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Moon Lander: How We Developed the Apollo Lunar Module
Chief engineer Thomas J. Kelly gives a firsthand account of designing, building, testing, and flying the Apollo lunar module. It was, he writes, "an aerospace engineer's dream job of the century." Kelly's account begins with the imaginative process of sketching solutions to a host of technical challenges with an emphasis on safety, reliability, and maintainability. He catalogs numerous test failures, including propulsion-system leaks, ascent-engine instability, stress corrosion of the aluminum alloy parts, and battery problems, as well as their fixes under the ever-present constraints of budget and schedule. He also recaptures the exhilaration of hearing Apollo 11's Neil Armstrong report that "The Eagle has landed," and the pride of having inadvertently provided a vital "lifeboat" for the crew of the disabled Apollo 13.
288 pages, Hardcover
First published March 17, 2001
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 39 reviews
April 17, 2014
One of my favorite episodes of the Tom Hanks mini-series, "From the Earth to the Moon," is the one that featured the crew at Grumman Corp. who designed and built the lunar landers. The episode is called "Spider," the name of the first manned Lunar Module (LM) to fly in space. I knew it was a dramatization, of course, but it was such a cool story that when I saw that Tom Kelly had written a book about his LM experience, I wanted to see how close the dramatization was to the truth.
Tom Kelly was one of the engineering leaders of the LM project from the start, and his character was particularly well written in "Spider," especially as the understated narrator. The bad news for lovers of the show is that not much of it appears to be accurate, which I kind of expected but was still a little disappointed to learn. Also, this isn't a stellar piece of writing (or ghost writing, as the case may be). It's a bit of a slog, with a great deal of engineering jargon that was over my head.
Still, I'm glad I read it. Kelly appears to be giving the warts-and-all account without sparing himself from the harsh criticism that NASA often leveled at Grumman for its many failures. It was a brutal process of learning to design, build, test, and refine this singular machine that absolutely had to work.
I don't know if today we can understand the kind of pressure these NASA contractors and sub-contractors were under to deliver something so complex, within Kennedy's wildly optimistic deadline, while so many millions of people around the world watched closely to see if the U.S. or the Soviet Union would prevail. Kelly gives us a glimpse of what this kind of pressure does to people. The pressure claimed casualties, yes, but it also molded the Grumman team into a family that overcame enormous odds and succeeded brilliantly.
Tom Kelly was one of the engineering leaders of the LM project from the start, and his character was particularly well written in "Spider," especially as the understated narrator. The bad news for lovers of the show is that not much of it appears to be accurate, which I kind of expected but was still a little disappointed to learn. Also, this isn't a stellar piece of writing (or ghost writing, as the case may be). It's a bit of a slog, with a great deal of engineering jargon that was over my head.
Still, I'm glad I read it. Kelly appears to be giving the warts-and-all account without sparing himself from the harsh criticism that NASA often leveled at Grumman for its many failures. It was a brutal process of learning to design, build, test, and refine this singular machine that absolutely had to work.
I don't know if today we can understand the kind of pressure these NASA contractors and sub-contractors were under to deliver something so complex, within Kennedy's wildly optimistic deadline, while so many millions of people around the world watched closely to see if the U.S. or the Soviet Union would prevail. Kelly gives us a glimpse of what this kind of pressure does to people. The pressure claimed casualties, yes, but it also molded the Grumman team into a family that overcame enormous odds and succeeded brilliantly.
October 24, 2012
A fascinating book. Being in the aviation safety business, the discussion of the Apollo 1 fire really hit home. Kelly wrote "if we were so obtuse about fire, how many other serious hazards had also escaped our faulty vision?" Still good words to consider 50 years on. Another interesting thing about this engineering story is that the potential show stoppers were just as likely to be related to project management as they were to be linked to engineering. Effective management was as important as brilliant engineering when it came to success in the Apollo program. I recommend this book to anyone interested in the space program, engineering history, and lessons in project management.
July 31, 2021
Fascinating story of some of the engineering and manufacturing work behind the moon landings. I think that this work is more interesting than the astronauts and moon landings themselves, though it is commonly overlooked because of its technical nature. Kelly brings it to life.
