I wasn’t ready to tackle any of the popular multi-volume works on LBJ. I found Lyndon B. Johnson: Portrait of a President to be a good introductory book on the subject. It offers a fairly comprehensive account of the man’s political life but I found it lacking when it came to his personal or family life (LBJ was a workaholic so perhaps there wasn’t much to speak of). With LBJ, it would be all too easy to break chapters up topically (civil right, Vietnam, etc) so I appreciated that the author largely followed a chronological approach so I could better understand how all these areas influenced each other over time. The writing style was good but there were times you could tell this was an abridged work of the author’s 1200 page, 2-volume set on LBJ.
Johnson himself I found an interesting character. Being both conservative and a member of the military, I didn’t start the book with a very high opinion of the man. Having finished it, I don’t think my opinion has improved (though the reasons may have changed). Though LBJ was trying to do good for others he was a pretty dirty politician (wiretaps on domestic and political opponents, abusing his office for financial gain, conflicts of interests, etc). On Vietnam, I never truly appreciated how slow the bleed was. He entered the conflict with overwhelming support and it stayed high for a really long time. I always appreciated the constraints he faced (not fighting to win because it could risk a wider war) but never really understood how far he went to hide his major decisions from the public in an effort to avoid debate (the side effect being he built no lasting consensus for the war). Once things went south, he stayed the course partly from conviction that it was the right thing to do but also because he could never admit it was a mistake and he would not be the first President to lose a war.
I enjoyed the author’s concluding assessment of his Presidency: LBJ was a quixotic man, the same grandiosity and energy that encouraged him to think he could build a Great Society and conquer poverty, led to his belief he could break the will of North Vietnam. His record is a study in paradox. He tackled big things that others were too timid to, but in so doing overreached himself. His grandiosity led him to promise more than he could deliver (an end to poverty, a Great Society free of racial tension, victory in Vietnam). His Presidency was one of great achievement and painful failure. Many loved him and many despised him. Some remember his great works, others excessive governance at home and defeat abroad. He was a reflection of the country’s greatness and limitations.
What follows are my notes on the book.
Born and raised in rural Texas without indoor plumbing or electricity. His father served in the state House of Representatives. His mother was a teacher from a family of Baptist ministers. LBJ had a palpable interest in politics from an early age. He would listen to front porch discussions of local politics, sit in the gallery of the state legislature, and accompany his father in their Model T while campaigning (1-6). His religious training never matched his attention to politics or adolescent high jinx. He was a rebellious teenager who drank, fought, and ran away to California. At 18, he was an uneducated and unskilled laborer. He eventually relented to his mother and agreed to go to Southwest Texas State Teachers College at San Marcos (11).
His fellow students remembered him being in perpetual motion and “always in a high gallup.” He was aggressive, ambitious, overbearing, and self-centered but could also be extraordinarily personable and empathetic. This combination was not entirely paradoxical…the two sides of Lyndon were comfortably linked: in return for the attention, influence, and power he craved, he gave concern, friendship, and benevolent support. The faculty viewed him as exceptional, but not for his academic performance. He ingratiated himself with his teachers, staying with them after class and listened intently as they poured their hearts out (12-15). Due to lack of funds, LBJ took a year off and taught at an impoverished Mexican-American school in Cotulla, TX. He threw himself into the work with a peculiar enthusiasm (16).
In 1930, he received his degree in education and history. He secured a well-paying job teaching in Houston. Later that same year, he accepted appointment as secretary to his district’s new congressman (a well-paying job in the midst of the Depression) (17-19). Congressman Kleberg was a wealthy playboy, and left the entire work of his office to 23 year old Lyndon. He latched onto other staffers and congressman who mentored him. He worked 12+ hours a day, 7 days a week with his characteristic, endless energy. He lived and breathed politics, developing his own convictions about good policy. He detested Hoover’s do-nothing government and supported FDR’s New Deal proposals (20-23). LBJ convinced the conservative Kleberg to support these programs despite his concern they were socialistic. He did so not because he had developed any guiding philosophy but because he believed it was good politics and he was always concerned with winning and being effective (23).
