The Achilles Trap: Saddam Hussein, the C.I.A., and the Origins of America's Invasion of Iraq

by Steve Coll

From bestselling and Pulitzer Prize-winning author Steve Coll, the definitive story of the decades-long relationship between the United States and Saddam Hussein, and a deeply researched and news breaking investigation into how human error, cultural miscommunication, and hubris led to one of the costliest geopolitical conflicts of our time

When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, its message was Iraq, under the control of strongman Saddam Hussein, possessed weapons of mass destruction which, if left unchecked, posed grave danger to the world. But when no WMDs were found, the US and its allies were forced to examine the political and intelligence failures that had led to the invasion and the occupation, and the civil war that followed. One integral question has remained Why had Saddam seemingly sacrificed his long reign in power by giving the false impression that he possessed hidden stocks of dangerous weapons?

The Achilles Trap masterfully untangles the people, ploys of power, and geopolitics that led to America’s disastrous war with Iraq, and, for the first time, dramatizes America’s fundamental miscalculations during its decades-long relationship with Saddam Hussein. Beginning with Saddam’s rise to power in 1979 and the birth of Iraq’s secret nuclear weapons program, Steve Coll traces Saddam’s motives by way of his inner circle. He brings to life the diplomats, scientists, family members, and generals who had no choice but to defer to their leader—a leader directly responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, as well as the torture or imprisonment of hundreds of thousands more. This was a man whose reasoning was impossible to reduce to a simple explanation, and the CIA and successive presidential administrations failed to grasp critical nuances of his paranoia, resentments, and inconsistencies – even when the stakes were incredibly high.

Calling on unpublished and under-reported sources, interviews with surviving participants, and Saddam’s own transcripts and audio files, many of which remain unavailable to the public, Coll pulls together an incredibly comprehensive portrait of a man who was convinced the world was out to get him, and acted accordingly. A work of great historical significance, The Achilles Trap is the definitive account of how corruptions of power, lies of diplomacy, and vanity – on both sides – led to avoidable errors of statecraft, ones that would enact immeasurable human suffering and forever change the political landscape as we know it.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Politics, Middle East, War, Military Fiction, American History

576 pages, Kindle Edition

First published March 5, 2024

About the author

Steve Coll is President & CEO of New America Foundation, and a staff writer at The New Yorker magazine. Previously he spent 20 years as a foreign correspondent and senior editor at The Washington Post, serving as the paper's managing editor from 1998 to 2004.

He is author six books, including The Deal of the Century: The Break Up of AT&T (1986); The Taking of Getty Oil (1987); Eagle on the Street, based on the Pulitzer Prize-winning account of the SEC's battle with Wall Street (with David A. Vise, 1991); On the Grand Trunk Road: A Journey into South Asia (1994), Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (2004); and The Bin Ladens: An Arabian Family in the American Century (2008).

Mr. Coll's professional awards include two Pulitzer Prizes. He won the first of these, for explanatory journalism, in 1990, for his series, with David A. Vise, about the SEC. His second was awarded in 2005, for his book, Ghost Wars, which also won the Council on Foreign Relations' Arthur Ross award; the Overseas Press Club award and the Lionel Gelber Prize for the best book published on international affairs during 2004. Other awards include the 1992 Livingston Award for outstanding foreign reporting; the 2000 Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Award for his coverage of the civil war in Sierra Leone; and a second Overseas Press Club Award for international magazine writing.

Mr. Coll graduated Phi Beta Kappa, Cum Laude, from Occidental College in 1980 with a degree in English and history. He lives in Washington, D.C.

Reviews

[Matt · Rating 4 out of 5]

“Like many people in the Middle East and elsewhere, Saddam [Hussein] thought of the C.I.A. as all-knowing. This contributed to his own misunderstandings of America, which were at least as profound as America’s misunderstandings of him. For instance, after 1991, Saddam assumed that the C.I.A. knew that he had no [weapons of mass destruction], and so he interpreted American and British accusations about his supposed arsenal of nukes and germ bombs as merely propaganda lies in a long-running conspiracy to get rid of him. He resisted the disarmament inspections demanded by Washington and London as a possible alternative to war partly because he saw the camera-wielding, walkie-talkie-toting inspectors as spies with a hidden agenda – again, not without reason. A C.I.A. capable of making a giant analytical mistake on the scale of its error about Iraqi WMD was not part of Saddam’s worldview…”
- Steve Coll, The Achilles Trap: Saddam Hussein, the C.I.A., and the Origins of America’s Invasion of Iraq


The 2003 American invasion of Iraq was the country’s worst decision since the catalogue of bad decisions that comprised the Vietnam War. Along with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it stands as one of the two biggest foreign policy blunders of the first quarter of the twenty-first century. It destabilized the Middle East, killed tens of thousands of people, cost trillions of dollars, and set in motion unintended consequences that will probably take decades to disentangle.

Given the long wake of the resulting reverberations, it’s far too soon to fully – or even partially – judge the significance of America’s choice to topple Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. However, having passed the twentieth anniversary of the war’s beginning, we’re edging closer to the time when a fuller picture of how the whole thing started can be presented.

In The Achilles Trap, Steve Coll – a Pulitzer Prize winner whose Ghost Wars is an undeniable classic – provides an immersive tale of ambition, paranoia, brinksmanship, and miscalculations, illuminating the shadowed path that led the United States to squander its soldiers, tax dollars, prestige, and moral standing in a place it never should have been.

***

Coll is not a man afraid of expanded word counts. Looking back through his canon, you’ll find a bunch of very lengthy tomes. When you get one of his titles in hardcover, it’s like holding a brick: there is just a lot of weight and density.

As an avowed big-book lover, this appeals to me. Just as important, though, is that Coll makes the pages count. He sets out to tell complex stories, often unfolding over decades, and recognizes that sometimes the best way is the long way.

Here, Coll starts in 1979, the year Saddam became president, and ends in 2003, with the first flurry of America’s “shock and awe” bombing campaign. In between, the narrative coalesces around three major events, which provides The Achilles Trap’s framework.

***

The first section covers the strange interlude in which the United States and Saddam Hussein were strategic allies, if not exactly friends. In a book full of controversial and dubious military moves, Saddam actually gets things started by instigating a war with Iran, which he soon began to lose. During this time, America provided behind-the-scenes support to keep Iraq from crumbling, which is one of those all-time historical ironies in light of events to come.

