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Bush at War #2
خطة الهجوم
"Plan of Attack" is a definitive account of how & why President Geo W. Bush, his war council & allies launched a preemptive attack to topple Saddam Hussein & occupy Iraq. Woodward's latest account of Washington decisionmaking provides an original, authoritative narrative of behind-the-scenes maneuvering over two years, examining the causes & consequences of the most controversial war since Vietnam. Based on interviews with 75 key participants & over 3.5 hours of exclusive interviews with Bush, Plan of Attack is part presidential history charting the decisions made during 16 critical months; part military history revealing precise details & the evolution of the Top Secret war planning under the restricted codeword Polo Step; part a spy story as the CIA dispatches a covert paramilitary team into northern Iraq 6 months before the start of the war. This team recruited 87 Iraqi spies designated with the cryptonym DB/ROCKSTARS, one of whom turned over the personnel files of all 6000 men in Saddam Hussein's personal security organization. What emerges are astonishingly intimate portraits: Bush in war cabinet meetings in the White House Situation Room & Oval Office, & in private conversation; Dick Cheney, the focused & driven vice president; Colin Powell, the conflicted & cautious secretary of state; Donald Rumsfeld, the controlling war technocrat; Geo Tenet, the activist CIA director; Tommy Franks, the profane & demanding general; Condoleezza Rice, the ever-present referee & national security adviser; Karl Rove, the hands-on political strategist; other key members of the White House staff & congressional leadership; & foreign leaders ranging from British Prime Minister Blair to Russian President Putin. Plan of Attack provides new details on the intelligence assessments of Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction & the planning for the war's aftermath.
642 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2004
128 people are currently reading
3565 people want to read
About the author
Bob Woodward
108 books3,259 followersLibrarian Note: There is more than one author by this name in the Goodreads database.
Robert "Bob" Upshur Woodward is an assistant managing editor of The Washington Post. While an investigative reporter for that newspaper, Woodward, working with fellow reporter Carl Bernstein, helped uncover the Watergate scandal that led to U.S. President Richard Nixon's resignation. Woodward has written 12 best-selling non-fiction books and has twice contributed reporting to efforts that collectively earned the Post and its National Reporting staff a Pulitzer Prize.
Robert "Bob" Upshur Woodward is an assistant managing editor of The Washington Post. While an investigative reporter for that newspaper, Woodward, working with fellow reporter Carl Bernstein, helped uncover the Watergate scandal that led to U.S. President Richard Nixon's resignation. Woodward has written 12 best-selling non-fiction books and has twice contributed reporting to efforts that collectively earned the Post and its National Reporting staff a Pulitzer Prize.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 203 reviews
September 13, 2007
My favorite memory of this book has nothing to do with what's written. When I was going through security at the Frankfurt airport a guard took my book off the X-ray conveyor belt and said in English, with a thick German accent, "Plan of Attack. It's not a real plan, is it?"
March 31, 2009
The only reason this book didn't get one star was because the behind-the-scenes accounts were kind of interesting. Of course, people present themselves in the best possible light when interviewed. The endless dialogue could've been summed up to one page:
Bush: What's our war plan for Iraq?
Gen. Franks: Long build up, long war. 18-24 months.
Rumsfeld: Make it shorter.
Franks: OK.
Bush: What do we have on Iraq intel?
Tenet: Nothing.
Bush: Saddam's crazy and may become a threat. They must have WMDs.
Everybody Else: OK.
Powell: We are going about this the wrong way.
Cheney: We are totally doing this correctly. War is what we need.
Everbody Else: OK
Bush: Where are we on our war plan?
Franks: After many planning iterations, we have it down to 3 months.
Bush: Perfect!
The end.
Bush: What's our war plan for Iraq?
Gen. Franks: Long build up, long war. 18-24 months.
Rumsfeld: Make it shorter.
Franks: OK.
Bush: What do we have on Iraq intel?
Tenet: Nothing.
Bush: Saddam's crazy and may become a threat. They must have WMDs.
Everybody Else: OK.
Powell: We are going about this the wrong way.
Cheney: We are totally doing this correctly. War is what we need.
Everbody Else: OK
Bush: Where are we on our war plan?
Franks: After many planning iterations, we have it down to 3 months.
Bush: Perfect!
The end.
March 9, 2013
I've read at least seven of Bob Woodward's instant history books so far. Like sugar candies, they go down easy. Like sugar candies they aren't satisfying.
Read Woodward with caution. His background raises an eyebrow. He comes out of Naval Intelligence, having been, among other things, General Alexander Haig's briefer. His contacts there, and the very figures he relies on for his insider accounts of events qualify his objectivity and his candor. Were he to be open, frank and honest, he would lose sources and the possibility of another off-the-assembly-line book.
Read Woodward with caution. His background raises an eyebrow. He comes out of Naval Intelligence, having been, among other things, General Alexander Haig's briefer. His contacts there, and the very figures he relies on for his insider accounts of events qualify his objectivity and his candor. Were he to be open, frank and honest, he would lose sources and the possibility of another off-the-assembly-line book.
November 12, 2009
First off, let me warn readers of occasional bad language, particularly of the "F" word.
As I read the book, I was alternately angered and saddened that our leaders could be involved in the tragedy that has been the Iraq war. Bob Woodward is usually attacked as a shill for the left, maybe rightly so, but after reading "The Agenda" about Clinton's first year in the White House, it is difficult for me to see him as other than a reporter of the facts - you know, "We report, you decide."
It is pointed out that Dick Cheney began pushing for action on Iraq from January 21, 2001 - nearly eight months before the Sept 11 attacks in New York and Washington. It is a real stretch to say that the invasion of Iraq was in response to 9/11. The military was pushed to update and strengthen plans for a war in Iraq from early in GWB's days at the White House. There seems to be no push for similar plans for North Korea, Libya, Iran, Venezuela or any place else.
The failure of the CIA to get good information is clearly pointed out. But the real problem is the overselling of the poor information and the bandwagon approach to grasping at very subjective information concerning Iraq's WMD and ties to al-Quaeda. In other words, I have to agree with war critics that say we should never have gone to war in the first place.
I have been continually told that congressional leaders had access to the same intelligence that the president had seen and therefore the war was justified. There at least four instances cited in the book where those leaders questioned what was being presented to them, and with good reason.
In my opinion, every American who can stand the language should read this book.
As I read the book, I was alternately angered and saddened that our leaders could be involved in the tragedy that has been the Iraq war. Bob Woodward is usually attacked as a shill for the left, maybe rightly so, but after reading "The Agenda" about Clinton's first year in the White House, it is difficult for me to see him as other than a reporter of the facts - you know, "We report, you decide."
It is pointed out that Dick Cheney began pushing for action on Iraq from January 21, 2001 - nearly eight months before the Sept 11 attacks in New York and Washington. It is a real stretch to say that the invasion of Iraq was in response to 9/11. The military was pushed to update and strengthen plans for a war in Iraq from early in GWB's days at the White House. There seems to be no push for similar plans for North Korea, Libya, Iran, Venezuela or any place else.
The failure of the CIA to get good information is clearly pointed out. But the real problem is the overselling of the poor information and the bandwagon approach to grasping at very subjective information concerning Iraq's WMD and ties to al-Quaeda. In other words, I have to agree with war critics that say we should never have gone to war in the first place.
I have been continually told that congressional leaders had access to the same intelligence that the president had seen and therefore the war was justified. There at least four instances cited in the book where those leaders questioned what was being presented to them, and with good reason.
In my opinion, every American who can stand the language should read this book.
