The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire

by Andrew O'Shaughnessy

A unique account of the American Revolution, told from the perspective of the leaders who conducted the British war effort

The loss of America was a stunning and unexpected defeat for the powerful British Empire. Common wisdom has held that incompetent military commanders and political leaders in Britain must have been to blame, but were they? This intriguing book makes a different argument. Weaving together the personal stories of ten prominent men who directed the British dimension of the war, historian Andrew O’Shaughnessy dispels the incompetence myth and uncovers the real reasons that rebellious colonials were able to achieve their surprising victory.

In interlinked biographical chapters, the author follows the course of the war from the perspectives of King George III, Prime Minister Lord North, military leaders including General Burgoyne, the Earl of Sandwich, and others who, for the most part, led ably and even brilliantly. Victories were frequent, and in fact the British conquered every American city at some stage of the Revolutionary War. Yet roiling political complexities at home, combined with the fervency of the fighting Americans, proved fatal to the British war effort. The book concludes with a penetrating assessment of the years after Yorktown, when the British achieved victories against the French and Spanish, thereby keeping intact what remained of the British Empire.

Genres: History, American Revolution, American History, Nonfiction, American Revolutionary War, Biography, Military Fiction

480 pages, Hardcover

First published July 4, 2013

About the author

Andrew O’Shaughnessy is the Saunders Director of the Robert H. Smith International Centre for Jefferson Studies at Monticello, and Professor of History at the University of Virginia. Originally from Britain, he lectured at the University of Oxford before moving to the US, where he currently lives in Charlottesville, Virginia.

Reviews

[Joy D · Rating 4 out of 5]

“Britain did not expect to have to occupy America. The most fundamental miscalculation of the men who lost America was the assumption that the loyalists were in a majority, and that they would rally in support of the army. This was the error that led to their most disastrous decisions – the attempt to solve the imperial crisis by coercion, the slow build-up of military forces at the beginning of the war, the failure to make a concerted effort to link the campaigns of Generals John Burgoyne and Sir William Howe in 1777, and the planning and conduct of the southern campaign after 1778.”

This is the story of the American Revolution written from the British perspective. It is told in a mix of minibiographies of the key people involved on the British side. It is separated into major periods. Part 1 covers the “view from London,” focused on King George III and Lord North. In Part 2, we learn about the victory and defeat in the northern colonies, with minibiographies of brothers Richard and William Howe, John Burgoyne, and Lord George Germain. Part 3 documents the battles that took place in the southern colonies. It highlights the actions of Sir Henry Clinton and Charles, Earl Cornwallis. In this section, these two go back and forth over who should “get the blame” for the loss. Part 4 moves into the other parts of the Americas, primarily in the Caribbean, and the British victories over France and Spain. In this section the minibiographies are concentrated on Sir George Rodney and The Earl of Sandwich.

This book discusses a number of factors that enabled the American colonies to gain independence. The British overestimated the strength of their own Navy in comparison to the French, who were allied with the Americans. They also scattered their forces by sending a portion to the Caribbean, which reduced those available to continue to fight on the continent. I am not going to try to list all the factors, but the author provides an in-depth analysis.

Most of my previous reading about the American Revolution has been told from an American perspective, and I found it quite interesting to view the war through a British lens. The history is the same, but the emphasis is different. I learned a great deal about the British leaders and participants, which are generally only discussed at a higher level in American-centric histories. This book is very detailed (perhaps overly detailed in places), but overall, it is definitely worth reading for those interested in the American Revolutionary period.

[Steven Peterson · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a fascinating work on the American Revolution. It is told as a tale of English leaders--political (George III, Lord North, Lord Germain, the Earl of Sandwich), army (Generals Howe, Burgoyne, Clinton, and Cornwallis), and navy (Admirals Howe and Rodney) One narrative of the success of the Revolutionary War is poor leadership by the British. This book, though, contends that many of the leaders were actually very good. Leadership was not, in fact the reason for the American victory.

George III? He is described as a king whose (Page 19) "accession seemed like the dawn of a new age with unbounded promise." And, later in his reign--before medical problems began to cripple him--he was still viewed positively by his people. Hardly the image of the tyrant. Given the increase in the role of Parliament that had been ongoing, his reign is the more intriguing.

Military leaders? The Howe brothers were part of a team that routed the Americans in Long Island and Manhattan. Generals Clinton and Cornwallis, as chief lieutenants, were key players in the humiliating defeats of General George Washington's forces. Gentleman Johnny Burgoyne was another of the key army leaders. He, too, had been under the command of General Howe. He convinced the British leaders that he could take a force down the Hudson and cut the republic in two. It did not work out, as he was defeated at the Battle of Saratoga and then surrendered to the American army under General Gates.

The narrative continues. Including General Cornwallis' string of victories in the South--which amounted to nothing as he ended up surrendering to George Washington's French-American army.

In the end, the author concludes, the military commanders--for the most part--did their jobs quite well. There was political turmoil that ended up undermining the military forces--budget problems, the questions about the war by many powerful figures, the involvement of France and Spain in the conflict.

In the end, the author concludes that the war was not readily winnable. There were too few military resources committed to the continent. There was not a full political consensus for continuing the war. There were budgetary constraints. Military resources were adequate for victory in battles--but not for occupation to maintain some degree of tranquility. Incompetent leaders? The author notes that many of the team (Page 361) "who lost America were also the men who saved Canada, India, Gibraltar, and the British Caribbean." A thought provoking work, with lessons going beyond the American Revolution.

[Jerome Otte · Rating 5 out of 5]

In the popular imagination of Americans, the revolution has been reduced to a cartoon, a story dominated by the “heroes”: the colonists that rallied to the cause of independence with enthusiasm, and the brilliant and noble military genius the lead them to victory, George Washington. As far as the British have any role in this myth, they are typically portrayed, cartoonishly, as evil tyrants bent on destroying liberty. All of these assumptions, which make up the popular image of the Revolution for many Americans, are utter nonsense. O’Shaughnessy cuts through this nonsense to approach the war from a perspective that Americans rarely bother to consider, let alone appreciate.