***

The second section recounts Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait, and the subsequent Persian Gulf War. The war itself turned out to be a stunningly one-sided victory. Despite having the world’s fourth largest army, the combined armed operations against him made Saddam zero for two when it came to invading his neighbors. Even though the military operations were relatively clean – stress relatively – the aftermath proved to be a mess. Sanctions and no-fly zones and rumors of a resurgent WMD program caused the relationship between the United States and Iraq to deteriorate, so that it was already thoroughly rotted when the storms of 2001 blew through.

***

The final third of The Achilles Trap traces the collision course between the United States and Iraq after the September 11 terror attacks. Though it had absolutely nothing to do with that terrible Tuesday morning onslaught of hijacked airliners, the potential threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s alleged weapons of mass destruction took root in the mind of President George W. Bush, and those advising him. While the onus rests with Bush – who gave the fateful orders – Saddam clearly misread the room, failing to understand that he had become a probable outlet for a lot of pent-up fury.

As Coll explains it, Saddam was weak but pretending to be strong, at the same time that the United States thought he was strong, despite his weakness. One of the telling things about Saddam’s thinking is how little preparation he made for war, despite the fact that everyone in the world knew it was coming.

***

Running as a connecting theme through all three parts of The Achilles Trap is the rise and fall and imagined re-rising of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapons program. There is no doubt that Saddam wanted an atomic bomb. There is also no doubt that such a thing might have been dangerous, as he had already used chemical weapons against both Iran and his own people.

Nevertheless, unlike North Korea, which has nuclear weapons, and Iran, which is close, Iraq never got all that far. This was due to a combination of factors, including Israeli sabotage, trade restrictions, inspections, and the outcome of the First Gulf War. At the time of the Second Gulf War, it was no longer a going concern. Unfortunately, fear-based thinking in the White House, a culpable media establishment, and a parade of Iraqi expatriates repeating doubtful rumors as fact, all combined to form an unstoppable momentum for conflict.

***

One of the things that stands out about The Achilles Trap is that it is told largely from the perspective of Iraqis. Coll and his researchers – who he acknowledges on the first page – have tracked down a lot of participants, and through them, we get firsthand accounts of life under Saddam. In these pages you find scientists, envoys, dissidents, a near-psychotic fail-son, and a survivor of one of Saddam’s mass executions. For instance, we spend a lot of time with Jafar Dhia Jafar, a physicist educated in Britain who became one of the leaders in the effort to construct an atomic weapon. Coll also follows Tariq Aziz, one of Saddam’s closest advisors, and the man often sent to represent Iraq’s president internationally.

And then, of course, there is Saddam himself. Whether removing Saddam from power proved a good idea is highly questionable. That said, he was not a good man: mercurial, brutal, and sometimes murderous. Still, he is a fascinating figure, and The Achilles Trap is at its dramatic best when he is around. One of the lasting images I’ll take from this is Saddam the wannabe novelist, diligently working on his ancient-set epics while his own doom rushed toward him.

***

There is a famous, oft-repeated quote from Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s second president. “The genius of you Americans,” Nasser reportedly told C.I.A. agent Miles Copeland, “is that you never made clear-cut stupid moves, only complicated stupid moves which make the rest of us wonder at the possibility that we might be missing something.”

This line summarizes Coll’s theory of the case. To him, Saddam did not underestimate the United States but – in a way – gave it too much credit. He mistook ignorance and wrongheadedness for cleverness, thereby reacting to American threats as though he were guilty of the charges against him.

Obviously, this is but a part of the reason the United States upended the Middle East on March 20, 2003. It’s probably not even that big of a part. Indeed, due to the Iraq-centered viewpoint, the role of the Bush Administration – the neoconservative theories, pressured C.I.A. analysts, delusional thinking, genuine fear, and no small amount of rage – is summarized, rather than studied in depth. That’s fine, because for as long as The Achilles Trap is, no single book can comprehensively map all the separate pathways leading to a disaster of this magnitude.

[Tanner Nelson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Steve Coll’s investigative journalism is always excellent. His recent focus on the consequences and causes of America’s wars in the Middle East and Central Asia are worthy of the praise lauded upon them. While “The Achilles Trap” was great, I wish the government archives Coll reviewed would have allowed him greater access.

Saddam Hussein, as described in this book, often reads like the one-sided caricature he was made to be by both Bush administrations. Coll identifies this as a shortcoming in the first few pages. He wasn’t able to portray Saddam in 3D because he could only access a tenth of all the documents captured by American forces in 2003. Without the remainder of the trove, we are left with a singular lens of the former dictator—a lens colored by the government that deposed him.

Criticism aside, this was a great analysis of the Gulf War and the Iraq War. Coll had an unparalleled ability turn thousands of pages of droll meeting minutes and memos into a riveting political thriller. Any one of his books would make an excellent high-budget miniseries a la HBO or Apple TV+. “The Achilles Trap” may be weaker than its counterparts, but it is still an excellent read.

If you, like me, have friends and family who participated in America’s wars in Iraq, I recommend this book to you. If you want important insight into how America stumbled into one of its great blunders in recent history, this is a must read.

[Steven Z. · Rating 5 out of 5]

For years, the United States was involved in a complex relationship with Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s the Reagan administration provided Baghdad with licenses to acquire certain implements of war, provided intelligence as to Iranian positions, and at the same time engaged with Iran with weapons for hostages. The United States employed Saddam as a counterweight to Teheran from 1979 onward. Later, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Washington completely altered its policies and organized a coalition to remove Iraq from Kuwait. However, before the war commenced the United States gave false signals to Saddam before he invaded Kuwait which he seemingly misread. Throughout the 1990s the United States backed a series of possible scenarios to overthrow Saddam, but none was successful.

Fast forward to 2003, the second Bush administration under the influence of neoconservatives fostered policies to invade Iraq remove Saddam and achieving control of Iraqi oil and reorienting the balance of power in the Middle East. It is clear today that the result of that policy was to elevate Iran’s regional influence as the Iraq counterweight was removed. The errors fostered by the Bush administration have been a disaster for Washington’s role in the region. How this all came about is the subject of Pulitzer Prize winning author Steve Coll’s latest book, THE ACHILLES TRAP: SADDAM HUSSEIN, THE CIA, AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA’S INVASION OF IRAQ.

