This is an indispensable addition to the now well-seasoned field of nationalism studies, arguably a a classic in its own right - up there with Gellner and Anderson's works on the same subject.
A quick note - I will, for these purposes, use the terms nationalism, nationhood and nations/nationality interchangeably, except where a distinction may be useful.
Billig's central thesis, as well summarised by other reviewers, is that nationalism (by which we mean the belief in the existence of "nations" and their place as the central legitimising force of state formation and power) is so taken-for-granted and everyday that it largely goes unremarked in contemporary society. Indeed, any quick assessment of this argument seems to prove it true - in contemporary discourse "the nation", and with it nationalism, are made to be appear natural and universal. Certainly Billig is correct in drawing attention to the false dichotomisation (still too common) between "nationalism" and "patriotism", in which the former is attributed to elements of the far-right and the latter portrayed as a more noble trait, despite the fact that both actually operate within the context of (and reproduce) the nation-state model. As another reviewer notes, Banal introduces a typology to distinguish between "banal" manifestations of nationalism and "hot" nationalism (p.43), only the latter of which tend to most often be called nationalism in common discourse and refers to active movements seeking the establishment of new nation-states.
Today, indeed, nationhood has been 'established as the universal form of sovereignty' (p.22) - at once both a inwardly-focused yet paradoxically universal ideology (p.22) that imagines the world as neatly divided into particular, territorially bounded, entities called nations - a 'cleansed vision of proper peoples in their proper places' (p.78).
Banal nationalism is for Billig the 'ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced' (p.6). He rejects the idea of nationalism as primordial (p.7), arguing instead that the 'aura of nationhood always operates within contexts of power' (p.4). As such:
'...in the established nations, there is a continual 'flagging', or reminding, of nationhood [...] nationhood provides a continual background for their political discourses, for cultural products, and even for the structuring of newspapers. In so many little ways, the citizenry are daily reminded of their national place in a world of nations. However, this reminding is so familiar, so continual, that it is not consciously registered as reminding' (p.8).
He stresses, however, that banality does not mean harmless and, in the case of many nation-states, it reproduces institutions that possess vast armaments (p.7). In this sense, and in line perhaps with a poststructuralist approach, nationalism both reflects and consolidates existing relations of power. Billig contends as much that the 'battle for nationhood is a battle for hegemony, by which a part claims to speak for the whole nation and to represent the national essence' (p.27). Even postcolonial states witnessed this process by which 'one section of the territory [...] [imposes it hegemony over the rest' (p.85). Any survey of the historically-specific origin of nationalist ideology - such as that offered by Gellner, Anderson, Hobsbawm, or Smith - would support these contentions.
Billig further rejects attempts to understand or explain nationalism through concepts that 'do not stand outside the topic' itself, such as language or the idea of "nations" (p.15, 29). Further, he adequately critiques the tendency of social scientists to unreflectively reiterate the norms of nationalism.
So, questions arise - if nationalism is dependant on 'collective amnesia' for its continued existence (p.38), how exactly does Billig envision this process functioning? And how is it perpetuated in societies? Billig accepts that the 'ordinary events' that overtly flag nationhood (nationalised sports events, ceremonies of remembrance, etc.) are not necessary sufficient by themselves to 'sustain a continuingly remembered national identity' (p.46).
Rather, banal manifestations of nationalism (the unwaving flag hanging from a public building, for example) and the assumptions they embody 'have to be flagged discursively' (p.93). That is, he explains, 'routinely familiar habits of language [...] continually [act] as reminders of nationhood' (p.93). This is demonstrated in the ways in which nation-states are commonly referred to as 'home' or the 'homeland' in media discourse, the empty ways in which politicians appeal to 'the people', etc. In this way, citizens - in spite of most never choosing the nation into which they were born or live - unmindfully (though not unconsciously) reproduce themselves as the aforementioned people simply by adhering to the 'habitual routines' of banal nationalism (p.95). There is, perhaps, something more sinister going on at the elite level - something taken up more forcefully by Hroch and Mann in their respective examinations of the spread of nationalisms. Indeed, Billig warns in his conclusion, 'national identities are rooted within a powerful social structure, which reproduced hegemonic relations of inequity' (p.175).
After the opening chapters, which embellish this theory, the book is then largely taken up by an analysis of British newspapers, which largely supports these arguments.
Another interesting and timely section is the time dedicated later in the study to the so-called "postmodern" thesis, which imagines the world of nation-states receding and being replaced by some kind of internationalised world order. Yet, Billig rejects the premise of this thesis - as his own study shows, the habits of nationalist thinking persist (p.139). It is indeed a myth to believe all nation-states operate with the freedom to act 'independently of a superior power' (p.141), but even in multinational organisations (such as the EU) that are commonly blamed for eroding national identities actually 'perpetuate the notion of nationhood' (p.141).
To be sure, there are faults with the book. Not only is it quite old now, but it sometimes needs greater elaboration. A deeper application of Gramsician theory on hegemony may have complemented the arguments alluded to above. And there is a want of appropriate anthropological evidence to back up his portrayal of medieval peasantry as narrow-minded and (implicitly, naturally) hostile to outsiders (p.79). Further, he perhaps misses slightly in his assertion that 'nationalism [...] has been produced by the age of the modern nation-state' (p.9). While I accept the two have emerged almost simultaneously, scholars like Anthony Smith might argue the inverse is actually true (the idea of 'nations' preceded the 'nation-state'). Additionally, he wrongfully suggests US involvement in Korea, Vietnam, Panama, etc. was nationalist - though I can accept the notion that the US's role was portrayed in nationalistic terms.
This is, nevertheless, essential reading for any student of nationalism or the social sciences more generally.