In 1934, he met Claudia Alta (Lady Bird) Taylor during a trip to Austin. Within 24 hours of meeting, he asked her to marry him. Within 3 months of meeting they were married. After 3 years, he was looking to start his own career. When Roosevelt established the National Youth Administration, Johnson secured an appointment as the head of the Texas branch. He attacked the project with his typical workaholic zeal making it the model for programs in other states. When Congressman Buchanan died in 1937, LBJ ran against 8 other candidates for his seat in the House (31). To overcome his relative obscurity, Lyndon aggressively aligned himself with FDR. He worked harder than any other candidate and won the seat with 28% of the vote (34).
His identification as a Roosevelt man gave him access that helped his career (37). He befriended Majority Leader Sam Rayburn. Lyndon was a southern New Dealer who sought to integrate the South into the mainstream of American economic life. He was a strong believer in using Federal power to help Americans (38). He was also a self-seeking opportunist who used his connections to advance himself. New Deal contracts enriched TX construction companies (like Brown & Root) which then paid his DC based law firm handsome fees and/or funded his campaigns. In 1939, Lyndon decided to run for Senate and began collecting hidden, illegal contributions from the Brown brothers (44). Despite raising more funds than anyone, machine politicians in Texas swung enough votes at the 11th hour to his competitor, Governor Pappy O’Daniel (47). Campaign finance laws and ballot box manipulations were not revelations to Johnson but his defeat convinced him politics was a dirty business and that being unprincipled was a requirement for success (48).
In 1940, anticipating the US entry into war, he sought and received a naval appointment as a Lt Commander. As a sitting member of Congress, he worked in the Navy Under Secretary’s office on war production. After WWII broke out, he believed a future bid for higher office would depend on a record of wartime service. He finagled a token trip to the South Pacific as an observer for FDR. There, he convinced MacArthur to let him ride along on a combat mission. The plane was damaged and dropped out of formation and barely avoided being shot down by Japanese Zeros. Even though he was just a passenger, MacArthur awarded LBJ a Silver Star. The pilot and other crew members received no such honors. LBJ went home with a “war record” and MacArthur gained a new vocal advocate in Washington (48-51).
Johnson purchased a radio station in Austin after favorable FCC support. The IRS investigated Brown & Root’s tax write-offs (secret donations to LBJ) and discovered $1M owed in back taxes. Pressure from the White House dropped the amount owed to $372K (52-53). In 1948 he made another run for Senate. He rented a helicopter (then a novelty) and flew into towns all over Texas spending hundreds of thousands of dollars (the limit was $10K under TX law) thanks to large contributions from the companies he made rich with New Deal and wartime contracts (61-63). Johnson defeated his Republican opponent but the rampant ballot manipulation and voter fraud in his primary victory called into question his legitimacy in the Senate (70).
From the start he strove to ingratiate himself with Senate leaders and learn every detail on the inner workings of the Senate. In 1951, Johnson became a compromise for party Whip (the youngest Whip in party history) (74). In 1952, he used the power of his office to gain an FCC license to construct the only VHF television station in Austin. While other cities had multiple stations, Johnson’s monopoly in Austin brought him significant financial gains (75-76). In 1952, he was elected the youngest Senate Minority Leader in Party history. Working with Ike, he established a reputation as a Democrat who put country above party (77-78). He became Majority Leader when the Democrats retook the Senate in 1956.
Lyndon established a system of control that made him the most effective Leader in Senate history. He dominated others by sheer force of personality. He broke long stand seniority rules and placed allies into coveted committee assignments (83). He became intimately familiar with the personal and professional interests of every Senator, Republican or Democrat, accumulating political debts to be paid back later (85). He masterminded the art of complex legislation, managing numerous bargains and trade-offs among senators. Journalists called Johnson’s method “the treatment”, a mix of supplication, accusation, cajolery, exuberance, scorn, tears, complaint, and hint of threat (87). Johnson thought the term nonsense that painted him as a bully domineering over paralyzed idiots. He believed his success a matter of enormous preparation and his talent for debate (88). Information was power and LBJ gathered every detail he could on other senators (strengths, weaknesses, aspirations, work ethic, beliefs, values, and personal behavior (alcohol, women, family life) (88-89).
