President Harry Truman was a disappointment to the Democrats, and a godsend to the Republicans. Every attempt to paint Truman with the grace, charm, and grandeur of Franklin Delano Roosevelt had been a dismal failure: Truman's virtues were simpler, plainer, more direct. The challenges he faced--stirrings of civil rights and southern resentment at home, and communist aggression and brinkmanship abroad--could not have been more critical. By the summer of 1948 the prospects of a second term for Truman looked bleak. Newspapers and popular opinion nationwide had all but anointed as president Thomas Dewey, the Republican New York Governor. Truman could not even be certain of his own party's nomination: the Democrats, still in mourning for FDR, were deeply riven, with Henry Wallace and Strom Thurmond leading breakaway Progressive and Dixiecrat factions. Finally, with ingenuity born of desperation, Truman's aides hit upon a plan: get the president in front of as many regular voters as possible, preferably in intimate settings, all across the country. To the surprise of everyone but Harry Truman, it worked. Whistle Stop is the first book of its kind: a micro-history of the summer and fall of 1948 when Truman took to the rails, crisscrossing the country from June right up to Election Day in November. The tour and the campaign culminated with the iconic image of a grinning, victorious Truman holding aloft the famous Chicago Tribune headline: "Dewey Defeats Truman."
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The election of 1948 is one of the most significant presidential elections in all American history. The Republican Party could almost taste an easy victory over plain little Harry Truman. After all, the Republicans had won control of Congress in 1946. They had a dream ticket -it appeared to many observers- in moderate liberal Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York and progressive Republican Earl Warren of California. Shortages and strikes, though no longer as troublesome as earlier, remained a worry for many Americans. In addition as the Cold War heated up with the Stalin’s Berlin Blockade the world seemed, once again, to be on the brink of nuclear war. Could Harry Truman, a man who had never won a national election and who became president by accident be trusted to lead America in this critical time? Could Truman even win the Democratic nomination? The Democrats were divided on the Civil Rights issue and Southern “Dixiecrats” might bolt the party, weakening the Democratic coalition. This is the fascinating story of Whistle-stop by Phillip White, author of Our Supreme Task. To those who have read the biographies of American presidents and US history the outline of the story is well-known. But Phillip White shows that Truman and his advisers, facing defeat, rose to the challenge with a vigorous and skilled response that, in retrospect is nothing more than heroic. This response was to have the president meet as many voters in person as possible all over the country armed with localized and personalized information about every city, every county and every state that Truman visited. Information, we have long known, is power but this inner story of the Democratic National Committee’s Research Division is crucial to understanding Truman’s victory. Truman traveled over 30,000 miles and gave, on average, 16 speeches a day. meeting millions of Americans. Truman was not a great public speaker, as White points out, compared to his contemporaries FDR, Churchill or even the firebrand Strom Thurmond but he demonstrated deep knowledge of the issues that concerned the American people, passion and his persona as a “down-home” man of the people was believable because it was evident to all who met him that Truman was a good and true man. But, as Phillip White points out if Truman had not be able to connect to so many middle-of-the-road voters he would not have won the election. The election was, in part, a referendum on Truman’s competence as president both on domestic and international affairs. One area of the 1948 campaign Whistle-stop underplays a little, in my opinion, is the impact of the Berlin Blockade on American public opinion and on Democratic insiders. I would have liked to have seen more of Truman’s opinion of the Candy Bombers, for example or a discussion of Gale Halverson, the original Candy Bomber and public reaction to the Candy Bombers. I recall my father and uncle telling me that candy companies made huge contributions and there was a lot of publicity about American children donating candy to the cause. It might be remembered that the Candy Bomber story started as an individual act of kindness by an American airman and thus was emblematic of Truman’s democratic America where reforms and change began from individual decision and from the bottom up not from the top down. Stalin and the Soviets had no way of replying to this kind of popular appeal and in the end the Berlin Blockade turned out as a complete disaster for the Soviets and ultimately led to them losing their control over the youth of Berlin and East Germany. When Kennedy came to Berlin in 1963 the fruits of the Berlin Airlift had matured and it was obvious to the entire world that Germany had rejected Soviet Communism. Stalin, perhaps also believing that Truman was a weak and insignificant man, as Dewey did, decided that the summer of 1948 was the time to annex West Berlin. In doing so he could delay the Western Allies from setting up a separate West German government and to keep a rejuvenated German economy from helping European Recovery. If Europe could have been kept in political and economic chaos the chance for Communist triumph would have been greater in places like Greece and Italy. So on June 19. 