November 14, 2017
I try to read all of Bob Woodward's "Bush at War" series, and this one was especially fascianating because it goes right from the aftermath of 9/11 -- America's government having gotten caught with its pants firmly around its ankles -- and the brutal retaliation.
This book specifically outlines the specious and spurious plan theory that Saddam Hussein not only had something to do with the Sept. 11 attacks, but that he was housing Weapons of Mass Destruction. (Let's face it, part of it was Hussein's own fault, because he wanted to play coy with the other Middle Eastern countries and pretend he had nukes to keep them in line.)
What struck me most about this book, however -- told in a very straightforward, largely objective manner -- is the way that President Dick Cheney and his figurehead George W. lost all semblance of skepticism when the narrative of Hussein having WMDs fit their objective, which had been from DAY ONE of Bush's term, to get rid of Saddam at all costs. Dick Cheney clearly had a hard-on for Saddam since the first Gulf War, and would do anything to shoehorn a quick war into his schedule.
Colin Powell is one of the only voices of dissent and reason in the entire thing, and he is roundly mocked for it by Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and the other clowns who needlessly cost thousands of American lives. And yet, even he is not held harmless in this tale, because despite his conscience, he capitulated to the Neo-cons eventually anyway, ruining his career and his own credibility.
The book ends right as the Cheney Administration starts realizing how badly they fucked up the war, and it ends with a kind of unintentional cliff-hanger: the Bushies were clearly feeling nervous, but they had no idea how badly they would end up destroying all sense of checks and balances in the Mideast. It's a fascinating book about groupthink and the perils that follow it.
This book specifically outlines the specious and spurious plan theory that Saddam Hussein not only had something to do with the Sept. 11 attacks, but that he was housing Weapons of Mass Destruction. (Let's face it, part of it was Hussein's own fault, because he wanted to play coy with the other Middle Eastern countries and pretend he had nukes to keep them in line.)
What struck me most about this book, however -- told in a very straightforward, largely objective manner -- is the way that President Dick Cheney and his figurehead George W. lost all semblance of skepticism when the narrative of Hussein having WMDs fit their objective, which had been from DAY ONE of Bush's term, to get rid of Saddam at all costs. Dick Cheney clearly had a hard-on for Saddam since the first Gulf War, and would do anything to shoehorn a quick war into his schedule.
Colin Powell is one of the only voices of dissent and reason in the entire thing, and he is roundly mocked for it by Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and the other clowns who needlessly cost thousands of American lives. And yet, even he is not held harmless in this tale, because despite his conscience, he capitulated to the Neo-cons eventually anyway, ruining his career and his own credibility.
The book ends right as the Cheney Administration starts realizing how badly they fucked up the war, and it ends with a kind of unintentional cliff-hanger: the Bushies were clearly feeling nervous, but they had no idea how badly they would end up destroying all sense of checks and balances in the Mideast. It's a fascinating book about groupthink and the perils that follow it.
January 29, 2009
I have read 3 of the books this author wrote about Pres Bush and the Iraq War. I was thirsty for any insight for what may have been going on in Bush's mind during this period. As might be expected, there was some overlap between the 2 books. I found Mr. Woodward to be open minded and even respectful as he began these books but could sense his feelings of frustration and unbelief as more and more revelations came out. I too felt frustration and disbelief. Could this (Bush) person who I voted for twice possibly be so arrogant, delusional and negligent in his duties to the people of this country? I think the author made his case for me, sadly.
April 11, 2022
Such a fascinating read.... Makes u look at things 🤨
February 24, 2025
Crazy how big of a shit Bush and everyone in his administration was.
April 27, 2024
Muy interesante. Buen relato de la toma de decisiones, debate e información para la invasión de Irak.
Permite conocer a los personajes y las decisiones que se tomaron con informacion parcial que eligieron creer.
Las consecuencias de estas decisiones llegan hasta nuestros días. Las mentiras que se dijeron y que justificaron la muerte y miseria de miles de personas
Permite conocer a los personajes y las decisiones que se tomaron con informacion parcial que eligieron creer.
Las consecuencias de estas decisiones llegan hasta nuestros días. Las mentiras que se dijeron y que justificaron la muerte y miseria de miles de personas
May 1, 2024
The countdown to a disaster, a war of choice, this book details the debates, decisions and planning at the highest levels that led up to the American invasion of Iraq in 2002. Woodward writes how war plans were developed, congressional resolutions were passed, and international support was courted. He narrates cabinet debates, major speeches, discussions with allies, and the arguments among the main players at the relevant cabinet meetings. He adequately describes the sense of panic in the administration after 9/11 and the anthrax attacks, when they didn't know what was coming next. While the book was more about process than thoughts, I gained some insight into why the United States invaded Iraq, its first and greatest foreign policy mistake of the 21st Century so far.
Woodward lists the main reasons that influenced the decision-makers: unfinished business from the first Gulf War, Iraqi sanctions busting, supposed weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, supposed links between the Iraqi regime and terrorists, a desire to spread democracy, and the safety of Israel and other American allies in the region. He also makes clear that the most hawkish senior official was Vice President Dick Cheney, but President Bush also was very hawkish. Other important cabinet members, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice seemed to support the war because the President wanted a war. Whatever they thought privately, they never expressed their opinion to the President. They drove events because they were asked to. As far as Rumsfeld goes, this surprised me. I thought he was a major force behind the war, but it seems that Bush never asked Rumsfeld what he thought about the invasion.
Bush's main motives seemed to be that he thought, in a post 9/11 world, that WMD-possessing, terrorist-supporting, dictator gangster Saddam Hussein was too dangerous to be left in charge of Iraq. Through regime change, America would remake Iraq, the Middle East, and perhaps the world for democracy. "I will seize the opportunity to achieve big goals." But Cheney really pushed Bush. In fact, Cheney pushed a hard line in public before the President had a chance to publicly state administration policy. He wanted to preempt Secretary of State Colin Powell, ex officials like Brett Scowcroft, and others who were more cautious and wanted to build a coalition to disarm Iraq through the United Nations. I never really understood what motivated Cheney. Revenge? Show America’s power after the catastrophe of 9/11? I don’t know.
This book was released in 2004, before Mearsheimer and Walt’s “The Israeli Lobby and American Foreign Policy,” in which the thesis is that Israel Lobby is the tail that wags the American dog, The neoconservatives, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and the Chief of Staff to the Vice President Scooter Libby, were in the book and acknowledged as the chief hawks who were making the case for the war. Woodward called Wolfowitz the “intellectual godfather” of the war; however, I am not so sure that they were as influential on the President as some have claimed. There is no direct evidence in this book. Wolfowitz was Cheney’s assistant. He provided arguments for Cheney, but it is not evident that Cheney had not already reached those conclusions. Libby was Rumsfeld’s assistant. This book shows Rumsfeld as less of a hawk than I previously believed. Assistants don’t make policy, principals do.
The business of United Nations weapons inspectors going into Iraq looking for WMD was a very revealed the attitude of the major players. Powell advocated for weapons inspections and United Nations resolutions in the hope that he could avoid war. Perhaps the American aim of disarming Iraq could be achieved peacefully. Bush, however, had no faith that the weapons inspectors would bear fruit, but he supported them anyway. Why? Because he believed that Hussein would fail the weapons inspection test and then the USA would have a pretext for war. Or, even better, the weapons inspections could be used as part of a pressure campaign on the Iraqi regime that, together with the American military buildup at his border, might lead Hussein to leave the country for asylum in a third country. This shows the differing positions of Powell and Bush. Powell wanted Iraq disarmed, Bush would only be satisfied with regime change. Cheney was adamantly opposed to the United Nations process from the beginning. He thought the Americans would get bogged down in arguments in the Security Council and General Assembly that would limit their freedom of action and take too much time. The fact that the United Nations option was chosen at first shows that Cheney would defer to Bush’s decisions. In the end, though, when the United Nations route failed, Bush went along with Cheney.