> sometimes I was there alone and could let my imagination fly ahead to the day when that very LM, that very square foot of cabin flooring where I was standing, would descend to the Moon’s alien surface in the final test of all our efforts and dreams. How I wished to be a stowaway in that tiny cabin! It was as close as I ever got to the Moon, but in my mind it was vivid and thrilling nonetheless.
> Soon after it was received at KSC, LM-1 was found to have widespread leakage in the propulsion and RCS systems. The people at Cape Kennedy quickly characterized Grumman’s first flight-worthy spacecraft that we had proudly, if tardily, shipped as a “piece of junk that leaked like a sieve.”
> Gentlemen, we have a serious problem. The problem is that Grumman believes the MIT guidance system is two orders of magnitude inferior to other available systems, and that the Apollo program is being jeopardized by this choice … Dave Hoag gave MIT’s rebuttal. Starting with Grumman’s number, 894 failures per million hours, he patiently showed how that number dropped as each incorrectly included or omitted set of data was corrected. … “Well,” he said, “I think this meeting has accomplished its purpose. Joe Gavin, is there any doubt in your mind that your people were wrong?” “None whatsoever. I’m sorry we gave everyone so much trouble.” Gavin was ashen-faced. MIT had blown Grumman’s analysis out the water, showing that we had not dug deeply enough to properly understand and interpret the GE reliability data. We left the meeting with our heads hung low, figuratively beating our breasts. This incident had a lasting negative effect on Grumman’s reputation on the Apollo program, and for a time it did not do my own personal reputation any good, either. Shea and others saw Grumman as a loose cannon meddling outside its jurisdiction—definitely not team players. They thought we could not be trusted and were particularly upset by what they saw as Grumman’s “holier-than-thou” attitude, ready to point an accusatory finger at the alleged transgressions of others. For years afterward we endured strained relations with MIT; not until we were jointly supporting flight missions with them did feelings improve. This incident reinforced NASA’s growing belief that Grumman required close oversight and constant detailed direction.
> in accordance with NASA’s thorough requirements, I observed a simple OCP to proof test the overhead crane before we entrusted it with the precious spacecraft. How rigid, by-the-numbers NASA is, I thought, insisting that we do this silly proof test when we know the overhead crane is routinely checked every six months. Fortunately I kept this thought to myself, so when the six-ton dead weight slowly slid back to the floor as the crane was trying to hoist it I did not have to explain to anyone. The crane was repaired and the proof test repeated—twice—and I silently praised NASA for its caution.
> NASA had posed a very broad requirement for reliability: each Apollo mission must provide .999 probability of crew safety (one in one thousand chance of fatality) and .99 probability of mission success (one in one hundred chance of aborting the mission). These overall probabilities had been apportioned by NASA to the individual elements making up the total mission, including the LM. We in turn had apportioned our total unreliability allowance (=1—p) among each of the LM systems and subsystems, resulting in allowable failure probabilities of one in ten thousand or less for each system. From a designer’s point of view these probabilities were not much help. In practical terms they could not be demonstrated because the allowable failure rates were so low that to prove them would require hundreds or even thousands of repetitive tests. Analyses, however, could be used to show relative failure rates of alternative system designs. The absolute value of such analyses was always suspect, but they would indicate the extent to which component redundancy or other system configuration changes would improve overall system reliability.
> After we had installed the instruments in three cockpits, a clever NASA inspector at Bethpage devised a new technique that was simple but effective in disclosing dirt particles trapped within the sealed case. He simply held the instrument on the workbench, glass face down, and shook and tapped it gently. Then, retaining the glass-down orientation, he lifted it up over his head and looked for dirt particles on the inside surface of the glass. If any at all were visible, the instrument had to be returned to its supplier to have the case opened, cleaned, and resealed. This improved inspection technique had never been thought of before, either by the instrument manufacturers or ourselves, and almost none of the instruments that had been delivered could pass it. For the manned flight spacecraft the new test was mandatory, so for LM-3, the cockpit of which was almost complete, we had to remove and replace all the instruments.
