the troops fall back Paris is captured by the Commune, left wing insurrection that attempts to relive 1789 but fails. The French army surrounds Paris and starves its inhabitants and then it enters the City of Light and drowns the failed revolution in a bloodbath. Over 20.000 people were killed. Thus began France’s so far longest living republican experiment. It lasted two months shy of 70 years. The current fifth republic has existed for 62 years.
The beginnings of the third republic were thus inauspicious. It began with a dictatorship (that of general Macmahon), without the support of the upper class (most were monarchists), of the Catholic Church (thus removing a large part of a cross section of society) or the working class (which was dominated by anarchists and socialists). So it had very narrow support, basically that of the laicized middle and lower middle classes. Crucially, it did not have the support of the army, whose officers were mostly Catholic aristocrats. However, it managed to survive multiple crises, including several coup attempts by potential strongmen, the rivalries arising from the colonization of Africa and the battles with the Catholic Church after ir rescinded Napoleon’s concordat with the Holy See. An ugly incident showed the deep fissures within this society: the Dreyfus affair showed a deep antisemitism and a right wing movement with strong popular backing and total amorality in reaching its goals. This society, that seemed right for the taking, became unified when the Germans attacked it in 1914, under the inspiring leadership of Clemenceau and a generation of brilliant military commanders, such as Foch and Joffre, they turned a rout into a successful counterattack and stopped the boches near the Marne. Eventually, with British and American support, they won the war. Contrary to popular perception at the time and afterwards, the peace conditions were not unduly harsh against the Germans (in fact much lighter than the Germans imposed and would again impose when they would have the upper hand). However, France was scarred by the terrible conflict and its vital force was sapped. It was cursed with a scurrilous press, and able politicians that prized mediocrity in the leadership so as to retain permanent power through the continuous cabinet reshuffles. There were plenty of scandals that delegitimized the state institutions. There were also plenty of homegrown fascists following the example of Italy and Germany. They nearly took over parliament in several terrible days in 1934. Top army leaders often sympathized with the fascists, seeing them as an alternative to the parliamentary system which they saw as weak and corrupt.
Like in real life, in this book time expands over certain events and contracts on others. In many historic junctures (such as January 30, 1933, when Hitler came to power), France had no government. It also lost many opportunities to stop Hitler, who did not have full army support in the first years of his dictatorship. France could very easily have stopped Hitler by itself when it moved into the Rhineland in March 1936 (he had already indicated his intention when he withdrew Germany’s consent to the military provisions of the Versailles treaty in 1935), or when he moved into Austria in 1938. Here France could have agreed with Mussolini to stop Hitler. In both cases Hitler would very likely have been toppled. There were chances as well in 1938 when he took over the Sudetenland in Bohemia, or in March 1939, when he occupied rump Czechoslovakia. Even in September 1939 it still wasn’t too late: when Hitler attacked Poland France and Britain had unwisely given a unilateral guarantee without Poland having agreed to allow Soviet troops to pass through its territory to attack Germany. This showed Russia that France and Britain were not serious about a defensive military alliance and Stalin sought an accommodation with Hitler. The divisions in French society didn’t help. The Socialists had come to power in a popular front of leftists, headed by Leon Blum. That he was a Jew, even though there were few Jews in his administration, helped fuel antisemitic conspiracy theories. Yet Blum was unable to help the legal government of the Spanish Republic during that country’s civil war, which allowed a hostile government on French borders to take power for decades, and showed the fascists and nazis that France was not serious about stopping them. Daladier, who for long was Minister of Defense and Prime Minister, was unable to change the hidebound upper military echelons. These officers dismissed planes as toys, useless in war, and tanks as little more than auxiliaries to the infantry. French tanks and planes were plentiful and well made, but they had no radios, so they couldn’t act as a coordinated force. No one of significance, besides Colonel de Gaulle, paid attention to evolving theories of tank warfare developed by the Germans Guderian and Rommel. They put all their trust in defensive fortresses along the Maginot Line, believing against all evidence that the Germans would attack well-defensed lines rather than moving through Belgium and the Ardennes forest in Luxembourg, like they had done in 1914.