A heart attack in 1955 discouraged a run for higher office though speculation was rampant. Joe Kennedy (JFK’s dad) offered to bankroll his campaign if he would bring his son on as his running mate. LBJ turned him down, beginning a long-term feud with Bobby Kennedy. LBJ thought Joe was setting JFK up to run in 1960, expecting LBJ to lose to the popular Ike in 1956 (94-95). Johnson needed some bigger accomplishments before running. Balancing his liberal beliefs against the reality of Southern politics, he pushed through a Civil Rights Act of 1957 but which largely had no teeth. In response to Sputnik, he co-sponsored a bill creating NASA (110).
LBJ thought he was best positioned for his Party’s nomination in 1960. He viewed JFK as an unaccomplished, untested playboy. LBJ vastly underestimated the importance of style in Presidential politics. He finally announced his candidacy too late to build momentum and JFK won the nomination. JFK, despite opposition from family, wanted LBJ on the ticket to draw in Southern states. Johnson was losing his control over the Senate and viewed being VP as good step towards integrating the South back into the national consensus (115-117). He believed he could re-invent the Vice Presidency but he grew just as frustrated as his predecessors. He was given ceremonial tasks (like goodwill ambassador trips overseas) & had limited roles in the administration (as evidenced by his silence during the Cuban Missile Crisis (131).
On Vietnam, Johnson view was in line with the prevailing wisdom in the administration, Congress, and the press (domino theory). He supported Kennedy’s move to expand the number of military advisors there (130-131).
Always the political animal, he would exploit Kennedy’s death by pushing for legislation in his name (144). He intended to pick up where FDR left off with the New Deal: opening opportunity to the poor and honoring the country’s equal treatment rhetoric. A “war on poverty” excited hiss imagination. In his first State of the Union he declared his aim was “not only to relieve the symptoms of poverty, but to cure it, and above all prevent it” (147-148). Speaking at the University of Michigan, he outlined his utopian goals for a “Great Society”. While few believed his rhetoric about curing poverty, they supported his positive outlook in the wake of Kennedy’s death (157).
As President he thought himself liberated from the constraints imposed on a Texas Senator and made a strong push for civil rights. He believed segregation only separated the South from the rest of the nation, a sort of relative the nation could neither disown nor accept (164). He was supremely satisfied with his historic gain (Civil Rights Act of 1964), though he feared he had delivered the South to the Republican Party for a long time to come. H feared the bill would damage his chances for being elected in his own right. Because it was passed by Congress (rather than judicial fiat) the bill would be accepted by the South (though he had no way of knowing that at the time)(169-170).
Though many viewed Goldwater’s nomination as absurd, LBJ took it seriously, viewing it as the outgrowth of long public unrest with Big Government and Big Spending (174). Goldwater’s rabid anti-communism likely contributed to LBJ taking a more aggressive stance on Vietnam to eliminate it as a campaign issue. While he had no intention of taking the US into an undeclared war, he viewed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution & retaliatory bombing raids as a way to put Hanoi on notice and demonstrate American resolve (179). The resolution rushed through Congress under crisis conditions was no substitute for debate & building up popular support.
The campaign was particularly nasty with LBJ painting Goldwater a dangerous extremist who would lead the country into nuclear war (YouTube the “Daisy” ad). LBJ won an Electoral College landslide 486-52. LBJ took the result as an endorsement of his Great Society and War on Poverty (189). He pushed several significant pieces of his agenda through Congress (federal aid to education, Medicare, and the Voting Rights Act). Medicare would prove enormously popular that no future president could oppose, unfortunately, it also directly contributed to staggering increases in medical costs (201). White American support for LBJ’s agenda plummeted after the Watts riots (207).