> sometimes I was there alone and could let my imagination fly ahead to the day when that very LM, that very square foot of cabin flooring where I was standing, would descend to the Moon’s alien surface in the final test of all our efforts and dreams. How I wished to be a stowaway in that tiny cabin! It was as close as I ever got to the Moon, but in my mind it was vivid and thrilling nonetheless.
> Soon after it was received at KSC, LM-1 was found to have widespread leakage in the propulsion and RCS systems. The people at Cape Kennedy quickly characterized Grumman’s first flight-worthy spacecraft that we had proudly, if tardily, shipped as a “piece of junk that leaked like a sieve.”
> Gentlemen, we have a serious problem. The problem is that Grumman believes the MIT guidance system is two orders of magnitude inferior to other available systems, and that the Apollo program is being jeopardized by this choice … Dave Hoag gave MIT’s rebuttal. Starting with Grumman’s number, 894 failures per million hours, he patiently showed how that number dropped as each incorrectly included or omitted set of data was corrected. … “Well,” he said, “I think this meeting has accomplished its purpose. Joe Gavin, is there any doubt in your mind that your people were wrong?” “None whatsoever. I’m sorry we gave everyone so much trouble.” Gavin was ashen-faced. MIT had blown Grumman’s analysis out the water, showing that we had not dug deeply enough to properly understand and interpret the GE reliability data. We left the meeting with our heads hung low, figuratively beating our breasts. This incident had a lasting negative effect on Grumman’s reputation on the Apollo program, and for a time it did not do my own personal reputation any good, either. Shea and others saw Grumman as a loose cannon meddling outside its jurisdiction—definitely not team players. They thought we could not be trusted and were particularly upset by what they saw as Grumman’s “holier-than-thou” attitude, ready to point an accusatory finger at the alleged transgressions of others. For years afterward we endured strained relations with MIT; not until we were jointly supporting flight missions with them did feelings improve. This incident reinforced NASA’s growing belief that Grumman required close oversight and constant detailed direction.
> in accordance with NASA’s thorough requirements, I observed a simple OCP to proof test the overhead crane before we entrusted it with the precious spacecraft. How rigid, by-the-numbers NASA is, I thought, insisting that we do this silly proof test when we know the overhead crane is routinely checked every six months. Fortunately I kept this thought to myself, so when the six-ton dead weight slowly slid back to the floor as the crane was trying to hoist it I did not have to explain to anyone. The crane was repaired and the proof test repeated—twice—and I silently praised NASA for its caution.
> NASA had posed a very broad requirement for reliability: each Apollo mission must provide .999 probability of crew safety (one in one thousand chance of fatality) and .99 probability of mission success (one in one hundred chance of aborting the mission). These overall probabilities had been apportioned by NASA to the individual elements making up the total mission, including the LM. We in turn had apportioned our total unreliability allowance (=1—p) among each of the LM systems and subsystems, resulting in allowable failure probabilities of one in ten thousand or less for each system. From a designer’s point of view these probabilities were not much help. In practical terms they could not be demonstrated because the allowable failure rates were so low that to prove them would require hundreds or even thousands of repetitive tests. Analyses, however, could be used to show relative failure rates of alternative system designs. The absolute value of such analyses was always suspect, but they would indicate the extent to which component redundancy or other system configuration changes would improve overall system reliability.
> After we had installed the instruments in three cockpits, a clever NASA inspector at Bethpage devised a new technique that was simple but effective in disclosing dirt particles trapped within the sealed case. He simply held the instrument on the workbench, glass face down, and shook and tapped it gently. Then, retaining the glass-down orientation, he lifted it up over his head and looked for dirt particles on the inside surface of the glass. If any at all were visible, the instrument had to be returned to its supplier to have the case opened, cleaned, and resealed. This improved inspection technique had never been thought of before, either by the instrument manufacturers or ourselves, and almost none of the instruments that had been delivered could pass it. For the manned flight spacecraft the new test was mandatory, so for LM-3, the cockpit of which was almost complete, we had to remove and replace all the instruments.