Then, when the Germans gave the French 9 months of fake war (drôle de guerre), the government and the political leadership did nothing to prepare. They did not coordinate their defense with Belgium’s (although in all fairness King Leopold did not make that easy), they did not take advantage of Germany being occupied in Norway, but they waited passively for the attack. When it came, the bovine leadership of useless generals Gamelin and Georges were completely unable to match the tempo of the German attack (the French fought as if they were in a leisurely nineteenth century war). The new leadership of Reynaud, who tried to be a French Churchill, failed, in part because he was surrounded by defeatists (including his lover, the ghastly comtesse Helène des Portes), in part because, even though he was intelligent and able, he lacked Churchill’s bloodymindedness and monumental self confidence. As the catastrophe unfolds the two months between 10 May 1940 when the Germans attack and 10 July widen into long days in which Reynaud tries to keep together his pro-war coalition against those who would accept any peace with the Germans to keep from fighting. Churchill drops in several times to try to stiffen resistance, but defeatist general Weigand stifles all attempts to defend France, in league with catholic monarchists such as Alibert and Baudoin. Unintelligent but stubborn president of the republic Lebrun is unable to help things and eventually power falls into the lap of senile general Petain and his evil genius, resentful politician Laval, the scene is set for a humiliating armistice and the fall of the government under the power of the Germans, and then the end of the 1875 Constitution as the two chambers enable Petain to issue a new Constitution (which he doesn’t) and the power to legislate in any matter (which he does often). In the end all honor is lost. France loses many fewer men in WWII than in WWI but compromises its honor and its spirit as it becomes a willing victim to Hitler and uses its state powers to persecute and murder. Such pollution is never washed away, particularly when there is no reckoning. As the book ends Laval reaches the climax of its power, although we are told he would be judged and executed in 1945, not before he persecuted and murdered many men better than him. The malignant, incompetent Weigand lives to be nearly 100, and even evil Alibert lives for decades more. The postwar wouldn’t be much kinder to France, as it stumbled through colonial crises that further compromised its values (notably the crushing defeat in Diem Viem Phu and the nightmarish exit from Algeria, that nearly caused a coup in France). General de Gaulle managed to make France feel like a world power with nukes and a seat in the security council of the UN, but it wasn’t. It still hasn’t found a role in a Europe with a stronger Germany, a feckless Italy and a quitting Britain.
Even though the specialized subject of this book and its bulk might dissuade readers from taking it up, they should give it a try. Shirer writes in a learned but journalistic style and the people portrayed are archetypes of those one would probably find in any society: smart and dull, crafty or artless, competent or inept, mostly good (like Reynaud) or mostly bad (like Laval), most in between. An excellent read.
June 16, 2025
The Collapse of the Third Republic is the third epic history book involving WWII I have read this year- the first being Shirer's own "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich", from the perspective of Germany, then Andrew Roberts' "Churchill", following the man himself.
The story of the fall of the Third Republic of France is a tragedy of Greek proportions, showing how fear can blind and corrupt an entire nation and lead to calamity.
The characters involved in France's downfall are a cast well-fit for such a drama.
Conniving Pierre Laval, geriatric Marshal Petain, tragic and exhausted Paul Reynaud, lonely Charles de Gaulle.
When I say that this is the one I enjoyed the least, it is not to say Shirer did not excellently put forth the evidence with his usual gripping narrative. Ultimately, the historical reality of the apathy of military and civilian leaders in France makes for a really boring middle third of this tome. The following cycle repeats itself for a good 12 hours-
1. The French military needs to prepare an action or counterattack immediately or else face grave consequences.
2. The people in charge do not prepare at all out of a combination of fear and laziness.
3. It is too late, the action is called off, and the Nazis are one step closer to victory.
This is basically how France loses the war. They had so many opportunities to put up a fight against the Nazis, but these were ultimately not taken.
A good lesson to learn from history? Absolutely. Interesting to read? Not at all.
Once you get through this section the narrative becomes gripping once again as the nation goes through it's final death throes- the casting of all hopes of a strongman in Marshal Petain, the cunning force of corruption in Pierre Laval, the ultimate suicide of the republic.
This is a truly fascinating slice of a nation's history unfortunately (but necessarily) bogged down by the reality of a slow and unnecessary demise. Really interested in WWII? Definitely worth a read. Looking to crack your first monster WWII history book? Start with The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich instead. 4/5
The story of the fall of the Third Republic of France is a tragedy of Greek proportions, showing how fear can blind and corrupt an entire nation and lead to calamity.
The characters involved in France's downfall are a cast well-fit for such a drama.
Conniving Pierre Laval, geriatric Marshal Petain, tragic and exhausted Paul Reynaud, lonely Charles de Gaulle.
