In his 2007 book Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution, Woody Holton (then Associate Professor of History at the University of Richmond, now the McCausland Professor of History at the University of South Carolina) explores the fiscal and economic background of the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, Holton argues that the Framers created the Constitution to serve as a check on the democratic excesses of state legislatures that were enacting tax and debt relief in response to popular pressure. In doing so, he highlights not only the Framers’ arguments, but also the voices of the contemporaries to whom the Framers were responding.
Holton is persuasive in arguing that the Framers’ concerns about tax and debt relief and the responsiveness of state legislatures to popular pressure played a significant role in the creation of the Constitution. Parts I and II, which set the stage by outlining the issues, are especially strong, shedding light on a complex and underappreciated topic in an understandable way. He cites ample amounts of primary source material documenting the Framers’ views on these matters, and demonstrates capably how the Constitution, as written, allayed their concerns. His use of Federalist 62 in Chapter 1, for example, to indicate how Madison saw the Constitution as a solution to the problem of low investor confidence brought on by debt relief is a persuasive point. One of the great strengths of Holton’s approach is the way he humanizes his topic by including recurring characters to illustrate his points. Abigail Adams appears at various points to provide the perspective of a bond speculator, while eccentric activist Herman Husband pops up repeatedly on the pro-relief side of things. The presence of these and other figures help to ground the abstract principles in discussion.
However, insofar as Holton’s argument is that this was the only, or even primary, reason for the Constitution, his case is much less persuasive. Monocausal explanations are seductively simple but are rarely sufficient when considering complex historical periods. This would require Holton not merely to make a positive case, but to demonstrate that any other potential cause was either not in the Framers’ minds or was secondary to the fiscal issue. He simply does not do this. In fact, he notably misses opportunities to advance this claim, such as failing to discuss why Congress called the meeting to revise the Articles of Confederation at the beginning of Chapter 11. In claiming that “the Constitution might never have been written” (277) were it not for the Framers’ fear of populist debt relief activism, Holton exceeds his evidence. This tendency of Holton’s claims to outpace evidence unfortunately appears on the smaller as well as the larger scale. For example, he suggests that the reference to “establish[ing] justice” in the preamble to the Constitution is “a very specific” reference to the matter of bond repayment (88). He simply does not provide evidence that this is the case, and it is difficult to believe that what he admits is a “seemingly vague phrase” (88) could not have simply been serving as a catch-all.
A final substantive criticism is that Holton is clearly sympathetic to the populist pro-relief argument in a way that is distracting and confusing. He generally allows both sides to state their case without further analysis or making a final judgement – indeed, he explicitly states that “determining which group’s arguments were more valid is a matter for the moralist, not the historian” (82) – but will later act as if he has demonstrated the righteousness of the populist cause: “historians err in echoing the Framer’s belief that they had transferred power from the greedy to the selfless” (276). This inconsistency is especially pronounced in the Epilogue. Holton is entitled to his view, which may even be correct, but he ought to make his argument, rather than explicitly hedging and then making statements that assume he has proved his point.
Stylistically, the book is reasonably well-done. Holton’s prose is quite readable, and he manages to make a fairly dry topic as engaging as it can be. Irritating quirks such as filler phrases in response to rhetorical questions – “Why … oppose a federal tariff? For a very good reason” (136) – occasionally detract from the experience. The division into five parts, each focusing on a different period in the debate, is useful, though Part V, dealing with ratification and its aftermath, starts to stray somewhat beyond the focus of the book. Chapter 15, for example, contains an extended discussion of the U.S. military that has little do with the 200 pages that precede it.
Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution is an ambitious, imperfect, but nonetheless highly informative look into its subject matter. Historians of the period would do well to read it and engage with its research and arguments.
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Written for my Early American Republic class at Randolph-Macon College.