Like all of Woodward’s books, this is impeccably sourced. He interviewed Bush, Rumsfeld, Powell, and dozens of other officials. He had access to secret documents. Woodward really understands the people and process in Washington. I have a great deal of confidence that what Woodward said happened actually happened in that way. On the other hand, there have been many books published on this topic, I have not read most of them, and my mind could be changed by new information. Plus, like Woodward’s other books, this was published rather quickly after the events and so the long-term consequences of what happened here are not included. The nature of the disaster, however, was becoming clear.
The war was a huge disaster. Although the CIA Director George Tenet had claimed that the presence of weapons of mass destruction was a “slam dunk”, none were ever found. The connection between Al Qaeda and the Iraqi regime was a made up fairy tale. Tens of thousands of American lives, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives, billions of dollars and the attention of the most powerful country in the world was diverted from what matters most: the economy, Al Qaeda in Iraq, Mosul, ethnic cleansing, and unrest spread out from the power vacuum in Iraq to other parts of the Middle East. The Americans took their eyes off Afghanistan so that too became a failure. Iranian influence spread like a cancer throughout the region. America’s reputation was in tatters in much of the world. More than twenty years later, Iraq is still unstable and American troops are still there.
When the late Chinese Premiere Zhou Enlai was asked what he thought about the French Revolution, he famously replied. “It’s too early to tell.” By that standard, we still don’t know what the long-term results of America’s invasion were. But here is another one. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Bush’s intentions might have been better in 2002 than Putin’s in 2022, but the action was very similar. A great power invades a country to remove a regime and bend it to its will. France, Germany, Canada and other of America’s allies who were convinced it was wrong were right.
Woodward lists the main reasons that influenced the decision-makers: unfinished business from the first Gulf War, Iraqi sanctions busting, supposed weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, supposed links between the Iraqi regime and terrorists, a desire to spread democracy, and the safety of Israel and other American allies in the region. He also makes clear that the most hawkish senior official was Vice President Dick Cheney, but President Bush also was very hawkish. Other important cabinet members, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice seemed to support the war because the President wanted a war. Whatever they thought privately, they never expressed their opinion to the President. They drove events because they were asked to. As far as Rumsfeld goes, this surprised me. I thought he was a major force behind the war, but it seems that Bush never asked Rumsfeld what he thought about the invasion.
Bush's main motives seemed to be that he thought, in a post 9/11 world, that WMD-possessing, terrorist-supporting, dictator gangster Saddam Hussein was too dangerous to be left in charge of Iraq. Through regime change, America would remake Iraq, the Middle East, and perhaps the world for democracy. "I will seize the opportunity to achieve big goals." But Cheney really pushed Bush. In fact, Cheney pushed a hard line in public before the President had a chance to publicly state administration policy. He wanted to preempt Secretary of State Colin Powell, ex officials like Brett Scowcroft, and others who were more cautious and wanted to build a coalition to disarm Iraq through the United Nations. I never really understood what motivated Cheney. Revenge? Show America’s power after the catastrophe of 9/11? I don’t know.
This book was released in 2004, before Mearsheimer and Walt’s “The Israeli Lobby and American Foreign Policy,” in which the thesis is that Israel Lobby is the tail that wags the American dog, The neoconservatives, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and the Chief of Staff to the Vice President Scooter Libby, were in the book and acknowledged as the chief hawks who were making the case for the war. Woodward called Wolfowitz the “intellectual godfather” of the war; however, I am not so sure that they were as influential on the President as some have claimed. There is no direct evidence in this book. Wolfowitz was Cheney’s assistant. He provided arguments for Cheney, but it is not evident that Cheney had not already reached those conclusions. Libby was Rumsfeld’s assistant. This book shows Rumsfeld as less of a hawk than I previously believed. Assistants don’t make policy, principals do.
The business of United Nations weapons inspectors going into Iraq looking for WMD was a very revealed the attitude of the major players. Powell advocated for weapons inspections and United Nations resolutions in the hope that he could avoid war. Perhaps the American aim of disarming Iraq could be achieved peacefully. Bush, however, had no faith that the weapons inspectors would bear fruit, but he supported them anyway. Why? Because he believed that Hussein would fail the weapons inspection test and then the USA would have a pretext for war. Or, even better, the weapons inspections could be used as part of a pressure campaign on the Iraqi regime that, together with the American military buildup at his border, might lead Hussein to leave the country for asylum in a third country. This shows the differing positions of Powell and Bush. Powell wanted Iraq disarmed, Bush would only be satisfied with regime change. Cheney was adamantly opposed to the United Nations process from the beginning. He thought the Americans would get bogged down in arguments in the Security Council and General Assembly that would limit their freedom of action and take too much time. The fact that the United Nations option was chosen at first shows that Cheney would defer to Bush’s decisions. In the end, though, when the United Nations route failed, Bush went along with Cheney.
Like all of Woodward’s books, this is impeccably sourced. He interviewed Bush, Rumsfeld, Powell, and dozens of other officials. He had access to secret documents. Woodward really understands the people and process in Washington. I have a great deal of confidence that what Woodward said happened actually happened in that way. On the other hand, there have been many books published on this topic, I have not read most of them, and my mind could be changed by new information. Plus, like Woodward’s other books, this was published rather quickly after the events and so the long-term consequences of what happened here are not included. The nature of the disaster, however, was becoming clear.
The war was a huge disaster. Although the CIA Director George Tenet had claimed that the presence of weapons of mass destruction was a “slam dunk”, none were ever found. The connection between Al Qaeda and the Iraqi regime was a made up fairy tale. Tens of thousands of American lives, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives, billions of dollars and the attention of the most powerful country in the world was diverted from what matters most: the economy, Al Qaeda in Iraq, Mosul, ethnic cleansing, and unrest spread out from the power vacuum in Iraq to other parts of the Middle East. The Americans took their eyes off Afghanistan so that too became a failure. Iranian influence spread like a cancer throughout the region. America’s reputation was in tatters in much of the world. More than twenty years later, Iraq is still unstable and American troops are still there.
When the late Chinese Premiere Zhou Enlai was asked what he thought about the French Revolution, he famously replied. “It’s too early to tell.” By that standard, we still don’t know what the long-term results of America’s invasion were. But here is another one. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Bush’s intentions might have been better in 2002 than Putin’s in 2022, but the action was very similar. A great power invades a country to remove a regime and bend it to its will. France, Germany, Canada and other of America’s allies who were convinced it was wrong were right.
June 27, 2015
Woodward again jumps into W. Bush administration, however I feel he seems to be to respective of the upper levels of our government. Unlike All the President's Men, this book gives us too much of W's gut feeling and his need too prove his father's war wasn't finished and his advisors wanted to finish it this time.
I have a problem with that because it's apparent that pre 9-11 they were toying with ideas, and that became the catalyst for a war that he, Cheney, Rumsfeld and Rice really had no exit strategy for. The plan of the attack, is that there is no plan... And like bullies on a playground the administration doesn't wait for the UN and official WMD inspectors, but feeds the U.S. Public and its allies blatant lies, which the CIA even wants stricken from speeches and leads us into one of the longest confrontations in U.S. history.