When I say that this is the one I enjoyed the least, it is not to say Shirer did not excellently put forth the evidence with his usual gripping narrative. Ultimately, the historical reality of the apathy of military and civilian leaders in France makes for a really boring middle third of this tome. The following cycle repeats itself for a good 12 hours-
1. The French military needs to prepare an action or counterattack immediately or else face grave consequences.
2. The people in charge do not prepare at all out of a combination of fear and laziness.
3. It is too late, the action is called off, and the Nazis are one step closer to victory.
This is basically how France loses the war. They had so many opportunities to put up a fight against the Nazis, but these were ultimately not taken.
A good lesson to learn from history? Absolutely. Interesting to read? Not at all.
Once you get through this section the narrative becomes gripping once again as the nation goes through it's final death throes- the casting of all hopes of a strongman in Marshal Petain, the cunning force of corruption in Pierre Laval, the ultimate suicide of the republic.
This is a truly fascinating slice of a nation's history unfortunately (but necessarily) bogged down by the reality of a slow and unnecessary demise. Really interested in WWII? Definitely worth a read. Looking to crack your first monster WWII history book? Start with The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich instead. 4/5
June 24, 2021
Long before the war, France had been in a status of corruption, instability, division, and hypocrisy, claiming to support democracy values while committing atrocities and crimes against humanity around the world and in its colonies, claiming to be the center of freedom while antisemitism was prevalent in its practices... It had been acting as a coward bully who would annoy small kids, but go hide behind Britain when another bully attacks. During the first world war, it was saved only because of British involvement, but ironically, the French didn't realize (or admit) this and claimed that they won the war. When the second war came, France was in a far worse status than before WWI, but way more arrogant and confident in its abilities, which (in addition to less British involvement) led to the inevitable defeat and occupation by Germany.
This book describes in detail the corrupt and divided status that France had lived since the 20th century started. My main critic against the book, is the author's one-sided view which may have been biased in some areas.
It's interesting to note that after France was liberated (by the USA and the UK) from the Germans in 1944, France did not admit and apologize for the crimes done by its Vichy government against the citizens (particularly the Jews) and in support of Nazi Germany's crimes, it did not even admit that the Allies (not the French) were the ones who saved it (again), and it continued its colonial policy and was the cause of atrocities, destruction, and wars in many places like Vietnam and Egypt.
This book describes in detail the corrupt and divided status that France had lived since the 20th century started. My main critic against the book, is the author's one-sided view which may have been biased in some areas.
It's interesting to note that after France was liberated (by the USA and the UK) from the Germans in 1944, France did not admit and apologize for the crimes done by its Vichy government against the citizens (particularly the Jews) and in support of Nazi Germany's crimes, it did not even admit that the Allies (not the French) were the ones who saved it (again), and it continued its colonial policy and was the cause of atrocities, destruction, and wars in many places like Vietnam and Egypt.
December 17, 2024
Brevity is not among this book's virtues. While a painstakingly detailed, week-by-week record of the events should definitely exist, I felt that this account lacked in the actual analysis: was the Third Republic bound to fall? is it, in the end, a cautionary story of systemic political dysfunction?
When the story is told primarily through a cavalcade of highly incremental but ultimately consequential missteps, all that happened appears inevitable. When some people--most notably, de Gaulle--are given more light early on just because they will be relevant or even “redemeed” in the future, all the wrong decisions seem to draw from individual vices. Personally, I think that neither of these tendencies of Shirer's implicit method are good ways to make sense of history.
All that being said, the account does abound in detail and does challenge some of the popularly held beliefs about the interbellum France and Europe writ large (chapters on the international scene between 1933 and 1939 were especially interesting, but maybe it's just me). There were things I was happy to learn more about -- for example, I was unaware France was such a stark example of runaway capitalism up until 1930s; past is indeed a foreign country.
I'd recommend it to those who have already done some reading on the subject and/or are not looking for the concept-heavy explanation for the Third Republic's failure. And yes, four paragraphs in, I can only admit brevity is not among my virtues, either.
When the story is told primarily through a cavalcade of highly incremental but ultimately consequential missteps, all that happened appears inevitable. When some people--most notably, de Gaulle--are given more light early on just because they will be relevant or even “redemeed” in the future, all the wrong decisions seem to draw from individual vices. Personally, I think that neither of these tendencies of Shirer's implicit method are good ways to make sense of history.
All that being said, the account does abound in detail and does challenge some of the popularly held beliefs about the interbellum France and Europe writ large (chapters on the international scene between 1933 and 1939 were especially interesting, but maybe it's just me). There were things I was happy to learn more about -- for example, I was unaware France was such a stark example of runaway capitalism up until 1930s; past is indeed a foreign country.