Remembering the lesson of Munich, Johnson refused to show weakness in Vietnam. McNamara believed the current course would end in defeat and pushed for greater US involvement. Rolling Thunder, the eight week, limited bombing campaign followed. Still Johnson didn’t see himself as committed to war (211). As the situation deteriorated, Gen Westmoreland asked for more troops and to abandon a defensive posture and take the fight to the enemy. All Johnson’s “wise men” agreed he needed to expand the war. Johnson announced the troop increases in such a way to avoid media attention that would distract from his domestic agenda (217). Troop levels went from 75K to 125K but Johnson said his decision “did not imply any change in policy” and surrounded his announcement with talk of his Great Society agenda (219). He also chose not to call up reserve units.
Johnson didn’t make his decision lightly. Firm belief in the domino theory and fear of a right-wing reaction that would wreck his administration if he lost Vietnam dominated his thoughts. Plus he assumed the Viet Cong and North Vietnam couldn’t hold out against America’s massive military power forever (220). LBJ assumed the mere presence of so much US power in Vietnam was enough to do the job and failed to develop a strategy for how to use that power (223). He thought critical members of the media were “subversives” who publicized US atrocities but ignored those of the Viet Cong. Still, public polling showed 10-1 against withdrawal from Vietnam (he took these results at face value, failing to recognize how superficial they were) (225).
By 1966 the War on Poverty faltered due to reduced funding and its own internal contradictions. While federal spending on the poor had increased dramatically under LBJ, budget analysts told him that the reduction in poverty actually came from increasing employment (242-243). Great Society programs gave some poor a modest hand up, but in black ghettos the policies were irrelevant. The effect there was increased numbers on welfare and thus greater dependency of black families (246).
Johnson saw a Republican wave building for the mid-term elections and didn’t campaign for Democrats to insulate himself (249). Even in 1966, a majority of Americans approved of his handling of Vietnam. Public attitudes toward the war bewildered LBJ. He couldn’t understand how people saw him as a villain; he was fighting for freedom for people everywhere (259). North Vietnam was always on the verge of faltering, victory was almost at hand. We were winning every battle, inflicting massive casualties. We were NOT losing, yet he couldn’t understand why negotiations failed to materialize (266).
Problems were growing at home as well. Crime had increased six times faster than population growth in the JFK-LBJ era. 1960s Supreme Court decisions banning school prayer, loosening obscenity laws, and expanding criminal rights contributed to arguments that bleeding heart liberals were soft on crime and trying to subvert the American way (278). LBJ abused the power of government to go after anti-war protestors and political opponents. More race riots in Detroit and Newark exploded in 1967. LBJ had been more attentive to the problems of blacks than any President and felt the riots were embarrassing and undermining him (281). Johnson appointed Thurgood Marshall to the Supreme Court to further promote equality and justice under the law (291).
By 1967 the war was a stalemate producing domestic divisions and a nightmare from which LBJ couldn’t wake. He grew irrational and repressive towards his opponents. He still refused to escalate but was desperate to end the war. It was crippling his freedom on domestic affairs and budget deficits were forcing him to cut funding to his own programs. But having invested so much of his energy into the war he stubbornly refused to admit it was a mistake (302). Losing was never a word in Johnson’s vocabulary. LBJ appointed McNamara (on the verge of mental breakdown) to be president of the World Bank (319).
1968 brought fresh hopes for a settlement until the Tet Offensive. Moving out of the jungles, the US devastated the North Vietnamese. However the size of the offensive shook US public opinion (322). The war, riots, loss of domestic support, and a primary challenge from Bobby Kennedy led him to not run for a second term. LBJ’s preferred successor was Rockefeller (Humphrey’s anti-war sentiments annoyed him) (339). After Bobby was assassinated, LBJ secretly pulled for Nixon (354). He flirted with running again but the protests at the DNC convention eliminated any last ideas about that (351).
He chose not to expose Nixon's interference in the peace talks (doing so would expose that he had bugged the Nixon campaign) (357-8). Politics was his life and his return to Texas felt like actual suicide. He suffered huge mood swings and dedicated his energy to five major projects: memoirs, presidential library, TV interviews, establishing a school of Public Affairs at Univ. of Texas, and putting his ranch and business interest in order (364). He detested McGovern and worked behind the scenes to ensure Nixon’s reelection (368). He died in 1973.