1948 the Red Army cut off West Berlin by closing off all canal, rail and highway traffic. Stalin hoped he could starve Berlin out. If Stalin had thought Truman and Attlee would just give in he was greatly mistaken. But Harry Truman never even considered leaving, “We are going to stay, period.” And throughout the crisis Truman and Attlee remained unified. Attlee saw to it that Britain and the Commonwealth countries gave full support to the Airlift and did not hesitate to allow Truman to station squadrons of B-29’s in England that could carry A-bombs as a response to Russian aggression against the Airlift. Secretary of State General George Marshall said, “We are in Berlin as a result of agreements between the governments on the areas of occupation in Germany and we intend to stay.” Marshall was backed up by the stoic American commander Lucius D. Clay. Clay had predicted in April 1948 that the push for a West German currency might trigger the Russians to “force us from Berlin.” In the Berlin Crisis, Truman displayed true leadership ability. This, to me was really decisive in Truman’s victory. Phillip White mentions the Berlin Crisis of course as part of the “external forces” that helped Truman’s underdog victory and underlines that Truman did not invent the idea of the airlift (it was the idea of General Clay and others) but White is correct that Truman gave this idea full and unequivocal backing. When soldiers, sailors and airmen but their lives at risk they appreciate being backed 100% and knowing what the mission is. Truman made the mission clear and backed the men 100%.
The Research Division helped Truman make connections with ordinary Americans but Truman’s victory was not based merely on “spin” but on the real achievements of his brilliant foreign policy of his Secretary of State Marshall beginning with the Marshall Plan and Truman’s tough response to Soviet Aggression that became known as the Truman Doctrine. Truman clearly demonstrated that he had learned from Munich that “peace through weakness has proved to be a dangerous illusion.” And, as Phillip White points out, that the Research Division itself was inspired by the courage and clarity of Truman’s policy. Frank Kelley, one of the top men in the Research Division, recalled later how his colleagues listened to Truman on the radio and were left with a “growing appreciation for Truman’s stature as a global statesman. “ White has a solid appreciation of Truman’s solid foreign policy but in his focus on the campaign itself I think he fails to realize that the Berlin Blockade dominated the headlines throughout 1948 as much or more as the 1948 election campaign and therefore Truman was campaigning, quite successfully, as a leader of the Free World against Stalin. Where Phillip White very successfully describes the greatness of Truman’s character is in explaining his sincere metanoia on race relations. I appreciated, especially, reading Truman’s sincere letters to personal friends on this issue. Truman, after all, was a Southerner and had almost joined the KKK; the main reason he didn’t was because the clan was anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant not because it was anti-Black. He had established the Committee on Civil Rights in December 1946 but had not yet desegregated the military. And many of his advisers did not want to risk losing the Solid South on the Civil Rights issue. But Truman seemed to sense that time and enthusiasm was on the side of the reformers. So Truman, the poker player gambled when his hand was forced to support Civil Rights. When Minneapolis Mayor and senatorial candidate Hubert H. Humphrey and the liberal factions of the Democratic Party supported a strong Civil Rights platform Truman supported it wholeheartedly and unhesitatingly. This was a mark of great leadership and statesmanship, as Phillip White points out, but also was a triumph of personal character also. This platform included support for the abolition of poll taxes in federal elections, a national anti-lynching law, fair employment legislation and the total end of segregation in the military. Today, Humphrey is almost forgotten as a Civil Rights leader but White makes us recall that Humphrey was an early courageous leader who speech is a true precursor to John F. Kennedy’s great 1963 Civil Rights speech. Said Humphrey, “this time has now arrived in America for the Democratic Party to get out of the shadows of state’s rights and walk forthrightly into the bright sunshine of human rights…I ask this convention to say in unmistakable terms that we proudly hail, and we courageously support, our President and leader Harry Truman in his great fight for civil rights in America!” As White indicates, Humphrey may have moved beyond the tactical point Truman wanted to express on Civil Rights at that time but Truman and his advisers seemed to sense the die was cast and when he gave his feisty acceptance speech delegates responded enthusiastically. Truman picked