July 31, 2011
A must read book for moon enuthiasts, engineers and project managers. Not for Apollo 11 "hoax" loonies; enough technical detail and history to shut down any "skeptic" - you can't make this detail and or fake the dedication of Kelly and the thousands of engineers, designers and tradesmen who made the moon landing possible.
This is not only the fascinating story about the greatest technological challenge of the 20th century, but also an amazing text for all project managers, customer managers and engineers. It not only demomstrates rigorous engineering practice when it counts most, but also how how important the softer skills of communicating and satisfying your client are. I particularly like how Kelly learnt his lesson about what is technically possible has to weighed up against the practicalities of constructing and delivering on time.
However there are a few negatives - Kelly is an engieer and report writer primarily , not a popular science or scholar. The writing is technical and litter with too many acronyms, many which aren't explained in the surrounding text - the glossary section at the front was well thumbed by the time I finished. The pictures aren't always near the relevant text and I really could have used a few more showing the complete lander unextended and stowed. Worst was the foot noting and referencing -
many of the "references" would have made great foot note annecdotes on the page of text, instead of having to flip to the end of the book to check on.
This is not only the fascinating story about the greatest technological challenge of the 20th century, but also an amazing text for all project managers, customer managers and engineers. It not only demomstrates rigorous engineering practice when it counts most, but also how how important the softer skills of communicating and satisfying your client are. I particularly like how Kelly learnt his lesson about what is technically possible has to weighed up against the practicalities of constructing and delivering on time.
However there are a few negatives - Kelly is an engieer and report writer primarily , not a popular science or scholar. The writing is technical and litter with too many acronyms, many which aren't explained in the surrounding text - the glossary section at the front was well thumbed by the time I finished. The pictures aren't always near the relevant text and I really could have used a few more showing the complete lander unextended and stowed. Worst was the foot noting and referencing -
many of the "references" would have made great foot note annecdotes on the page of text, instead of having to flip to the end of the book to check on.
July 10, 2012
Being in the space program and having met some of the players of the Apollo era, it's always good to read a book and say, "yes, that's very accurate". This was one of those books.
At a time when engineering excellence and competence was meeting the needs of a national priority, it's hard not to envy the drive and dedication of those working on something as HARD as the Apollo Moon Lander. Kelly gives you the straight talk with a minimum of cover your butt. Anyone who wants to engineer great things should read this.
At a time when engineering excellence and competence was meeting the needs of a national priority, it's hard not to envy the drive and dedication of those working on something as HARD as the Apollo Moon Lander. Kelly gives you the straight talk with a minimum of cover your butt. Anyone who wants to engineer great things should read this.
August 4, 2019
Who knew that the detergent you used to clean the cloths mattered when you wiped down the weld in a titanium tank?
Or that removing contaminants would weaken a propellant tank?
Not me but I do now after reading this book.
I think the Apollo program was the greatest engineering feat in human history.
I've been reading a bunch of books in honor of the 50th anniversary of the first moon landing.
There was a little too much about org charts in this book, but enough actual engineering stories to compensate.
The lunar module is my favorite real spacecraft and I'm glad I read this book.
Or that removing contaminants would weaken a propellant tank?
Not me but I do now after reading this book.
I think the Apollo program was the greatest engineering feat in human history.
I've been reading a bunch of books in honor of the 50th anniversary of the first moon landing.
There was a little too much about org charts in this book, but enough actual engineering stories to compensate.
The lunar module is my favorite real spacecraft and I'm glad I read this book.
August 23, 2014
Overall I liked this book. What surprised me was that the dynamics of the organizations played just as much a role in this book as the technical aspects of the development. At times the writing was kind of bland and a bit boring but was never unbearable and I did enjoy learning about how the lunar module went from being little more than a hopeful proposal to a physical reality that achieved the moon landings.
November 26, 2024
While the information within on the development of the Apollo lunar module is certainly interesting, this book often gets bogged down in dry details on things like management practices, which can make some parts a chore to get through.
May 14, 2019
More about the organizational and management struggles than design and technical details.