As O’Shaughnessy shows, British policymakers were far from the corrupt, incompetent tyrants that we think them to be. Most of them were practical, sensical men that were unable to overcome the limitations that geographical and political conditions put them in. The Americans, of course, did not initially fight for independence; they fought for their rights as free Englishmen. Pro-independence sentiment came only later. And most colonists did not especially hate George III; they directed their sentiment against Parliament. Only when King George proved unable to scale back Parliament’s excesses did he become a target of American sentiment. During the early stages of the war, both American and British soldiers and political figures claimed to be fighting for the maintenance of true British monarchy. And it seems that only George III believed that resisting American demands could preserve the empire; everyone else, including the Howe brothers and many parliamentary politicians seriously doubted that the rebellion could be suppressed. The King’s hard-line approach also alienated Americans, who had previously only blamed parliament for their ills.

Thomas Jefferson blamed George III personally for the breakdown in British-colonial relations and believed from the beginning, somewhat naively, that George III was scheming to impose tyranny on America. In our popular mythology King George is often called a “tyrant” for no other reason that that he was a monarch. But in reality, George III was the weakest monarch in Europe at the time. The colonial policies that triggered revolution originated not with George III, but with his ministers, and the king frequently acted as a restraining influence on the most extreme of these policies. King George’s involvement was minimal until the Tea Party broke out. The Declaration of Independence exaggerated King George’s role in colonial grievances. He was a useful scapegoat for unpopular policies that he more often than not had little involvement in.

The weak management of prime minister Lord North resulted in a divided Cabinet of strong personalities, which inevitably resulted in feuds, indecision, and conflicting initiatives. North was indecisive, lacked a stable following, and was averse to confrontation. He was ultimately responsible for the Tea Act. The Tea Act was not a tax on tea as is commonly believed, it removed the tax on tea in order to make it cheaper and thus save the East India Company from bankruptcy. It was also designed to undercut the prices of colonial smugglers; most colonials received their tea illegally through smuggling, hence the outrage over the Tea Act.

The British government mismanaged the war not because they were tyrants, but because they were struggling to manage the most democratic government that the world had at the time. Domestic political opposition to the American war was a significant factor, as was public scrutiny by a free press. Paradoxically, George Washington was more a hero to the British press than any of the generals engaged in putting him down. And the king did not dictate policy and set strategy; he had to obtain the agreement of his cabinet and parliament.

Because of the nature of their government, the British war effort was paralyzed by partisan politics and the heated criticism of a free press. British anti-war sentiment was a powerful force. The British decision to employ Hessian “mercenaries” (they weren’t really mercenaries, they were loaned to the British by the German princes in order to keep their military active and experienced) was regarded in the colonies as proof of the British government’s “barbarity.” But in fact, the Hessians were employed by the British because the American war was so unpopular in England; few British citizens were eager to send their own troops to fix a problem they blamed on the government.

Contrary to popular belief, the British were not opponents of liberty and representative government. They saw themselves as defenders of liberty and the rule of law, and they believed the best way to safeguard those principles was to uphold the supreme authority of Parliament.

When war came, the British were completely unprepared. The national debt imposed budgetary constraints and the navy was in less than ideal shape. The British cabinet had little grasp of global strategy and no inclination for military affairs. British military commanders were hampered by contradictory instructions, a lack of strategic direction, administrative incompetence, and overlapping spheres of authority. On paper, the king was head of the army, but he did not appoint a commander-in-chief for it until 1778. Contrary to popular belief, British officers were not always better trained than their American counterparts. Ironically, the loss of the American colonies allowed the British to globalize their empire.

We often hear that Britain had the most powerful military in the world at the time of the Revolution. But in reality, Britain’s army was relatively small due to the British public’s suspicion of a large standing army. Of course, the only time we really hear that the British military was so powerful is when an American makes the common statement, “We defeated the most powerful military in the world at the time.” More likely, this myth was just one of many invented to make Americans feel good about how awesome we are. The navy in particular was in awful shape. The British navy at the time was rather small, its admirals were not household names, and it was spread thin by vast commitments, ranging from the Home Islands to the Caribbean to the Mediterranean to India to Canada. This overextension was a direct cause of Britain’s defeats in the Chesapeake to the French fleet. The entry of the Dutch and the Spanish into the war taxed the Admiralty’s resources further.

Britain’s military commanders were typically less hawkish than its politicians. Ruthless tactics and indiscriminate plundering by the likes of Banastre Tarleton were the exception rather than the norm. When Tarleton returned to Britain, he was met with disapproval.

Still, Britain’s commanders they were quite capable and courageous to the point of recklessness. The Howe brothers, General William Howe and Admiral Richard Howe, had distinguished careers and good reputations. They were both members of Parliament and were sympathetic to colonial grievances. Many members of Parliament who were in the military actually resigned their commissions in protest of the American war. Despite their talent, the operations of the Howe brothers were often hampered not by any military genius on George Washington’s part but by logistical problems that never went away. Supply shortages and logistical problems frequently prevented General Howe from following up his successes. A fractured command system did little to aid coordination. Britain was headed by a coalition government, which did much to hamper coordination.It was also under pressure to keep down the cost of the war.

The British army captured every major city during the war, but never had enough troops to occupy and police the territory it captured. In all their major defeats, the British lost only because of superior numbers on the colonists’ part. The American victory in the war was not as total, inevitable or decisive as mythologists would lead you to believe. Britain’s defeat was not total. The British still possessed Canada, the Midwest, Savannah, Charleston, Maine, and New York. And they had successfully prevented France and Spain from seizing India, Gibraltar, and its Caribbean possessions.

In all, an excellent account of the revolution that I enjoyed immensely and I’m sure anyone else would as well.

[Wendy · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very, very informative. There's a lot to absorb, so it can be a bit of a drag to get through it at times. If you're interested in this part of history, though, it's very definitely worth it.

[Ed · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is a detailed account of British elites clashing with each other over matters of policy, precedence and place on promotion schedules and political matters unrelated to the war with the American colonies described through a series of linked biographies of four political leaders, three generals, two admirals and one king. They did lose America but not for the reasons many of us have come to believe.

British and their German allies/mercenaries were generally brave, resourceful soldiers led by generals and field grade officers who had long experience not only in Europe but in frontier wars in North America and India. The generals weren’t hide-bound martinets tied to outmoded and doomed tactics. They adapted to the American terrain and the irregular militia strategies of the rebels. They didn’t stand in serried ranks, firing volleys on command but fought in long skirmish lines and often carried the day with fierce bayonet charges with fifteen inch three sided bayonets fixed on the end of their muskets. This is one place where British discipline and drill were important, carrying home a bayonet charge after a day of fighting.