I'd recommend it to those who have already done some reading on the subject and/or are not looking for the concept-heavy explanation for the Third Republic's failure. And yes, four paragraphs in, I can only admit brevity is not among my virtues, either.
June 10, 2020
This is a simple case of a book being too long. Shirer makes the main thrust of his argument in the first three hundred pages. He then spends most of the rest of book recapping those same points and going the lead up to World War II through to the Fall of France in extreme detail. If you are one of the lucky few who hasn't had to memorize these events and now you want to, this would be a good book to get you started. If you are familiar with the events of the war my recommendation is that you read the first two pages and then skip ahead to the last chapter.
January 8, 2010
This should be required reading for anyone interested in government, history, or both. An amazingly intimate and detailed portrait of the governmental dysfunction of a major world power (at least at that time).
January 30, 2024
If you want to know why France collapsed in 1940 after a six week attack by Nazi Germany, then you need to read this book. The country was divided, but rot had begun years earlier. Willim Shirer did an excellent job at explaining the downfall of what had been a world power.
September 17, 2012
Great- detailed breakdown of military and political fall of France.
December 8, 2012
Excellent. Nearly as good but certainly as insightful as The Rise and Fall...
May 10, 2020
Way too much detail for a detail-oriented person.
August 5, 2019
“All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.”
Watch good men doing nothing- except destroy the French Third Republic, a bullwork of chaotic and glorious democracy. They destroyed it by parts, slowly at first, then with rapid abandon - with inaction, timidity in the face of bullies, and blindness. Watch them underestimate the dangers of fascism and radicalism and nationalism. Watch them overestimate the strength of their governmental and social system.
Their actions had dire consequences... for the French, for their hapless 'allies' they were sworn to protect, for the world. By the time they bestirred themselves to action,bit was far, far too late.
Hear it in the words of one of Murrow's stars, who reported it in real time from the places this ridiculous episode of humanity took place. Shirer was a witness to the insanity of World War II and a most gifted narrator of the events that unfolded.
Grover Gardener is phonemenal again as he channels Shirer.
Don't think this could happen again? Then you're a fool. Because “All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.”
Watch good men doing nothing- except destroy the French Third Republic, a bullwork of chaotic and glorious democracy. They destroyed it by parts, slowly at first, then with rapid abandon - with inaction, timidity in the face of bullies, and blindness. Watch them underestimate the dangers of fascism and radicalism and nationalism. Watch them overestimate the strength of their governmental and social system.
Their actions had dire consequences... for the French, for their hapless 'allies' they were sworn to protect, for the world. By the time they bestirred themselves to action,bit was far, far too late.
Hear it in the words of one of Murrow's stars, who reported it in real time from the places this ridiculous episode of humanity took place. Shirer was a witness to the insanity of World War II and a most gifted narrator of the events that unfolded.
Grover Gardener is phonemenal again as he channels Shirer.
Don't think this could happen again? Then you're a fool. Because “All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.”
March 22, 2025
This book is a must companion for "The Rise and Fall of The Third Reich" by the same brilliant author. Shirer did us all a favor for saving his account in his eloquent and well-established writings.
I thought that this book would be repetitive for someone who read the "Rise and Fall", but I was proven wrong! The view from the French side was important to understand that it wasn't just the Biltzkrieg of the Wehrmacht that won them the battle. The third republic made a multitude of blunders within its chaotic political system that enabled the other side successes.
A true masterpiece.
I thought that this book would be repetitive for someone who read the "Rise and Fall", but I was proven wrong! The view from the French side was important to understand that it wasn't just the Biltzkrieg of the Wehrmacht that won them the battle. The third republic made a multitude of blunders within its chaotic political system that enabled the other side successes.
A true masterpiece.
September 18, 2025
A monumental look at the turbulent fall of the French Third Republic to Fascism, polarization, defeatism, and apathy whose lessons echo into the current geopolitical climate. A fascinating examination of all the key figures (Pétain, Daladier, Reynaud, Gamelin, Laval, etc…) who facilitated and failed to prevent the fall of their beloved nation. A must read for any student of history!
July 5, 2017
En un sens, ce livre fut un chemin de croix : il m'aura fallu un temps immense pour le terminer. Sujet passionnant, récit qui l'est tout autant. Sujet qui interpelle, parallèles qui troublent. Je ne peux qu'en recommander la lecture bien qu'il faille s'armer de patience ;)
August 12, 2021
I loved, loved, loved William Shirer's "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich" [so much I read it twice]. Mr. Shirer was a journalist so he brings a journalist's eye and writing ability to the historian's task and it usually makes for compelling reading. This book was no exception.