I really want this group of individuals held responsible for their actions on this, but unlike All the President's it seems that W and Cheney are above reproach, despite coming out on the record for these books admitting that Iraq was on there minds long before the election of 2000 and the known lies told to the American people to take us to war. And unlike the rebuilding of Europe and Asia after World War II, we had no idea how to rebuild Iraq once the regime fell.
This book just added to my frustration of the policies of this country at that time period.
I have a problem with that because it's apparent that pre 9-11 they were toying with ideas, and that became the catalyst for a war that he, Cheney, Rumsfeld and Rice really had no exit strategy for. The plan of the attack, is that there is no plan... And like bullies on a playground the administration doesn't wait for the UN and official WMD inspectors, but feeds the U.S. Public and its allies blatant lies, which the CIA even wants stricken from speeches and leads us into one of the longest confrontations in U.S. history.
I really want this group of individuals held responsible for their actions on this, but unlike All the President's it seems that W and Cheney are above reproach, despite coming out on the record for these books admitting that Iraq was on there minds long before the election of 2000 and the known lies told to the American people to take us to war. And unlike the rebuilding of Europe and Asia after World War II, we had no idea how to rebuild Iraq once the regime fell.
This book just added to my frustration of the policies of this country at that time period.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
October 27, 2008
How much of what the White House interviewees told Woodward was true? How much was spin? It remains clear from this telling that plans were afoot very early to invade Iraq, and the ploy of saying that "there is no plan on my desk" was pure spin. Colin Powell seems to be a voice of caution.
It has a mixed message on who is actually in charge. On one hand people say that Bush always has the final word, and is referred to as "the Man" by White House folk, but decisions are only final after he clears them with Cheney.
It details the many iterations of a war plan that were considered, from the Powell 1991 plan, calling for massive force, to various lighter plans. Rumsfeld comes across as a pain in the ass who will never offer his own opinion but rules by constantly asking questions and seeking to have all conceivable concerns addressed. This seems to come from Powell. Cheney comes across mostly as the behind-the-scenes power, eager to remain in the shadows. There is a lot here on the diplomatic dealings. It was clear to any who paid attention that the decision for war was a foregone conclusion. It is also clear from the book that planning for the war began shortly after 9/11.
It has a mixed message on who is actually in charge. On one hand people say that Bush always has the final word, and is referred to as "the Man" by White House folk, but decisions are only final after he clears them with Cheney.
It details the many iterations of a war plan that were considered, from the Powell 1991 plan, calling for massive force, to various lighter plans. Rumsfeld comes across as a pain in the ass who will never offer his own opinion but rules by constantly asking questions and seeking to have all conceivable concerns addressed. This seems to come from Powell. Cheney comes across mostly as the behind-the-scenes power, eager to remain in the shadows. There is a lot here on the diplomatic dealings. It was clear to any who paid attention that the decision for war was a foregone conclusion. It is also clear from the book that planning for the war began shortly after 9/11.
October 4, 2023
Fine overall, but somewhat difficult to review as so many of its strengths are also its weaknesses. I don’t doubt that this is THE definitive book (or series of books) on the decision making process that led up to (and during) the Iraq war. It’s absolutely chock-full of detail, but that makes it proceed in parts at an almost glacial pace. There are segments of this book where you feel like you’re reading line-by-line transcriptions of every conversation that happened every day of a 2 year period. There are so many lists, so many plans revised ad infinitum, so many meetings on the same topics, etc. that - with all due respect to Woodward - just make for downright boring reading in certain parts.
All to say it’s still an impressive and important piece of journalism, but a book with this level of detail and the accompanying difficulties of keeping the reader engaged is probably the price you pay when you write four volumes on the same topic. I wish Woodward would inject his own analysis more instead of being a fairly removed play-by-play commentator, but I guess that’s just his preferred style.
All to say it’s still an impressive and important piece of journalism, but a book with this level of detail and the accompanying difficulties of keeping the reader engaged is probably the price you pay when you write four volumes on the same topic. I wish Woodward would inject his own analysis more instead of being a fairly removed play-by-play commentator, but I guess that’s just his preferred style.
November 12, 2015
تمتاز كتب بوب ودورد بأنها تجعلك تعيش الأحداث في مسارها شبه اليومي ويجعلك من خلال مقابلاته التي تمثل المادة الرئيسة للكتاب تنتقل إلى مطبخ صنع القرار.
هذا الكتاب خصصه ودورد للحديث عن الاحتلال الأمريكي للعراق عام 2003 وهو الثاني في سلسة كتب أعدها المؤلف عن فترة جورج بوش الابن (سبقه كتاب وتلاه كتابان
هذا الكتاب يمكن أن تقرأه لمعرفة الأحداث التي سبقت غزو العراق ولكن قيمة الكتاب ستختلف تماماً إدا تم تناوله من زواية كيف يصنع القرار في الولايات المتحدة وما هي القوى المؤثرة في نظام قائم على الفصل بين السلطات؟ ومتى يستطيع الرئيس الأمريكي أن يملي إرادته على الكونجرس؟ وما هو دور العوامل الخارجية وتوازن القوى الدولي في عملية صنع القرار ....إلى آخر تلك الأسئلة التي يمكن أن تجد إجاباتها من خلال ثنايا هذا الكتاب والتي برأي ستزيد من قيمة الكتاب أكثر وتحوله من مجرد سفر لسرد الأحداث إلى دراسة شيقة حول كواليس المطبخ السياسي في الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية
هذا الكتاب خصصه ودورد للحديث عن الاحتلال الأمريكي للعراق عام 2003 وهو الثاني في سلسة كتب أعدها المؤلف عن فترة جورج بوش الابن (سبقه كتاب وتلاه كتابان
هذا الكتاب يمكن أن تقرأه لمعرفة الأحداث التي سبقت غزو العراق ولكن قيمة الكتاب ستختلف تماماً إدا تم تناوله من زواية كيف يصنع القرار في الولايات المتحدة وما هي القوى المؤثرة في نظام قائم على الفصل بين السلطات؟ ومتى يستطيع الرئيس الأمريكي أن يملي إرادته على الكونجرس؟ وما هو دور العوامل الخارجية وتوازن القوى الدولي في عملية صنع القرار ....إلى آخر تلك الأسئلة التي يمكن أن تجد إجاباتها من خلال ثنايا هذا الكتاب والتي برأي ستزيد من قيمة الكتاب أكثر وتحوله من مجرد سفر لسرد الأحداث إلى دراسة شيقة حول كواليس المطبخ السياسي في الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية
April 17, 2022
A great read - well researched, surprisingly easy to follow, featuring insights from interviews with the President directly and his close circle. Such a book isn’t even possible in many parts of the world - which makes it even more worth reading.It doesn’t push you to any conclusions - but gives enough facts so that you can think for yourself, which I liked most about it.
It is also not just about the chain of decisions that led to this particular war. It’s much broader. It’s about how any large organization comprised of humans operates, how confirmation bias and sunk cost fallacy work, how beliefs and facts become interchangeable, how personal convictions and loyalty to a larger entity can crash, how fear often trumps any other emotion, how scenario planning when done at a high enough level becomes policy, and how the longing for personal legacy becomes decisive.
It is also not just about the chain of decisions that led to this particular war. It’s much broader. It’s about how any large organization comprised of humans operates, how confirmation bias and sunk cost fallacy work, how beliefs and facts become interchangeable, how personal convictions and loyalty to a larger entity can crash, how fear often trumps any other emotion, how scenario planning when done at a high enough level becomes policy, and how the longing for personal legacy becomes decisive.