What becomes clear from Coll’s account is that there was more to Saddam than American politicians and spies could understand – even when the stakes were so high in dealing with him be it trying to uncover his nuclear capabilities, the sellout of the Kurds in northern Iraq, the invasion of Kuwait, and the final cat and mouse game that led to the Second Gulf War. Coll’s research consisted of numerous interviews of the participants in this historical relationship in addition to the availability of Saddam’s secret treasure trove of over 2000 hours of tape recordings of leadership meetings – private discussions – meeting minutes- intelligence files – and other materials. It allows us to see Saddam in new ways, “what drove him in his struggle with Washington, and to understand how and why American thinking about him was often wrong, distorted, or incomplete.” The result is an incisive monograph that details events and decision making in a readable format providing a review of Iraqi American relations since the 1970s. Coll pulls no punches in his analysis, and it is an important contribution to the many works that deal with this topic.

From the outset Coll introduces Saddam’s fears of the Iranian Revolution, his hatred for the Ayatollah Khomeini, his obsession with Israel’s nuclear capability, and his need to develop atomic weapons. He introduces Jafar Dhia Jafar, a British educated physicist who would become the intellectual leader of Iraq’s atomic bomb program who plays a vital role throughout the book as Saddam’s Oppenheimer. Coll’s discussion of the Iran-Iraq war focuses on the motivations of each side and the key role played by American intelligence, weaponry, and licensing. It was clear under the Reagan administration that it wanted to work with Saddam but as we did so we misread his goals. Further Washington’s support for Baghdad fostered deep misunderstand on Saddam’s part as to what they could get away with without American opposition which is the major theme of the book. Throughout the narrative Coll explains the inability of Iraqi and American officials to understand each other from Washington’s refusal to allow Iraq to buy gun silencers to the nuclear policies of both countries.

Coll does a masterful job presenting the background information for Saddam and his family. The relationships within the family exemplified by Saddam’s erratic and murderous son Uday and his brother Qusay, or his son-in-law Kemal Hussein are very important in understanding how Saddam ruled and the impact of his relatives on Iraqi society. Each individual is the subject of important biographical information that include Tarik Aziz, Saddam’s pseudo Foreign Minister, Nizar Hamdoon, close to Saddam who was his liaison to the United States and Iraq’s UN envoy, Ali Hassan al-Majid, better known as “chemical Ali,” who carried out many of Saddam’s most despicable policies, Ahmad Chalabi, a duplicitous character who lied his way to influence CIA policies toward Saddam, and Samir Vincent, an Iraqi-American who worked on the Oils-For-Food negotiations to revive a diplomatic solution between Baghdad and Washington, among others.

The author raises the question as to why Saddam would risk an invasion when he was aware that he lacked a nuclear option. He would eventually agree to the return of UN inspectors, but it would be too late. The problem as correctly points out is that a decade of an American containment policy had conditioned Saddam to doubt the prospect of a land invasion. Further, since 1991 had threatened military action, but did little. Further he could not fathom why an invasion would take place when he suspected the CIA and other agencies knew he lacked nuclear weapons – an important miscalculation as the Bush administration was bet on war by late 2002, and the task of US intelligence was to find a causus belli to justify an invasion.

Coll is on firm grounds as he describes the many attempts to overthrow Saddam. It is clear that the first Bush administration wanted Saddam to be replaced but refused to engage in assassination. After the first Gulf War, Washington decided not to march to Baghdad and remove him for fear of upsetting the regional balance of power. During the Clinton administration there were many CIA plots involving Saddam’s overthrow from Chalabi’s conspiracies, supporting Wafiq al-Sarranai, an officer close to Saddam, Ayad Allawi, the head of the Iraqi National Accord who led the opposition to Saddam and was an enemy of Chalabi, to members of his dysfunctional family, particularly his demented son Uday.

A major part of the narrative involves western attempts to uncover and end Saddam’s nuclear program. Coll takes the reader through the “shell game” involving United Nations and the International Atomic Agency’s inspectors to locate evidence of Saddam’s nuclear program. A number of important individuals are discussed including Swedish diplomat Hans Blix, and Rolf Ekeus, the Director-General of the IAEA, David McKay, an American inspector and a host of others. The details of the “cat and mouse” game conducted by the Iraqis is detailed as is the internal dynamic of investigators and their disagreements, including the role of the CIA and American intelligence. They would soon discover that Saddam had a sophisticated bomb program for at least five years without being discovered and Saddam’s capacity to build a bomb was also unknown during that period. It is clear that by the mid-1990s there were no nuclear weapons, but there were biological agents mounted on missiles.

Coll takes the reader through the two Gulf wars, the use of chemical weapons against his enemies, the attacks on Kurdistan, the attempts to remove him from power , all topics that have been dealt with by others, but not in the detail and the perspectives that the author presents. All of this leads to the decision to go to war in 2003 and finally remove Saddam from power and use a new Iraq, dominated by the United States to control the Middle East and its oil resources. In developing this aspect of the book as he does throughout Coll focuses on how Saddam misread American actions and policies toward him. This misreading and/or misunderstandings in the end resulted in his death and a quagmire for the United States that lasted for a decade and even today the United States has difficulties with ISIS terrorists ensconced in Iraq, and a Shia dominated government that our policies helped bring to power.

Coll pulls no punches as he discusses aspects of his topic. A useful example is the relationship between neoconservatives who served during the Reagan administration and Ahmad Chalabi. Coll describes “neocons” as “a loose network of like-minded internationalists who advocated for an assertive post-Cold War foreign policy that would advance American power by expanding democracy by challenging tyranny all around the world.” They sought to undermine the Soviet Union and Saddam advocating human and civil rights as a moral imperative. They would attract the likes of Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld and others who were men who liked ideas on questions as what to do about Iraq. The result was Saddam’s actions invigorated a domestic alliance of American hawk’s laser focused on removing the Iraqi dictator. Chalabi who saw himself as an Iraqi Charles De Gaulle had no following in Iraq and fed numerous lies and conspiracies to the CIA and others and received millions in return – this was the “neocon” darling! Men like Paul Wolfowitz, Zalmay Khalilzad, Richard Perle, and Richard Armitage pushed for war when they realized Bill Clinton would not engage in regime change. American generals thought their ideas were “crackpot.”