Kentuckian Alfred Barkley as his running mate and slammed the “do nothing Republican Congress” and in a brilliant move never once mentioned Dewey or Warren. Truman urged the Democrats to “get together and beat the common enemy.” He urged the American people to decide whose record they believed in the Republican one or his. Said one, “you can’t stay cold about a man who sticks his chin out and fights.” Liberal columnist Max Lerner said, “It was a great speech for a great occasion” and New York Times columnist Clayton Knowles said he thought “President Truman got in the first good punch of the 1948 campaign.” However, the adoption of the Civil Rights platform split the Democratic Party wide open. Only two days after the convention delegates from the 13 southern states held their own convention in Birmingham, Alabama. In a hall flanked with Confederate Battle Flags and resounding with rebel yells and strains of “Dixie” the State’s Rights Democratic Party nominated Governor Strom Thurmond for president and Governor Fielding Wright of Mississippi as his running mate. Thurmond fanatically and demagogically upheld segregation and did not hesitate to denounce by name the “nigger race.” Ironically, Thurmond’s rhetoric probably helped increase Democratic turnout among African-Americans in key northern cities like New York, Chicago, Cleveland, Philadelphia, and Indianapolis. Truman himself responded with Executive Order 9980 to guarantee “fair employment “ for all regardless of “race, color, religion or national origin” and Executive Order 9981 desegregating the US Armed forces. Traditionally, of course, the African Americans had identified with the Republican Party not the Democratic Party and Martin Luther King Jr. and his father were both registered Republicans. But this had gradually changed 1932-1945 under FDR and Truman would decisively win the African American vote (75%) while successfully winning the support of white immigrants with this unwavering support of civil rights for all as essential for “American ideals of liberty and justice for all. “ In the election of 1948 these votes more than compensated for the loss of 1.1 million white votes in the South and four states in the Deep South (South Carolina, Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama) to Strom Thurmond. Nonetheless, it appeared even more ominous for Truman’s chances to win when Henry A. Wallace and his followers created a new “Progressive Party” (endorsed by the Communist Party). But in reality Wallace also probably helped Truman by making the Democratic Party less vulnerable to charges that they had been penetrated by pro-Communists. Still the major newspapers and magazines and many of the polls indicated that Dewey was ahead and that Truman was as dead as doornail. But as White demonstrates, Dewey was simultaneously overconfident and at times vague even incoherent. Dewey’s train, the “Victory Special” “moved through the country with leisurely assurance.” Dewey felt he was ahead and so would gamble nothing. He made no impassioned speeches for the plight of African-Americans or Displaced Persons (DPs)in Europe. Dewey relied on “pleasant sounding generalities” such as “you can’t have liberty without freedom”, agriculture was important and repeatedly “our future lies head of us.” 1948 was also the first campaign in which TV was to play a part. On TV, as on the road, Truman seemed friendly, honest, determined forthright and homey –a real down to earth American. Dewey, by contrast, never varied from the text of his frankly uninspired and boring speeches and when he did ad lib he floundered. At one campaign stop, Dewey saw a large number of young people in the crowd. Dewey said with a self-satisfied smile that they should be glad he got them a day off from school to see him. One kid called out, "Today is Saturday!" The crowd laughed; Dewey, agape, did not laugh. Dewey often appeared stiff and formal like the bridegroom on a wedding cake. Ironically this epithet came from Republican sources; in 1944 a Republican socialite described the short in stature Dewey as “looking like the little man on top of the wedding cake.” Truman, meanwhile did not stand still, it seems for a single day, campaigning long days like a 40 year old not a 64 year old. Truman called the 80th Congress back into special session and challenged them to enact the platform the Republicans had endorsed at the Republican convention. When they failed to do so, Truman hammered them over and over as a hypocritical “Do-Nothing” Congress. Since Dewey did not have a congressional record to attack this was brilliant since Dewey had formally supported the Republican platform as the Republican nominee. Truman also attacked the one law passed by the Republican dominated congress the Taft-Harley Act as anti-worker and nothing more than an attempt to pauperize and enslave American workers. Truman also attacked the Congress for closing American’s immigration laws to the displaced persons of Europe. Truman traveled on his armored campaign train the Ferdinand Magellan in a whirlwind campaign in which he made numerous “whistle-stops” just long enough for some photo ops and some friendly greetings to local townspeople. Phillip White gives the background to these many stops with charming detail and anecdotes including the “fireworks incident” in which Mrs. Truman and Representative