January 9, 2023
A much better book than its predecessor. Woodward spends more time analyzing and questioning in this book, and it shows. Bush and the war effort is no longer taken at face value and the cracks in the facade have started to show. Like Bush at War, I think this acts as an interesting chronicle of the thinking at the time. The Afghan War, at this point, has begun to unravel, and the good will Bush held after 9/11 has been expended. The tensions within the cabinet show through now, and the role of each cabinet member in enabling the poor decision-making that led to war is highlighted in stark detail. Now, nearly 2 decades after it was published, these things are well known. However, at the time, this would have been mind-blowing.
Read
March 9, 2024Read this book for a polictical science class. I found the almost romantic like imagery hilarious. Look for lines like, "Donald Rumsfeld entered the room, his broad shoulders jetting out..."
Though honestly it did give a very good understanding of what really went on in the Bush administration before the Iraq war. It scared me too, since you think of the government as this all powerful being that clear objectives but really you see that America was lead by a frat boy who was easily mislead by his emotions.
Though honestly it did give a very good understanding of what really went on in the Bush administration before the Iraq war. It scared me too, since you think of the government as this all powerful being that clear objectives but really you see that America was lead by a frat boy who was easily mislead by his emotions.
December 22, 2007
This book was good when I first read it, but later when I read Suskind's "One Percent Doctrine" and saw subsequent interviews with the official involved, I felt betrayed by the sensationalism that Woodward made of the situation. The characters and events are not so cut-and-dry as he makes them. Unfortunately, Woodward traded accurate journalism for cheap entertainment. That said, it still has some value, as long as one can tell the fact from the fluff.
July 21, 2014
To be read with a grain of salt, i was intrigued to read behind the scenes of the decisions that lead to a war that was very real in my lifetime. It helps me understand it more. Whether I agree or not, I now have perspective. As the world again looks a little shaky at this moment, I think it's a good thing to read a few books like this at this time
November 10, 2025
This is a day-by-day, sometimes hour-by-hour journalistic account of the Bush administration deciding on and preparing for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. It was published in 2004, in time for the presidential election that year. It is based on extensive interviews with the principal decision makers and advisors; in fact in places it reads like transcribed interview of meeting notes. It gives a lot of insight into what it takes to plan a forceful regime change.
The administration's conviction was strong from the beginning that Saddam Hussein had a hidden arsenal of chemical and biological weapons and was working devilishly to obtain nuclear weapons. His actions seemed devious and he had expelled the inspectors he had agreed to admit to end the 1991 war. The country was suffering from ongoing sanctions and there was an ongoing low-level conflict, including air attacks. If Saddam had no WMDs, why didn't he just come clean, like South Africa did in the 1990s? Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Cheney had been eager to find a way to overthrow him even before 9/11. Unless he capitulated and cooperated wholeheartedly with very intrusive inspections he would have to be removed from power by force. So planning and preparations began in late 2001. Bush said, "I will seize the opportunity to achieve big goals" (p. 162). There were two lines of effort: the diplomatic one, to gather all possible support from the UN and allies and (if somehow possible) to persuade Saddam to give in; and the military one, making thorough plans and preparations to give the best chance of a quick victory with as few casualties as possible and a rapid national reconstruction along democratic lines.
The US did not get explicit approval from the UN for the use of force, but it did get support and participation (nominal or substantial) from a number of allies, including Saudi Arabia, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, Poland, Bulgaria, Australia, and of course Britain. Military planning at first envisioned 45 days of air campaign followed by 90 days of ground combat. This was revised several times over the course of 2002 to make it shorter and more intense. Units were quietly moved to the theater to be ready for hostilities. There was due attention to avoiding strikes on humanitarian sites like hospitals, and to have the resources for large-scale public assistance after the war. The preparations also included a big CIA operation based in the Kurdish area of northern Iraq that succeeded pretty well in recruiting a network of agents throughout the regime. (There had been very few sources before 9/11.) Short after Bush gave his 48-hour ultimatum on 17 Mar 2003, they got a credible tip that Saddam and his sons were at a particular rural location. Bush decided to attempt a decapitation attack with two F-117s and a volley of Tomahawks. Saddam escaped, but the war was on. On 21 Mar the Army and Marines crossed the border in force. By 2 Apr they were within 10 miles of Baghdad. On 9 Apr the Iraqi regime collapsed. (Woodward does not mention the famous Thunder Runs.) On 1 May, 41 days after the start of the invasion, Bush gave his famous victory speech on the USS Abraham Lincoln, with the big "Mission Accomplished" banner.
If we had it to do over again, surely we would do it differently. But there were some things that went well. The invasion went much more quickly and with far less death and destruction than was expected. The oil fields were not extensively damaged. The criminal Baathist regime was removed, including Saddam and his even more odious sons. Eventually, Iraq did get an independent democratic government (at least by Middle East standards), it does not support terrorism or threaten its neighbors, and it cooperates to some degree with the US.
But set against this the disastrous misjudgments.
First, there were no weapons of mass destruction. Woodward says that was pretty clear in 2004, and it is now certain. People admitted at the time that nothing could be 100% certain, but CIA Director Tenet famously said that it was a "slam dunk." British and Egyptian (!) and "most serious foreign intelligence agencies" (p. 298) agreed with the assessment. However, all the evidence was equivocal, circumstantial, doubtful, or speculative. It was all confirmation bias. There had been much criticism of failure to "connect the dots" after 9/11, so I guess people started connecting dots like mad. There were no consequences afterwards for treating a highly consequential conclusion as certain when it was not.
Second, the Iraqi regime was not a supporter of Al Qaeda. That should have been seen as very probable from their radically different ideologies, even if it was not impossible that they could make common cause against a common enemy. There was a conflation of the danger from terrorists and the danger from state-controlled WMDs.
Third, violence continued in Iraq for years and it took a long time and much effort to establish a responsible government. (This phase had gone much easier in Grenada and Panama.) The Iraqi people were just not accustomed to democracy and orderly government. Expectations that they would quickly adapt to one were catastrophically misguided. Bush believed that the Iraqi people would welcome democracy, but that was wishful thinking.
The administration's conviction was strong from the beginning that Saddam Hussein had a hidden arsenal of chemical and biological weapons and was working devilishly to obtain nuclear weapons. His actions seemed devious and he had expelled the inspectors he had agreed to admit to end the 1991 war. The country was suffering from ongoing sanctions and there was an ongoing low-level conflict, including air attacks. If Saddam had no WMDs, why didn't he just come clean, like South Africa did in the 1990s? Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Cheney had been eager to find a way to overthrow him even before 9/11. Unless he capitulated and cooperated wholeheartedly with very intrusive inspections he would have to be removed from power by force. So planning and preparations began in late 2001. Bush said, "I will seize the opportunity to achieve big goals" (p. 162). There were two lines of effort: the diplomatic one, to gather all possible support from the UN and allies and (if somehow possible) to persuade Saddam to give in; and the military one, making thorough plans and preparations to give the best chance of a quick victory with as few casualties as possible and a rapid national reconstruction along democratic lines.