July 26, 2022
It was just okay. Lots of technical facts an timelines that most will find boring I’m guessing. Was more interesting towards the end when it got more into space travel and the missions flown.
December 15, 2017
I have read just about everything there is to read about Apollo and the political socioeconomic era in which that project emerged ... and this is the book that has most inspired me. The company and the factories and engineers that designed and built the series of Apollo Lunar Landers became all very real and alive in my imagination .. this could be replicated! I felt I really wanted to be in those factories and part of the teams actually making hardware that would fly to the Moon, land and return.
Strip away the giant number of 700,000 people involved in the Apollo programme and focus just on the lander ... a single highly-motivated company can build the lander, even better a small special team within an already highly motivated and successful company can make great strides towards a workable design that can become a reliable work horse as the Moon is fully scientifically explored and surveyed. Investigating what can be done with modern materials, tooling, CAD and electronics is an exciting prospect.
Strip away the giant number of 700,000 people involved in the Apollo programme and focus just on the lander ... a single highly-motivated company can build the lander, even better a small special team within an already highly motivated and successful company can make great strides towards a workable design that can become a reliable work horse as the Moon is fully scientifically explored and surveyed. Investigating what can be done with modern materials, tooling, CAD and electronics is an exciting prospect.
January 20, 2018
A fascinating read if you are interested in space history, engineering, or even just project management. If you're familiar with the history of the design and production of the LM, you know that Grumman and NASA had to do the impossible with this project. Nothing had even landed on the moon or even photographed it well when the team began conceiving this machine, let alone designing it. It's no surprise that the design and construction process was stressful and took longer than anyone thought it would. Tom Kelly is the "father of the LM" and provides an excellent account of his creation. The story reads like a suspense novel in that with every challenge there is at least one setback, and you think "How are they going to get out of THIS one?" and want to keep reading.
March 23, 2017
The Apollo program was the most complex undertaking in the history of mankind. Moon Lander is the story of the development of the Lunar Module told by its chief engineer, Tom Kelly. The book is fascinating in its detail and stories surrounding the enormous endeavor to build a vehicle to safely land astronauts on the moon and bring them back. The book covers not only the technical challenges of building the LM, but also the managerial challenges of organizing the effort. It concludes with a superb overview of all of the Apollo flights. This book is a must read for any space exploration enthusiast.
September 2, 2019
Excellent engineering history
Rarely do you get a history that integrates history with the engineer’s view. It shows both the engineering problems/solutions as well as the overall goals the people worked toward.
The one fault in the scope of the book is that it follows Tom’s perspective. He’s one man, and he couldn’t possible experience everything. There’s no discussion of the Lunar Lander Descent Engine from TRW - a VERY complex piece of engineering.
This is still THE definitive LEM book, but no book can be perfect.
Rarely do you get a history that integrates history with the engineer’s view. It shows both the engineering problems/solutions as well as the overall goals the people worked toward.
The one fault in the scope of the book is that it follows Tom’s perspective. He’s one man, and he couldn’t possible experience everything. There’s no discussion of the Lunar Lander Descent Engine from TRW - a VERY complex piece of engineering.
This is still THE definitive LEM book, but no book can be perfect.
November 19, 2019
I really enjoyed this book, despite struggling at times with the technical descriptions and engineering concepts due to having no prior exposure to this side of things. Kelly as a narrator deftly weaves an underdog story of a young, small company (Grumman) coming together, growing, changing and eventually triumphing in creating that object which had never before in human history been realised - a vessel designed to take man to the surface of our moon, and return him safely to Earth.
June 24, 2020
There are several books on Apollo Mission, most of them describe the overview for non-geeks. But this book is very focused on the author perspective, which is the Apollo Lunar Module, the technological core of the moon landing. With some background knowledge and geeky interest required, it is difficult to be recommended for general readers. Yet, it is very well described and informative. This is the best book I have read about the historical mission to the moon.
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May 26, 2020One of the most fun books I have read in a longtime. The impossibility of the moon landing is conveyed on about every page of this book. Yet the thousands of individuals that worked to achieve President Kennedy's challenge answered everyone of these challenges and achieved the greatest engineering feat until recorded time.