The book covers French history from the start of the Third Republic to the, as Mr. Shirer puts it, suicide of the Third Republic in July of 1940. About half the book traces important themes in French history (like the Dreyfuss affair) up to the late 1930s, and the second half covers only the time period from the beginning of the war in September 1939, to the French capitulation and armistice in summer 1940.
The book makes for difficult reading at times because the collapse of the Third Republic is a very embarrassing period in French history. History was not kind to Marshall Petain—who took over just as the French capitulated to the Germans. He oversaw the suicide of the Third Republic and the rise of what William Shirer calls, a totalitarian state with more power than Hitler had.
What stood out to me was how divided the French people were politically in the 1920s and 1930s, between left and right—the average government lasted only 3-4 months, and how this division consumed the French public to such an extent that they were distracted from foreign affairs and the looming nightmare of Germany's rise under Hitler.
In addition, the French army leadership can only be described as pathetic. They didn't understand how to use the tank in a modern battlefield, were not prepared for the German attack, even though they had 8 months to prepare, and when they were attacked performed dismally. Just one data point will suffice. The French Air Force was so pathetic that they ended up with MORE aircraft after the German attack, then they had at the start. For some reason—and neither Shirer nor any other historian has been able to pin down why—the leadership of the French Air Force was more concerned with storing and protecting their aircraft than using them to fight the Germans. The head of the French Army comes across as incompetent. He is finally sacked a few days into the German attack, but by then it is too late to do much of anything against the well-coordinated blitzkrieg.
Fascinating reading, but a sorry chapter in French history.
The book covers French history from the start of the Third Republic to the, as Mr. Shirer puts it, suicide of the Third Republic in July of 1940. About half the book traces important themes in French history (like the Dreyfuss affair) up to the late 1930s, and the second half covers only the time period from the beginning of the war in September 1939, to the French capitulation and armistice in summer 1940.
The book makes for difficult reading at times because the collapse of the Third Republic is a very embarrassing period in French history. History was not kind to Marshall Petain—who took over just as the French capitulated to the Germans. He oversaw the suicide of the Third Republic and the rise of what William Shirer calls, a totalitarian state with more power than Hitler had.
What stood out to me was how divided the French people were politically in the 1920s and 1930s, between left and right—the average government lasted only 3-4 months, and how this division consumed the French public to such an extent that they were distracted from foreign affairs and the looming nightmare of Germany's rise under Hitler.
In addition, the French army leadership can only be described as pathetic. They didn't understand how to use the tank in a modern battlefield, were not prepared for the German attack, even though they had 8 months to prepare, and when they were attacked performed dismally. Just one data point will suffice. The French Air Force was so pathetic that they ended up with MORE aircraft after the German attack, then they had at the start. For some reason—and neither Shirer nor any other historian has been able to pin down why—the leadership of the French Air Force was more concerned with storing and protecting their aircraft than using them to fight the Germans. The head of the French Army comes across as incompetent. He is finally sacked a few days into the German attack, but by then it is too late to do much of anything against the well-coordinated blitzkrieg.
Fascinating reading, but a sorry chapter in French history.
April 7, 2020
I am an amateur historian. One who has great respect for what has come before. It is silly to remain ignorant of our past and what our previous relations endured. Because, wow, are we bubble-wrapped.
In 1940, the Nazis overran France in two weeks. It was difficult to read Shirer’s exhaustive 1,500 page weighty tome without drawing parallels to Covid-19. Suffice it to say, our current situation does not involve tanks or dive bomber but we are facing unprecedented hardships.
Clearly, our parents and grandparents endured much. Prohibition, depression, war, economic swings. What were our woes? We worried about that next trip or spa treatment, or on-line order of something we did not appreciate or really need. All financed by personal debt or parental largesse. We have spoiled and underequipped our children. We have shirked responsibility. What we are enduring now is all about entitlement.
The people of France never expected the party to end in 1940. Neither did we in 2020. Clearly, Nazis are not Coivd-19. That comparison is silly. What is accurate, is our complicity and naivete.
I loved Shirer’s Fall of the Third Reich. It is mandatory reading for that chunk of history, any chunk of history. His attention to detail is staggering. In his book regarding France, it is excruciatingly easy to condemn any of its republics. The author clearly has a distaste for France’s leadership and the country’s ethics. They are laid bare. French culture is entirely opportunistic, hypocritical and contradictory.