It was strategic, political and diplomatic failures that led to the defeat of the British in America. Even after the surrender at Yorktown they hadn’t been decisively defeated but the army and navy were urgently needed elsewhere, particularly India and the Mediterranean where even graver threats to the crown and the empire were developing. For one thing the British forces were at the end of an untenably long supply line—reinforcements, ammunition, powder, even forage for horses had to be transported by the navy and merchant marine across the North Atlantic. Internal supply lines were overstretched as well—for example when General John Burgoyne lost the second battle of Saratoga his forces depended on convoys from Montreal, 200 miles away over difficult terrain and through still contested by Indians and rebels. The logistics proved unsolvable.

The lack of local supplies and dependence on far distant sources (it took eight month for a letter from London containing changes in the chain of command to reach the headquarters of William Howe in Boston, for example, was due in significant part to fundamental miscalculations about those colonists still loyal to the crown. It was wrongly assumed that the loyalists were the majority of American colonists and that they would rally to the British Army. Both of these suppositions were wrong and both were the bedrock of British strategy.

Another intelligence failure was the idea that the rebel armies were no more than a poorly armed rabble who would melt before the disciplined ferocity of the veteran Redcoats. The British were shocked at the Battle of Bunker Hill that the rebels were not only willing to stand against musket volleys, artillery fire and bayonet charges but were constantly reinforced by locally recruited militia Rebel sappers and engineers took advantage of any British hesitation to pepper the battlefield with obstacles and fences, often installed while under fire. General James Grant, a senior general on the British side then wrote that the rebel forces had the discipline, subordination, regulation and courage of any army he had faced in years of command—and that the loyalists were deficient in all of those qualities.

The rebels didn’t have to win in the field in order to win the war—a good thing since the British won most the battles. They conquered every American city—Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, New York, Charleston, Savannah but since it was an army of conquest and not occupation they were unable to hold their gains but faced constant armed rebellion even after victory in the field. The rebels, as in any war of national liberation against a distant colonial power won by simply not losing. George Washington showed his strategic brilliance in keeping his army together and generally refusing battle on any but the most favorable terms. The British army was worn down by constant small actions and skirmishes.

The men who lost America, both politicians and generals, were the same men who saved Canada, Gibraltar, Indian and the British Caribbean for the Empire. Charles Cornwallis who surrendered at Yorktown was appointed Governor-General and Commander in Chief of India where he won the Anglo-Mysore wars and pushed through important domestic reforms. Admiral Richard Howe, another subject of the linked biographies in the book, was unable to break the French blockade at Yorktown—the French Navy deployed more, better and heavier gunned ships—but went on to command the Channel Fleet, the most important post in the Navy, and defeated the revolutionary navy and lifted the blockade of Gibraltar by the French and Spanish navies. Andrew O’Shaughnessy notes that opposition politician Charles Fox said that hat the generals had not failed for want of professional skill, bravery or devotion to duty ”but merely from being employed on a service in which it was impossible to succeed”. It is hard not to agree based on this book.

Well written and meticulously researched, O’Shaughnessy has an enviable prose style and remarkable command of the sources. Recommended to those interested in the American Revolutionary war and also for those looking for answers regarding how war of national liberation can be won and lost.

[Stacy · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting take of the American Revolution. Despite knowing the topic, I learned a lot. His strength was the chrono-thematic structure of the book through the eyes of British leaders both political and military. Love the last sentence. I knew it was coming. Even with the ‘loss’ of the American Revolution, no one can argue the world dominance of Great Britain for the 18th and 19th centuries (minimally).

[Chris · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book takes the viewpoint of the British political and military leaders who were the prime decision-makers during the American Revolution. It profiles the following 10 prominent characters who had varying degrees of influence during the course of the war.

1. King George III
2. Lord North, Prime Minister from 1770-1782
3. George Germain, Secretary of State for America in Lord North's Cabinet
4. General William Howe, Commander-in-Chief at the beginning of the war thru 1778
5. Lord Admiral Richard Howe, brother to William and naval commander at the beginning of the war thru 1778
6. General John Burgoyne, commander of the Saratoga Campaign, defeated at Saratoga in September 1777
7. General Henry Clinton
8. General Charles Cornwallis
9. The Earl of Sandwich, First Lord of the Admiralty, 1771-1782
10. Admiral George Rodney

Since this book is not a chronological telling and also assumes some familiarity with the events of the Revolution, I would recommend this to readers who already have a good understanding of the events and players of the Revolutionary War. This is an excellent study of the war from a British perspective. Highly recommended.

[Courtney C. · Rating 5 out of 5]

It’s always good to read history from the “other side.” This book was a series of snapshots of the lives of ten leading British figures at the time, and detailed accounts of their contribution to the war. It might be hard to follow if you are starting at zero knowledge of this time, but if you have some background knowledge it’s an easy nonfiction read.

Bonus: If you’re a fan of the movie The Patriot, Lord Cornwallis’s account is very interesting.

Well done by the author. I will be reading more books by him.

[Stephen · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Men Who Lost America is a rare history of the American Revolution, one which follows not the revolutionaries, but their opponents: the British leadership of the late 18th century. Although largely till a military history, it offers a greater survey of the war than most, covering the European battles for power in the Caribbean and South America.

I requested this volume primarily to learn about British politics at the time of the revolution, since for all the rage fixed on George III, Great Britain was already more ruled by Parliament than executive command. The sovereign, like the prime minister, emerge from the volume not as villains, but as politicians doing their job. While George disapproved of many of the measures being applied against the colonies, once they had revolted he favored a strong response. Parliament, too, was of mixed opinion; many felt a strong response was warranted, others demurred, and a slight minority even favored American independence. Complicating matters for the politicians and the generals was the fact that investing too strongly in one theater meant leaving others ill-defended. Why wage war in America if it put the more profitable island colonies in the Caribbean at risk? The American Revolution, once it brought in France and then her ally Spain, forced Britain to cover a lot of ground with relatively few troops, and the war in America was altogether different from European struggles. Even as men like Clinton and Cornwallis were being tasked with 'winning the hearts and minds' of the colonists, they were also expected to support the defense of the Caribbean. While American histories of the war depict a pitiful few colonists pitched against the Imperial Might of the British Empire, that empire was sorely overtaxed. The result reminds one of modern American adventurism.