Mary T. Norton were nearly set on fire. When November 2, 1948, Election Day came around most polls and papers predicted a Dewey win. It is amazing, in retrospect, that the pollsters could have gotten it so wrong. Part of this mistake was because they underestimated Truman’s sheer dogged courage and his “secret weapon” of the Research Division. This has to be because of the deep prejudice of certain elites who believed a “country bumpkin” like Truman could never win. On November 3, 1948 the Chicago Tribune headline, erroneously, that Dewey had won the election. This made for Truman’s favorite photo of himself holding up a copy of the Chicago Tribune that stated “Dewey Defeats Truman.” In fact, votes from America’s hinterland and farm belt as well as big cities had turned the tide. When it was all over Truman had 24 million popular votes (49.5%) to Dewey’s slightly less than 22 million (45.1%) while the minor parties garnered about 1 million each. In the Electoral College Truman won decisively with 303 votes to Dewey’s 189, Thurmond’s 39 and Wallace’s zero. Ohio, California and Illinois were all won by paper thin margins. Considering how popular Earl Warren was in California, Truman’s narrow victory over Dewey there is even more remarkable. In addition Truman had coattails as the Democrats won a majority of 93 seats in the House and 12 in the Senate. In describing Truman’s victory Phillip White is certainly right that Truman was no political mastermind like FDR or John Adams or Lincoln. Truman won because he was “whip-smart, principled, and passionate man who cared deeply for the people of his country and believed he would do right by them.” White is correct that though Truman may have lacked Churchillian rhetoric he had qualities that Churchill himself lacked: the touch of the common people. I also believe that Phillip White is right when he says today’s candidate could benefit by less spin and more “clarity, conviction and concision that Truman displayed.” I think of Romney winning the first debate and then politely refusing to take any chances, like Dewey, and allowing President Obama to win on points when he had been on the ropes with issues like the Keystone Xl pipeline, Benghazi, and economic policies. White is correct that Dewey succumbed to the “fatal flaw of hubris” thinking victory is assured. There is no question that, as White points out, elections cannot be won by hard work alone but “Dewey’s example shows that plenty can be lost by the lack of it. “ White’s afterword is well worth reading as well and is wise.
Whistle stop is a wonderful read, though I noticed it is marred by a few minor typographical or historic errors such as saying “NBC” rather than “CBS” when referring to Edward R. Murrow and Eric Sevareid on page 80. I think we can chalk this up to the youth and inexperience of some proofreaders; after all in the acclaimed book trilogy by Rick Atkinson I noted some errors also such as referring to the “Washington Nationals” (the current team) as being a baseball team during WWII. Undoubtedly, thought I, baseball history is no longer as well-known among the youth as it was in my day. Similarly, in this age of the Internet the big names of ABC, CBS and NBC are almost meaningless. Also on page 174 White inexplicably calls Speaker Rayburn “Senator” Rayburn; anyone who remembers the 1950’s or the early 1960’s would know that Rayburn was a long serving member in the House. I remember the pictures of Kennedy, Eisenhower, Truman and LBJ at his funeral. Naturally, I didn’t know much about Rayburn but I knew he was an important man from Texas and had been Speaker of the House. But once again this is really a minor typo and does not distract at all from the main narrative of Truman’s campaign. I think the book would have benefited with more maps and some charts of the statistics of the presidential election state by state. I found myself looking up maps elsewhere to refresh my memory and to analyze Truman’s victory. Whistle-stop is a at once a narrative that shows Truman at his personal best both as a man and as a candidate: this is something White does brilliantly and convincingly. Whistle-stop also shows how determination, brains and teamwork can help overcome seemingly impossible difficulties such as the splintering of the Democratic Party. I also had a sense that Whistle-stop while one of the first “modern” campaigns in that it was one of the first to use TV that it was one of the last of the old campaigns that relied so much on open car motorcades. When I show my students the film “The Last Hurrah” one of the things they notice is the lack of security and the open car motorcades. We have lost of lot since 1948 –and 1963- and perhaps we can never get it back. But Phillip White is right –we can surely do better and should expect more from our candidates for president.
White's hook here is he covers Truman's Whistle Stop campaign. It's solid reading for anyone who is involved in or interested in election politics.
As we know, Truman was in dire straits heading into 1948. He had lost the backing of FDR's family, he was watching Henry Wallace and Strom Thurmond defecting from the Democrats and taking supporters with them, and he was in a world where Stalin and the Communists were bullying Europe and Mao had taken over China. Also, the Republican nominee Thomas Dewey was very popular.
