Popular author Tom Clancy, well known for his techno-filled espionage super-thriller novels has been able to impart on his readers a certain air of plausibility through the extremely tight plots and concise attention to technical detail his fiction novels portray. Over the years, Clancy has capitalized on this trust by publishing a series of nonfiction ‘Guided Tour’ books that describe how military units and certain systems operate, giving the reader a very detailed and highly glamorized view of American war-fighting capabilities.
Into the Storm: A Study in Command , co-authored by Ret. General Fred Franks Jr., purports to be a ‘study in command,’ part one of a four-part series designed to give the reader a broader view of how military leaders grow and learn. For those that may not know, General Franks, VII Corps Commander in Operation Desert Storm, became embroiled in controversy for his conduct during and after the war. Franks was accused by critics of not moving aggressively enough toward his—and the entire ground campaign’s—key objective: destroying the Iraqi Republican Guard. Theater commander, Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, had identified the Republican Guard as the most important operational center of gravity—the nexus of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s power. He assigned Franks’ VII Corps the task of destroying the Republican Guard—the famed left hook maneuver—while the Marines on his right flank fixed the regular units in place in Kuwait, and the XVIII Airborne Corps on Franks’ left to cut off any retreating forces. Franks’ corps failed to accomplish this mission, and much has been written about it since.
Into the Storm is Franks’ attempt at exoneration. One of his harshest critics was General Schwarzkopf, who blamed Franks’ slowness and indecisiveness for the failure. Franks seems to be using Clancy’s book to fire back at Schwarzkopf whose memoir, It Doesn’t Take a Hero , recounts the accusations. Clancy is either completely unaware of all this taking place by getting lost in the details and artistry of large-scale maneuver land battle doctrine, or has allowed Franks a platform in which to return fire through a highly detailed narrative written by Franks in the final three hundred pages of the book.
Ultimately, for the studied military historian, Franks’ battle against the Republican Guard looked much like the battle of Antietam; the enemy conceded the field losing the tactical battle, but the victor missed the larger opportunity. Antietam helped accomplish several political goals, but it could have shortened the Civil War by many years. Similarly, destruction of the Republican Guard might have accomplished the coalition’s second-order goal, the overthrow of Hussein’s regime. Schwarzkopf stood in relation to Franks as much as Abraham Lincoln stood in relation to Union General McClellan—prodding and cajoling him into action. History does indeed repeat itself. Both cases provide a valuable lesson; when commanders focus more on what damage an enemy can inflict on them than the damage they can inflict on the enemy, they will not win. General Franks certainly did not lose his fight, but just as certain did not win it either. All of Clancy’s writing skill and Franks’ exculpatory detail cannot hide that fact.