The Men Who Lost America was definitely worth the wait for me, despite not delving into British politics as much as I had expected. In focusing on the lives and trials of Cornwallis, Clinton, the Howes, Burgoyne, and others, they become much more interesting characters. Cornwallis, for instance, opposed the various taxes levied against the colonies, as well as the war, but once he was asked to pitch in, he took it as his duty to do his best. Military campaigns considered questionable in hindsight make more sense when we realize that the British generals were also testing the waters of the American people, invading loyalist-held areas to see how many proper subjects would actually come to the defense of the Crown. In short this is a very commendable history of the American Revolution, one which demonstrates how understandable the cause of both sides could be, and offers plenty of room to respect the British leadership -- who, for all their troubles and their ultimate inability to woo back the colonists or conquer them -- kept the Empire afloat in other domains.

[David Eppenstein · Rating 4 out of 5]

I enjoy reading histories and especially histories of our Revolution. Most of these histories are written from the perspective of the Americans as this war is not viewed as particularly noteworthy to the British. Therefore, it is rare to find a history that deals with the the British views and problems they endured during this conpflict. This book is one of those rare volumes that examines the British side and it does this by giving the reader a brief biography of the 9 primary British characters responsible for the loss of the colonies. After the brief background sketch the author then examines the role of each of these 9 individuals and what they were able and not able to do and why. After reading this book I almost felt sorry for the British military leaders involved in our Revolution. Clearly, this war was their Viet Nam, a hopeless quagmire of an unwinable war in which military leaders had their hands tied by politicians 3,000 miles away acting on bad intelligence or no intelligence at all. While the war was unwinable by the British it was still possible that we could have lost if it weren't for the capabilities of our military leaders which offset the ineptitude of our political leaders in the Continental Congress. The Revolution was ours to lose and that was the only way the British could have succeeded. This was a very well written and highly informative history of our Revolution and well worth reading.

[Mark Lawry · Rating 4 out of 5]

Growing up in Boston I had long believed King George III was known for "our great disturbances with our North American colonies (Adam Smith's description of the situation in his The Wealth of Nations, 1776.)" Later in life it was pointed out to me that King George was king for 60 years and the little unfortunate situation south of Canada at some point early in his reign was nothing but an afterthought. This entire book reminded me that the senior leaders of the war had other things going on. Hanging out with mistresses, contemplating their plantations in the Caribbean, sending Cook out to explore Hawaii, etc. To the British the reign of King George III was one of many other things going on.

[Elizabeth S · Rating 5 out of 5]

First and foremost, I think this book is an important one.

As an American, I can easily attest to just how biased lessons on the American Revolution are at all levels of schooling, except perhaps under the very best college professors. On one hand, this makes complete sense; the winners write history, and of course the victorious Americans want to play up their success. No one ever denies that the British were immensely powerful (and not only in terms of their military strength and prowess) and seemed likely to win.

Yet at the same time, it’s rare to hear anyone give true credit to the impressive feats on the British side.

O’Shaughnessy takes a very thorough swing at filling that void.

The breadth of information he brings to the table, along with how readily he acknowledges the many amazing accomplishments of various British leaders, makes The Men Who Lost America a worthwhile and valuable read.

On the flipside, O’Shaughnessy does not elevate his subjects too high. King George III is not simply cast aside as mad, but he is also not subsequently painted as a victim of lofty colonial outrage. While the author gives well-deserved credit to these men, he does not overlook their many shortcomings.

After all, they did lose the war, and there has to be an explanation for that on the British side, too.

I could go on for quite some time about how much I enjoyed reading this book and how pivotal I think it is for anyone with an interest in the American War of Independence, especially for Americans who are almost always presented with one-sided accounts of history. Instead, I will simply say that I highly recommend The Men Who Lost America, and I hope plenty of others will take the opportunity to read it.

[Bob Mayer]

Tells the British side of this stunning defeat for them. It has lessons for the American empire as we're reeling from yet another foreign defeat as an occupying power. It's as important to win the war at home in such a battle as the one abroad. Of course, the British also lost in Afghanistan a while ago.

[Gerard Costello · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is a masterpiece of analytical historical writing. Anyone seeking a good understanding of the American Revolution should read it. The book enilghtened me to the fact that the English, far from being a tyrannical force seeking to crush under heel the rights of man in America, where in fact quite legitimately seeking to put down what they regarded as a criminal rebellion.

The popular notion of Washington, Jefferson and the Continental Congress as the standard bearers of liberty rising in outrage against the evil oppressors of liberty appears farcical when one considers the fact that the British, following their defeat, helped tens of thousands of former black slaves to escape the United States (including slaves who had been the personal property of Jefferson) and helped to set them up as free men in other parts of the Empire.

I also learned a great deal about the geopolitical state of the world in the late 18th century and the specific military, economic and social reasons why the English where unable to win the war in America.

O'Shaughnessy combats the lazy and historically accepted view that Lord North and his Cronies where fools and blunderers who, in their boundless incompetence, lost a great Empire, caused a humiliating defeat and nearly bankrupted the country in doing so. O'Shaughnessy places the conflict in the context of the greater world war which brewed and then exploded while the conflict in America was taking place, and also explains the more complex human reasons why the war went badly: high ranking English officers who disliked eachother, political miscalculations about loyalist support, the drain upon the English military of supporting the many loyalists and runaway slaves who did join them in the fight against the Continentals, the deeply racist character of American colonists who hated the English for using runaway black slaves and Indians to bolster their military muscle.

I should point out that this book is not just a long, dry analysis of the war, politics, economics etc. It is also a brilliant character examination of the men who lost America. The depth of O'Shaughnessy's research is evidenced by the vivid manner in which he fleshes out Lord North, Clinton, Burgogne, Sandwich, Cornwallis, Germaine, Tarelton, the Howe brothers and Rodney (whose rape of St. Eustatius is in my opinion the most beautifully written part of this book, which, while communicating the seriousness of Rodney's crime, does so in a manner that allows the surreal comic nature of the act to be impressed upon the reader).