Truman decides to cross the country, first in an ostensibly "nonpartisan"Presidential Tour and then a campaign tour, the total taking in (as the book's title suggests) 31,000 miles and 352 speeches.
One of the reasons the tour was successful was the group behind his speeches. Like a modern day political" war room, except without the conveniences and stuck on an uncomfortable train, this group gave Truman the ammunition he needed.
Truman was not good at prepared speeches, but he was a dynamic speaker off the cuff. With a few bullet points, he was able to draw on this strength. His aides, for the first time in history, were crafting speeches which were tailored for the venue. Perhaps, it was local lore, perhaps, it was statistics that mattered to the particular population.
It is worth reading if you are interested in this stuff. Truman really reached people and worked hard to get voters, while Dewey stuck to standard script. Truman made strong calculated decisions, like attacking Congress instead of Dewey (but tying Dewey in as a Republican) and forcing their hand to make policy or do nothing.
Truman also bravely moves forward on civil rights, conceding that it was not worth the Dixiecrats' votes. It is truly something Truman believed in, though, and the country needed.
Truman spoke straight arguing the principles of liberalism, and he also would not let the Republicans "own" Patriotism. Modern day Democrat candidates would do well to read this book.
Truman also never gave up, despite the grueling schedule.
There's a lot here to digest. it is really an unique perspective of 1948, with a lot of personal interviews, letters, and insight. It is an academic book, but it is generally easy enough to read.
The Whistle Stop Tour of Harry S. Truman has gone down in political lore on how to win an election as well as lose one. Philip White in his book “Whistle Stop” describes the famous political tour from inception to conclusion, not only following Truman’s actions and the political team supporting him but events both domestically and internationally that influenced the race.
White begins his book by setting the stage for the 1948 Elections including brief description Harry Truman’s three years in office by spring 1948 as well as the 1946 Congressional elections and the consequences of the Republican sweep of both houses. As the prospects for Truman’s reelection, let alone his nomination for the Democrats, grew increasingly worse White notes that Truman believed he would come out on top and that his chief aides had already begun laying the ground work for his Whistle Stop Tour by the creation of the Research Division, inspired by the one Thomas Dewey had created for his 1944 Presidential run again President Roosevelt.
Truman’s “nonpolitical” trip out West in early summer 1948 was described in detail as both President and his team created the blueprint for his fall campaign, even though his nomination wasn’t assured. The three-way split of the Democrats with the far-left progressives of Henry Wallace and the segregationist Dixiecrats and its consequences are traced throughout the book, especially how in the end they resulted in Truman triumphant both at the convention and Election Day by focusing Truman’s rhetoric and shaping his itinerary.
White does not neglect the Republicans, both presidential contenders and Congressional leaders, in his book. Truman’s congressional opponents, primarily conservative Robert Taft, rhetorically countered the President more than his eventual opponent New York governor Dewey did during the campaign. However the ideological divide between the moderate Dewey and Taft led to a less than unified party that was confident in victory leading into the fall campaign with disastrous results.
The dominate part of White’s book is the Whistle Stop Tour itself including numerous speeches by Truman throughout his crisscrossing of the nation. The daily stressful schedule Truman endured and put his political team, as well as reporters, through was described in detail. White contrasts Truman’s campaign and speeches to that of Dewey, who unlike the President did not explain his position on issues. The most remembered part of Truman’s campaign was his attack on the “do-nothing” Republican Congress that is always positioned as the enemy of the interest of the average man and the use of the Turnip Day Special Session of Congress by Truman framed the campaign the way he preferred.
White’s book is not the first covering Truman’s campaign or the 1948 Presidential election nor does it fully cover everything in detail. However a first time reader of the subject, like me, will find it a fascinating and informative introduction to the postwar period of politics that will wet one’s literary appetite to learn more of Harry S. Truman, Thomas Dewey, Robert Taft, and the post-FDR era of political history.
I received this book free through LibraryThing's Early Reviewer program.
I'm not entirely sure who the audience for this book is supposed to be.
Philip White traces the momentous 1948 presidential campaign of Harry Truman, which historically is best known for the famous image of his holding the newspaper that erroneously declared opponent Thomas Dewey the victor. As the title suggests, the main subject of White's book is Truman's train tour across the country. Also explored: the impact of a data-mining team called the Research Division, the state of civil rights, and the spread of communism.
