Feeling Backward takes up the notion of queer failure first explored by Lee Edelman’s No Future and by Judith Halberstam’s “Notes on Failure” (presented at UCI’s Visual Studies conference in 2006). Arguing that “Although many queer critics take exception to the idea of a linear, triumphalist view of history, we are in practice deeply committed to the notion of progress; despite our reservations, we just cannot stop dreaming of a better life for queer people” (3), Love offers the notion of “feeling backward” as an antidote to the problem of compulsory gay pride. Love defines feeling backward as a “tradition of queer experience and representation” that constitutes “an account of the corporeal and psychic costs of homophobia” (4). In her discussion of this “archive of feeling,” Love focuses on “feelings such as nostalgia, regret, shame, despair, ressentiment, passivity, escapism, self-hatred, withdrawal, bitterness, defeatism, and loneliness [because such] feelings are tied to the experience of social exclusion and to the historical ‘impossibility’ of same-sex desire” (4). She explores these feelings through ambiguously modernist texts by Walter Pater, Radclyffe Hall, Will Cather, and Sylvia Townsend Warner. Love’s aim in excavating figures of queer backwardness is “to create an image repertoire of queer modernist melancholia in order to underline both the losses of queer modernity and the deeply ambivalent negotiation of these losses within the literature of the period” (5). In the process, she argues against models of progress, queer utopianism, queer modernity, and pride-as-normativity.
I have a great deal of sympathy for Love’s interests in this text. I agree, along with so many other queer critics, that the “pride” model is flawed and participates in capitalism’s logic of progress and market normalization. I also believe that melancholia and grief can be fruitful thematics for queer theory, as Judith Butler demonstrated so elegantly. That said, I find Love’s negotiation of these terms frustrating and poorly managed. She begins by arguing that queerness itself participates in a legacy of backwardness: “Accounts of queer life as backward are ideological, however backwardness has the status of a lived reality in gay and lesbian life. Not only do many queers, as I suggest, feel backward, but backwardness has been taken up as a key feature of queer culture” (7). Love also cites the history of queers as “backward race” (a problematic use of the term race, I believe) understood as “perverse, immature, sterile, and melancholic” (6). Other parts of her argument, however, frame this “backwardness” as a trait that characterizes only some queer modernisms, namely, those performed by the authors in her study. This slippage of the location of backwardness produces an ambiguity around the term: is backwardness a queer trait? Or are certain queer figures backward in relation to an otherwise forward-looking tradition? This ambiguity is further complicated by Love’s argumentation: once she has argued for a queer relationship to backwardness in her introduction, the relationship between queerness and negativity goes unquestioned, meaning that terms as diverse as loneliness, passivity, victimization, and refusal are each approached as implicitly queer. The problematic reading of these terms is reproduced because Love fails to manage their differences. Victimization, for example, requires a deft touch; here, it is joined with apostasy, refusal, and domination with no argument to justify such a grouping.
Love’s failure to manage these terms becomes, for me, one of the major problems of this work: she fails to read the idea of negativity in general. In her first chapter, Love declares her intent to “think with [the authors in her study] rather than against them, identifying with rather than critiquing their refusals and their backwardness” (23). This methodology seems to result in an insufficient analysis of the figures of refusal and backwardness. Although she identifies such figures, and launches thorough arguments against the recuperation of this negativity, the figural significance of negativity as such remains untheorized here. For me, this is deeply dissatisfying and reproduces the problem of the queer imperative: Love has deconstructed the imperative to pride, but has replaced it with an imperative to embrace our shame. I’m all for exploring that negativity, but she has not persuaded me that it is a specifically queer component of modernism (see, for example, the work of my fellow grad student, Mia McIver at UCI, whose dissertation explores exactly the same modernist affects—passivity, suspension, etc—with nary a queer reference).
Finally, the most interestingly argued moments in Feeling Backward are, in fact, generally optimistic. Her discussion of Pater’s “epistemology of the vestibule,” for example, is interesting not because of its purported passivity, but because of the reformation of kinship that this semi-public space accomplishes. On the other hand, Love’s argument demonstrates a certain weakness here as well: her examples of negativity often veer in the direction of messianic and spectral futurity which, although superficially negative, participate in a pervasively optimistic philosophical gesture. Thus, her concluding sentence performs the very recuperation against which she claims to argue: “the question that faces us is how to make a future backward enough that even the most reluctant among us might want to live there” (163).