I feel like my understanding of history, and indeed historiography, has been greatly enhanced with the reading of this great work. I recommend the book to anyone who has the patience to read it and is interested in history or the American Revolution.

[Porter Broyles · Rating 4 out of 5]

"The Men Who Lost America" is an excellent book.

That being said, it is not a book for novices on Revolutionary War history. If you aren't familiar with the events of the war, who partook in what battles, what happened, and what was going on then this book isn't for you. While it is written in such a manner that anybody can learn something from it, I think familiarity with the war will really help people appreciate the book.

This book is not a book about the Revolutionary War, but about 10 key British figures in the war. It tells the story of these 10 men before durign and after the war. There will be times where the author is describing an event. To somebody familiar with American history, the event might be fairly significant, but in this book it might be mentioned in passing. The author is presenting the event from the British perspective or assumes that the reader is familiar with the event. The book also descibes different events as British victories, but other books will list the same event as an American victory---usually this is the case where the British won a military victory, but was a strategic victory for the US. For example, the Battle of Valcour Lake... the British won control of the lake and defeated Benedict Arnold's Mosquito Fleet, BUT Arnold was hailed as a hero because his objective wasn't to defeat the British, but to delay them enough that the freezing of the lake would halt their progress. He succeeded.

In other places, the book talks about the strategy---successes and failures---from the subjects point of view, not from an overarching historical perspective of the evnts or what other participants in the battle or event might be thinking/perceiving. This is ok, because the book does not pretend to be about the war itself (many of the significant battles are mentioned in brief passing assuming that the reader is familiar with the Battle of Saratoga or whatever battle is being talked about.) The book is a collection of short biographies. As long as you keep that in mind, then this book becomes a must read for anybody interested in history. If you are looking for a high level overview or understanding of the Revolutionary War, then this book is not the book for you.

[Jonathon Kycek · Rating 5 out of 5]

Quite understandably, every nation needs its own origin myth, and the country of my birth is no exception. George Washington wintering at Valley Forge, the traitorous Benedict Arnold, and the larger than life "founding fathers" all are all bits and pieces that make up our war of independence from the tyrannical and fiendish British Empire.

Except, like every story, this one has two sides. The Men Who Lost America is a book that attempts to shed light on that "other side." Split up into chapters that delve into the major players in both the British government and military, I easily learned more from this book about who these men were and what the rational was behind their struggle to keep the Empire whole than I had learned in my 37 years in this former colonial land.

Was King George III the Tyrant that our Declaration of Independence portrays him to be? Not really. Was Parliament filled with men who wanted nothing other than to punitively subjugate the colonies? I wasn't seeing it.
Was the United States destined to overthrow their overlords from the start? Surely not like we see through hindsight.

What I read reminded me very much of what we are told about Abraham Lincoln and the North in our civil war with "the rebellious Southern states." Of a King and Parliament who wanted to maintain the unity of the Union. Of military officers who often felt vexed at the prospects of fighting a war they didn't really want to fight. Of a population who felt a kinship with the breakaway rebels and felt a betrayed by their succession.

Certainly the British were not without faults. Petty laws, acts that amounted to war crimes, and an obstinacy that could only lead to war marred what began as their good intentions. But like I said, I already knew that story. I didn't get to know this other side.

I would heartily recommend this book to anyone who has only been presented with the side you learned about in school. The Men Who Lost America to me isn't a book about an enemy. It's a book that details the breakup of what could have stayed a beautiful relationship.

[Robert · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book has an interesting and I think a needed theme, the lives of the men who 'Lost America'. Coming from an American background and education, the names Gentleman Johnny, and Charles 'bag a fox' Cornwallis often mean a serious of generals who were either unable to win the war or gentlemen soldiers who had no business being on the battlefield. As the author points out, the British politicians were anything but incompetents but actually quite accomplished in most cases. The series of short biographies cover the generals, politicians, and admirals associated with the American revolution and remind me, and in some cases taught me while the United States was lost, Britain also won some substantial victories and permanent territory in the war.

I think with many things and especially history, the other side of a conflict is perhaps the most interesting. We know about Alexander the great and his conquest of Persia for instance, but what about the Persian view of Alexander? Or the opinion of the Carthaginians when Rome was conquering them? And here we can see a little more about the British who fought the Americans.

Of course my only complaint is at times the biographies seem a bit short. But this is a forgivable fault as this single volume could never adequately offer a life of so many different people. However it is excellent for a new perspective and look into this period.

[Joshua Horn · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book approaches the American War for Independence from a several unusual angles - both looking at the war from the British perspective and delving in to several lesser known events of the war, some outside of North America. I did find this helpful and enjoyable.

However, I did not like the format of this book. It is done as a series of seperate biographies of British politicians and generals from the time. This means that the book is not in chroniological order - each biography has to cover nearly the entire war to explain what its subject did during that time. This can make it difficult, at times, to get a good sense of the sequence of events. Some sections were also rather dull, as the author seemed to prone to giving listings of character's hobbies or accomplishments. There was also at least one very crude section that was not at all necessary for the flow of the narrative.

[Rodney Harvill · Rating 4 out of 5]

When one’s country is at war with another, it is normal to see the enemy nation and its leaders as villains, and the attitudes of Americans in the Revolutionary War were no exception to this rule. In fact, this view was so strongly held that it colors how the history of that war is written. This book, on the other hand, is an exception in that it portrays the key British leaders as normal human beings and avoids caricature. Their humanity is on full display: their motivations, their strengths and weaknesses, the challenges they faced and how they rose to meet them or fell short. These leaders are:

• George III
• Lord North (Prime Minister over much of the war)
• William Howe and Richard, Lord Howe
• John Burgoyne
• Lord George Germain (Secretary of State for America)
• Sir Henry Clinton
• Charles, Earl Cornwallis
• Sir George Rodney
• Earl of Sandwich (First Lord of the Admiralty)

I will discuss some of these men but first will deal with something that came as a surprise to me, that the British faced severe constraints on their resources during the American Revolution. I remember reading about the shear number of ships involved in the conquest of New York City (1776 by McCullough) and thinking that the British had a strong resource advantage over the Continentals, and that was true to an extent. However, that action represented a concentration of very large portion of Britain’s military might, something that usually did not and could not happen during the remainder of the war. When concentrated, the British army was hard to defeat on the battlefield, but there were never enough troops to occupy and hold hostile territory; many of the American victories represented engagements against detachments of British troops. The Royal Navy was responsible for transporting troops and supplies to America, protecting supply convoys from American privateers and blockading American ports. Furthermore, after the entry of France and Spain into the war, the Royal Navy had to protect other overseas possessions, such as spice islands in the Caribbean and Gibraltar, and maintain a defense against a cross-channel invasion, as well. All these duties stretched it thin.