The US did not get explicit approval from the UN for the use of force, but it did get support and participation (nominal or substantial) from a number of allies, including Saudi Arabia, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, Poland, Bulgaria, Australia, and of course Britain. Military planning at first envisioned 45 days of air campaign followed by 90 days of ground combat. This was revised several times over the course of 2002 to make it shorter and more intense. Units were quietly moved to the theater to be ready for hostilities. There was due attention to avoiding strikes on humanitarian sites like hospitals, and to have the resources for large-scale public assistance after the war. The preparations also included a big CIA operation based in the Kurdish area of northern Iraq that succeeded pretty well in recruiting a network of agents throughout the regime. (There had been very few sources before 9/11.) Short after Bush gave his 48-hour ultimatum on 17 Mar 2003, they got a credible tip that Saddam and his sons were at a particular rural location. Bush decided to attempt a decapitation attack with two F-117s and a volley of Tomahawks. Saddam escaped, but the war was on. On 21 Mar the Army and Marines crossed the border in force. By 2 Apr they were within 10 miles of Baghdad. On 9 Apr the Iraqi regime collapsed. (Woodward does not mention the famous Thunder Runs.) On 1 May, 41 days after the start of the invasion, Bush gave his famous victory speech on the USS Abraham Lincoln, with the big "Mission Accomplished" banner.
If we had it to do over again, surely we would do it differently. But there were some things that went well. The invasion went much more quickly and with far less death and destruction than was expected. The oil fields were not extensively damaged. The criminal Baathist regime was removed, including Saddam and his even more odious sons. Eventually, Iraq did get an independent democratic government (at least by Middle East standards), it does not support terrorism or threaten its neighbors, and it cooperates to some degree with the US.
But set against this the disastrous misjudgments.
First, there were no weapons of mass destruction. Woodward says that was pretty clear in 2004, and it is now certain. People admitted at the time that nothing could be 100% certain, but CIA Director Tenet famously said that it was a "slam dunk." British and Egyptian (!) and "most serious foreign intelligence agencies" (p. 298) agreed with the assessment. However, all the evidence was equivocal, circumstantial, doubtful, or speculative. It was all confirmation bias. There had been much criticism of failure to "connect the dots" after 9/11, so I guess people started connecting dots like mad. There were no consequences afterwards for treating a highly consequential conclusion as certain when it was not.
Second, the Iraqi regime was not a supporter of Al Qaeda. That should have been seen as very probable from their radically different ideologies, even if it was not impossible that they could make common cause against a common enemy. There was a conflation of the danger from terrorists and the danger from state-controlled WMDs.
Third, violence continued in Iraq for years and it took a long time and much effort to establish a responsible government. (This phase had gone much easier in Grenada and Panama.) The Iraqi people were just not accustomed to democracy and orderly government. Expectations that they would quickly adapt to one were catastrophically misguided. Bush believed that the Iraqi people would welcome democracy, but that was wishful thinking.
October 29, 2017
Somehow hadn't read the entirety of this book yet. Not as interesting or compelling as Fiasco, Assassins' Gate, or the Arrows of the Night, but vital for Iraq scholars because of Woodward's unequalled access to the big names of military and foreign policy.
May 12, 2012
It is a good read. As an outsider, I learned a thing or two about the Iraq Invasion Version 2.0. I'm a little dissatisfied that I just have to take Woodword's words for it, as he hasn't supplied how he obtained much of the information included in the book.
July 2, 2007
Good stuff that confirmed my suspicions and verified my disappointment/anger towards the current administration.
April 22, 2008
Fantastic book. It's disturbing enough to be led to the slaughter, but to be taken there by a self-serving idiot is terrifying.
April 24, 2008
Mirrors and probably authenticates the numerous books regarding the War in Iraq and the missteps of this administration to take America there.
November 1, 2016
واقعا ترجمه کتاب افتضاح بود
June 26, 2022
Bob Woodward never disappoints – and that’s certainly true with this well researched, fascinating book that is not just on one war but in how our nation prepares for the possibility of any war.
The first quarter of the book was probably the most interesting. It reviewed how war plans that were not brought up to date it during the Clinton years. He does a good job and sharing pressure put on by the military by elected authorities to come up with a plan for a war - quickly. He speaks about how they overcame the rightful resistance. He addresses how facts were developed to back their hopes of going to war. And he accounts how the Bush administration and military move troops into the theater in plain sight and, perhaps, that further pushed the administration to take action when he should’ve listened to his Secretary of State.
The book makes it very clear, as does the law, that the president himself makes the decision to go to war. Clearly it is a lonely decision.
There are many interesting points in his book, as usual, of how our government and specifically the White House operates. At one point the author reports the chief of staff, Andrew Card, thought he had three responsibilities in his position: care and feeding of the president, policy formation, and selling and marketing decisions of the White House. The draconian actions of Vice President Cheney are also covered well in this book. The author accounts how Cheney wanted to have the administration’s position put forward into the media and quietly secured President Bush’s approval without bringing other administration personnel into the decision-making. What resulted was a public declaration just short of war.
Ironically, it might have been a combination of Cheney and a Clinton appointee that resulted in the misguided war against Iraq. CIA chief, Tension, appointed by President Clinton, told President Bush that “it’s a slam dunk” case that there were WMDs in Iraq.
International politics and trying to get the United Nations to work in a systematic, helpful manner is also an interesting portion of this book. Woodward pointed out that France, Russia, and China all had lucrative commercial ties with Iraq and were concerned about any direct actions of the United States against the dictatorship led country. It reminds us of what President Biden has to deal with today in pulling together a strong, united front against Russian aggression.
As in his previous books, Woodward has some fun stories hidden in the overall story. He reports Russia’s Putin called Bush and said how difficult the decision was going to be and spoke about the “enormous human suffering “-- due to the war. Bush supposedly said “thanks for calling. You’re awfully kind to do that. “ Bush later recalled that it was a “genuine call“ not a “I told you” so type call. He said it was a friendship call and he appreciated it. He said it that it was only call he got like that.
There’s also a fun story about the bush sons (including W) skipping out and watching their father debate Dukakis for president, worried about his performance. They went to the movies instead.
When they got home, their dad called them and asked what they thought of his performance. They told him he was good.
Woodward coverage of the famous “Mission accomplished “press conference was disappointing. He never spoke about any meetings to plan it or whose idea it was to take a victory lap in advance. He seemed to blame it on Bush’s speech writer.
Woodward also reported on the secret operations of the CIA. At one point he spoke about millions of dollars they were put in $100 bills to pay in bribes throughout Afghanistan and Iraq. He stated that $1 million in hundred-dollar bills weighs about 144 pounds. American personnel to put his life at risk for this operation is paid about $80,000 a year for about $150 a day to take home pay.
In addition to so many brave soldiers, the other loser In this war was Secretary of State Powell. Edward did a good job in sharing how he caught it and all sides and the fact that he did not have a close relationship with the president while others did, hurt him and his effort to use diplomacy instead of arms. In many ways, there were times when we could have a boy did this war. Democrats in Congress pulled it more than they should have, Saddam actions were not rational, and Paul might have been successful, if given. Had the CIA not made statements that were exaggerated and false, war would have never taken place forwarding to a summary of this book.
The first quarter of the book was probably the most interesting. It reviewed how war plans that were not brought up to date it during the Clinton years. He does a good job and sharing pressure put on by the military by elected authorities to come up with a plan for a war - quickly. He speaks about how they overcame the rightful resistance. He addresses how facts were developed to back their hopes of going to war. And he accounts how the Bush administration and military move troops into the theater in plain sight and, perhaps, that further pushed the administration to take action when he should’ve listened to his Secretary of State.
The book makes it very clear, as does the law, that the president himself makes the decision to go to war. Clearly it is a lonely decision.
There are many interesting points in his book, as usual, of how our government and specifically the White House operates. At one point the author reports the chief of staff, Andrew Card, thought he had three responsibilities in his position: care and feeding of the president, policy formation, and selling and marketing decisions of the White House. The draconian actions of Vice President Cheney are also covered well in this book. The author accounts how Cheney wanted to have the administration’s position put forward into the media and quietly secured President Bush’s approval without bringing other administration personnel into the decision-making. What resulted was a public declaration just short of war.