George W. Bush’s cabinet read like a “who’s who” of “neocons” with Cheney as Vice President, Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense, and Wolfowitz as Deputy Secretary of Defense, all backed Chalabi’s “rolling insurgency” plan to overthrow Saddam. Secretary of State Colin Powell who opposed these ideas offered “smart sanctions” – restrict trade directly related to WMD and avoid policies that hurt children and the general Iraqi populations. He felt the military option was not in the best interest of the United States, though he did not rule it out.

The question is why did Saddam want to keep the myth of weapons alive when facing steep economic sanctions and threats of war? Coll is clear in his study of Saddam that for the Iraqi dictator a “mutually assured destruction” strategy would offset his fear of an Israeli nuclear attack, an ego which was such that it would provide him with greater security internally and externally, and his misunderstanding of Washington’s capacity to stop him.

Coll’s story presents the long and mutually confusing relationship between the United States and Iraq. It ranges from Saddam’s rise to dictatorial power in 1979, soon after which he started a covert nuclear program, to the 2003 invasion, and his execution in 2006. Along the way we experience a dark chapter in US foreign relations highlighted by the Reagan administration’s turning a blind eye to Saddam’s use of WMD against Iranian soldiers, and under the Bush administration Kurdish villagers, along with CIA policies that enhanced Saddam’s paranoia which led him to defeatist policies as he misread the United States, who at times he perceived to be an ally. All in all, it resulted in what the second Bush administration made, in hindsight across ideological lines a terrible geopolitical mistake which we are still paying for.

What sets Coll’s narrative apart from other authors is his knowledge of Iraqi planning and Saddam’s mindset as it was clear that Bush had made up his mind for “preemptive war”. Coll’s account of the Bush administration’s actions, views, and planning has been detailed by others, but it is his deep dive into Iraqi strategy and the views of Iraqi planners that distinguishes his work.

Charlie Savage in his August 29, 2024, article in the New York Review of Books entitled “A Terrible Mistake” perfectly encapsulates the importance of Coll’s work; “Beyond its value as a history and reappraisal of events, what lessons does this tale of ceaseless misconceptions and miscalculations hold for today? If Iraq was a trap, it was one that a succession of American policymakers clearly did not understand they were getting the country into until extricating it cleanly was nigh impossible. Coll gestures toward the difficulty of understanding dictatorial rulers whose regimes are hard for American intelligence agencies to penetrate and whose own pathologies may also make it hard for them to see the US clearly:

One recurring theme is the trouble American decision-makers had in assessing Saddam’s resentments and managing his inconsistencies. It is a theme that resonates in our present age of authoritarian rulers, when the world’s stressed democracies seek to grasp the often unpredictable decision-making of cloistered rulers, such as Vladimir Putin, or to influence other closed dictatorships, such as North Korea’s.”

[Surbhi Mishra · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Achilles Trap by Steve Coll offers an in-depth exploration into the life of Saddam Hussien chronicling his ascent from relative obscurity to becoming a central figure in the Middle Eastern political arena and an influential player on the world stage. It meticulously traces how his unique blend of charisma, strategic acumen, and ruthless determination enabled him to secure and wield power with lasting effects on regional and international geopolitics.

Steve Coll offers a prelude to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq by navigating through the intricate web of events and decisions leading up to the momentous and controversial invasion. By offering this exploration, he presents a window into the often opaque processes of international diplomacy and military strategy. The book provides readers with a nuanced understanding of how historical legacies, personal vendettas, economic interests, and global power dynamics can converge to shape a decision that has defined an era.

The account spans from the shocking inhumanity that marked Saddam’s rule to the complex interplay within his own family, and even touches on surprising elements of his character, such as his unexpected stint as a historical romance novelist towards the end of his life, reminding us of the layered nature of even the most vilified individuals.

In his compelling narrative, Steve Coll not only paints a detailed picture of the dictator’s brutal reign but also critically examines the United States’ involvement and policies that left indelible marks on the historical timeline. He reveals the treachery, arrogance, and hypocrisy embedded in the decision-making processes and delves into the miscommunications and grave errors made by intelligence and elected officials.

The Achilles Trap is a sobering reminder of the complex interplay between power and ethics, and the lasting impact of those decisions on the global stage.

Thanks to the publishers at Penguin Press for the advance review copy.

[Megan · Rating 5 out of 5]

I’m going to go ahead here and steal a fantastic quote I read from Matt’s 4-star review of The Achilles Trap: Saddam Hussein, The C.I.A., and The Origins of America’s Invasion of Iraq (posted 08/09/2024) by former Egyptian president Gamal Abdel-Nasser, when describing U.S. actions in the Middle East, from his point of view, and what Saddam and many other foreign leaders have undoubtedly thought:

”The genius of you Americans is that you never make clear-cut stupid moves, only complicated stupid moves, which make the rest of us wonder at the possibility that we might be missing something.”

After reading Pulitzer Prize winning investigative journalist Steve Coll’s book on just how disastrously misunderstood the situation truly was when we invaded Iraq in March of 2003, by both sides, it’s a perfect synopsis for the downright ridiculous war.

Let’s not pretend like we were all screaming against it, either. Obviously, the more it dragged on and on, the dumber we began to feel as a nation. But only a very limited numbers of Congress voted against it, and the majority of Americans were calling for his head. Even though I was young when this happened, I wasn’t so young as to not remember the moment when the bombs dropped on television, with the news channel literally playing Outkast’s hit 2002 song, “B.O.B. (Bombs Over Baghdad.”

It’s an excellently executed narrative, using the words and views many Iraqis involved in Saddam’s government had at that time in history, such as his leading nuclear scientist, his top political advisers, some of his close family (all of whom were drunk with power - if not just plain drunk - and batshit crazy). It’s nice to get the Middle Eastern version instead of it being purely Westernized, as is so often the case.

The whole story is told in three sections: the first of when Saddam came to power in 1979 and how the U.S. government covertly backed the Iraqi regime in their war with Iran, the second part in which the U.S. decided after Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait (1990) that we’d no longer tolerate his regime - particularly their use of chemical weapons attacks against civilians - thus, beginning our initial attempts to topple him from power.