In past wars, Britain had been able to rely on European allies to draw off some of France and Spain’s attention, but it had to stand alone during the American Revolution. In fact, Dr. O’Shaughnessy argues that Britain was more isolated internationally than it was in World War II right after the fall of France. He also makes the point that Americans have historically vilified George III for the same refusal to quit that we praise in Winston Churchill.

Interestingly enough, many of the British decision-makers thought that the leaders of the American Revolution had simple regime change in mind, a non-representative government with themselves in charge in place of King George and Parliament. This, along with other factors such as the number of people signing loyalty oaths in British-controlled areas, contributed to a belief that the majority of the populace in the colonies supported Britain and would rise up against the revolutionary leaders. What they failed to recognize is that there is a big difference between people willing to sign a loyalty oath to avoid arrest or confiscation of property and people willing to take up arms for the mother country. To win the war, the British needed a large number of loyalists fighting for them, but that never happened. This misperception of the motivations of the American leadership likely contributed to King George’s outburst on hearing that George Washington was resigning his commission and returning to private life once the war was over, “If he does that, he will be the greatest man in the world.”

One leader that particularly fascinated me was the Earl of Sandwich on account of how he managed the demands on the Royal Navy. When he was appointed to that post as the winds of war were brewing in America, he quickly realized it wasn’t ready for a major conflict and set out to prepare for war by doing the following:

• He built up reserves of seasoned timber and other supplies for ship construction and maintenance.
• He had additional dockyard capacity built because the existing dockyards were inadequate to maintain the Royal Navy in peacetime, much less in wartime, when they would need to support new construction and repair of battle damage. When I was in the U.S. Navy as a young adult, I spent four years on a CVN. When I reported aboard, it was in a shipyard. When went on separation leave, it was in a shipyard. Between its two deployments with me as a member of the crew, it spent several months in drydock. Shipyards are important for readiness today, and they were no less important in the days of sail.
• The Royal Navy had a bad habit of holding on to old ships that were no longer seaworthy, tying up dockyard space. He decommissioned these old hulks although it made the Navy look like it was shrinking, at least on paper.
• Anticipating war with France, he requested more funding for the Navy in the early days of the American Revolution because it took several years to build a warship. To field a larger Navy in a war with France, he needed to start building ships then, not after France had declared war. But, Parliament, in its infinite wisdom, refused to provide the additional funding until France and Spain were at war with Britain, and considered it Sandwich’s fault that he couldn’t put more ships in action right then and there. I remember reading that after Pearl Harbor, the loudest voices in Congress asking, “Where is the Navy,” were the same voices that had consistently voted against military spending. Some things never change.

Sandwich was routinely criticized by his contemporaries, but I see a man characterized by foresight and dedication to duty.

As I have gotten older, I increasingly see the importance of understanding both sides in a war. Most books that I have read about the American Revolution are written from the American perspective, and I found it very enlightening to read about it from the British perspective.

[Russ · Rating 4 out of 5]

Really interesting examination of the American Revolution through mini-biographies of the men who led Great Britain during the war. I learned a lot about King George III, Lord North, the Earl of Sandwich, and Generals Howe, Burgoyne, Clinton, and Cornwallis, as well as others and the way they interacted with each other, and how their personal relationships sometimes had a great effect on the war effort. I learned that this was not a super popular war on the British home front, which contributed to the British loss. And O'Shaughnessy recounts numerous decisions that seemed insignificant at the time, but that ultimately played a major role in the outcome of the war. It is long, it can be a little dry at times, but the biographical approach does make it a little more engaging than some histories. I recommend to those interested in the American Revolution.

[Christopher · Rating 3 out of 5]

Primarily a character study on the impactful political and military profiles that worked to keep the American colonies part of the empire during the American Revolution, the first 60-70% of the book is standard fare for most. If you’re familiar with the political intrigues of the early 19th century in the pre-regency era of George III’s reign you won’t find much here new. However the study of some of the military characters is helpful in understanding the breakdown of the British military in the colonies.

The latter part of the book widens the lens and places the revolution as a very small part of a number of ground breaking events across the empire that makes more sense as to why British focus was so splintered.

[Peg Lotvin · Rating 4 out of 5]

OMG Long, dense, hard to read but so very interesting. There are longish essays on each of the most famous generals and admirals who participated in the American Revolution on the British side. The most interesting thing is how much the British generals were at the mercy of politicals at home many thousands and many weeks away from what was happening in the colonies. Also, something I never knew is how much more English, French and Spanish interaction went on in the Caribbean after the fighting was over in America. I see this is part of a series, but I am not tempted to delve any further at the moment.

[Paul Brewer · Rating 4 out of 5]

One of the greatest problems in the writing of history, whether by scholars or by amateurs, is to start from the end and then look back to find out why it happened like that. History-makers don't have that option available to them. A better understanding of 'why did this happen' is reached by working forward rather than working back, because blind alleys that at the time looked promising make more sense.

O'Shaugnessy's book falls just short of the coveted five-star ranking because he doesn't quite pull off the 'history played forward' trick. Nonetheless, it is a masterwork in helping explain why the Americans won independence in 1783, because he tells the story from the perspective of policy makers in London and with the armies and navies on campaign.

The book is structured around prominent individuals in the British war effort, yet maintains a broad chronological direction by allowing each individuals' story to dominate the narrative where their influence was greatest, then summing up their relationship to the rest of the war once their influence begins to wane.. It starts at the top with George III, because it was political choices at the constitutional node of 'the Crown-in-Parliament' that started the war, and ends with the Earl of Sandwich, because by war's end the Royal Navy had managed to recover a global strategic position that in 1779 was looking a ropey proposition -- the Atlantic coastline from the Bay of Fundy to Florida may have been lost, but the British position in the more valuable West Indian and East Indian colonies, plus Gibraltar, the key to the Mediterranean, had been recovered.