Ironically, it might have been a combination of Cheney and a Clinton appointee that resulted in the misguided war against Iraq. CIA chief, Tension, appointed by President Clinton, told President Bush that “it’s a slam dunk” case that there were WMDs in Iraq.
International politics and trying to get the United Nations to work in a systematic, helpful manner is also an interesting portion of this book. Woodward pointed out that France, Russia, and China all had lucrative commercial ties with Iraq and were concerned about any direct actions of the United States against the dictatorship led country. It reminds us of what President Biden has to deal with today in pulling together a strong, united front against Russian aggression.
As in his previous books, Woodward has some fun stories hidden in the overall story. He reports Russia’s Putin called Bush and said how difficult the decision was going to be and spoke about the “enormous human suffering “-- due to the war. Bush supposedly said “thanks for calling. You’re awfully kind to do that. “ Bush later recalled that it was a “genuine call“ not a “I told you” so type call. He said it was a friendship call and he appreciated it. He said it that it was only call he got like that.
There’s also a fun story about the bush sons (including W) skipping out and watching their father debate Dukakis for president, worried about his performance. They went to the movies instead.
When they got home, their dad called them and asked what they thought of his performance. They told him he was good.
Woodward coverage of the famous “Mission accomplished “press conference was disappointing. He never spoke about any meetings to plan it or whose idea it was to take a victory lap in advance. He seemed to blame it on Bush’s speech writer.
Woodward also reported on the secret operations of the CIA. At one point he spoke about millions of dollars they were put in $100 bills to pay in bribes throughout Afghanistan and Iraq. He stated that $1 million in hundred-dollar bills weighs about 144 pounds. American personnel to put his life at risk for this operation is paid about $80,000 a year for about $150 a day to take home pay.
In addition to so many brave soldiers, the other loser In this war was Secretary of State Powell. Edward did a good job in sharing how he caught it and all sides and the fact that he did not have a close relationship with the president while others did, hurt him and his effort to use diplomacy instead of arms. In many ways, there were times when we could have a boy did this war. Democrats in Congress pulled it more than they should have, Saddam actions were not rational, and Paul might have been successful, if given. Had the CIA not made statements that were exaggerated and false, war would have never taken place forwarding to a summary of this book.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
December 31, 2025
I read this book as part of a research project weeks ago. I remember enough to write a review of my thoughts, but I will be pulling only a few specific examples or passages from the book.
I read Woodward's book as an entry‑level source on the Bush Administration's decision to invade Iraq in 2003. For this purpose, it adequately serves. Down to the most pressing days and desperate hours, Woodward conducts excellent research on the months leading to complete U.S. mobilization against Iraq. He spends appropriate time focusing on the decisions and roles of various key figures in the Administration: primarily the President, Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and General Tommy Franks. Woodward does a good job differentiating the dispositions, outlooks, and goals of each of these figures, creating a truly multi‑faceted image of the Administration. His reporting also reveals how some ideas and figures—most prevalently its hawkish voices—noticeably prevailed over others in influencing Bush's directives. Woodward's well‑researched account of Colin Powell’s role as a figure of restraint and alternative action, eventually seeing the necessity of war reach its last resort, is especially interesting and representative of how Iraq progressively consumed every priority, worry, and initiative of the Administration.
This is the primary narrative Woodward is comfortable leading: necessary planning drove policy, which made the Iraq War inevitable. This is well supported and hard to argue. Woodward describes the intricacies of Rumsfeld's desire for a “225‑day war,” the plan for which was changed nearly every week. If planning for a war in Iraq—even as a last resort—aircraft carriers had to be moved; military bases and infrastructure expanded; allies recruited; and an initial 130,000 troops deployed overseas.
My criticism of Woodward lies in his reliance on this argument because it is obvious. It ignores underlying factors that may—or may not have—driven the United States to war with Iraq. Woodward is clearly aware of them; he constantly draws attention to the neo‑conservative rhetoric that Bush and his cabinet used in speeches to justify U.S. interventionism and an expanding sphere of influence in the Middle East; the constant invocation of 9/11; the threat not only of terrorists but of states that sponsor their activities; and the creation of the “Axis of Evil,” designed to globalize the threat to U.S. hegemony. It goes on.
Woodward compiles an extensive amount of research into a book that is well‑paced and engaging, yet shallow and surface‑level in terms of actual analysis. He even went to the lengths of interviewing the former President over three days, only to ask the usual expected questions with predictable answers. Of course he was concerned with protecting his presidential reputation by saying that Iraq was never about WMD; it is not indicative of anything. It does not add to the book—although, given Woodward’s deliberate choice not to expand on any of his reporting, it does not detract much either.
Read this book if you want an accurate account of the months leading to the 2003 Iraq War: the decisions made, the personalities that drove them. But don’t expect to find anything deeper. Apparently, Woodward has left that work to other scholars to fill.
I read Woodward's book as an entry‑level source on the Bush Administration's decision to invade Iraq in 2003. For this purpose, it adequately serves. Down to the most pressing days and desperate hours, Woodward conducts excellent research on the months leading to complete U.S. mobilization against Iraq. He spends appropriate time focusing on the decisions and roles of various key figures in the Administration: primarily the President, Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and General Tommy Franks. Woodward does a good job differentiating the dispositions, outlooks, and goals of each of these figures, creating a truly multi‑faceted image of the Administration. His reporting also reveals how some ideas and figures—most prevalently its hawkish voices—noticeably prevailed over others in influencing Bush's directives. Woodward's well‑researched account of Colin Powell’s role as a figure of restraint and alternative action, eventually seeing the necessity of war reach its last resort, is especially interesting and representative of how Iraq progressively consumed every priority, worry, and initiative of the Administration.
This is the primary narrative Woodward is comfortable leading: necessary planning drove policy, which made the Iraq War inevitable. This is well supported and hard to argue. Woodward describes the intricacies of Rumsfeld's desire for a “225‑day war,” the plan for which was changed nearly every week. If planning for a war in Iraq—even as a last resort—aircraft carriers had to be moved; military bases and infrastructure expanded; allies recruited; and an initial 130,000 troops deployed overseas.
My criticism of Woodward lies in his reliance on this argument because it is obvious. It ignores underlying factors that may—or may not have—driven the United States to war with Iraq. Woodward is clearly aware of them; he constantly draws attention to the neo‑conservative rhetoric that Bush and his cabinet used in speeches to justify U.S. interventionism and an expanding sphere of influence in the Middle East; the constant invocation of 9/11; the threat not only of terrorists but of states that sponsor their activities; and the creation of the “Axis of Evil,” designed to globalize the threat to U.S. hegemony. It goes on.
Woodward compiles an extensive amount of research into a book that is well‑paced and engaging, yet shallow and surface‑level in terms of actual analysis. He even went to the lengths of interviewing the former President over three days, only to ask the usual expected questions with predictable answers. Of course he was concerned with protecting his presidential reputation by saying that Iraq was never about WMD; it is not indicative of anything. It does not add to the book—although, given Woodward’s deliberate choice not to expand on any of his reporting, it does not detract much either.
Read this book if you want an accurate account of the months leading to the 2003 Iraq War: the decisions made, the personalities that drove them. But don’t expect to find anything deeper. Apparently, Woodward has left that work to other scholars to fill.