December 13, 2024
I really enjoyed this book and the epilogue provided a pretty fascinating summary regarding the impact of Apollo on our world today. This being said, I rated 3 stars because it’s not a flashy or riveting read. It’s a straightforward look into what it took technically and organizationally to create and build the lunar module.
February 10, 2025
In depth and enlightening glimpse into the struggles and triumphs of the LM program. Particularly interesting to see the (often rocky) relationship between NASA and Grumman. Really enjoyed the chapters explaining individual road blocks and the engineering solutions to overcome them. Might be a bit too technical/dry for a casual reader.
December 21, 2018
An excellent history of the design and building of the Lunar Module specifically, and of the development of engineering projects in general. A fine book, but one probably best suited for those who already have a substantial familiarity with the Apollo project.
January 15, 2020
Great book
Awesome book about the tenacity and dedication it took to journey to the moon, written by a person who was directly responsible for that successful and courageous endeavor
Awesome book about the tenacity and dedication it took to journey to the moon, written by a person who was directly responsible for that successful and courageous endeavor
December 2, 2022
Non avrei mai pensato che le storie di - grossi - cazzi di sviluppo prodotto, come nel caso del LM, potessero essere raccontate in maniera tanto epica.
Ne farò tesoro anche nella mia meno ambiziosa attività professionale.
Ne farò tesoro anche nella mia meno ambiziosa attività professionale.
January 23, 2023
It took me a long time to read this book, as it is full of details on engineering problems, project management history. But, told with a great count of details, this book is a must read for all fans of spacecraft engineering, problem solving and space program history.
October 2, 2019
Great insight, fascinating detail, albeit a bit dry and technical
May 21, 2022
Non Nonsense review
No nonsense story told by one who lead the teams that built the Lunar Module. Great information that adds to the Apollo lunar mission history.
No nonsense story told by one who lead the teams that built the Lunar Module. Great information that adds to the Apollo lunar mission history.
July 26, 2024
If you want to know how the lander was built, from soup to nuts, this is the book for i
July 14, 2025
An interesting and informative book, but can be difficult to follow due to the overly technical engineering jargon.
August 23, 2025
As a propulsion engineer who has touched some modern lunar landers, this was a really fun read.
February 27, 2016
Set in the 60s and early 70s, Grumman Corporation managing engineer Thomas Kelly brings to life the profound, often painful, but enormously rewarding challenge of designing and building the world's first true spacecraft: the Apollo lunar lander. The author refers the reader to some extent to my next favorite history of the lunar program: Chariots for Apollo, for further details. The machine itself proved itself on all six landings and as a lifeboat that got its voyagers safely home from the crippled Apollo 13 mission. Astronauts reported the lunar module handled like a sports car or fighter aircraft. This from the same Grumman that made the ubiquitous U.S. Postal Service mail delivery vehicles that replaced its familiar Jeep fleet. Kelly gives insight into the pressures - time, politics, technology - that all Grummanites (or Grummies, if you prefer) faced daily over years on end when success seemed not only distant, but dogged by a continual laundry list of problems entailing uncertain risks that hovered overhead like the sword of Damocles, ready to cut short the human hubris of reaching orbital heights. Kelly suffered many personal losses along the way, and talks of his family often, strained for attention in the same way we now know many astronauts themselves could not bear. He also humanly bares his wonder at being chosen for the engineering task of the century, and coming through in such a way that he felt, in palpable terms, he was riding along on the astronauts' shoulders across the lunar plains, mounts, and craters. In this way, Kelly is the atypical engineer, able to help create a hot rod vehicle and relate awestruck beauty at where it took all mankind.
May 9, 2013
Tom Kelly writes the end-to-end story of Grumman's titanic struggle to develop the spindly-legged fragile tin can that went seven times to the Moon, landing and lifting off six times and once serving as a lifeboat, all with utmost reliability. His time as project leader, meeting over and over again challenges that nobody knew existed before they arose, must be seen as heroic. At the same time, Kelly is brutally honest, with himself and his employer as the facts required, which only polishes the truth of his tale to brilliance.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 39 reviews