The only thing missing is any real sense of context. White jumps back in time often enough to remind the reader how Truman became president in the first place. He doesn't dwell a lot on Truman's time in the White House, except to note a series of accomplishments and how he didn't seem like the type of man who should have been president. By the time, in case you had no idea, Truman indeed wins re-election, White has no time left to report what he actually did with his next four years.
You can argue that this isn't really the subject of the book, and yet it seems vital in appreciating the events detailed herein. White goes out of his way to paint a vague portrait of the raw deal Truman experienced in office and as candidate, and then reiterates time and again the things he campaigned on. He's equally vague in his conclusions, although you can guess that he's probably a Democrat.
By Whistle Stop alone you might assume that Truman is after all one of the great unsung champions of civil rights. You would probably have to skip over the frequent, and just as frequently vague, "in a generation" statements that're one of the more glaring vacuums in perspective White leaves behind. It's fine to acknowledge a significant part of Truman's legacy this way, one that history has tended to overlook (if you know Truman at all, really, besides that famous picture, which uncaptioned will probably best leave you with the name "Dewey" and, yes, a vague notion that you should remember which president is celebrating; also, how he dropped the two atomic bombs thus far used in warfare), but anyone knows how the fight for civil rights hardly ended in 1948, and in fact was a defining struggle of the 1960s, well after Truman's time in office.
The early period of the Cold War is another significant thing you might learn about in the book. You might not learn too much, of course. After WWII, Stalin set about an antagonist spread of communism. China falls to Chairman Mao during the months chronicled. (Kind of a big loss, that one.) How significant or effective was Truman during this period? Well, he was there when the United Nations was founded. He airlifted a lot of supplies to West Berlin. But on the whole, the record looks bleak. Care for a little more perspective here, Mr. White?
Truman's contentious relationship with Congress during this period, and one of his most maniacal topics during the campaign, is also...presented in broad strokes. You don't even learn for certain that Robert Taft was indeed President Taft's son until well into the book. If you want to know much more about Tom Dewey than finally seeing a picture of him (I think it's my first, anyway), you will find a lot of...vague answers here.
The truth about Truman, and this whole period, is probably the subject of a thousand books. You don't need to have everything outlined in Whistle Stop. But if you want more than a taste, White's book is frustrating. From freely indicting Republicans for the failures of the pre-WWII years (all too frequently, Roosevelt and the New Deal are given a free pass to represent all the answers; that's exactly what White assumes, and this is not to say there's considerable merit to this notion, but...c'mon, without WWII, do you really think they would have been as successful as they were?) to overlooking that Truman probably had a better shot than all the polls suggested (which is the implication anyway, right?). Just because he was dismissed for not being Roosevelt, doesn't mean Truman didn't ride Roosevelt's coattails in every conceivable way.
By the time an allusion to Truman's similarities to Andrew Jackson are made, you might be begging for some real perspective. Instead you get a lot of general reports on the many speeches Truman made, and how a dedicated team of researchers spent a vague amount of energy helping him craft them.
Oh, and White's big conclusion as to why Dewey didn't win? Because he was too vague.
I'm being harsh, but the truth is, this is a nice little primer into an anecdote of American history that provides a window into the nature of politics, campaigning, and several of the defining developments of the 20th century that coincided with Truman's busy year.
Bottom line, though: Philip White is no Joseph Ellis.
I enjoyed this book alot. If you are a fan of presidential campaign history or of mid-twentieth-century America I think you would enjoy this book too. The book was a bit dry in parts, and jumped right into the 1948 campaign without a lot of background or context. So your enjoyment might depend on how well you know your 1940s history. The book goes into some detail about the "Research Division" of the campaign and makes the case that this group was the forerunner of the "War Rooms" of modern campaigns.
Reading this book during the 2020 presidential campaign season it's fascinating to reflect on the fact that even though the times are very different, so much of politics actually remains the same. There are snippets of some of Truman's Whistle Stop speeches in the book, and you could easily imagine very similar words coming out of Joe Biden's mouth today. On the other hand, the Republican candidate, Thomas Dewey, was very laid-back (too much so it turns out), while Truman was accused of "brass knuckle fighting" based on the content of some of his speeches - a party/role reversal from then to now.
Incredibly informative for a piece of history previously not widely thought about (the logistics of Truman's 1948 election campaign), but frustratingly repetitive, the latter always par for a university press.