November 7, 2025
The 2004 book Plan of Attack is based on classified papers and in-depth interviews with more than 75 officials, including President George W. Bush written by Bob Woodward. In Woodward's trilogy about the Bush administration, it is the second in that series. The book shows how, long before any public explanation was offered, the United States proceeded from the 9/11 attacks to preparing the plan for invasion of Iraq.
Woodward demonstrates preemptive war planning that started shortly after 9/11, even before the Bush Administration claimed to have credible proof connecting Saddam Hussein to Al-Qaeda.
President G.W. Bush is portrayed by Woodward as resolute but sheltered, mainly depending on a few advisors from his own administration (Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Rice) when formulating plans. Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of defense, one of the intellectual godfathers for ousting Saddam Hussein by force. Bush believed that Saddam's removal was destiny and that the choice was morally and preventing spread of WMD motivated.
According to Woodward, President Bush is insulated but determined, driven more by moral conviction and faith than by candid discussion. Secretary of State Colin Powell is shown as a hesitant participant who is highly doubtful about the necessity of the war, while Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld emerge as powerful figures. The book focuses on the selective use of WMD intelligence to support a predetermined policy. It also demonstrates how the administration, Congress, and UN avoided more extensive consultation in favor of secrecy and a small decision-making circle.
Woodward describes the selective use of intelligence, particularly WMD accusations, to bolster the case for war. Senior officials frequently misinterpreted or oversimplified the CIA's careful findings.
The United States wanted political legitimacy from friends as well as military partners, but as Woodward demonstrates, the majority of the planning was done unilaterally, and backing was eventually obtained more for show than for practical reasons. The primary ally in the invasion of Iraq was the United Kingdom. The biggest and first supporter was Tony Blair's Britain. Blair was close to Bush because he thought Saddam's government posed a threat to the entire world. With almost 45,000 soldiers, the UK had the second largest force behind the United States. Blair's allegiance, according to Woodward, was essential to the invasion's seeming international legitimacy. Poland and Australia also provided troops. Apart from this, states such as Spain and Italy backed President George W. Bush, as did Kuwait and Qatar, who only provided bases that were not actively involved in the conflict.
This book is deeply sourced and journalistic in detail.
Woodward demonstrates preemptive war planning that started shortly after 9/11, even before the Bush Administration claimed to have credible proof connecting Saddam Hussein to Al-Qaeda.
President G.W. Bush is portrayed by Woodward as resolute but sheltered, mainly depending on a few advisors from his own administration (Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Rice) when formulating plans. Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of defense, one of the intellectual godfathers for ousting Saddam Hussein by force. Bush believed that Saddam's removal was destiny and that the choice was morally and preventing spread of WMD motivated.
According to Woodward, President Bush is insulated but determined, driven more by moral conviction and faith than by candid discussion. Secretary of State Colin Powell is shown as a hesitant participant who is highly doubtful about the necessity of the war, while Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld emerge as powerful figures. The book focuses on the selective use of WMD intelligence to support a predetermined policy. It also demonstrates how the administration, Congress, and UN avoided more extensive consultation in favor of secrecy and a small decision-making circle.
Woodward describes the selective use of intelligence, particularly WMD accusations, to bolster the case for war. Senior officials frequently misinterpreted or oversimplified the CIA's careful findings.
The United States wanted political legitimacy from friends as well as military partners, but as Woodward demonstrates, the majority of the planning was done unilaterally, and backing was eventually obtained more for show than for practical reasons. The primary ally in the invasion of Iraq was the United Kingdom. The biggest and first supporter was Tony Blair's Britain. Blair was close to Bush because he thought Saddam's government posed a threat to the entire world. With almost 45,000 soldiers, the UK had the second largest force behind the United States. Blair's allegiance, according to Woodward, was essential to the invasion's seeming international legitimacy. Poland and Australia also provided troops. Apart from this, states such as Spain and Italy backed President George W. Bush, as did Kuwait and Qatar, who only provided bases that were not actively involved in the conflict.
This book is deeply sourced and journalistic in detail.
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July 31, 2018Sometimes you read about past disasters to distract from the present ones. They might even prove instructive.
What is most apparent from Bob Woodward’s account of the George W. Bush administration’s path to the 2003 invasion of Iraq is how pre-determined it was, and how comprehensively was their refusal to recognize their own self-enforced inevitability.
The Bush administration liked to speak of a world pre and post-9/11, but, ironically, it seemed their own mindset that was unable to adapt to the new demands of an age of terror. Before al-Qaeda attacked New York and Washington, Bush, and, especially, advisors like Wolfowitz and Cheney, were feverish in their belief that Saddam Hussein was an intolerable irritant to American interests in the Middle East and that the accomodating approach of the Clinton administration belied a lack of confidence in American power and authority. (Sound familiar?) After 9/11, they thought exactly the same, only more fearfully, with more paranoia, and with too little consideration that Islamist terror was a threat of a different kind, and not one that could be approached as an adjunct to their pre-existing heuristics.
(Rumsfeld, for his part, just seems to want the chance to be really good at doing wars.)
The principals are so earnest and insistent on the seriousness of their project, imagining they were creating a new model approach for US foreign policy; it would almost be better if they were as buffoonish or as evil as we imagine their most cartoonish selves to be. (Cheney is really that evil though.) Bush comes off as less the idiot he is suspected to be but instead a leader insecure about his authority and seriousness, and acting incuriously and unilaterally as a result. Colin Powell is a peace-minded dupe who feels duty-bound to get on board with the war, and, in doing so, accelerates its execution.
Some of our contemporary faves show up: new Turkish democrat Recep Tayyip Erdogan! Friendly Russian leader Vladimir Putin — so helpful, so unlike the obnoxious French! FBI director Robert Mueller even has a cameo.
If you’re wondering about John Howard: yeah, he’s here. He doesn’t ever seem very important. Bush mostly tells him what’s going on and what to do. Showing up seems to be the main extent of his contribution.
What is most apparent from Bob Woodward’s account of the George W. Bush administration’s path to the 2003 invasion of Iraq is how pre-determined it was, and how comprehensively was their refusal to recognize their own self-enforced inevitability.
The Bush administration liked to speak of a world pre and post-9/11, but, ironically, it seemed their own mindset that was unable to adapt to the new demands of an age of terror. Before al-Qaeda attacked New York and Washington, Bush, and, especially, advisors like Wolfowitz and Cheney, were feverish in their belief that Saddam Hussein was an intolerable irritant to American interests in the Middle East and that the accomodating approach of the Clinton administration belied a lack of confidence in American power and authority. (Sound familiar?) After 9/11, they thought exactly the same, only more fearfully, with more paranoia, and with too little consideration that Islamist terror was a threat of a different kind, and not one that could be approached as an adjunct to their pre-existing heuristics.
(Rumsfeld, for his part, just seems to want the chance to be really good at doing wars.)
The principals are so earnest and insistent on the seriousness of their project, imagining they were creating a new model approach for US foreign policy; it would almost be better if they were as buffoonish or as evil as we imagine their most cartoonish selves to be. (Cheney is really that evil though.) Bush comes off as less the idiot he is suspected to be but instead a leader insecure about his authority and seriousness, and acting incuriously and unilaterally as a result. Colin Powell is a peace-minded dupe who feels duty-bound to get on board with the war, and, in doing so, accelerates its execution.
Some of our contemporary faves show up: new Turkish democrat Recep Tayyip Erdogan! Friendly Russian leader Vladimir Putin — so helpful, so unlike the obnoxious French! FBI director Robert Mueller even has a cameo.
If you’re wondering about John Howard: yeah, he’s here. He doesn’t ever seem very important. Bush mostly tells him what’s going on and what to do. Showing up seems to be the main extent of his contribution.
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