The final part is where things get so outrageous due to misinformed intelligence reports and false beliefs from both countries as to the other’s intentions. It covers 9/11 and the years following the attack, where we attempted to track Saddam down.

Really, as crazy as Saddam was, most Iraqis had accepted it and learned how to live according to his rules. We gave them a ton of empty promises just like we did in Afghanistan - about building democracy, building infrastructure and modernizing Iraq - only to destroy it entirely and then leave them to deal with the devastation our assumptions caused.

As we’re well-aware now, Iraq possessed no WMD. The craziest part of all of this was that because Iraq, much like most countries in the Middle East (and elsewhere) tended to believe in the all-knowing power of the Americans and the CIA in particular, Saddam and his government were convinced that we were aware they’d destroyed all the work they’d achieved toward chemical and nuclear weapons capabilities about a decade prior to invasion.

Saddam was getting tired of constant inspections by UN ambassadors, but instead of publicly getting rid of the weapons they’d begun building and the research they possessed, they went about destroying it in secret. So there was no actual proof in the beginning that everything had been destroyed, only the words of Saddam (which weren’t exactly the most trustworthy).

Hussein genuinely held the belief that the CIA was playing its usual games with him; making up the WMD issue as a propaganda ploy, in an effort to gain the support of other countries in our attempt to topple him from power. While it’s true that this was a goal aligned with the WMD goal, it wouldn’t have been a good enough excuse for an invasion.

There’s not much more I can really say other than I definitely believe this is a book worth reading. No matter who tells it, the story is going to be convoluted and chaotic, so it’s hardly Coll’s fault if things don’t appear to be written straightforward: there really isn’t a better way of telling such a confusing story, so kudos must be given to Coll for his extraordinary undertaking and ability to tell it as clearly as possible.

4 1/2 stars, rounded up.

[Chris Barsanti · Rating 5 out of 5]

About as coherent an answer as we are likely to get to the most maddeningly complex question about the Iraq War: "Why?" Steve Coll's prodigious researching, reporting, and writing background on the Middle East and Central Asia (Ghost Wars, especially) helps him create this book's densely factual yet compulsively readable narrative. Through it all, Saddam Hussein emerges as not the monomaniacal cartoon dictator of pro-war propaganda but a far more recognizable type: the Qaddafi-like paranoid autocrat who didn't realize the ground had shifted under his feet until it was too late. This is history as tragic farce.

[Sarthak Bhatt · Rating 5 out of 5]

have read plenty of politics-- safe to say america does breed the smartest and the most retarded politicians out there, the latter half of this book covers the story of retard no 1.

[Matt Caris · Rating 3 out of 5]

As always with Steve Coll, the reporting here is excellent, and the access to numerous otherwise unavailable sources makes this an interesting read, even for someone very familiar with the US-Iraq confrontation from 1991-2003.

However, in his analysis, Coll falls oddly short in a couple places. A couple examples:

1) Despite an extensive section (as to be expected) on the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Coll does not really identify the key decision points or even decision-makers (besides George W. Bush’s overall authority as president) involved in the decision to invade. To a degree, this isn’t Coll’s fault - famously, that decision remains murky and surrounded in opacity. But while Coll vividly illustrates how from an early stage, the Bush Administration was cherry-picking intelligence - often qualified or questionable - to use as part of its public campaign for aggressive action against Saddam, he does not (or perhaps simply cannot) show how or when the administration got to the point of deciding such action was necessary in the first place. The illegal, immoral, and strategically disastrous invasion therefore is left as a sort of inevitable conclusion of the preceding 12 years of conflict and stalemate, rather than as a dramatic volte-face of American policy, under Bush’s authority and engineered by advocates within the administration. Interestingly, Saddam himself illustrates just how dramatic this policy reversal was: Coll paints Saddam as flippantly disbelieving of the threat of an American invasion, conditioned by those same 12 years of conflict, avowed dedication to regime change, etc., but without any serious effort to actually undertake such a change.

2) Coll argues that a more aggressive effort at deterrence towards Saddam prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait could have prevented that invasion and the 1991 Gulf War, and allowed the US and Iraq to eventually find their way back to some kind of working relationship. While this, in and of itself, is reasonable, it ignores that Iraq’s nuclear program was far more advanced than anyone outside the country believed possible, and that the state of said program was only discovered in the wake of the Gulf War, thanks to the inspections regime forced upon Saddam following his defeat. So, in this counterfactual, while the US could have likely groped its way back to a relationship with Saddam, Coll never seems to consider the possibility (probability?) that in this case, Iraq would have been able to proceed with its nuclear program undiscovered, until it finally produced some attempt at a fission weapon.

Three stars may be a bit harsh, but Coll’s previous books have been so good, that the analytical muddiness of this work was particularly disappointing.

[Liam Ostermann · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a splendid book which anyone interested in understanding the Middle East today and the history of only one of a century's worth disastrous and foolhardy interventions into the region made outside powers should read. The full history of Iraq's relations with the USA and vis a versa is still to be told, but twenty years on we probably have information and more understanding of the 2003 Iraqi war then most historians had of the causes of WWII and Nazi Germany in 1959.

What is particular splendid is the use Mr. Coll has made of Iraqi sources and I want to pay tribute to that and his honesty in acknowledging the help he has received in translating Iraqi documents, in many cases having them retranslated to ensure accuracy. I often complain about writers who hide their linguistic short comings and end up reinforcing cultural biases and misconceptions but understand that no one can read every language and being honest about such limitations is the first step to overcoming them.

I am of a generation old enough to have passionately objected to my governments (the UK) participation in the 2003 invasion so I am biased but I have more sympathy and understanding for President Bush than I have for prime minister Tony Blair of the UK. Bush made massive mistakes through ignorance, Blair made those same mistakes with eyes open and for the most cynically opportunistic of reasons. I dislike Bush but have a limitless contempt for Blair who for me, by his sins of omission (because he is too unimportant to have real responsibility for what happened) are the most egregious. The road to hell is full of good intentions gone horribly wrong but, most importantly, it is lined with 'the enablers' who knowingly allowed bad decisions to be made. Blair is an enabler, I don't say he could have stopped things, but he could have done what was right. I don't know how he can sleep at night.