Throughout the war, O'Shaughnessy defines the bedrock of British war-making as the idea that most of the Americans rejected the leadership of the hotheads in the Continental Congress. Thus, were the Americans able to express freely their opinions, they would prefer to remain part of the empire. The military forces sent to America were seen as protectors of these Loyalists' interests, eliminating the brutal repression of Loyalist opinion by gangs such as the Sons of Liberty. The problem was that the Loyalists were well aware that whatever happened while the army was around, once it was gone the gangs would creep out of their bolt-holes and resume the politically repressive window-breaking and tarring-and-feathering that had already silenced all but the bravest Loyalists. The real 'sunshine patriots' of the American War of Independence were the Loyalists, who couldn't afford to be impulsive in their declarations of loyalty until victory was certain.

Victory, however, was never certain. The best chance of a partial military victory may have come had the British descended on the Chesapeake in 1776 rather than New York, and pursued the Southern Strategy that they turned to after the Northern one failed at Saratoga. The second-best chance may have been if Burgoyne chosen to withdraw after the Battle of Freeman's Farm in September 1777. It's quite possible that the financial difficulties that were increasingly afflicting the Continental Congress' war effort would have loomed larger in the Continentals' thinking, in the absence of such a decisive victory and the resultant French intervention. O'Shaughnessy explains why the British chose to do what they did at these decisive moments, and in many others. Most importantly he explains why over-stretched naval forces were the main cause of the British surrender at Yorktown, and gives a good summary of the war's continuing until 1783.

There is an extensive academic apparatus of endnotes and bibliography. The prose style avoids being too dry, and there's not much need to review overlapping material as we shift perspective from one leader to another with each successive chapter. (I was forced to set the book aside for about three weeks and it was easy to pick up where I left off.) Recommended for anyone with an interest in the American War of Independence, or anyone looking for a perspective on history from an uncommon point of view.

[Nathan Albright · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book seek to defend the British from the accusation that it was their incompetence that led to the American victory in the American Revolution.  Yet in the author's defense of the British leadership, the reveals some of the major blind spots that made American victory possible, pointing out the divided focus of the British leaders as well as some of their character faults that prevented them from providing inspiring leadership.  By and large the author demonstrates at least basic competence on the part of British political and military leadership but also demonstrates the way that this leadership was hamstrung by internal weaknesses and divisions.  If this is not exactly incompetence, it does demonstrate that the British effort to crush the American Revolution suffered from some major blind spots that prevented them from acting in the right manner, if it was indeed possible for them to avoid the problems of either being too harsh or too soft or oscillating between the two in a way that ensured failure, as indeed happened.  And Britian's failures are certainly the sort that an imperial America would well understand in later conflicts.

This book is a bit more than 350 pages long and is divided into four parts and nine chapters that explore the British war effort from a variety of different perspectives.  The author begins with acknowledgements and an introduction and then moves to discuss the view of the British war effort from London (I), which involved a discussion of George III's role in the American Revolution (1) as well as that of the Prime Minister, Lord North (2), who was loyal to his king but not enthusiastic about the odds of British success.  After that the author discusses those responsible for victory and defeat in the north between 1776 and 1778 (II), namely the Howe Brothers (3), who combined their army and naval authority with a desire to be peace commissioners, as well as the gamester John Burgoyne (4), whose underestimation of the American effort proved disastrous at Saratoga, and also Lord Germain (5), whose efforts at trying to control the war effort came in for a great deal of criticism, besides his criticism for his sexuality.  The author then looks at the two people responsible for the British war effort in the South from 1778 to 1781 (III), namely the scapegoat of British defeat, the cerebral Sir Henry Clinton (6), as well as the dashing and bold but ultimately unsuccessful Charles, Earl Cornwallis (7).  Finally, the author closes with a discussion of those who provided for victory against France and Spain in 1782 (IV), namely Sir George Rodney the impecunious naval hero (8), and the Earl of Sandwich (9), who had a famous rivalry with Germain, it should be noted.

How did the men who lost America lose America?  America was lost in a variety of ways.  It was lost because the British underestimated the passion for American independence that had developed since the French & Indian War.  This led the British to try conciliation and overestimate the amount and strength of loyalist fervor until it was too late for victory.  Likewise, the English political body itself was divided as was the political class, and Britian had failed in their diplomacy to the extent where they alienated all of the other powers and so had no allies when they were attacked by France, Spain, and the Netherlands simultaneously in defense of American independence.  Mistakes like the sacking of St. Eusticius and the inability of the British to ensure naval superiority forced Britain to fight on the defensive.  In the end, it was amazing that Britain did as well as they did, but it was their fault that they ended up where they were, since the colonial troubles with America were due to their attempts to force a change in what had been a lengthy policy of salutary neglect, and their failures in diplomacy gave them a lot of enemies who wanted to see them cut down to size, and that was their fault.

[Megan · Rating 3 out of 5]

I picked this up because I've often wondered what the British side to the American Revolution was. The book tells the story of the British side of the Revolutionary War from the points of views of the major players, such as King George III, Lord North, and General William Howe. Each chapter is written like a wartime biography of each figure.

I enjoyed learning different things in the book, such as that King George III was actually not protective of the power of the monarchy at all (he endorsed the war because he believed Parliament should rule the American colonies and that the loss of America would be disastrous to Britain).

However, I thought the mini-biopic format slowed the pace of the book down. While the sections on some of the more major figures like George III were interesting, sections on people less known to me (such as Henry Clinton) were less so, because I wasn't able to compare the history I was taught to the history I was reading. I also felt that some of the historical facts and vignettes (e.g., Lord Cornwallis's marriage) were less useful to me than more general and theoretical discussions (e.g., the political landscape in Europe at the time of the war). I wished there was more of the latter. I skipped the last few chapters in favor of the Conclusion.

Ultimately, a more straightforward analysis of the war from the British side would have been more compelling for me. A history buff who is already familiar with all the key British players of the Revolution may feel differently.