Shirer published this history in 1969. It is clearly the seminal book on the subject. It is extremely dense and academic in style. These days military historians like Beevor and Atkinson write narrative histories. They bring people to life against historic backdrops. That is why, though seminal, I would only recommend The Collapse of France to those seriously studying that era. It was a slog to get through and so frustrating to see the hundreds of mistakes made by France.
In 1940, the Nazis overran France in two weeks. It was difficult to read Shirer’s exhaustive 1,500 page weighty tome without drawing parallels to Covid-19. Suffice it to say, our current situation does not involve tanks or dive bomber but we are facing unprecedented hardships.
Clearly, our parents and grandparents endured much. Prohibition, depression, war, economic swings. What were our woes? We worried about that next trip or spa treatment, or on-line order of something we did not appreciate or really need. All financed by personal debt or parental largesse. We have spoiled and underequipped our children. We have shirked responsibility. What we are enduring now is all about entitlement.
The people of France never expected the party to end in 1940. Neither did we in 2020. Clearly, Nazis are not Coivd-19. That comparison is silly. What is accurate, is our complicity and naivete.
I loved Shirer’s Fall of the Third Reich. It is mandatory reading for that chunk of history, any chunk of history. His attention to detail is staggering. In his book regarding France, it is excruciatingly easy to condemn any of its republics. The author clearly has a distaste for France’s leadership and the country’s ethics. They are laid bare. French culture is entirely opportunistic, hypocritical and contradictory.
Shirer published this history in 1969. It is clearly the seminal book on the subject. It is extremely dense and academic in style. These days military historians like Beevor and Atkinson write narrative histories. They bring people to life against historic backdrops. That is why, though seminal, I would only recommend The Collapse of France to those seriously studying that era. It was a slog to get through and so frustrating to see the hundreds of mistakes made by France.
June 23, 2019
I found this to be a tedious read. I enjoy military history but I understand the role politics plays in shaping military affairs. This book is overwhelmingly about French politics prior to and during the early stages of the Second World War and it underwhelmed me at times. Items such as disputes regarding the phrasing of a word or term bored me. The jockeying of political personages for offices, titles or manipulating others into taking certain positions was expected.
I would say about 90% of the book deals with the politics and about 10% dealt with military campaigns. Of the campaigns, almost nothing was covered about Poland. I was surprised at the relatively generous coverage of the Norwegian campaign, probably because French forces were actually involved in it. The most extensive coverage, and there wasn't much, was regarding the German offensive into the Low Countries and the campaign to cut off the western allies in France as well as the following stage to finish off the French.
Some of the information here is dated and not quite accurate. The author repeatedly states the French didn't employ their air forces as effectively as they could have. I've read in other books this was in part because the French had a shortage of qualified pilots, which Shirer either never knew or chose to omit.
I would say about 90% of the book deals with the politics and about 10% dealt with military campaigns. Of the campaigns, almost nothing was covered about Poland. I was surprised at the relatively generous coverage of the Norwegian campaign, probably because French forces were actually involved in it. The most extensive coverage, and there wasn't much, was regarding the German offensive into the Low Countries and the campaign to cut off the western allies in France as well as the following stage to finish off the French.
Some of the information here is dated and not quite accurate. The author repeatedly states the French didn't employ their air forces as effectively as they could have. I've read in other books this was in part because the French had a shortage of qualified pilots, which Shirer either never knew or chose to omit.
December 24, 2022
Worth the time required to plow through it, and I do mean PLOW. It’s heavy going — no fault of the writing, as it’s excellent and clear — what I’ve come to expect in Shirer. There’s just tons of material and myriad twists and turns.
While the "collapse" in World War II is the main event, in his typical fashion the author gives us voluminous material on the previous sorry history of the Third Republic. Shirer is writing in the dual role of eye witness and historian, which provides an interesting perspective. Lots of footnotes involved (in a good way --give context and often relate author's personal involvement at the time).
A 21st Century American reader may see parallels between politics of today and the behavior of French politicians of the Third Republic. Not a pretty sight!
While the "collapse" in World War II is the main event, in his typical fashion the author gives us voluminous material on the previous sorry history of the Third Republic. Shirer is writing in the dual role of eye witness and historian, which provides an interesting perspective. Lots of footnotes involved (in a good way --give context and often relate author's personal involvement at the time).
A 21st Century American reader may see parallels between politics of today and the behavior of French politicians of the Third Republic. Not a pretty sight!
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