But back to this splendid book - one of its great joys is the richness of the sources he has accessed and the way he allows them to speak for themselves. One magnificent anecdote (page 383) records a sureal conversation between Charles Duelfer (former head of UN weapons inspection and the American who had spent most time in Baghdad in the 1990s) and various CIA officials at a closed door conference at Iraq in 2001 when the CIA admitted they had no idea of the whereabouts of Jafar Dhia Jafar, former head of Saddam Hussein's Nuclear program.

"The talk turned to 'lots of very technical ideas' to track Jafar down, including 'senors on satellites, communications-intercept techniques, new widgets on the ground.'

"Duelfer intervened: 'Why not just call him up? His former is probably in the UK, you could ask for her number.' He mentioned Jafar's wealthy brother, Hamid, who ran a trading firm with offices in the United Arab Emirates. 'Ask him,' Duelfeur suggested. 'It will be easy to contact him.' The discussion left Duefleur reflecting on the apparent 'absence of information' at the CIA 'about the internal political and social situation in Iraq.' How could the United States be so far out of touch."

It is not just a reflection on CIA limitations but a good example of the limitations of what any security service can know, or maybe access, at any point in time. But more importantly I think it shows how terribly easy it is for an 'institutional way of thinking' to take over and suppress everything else. This is particularly true when you examine the dealings of the USA/CIA with Saddam Hussein going back to the 1980s when large amounts of intelligence was supplied by the CIA to help Iraq in its war with Iran. Although Saddam Hussein, and his generals, were happy, eventually, to use the satellite and other intelligence that the CIA supplied regarding Iranian army positions, Saddam never trusted the CIA or the USA and was deeply suspicious of the US government intentions (more about Saddam in a moment) and thought that the USA might also be supplying similar information to the Iranians. When the Iran-contra scandal broke Saddam was not surprised so much as confirmed in his belief in the duplicitous nature of the CIA and US government.

All too often powers like the USA and, more surprisingly, organisations like the CIA operate with no historical memory, forgetting everything they have done and presuming that every new client, contact, organisation or government will be equally forgetful. But of course they aren't and because they believe the CIA's own legend of its competence and ability to be all seeing and knowing they inflate what it knows and can accomplish. Rulers of countries like Iraq do not believe that events like Iran-contra reveal inefficiencies or shortcomings. They see vast conspiracies not cock ups. Saddam Hussein couldn't take the 'moral' indignation and denunciation of his use of chemical weapons seriously when for so long leading USA politicians, like Bob Dole, had blocked all attempts to censure him.

The insights this book provides about Saddam Hussein are fascinating, if to a certain extent limited because information is still being withheld for 'security reasons' by the US. Personally I think when all information is revealed it will only add nuance to the portrait we already have of Saddam. He does come across as a two-dimensional cliched paranoid 'bad guy' but dictators are a bizarre breed and staying in power often depends on being suspicious to the point of paranoia and surrounding yourself with yes-men (as always literature tells more truth then non fiction and I recommend 'The Dictator’s Last Night' by Yasmina Khadra on Muammar Gaddafi as excellent tangential reading). Hussein was far more interesting, and intelligent, then he allowed people outside his closed circle to see. He was wrong about many things but this book will help you understand why he was wrong.

His weapons of mass destruction were always about deterrent because he felt threatened, particularly by Israel backed by the USA. That was his thinking behind the attempts to develop a nuclear capability (and again why not? he reasoned. Israel, India and Pakistan had done so with no consequences). The combination of his belief in the CIA's omnipotence and in the necessity of having others fearing his weapons capability would lead to the farce and misunderstandings of the whole attempt to 'find' Saddam's weapons of mass destruction.

Saddam destroyed his WMD capability, but kept no records, and didn't want to admit this because he was afraid of internal and enemies taking advantage of such weakness. But his belief in the CIA omnipotence meant he couldn't believe they didn't know he was without them.

That the US decided to treat everything coming from Iraq on the basis that 'All Cretans are liars' and insist that they prove a negative ('when did you stop beating your wife') meant that there was no way of preventing the already decided upon invasion.

There are so many good things in this book, but also many things that make me weep with anger and frustration such as Colin Powell's February 5, 2002 speech to the UN (page 449) a litany of invented, misinterpreted and exaggerated intelligence claims of such astounding mendaciousness that it could be a set text on why you should be suspicious of anything any government says.

This is a fabulous history and I am afraid I may have made it sound prescriptive in its presentation. The greatest attribute of this history is that it lets the evidence speak for itself and speaks loudly without any authorial nudges. Accept my encouragement to read 'The Achilles Trap' but ignore anything I have said that might put you off. This is history that allows you to discover things for yourself. Absolutely first rate.

[Mike · Rating 5 out of 5]

I am late to the party with Steve Coll but I am glad to have finally arrived. What a fantastic book on the reign of Sadam Hussein and his relations with the United States. I essentially grew up during this time period, but there was so much I did not know that I learned reading this book. I mean how about this nugget - Sadam spent his last years in power writing novels. Classic case of a dictator doing his thing while the world was burning around him. Highly recommended.

[Andrew Englund · Rating 4 out of 5]

During his novel-writing period, Saddam suspended a news anchor for six months for reading a statement on air containing a grammatical error.

[Garry · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fascinating journalistic history of the relationship between the dictator Saddam Hussain and his rule in Iraq and US Presidents and the CIA in America. There are so many mistakes and miscalculated moves on both sides, and finally, the war for regime change without evidence or reason and no plans for managing post-war Iraq.

[Raughley Nuzzi · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Achilles Trap is a fascinating biography of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, from his rise to power through his execution. It explores the personalities involved in his conflicts with Iran, Kuwait, and the United States on all sides of the equation and shines a light on how he and America lurched towards renewed conflict. It's easy to use hindsight and known knowns to handwave away the mystery surrounding Saddam's WMD program, for example, but the full context of his duplicitousness and paranoia helps explain why inspectors or the US could so readily believe their own preconceived conclusions.

The author does an excellent job of balancing the book through these tricky subjects and I would highly recommend it for anyone interested in Hussein-era Iraq. Plus, you can find out about Saddam's romance novels!