[Nicki Markus · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Men Who Lost America is a fairly 'stodgy' read in a way, with a combination of small font size and dense prose making it slow going, but it was enjoyable nonetheless. O'Shaughnessy paints compelling portraits of the key players on the British side during the Revolution, considering the reasons behind their choices and suggesting that circumstances and incorrect intelligence, rather than plain incompetence, led to their ultimate defeat. Prior knowledge of the major events of the Revolution is useful in reading this book, as O'Shaughnessy concentrates his attention on the political side of things. However, for American Revolution scholars and devotees, this is an excellent addition to any library, for it offers a very different approach to the subject that is certain to change the way you view the course of the war and the players therein. 4.5 stars

[Shrike58 · Rating 4 out of 5]

Although this collection of biographical sketches does not serve as an introductory history of the late unpleasantness of the 1700s, it does the advertised job of giving the reader an insight into the motivations of the British leadership as they struggled to hold Britain's North American empire together. The main issue that George III and his supporters could never quite comprehend, until it was too late, is that a sea change had occurred in the collective political consciousness of the Thirteen Colonies in the wake of the Seven Years War and that the old lines of authority were untenable. I found the chapters dealing with high-ranking civilian officials such as North, Germaine and Sandwich to be particularly useful, as they found themselves waging an essentially unlimited war with limited resources.

Originally written: October 29, 2019.

[Gabriel Stein · Rating 5 out of 5]

A healthy reminder

It is always easy to assume that history happened because it was bound to happen. In the case of the American Revolutionary War, this is coupled with the myth that the Americans won their independence because their British opponents were incompetent. In fact, as this book shows through a series of portraits of soldiers and politicians, this was far from the case. If anything, this enhances the American victory. And lest we forget, Britain was not comprehensively defeated. It kept Canada, and in other parts of the world it did fight off the Franco-Spanish alliance

[Carl · Rating 5 out of 5]

For someone used to American histories of the American Revolution, this book has a Through the Looking Glass feel about it. The book describes how the British saw the war, told gradually bit-by-bit through interesting mini-biographies of ten of the main British decision makers of the war, the “Men Who Lost America.” (Some of these men, such as King George and Cornwallis are pretty well-known, others are not.)

The British faced a number of problems that are usually not discussed in an American history. Probably the most important was that after the French, Spanish, and the Netherlands joined the war against the British, the war became a global conflict. Besides America, the British had to worry about a Channel invasion, the British Caribbean, Gibraltar, and India. (The author claimed that the last battle of the American Revolution was fought in India!) All these theaters drained troops, ships, and resources from the effort in the colonies.

As for the Channel, I was surprised to learn that in 1779 the comte de Rochambeau commanded an army of 30,000 men ready to invade England. The marquis de Lafayette was one of his aides. (These two men were also present at Yorktown, of course.) Only a storm stopped the invasion.
It was humbling for me to learn that the British considered their possessions in the Caribbean to be more valuable than the 13 colonies. For example, Philadelphia was given up to save St. Lucia.

A big mistake that the British government made was overestimating the Loyalist support in America. The government thought that just a small fraction of the Americans were revolutionaries who wanted to seize power by suppressing all dissent. As the war went on, the British realized that most of the population was more or less against them, and that they could conquer America but would need a much bigger army to occupy it.

After Yorktown, King George and a minority of his ministers wanted to continue the war, but the majority of the Cabinet and Parliament decided to give up on the expensive and fruitless war in America, even though three fourths of the British Army in America was still intact. King George had kept the war going, but he was finally overruled. (I was surprised to learn that many of the top men in the British government were always ambivalent about the war.)

The author seems sympathetic to King George. He describes King George as a pleasant polite gentleman – very well educated and intelligent, fluent in French and German, also a good horseman. When John Adams was the first ambassador to England after the war, he and his wife Abigail became quite fond of King George.

Prime Minister Lord North is always quoted in history books for saying, after learning about Yorktown, “O God, it is all over!”. Lord North was a reluctant prime minister – always asking to resign, but King George wouldn’t let him go. North was a superb parliamentary tactician and speaker, and King George didn’t have anyone to replace him. Lord North was known to be very likable, even to his opponents in Parliament.

Charles, Earl of Cornwallis, disapproved of the British policies that triggered the Revolution. In 1765, he was one of six members of the House of Lords who voted against the Stamp Act. However, he was a professional soldier who loved the army and did his job. He was in command at the Yorktown disaster, but was not disgraced. The author of the book says that Yorktown was an accident waiting to happen. The British Navy was too overstretched to prevent Cornwallis’s army from being cut off – there were three or four other instances where the same thing almost happened. After the war, Cornwallis had a quite successful career. The author called him an “Imperial Troubleshooter”, in Ireland and India.

Another general in the author’s list was John Burgoyne, whose army was defeated at the critical battle at Saratoga. Burgoyne was a successful playwright after the war.

The two Howe brothers are included in the list of the ten men who lost America. During a good deal of the war, one was the top general in America, the other was the top admiral. Before the war, Admiral Howe had met with Benjamin Franklin in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent the war.

The First Lord of the Admiralty during the American Revolution is well-known (in a way). John Montagu, 4th Earl of Sandwich, is remembered for his habit of snacking on a chunk of meat between two slices of bread while working or gambling. The Earl was much criticized during the war for not providing enough war ships, but the author says he actually did a good job. It took five or six years to build a large ship – you just couldn’t snap your fingers and get one. Sandwich’s work really only bore fruit in battles after the American Revolution.

The author includes Sir George Rodney in the list of his ten men who lost America (I never heard of him). Rodney seems to have contributed to the defeat at Yorktown, but made up for it by a big victory in the Caribbean after Yorktown. By then the war in the colonies had pretty well wound down.

The author also included Sir Henry Clinton and Lord George Germain in his list of the men who lost America, but did not include Lord High Chancellor Alexander Wedderburn. I wonder if Alexander Wedderburn should have been included. He was the man who humiliated Benjamin Franklin in the Cockpit in 1774, and completed his transformation into a powerful rebel.

Finally, the author makes it clear that he does not regard the ten men who lost America as incompetent. They lost America, but they kept Canada, India, Gibraltar, and the British Caribbean.

[Arthur · Rating 5 out of 5]

Thorough and Lucid Analysis, Very Readable

This conflict could have gone either way. After Yorktown both sides were like boxers still on their feet in the last round and capable of delivering a knock out punch. The men who lost America were politicians, soldiers, and sailors; some of them filling two roles at the same time. While there is some overlap, the author deftly keeps it from distracting the reader. The conclusions are solidly based on research and well-drawn. Regardless of their views, readers on both sides of the Atlantic will find this book valuable.