[Chad Manske · Rating 4 out of 5]

Coll’s “The Achilles Trap” is a captivating and eye-opening account of the events leading up to the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003. Coll, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and author, delves deep into the complex web of politics, intelligence, and power that ultimately led to one of the most controversial military interventions in recent history. From the very first page, Coll grabs the reader’s attention with his detailed and meticulously researched narrative. He carefully examines the role of Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi dictator whose brutal regime and alleged weapons of mass destruction were used as justification for the invasion. Coll also sheds light on the actions of the C.I.A., the American intelligence agency that played a pivotal role in gathering information and building the case for war. One of the most fascinating aspects of “The Achilles Trap” is Coll’s exploration of the personal motivations and decisions of key players in the lead-up to the invasion. He provides insight into the mindset of President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, and other members of the administration who were instrumental in shaping U.S. foreign policy at the time. Coll’s ability to humanize these individuals while also critiquing their actions adds depth and nuance to his narrative. In addition to its compelling storytelling, “The Achilles Trap” is also a thought-provoking analysis of the broader issues surrounding the invasion of Iraq. Coll raises important questions about the ethics of preemptive war, the reliability of intelligence gathering, and the consequences of military intervention in the Middle East. His book serves as a powerful reminder of the complexities and consequences of foreign policy decisions made by those in power. This is a must-read for anyone interested in understanding the origins of America’s invasion of Iraq.

[Ayushman · Rating 5 out of 5]

Superb, Coll delivers again. Also happy to see Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer’s influence throughout the 1990s.

[Denise · Rating 5 out of 5]

Impeccably researched, in-depth look at the life of Saddam Hussein and his decades-long complex relationship with the US government, culminating the US invasion of Iraq. Coll never disappoints.

[Jessica · Rating 4 out of 5]

Incredibly thorough reporting, have to be very interested in the topic and read it quickly enough to keep momentum as it is packed w detail/dense material. Important to understand how the war actually got started and the US’ flaws in the process.

[olivia bennett · Rating 3 out of 5]

if you want a very dry, textbook-esque informational read about america’s involvement in iraq, this is the book for you

[Ben K · Rating 5 out of 5]

Saddam was absolutely bananas but the U.S. IC really blew it by faking the existence of WMD. This book is a thicky but Steve Coll does a great job making it an easy read. Great way to learn ab Iraq

[Holly Seliga · Rating 4 out of 5]

Another book in Middle Eastern politics that reminds us perhaps the real villain all along was low key the United States

[Joey · Rating 4 out of 5]

"The Achilles Trap" is excellent, yet not quite an irresistible page turner. Short stretched dragged a little, bogged down in slightly too much minutiae. For instance, the years of UN weapons inspections in Iraq are of course integral to the story of America's tragic march toward unnecessary and avoidable war, but Coll lingered just too long from time to time on the technical details, not only of the inspections but also the mechanics of Iraq's nuclear program itself. But this is a small beef overshadowed by a largely tight and compelling narrative woven by an experienced master analyst and storyteller.

As Coll notes in his acknowledgements near the end of the volume, he originally considered starting the narrative arc of "The Achilles Trap" in the immediate aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. The fact that he wisely heeded advice to go back much further to find the roots of the tangled relationship between the United States and Iraq makes this book credible and indispensable within the literature of both Saddam's Iraq and American adventures -- and misadventures -- in the Middle East.

Coll ably presents a compelling character sketch of Saddam Hussein, identifies the key points of American-Iraqi miscommunication and missed opportunity, and follows those threads expertly to the hubris-drenched Washington area in 2002 and 2003. Readers can -- thanks to Coll's expert tone and pacing -- both watch and sense the train wreck in slow motion. For those who lived through the whole story, reliving it can be vaguely sickening. But Coll lifts readers to a high-level perspective, allowing us to experience the long parade of political mistakes, oversized egos, and bad/lazy decisions in a way we couldn't in real time. "The Achilles Trap" is essential reading for students of the Middle East, as well as policy practitioners looking for background to understand why we are where we are, and hopefully avoid repeating errors.

[Dennis Hogan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Finished The Achilles Trap: Saddam Hussein, the C.I.A., and the Origins of America's Invasion of Iraq by Steve Coll, a new work of non fiction. The book takes a comprehensive look at what led up to this modern day tragedy, the Iraq War the mess made that led to the lives lost, ordinary Iraqi’s and the US and allied military that were wounded or died. George W Bush gets a lot of blame and rightfully so but all US Presidents from Ronald Reagan to Barak Obama deserve a share. Saddam was a bad man, who deployed Bacterial Weapons and would have used atomic weapons if he could have developed them, but we used him to combat Iran, bought his oil and then wrung our hands at the monster we facilitated. Reagan played both sides, selling weapons to Iran while supporting Saddam. HW Bush, Clinton and George W Bush attempted to topple Saddam painlessly by using the CIA and UN Atomic weapons inspectors. This book is a case study in misreading an opponent and doing a poor job developing strategic solutions while forcing half baked solutions. Saddam’s years of lying and treachery bore poison fruit when he tried at the eleventh hour to claim he had no WMD’s and was not believed. Steve Coll has written a clear eyed account of a terrible situation made worse. Obama’s blame is much less, given the mess he inherited from multiple administrations and his early objections to the Iraq War, but ultimately we wobbled in ending US involvement and made terrorists stronger in the region and the rest of the war.

[James Lyons · Rating 5 out of 5]

I got #funsaddamfacts out of this book and just for that it was worth it. Incredibly well researched and written and from a historical perspective I appreciate the care and effort into the research. Helped me understand so much more about the decade that defined me growing up.

[Alexander Norris · Rating 4 out of 5]

Ever wonder why the US invaded a country over a non-existent WMD program?

Read this book

[Jim Beatty · Rating 5 out of 5]

The CIA is completely prepared to burn down your house in order to light a cigarette.

[Hunter Flamm · Rating 4 out of 5]

Through Steve Coll's clear, concise prose, The Achilles Trap guides the reader through the decades leading up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The books serves, partially, as a biography of Saddam Hussein, chronicling his rise to power and the structure of his dictatorial regime. Coll does not come across as overly "pro-American" or excessively harsh against Hussein. He frames U.S.- Iraq relations as something of a tragedy rooted in double-dealing, atrocity, and misunderstanding (on both sides).

It is widely accepted that the Iraq War verged on illegality and was, by all accounts, a useless tragedy that cost countless lives, in addition to creating the circumstances for ISIS and other terrorist groups to exploit disorder. In response to the war, some journalists, historians, and academics have taken to portraying Hussein as a roguish, heroic figure; a Che Guevara of the Middle East. As history, and Coll's portrayal highlights, this was not the case. Hussein was a brutal autocrat, one who had no qualms about deploying chemical weapons against his own people or initiating a destructive war with Iran. He was a complex person, with literary aspirations among other interests. However, Saddam was cruel, delusional, fickle, and impulsive; traits that led him on a path of imminent collision with the U.S.

As for the Americans depicted in the book, Coll's assessments are as critical as they are of Hussein. Veteran diplomats and CIA officers come across as sincere and dedicated to their missions, but often misunderstanding of Iraq and Hussein's goals for the nation. The U.S. willingly engaged in double-dealing in the Iran-Iraq war, selling weapons and providing intelligence to both sides. Until Saddam was deemed too volatile to work with, he was a dictator that the U.S. "could do business with". Coll's assessment of U.S. Presidents Bush 41, Clinton, and George W. Bush are not adulatory, but not damning. Bush 41, a World War 2 veteran, initiated the Gulf War in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait because he saw Saddam as a leader in the vein of Hitler. While Bush's moralism led to a military confrontation, Clinton's distraction with domestic issues allowed the conflict with Iraq to simmer, as a no-fly zone was maintained and Iraq was periodically struck with airstrikes and a devastating embargo on aid. Bush the younger surrounded himself with hawks, some veterans of his father's administration, like Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld , that sought Saddam's ouster. Others, like Colin Powell, who oversaw Desert Storm as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, were easily converted to the cause.

Coll's best arguments come from his analysis regarding Saddam's flirtation with WMDs. The author unilaterally acknowledges, almost ad nauseam, that Iraq never obtained WMDs at the time of the invasion (although they had used, had possessed, and were capable of producing chemical weapons). Hussein believed that a nuclear weapon would shield him from invasion and ouster and drove the Iraqi nuclear weapons program to obtain a working bomb. Saddam was certain that Iraq would be invaded if he barred UN representatives from surveying his weapons programs. Despite this, he routinely expelled inspectors, and constantly threatened the U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia with chemical attack. Hussein was smart enough to know he was on thin ice; additionally, the Americans had an extremely low bar for attacking Iraq in the event that they believed there were WMDs. Furthermore, while it was initially acknowledged and accepted, even by the U.S. that Iraq had zero involvement with the 9/11 attacks, Saddam chose to antagonize the U.S. and expressed approval of the attacks. While the Americans misunderstood Iraq's capabilities, Hussein's antagonization of the Americans and unwillingness to comply with UN restrictions guaranteed Iraq's invasion and his ouster and, ultimately, his own execution.

[Matthew Dimsey]

"You overlook many truths from a liar"

In The Achilles Trap, Steve Coll analyzes the decades long history between the United States and Saddam Hussein leading up to the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq. Spanning four U.S. presidencies, this history reveals the complexities of foreign policy and diplomacy, as well as (true to U.S. fashion) the covert operations prescribed to achieve strategic aims.

Before reading this book, my understanding of the 2003 invasion and U.S.–Iraq history was largely limited to the idea that “the U.S. invaded because it suspected Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.” While that pretext is not wholly inaccurate, I was not well informed about why the U.S. believed this, or why the Bush administration ultimately decided to invade. Coll, I believe, clearly describes how muddy events and murky intelligence coalesced into what we now understand to be one of the costliest geopolitical conflicts in recent memory.

Coll chronicles Saddam’s rise to power in 1979; the Iran–Iraq War; Saddam’s use of chemical and biological weapons; the CIA’s relationship with Saddam during the Iran–Iraq War; Arab–Israeli regional conflicts; Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990; Iraq’s “crash” WMD program; the Gulf War; United Nations inspections and oversight of the dismantling of Iraq’s WMD program; the crippling enforcement of UN sanctions; Clinton’s Operation Desert Fox and the enforcement of no-fly zones; the paranoia surrounding terrorist capabilities following 9/11; and the Bush administration’s efforts to topple Saddam and ultimately invade Iraq.

Clearly, this was a tumultuous period in history, and one cannot definitively explore all its nuances, but Coll does an honest job of identifying key moments and is critical of the participants involved

[alessi · Rating 5 out of 5]

First off would like to give myself kudos for fully finishing a big work of nonfiction. Second off, this is one of the most well researched pieces of literature I’ve ever read — I simply can’t imagine how much work went into this. My biggest takeaway was that some of the systems we take for granted are in fact fallible as anything else, like our government or intelligence systems, etc. My second takeaway is that all of this back and forth between the US and Iraq over decades truly just came down to miscommunication. If only politicians did away with the evasiveness, I truly feel we would have a lot clearer of a geopolitical landscape. What a fantastic read, highly recommend.

[Len Boselovic · Rating 5 out of 5]

A nuanced, well balanced account of American failure in Iraq and the Middle East. This meticulously researched history doesn't make the outcome more palatable, but perhaps a few in command will take heed from the lessons it clearly outlines. However, judging from the disaster unfolding in Gaza, it seems Coll's parable hasn't made it to the bookshelves of a few world leaders who could benefit from a careful reading of it.

[James Hogan · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a really well researched book on the CIA, Saddam Hussein and Iraqi public figures generally leading up to the catastrophic Iraq war. As such I loved it. Coll has a good writing style and frames the various players well, this book does feel very American though and that can be annoying. I would say what the book does best is show you a glimpse at a more balanced Saddam all the while never letting you forget his war criminal past. You do gain a real appreciation for why Saddam felt persecuted and also for how prescient and knowledgeable he was on world affairs.

The book also shows how the CIA and successive American presidents/governments completely misunderstood both Saddam and Iraq as a state and often had completely the wrong understanding of the WMD situation. George W Bush probably comes out of this book the looking the worst, he is put in the crosshairs firmly as a warmonger who wanted to depose Saddam at any cost. The criticism I have of this book is it does not hold the flow of time well and lacks detail in some areas and as such it can at times feel a bit loose and vapid. I am however somewhat of the opinion that this may be a fault of the available information rather than the author.

A great read that is thoroughly entertaining/enlightening as a modern history piece.